Category The Chinese Air Force

As previously mentioned, the Shenyang Aircraft Factory refused Soviet assistance on the J-6A and set out to manufacture the required tooling domes­tically.61 These efforts were not particularly successful; production was halted at various times as the result of poor quality manufacturing and the PLAAF refused to fly the J-6A until improvements were made.62 Under the guidance of SAF vice general secretary Wang Qigong and vice chief technician Luo Shida, a document was drafted outlining 10 standards to follow in the second series of J-6 prototype production.63 With better quality control procedures in place, SAF was able to finally produce a J-6 prototype which met state standards for mass production in 1963. Once mass production was approved, the Nanchang

Aircraft Factory (NAF) began manufacturing the J-6. This required NAF to convert from a propeller aircraft factory to one that produced jet fighters.64

Improvements to J-6 production quickly eroded with the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Aircraft designers and engineers were among the group of “intellectuals” targeted in the mass movement, and their marginalization along with a number of other technical issues plagued China’s defense indus­tries.65 By the early 1970s, hundreds of substandard J-6s had to be dismantled and rebuilt (to the tune of millions of yuan).66 Though the J-6 and J-7 repre­sent the height of Chinese advancement in terms of the serial production of military aircraft during this time period, efforts continued to improve upon previous J-5, J-5A, and JJ-5 designs. These improvements were for the most part cosmetic (the lengthening of a fuselage, relocation of components, etc.) and though Chinese writings are sanguine about the progress made, there was very little in the way of actual innovation.

Bomber production made some modest advances during this period, with a domestically manufactured Xian H-6 medium bomber taking to the air on December 24, 1968, and serial production beginning shortly thereaf­ter.67 Efforts to produce the H-6 were delayed significantly by the withdrawal of Soviet advisors, but Chinese engineers were eventually able to use the plans and tooling to successfully produce the bomber. Chinese serial production of the H-6 was a notable achievement for the military aviation industry, but the aircraft was based on the Tupolev Tu-16 Badger, which had been in service with the Soviet air force since 1954.68 The H-6 has remained China’s mainstay bomber over the decades with modified versions of the aircraft comprising the bulk of the PLAAF bomber fleet even today.

A full-scale amphibious invasion is obviously the most serious form of military action the PRC could undertake against Taiwan, and would constitute a military “culminating point” in the relationship between the two entities. For the PLA, full-scale invasion constitutes an ultimate solution if the PRC per­ceives its unification goal and territory threatened, or the ongoing dispute is deemed impossible to be solved in any other way. From a military perspective, it will involve neighboring countries, a sensitive interregional area, and will necessarily greatly change the international political climate and global politi­cal affairs. From a financial standpoint, an invasion would obviously affect the global economy. From a military perspective, the PRC would have to expect that Taiwan would likely be assisted by a coalition of strong enemies acting to prohibit the PRC from unifying Taiwan by force, with a high probability that PRC forces would have to fight multiple enemies, not just the forces of Taiwan.37 Under these circumstances, the PLA may employ the Second Artil­lery to undertake sustained missile bombardment, with the objective of forcing Taiwan to plead for peace before possible foreign powers can intervene, and thus creating an irreversible fait accompli before international intervention can work to thwart the PRC’s aggressive plans.38

Former Taiwan Deputy Minister of National Defense Lin Chong-pin, in an interview during a visit to London in 2009, told a Central News Agency journalist that using military force to attack Taiwan is the PRC’s final choice. To fight quickly and win quickly, he believed, the PLA will not resort to blockade, since blockades take time and provoke international outrage and intervention. Rather, he said, since 1990, the PLA has stressed quick and decisive military action, embodied in the slogan “First battle decides the war”; the PLA, he believed, would seek to launch and win an amphibious action “probably within one week”39

Since ancient times, amphibious operations have historically been extremely difficult to prosecute. Even for highly trained forces possessing asymmetric advantages in power projection, landing in the face of opposition has proven costly, even if ultimate victory has been secured. Such landings are recognized by military experts from the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States as among the most demanding and risky of all military operations.40 The U. S. Department of Defense has noted the following:41

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military maneuvers. Success depends upon air and sea supe­riority, rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore, and unin­terrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would strain China’s untested armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complex­ity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency (assuming a successful land­ing and breakout), make amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. Taiwan’s investments to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could also decrease Beijing’s ability to achieve its objectives.

An island landing invasion would involve joint operations by the PLA Ground Force, PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery, supported by the Peo­ple’s Armed Police (PAP), PLA Reserve Force, and Militia, all acting in accor­dance with a unified joint campaign plan and command structure.42 It would involve most, and potentially all, aspects of land, sea, air, and electronic war­fare, including use of space-based assets and cyber attack. The crucial PLA challenge, obviously, would be circumventing or breaching Taiwan’s shore defenses, establishing and building a beachhead, transporting personnel and materiel to designated landing sites along Taiwan’s western coastline, and launching attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island.43

PLA amphibious doctrine logically sets forth the progression of an amphibious operation in three phases: preliminary operations, embarkation and movement, and assaulting and establishing the beach-head. Each of these is addressed below, based upon Zhang Yuliang’s Science of Campaigns.44

Preliminary Operations are undertaken to paralyze an enemy’s oper­ational system, to seize the initiative in the battle, and to set the conditions for amphibious landing operations. The missions in this phase include seizing information dominance via electronic combat and cyber warfare, and air and sea dominance via a comprehensive opening air and missile strike. Informa­tion dominance of the landing battle is the critical element of seizing air and sea dominance and the initiative of battle. The purpose is to greatly reduce the opponent’s capability of electronic equipment and secure the PRC’s own elec­tronic warfare efficiency. Generally, it will start before the comprehensive fire assault, or at the same time, and will be proceeding throughout the whole battle process. Besides using airborne electronic countermeasures against Taiwan’s air defense equipment, the PLA is likely to use precisely targeted special oper­ations forces against Taiwan’s electronic infrastructures, since use of broader – effect attacks, such as electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP) or broad-area cyber attacks, might affect the PRC as much as Taiwan.

A preliminary comprehensive raid would employ missiles and other air­borne fires to strike essential targets like command structures, air and naval bases, missile sites, and air defense systems in a sudden, massive, overwhelm­ing manner. The purpose would be to paralyze Taiwan’s military operations, incapacitate its warfighting abilities, and thereby set up favorable conditions for seizing information, air, and sea dominance. In general, this action would consist of a primary raid, and follow-up raids.45 The first raid is the most criti­cal, involving joint force attack by missiles and the service air components, par­ticularly Second Artillery and the PLAAF.

Considering likely risk, efficiency, penetration, and costs, the PLA would probably choose SRBMs to execute the first raid. The high-priority tar­gets of the raid might be SAMs, air defense radars, and fighter bases, because these targets, if untouched, could inflict heavy losses on PRC follow-on air and surface forces. The follow-on raids would be based on the result of the first raid. If the first raid degraded Taiwan’s air defenses sufficiently so that PLAAF attack aircraft could operate with relative safety, then following raids would likely use aircraft primarily. Otherwise, follow-on attacks might continue to employ SRBMs until conditions favorable for PRC air dominance over Taiwan were achieved. Once Taiwan’s integrated air defense system (IADS) had been destroyed or seriously degraded by SRBMs, the PRC’s aircraft would become more active, furnishing a more precise, flexible, functional, and efficient means to apply military force in support of PRC campaign objectives.

Thus, the type, frequency, and interval of follow-on raids depend on the assessed battle damage and recovery time of Taiwan’s air defense ability. This is, it might be noted, a very different form of air attack from that employed by coalition forces during the opening hours of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. In that case, there was essentially no pause for assessment between the first and fol­low-on strikes. Rather, following the first paralyzing strike by stealth aircraft and cruise missiles, a follow-on “gorilla package” strike was immediately undertaken.

This strike, enhanced by UAS systems mimicking manned aircraft, intimidated the surviving elements of Iraq’s air defense network into revealing themselves so that they could be jammed by EW and destroyed by coalition SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) strikes. After this second strike, Iraq had essentially lost any hope of maintaining any semblance of air control over its own territory. Non­stealthy coalition aircraft could then fly with relative impunity across Iraq for the next 6 weeks of war.46 In contrast, the PLAs writings imply a longer assessment period between the initial opening strike and follow-on attacks.

According to a RAND study, about 60-200 submunition-equipped SRBMs could temporarily neutralize most of Taiwan’s fighter bases. They could effectively suppress Taiwan air defense operations, allowing follow-on PLAAF strike aircraft to attack air bases and other targets with modern preci­sion weapons.47

Seizing air dominance by conducting surprising, fierce, continuing, and precision strikes is thus a crucial prerequisite for any landing force’s grouping, embarkation, navigation, assault, and landing. Operations would be mainly conducted by the PLAAF, and joined by the Ground Force, PLAN, and Sec­ond Artillery, suppressing the enemy on the ground or jointly destroying the enemy in the air.48 Unless Taiwan’s air defense assets are mobile, bombproof, invisible, quickly recoverable, redundant, and numerous, the result can only get worse when the PLAAF is able to strike freely across the island. Seiz­ing sea dominance would primarily involve the PLAN, joined by the PLAAF, ground forces, and Second Artillery, working together to control the area of the anticipated naval campaign, securing the landing force’s abilities to undertake embarkation, seaborne transportation (coupled with defensive mine sweeping), and the assault landing.49 The naval campaign poses chal­lenges for both sides. Given the profusion and range of the antiship weap­ons available to both sides, it is difficult for both the PLAN and Taiwan naval forces to hide and survive in the Taiwan Strait because of its limited and con­strained operational space.

Preparatory attacks against Taiwan’s coastal defenses prior to an amphib­ious landing invasion would be mainly conducted by the PLAAF, joined by ground forces, PLAN, and Second Artillery forces. Depending upon the results of the previous missile and air attacks, PRC forces would seek to destroy enemy coastal defense facilities, artillery positions, missiles, radar sites, com­mand structures, communication nodes, and other key targets. Through these, the PRC would seek to reduce enemy defense capability, stop enemy move­ments, isolate the landing area, and create favorable conditions for landing PLA ground forces.50

Embarkation and movement would proceed upon the basis of success­ful preliminary operations. The mission of embarkation is organizing land­ing forces, with their attendant logistical requirements, and loading them for transportation. Movement means all formation of landing forces en route to the respective staging area from the rendezvous area. According to a James­town Foundation study by Dennis Blasko, the PLAN lacks strategic sealift capacity, and thus cannot meet the requirements of a full-scale amphibious landing invasion against Taiwan, at least in the short term.51 If this is the case, the PLA should employ more than one wave of amphibious fleets in a secured environment when it intends to invade Taiwan directly. The embarkation point must be a short distance from landing beaches to reduce time spent at sea. This is quite risky, for PLAN forces would be under near-constant Taiwan counter­sea attacks. Since, as Blasko notes, “Naval units from the South Sea Fleet would have to travel at least 500 nautical miles and those from the North Sea Fleet would have to travel at least 700 nautical miles to reach Taiwan,” the employ­ment of fires against PLAN forces would be near-constant, and grow ever more deadly as forces came within reach of increasingly numerous shorter – range weapons, such as aircraft, sea – or-land-based antiship missiles, coastal gun fire, and battlefield rocket artillery such as the multiple-launch rocket sys­tem (MLRS).52

Assaulting and establishing the beach-head is primarily conducted by landing groups and assisted by other services to fight and assure the joint oper­ation’s success. In the view of PLA analysts, it is the most critical of any of the invasion’s operational phases, the time of greatest stress, intensity, difficulty, and decisiveness. It is incumbent upon the invasion commander to assure the landing operations are successful by all means. The landing beach must be as swiftly established as possible after the first echelon of landing forces have assaulted and secured the beach front, and then developed rapidly in depth so that follow-on landing forces can exploit it. All these operations must be assisted by on-call, persistent, close air support, which would be provided pri­marily by the PLAAF.53

Air forces are unique among the military services in that it is the offi­cers who do the fighting and therefore the bulk of the education and training focus is aimed at their development and proficiency. This axiom holds espe­cially true in the PLAAF because technical officers continue to play a critical hands-on role in the maintenance and repair of aircraft and other weapons sys­tems. Consequently, PLAAF education and training programs are principally focused on officer development across all branches and specialties and sec­ondarily aimed at raising the skill levels of NCOs.27 Airmen, on the other hand, may only receive rudimentary training while serving in their first 2-year enlist­ment, as they are essentially on probationary status awaiting determination of their suitability for potential development into NCOs or officers.28

As with other air forces, the PLAAF has established a comprehen­sive military education structure which focuses on four common objectives: schools and institutes must strive to achieve compatibility between force devel­opment requirements, force composition and career specialties, and the cat­egories of schools, training allocations, and levels of education and training; officer development capacity of air force schools and institutes must be bal­anced against and consistent with the requirements of peacetime replacement rates; division levels within the air force training structure must be consistent with officer development regulations; and, the structure must combine officer academic education with military specialty training and integrate pre-assign­ment coursework with post-assignment advanced studies.29

Estimates by Western PLA military experts suggest that the PLAAF com­missions approximately 4,000-6,000 new officers each year, of whom approx­imately 1,000 are aviators.30 Until recently, the PLAAF has relied on its own colleges and academies to educate and develop new officers (cadres), but that paradigm changed in May 2000 under a new policy document issued j ointly by the State Council and the CMC entitled “Decision on Establishing a Military Cadre Training System that Relies on Civilian Higher Education й®Л^Йй±п#¥РАТнРФ1ЙЙ^&£]."31 The “decision" was announced follow­ing an initial trial program conducted at 22 of China’s top universities—includ­ing Beijing, Qinghua, and Fudan—beginning in 1999.32 The new policy opened up three new commissioning channels to a civilian university inclined toward a national defense direction (НКЙЙ). First, the new program permits the direct recruitment of university students for direct entry into one of the PLAAF mili­tary colleges. Second, it provides a path of direct accession to college graduates, although they may be required to complete a full year of military training prior to commissioning. And third, it established the National Defense Student (S |5fr£) program which operates similarly to the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) in the United States.33 The PLAAF has established National Defense Student programs on multiple campuses throughout China and detailed air force officers to the faculty to instruct military courses as part of the academic load. Additionally, National Defense Students participate in drills at assigned units during summer academic breaks. Following graduation, National Defense Students receive an additional 3 months of military skills training and political education prior to commissioning. Operating on the campuses of leading uni­versities throughout China, this program has become a common gateway for many of today’s new PLAAF officers.34

While the induction of civilian college graduates into the PLAAF repre­sents a monumental adjustment to the military education and training struc­ture, the PLAAF continues to rely on its own command academies and techni­cal schools to recruit and develop over half of its new officers. These academies accept graduates of public high schools and qualified airmen from the ranks with high school equivalency-level education. Officer accession schools pro­vide either a 3-year vocational education (ftWMM) leading to a technical degree (^ft) or 4-year academic education (¥ШШЖ) leading to an undergrad­uate degree (^ft). Specialty programs have been established at the flight acad­emies, the Guilin Air Force College, and the First Aviation Academy, develop­ing officers for various air force branch specialties (aviation, communications, radar, SAM, etc.). The PLAAF Engineering University, the PLAAF Aviation University, and the Xuzhou Air Force Academy are 4-year institutions which confer undergraduate degrees. PLAAF Aviation University cadets receive an abbreviated academic curriculum that includes 30 months of academics, 6 months of aviation theory, and 12 months of basic flight training. Depend­ing on the school and specialty, the PLAAF appoints graduates of 3-year and 4-year schools as either a commanding officer or technical officer, with some technical officers holding civilian rank (^Щ).35 With the exception of aviators who receive their undergraduate education through the PLAAF Aviation Uni­versity or civilian university before reporting to one of the flying academies, the foundational education for PLAAF officers in other career fields is nor­mally completed through attendance at a single college or school.36

PLAAF command academies are organized into a three-level structure providing pre-accession education and training at the foundational level, and professional military education (PME) at the intermediate and senior levels.37 Mid-level command colleges, such as the PLAAF Command College, are tar­geted at active duty officers who have attended a foundational command college and possess a senior technical degree or higher. The mid-level school curricu­lum varies from 6 months to 1 year and prepares graduates to perform work in operational, political, logistical, or equipment sections at the regimental and divi­sion levels. PME for senior air force officers is conducted through the National Defense University (NDU) for those who have completed a mid-level command course and possess a senior technical degree or higher. Graduates are prepared to assume responsibilities at Group Army – or Military Region-level command positions. In recent years, the PLAAF has gradually improved its PME courses through efforts to increase the contact and coordination between its faculty and operations. Air force officers—whether in operational, political, logistical, or equipment branches—are offered various opportunities for attendance at PME and graduate degree programs during their careers.38

The PLAAF graduate education program consists of master’s candi­dates, Ph. D. candidates, and military specialty master’s candidates, with pro­grams lasting 2-1/2 years, 3 years, and 2 years, respectively. The graduate stud­ies program is implemented to address the full spectrum of knowledge required within the service, and now includes programs in military professional studies.

In addition to the in-residence formal education programs offered to officers and NCOs, in 2008 the PLAAF established the Air Force Military Pro­fessional University, offering service personnel opportunities for study through correspondence courses, mini-courses, seminars, and study at civilian colleges. This new program appears to operate as a virtual university to promote the individual development of officers and NCOs in various career fields.

China received licensing rights for the MiG-21F-13 and its Tumansky turbojet engine, but transfer of other MiG-21 technical information ended with the Sino-Soviet split.69 Despite incomplete information, China managed to produce various models of the J-7/F-7, as well as the Tumansky engine, in the 1960s and 1970s. Some variants featured limited upgrades and improve­ments. SAF had taken possession of several completed models of the MiG-21, along with a number of assembly kits, before the USSR withdrew assistance. This provided a decent base to start from, though SAF only succeeded in pro­ducing upgraded J-7/F-7 fighters through intense efforts at reverse engineer­ing.70 The original J-7 experienced numerous teething problems before mak­ing its maiden flight in 1966, but was reworked and ultimately entered service with the PLAAF, and was exported as the F-7A. Both the Tanzanian and Alba­nian air forces operated this aircraft.

SAF later came out with the upgraded J-7I that featured a variable air intake with translating shock cone, an indigenous add-on developed due to missing information in the Soviet manufacturing documents.71 The PLAAF operated the J-7I interceptor along its southern borders during the Viet­nam War, where it shot down six U. S. combat aircraft that entered Chinese airspace.72 The J-7 program demonstrates that although China was unable to design and produce its own fighters, it had mastered coproduction and reverse engineering well enough to produce reasonably capable (though by no means state-of-the-art) fighters without Soviet assistance. This produc­tion capability allowed China to produce F-6 (MiG-19) and F-7 (MiG – 21) variants to customers seeking low-cost fighters. The J-6 export variant (F-6C) was produced from complete Soviet blueprints and with initial Soviet assistance.

Although China had not received a license to coproduce the Il-28 bomber, it ultimately decided to try to reverse engineer and independently produce the bomber as the H-5 (or B-5). As a result, China did not possess the same level of design information and Soviet technical support as with its fighter aircraft or the H-6 bomber. When the project finally began in 1963, there were some significant design alterations in the Chinese version.73 Chinese-produced H-5 bombers did not enter service with the PLAAF until 1967.74

The result of forced reliance on indigenous production and reverse engineering was a PLA Air Force equipped throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s with large quantities of obsolete aircraft based on 1950s vin­tage Soviet designs that were all the Chinese aviation industry could pro­duce. Although PLAAF leaders (and to some extent Chinese civilian lead­ers including Deng Xiaoping) were aware of the extent to which China was falling behind advances in Western and Soviet military aviation technology, they had few options available to rectify the situation. In addition to limited access to international aircraft and aviation technology potential, the loss of Soviet support highlighted the importance of self-reliance in military tech­nology for Chinese political leaders and reinforced the interest of key civilian and military leaders in building a defense industry capable of independently designing and producing advanced systems. The result has been an enduring tension between PLA leaders focused on equipping the military with techno­logically advanced systems (acquired from abroad if necessary) and civilian and defense industry leaders focused on the Maoist goal of building an inde­pendent, indigenous defense industry (even if the weapons it produced fell well short of state-of-the-art Western systems).

New Windows of Opportunity (1977-1989)

Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as China’s top leader and the initiation of economic reforms and opening in 1978 offered new opportunities for the Chi­nese economy generally, and for the defense industry in particular. An ini­tial focus of the reforms was the Four Modernizations campaign (Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology, and National Defense). Although defense was the last of the Four Modernizations and given lower priority than the first three, the strategies used to modernize China’s national defense were consis­tent with the broader economic development strategy’s emphasis on opening and reform. Creating a self-sufficient Chinese national defense infrastructure based on a modern technology base had been a goal since the first five-year plan.75 The pursuit of air superiority and the role the Chinese military avia­tion industry played in this pursuit took on a new level of importance once Deng became Chairman of the CMC in 1977.76After consolidating all top posi­tions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and becoming “paramount leader,” Deng continued to develop his case for airpower, stating to the CMC in January 1979: “Without the air force and air domination, winning a future war is out of the question. . . . Stress investment in the development of the aviation industry and the air force to ensure air domination.”77

China’s ten-year plan for developing both the national economy and the science and technology base was published on February 26, 1978.78 The plan outlined many of the key elements necessary to produce modern mili­tary equipment: more raw materials, better understanding of modern scien­tific techniques, and access to foreign technology and production practices. China would increase trade by opening its economy, allowing foreign direct investment, and purchasing capital goods and technology from the devel­oped world. Investment from abroad would be obtained by expanding China’s export-oriented light industries (i. e., textiles, clothing, and handicrafts), which required low amounts of capital, could be rapidly established, and had “high foreign exchange earnings potential.”79 Earnings originating from light indus­tries could then be recapitalized to continue expanding that sector, applied to the import of advanced foreign technology, or both. China was also in a posi­tion to leverage its ample energy resources to finance technology acquisition from abroad. This was the basis of an 8-year, 20 billion dollar agreement signed with Japan in 1978.80 Casting military modernization in a subordinate role to the other three modernizations inverted Mao’s “superpower” strategy, which stressed building national defense as the first imperative in elevating China to great power status. The more pragmatic reform-era leadership understood that national defense capability improved as a function of overall economic prog­ress. Moreover, it realized that to achieve self-reliance in the long term, China would have to pursue the transfer of advanced foreign military and dual-use technologies in the near term.

China continued to refine its industrial policy throughout the 1980s, with the goal of developing a modern, science and technology-driven economy in the first half of the 21st century. Evan Feigenbaum notes the contributions of scien­tists involved with China’s nuclear program in the 1950s and 1960s in crafting and pushing forward the set of policies establishing a new national development trajectory.81 Prominent nuclear scientists like Zhang Jingfu and Song Jian were among a small group of Chinese technical personnel involved in Mao era pro­grams requiring “‘scientific’ decision analysis.”82 This gave them valuable experi­ence organizing research and development to meet specific scientific objectives, and applying lessons learned in the process to other related areas. Observing the state of global technological innovation in the late 1970s and early 1980s led the group of scientists advocating China’s new industrial policies to the conclusion that novel state-of-the-art technologies (semiconductors, integrated circuits) would be increasingly dual-use in nature and thus result in a “spin-on” paradigm.83 Because commercial and military technologies would be inextricably linked in the future, China would have to reengineer its entire state R&D system and not focus solely on developing military technologies. The Chinese government’s efforts to bridge the technology gap with Western military powers rely on spurring inno­vation, stressing market competition, and emphasizing civil-military integration (Junmin Yitihua) to create greater efficiencies. These policies seek to construct an effective dual-use technology base that can support both the civilian economy and the needs of the military.84

China’s opening and reform efforts built upon its rapprochement with the United States and the West in the early 1970s. The primary impetus for rapprochement was strategic, but improved relations also created a favorable climate for China’s economic reforms and, eventually, for defense industrial cooperation with Western countries. Mirroring the Soviet logic of the 1950s, the United States and other Western military powers sought to improve Chi­na’s defense capability as a means of tying down the vast Soviet military. There was obviously not the same strong ideological affinity between China and the West that there had been during the Sino-Soviet partnership. There was, however, a mutual understanding that certain common objectives— namely, undermining Soviet power and influence—could be advanced by assistance to China’s defense industry. China did not view the West as an ally per se, nor did the West expect a close defense relationship to emerge from new circumstances.

The strategic rationale for cooperation was paired with the realization by Western defense industries that significant profits might be available by selling arms to China and assisting in the modernization of China’s backward defense industries. Continuing export controls and legal restrictions on the export of arms and advanced technologies to China also meant that coop­eration expanded at a gradual, modest pace with considerable oversight by Western governments. On China’s side, the opportunity to take advantage of new access to Western military aviation technologies clashed with the desire to build an independent aviation industry and Maoist concerns about self­reliance. As Lewis and Xue write, “The ensuing compromise restricted the definition of self-reliance to the outright purchase of aircraft, while extending the meaning of Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy to permit the acquisition of foreign air-launched weapons and avionics.”85

As the PLA’s descriptions of amphibious landing invasion phases and scenarios are more deeply examined, considerations of employing airpower in the Taiwan Strait emerge more clearly. Reviewing all the phases of amphibious landing operations in the Taiwan Strait, we may conclude several points:

Taiwan’s purpose for employing airpower is for self-defense only, not for offense. Taiwan’s airpower forces must be employed in accordance with the agreed Taiwan defense strategy, and for the purpose of self-defense. Indeed, it may not be necessary to kill the enemy or to destroy enemy air bases, missile sites, naval ports, etc. To speak more clearly and practically, Taiwan’s purpose in employing airpower is to keep enemy forces out of its territory and lifeline. As long as the enemy does not step on Taiwan’s territory and impede its lifelines, they don’t win and Taiwan doesn’t lose, and its national security is secured. Any operations out of this scope would be a waste of resources, attrite limited assets, and could prove disastrously counterproductive. After all, national defense strategy is not about a matter of face, but about economy of force.

Taiwan must employ its airpower after the PLA initiates the first strike. To be consistent with the first point, it is impossible to apply airpower to attack the enemy prior to its first move. The reason is simple: Taiwan can’t afford the international liability of initiating the war. During the period of any preliminary operations and the embarkation phase, all targets are shielded under the PLAs layered and integrated air defense umbrella. Taiwan would need to penetrate these defenses prior to prosecuting any attacks on those radars, missile sites, and air force bases—facilities that are typically hardened or well-protected by intensive air defense firepower. It is most unwise to conduct such a mission, which would simply consume Taiwan’s airpower assets for nothing in return. Even in the name of a preemptive defense attack (such as Israel conducted in June 1967 against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan), it is unnecessary. Indeed, any Tai­wan offensive operations prior to the PLAs first raid would furnish an excuse for the PRC to invade Taiwan and thus work to legitimize the invasion.

Retaining substantial airpower is dependent upon Taiwan’s critical air assets surviving the PLAs first strike. Although it may seem counterintuitive, Taiwan’s force-structure airpower and air defense inventory prior to the PLAs first raid may not count. Instead, we need to take the PLAs preliminary opera­tions into account, considering what assets would likely remain following the opening SRBM attack. We need to deduct those which are not mobile, bomb­proof, invisible, loss-tolerable, or quickly recoverable. Frankly, sooner or later all fixed facilities will be destroyed. This means most of Taiwan’s major air – power assets will be eliminated in the opening strike, leaving its defenders with only a few sheltered aircraft, mobile radars, mobile air defense missiles, and (hopefully) some recovered runways (if the PLAs raid frequency or lack of accuracy allows this). Therefore, a mobile defense is needed to ensure Taiwan’s forces survive the PLAs missile and air strikes.

Taiwan’s limited airpower should be concentrated to a critical time and place. Avoiding attrition of Taiwan’s limited resources of airpower little by little is important. We should join the navy and army’s resources and apply airpower only at a decisive time such as during the PLAs crossing of the Strait, select­ing amphibious ships as the core targets. They are the “center of gravity,” and must be struck before personnel debarkation by joint-service antiship weap­ons employed by the joint land, sea, and air forces. There is a historical prece­dent: the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in February 1943, in which American and Australian land-based attack forces destroyed a vital Japanese convoy carry­ing troops and supplies to New Guinea, effectively dooming Japanese plans to retain control of New Guinea.

Taiwan’s should broaden its air defense by connecting all mobile radar and antiair weapons of all services. Taiwan must construct a mobile, diffuse, and widespread air defense umbrella covering point, area, and then theater air defense. It is technically workable and economically affordable. One example of this approach would be data-linking truck-mounted and sea-based radars and air-to-air missile launchers to provide air defense against follow-on PLA raids.

Taiwan should develop a multifunctional airforce using advanced aircraft, helicopters, and UAS vehicles. Taiwan requires advanced aircraft for air superi­ority especially since the PLA now has more and more new, advanced aircraft of its own. But Taiwan also needs aircraft that can take part in countersea oper­ations. In this regard, Taiwan should have some attack helicopters which can deliver antiship weapons, making a vertical take-off from a hidden point and flying at tree-top height. And it should have some small or unmanned aircraft taking off in a short distance to cruise and observe along Taiwan’s coastline to search for important targets and collect information for use in antiship opera­tions by land – and sea-based forces.

Taiwan should develop a decentralized, network-centric command and com­munication structure. Understandably, Taiwan’s command, control, communica­tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system constitutes a high-priority target for initial strikes by the PLAAF, Second Artillery, and special operations forces. Since Taiwan’s current command and communica­tion system is fixed in place (although there are some back-up systems), there is a high probability it will be quickly destroyed, thus not lasting long enough to be a significant element in Taiwan’s defensive operations. To ensure the command and communication function will survive the opening missile and air strike, Taiwan should duplicate it by decentralizing and duplicating the command and commu­nication center downward through the defense infrastructure, and possibly com­bining the military and civilian communication systems.

Taiwan’s current airpower assets should be enhanced. Airpower is inher­ently powerful, speedy, and flexible. While this is its strength for an attacker, it is also its vulnerability for a defender. In cross-strait conflict, due to the vul­nerability of runways, shelters, radars, and missile sites, there is very high risk to Taiwan’s current facilities. Taiwan should improve current facilities to with­stand future air and missile attack. This can be done in several ways: increasing the strength of runways, shelters, and other facilities likely to be raided; under­taking structural strengthening, increasing material preparedness, and practic­ing repair and recovery operations to quicken post-raid recovery and reconsti­tution;54 and researching and developing new facilities or equipment to reduce runway dependence, such as RATO (rocket-assisted take-off), catapult launch, VTOL (vertical take-off and landing), STOL (short take-off and landing), and naval-style arrested landing systems.

Taiwan should adopt a “Starfish” strategy to enhance its survivability. Star­fish usually have five or even more arms. Their multi-arms not only can tolerate more damage, but also can regenerate automatically. Once its arm is cut, the body will regenerate another arm to become a normal starfish again. Also, the separated part of the arm will regenerate to become another small starfish.55 Applying this to Taiwan’s defense system means that when some part of its force is hit by the enemy, it will not be paralyzed but will survive and fight independently if it cannot recover to its original body (unit). Taiwan should try to apply this strategy to decentralize the commanding activity to the very basic units of its organizations, equipment, facilities, or personnel, to ensure that sustainability and survivability will expand.

In conclusion, many articles study the balance of airpower across the Taiwan Strait, with a consensus that Taiwan has lost both its quality and quan­tity advantages of airpower. There is no evidence to show that the balance of airpower across the Taiwan Strait will get better in the near future. Accordingly, when facing a continually modernizing airpower projector like the PLAAF, Taiwan should become more creative and think beyond the traditional scope of airpower options. Taiwan shouldn’t limit its imagination just to airpower. It needs to prevent cross-strait conflict by any means, even those other than air – power, like political or cultural power. For example, Taiwan can create a peace­ful atmosphere by cultural power and economic power; it can construct a firm government by psychological power, and employ soft power so that the PRC has no excuses to justify an invasion. It will take joint efforts to fight this war: joint air force, navy, and army partnership will strengthen defensive airpower. Joint airpower, sea power, and land power will strengthen Taiwan’s overall defensive power. Then, joint efforts linking hard power with soft power will form smart power, ensuring everlasting peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Notes

With the emergence of the of NCO corps in 1998, the air force determined that the primary development focus for NCO schools was to be “professional theory knowledge and training in procedures and rules for the proper opera­tion, employment and care of weapons and equipment.”39 In other words, NCO schools are focused on providing technical or occupational specialty training.

NCO education is conducted at special NCO schools and through spe­cial NCO programs conducted at the PLAAF officer academies. Qualified per­sonnel with a high school or middle school equivalency education are enrolled in 2-year and 3-year academic programs that confer secondary or senior tech­nical degrees as well as occupational specialty training. NCO education is characterized as occupational (specialty) training, aimed at developing entry – level technicians. NCO schools of all categories are founded on the principle of “promote suitability while furthering development” (^Ж M^tt, ШШ ^K), indicating that there is a strong element of political education along with the development of technical skills.

The PLAAF has approximately 300,000 active duty personnel with as many as two-thirds of these serving in enlisted ranks. Of those, perhaps as many as one-quarter (50-60,000) are first-term recruits who are serving an ini­tial 2-year term of service.40 The PLAAF draws its recruits from both rural and urban residents, with varying entry requirements for each locale. China’s mili­tary service law stipulates that rural recruits must have graduated from middle school (ЙФ) while urban recruits must have graduated from high school (Ф ^), a vocational high school (Ф^), or a 3-year technical college (^^), or be enrolled in a 4-year college (^^) to be eligible for enlistment.

Following a PLA-wide strategy to increase the quality of its recruits, the PLAAF is making efforts to increase its enlistment of college students by offering preferential treatment and other incentives. For example, the maximum age for female recruits with 4-year college education or higher has been lifted from 22 to 24, while the limit for female graduates with a 3-year education was raised from 21 to 23. In addition, the students-turned-soldiers are entitled to receive “a one – off refund of up to 24,000 yuan ($3,500) as compensation for college tuition fees or student loans.”41 In addition, candidates may be promised preference while seeking jobs at police and other law-enforcement departments. According to the Global Times, the PLA recruiting effort on Chinese college campuses may be producing desired effects in view of an oversaturated labor market that leaves as many as one-third of each year’s 6 million graduates unable to find suitable jobs.42

China chose to pursue acquisition of armaments and avionics rather than outright purchases of Western combat aircraft (which Western governments would have been reluctant to allow). Helicopters were an exception to this gen­eral rule. In 1977, the French delivered the SA-321 Super Frelon helicopter to China, and allowed China to coproduce it as the Z-8 beginning in 1981.86 France also agreed to let China coproduce its Dauphin 2 attack helicopter as the Z-9 beginning in 1980.87 The earliest fighter technology transfers came in 1979, in the form of a license agreement between China and the British defense firm GEC-Marconi (now BAE avionics) to supply the J-7II tactical fighter, as well as F-7 export variants, with a complete avionics suite. This upgrade, which included the Type 226 Skyranger radar, weapons-aiming computer, and state- of-the-art display systems, represented a huge boost for China’s military avia­tion industry. Chinese-produced F-7s with Western avionics sold well on the export market with the air forces of Sri Lanka, Iran, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan all signing purchase agreements in the 1980s. The F-7s were not actu­ally delivered until the late 1980s and early 1990s and many remain in service today. J-7/F-7 aircraft produced in the 1970s and 1980s with advanced avion­ics were an improvement over the J-6/F-6 series, but still lagged far behind Western and Soviet fourth-generation fighters that were entering service in the same time period.88

The Shenyang J-8A (a twin-engine MiG-21 derivative) was the most sophisticated fighter China operated in the late 1980s. Shenyang Aircraft Cor­poration (SAC)89 proved that it could go beyond simply reproducing Soviet designs by modifying the MiG-21 airframe to accommodate the J-8A’s two Wopen-7A turbojet engines. However, the derivative body design limited top speed to a “modest” Mach 2.2, making the J-8A slower than third-generation Soviet fighters like the MiG-23.90 China sought to use its newfound access to Western avionics to improve the J-8A’s combat capability. By the mid-1980s, China had developed its first indigenous fire control radar (Type 204), but this system lacked some state-of-the-art features embedded in Western and Soviet radar systems, most notably beyond-visual-range capacity. One of the four programs under the U. S./China “Peace Pearl” initiative launched in the mid 1980s involved the U. S. firm Westinghouse equipping 50 J-8 fighters with advanced, beyond-visual-range capable radar systems. Sanctions ban­ning sale of U. S. arms to China were imposed in the wake of the 1989 Tianan­men massacre, but in 1992 President George H. W. Bush issued a waiver stat­ing that it was “in the national interest” to fulfill the terms of four suspended weapons sales programs on the grounds that none of them “significantly” boosted Chinese military capabilities.91 The waiver also stated that fulfill­ing these programs would “improve the prospects for gaining further coop­eration from China on nonproliferation issues.”92 The PLAAF ultimately received two modified J-8 fuselages and four avionics kits to close out the “Peace Pearl” effort.

China also reportedly developed a variant of the J-8, the ACT con­trol variant, which featured analogue fly-by-wire (FBW) controls. A working test bed was flown in 1988. The ability to produce an aircraft incorporating this technology is noteworthy given the fact that China had no legal access to it through Western or Soviet channels (FBW controls had been incorpo­rated into new Western and Soviet fighters by the mid-1970s). Chinese mili­tary aviation had not mastered less challenging aspects of avionics develop­ment at the time the J-8ACT program was underway, and it is unlikely that the knowledge to produce FBW controls came about via indigenous R&D. There is no way to draw definitive conclusions about where China acquired the knowledge to produce this technology, but its defense relationship with Israel provides one possible answer. Development work on the FBW-capable Israeli Lavi fighter began in 1982 and by the time Sino-Israeli defense coop­eration was established in 1984, the Lavi project was in full swing. A range of open source information suggests that Israel transferred advanced military aviation technologies to China long before formal diplomatic relations were established in 1992.93

Advances in Chinese military aviation from the late 1970s to the late 1980s came primarily as a result of exposure to more sophisticated Western aviation technologies and their integration into PLAAF aircraft. Access to the GEC Marconi radar and to FBW technology required Chinese technical personnel to perform design modifications necessary to accommodate these new systems. It also provided a starting point for reverse engineering efforts, though due to China’s inexperience with Western production practices there was no guarantee of success. Despite newfound access to some state-of-the – art military hardware and innovations in airframe design, China’s defense sec­tor remained incapable of producing modern weapons systems.94 Numerous deficiencies prevented China from turning out cutting-edge equipment. The issues it faced were specific to its system of economic and political organiza­tion, not merely the byproducts of central planning. (The Soviet case proves that an economy based on central planning can produce some of the world’s most advanced military hardware.)

During the 1980s and 1990s, state-owned Chinese defense enterprises received cost plus 5 percent for all equipment produced, providing no incentive to cut costs or maximize production efficiency.95 There was no competition to determine which enterprise would build which system. Enterprises were (and still are to some degree) assigned projects based on ministerial bargaining, nul­lifying a great deal of the incentive to turn out a better end product.96 The story of this time period for the aviation industry is mixed: from an organizational perspective, the objectives articulated in the Four Modernizations campaign and attention to airpower at the highest levels of leadership set a course for progress. On the other hand, the industry made almost no tangible progress in closing the technology gap with Soviet or Western air forces in the 1980s.

Three significant developments would come to shape the trajectory of Chinese military aviation in the next time period we analyze. First, there was the decision to emphasize the development and diversification of the overall Chinese economy via deeper market reforms. The initial impact on the defense industry was negative, as funding for the military was reduced and the defense industry was encouraged to convert to civilian production. Over the longer run, however, development of the broader economy produced both finan­cial resources and access to technologies that would support a more advanced defense technology base. The second important event was the Sino-Soviet rap­prochement. Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in May 1989 marked the official return of normal relations between the two sides and was eventually followed in the early 1990s by new arms sales agreements, includ­ing the sale of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker.97 These deals were largely negotiated on Chinese terms, offering China the opportunity to pursue new procurement strategies. Finally, the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989 led to an immediate end of Chinese legitimate access to most Western arms and military aviation technologies.

David Frelinger and Jessica Hart

This chapter presents an alternative framework for approaching the dis­cussion and assessment of the “military balance” between the United States and China, with an emphasis on the effect of People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) modernization. This approach provides for a more comprehensive means of thinking about the military balance and illuminates some deficien­cies in current assessments. The framework assesses PLAAF modernization through the lenses of three “games”—the Game of Influence, the Battle over a Third Party, and the Great Power Game—that represent the range of relation­ships the United States and China could forge, with a focus on the military aspects of those games. As this analysis will demonstrate, the effect of PLAAF modernization is most fully understood not as an input in one overall U. S.- China military balance, but as a series of moves occurring in the context of the game or games the United States and China are playing.

Why a New Framework?

The U. S.-China military balance is most often spoken of in Cold War terms of force-on-force counts, defense expenditure comparisons, and other metrics that are relatively straightforward to calculate. These calculations are then used to define the balance within future “worlds” that could exist between the two nations.1 These analyses assume that the United States and China are playing the same game in these worlds, that both recognize the other side is playing that game, and that the game remains dominant and consistent for an extended period of time. Assessing the balance through this narrow aperture misses important nuances in what is in fact a fluid military context—one in which PLAAF modernization plays many roles. This type of assessment also does not account for the facts that powers may play more than one game simul­taneously, that both sides are not necessarily playing the same game, and that both may fail to recognize what game the other has chosen.

An alternative framework is necessary to address these analytical defi­ciencies. By acknowledging the range of games and the fluidity of their context, the framework allows for a fuller assessment of the effects of PLAAF modern­ization on the military balance within the games. This avoids viewing PLAAF modernization through the lens of only one game while also highlighting the fact that there is not one military balance, but several. By adopting a more comprehensive framework, this assessment also avoids utilizing familiar—and inappropriate—analytical narratives. Many attempt to frame at least a portion of the U. S.-Chinese interactions in Cold War terms—what we call here the Great Power Game. In the Cold War, the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union as the only two remaining great powers were relatively ossified from the outset, and the overarching ideological narrative provided a ground­ing framework for understanding the game that both sides were playing. This is not the case for the United States and China. The relationship is not yet mature, and there are multiple, competing narratives about interests and goals on both sides. Those narratives as well as U. S. and Chinese actions provide no convincing indications that either side has made a deliberate decision as to which game it wishes to be playing—much less what game the other is play­ing or will choose to play in the future. Instead there are elements of multiple games that must be assessed.

The key to strengthened national defense and military modernization is to foster and raise a large batch of high quality, new-model, talented mili­tary personnel, while vigorously increasing the ability to make innova­tions in science and technology. We must grasp these two requirements as the primary responsibility of the military academies, properly grasp­ing the developing trends of modern technology and the developing pat­terns of military education, diligently pressing for military academies to successfully become the cradles for development of high quality, talented military personnel—the foundations of new high technology and military theory innovation.43

While the PLAAF aspires to set up educational infrastructures that “become the cradles for development of high-quality, talented military person­nel,” it remains to be seen whether the programs that are now being put into place will deliver the desired results. Accurately assessing the competency of PLAAF personnel has been and remains a difficult endeavor. The PLAAF has not been operationally tested since the Korean War, and it has been absent from

Chinese military interventions since the 1950s. The air force was never com­mitted into battle during ground force skirmishes on Vietnam’s border in the late 1970s. Since then, PLA operations have been limited to humanitarian relief efforts in response to flooding or earthquakes. In these instances, the PLAAF’s limited airlift capacity has left it sidelined during the army-led operations. Nor has the PLAAF participated widely in United Nations peacekeeping missions, although the PLA is expanding its support of logistics and medical teams in Africa and Asia. And, the PLAAF has not established the type of bilateral train­ing exercises with other regional air forces that would provide insights into the level and sophistication of its tactical forces. Although the PLAAF Command College has cracked opened its doors to foreign military students, these officers are segregated into a separate international seminar which limits their interac­tion with and exposure to Chinese field grade officers. Thus it is necessary to look for other proxies that can yield insights into the progress, professionalism, and operational capacity of the officers and airmen of the PLAAF.

Despite recent progress and increased accessions of graduates of civil­ian universities, the PLAAF may be a long way from reaching its education goals. The PLAAF has announced that improved officer education is a top pri­ority and an enduring long-term goal. In fact, the PLAAF has set as a near­term goal to ensure all new officers attain a 4-year undergraduate degree prior to accession. In the mid-to-long term, the PLAAF hopes to build an officer corps in which 100 percent have undergraduate degrees and over 30 percent have advanced degrees. Additionally, the PLAAF intends to see that over 95 percent of commanding officers at the division, brigade, and regimental lev­els are equipped with basic degrees, with 80 percent or more having advanced degrees.44 Yet, as late as 2009, fewer than 40 percent of officers leading the air force’s front line units possessed an undergradu­

ate degree and less than 1 percent of those commanders held a postgradu­ate degree.45 This lack of credentials among PLAAF commanding officers may be explained by PLAAF restrictions placed on their course attendance. Senior command track officers—at the colonel and senior colonel level—are only authorized to attend a 1-year, nondegree PME program, while support and technical officers are afforded opportunities to pursue graduate degrees in multiyear programs at either PLAAF or civilian colleges.

Another measure of the professional development of the PLAAF is the vol­ume and quality of military professional publications that are being developed by its officer corps. The PLA’s airmen have published extensively during the past 10 years, oftentimes in the performance of directed research on key topics—strat – egy, doctrine, tactics, air force building, education and training, logistics, etc.— assigned by the PLAAF Headquarters. Officially developed publications are generally produced by a research team under the guidance of a senior officer and vetted through a formal review prior to publication. Top-level writings are endorsed by the PLAAF Commander or the Political Commissar, or both. In recent years, the PLAAF has written extensively on military education and train­ing, and a listing of relevant recent publications can be found in the appendix.

Although the volume of PLAAF military writings is an important indi­cation of the transformation that is taking place in PLAAF education and training, significant variations and gaps remain in both the substance and the operational concepts articulated by various authors and institutions. For exam­ple, Science of Air Force Training (ё¥¥ВДШ^), published in 2006 under the guidance of Lieutenant General He Weirong, was the air force’s contribution to a PLA series that includes separate volumes on army, navy, and joint train – ing.46 The book provides a comprehensive overview of the PLAAF training structure, laying out the hierarchy of training organizations, classifications of training, specific training responsibilities at various levels of command, and categorization of training methods. But, one must ask: what is the purpose and motivation behind this publication? And, who is the target audience? The publication lacks the authority of a service regulation or manual, and it does not include sufficient detail to either develop or execute training programs. In effect, the Science of Military Training series serves only as a primer on PLAAF service training programs and infrastructure, and therefore may be an indica­tion that the PLAAF (and the PLA) are still at a very early stage of revamping military training programs.

Yet another indicator of professional development within the PLA—and by extension within the PLAAF—is the well-defined process for compilation, review, and validation of training standards. The PLA has demonstrated a con­sistent pattern of managing operational training as it has twice revised and pro­mulgated new Outlines for Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) within the past 10 years. The most recent effort was undertaken beginning in 2006 to correct recognized training deficiencies in the 2002 version of the OMTE. From initial review in December 2006 through promulgation in July 2008 and implementation in 2009, the OMTE development and review process took slightly over 2 years to complete. As the event sequence and timelines in table 10-1 demonstrate, the procedures and deadlines for the development of the 2009 OMTE followed a pattern of development similar to the previous OMTE revision cycle that ran from January 2000 and October 2001.

Field units played a substantially greater role in the initial development of the 2008 OMTE. Standards development and field testing were carried out during the 2007 and 2008 annual training cycles with 163 division – and bri­gade-level units participating in the trial training and validation of the 2008

OMTE.47 The 2-year process of revision, experimental training, and valida­tion was a PLA-wide effort that included participants from each of the seven military regions, the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, People’s Armed Police, and 21 departments within the four General Headquarters.48

The new OMTE was designed to address the training shortfalls that have repeatedly been cited in Kongjun Bao and other PLA newspapers, including expanded training for noncombat military operations; increased proportion of informatized knowledge skills and simulated training with high-technology weapons and equipment, including aircraft; standardized methods, procedures, and criteria for network-centric and “opposing force” training; clarified condi­tions, styles, methods, and requirements for training in complex electromagnetic environments, training at night, and training under adverse weather conditions; established capabilities-based training standards and assessment system; raised standards for basic training; expanded scope of training appraisals; revised eval­uation program; and defined training management scheme, specified duties, and functions of training.

July 1, 2009.

— "PRC Officers Discuss Training Outline Reform," Jefangjun Bao (Internet Version) in Chinese August 15, 2000, 6.

The immediate Chinese leadership response to Tiananmen was a polit­ical clampdown and economic retrenchment, but by early 1991 economic growth had resumed and the stage was set for further economic reforms that would lay the foundation for sustained Chinese growth. Openness to trade and foreign investment helped the Chinese economy grow rapidly and develop a deeper civilian technology base. Although the United States and Western European countries sought to limit Chinese access to Western arms and military technology through export controls and sanctions, the lure of access to China’s market ultimately gave China’s defense industries access to considerable dual-use technology that could be “spun on” to military appli­cations. Moreover, the rapid advancement of computer, communications, and material technologies in a globalized economy meant that technologies once used primarily in military industries became ubiquitous (and free from export controls).

The Chinese defense industry’s access to advanced computers in the mid-1990s supported efforts to develop more sophisticated design capabilities. Supercomputers obtained from the United States after export laws were loos­ened in 1996 and 1998 were later used to simulate the detonation of nuclear warheads without actual underground testing.98 China’s shipbuilding industry also made new advances enabled by computer-assisted design (CAD) technol­ogy to improve both the quantity and quality of maritime vessels.99 The Xian FBC-1 fighter-bomber (also known as the JH-7) presents the most compelling example of U. S. supercomputer technology being used to expand Chinese mil­itary aviation capabilities. Designed to replace outdated light bombers like the Nanchang Q-5 and Harbin H-5, the development program for the JH-7 began in the 1980s. Six prototypes were developed in the early 1990s and delivered to the PLAAF and PLANAF for evaluation. An upgraded variant, the JH-7A, came out around 2000 and was the first Chinese aircraft based solely on CAD design. Chinese engineers reportedly bragged that the fighter-bomber was designed using supercomputers imported from the United States. The fact that Xian Jiaotong University houses a supercomputer and has ties to the Xian Air­craft Industry Corporation (XAC) and the 603d Aircraft Design Institute, the principal contractors on the JH-7A, may explain why CAD technologies were applied to the JH-7A rather than the more advanced J-10 fighter. In the wake of discoveries during the 1990s that China had diverted some supercomputers acquired from the United States for military purposes, Congress passed a law in 1998 tightening restrictions on the technology. China’s indigenous efforts to develop its own supercomputers since the late 1990s have made the law (at least as it applies to China) somewhat irrelevant.100 A 2003 report cites the twin seat J-10BS variant as the first Chinese fighter produced with CAD, noting that the software decreased the time it took to render design drawings from 10 to 6 months.101 The fact this achievement was reported publicly does not con­tradict the conclusion that the JH-7 was China’s first CAD assisted fighter, but instead hints at the fact that the J-10BS was the first example of a military air­craft designed using domestically produced CAD technology. All subsequent Chinese military aviation development projects almost certainly utilize CAD.

Although China lost legitimate access to most Western defense tech­nologies after Tiananmen, it continued existing defense technology ties with Israel and reestablished them with Russia. Ukraine also emerged as an impor­tant source of air-to-air (AAM) and air-to-surface missiles (ASM) for the PLAAF.102 Unlike the previous Sino-Soviet defense arrangement where Beijing was dependent on Moscow and negotiated from a weaker bargaining position, the economically tumultuous post-Soviet Russian state was much more depen­dent on China as a buyer. This allowed China to gain access to both advanced fighters and aviation technologies that a more solvent Russian government likely would have preferred not to sell.

In response to these new opportunities, China pursued multiple options to advance military modernization. The PLA purchased limited quantities of advanced Russian aircraft, ships, and submarines in order to gain experience operating modern weapons systems. For the PLAAF, this included acquisition of the Su-27 fighter and the S-300 surface-to-air missile. The deal eventually evolved into a coproduction arrangement intended to produce 200 aircraft and then into efforts to reverse engineer key components to create an independent production capability. Chinese defense industries continued efforts to develop their own new systems, seeking to integrate advanced imported technologies and components into the design where Chinese equivalents were not available. The J—10 fighter, which uses Russian engines, is one such example. Chinese defense industries also sought to adapt imported and indigenous avionics and armaments to improve the capabilities of older platforms.

At the strategic level, in keeping with Deng’s earlier pronouncements regarding the centrality of airpower in winning modern wars, the Chinese began investing more time in related research. Academics and military strat­egists examined U. S. and Soviet theories on how to achieve maximum effect through the use of airpower.103 Beijing was realistic about the relative weak­ness of the PLAAF when measured against its U. S. and Soviet counterparts. While it assimilated airpower strategy as conceived by the superpowers, China was equally interested in understanding how countries with qualitatively less advanced air forces could employ airpower against more powerful opponents. Several works cite surprise attacks by the Argentine air force against British naval forces during the Falklands War as an illustrative example.104 It was also during this time period that Chinese defense analysts and military planners began to translate the emphasis on expanded airpower into concrete technol­ogy acquisition and procurement goals. In the early 1990s, the PLA was still operating under significant budget constraints; since the outset of opening and reform, resources had been shifted to nondefense areas of the economy. Despite this situation, PLAAF planners mapped out a development trajectory for the air force which has been more or less followed: (1) phase out equip­ment based on antiquated technology; (2) place emphasis on aircraft quality over quantity; (3) graft, when possible, new technology (radar, avionics, mis­siles) onto older airframes to increase combat effectiveness and extend service life; and (4) focus on long-term self-reliance, while filling existing technology gaps in military aviation via procurement of foreign equipment/knowledge.105

In 1998, China undertook a massive restructuring of its defense industry with the aim of ensuring that the PLA was adequately involved in procurement decisions. Prior to creation of the General Armaments Department (GAD), the intermediary between the end user of weaponry (PLA) and the supplier (the defense industry) was the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). This system resulted in a fundamental mis­alignment of interests as COSTIND failed to properly represent the needs of the Chinese military, instead allowing the weapons producers to advance their own institutional interests at the expense of the PLA.106 The defense reforms of the late 1990s allowed the PLA, through the GAD, to take the lead in dictating procurement requirements based on actual need.107 While the reforms did not specifically address resource competition among the service branches, they did provide a mechanism for the PLAAF to align procurement with its strategic development objectives. Leadership support for increased airpower capability also helped the PLAAF advance its procurement agenda.