Category A VERTICAL EMPIRE

Firms

De Havilland Propellers (later Hawker Siddeley Dynamics or HSD) was of course the largest contractor, building up to 18 flight models of Blue Streak (not all of which were completed) as well as several non-flight vehicles. Large test stands had also to be erected at Hatfield for proving purposes. Rolls Royce developed the prototype RZ 1 engines (copies of the American S3 engine) then designed and built the RZ 2.

De Havilland was also responsible for the Sprite and Super Sprite, designed to assist take-off for the likes of the Comet and the V bombers, and also the Spectre, used in the rocket interceptors and early test models of Blue Steel.

Armstrong Siddeley, which became Bristol Siddeley Engine (BSE) before being absorbed into Rolls Royce, was one of the first of the firms to be involved in rocket development, with the Snarler and Screamer motors. They were then chosen to develop the Gamma motor for Black Knight, the Stentor motor for Blue Steel and the later Gamma motors for Black Arrow. Their test site was at Anstey, near Coventry.

Napier was also involved in HTP work, producing the Scorpion, installed in Canberra reconnaissance aircraft, and a rocket pack intended for the Lightning fighter.

Many other firms were also involved as subcontractors, and in particular Sperry and Ferranti were responsible for inertial guidance platforms.

All these were mainstream aircraft manufacturers, and as such, their involvement in these projects is immediately obvious. What is less obvious, however, is the large part played by an otherwise rather obscure subcontractor and builder of somewhat indifferent flying boats: Saunders Roe (taken over by Westland in 1959, becoming the British Hovercraft Corporation in 1964, the Westland Aerospace in 1985, before being finally absorbed into GKN Aerospace).

Why Saunders Roe? Their previous history had been that of a small but enterprising firm, involved both in marine work and in aviation, and thus, not surprisingly, concentrating in the main on flying boats. It would be fair to say that many of the flying boat designs were rather indifferent. It would also be fair comment to say that later, from the 1950s onwards, throughout their existence as Saunders Roe and later in various Westland guises, they worked on idiosyncratic and often quite advanced projects that would reach prototype stage, but rarely ever reached production. A review of the projects they undertook reveals programmes with technological fascination, but which were often dead ends. These include:

• the SRA/1, a jet engined flying boat fighter. Three prototypes were built, the first of which flew on 16 July 1947.

• the Princess, a very large turbo prop passenger flying boat. Three prototypes were built, the first of which flew on 22 August 1952.

• the SR53, a mixed power plant (rocket/jet) supersonic interceptor. Two prototypes were built. The project had its inception in 1952, and the first flight was on 16 May 1957.

• the SR177, an extended version of the above. Prototypes were being built at the time of cancellation. Inception 1954, cancelled 1957.

• a design for the specification of F155, producing what would have been the very last word in rocket powered interceptors.

• a ‘hydrofoil missile’ for the Admiralty. This was a design for a large hydro-foil craft, powered by a jet engine driving a large wooden airscrew, under radio control, and carrying sonar and a torpedo. Design study 1957.

• the Black Knight research ballistic rocket. More than 25 built; 22 flown. Inception 1955, first flight 1958, last flight 1965.

• the design brochure for Black Prince (see Chapter 8) 1960.

• a design brochure for a liquid hydrogen stage for the Blue Streak satellite launcher (1961).

• the Black Arrow satellite launcher. Five vehicles built, four launched. Inception 1963, first flight 1969, last flight 1971.

• the SRN-1, Britain’s first hovercraft. Indeed, the firm for some years was known as the British Hovercraft Corporation, developing and building all the British hovercraft.

This is not an exhaustive list. Ironically, all these projects fulfilled their requirements. If Saunders Roe were asked to produce a design, they did so, and it would be fair to say that the designs were exactly what was asked for. If that is the case, then it has to be asked whether the requirements were reasonable to begin with. Hindsight is very valuable, but it is pointless to castigate others for not foreseeing the future. However, a more polite way of rephrasing this would be to say that the projects investigated possibilities which might have had a fruitful outcome, and which were worth investigating for their potential.

In addition, the firm undertook a large number of design studies for other projects. Any firm of this sort will always be thinking of new designs, many of which will never see the light of day, but the Saunders Roe team produced an astonishing array of ideas. Again, most of these, like the ones listed above, are noted as much as anything for their eccentricity. Highest on such a list, second only to the hydrofoil missile, might come a study for a nuclear powered flying boat undertaken for the US Navy.

Money values

It is almost impossible to convert from 1950s and 1960s prices to current prices. One measure is the Retail Price Index (RPI). The RPI in 1960 was 12.6; in 2009 it was 218.0, an increase of more than seventeen fold. At a very rough estimate, multiply by twenty. Thus, Black Prince at £35 million could be obtained for the price of the Millennium Dome!

It can be argued that inflation with regard to defence projects has been higher. The cost of deploying Blue Streak was put at perhaps £600 million, or perhaps £20 billion in today’s currency. On the other hand, the cost of replacing the present Trident system is put at somewhere around £80 billion over twenty years. [1]

That was certainly an accurate forecast!

Hence in September 1954 a letter was sent to the V bomber firms with data for a possible missile3. At this point the design had not been thought through in any detail, and there were up to six different possible configurations under consideration, some with ramjets and solid boosters, others with liquid fuelled rocket motors. The V bomber firms had then to start thinking how they were going to carry the missile on the aircraft.

Vickers, who made the Valiant, were the initial favourites for the contract, which eventually, despite misgivings, went to Avro. The extant papers of the Ministry of Supply give no real reason at all for the choice. Avro had no guided weapons expertise, and had to set up a special department for the purpose, headed by RH Francis, who had previously worked at RAE. His approach was the more measured one of a government department rather than the more urgent and commercial approach of a firm engaged on an urgent defence project.

The Air Staff had specified a missile to be available by 1960, and by about 1965 the missile would effectively have become obsolete since its range was only 100 miles. By this date, it was expected that the Russians would have developed defence in depth, so that a combination of missiles and interceptor aircraft would mean that the bombers would not be able to reach their release points unscathed. Hence its service life would be short. It need not be a particularly sophisticated design, but it did need to be in service on time. Given the performance limits, light alloy would have sufficed for the structure. Propulsion could have been by turbojet, ramjet or rocket motor.

Unfortunately the design produced by Avro was a good deal more sophisticated than was necessary. The airframe was to be built from stainless steel, a difficult material to work with, particularly when it came to bending it in two planes at the same time. A rocket motor was chosen for propulsion, and this would have a considerable impact on the serviceability and availability of the missile when it entered into service.

Blue Steel was not a ballistic missile, but instead was controlled like an aircraft. It was intended for release from the bomber at around 40,000 ft. The aircraft would be travelling at around Mach 0.7 or so. After release, it dived down, and after 4 seconds, at around 32,000 ft, its motors lit up. From there it climbed to around 59,000 ft, then increased speed to Mach 2.3. After that, the missile began a cruise/climb, using only the small chamber of the rocket engine, to over 70,000 ft. When it ran out of fuel or arrived at the target, the motor cut, and the missile dived down to its target.

The engine designed for Blue Steel was designated the PR94, which became known as the Stentor, built by Armstrong Siddeley (later to become Bristol Siddeley). Early test versions used the de Havilland Double Spectre engine until the Stentor became available. The Stentor had two combustion chambers, one of which was of fixed thrust of 25,500 lb at 45,000 ft, the other was to have a variable thrust of between 1,000 lbf and 6,200 lbf at 45,000 ft, and was capable of being throttled. Burning HTP and kerosene, it produced an S. I. of around 220. The large chamber was intended for the boost phase to high altitude; the small chamber for the cruise phase thereafter. The motor turned out to be reliable and effective; so much so that when reports of the failures of the early rounds stated that the rocket engine had failed, the chairman of Armstrong Siddeley wrote a sharp letter pointing out that this was not the case: the engine had been starved of fuel as a result of sloshing in the tanks. He did not want his company associated with the poor reputation the missile had at that time.

The Stentor chamber was the first HTP motor to be made from tubes braised together and formed into shape, rather than the double-walled chambers such as the Gamma or Spectre. The small chamber would, in the course of time, go on to power Black Knight and Black Arrow.

Avro tested the aerodynamics on a 1/8th scale model, moving up to a 2/5th scale model. These were tested by using solid fuel boosters to launch them at the RAE range at Aberporth in Wales, then variants made of light alloys rather than stainless steel were tested. For full scale missiles, the range at Woomera was brought into use, which entailed further delay as specially equipped Valiants had to be prepared (although the Valiant was not to carry the operational weapon, they were used in early trials). There was an attempt to speed up the testing by doing trials at both Aberporth and Woomera. This turned out to be a mistake. Two aircraft had been converted for trials purposes, and so one was based in the UK and the other in Australia. The problem was that they would frequently go unserviceable. If two aircraft had been available in Woomera, then the other could have been used as a back-up.

The problems were many and varied. The Auxiliary Power Unit, made by de Havilland, was particularly troublesome. The unit used HTP, which was catalytically decomposed, and the gases produced then drove a turbine that in turn drove the generator. Sloshing of the fuel caused problems as the missile went through some vigorous manoeuvring as it climbed, levelled off, then went into its final dive.

The weapon was supposed to have been ready to enter service by 1960. In April of that year, the first three rounds of the final version of the missile had been fired at Woomera and each had failed to follow the launch programme. The minutes of the second meeting of the Blue Steel Management board talk about Avro’s ‘dismal record at Aberporth’5 when talking of the delays in flight testing. The first round approximating to the final version was not successfully flown until 1962.

The problems led to the RAE being called in to assess Avro’s performance, and a series of Study Groups were set up. In December 1960 comments were made to the effect that the design of the missile was sound enough, but that ‘the standard of engineering is poor in a number of respects, with far too little emphasis on reliability studies’.6

In addition to work being done on the missile, a considerable amount of work had to be done on the V bombers to prepare them for the missile. The large size of the missile meant that it was carried semi recessed into the fuselage. One of the problems with the Victor bomber was that its ground clearance was quite small – there is a story (quite possibly apocryphal) that the only way to get the missile under the bomb bay was to deflate the tyres of the trolley carrying it, so as to give sufficient clearance.

That was certainly an accurate forecast!

Figure 34. A Blue Steel missile being serviced in a hangar.

Blue Steel came into service at a time when Britain’s deterrent policy was changing rapidly. It had been originally intended to extend the operational life of the V bombers until Blue Streak was deployed in the mid-1960s. When Blue Streak was abandoned in favour of Skybolt, the need for Blue Steel was far less acute, since the Air Staff hoped to have the first squadrons of V bombers equipped with Skybolt deployed by 1964. To the consternation of the British Government and the Air Staff, Skybolt was cancelled at the end of 1962. Some rather tense negotiations led to the Nassau Agreement, whereby the United States agreed to supply Britain with Polaris missiles. The drawback was that it would take some years to build the submarines and equip them with the missiles, and so Blue Steel would have to soldier on long past its ‘sell by’ date.

The Treasury was adamant that there would be no more money for Blue Steel and the V Force. The only way that the bombers could now penetrate Russian airspace was to fly as low as possible: a role in direct contradiction to the design of both aircraft and missile, which would now be launched at an altitude of 1,000 ft.7 This would halve its range, making the system even less viable.

This was not the only problem. The one advantage of choosing a rocket motor was that the missile did not need an air intake, and as a result its radar cross section was very much less – in modern jargon, it was ‘stealthier’. The use of HTP gave rise to a whole host of other problems. The first and unexpected problem was that aircraft de-icing fluids exploded when coming into contact with HTP, which necessitated a rapid change in procedure for de-icing during winter. The time needed to prepare a missile was of the order of seven hours. One option was to keep some missiles partly prepared, which might mean filling with HTP. The HTP had at some stage to be drained out of the missile, and the tanks were then flushed out with water and dried. Only one drying unit was provided for each station, so that after a full-scale exercise or sudden emergency, it could take as long as two weeks for the station to recover its normal peacetime preparedness!

The use of HTP also meant obtaining safety clearances from the Ordnance Board and Nuclear Weapons Safety Committee. Worries about safety meant that the Nuclear Weapons Safety Committee withheld the authority to fuel the missile on the aircraft when the warhead was fitted, the authority to fit the thermal batteries to readiness missiles and the authority to fly the aircraft with the warhead fitted to the missile to a dispersal base. Thus for a considerable part of its service life, Blue Steel could have fuel, or a warhead, but not both.

Blue Steel was only intended as an interim measure, and the Air Staff issued two further Operational Requirements, OR 11498 and OR 11599. These were for air-launched missiles, but ones with much greater ranges. The extra range effectively ruled out a rocket powered missile: the only way such ranges could be achieved was with an air-breathing missile using a turbojet or ramjet, and as such are beyond the scope of this book.

Various proposals were made for extending the range of Blue Steel, but such proposals were effectively just tinkering at the edges. This was summed up in a memo from the Deputy Chief of Air Staff to Watkinson, the then Defence Minister:

In considering Blue Steel and any possible developments of it we must take note of some pretty unpalatable facts. We first started thinking about this weapon in 1952. The OR was accepted by the Ministry of Supply in 1954 for an in service date of 1960 and events have I think proved that had this date been met the weapon would have had a useful and viable life. An in service date of 1963 for a weapon with a range of only 100 miles is however a different matter.

In our submission to the Treasury in 1955 the total R&D was estimated at £12.5M. This is now estimated to be £55M…

In all the circumstances I cannot see that we would be justified in pouring more money into the development of a weapon which has made unsatisfactory progress to date and which remains dangerously close to being a non-viable weapon at the time of its introduction into service.

There was also the fear among the Air Staff that if Avro were given the go – ahead to start work on any of the improved versions then there was a good chance that Mark I might be delayed even further.

Blue Steel eventually came into service with the RAF in a limited capacity at the end of 1962, although it was not until April 1964 that clearance was given for a filled and fuelled operational Blue Steel to be used with the Vulcan Quick Reaction Alert. However, its reliability was not good: in 1963 the RAF estimated that the chances of a powered missile being fit for powered launch at the target was around 40%, and of these, only about 75% would reach their targets. The Victor squadrons were operational until 1968, when they were retired from the Blue Steel role. The Vulcans continued with the missile until 1970, when it was withdrawn from service.

That was certainly an accurate forecast!

Figure 35. The Stentor rocket motor as fitted to Blue Steel.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that HTP/kerosene was a poor choice of propellants for Blue Steel, and that Avro, completely inexperienced in missile development, was a poor choice by the Ministry of Supply for its development. Both these factors extended an already critical development time and led to many operational difficulties. The delays in the programme, the cost overruns and the difficulties involved in handling the missile all conspired to reduce even further the reputation of the British aircraft industry. Blue Steel would be replaced by Polaris, then by Trident – both American-built. It is now half a century from Blue Steel, and Blue Steel was the last offensive British missile to be developed and deployed.

From the narrower perspective of British rocketry, the most useful contribution of Blue Steel was the two thrust chambers, which were the most successful part of the project. The smaller chamber went on to become the chamber that powered the later Gamma engines of Black Knight and Black Arrow. The larger chamber was suggested for various vehicles, but despite its apparent usefulness, was never exploited further. [3]

The European Launcher Development Organisation – ELDO

The political, technical and financial fiasco that would become ELDO grew from an act of political cowardice by the British Government. In an attempt to deflect some of the criticism that he knew would come its way after the Blue Streak cancellation, Watkinson had announced that development would continue as a satellite launcher. This was a disastrous move from several points of view.

Firstly, it deflected very little criticism. Very few people were interested in Blue Streak as a satellite launcher, but they were interested in the effect the cancellation might have on the Government’s defence policy. Secondly, the popular enthusiasm for a satellite launcher was small to non-existent. Thirdly, even civilian development was going to cost a great deal of money, and fourthly, there was no demand for a satellite launcher. It looked very much as though it might become a white elephant before it was even built.

One way round the problem was to try and find partners: Thorneycroft had tried the Commonwealth but had received little concrete help. The French, on the other hand, were very interested, as this note from Selwyn Lloyd, then Foreign Secretary, shows:

The French Ambassador raised with me on the 8th of July the question of Anglo-

French co-operation in the development of Blue Streak as a space project. He said

that the reply to the French aide-memoire had been communicated to the French

Government and that he himself had spoken about the matter to the French Minister

of Defence when he had been in Paris.1

Thorneycroft was anxious to find partners for the launcher, and so a draft document was quickly put together as the basis of an offer to the French:

1. All firings to be done at Woomera.

2. Offer to divide satellites for initial programme equally between partners, each paying their share of the cost.

3. The French to make the third stage boost.

4. French technicians to be associated with the completion of BLUE STREAK and

BLACK KNIGHT, and to be given all design information and know-how in a return for a payment of £X for five years.2

Not everyone was happy with a bilateral deal with the French; Edward Heath, then Lord Privy Seal, wrote to the Minister of Aviation thus:

Although I realise that the French are more likely than anyone else in Europe to make a useful technical and financial contribution to the development of a European launcher, I do not feel it is politically possible now, having made an approach to so many European countries to turn round and tell the Europeans that we propose to enter into an exclusive bilateral scheme with the French…

The French may of course try to steer us towards a bilateral scheme: if so, we should have to think again, and very hard: for I see substantial political objections to some exclusive Anglo-French scheme.. .3

Despite Heath’s objection, a party of French engineers visited London on 29 September, moving on to Farnborough on 30, September followed by a much longer four day visit in November, when the itinerary included Hatfield, Ansty, RPE, Spadeadam, Cowes and London.

Thorneycroft summarised the results of the visits in a note to the Prime Minister:

The French have replied on Blue Streak. Essentially they have said 4 things –

(a) That they will join us in an approach to other countries in Europe.

(b) That they remain uncommitted at this stage.

(c) That they want to make a good slice of the composite rocket themselves.

(d) That it will all take a long time to arrange.

(a) is excellent, (b) and (c) are understandable and (d) must be avoided at all costs.4

Then it was the turn of the British to go to Paris in January 1961. The record of the meeting begins with the sentence: ‘M. Pierratt opened the discussion by stating that the French had received instructions from top level on Wednesday last to work at a joint solution with the British for a European space launcher’ (‘top level’ being interpreted by the British in this context as meaning General de Gaulle himself).

The meeting then went on to discuss the details of the design. The French, at this stage, were leaning towards the idea of a solid fuel second stage deriving from their military programme. The British technical representative, Dr Lyons from RAE, was

… disappointed… not so much that the payload was less, but because it was less flexible in terms of a change in diameter. A 1.5 meter second stage would not produce a good three stage build-up if in later years a Hydrogen third stage was considered. The solid fuel motor would have been a cheaper option, since it was already being developed for the military. The liquid fuelled proposal would use

UDMH and N2O4, although the French admitted when asked what experience they had with these propellants: ‘… very little indeed. They had fired some engines of a research size for very short durations only’.

The most surprising point about the technical exchanges is how seemingly ill- prepared the French were. The first contacts had taken place more than six months ago, the first technical visits more than three months before, yet obviously no detailed consideration had been given to the design at all. If even such a basic point as whether to go for a solid or liquid fuelled design had not been considered in any depth, then there was a great deal of work still to be done. There was an interesting coda to the meeting. To quote:

French said they would try to work out these costs this evening and on Saturday morning. They would have to go carefully into the savings to be made on the military investment and the question of British help in this field was of major importance.

Twinn said we fully recognised this, and in order to be as helpful as possible we would like the French to define in more detail than previously just how we could help with the military programme.5

The items were listed in a separate table:

The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDO Подпись: Methods of manufacture Damping Stage separation Fuel sloshing Coupling between structure and control: frequencies Comparison between inertia and radio guidance

MILITARY INFORMATION EXCHANGE ITEMS

Подпись: EquipmentRefrigeration and cooling

Re-Entry Head Stabilisation, orientation

Rate of spin, methods of spin control

Heat flux

Materials

Equipments concerned with operating the bomb

These are exactly the questions one might expect, although if the French were intending to produce a solid fuelled missile, some of the items such as sloshing would become redundant. It is unlikely that Britain could have given much help on large solid motors. Some of the other items were ones which had given particular difficulty to the British only two or three years before – inertial guidance and re-entry in particular.

Sir Steuart Mitchell’s comment on the re-entry head read as follows:

The design of re-entry head which we finally ended up with for Blue Streak is:-

(a) Of British origin.

(b) It is now joint UK/US information.

(c) It is agreed by the US to be much better than their designs as regards invulnerability and US has now copied it.

(d) As regards invulnerability it is so advanced that neither the US nor ourselves can conceive a counter to it.6

Writing to Solly Zuckermann in a memo entitled ‘Possible Transfer to French Government of Military Technical Information on Blue Streak’, he also notes that:

Re-entry head.

Radar Echo. Information on this is mostly Top Secret and would be of great value to the French. The most advanced work in this field is British and is acknowledged by the US to be ahead of their work. It is thought that future US warheads may be based on this British work.

Release of this information would be contrary to I and II of para 3 in that it could provide an enemy with a ballistic weapon against which we see no defence and it would prejudice American weapons. It is desired to draw particular attention to this point and it is recommended that this information should not be released.

To provide a line of defence on which any technical conversations might be conducted it is suggested that we take the line that –

Details of shape, weight, dimensions, etc. of the Blue Streak re-entry head cannot be discussed as they contain “atomic” information.

Decoys. Information on these would contravene I and II of para 3 above. This is a sensitive Top Secret field in which we are well ahead of the USA who accordingly would be apprehensive if we released information to the French.7

He also made the point that ‘… the re-entry head design is highly specific to the weapon parameters.’

It is clear, however, that the French regarded the military information as something of a quid pro quo:

… they wished to make a political point of associating the exchange of military information with the cost for the space launcher, and they wished to make the inter­dependence clear at Ministerial level by presenting both cost and military exchange papers to Mr Thorneycroft at Strasbourg.8

The British delegation was less than happy with this idea: ‘The representation at Strasbourg was not the channel at which we would prefer to deal with this.’ Mitchell wrote a minute (‘French Proposals for 2nd and 3rd Stage’) for the Minister, summing up the position to date. An interesting comment was that

‘since August [1960] no approach to UK firms to start design of the second and third stages has been permitted, partly to avoid compromising our negotiating position in Europe’. Using a French second stage would increase development time, and CGWL felt that this ‘now gives enough time to develop a liquid hydrogen 3rd stage’.

He also had these comments to make on the French proposals:

… if the French chose a liquid motor for the 2nd stage, and if they followed their present lines of development, the performance of their 2nd stage would again be appreciably lower than that of Black Knight.

This is due to the fact that the French have not developed high performance turbo pump fuel systems on UK or USA lines and, for their weapon development, are not prepared to face up to their technical complexities. They intend to use the cruder method of gas pressurisation of the fuel tanks as a means of pumping the fuel. The resultant penalty in tankage weight is considerable.

As a result of the above, the conclusions as to French 2nd stage performance are as follows:

The French agree that there would be a loss of performance, but argue that it would not be great… We, with much more experience, consider that the penalty would be considerable.9

There was a way round this performance loss: replacing the planned HTP/kerosene third stage with one using liquid hydrogen. His suggestion was:

Participation by other European countries in the Space Club is essential. Hence I suggest that development of the liquid hydrogen 3rd Stage should be offered to a consortium of European countries with some UK technical participation in the development teams.

His final conclusion was that

We are in favour of proceeding with a French 2nd stage and a European 3rd stage, recognising that by so doing the completion date for the European launcher will be delayed by perhaps Ш years and that the total costs may rise by perhaps 10-15%.

There followed some very rapid writing of proposals which would be put to other European countries. The end result was a long brochure, describing the vehicle and its missions in considerable detail10. The introduction provides a useful summary of the history of the project to that date:

After the British Prime Minister’s Statement in May 1959 that an investigation would be made of the adaptation of British rockets for satellite launching, extensive studies of the capabilities of Blue Streak, in combination with other rocket stages, have been made by the United Kingdom Ministry of Aviation at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough.

The later proposal that a satellite launching vehicle system based on a Blue Streak as a first stage should be developed as a joint European and Commonwealth effort, has recently caused these studies to be extended by joint Anglo-French investigations into a design incorporating a French second stage.

The original British proposals were put to representatives of European nations at Church House, Westminster, London on the 9th and 10th January, 1961. At Strasbourg, during the week of 30th January to 3rd February, a preliminary description of a joint Anglo-French proposal was presented for the consideration of representatives of a number of European nations.

One of the guiding principles of the United Kingdom studies was the minimisation of cost, particularly capital cost, and thus the greatest possible use should be made of existing equipment and facilities, including the rocket ground testing and development facilities at Hatfield and Spadeadam, in England, and also the launching and other range facilities at the Weapons Research Establishment, Woomera, Australia.

France, on her side, has undertaken an extensive national programme of basic studies and development of ballistic missiles. The French proposal for a second stage, later to be described, is closely related to this programme in order, again, to minimise cost, delay and technical uncertainty.

This brochure contains outlines of the jointly proposed satellite launching vehicle and its systems as they stand at February, 1961. The opportunity has been taken since the Strasbourg meeting to bring the proposals into accord with the latest technical information. The assessment work which will lead to a full design study is by no means complete, depending as it does considerably on the parts of the work to be undertaken by the European nations involved. All aspects of the combination of the French second stage with Blue Streak have not yet been completely examined. The brochure, therefore, contains the joint Anglo-French proposals as far as they have gone, and where the necessary work has not been completed, the parallel work done on the original British configuration has been referred to. In the absence so far of an alternative proposal for the third stage, the third stage described is the original UK proposal.

The brochure went on to describe the capabilities of the launcher:

(i) A large satellite weighing between one and two thousand pounds in a near circular, near earth, orbit. This satellite would be space-stabilised with a primary purpose of making astronomical observations above the earth’s atmosphere.

(ii) A smaller satellite of several hundred pounds weight, moving in an eccentric orbit out to two or three earth radii, for the investigation of the earth’s gravitational, magnetic, and radiation fields, and the constitution of the earth’s outer atmosphere.

(iii) A satellite of the order of one hundred pounds weight, in a highly eccentric orbit reaching out to about 100,000 miles, to carry instruments for the study of the sun’s atmosphere.

These aims have been subsequently extended to cover the possible launching needs for Satellite Communication Systems and this has led to the consideration, in addition, of circular orbits at several thousand miles altitude.

Подпись: (18-75 M)

The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDO The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDO
The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDO
Подпись: (3-04 8 M)
Подпись: (.31-4 M)
Подпись: CI9-9I M;
Подпись: Г25-5 MJ

The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDO-BREAK UP CHARGES. CHARGES DE DESTRUCTION

KEROSENE TANK. RESERVOIR DE KEROSENE

The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDO

-RATE GYROS. GYROMETRES

Figure 62. The Anglo-French proposal. This is effectively the Black Prince design with a French second stage.

The first three objectives are taken from the Saunders Roe brochure for Black Prince, published a year previously. It does highlight an absurdity of the programme: £60 million for three satellites does seem excessive. The communications requirement is new, and the Saunders Roe liquid hydrogen stage was optimised for just such a role. The main problem was that even 5,000-6,000 miles was still too low an orbit for communication satellites. RAE and others tried looking at 8-hour or 12-hour orbits, but it is only the geostationary orbit which is of any practical use.

The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDO

Figure 63. The French proposal for the second stage (the final version would be very similar, except that the one large chamber would be replaced by four smaller ones).

The brochure then went on to describe the vehicle in more detail:

The original British proposal for the second stage was to use a modified form of the ballistic research vehicle Black Knight. This has now been replaced by a proposed French second stage making use of techniques currently under development in that country. This stage will be propelled by a liquid propellant engine using Nitrogen Tetroxide and UDMH with, a sea level thrust of 25 tons (32 tons vacuum) and vacuum Specific Impulse of 276 seconds. The vehicle tanks contain approximately 7 tons of propellants and are pressurised by means of a solid propellant gas generator. The single thrust chamber is gimbal mounted for control in pitch and yaw. Roll control is achieved by means of auxiliary jets mounted at the top of the vehicle…

Studies indicate that it is possible to inject a satellite into orbit using the proposed two stage combination but this would necessitate a long coasting period after perhaps 90% of the second stage propellants had been burnt, followed by a relight of the second stage engine to inject both satellite and empty second stage into orbit. This approach introduces problems of relighting the engines under zero acceleration as well as the necessity for ensuring correct orientation of the second stage at engine relight.

Though such problems have been solved in other satellite launchings, the two stage vehicle would give considerably reduced payloads and would be unable to put any payload into higher orbits. The preferred approach is therefore to introduce a small third stage rocket. This is sometimes referred to as a vernier stage. The engine of this stage, working at a relatively low thrust level of between 1000 lb and 2000 lb would be started during separation from the second stage and would continue to burn through what would otherwise be the coasting period, cutting off when orbital altitude and velocity had been achieved. The low weight of the third stage structure and engines, compared with that of the relit second stage, affords considerable improvement in payload weight into low orbits and makes possible the injection of payloads into very high orbits.

The British proposal for a third stage engine is a four chamber design, each chamber pivoted about one axis for steering. It would use hydrogen peroxide and kerosene. With low thrust and four chambers, very high nozzle expansion ratios, of 1000 : 1, are possible without undue chamber size and length…

The European Launcher Development Organisation - ELDOIt is possible to meet the several orbital requirements by exchanging satellite payload weight for propellent weight in the third stage whilst maintaining constant the overall weight of the third stage plus satellite payload at some 5000 lb; that is, the third stage incremental velocity can be increased at the expense of payload. The tank volume is altered to suit the orbital mission allowing the remainder of the third stage, including the engine, and all equipment, to remain sensibly unchanged.

For the configuration just described, with a take-off thrust of 300,000 lb weight a satellite of 2,160 lb may be put into a 300 mile circular polar orbit.

Corresponding payloads for elliptical polar orbits, both with perigee heights of 300 miles, and apogee height of 7000 and 100,000 miles, are respectively 910 lb and 320 lb.

For a typical high altitude equatorial orbit (launched near the equator) at, say, 5000 miles altitude; a payload weight of 700 lb is calculated.

These are ‘nominal’ payloads making some allowances for weight growth of the launching vehicle. It would be prudent, however, to assume that actual payloads would be perhaps 200 lb less than these nominal values to allow for unforeseen contingencies.

The negotiations were not easy. Enthusiasm for the project in Europe was very limited. Indeed, in May 1961, Thorneycroft asked Mitchell what needed to be done to go ahead with an all-British launcher, and received a reply saying that it would be quite straightforward with the original HTP design, with or without the liquid hydrogen stage. Even Australia seemed to be making difficulties, and Thorneycroft took the unusual step of writing to Mitchell to ask whether it was feasible to launch Blue Streak from Spadeadam!

The conclusion to his hastily written paper (the full version can be found in Appendix A):

Spadeadam is technically both feasible and attractive. From the cost point of view, it is approximately the same as Woomera, and is much cheaper than any alternative.

It must be accepted, however, that some cut-downs on to UK territory would inevitably occur if we fire from Spadeadam. The chance of serious damage to life and property from such cut-downs are numerically small.

The risk of damage to foreign countries, or to shipping, is negligible.

The crucial point is the political acceptability of the risk in the UK Hitherto this has been regarded as unacceptable, and it would be no less now than when previously considered. My advice is that the risk is appreciable and should not be accepted.11

As Mitchell says, the crucial point is political acceptability. The thought of launching a rocket as large as Europa from an inland site in Britain is one which should fill any politician with horror. The repercussions from an accident would be horrendous.

There is also another technical point. Mitchell describes the launch direction as ‘North 15 East’, or 015° in modern parlance. To be restricted in launch direction in this fashion very much reduces the value of the site (and this also applied to Woomera). Different satellites fulfilling different roles need different orbits. It certainly would be useless for communication satellites.

Fortunately, agreement was reached with the Australians, and Woomera would indeed become the launch site for the first ten launches.

Although several European countries sent delegates, most of Thorneycroft’s efforts were devoted to persuading the German and Italian Governments to join the project. Both countries were reluctant; the Italians wanting to reserve their money for their own national programme. Belgium and the Netherlands were willing to participate, but their contributions would be small. Denmark had taken part in the discussions but decided in the end not to join, but again any Danish contribution would not have been very significant.

After further protracted negotiations, Germany agreed to join, and would build the third stage; the Italians would provide the satellite fairings and the Satellite Test Vehicle (STV). Thus the final membership of ELDO consisted of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, with Australia making the seventh member.

The cost of the programme was split thus

Britain:

38.8%

France:

23.9%

West Germany:

22.0%

Italy:

9.8%

Belgium:

2.9%

Netherlands:

2.6%

Australia would make no direct contribution, but would instead develop the Woomera launch site.

Подпись: Figure 65. The inital design for the ELDO launcher. ELDO came into formal being in March 1962 by a Convention which was signed by the seven Governments and which came into force on 29 February 1964 after ratification by the signatory states. The headquarters were in Paris, and it was governed by a Council that had two representatives for each member state. The Council was assisted by an International Secretariat under the direction of a Secretary General, with two Deputy Secretaries General, one in charge of technical affairs and the other of administrative affairs. The staff of the Secretariat amounted to around 180 people in 1965.

But while design work for the new launcher had started, ELDO itself was already running into serious political trouble. Indeed, it would spend most of its existence staggering from crisis to crisis, either technical, financial or political.

By 1964, the design of the vehicle had finally been decided12, and work was beginning on the design and construction of the upper stages. The French then dropped something of a bombshell by stating ELDO A was inadequate, that it should be dropped, and that the organisation’s efforts should be directed towards a new launcher, ELDO B.

There were immediate objections from the other member states, mainly on the grounds that an entirely new upper stage would be technically demanding and take several more years to develop, whilst in the meantime, nothing else would be happening. Blue Streak had already been successfully tested, and work was proceeding on F4, which was Blue Streak with dummy upper stages. Under the French proposal, there would be no further launches for some years until the new upper stages had been designed and developed. To be fair to the French, if ever there was a time to go for a design that was far more capable, this was it, but given that it had already taken four years to get to the point of beginning work on ELDO A,

the reluctance of the other countries was understandable.

But the French took their objection to ELDO A one step further: they refused to provide any further funding. This did produce quite a serious crisis: without an agreed budget, all work would grind to a halt by the middle of 1965. Negotiations with the French proved difficult: the British representative referred to what he called ‘decisions handed down from Mount Olympus’ – in other words, a decision taken on high, and presumably a reference to General de Gaulle, which the French ELDO representatives could do little about. One junior minister, Austen Albu, described the situation thus: ‘Whatever the merits of the case we are in fact being blackmailed by the French.’13

The British Government had by now become actively hostile to ELDO, and there were hopes that French intransigence might bring about the collapse of the organisation.

From the economic point of view, the safest course would still appear to be to decline any further financial obligations beyond our share of the original £70 million on ELDO A, to which we are already committed. It has certainly not been demonstrated that a firm stand on these lines will involve serious dangers to those policies on which it is really important that we should have our neighbours’ support [referring to other members of ELDO]. Such action might indeed gain us enhanced respect in the more responsible sections of our neighbours’ administrations…

If however the feeling of Minister’s colleagues is against such risk of friction to neighbourly relations as a firm stand might involve, the next best course would be to take the line that on present evidence Britain

is not prepared to depart from ELDO A as originally conceived,

is unwilling to proceed to completion of the ELDO A programme until more

adequately costed,

as regards ELDO B no commitment could be considered until much more information was available.

There are many who consider that if Britain takes a position along these lines ELDO will die a natural death, without Britain having to plunge the dagger. First Secretary, however, will appreciate that such a happy outcome cannot be guaranteed and that the more moderate course must carry the risk of a lingering British involvement in these unrewarding activities.14

There were attempts at a compromise. One was to proceed with what was called ELDO A(1+3), to keep the programme going whilst work began on ELDO B. This was a proposal to put the German third stage on top of Blue Streak – hence the (1+3) designation. This, it was thought, could put 300 kg into a 500 km orbit. Use of an apogee motor would enable payloads to be put into highly elliptical orbits, which might suit some of the proposed European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) requirements. Given that the German stage was the least well developed part of Europa, this too was somewhat optimistic.

An ELDO document15 described the proposal thus:

The 1+3 programme would provide for development of basic techniques, establishment of facilities, and experience by personnel as a foundation for the ELDO B programme including proof of the first stage and engines; development of throttled engines, live-stage separation; instrumentation, safety, nose-fairing and STV separation, and inertial guidance. This is work which can only be carried out in a vehicle based on Blue Streak.

The studies so far undertaken, necessarily limited by time, give the Secretariat good grounds of assurance that the programme is technically feasible.

The payload performance of the 1+3 vehicle is strongly dependent on the 3rd stage performance and empty mass. Its round to round variation will be somewhat smaller than that of the original three-stage vehicle. For a 300 km orbit, the upper limit of payload performance is about 500 kg…

This payload performance would have application to:

a) missions requiring light satellites, e. g. for navigation, meteorology or geodesy,

b) ESRO requirements for the launch of small satellites, i. e. those within the launching capacity of Thor Delta.

It was a proposal that died together with ELDO B. A 500 kg payload is quite respectable, but whether it would be worth using a launcher as expensive as the (1+3) scheme is debatable. A sketch of the proposed vehicle is shown on the left.

Подпись: Figure 66. The ‘1+3’ proposal. The (1+3) programme was intended to run in parallel with the ELDO B development, but ELDO B was abandoned as a result of the Intergovernmental Conference in July 1966. Instead, a new five year programme was drawn up, starting in January 1967 at an estimated cost of 331 MMU. (1 MMU was effectively the same as 1 US dollar, so at the then rate of exchange this was a little less than £120 million.) 10 MMU were set aside for ‘studies and experimental’ work – ELDO B was not entirely dead yet.

On the other hand, the rejection of ELDO B left the organisation with a vehicle that had very little purpose. In order to salvage something from the wreck, the Perigee Apogee System (PAS) was put forward. This consisted of two solid fuel motors and a communications satellite. The system would be put into orbit by Europa, then the first solid fuel motor

would be fired to put the satellite into a highly elliptical geosynchronous transfer orbit. The apogee motor would convert the elliptical orbit into a circular orbit.

A geosynchronous orbit required a launch site close to the equator – and Woomera was too far south. The launch corridors from Woomera were very restricted by the centres of population below the flight path. ELDO set about finding an alternative site, and the two main contenders were Kourou or Darwin, and, as we shall see, Kourou was chosen.

So a new launch site for Blue Streak was built in the depths of the South American jungle. The last launch of Europa from Woomera was F9, after which Australia left the organisation. A non-flight model Blue Streak, known as DG, was taken out to Kourou to test the facilities. F11 (there was no F10) would be the first launch from South America, the first with the PAS operational, carrying a communications satellite for France, and the last ever launch of Blue Streak and Europa.

BK17

Two stage. Launched 7 June 1961 20:50. Apogee 362 miles.

BK17 was another two-stage vehicle but with a lighter low-drag eroding head to give higher re-entry speed. The first stage performance was very good. The kerosene level sensor and HTP probes worked well and propellant usage in flight was determined. Visual observation and camera records of re-entry were confusing, but it soon became clear that the second stage had not functioned correctly. The head and tape recorder were recovered, and subsequent analysis of head tape record and body telemetry indicated that second stage separation occurred at re-entry and not at the end of first stage burning. It was possible to deduce from the records that the failure of second stage separation at first stage burn-out was due to failure of one of the two explosive bolts. In later vehicles explosive bolts and associated circuits were duplicated. At re-entry the second stage was torn off, followed by second stage burning.

The tape of the recorder in the head ran out before re-entry. In subsequent heads, the speed of the tape in the tape recorder was reduced so as to run for a longer period and ensure recording re-entry.

R3 – 28 October 1971

R3 was dispatched to Australia early in 1971, and the second stage arrived at Woomera on 26 July, followed by the first stage on 17 August. Static firing of the second stage occurred on 1 September, and the two stages and the back-up satellite had been assembled by 1 October. The complete vehicle was given a static firing test on 8 October, and the flight model satellite was fitted by 22 October. A decision was made to delay the launch until 26 October, but systems checking delayed the launch further.

Derek Mack, one of the Saunders Roe launch team (Saunders Roe had by then become the British Hovercraft Corporation), remembers the morning of 28 October as a cool, fresh Australian spring day, with clear skies. The overnight crew had filled the HTP tanks and adjusted the kerosene levels, as well as arming the many pyrotechnic systems on the vehicle. The gantry was wheeled back at 11:00, but there was some alarm when the Attitude Reference Unit, which steers the vehicle, began to give erratic signals. There was relief when it was realised that this was due to the vehicle swaying gently in the light breeze. The vehicle lifted off smoothly, and the various telemetry stations north of Woomera reported that all events had been successful. However, this did not yet mean that the launch had been successful: it was only when the global satellite station at Fairbanks reported an operational signal from a satellite on a frequency of 137 MHz that the team knew that they had an orbiting satellite. The party could begin, but there was a sour taste to it.

R3 launched the Prospero satellite (X3) into orbit on 28 October 1971, in a text book launch.19 The programme had meanwhile been cancelled by an announcement in Parliament by the new Minister at the Department of Trade and Industry, Frederick Corfield, on 29 July 1971. The teams that had built Black Arrow and launched it were out of a job.

Prospero had a mass of 66 kg, and was launched into an orbit of perigee 557 km, apogee 1,598 km, and an inclination to the equator of 82°. It is still in orbit. It carried four experiments:

(a) To determine the thermal stability of a number of new surface finishes.

(b) To determine the behaviour of new silicon solar cells.

(c) An experiment in hybrid electronic assemblies.

(d) An experiment by Birmingham University to determine the flux of micro meteorites.

The satellite was formed from eight faces covered with 3,000 solar cells. Since the spacecraft would be in the earth’s shadow for part of its orbit, rechargeable batteries were also carried.

The flight sequence for the Prospero satellite launch was:

Event Time (seconds)

Lift-off 0

First stage engine shut down (HTP depleted) 126.9 Stage separation/second stage ignition 133.5

Inter stage bay separation 139.1

Payload fairing separation 180.0

Second stage shut down (HTP depleted) 256.9

Pressurise attitude control system 262.5

Spin-up rockets 575.0

Stage separation 577.0

Third stage ignition 590.0

Payload separation 710.1

The fifth vehicle, R4, was never fired, and is now on display in the Science Museum, London.

Rocket Motors

Rocket motors work by ejecting gases at high speed. From the physics point of view, the momentum given to the gases will be counteracted by an equal and opposite momentum given to the rocket. Rocket motors are designed to make this momentum change as large as possible.

A change in momentum implies a force, since force x time = change in momentum. The force is given by change in momentum per second (strictly speaking, rate of change of momentum). This is usually referred to as the rocket thrust, measured in newtons, or, in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, in lb – a shorthand for pounds force.

Gases moving at high speed have kinetic energy, and in almost all rocket motors this kinetic energy comes from chemical energy. With solid fuel motors, the fuel and the oxidant are melted together and poured into a casing to cool and solidify. Almost all liquid fuel rockets need both a fuel and an oxidant. There are a few chemicals which can be used by themselves (referred to as monopropellants) – hydrazine (N2H4) and hydrogen peroxide (H202) are examples. They can be decomposed directly to gases (usually by means of a catalyst). The drawback is that they are not very energetic and tend to be used only for small control jets.

The most common rocket fuels are:

• hydrocarbons, referred to generically as ‘kerosene’ (some early British documents refer to ‘kerosine’), usually as some form of jet fuel.

• hydrazine or some related compound (usually UDMH – Unsymmetrical DiMethyl Hydrazine or (CH3)2N. NH2).

• liquid hydrogen.

Kerosene is cheap, easy to handle, not volatile and not poisonous. Hydrazine is easily storable, and it is mostly used in combination with dinitrogen tetroxide, N204. Both produce highly poisonous fumes, and dinitrogen tetroxide is also very corrosive. They ignite spontaneously on contact (i. e. they are hypergolic). The combination is often used in missiles which are left fuelled up on a long-term basis, or in upper stages of satellite launchers, particularly when a restart capability is needed.

Liquid hydrogen is the most energetic and effective fuel, although it suffers from two major drawbacks: it boils at -253 °C or 20 K, and has an extremely low density of 71 kg/m3 compared with 1,000 kg/m3 for water. Low density implies large tank volume and, as a consequence, extra weight.

Kerosene was the usual fuel of choice in the UK, with either liquid oxygen or HTP as the oxidants. Although a good deal of research and development was done on liquid hydrogen, including test firing of liquid hydrogen chambers, sadly no rocket stages were built using liquid hydrogen.

Common oxidants are liquid oxygen, and as mentioned, dinitrogen tetroxide in combination with hydrazine. However, Britain was to make extensive use of another oxidant, hydrogen peroxide (H2O2), and the way it was used was and still is unique. Hydrogen peroxide was used in the form of High Test Peroxide or HTP, a solution with 85% of hydrogen peroxide and 15% water. Hydrogen peroxide can be decomposed to steam and oxygen at a high temperature using a catalyst – nickel gauze plated with silver, the silver being the catalyst. In this way, the HTP could be used as a monopropellant, but it was much more efficient to inject a fuel such as kerosene into the hot gases to be burnt in the oxygen produced in the decomposition. HTP was also thought to be safer and easier to handle than liquid oxygen. In 1952, the decision was taken to use only HTP motors for all liquid propellant rockets used on, or in, aircraft1.

Blue Streak – The Origins

The story of Blue Streak divides into two phases, phases which are very sharply divided from each other: the military and the civil. The civil phase was an afterthought, a by-product from the military. Blue Streak was cancelled as a military weapon in 1960, and its life as a civil project began with the intention of creating a satellite launcher from what had been intended as a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). But after 14 years and hundreds of millions of pounds of expenditure (much to the despair of the Treasury) neither programme yielded useful results – but that was not the rocket’s fault. Technically, the design was excellent. Almost every launch was flawless. But it spent most of its life in search of a role.

The original intent behind Blue Streak was to produce a guided weapon capable of carrying a megaton range warhead to the strategically important parts of the USSR. Design work began in 1955 and the final result was a technological snapshot of rocketry progress circa 1957. In principle and design it was very close to its American and Russian counterparts, and very much their equivalent. But to realise this, we have to look briefly at the history of guided weapons.

The V2 was notoriously inaccurate, and given in addition its limited payload (1 tonne of high explosive), it was not an effective military weapon. Following the war, both the Americans and the Russians pressed on with improved designs, based around the V2 concept. The British devoted relatively little effort to large rockets at this stage, and such work was, in the main, theoretical, although three captured V2s were fired off in Cuxhaven, Germany (Operation Backfire) in what was effectively a familiarisation exercise. However, the post-war rocketry effort in the three countries began to solve some of the three major problems of guidance, accuracy and range.

Most of the work done in the UK in the early 1950s simply consisted of studies of possibilities. The technologies of the time were changing fast, and the problems were firstly to choose which would be the most fruitful, and secondly, to try and estimate how far the technologies could be usefully developed. One of the first significant British developments in this field of long-range delivery
systems was a report commissioned from the English Electric Company Ltd.1 Work on the report, entitled ‘Long Range Project’, by LH Bedford, started in March 1952, and the completed report was delivered in July 1953. The first consideration was that of range and accuracy. The report took a range for the weapon of 2,000 nautical miles with circular error probability (c. e.p.) of the order of 1,500 ft as the target to be aimed for (c. e.p. refers to the probability of 50% of the missiles landing that distance from the aiming point). Three types of missiles were considered: the ramjet, the glide rocket and the ballistic rocket. The guidance system for all of these was taken to be integrating accelerometers using gyroscopes. The times of flight were calculated as 16 minutes for the ballistic rocket, 25 minutes for the glide rocket and 50 minutes for the ramjet. The significance of this was that the accuracy of the system decreased as time of flight increased. Thus the ballistic rocket was to be preferred on two counts: that of accuracy and that of invulnerability. Intercepting a warhead from a ballistic missile is a task that even today is extremely difficult. Indeed, if attempted operationally on a system with even rudimentary decoys, it is well-nigh impossible.

The two major problems of the ballistic rocket were identified firstly as obtaining a sufficiently high S. I. from the rocket motors, and secondly the problems of re-entry into the atmosphere. In neither case were practical solutions offered, nor was there any attempt to suggest design features such as the fuel to be used. The report was still theoretical and speculative.

Подпись: Range: 500 1.500 2.500 Подпись: Ram Jet Winged Rocket 24,000 22,000 34.0 56,000 48.0 135,000 Подпись: Ballistic Rocket 35,000 105.000 210.000

The RAE was conducting its own studies into the same areas as the English Electric Report, and it is interesting to note the estimated all-up weights of the three options2:

(Range is given in nautical miles; weights in thousands of pounds)

This has important implications for the design of any ballistic missile: a mass of 210,000 lb implies a lift-off thrust of at least 250,000 lb. It was noted that the ballistic missile would be much heavier than the others, and that if it were to be chosen it would be because of its much greater chance of survival against enemy defences. The calculations were done assuming liquid oxygen and kerosene as propellants, and give a remarkably accurate prediction for the weight of what would become Blue Streak.

As a consequence of these deliberations, the RPD at Westcott pressed ahead with design studies on larger motors. But even at the end of 1954 no formal summary had been made of the RPD’s overall policy on the ballistic missile, as it was felt the position was constantly changing. At the same time, research was continued on a series of rocket engines that went under the generic name of Delta. Despite RPD’s earlier dislike of kerosene as a rocket fuel, these were lox/kerosene fuelled, and mainly for research purposes. There was no firm design for a missile at this stage, although speculative drawings of how to fit several motors together for such a missile were made.

Commercial firms were also interested in the concept: during a meeting between the RAE, RPD and Rolls Royce, the company stated that:

In their own studies they had assumed a warhead of 10,000 lb and minimum range of 2,500 miles and had produced a preliminary design. This design was a single stage missile with an all-up weight of 250,000 lb and empty weight 18,000 lb giving a mass ratio (empty/all up) of 0.072. Thirty-three chambers of 10,000 lb thrust each were used.

Apart from the number of chambers, again this sounds very much like Blue Streak.

At around this time the ramjet and the glide rocket drop out of consideration. The glide rocket was never a very serious candidate. The ballistic missile with separating warhead and self-contained guidance system has the great advantage that it was, and still is, almost invulnerable to defensive counter measures. A missile is also much better equipped to carry decoys; in other words, dummy re­entry vehicles or devices that would look the same as a re-entry vehicle to enemy radar. Decoys have been an on-going area of research up to the present day.

The ramjet is not as vulnerable to guided missiles as the manned aircraft, but does not begin to compare with a free falling re-entry vehicle at velocities of several thousand ft per second. Height is also a factor here: today’s turbofan subsonic cruise missile is designed to fly as low as possible since terrain following radar and accurate guidance have subsequently been developed to make this possible. Supersonic ramjets would be high flying and more vulnerable to defensive missiles.

In 1954 the Sandys/Wilson agreement was signed between the UK and the US, whereby the two countries agreed to collaborate on long range missiles; the British concentrating on medium range weapons whilst the Americans would aim for intercontinental ranges. However, to produce an effective military weapon, there were several important problems to be solved other than simply building a big enough rocket. For the missile to fulfil its function, all the systems had to work together. Loss of just one would render the weapon impotent.

The first of these problems was that of guidance. Radio/radar guidance during the launch phase was possible. However, such external guidance could easily be jammed or destroyed, particularly during a nuclear attack. The answer lay in internal inertial guidance, using gyroscopes and accelerometers to determine the vehicle’s heading and speed accurately. The American Atlas missile used a form of radio guidance, but all other missiles carried inertial guidance. A form of radio guidance for Blue Streak was also developed for a time before being abandoned as too easy to jam and too easy to destroy, and also because there was an economy drive on! There were many obstacles to an accurate inertial guidance system in the 1950s, before the advent of transistors and when electronics depended on power-hungry thermionic valves for amplifiers. Suitable gyroscopes were difficult to manufacture, and eventually, partway through the project, gyros had to be bought from the American firm Kearfott. To give some idea of the accuracy which was needed over a range of 2,500 nautical miles, it was stated early in the programme that there was

a requirement for a 50% circular error no greater than 8,000 feet at all ranges. If this requirement should result in undue delay in the introduction of the missile into service the Air Ministry will be prepared to accept a 50% circular error of no greater than 3 miles at all ranges in the first instance.3 [8,000 ft is around one and a half miles.]

A novel feature of these designs for ballistic missiles was that at the moment the engines cut, some two to three minutes after launch, the warhead and its re­entry vehicle would separate from the empty rocket shell and travel along a ballistic path outside the atmosphere towards its target. After a flight time of some tens of minutes, the re-entry vehicle would descend on its target at very high speed – perhaps as much as 15,000 miles per hour. It had to re-enter the atmosphere at this speed, which led to the other unknown of the time: what would happen to such a vehicle? Would it survive re-entry or would it burn up like a meteor? In parallel with Blue Streak, the Black Knight programme was set up to investigate the problem. Guidance and re-entry were the two major imponderables, for which a good deal of work had to be done in parallel to the main project. But what of the rocket itself?

After the Sandys/Wilson agreement had been signed, the US and the UK set out to design missiles which were complementary to each other. Initially, the Americans were to produce the long-range Atlas missile, the British the medium- range Blue Streak. A team of Americans visited the UK in April 1955 to discuss progress. Sir Steuart Mitchell (CGWL) described the British plans, which involved the RAE as the principal designer for the first two years, control being passed to the firms in the second year. The American team was not impressed by this idea. The VCAS (Vice Chief of Air Staff) noted that he had been told in private that

They felt themselves that unless we give it to industry with a free hand it might delay the project greatly. They voiced the opinion at the meeting that the British Technical Civil Service was of a much higher calibre than the American, but that a scheme such as that proposed by Mitchell would just never work in the US.

Whether this was the case is difficult to judge, but certainly, progress in 1956 seems to have been slow. On the other hand, uncertainties as to the warhead, as we shall see, contributed to the delays.

It is also noticeable that the many technical reports that came out of the RAE at this time were also speculative and academic. Typically, a half dozen different design solutions would be carefully evaluated in these reports, but they did not lead to a direct practical design in the way that an aircraft design team might work. British aircraft designers of the time would start with quite detailed sketches, which would be refined up to the final solution. A commercial firm was also under pressure to produce a prototype as soon as possible in a way that the RAE was not.

At the same time, a British team from RAE had visited America, and produced a report defining the problems more clearly. As a result of this, the Air Staff felt sufficiently confident as to issue an Operational Requirement (OR 1139) for the missile in 1955, which stated a requirement to deliver a megaton range warhead over a distance of up to 2,500 miles. An OR is one thing, a design is another. Throughout 1955 and 1956, whilst work started on Black Knight and on other aspects of the programme, arguments went back and forward as to the details of the design. The crucial point, from which all else flowed, was: should it have one motor or two? The motor under consideration, an American design, had a thrust of 135,000 lb. This implied a missile weight of no more than 100,000 lb with only one motor. A two motor design could be double that mass. The critical factor, and an unknown factor, was the payload, and the payload was, of course, a megaton warhead and its re-entry vehicle.

With only one motor and a warhead weight of 2,000 lb, the maximum range that could be expected was only 1,900 miles – not enough. There was a further snag: Britain did not have a thermonuclear warhead weighing only 2,000 lb. Indeed, Britain did not have a thermonuclear warhead at all – in 1955, the design of such a warhead was only just beginning. It would not be until late in 1957 that such a device would be tested successfully. The only warhead that might have done the job weighed 4,500 lb – far too much. Some lateral thinking would be needed.

The Political Failure of ELDO

But in parallel with this crisis, another was developing; this time within the British Government. ELDO had been set up by the Conservative Government under Macmillan, and Douglas Home, Macmillan’s successor, was not in office long enough to bring about any major policy changes. The new Labour Government under Harold Wilson took a very different view of the organisation, aided by the Civil Service, who had always been opposed to ELDO, and saw their chance to cancel it. The Treasury memo on space to the new Chancellor, Jim Callaghan, in 1964 is an interesting read (it is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix A)16.

Part of Wilson’s rhetoric at the 1964 General Election had revolved around the idea that the Conservative Government had been out of date and out of touch, as opposed to a more dynamic Labour Party. The phrase ‘the white heat of the technological revolution’ is attributed to him after his speech at the Labour Party Conference at Scarborough in October 1963. Like many such catch phrases, he did not say it quite in this form; it has been slightly paraphrased. (His actual words were ‘In all our plans for the future, we are re-defining and we are re­stating our Socialism in terms of the scientific revolution. But that revolution cannot become a reality unless we are prepared to make far-reaching changes in economic and social attitudes which permeate our whole system of society. The Britain that is going to be forged in the white heat of this revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or for outdated methods on either side of industry.’)

Wilson felt that the Conservatives had committed themselves to some extremely expensive technological programmes such as Concorde, TSR 2, ELDO, and so on, and that the scientists, engineers and technicians involved should instead be working in private industry, helping to produce up-to-date goods for both the domestic and export markets. A number of aviation projects were cancelled in 1965, but Concorde and ELDO proved to be more difficult – they were international projects, and the Government had signed treaties which were hard to break. If the British Government were to cancel the projects, then they would be repudiating the treaties and be liable for damages – and the cost of the damages might well soak up any saving (although it is probable that the Government ended up spending far more on both Concorde and ELDO than it would have paid in damages as a result of cancellation in 1964).

Having discovered that pulling out of ELDO might be more trouble than it was worth, the British began employing other tactics. One was a demand for a reduction in its share of the budget. The argument being used here was that other countries were benefiting from developing new technologies, whereas developing Blue Streak was fairly routine work and nothing new was being learned.

Another tactic was to become excessively legalistic as to the nature of the work being carried out – whether it was part of the ‘original programme’ or not. The British Government had signed up to the programme as agreed in the original convention, and nothing else. Any change to the programme – for example, the perigee/apogee system – could then be opposed on the basis that it was not in the original agreement. These problems became more acute as costs rose, and new budgets had to be negotiated. Finally, the British Government effectively withdrew on the basis that it was interested in developing the technology that went into the satellites rather than the launchers. This withdrawal was de facto rather than de jure, as we shall see.

An example of the British attitude can be seen in a memo concerning the French and ELDO B:

If ministers accept the Chief Secretary’s view that the UK should not participate in the ELDO programme as proposed by the Minister of Aviation, it will be important to handle this in such a way as to minimise political repercussions. I do not doubt that if the UK delegate were to stand up at the beginning of the conference and announce crudely that the UK is to withdraw from the organisation, there would be an unfortunate reaction among other members. But as stated earlier, the French have themselves called the whole future of the Organisation into question by insisting that its programme should be radically recast and that until this is done the French financial contribution will be restricted. It ought to be possible to take advantage of this to throw most of the onus for the collapse of the organisation on to the French. One need not say in terms that the UK regards ELDO as undesirable. All that would be necessary to say, as I see it would be that the UK are not prepared to depart from the concept of ELDO A as originally conceived and that they are not even willing to proceed to completion of this programme until it has been more adequately costed. As for ELDO B they could not begin to consider a commitment in principle on the basis of the inadequate information about the cost, technical validity and economic prospects of the project so far available. This, one hopes, should suffice to bring about the demise of ELDO.17

Such behaviour was also guaranteed to irritate Britain’s partners. It was Britain, after all, that had worked so hard persuading these countries to join ELDO, and now, halfway through the programme, it was Britain that was working to destroy the organisation. There is an interesting letter on the subject in the ELDO archives:

It is unrealistic and wasteful to attack either the British decision of April 1968 not to contribute to the ELDO overrun and not to participate in post 1971 rocket development, and the decision of the Four [that is, the four nations remaining in ELDO: France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium] to make sure that Europe possesses rockets for putting into orbit both near and geostationary satellites. What is at issue is purely the British contributions for 1969, 1970 and 1971 of a total value of about £M17.

In April, Mr. Wedgwood Benn announced the decision mentioned above, but stated that of course the UK would carry out its commitments as agreed in 1966 and earlier, evidently referring to these £M17. It seems, however, that the UK expected the immediate collapse of ELDO following the British announcement with dissolution liabilities, the British share of which could at most come to £M10 after 1968. This expectation may also have been partly responsible for the hesitations expressed about the supply of Blue Streak.

By the time of the Bonn Conference it had become clear that the Four wished ELDO to continue. This led on the one hand to British assurances on the supply of Blue Streak which were accepted by the others, and to the proposal made by Wedgwood Benn at Bonn that if the British liability to ELDO was reduced (the figure of £M17 was not mentioned then, but subsequently, especially at the ELDO Council on 29 November) the UK would put that much and more into application satellites, reversing the UK decision of April on this issue. Although the UK was helpful at Bonn on several issues (use of launchers, unifications), acceptance of this protocol was made a necessary condition for lifting the reservation the UK had put on this and several other points.

In fact the British proposal was never seriously considered because the others

(i) saw no sense in an applications programme without a launcher;

(ii) if the UK switched resources from the technically uninteresting production of

Blue Streak to application satellites, it would benefit her and no-one else;

(iii) the others were not in a hurry on applications;

(iv) they thought the UK was keen on applications anyway.

In these circumstances, the UK, on December 18, 1968, in a letter to the Ministers, released herself unilaterally from the commitment by regarding ELDO’s austerity plan T9 as different from what agreed in 1966. This pretext, although possibly justified on the narrowest legal basis, shocked the others by its patent conflict with earlier British statements. They fear the effect of this unilateralism as a precedent and certainly are asking whether such legal devices could be used equally in any other technologically risky long-term programme. The very basis of European technological co-operation has been undermined by this step through its fundamental shaking of confidence. The UK’s fitness as partner for any future enterprise is now being questioned even by her closest friends. Note that in this painful development there has never been any advice on the £M10 first presumably evaluated in April and now offered as a present, as no commitment is now said to exist.

All European technological co-operation in space, and possibly elsewhere, will be ruined by this destruction of trust. The severity of the step does not seen to have been understood in the UK, and is of course totally divorced from the merits or otherwise of ELDO.18

And even as ELDO was falling apart, the French Government was still pressing Britain on its participation, to which a memo from within the Department of Trade and Industry commented that:

The fact remains that there is little to be gained by the ELDO Secretariat or by the other ELDO members from making a fuss to keep us in the organisation. Legally we can argue the toss. Politically we can point up the logic of our position. And financially the organisation will be no worse off by our departure.19

In other words, the Government had washed its hands of the organisation, and there was very little in practical terms that the other countries could do. ELDO was finally wound up in 1972, and the British Government has never participated in any part of the Ariane project that followed.

Those in the ELDO Secretariat were well aware of its weaknesses, but had their hands tied. An exposition of the situation was given to the Royal Aeronautical Society in February 1968 by Dr Iserland of ELDO:

The difference between the technological task of ELDO and a political, economic or scientific task of other organisations, showed up from the start: time is a prime factor in technological achievements and, in particular, in space missiles.

When the Convention was signed in 1962, it was decided, therefore, not to wait until its ratification by the Governments, which took place only in 1964. To enable work to be started immediately, a Preparatory group was instituted as a part-time body with the responsibility of specifying and co-ordinating the work and preparing for the functioning of the Organisation on entry into force of the Convention. During this period, each member country started the work under its own authority and at its own financial risk by placing the contracts. To avoid discontinuity, the Convention also stipulated that after ratification, the authority for the contracts would remain with the Governments for the Initial Programme and that direct contracts between ELDO and the firms would necessitate the consent of the member state.

Paradoxically, this laudable desire for speed to start the work, characteristic of the technical nature of the enterprise, resulted, after 1964, in a factor slowing down unnecessarily the speed of progress. Since ELDO did not place the contracts itself, it was not vested in the authority of the ‘overlord’ which is essential in carrying out efficiently an industrial programme.

Strictly speaking, with the kind of organisation imposed for the Initial Programme, the executive lines for co-ordination and management of any part of the development programme of the Europa I launcher were as follows: if the central technical group in the Paris headquarters, known as the Secretariat, found it necessary to define or to specify some technical requirement, it would have to approach the appropriate ministry of the country in which the equipment was built: if this ministry accepted the need for it, it would pass the recommendation to the establishment which was entrusted with the supervision of the national work on behalf of the Government – in the UK this would have been Farnborough. This establishment would then specify the technical requirements to one or two different firms.

This already long process of imposing in ‘open-loop’ an already chosen solution is still relatively straightforward, compared with the process of agreeing on a technical solution where information had to go up and down this long ladder several times simultaneously in one or two different countries, first to find a technical solution and then to implement it. Needless to say, this strict formal line could not always be followed and technical features often had to be by ELDO representatives with some representatives from specialised establishments or industrial firms. However, a pragmatic practice which does not follow the agreed formal lines of control and financial authority can obviously lead to confusion at the risk of offsetting thereby, the advantage of the direct approach. The alternative, to avoid too long information lines, was to agree on a solution in meetings or Working Groups. Since ELDO had no authority to arbitrate a solution (not being the ‘overlord’), a kind of unanimity rule had to be followed, which consisted of convincing the representatives of each country and firm of the correctness of the suggested decision or to find a compromise, which was not necessarily technically optimum. There then still remained the long channel for implementation through the various steps mentioned before.

It will easily be imagined what difficulties are encountered in co-ordinating by such means, for example, the definition of a common electrical circuitry throughout the three-stage launcher.

In some instances, the frightening complexity of this type of co-ordination had a direct influence on the choice of some technical solutions. Here is one example: When it had to be decided whether a central sequencer for all flight events should be adopted for the complete vehicle or else individual sequencers for each stage, relaying each other after exchange of signals at the cut-off of one stage to initiate the start of the next one, it was judged that only the solution with individual stage sequencers had any chance of practical achievement, the central sequencer being outside the possibilities of such a remote co-ordination set-up in view of the numerous events, intimately related to details of each stage, which it would have to control. Without judging which solution is superior on strictly technical grounds, it can certainly be stated that the partial failures in our last two launches have some relation to that choice insofar as the light-up of the second stage did not occur in both cases because of incorrect functioning of the second stage sequencer, while the first stage operated with its own sequencer. Perhaps with a central system, we might either not have launched at all or else had correct sequences throughout the two-stage flight…

The first critical period developed when ELDO presented the budget for 1965. The new estimate of cost to completion of the Initial Programme was for approximately 400 million MU [MU = Monetary Unit, effectively equivalent to 1 US dollar] i. e., twice the original amount estimated in 1961 before the creation of ELDO. Consultations between the member countries became necessary according to the Convention. They took place early in 1965. France suggested to stop the development of the Europa I launcher and to proceed directly to the development of a more advanced and more powerful launcher with upper stages based on liquid hydrogen/oxygen.

The critical period lasted for about three months, during which an extensive study of the French proposal was made, before it was decided to continue the development of Europa I. The effect of this period can still be felt, as it slowed down the work and resulted in delays; delays which amounted to considerably more than the period of uncertainty itself. For the consultations of 1965, ELDO had prepared proposals for follow-up programmes after the Initial Programme. Decisions on these later programmes were, however, postponed by the member countries until 1966. This fact did not help to speed up the work on the Initial Programme after the crisis had been resolved.

Consultations between member countries resumed in 1966, but this time at ministerial level. It was now the turn of British Government to express doubts about the technical and economic validity of the Europa I launcher and to be concerned about the increasing costs. A second critical period began, and it took three sessions of the Ministerial Conference from April to July 1966 to resolve the crisis.

The comments about the flight sequencers (electronic systems that produce the signals to initiate events during flight) are interesting: ‘only the solution with individual stage sequencers had any chance of practical achievement’. Certainly the failures of F5 through to F8 can be put down to exactly that cause: the flight sequencers sending the wrong command at the wrong time, which might not have happened had there been one sequencer for the complete vehicle. It is a considerable indictment of the organisation that it was forced to adopt an engineering compromise which could well have led to the loss of five consecutive launches.

The attitude persisted as far down as the individual launch teams. Alan Bond (later to be designer of the UK spaceplane HOTOL) was the Rolls Royce performance engineer sent from England to monitor the engine performance on the F8 round, and has this to say about his experiences:

The Rolls Royce team at Woomera was under the very capable management of John Bowles. The insular nature of the various teams was striking from the start, not only internationally but also between the vehicle and propulsion teams from the UK.

I am not implying any animosity, there certainly was not any. In fact there was a palpable sense of doing something very important which everyone was very proud of. But there were cultural barriers to communication, except through the regular management channels. In the whole four months of the campaign, the conversations I had with members from the French, German and Italian teams could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

This was in complete contrast to the experience I had seven years later as part of the JET fusion research project where the integration of the international teams was very close. JET went on to be a world beating success and a demonstration of what collaboration can achieve.20

But there were other failures in ELDO, within the organisation itself. ELDO was very much a political construct, designed to cope with all the wheeling and dealing that went on in a multinational organisation such as this. The failure lay on the technical side.

Each country provided its own part of the vehicle, and acted independently. Thus the British set up Blue Streak as the first stage, and then the French would come along and add their stage on top, then the Germans would come with their stage, and finally the Italians would fit the payload and payload shrouds. There was no one in overall technical command. The Secretariat could only make recommendations to member states, with exhortations such as these:

Following the F7 trial [F7 being the seventh flight], the Secretariat tried to inculcate a greater awareness of the need for better technical discipline and control of operations during a trial. Meetings and discussions took place with Member States on the subject of inspection and defect reporting in particular. During the F8 trial, some improvement was obvious, but it is still apparent that these disciplines are not accepted as having the importance attached to them which the Secretariat would

wish. The supply and control of spares was also still far from satisfactory in the

21

upper stage areas.

Despite the exhortations, matters did not improve, as the report on the failure of the eleventh launch, F11, shows:

Two main points provide the basis for the failure of the project.

– the poor organisation of the management system as a whole;

– the technical difficulties of the third stage and its equipment.

The management system established since the beginnings of the Organisation has proved its ineffectiveness.

There exists a certain confusion about the respective roles of the national agencies, the Secretariat, and industry. With regard to the internal structure of the Secretariat, levels of authority are not sufficiently clear. Some firms are badly organised and have not shown a sense of responsibility. Finally, political problems have too often taken precedence over the technical problems and cost-effectiveness of the project.

In these conditions, the Secretariat was unable to play its proper piloting role, which resulted in an unflightworthy launcher and the abnormally high cost of the programme.

Without going into detail, the main technical problems lie in the third stage. Its design is complicated and its wiring needs to be thoroughly revised. Its integration has been particularly deficient. Three major systems in this stage have net been qualified: the sequencer, the middle skirt separation system, and the guidance computer. The latter, moreover, which is a prototype product, is not flightworthy.

To guarantee an adequate level of reliability, it is necessary:

– to achieve by appropriate tests the integration of all the on-board electrical systems of the third stage and to demonstrate their electromagnetic compatibility;

– to reorganise the Secretariat in order to transform it into an efficient management tool and provide it with unquestionable technical competence, so that it may play its proper role in discussions with industry.

– to rationalise the Secretariat industrial arrangements to enable a satisfactory solution of the interface and integration problems.22

F11 had been launched in November 1971. Ten years after the initial Anglo – French proposals, after eleven launches and literally hundreds of millions of pounds, the vehicle was still not, in the words of the report, flightworthy. Even so, ELDO still hoped to continue with Europa:

Following the failure of F11, the ELDO Council set up a EUROPA II Project Review Commission on 18th November 1971.

This Commission’s terms of reference were to propose corrections to the programme from both the technical and organisational points of view and to indicate the consequences of these corrections for future launchings.

The aims that the Commission sought to achieve were the following:

– to determine the technical, administrative and financial conditions for ensuring a substantial probability of success for the next EUROPA II launch within reasonable time limits, or to conclude that this is not possible;

– to propose a fresh target plan for launchers, launches and payloads from F12 to F16 inclusive.23

But the Germans failed to make much progress on the redesign of the third stage. The launch of F12 was put back until October 1973 (the F12 Blue Streak
arrived at Kourou in April), but it soon became apparent that ELDO was going nowhere, and in May 1972, the F12 launch was cancelled, Europa II abandoned, and ELDO was wound up at the end of the month. [9] [10]

BK15

Single stage. Launched 1 May 1962 at 22:43. Apogee 494 miles.

BK15 was a re-entry physics experiment but limited by the availability of ground instrumentation on the range at the time, i. e. the ‘Gaslight’ project equipment and not the more sophisticated ‘Dazzle’ project equipment.

A single-stage vehicle was fitted with a separating uninstrumented 36-inch diameter copper sphere (the first pure metal head used). The object was to achieve re-entry of the sphere in advance of and well separated from the main body, to provide spatial resolution for ground instruments. This was to be done by turning the vehicle over in the yaw plane after engine burn-out, then separating and pushing the head vertically downwards away from the body when it had turned through 180o.

BK15

Figure 95. BK15 prior to launch.

A sabot containing thrust units was used to push the head away; the sabot itself was to have remained attached to the body by a lanyard. Subsidiary upper atmosphere experiments were also carried out and further data obtained on Gamma 201 engine performance and propellant usage. It was also intended to test for the first time an ‘automatic pilot’ in the ground guidance system. A head re-entry velocity of 11,600 ft/second was achieved at 200,000 ft.

The vehicle turnover and head separation devices worked, but the timing of the latter was incorrect; the head was separated before the vehicle had turned through 180o. The lanyard failed to hold the sabot to the body and the sabot therefore accompanied the head. The re-entry of the head was not recorded by any ground instrument nor was it seen by any observer.

This in itself is a significant result since it confirms the prediction that, because of the absence of ablation products and other contaminants in its wake, the re-entry into the atmosphere of a pure copper head should be a target difficult to detect by optical means. The sphere was recovered and, as expected, there was no heat discolouration of the surface; the maximum surface temperature did not exceed 350 °C during re-entry.

BK15

Figure 96. The BK15 copper sphere after re-entry.

The Cancellation

Governments tend to make the announcements of the cancellation of a project as brief as possible. The Opposition and the Press will not follow up the cancellation of a project such as Black Arrow unless there is the whiff of a scandal. The Press was not interested; and in this case there was very little that the Opposition could use to attack the Government.

EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE FINISHES

Подпись:Подпись:Подпись: DATA TRAYПодпись:The CancellationEXPERIMENTAL SOLAR CELLS

POWER SYSTEM ELECTRONICS

ASPECT SENSORS

BATTERY

One group of people that is rarely informed of the true reasons for the cancellation are those who work on the projects, and whose livelihood depends on them. Not surprisingly, urban legends or conspiracy theories begin to emerge. The cancellation of Black Arrow was no exception.

Engineers are usually conservative by nature, and often Conservative by political inclination. One of the ‘bogey men’ of the time was Tony Benn (known earlier in his career as Anthony Wedgwood Benn, but who had now adopted a more demotic name), and to those who worked on the project, part of the mythology was that it was cancelled by Benn and the socialists, when it was actually cancelled by a Tory Government!

In reality, virtually all the opposition came from the Treasury, as the following memo from February 1969 illustrates:

I have no doubt that the Cabinet will give overwhelming approval to the Ministry of Technology’s [Tony Benn] proposals for Black Arrow. At the S. T. meeting on Friday, 21st February, all Ministers from all Departments except the Treasury were not only in favour of the proposals, but emphatically so. The reservations of D. E.A. officials [Department of Economic Affairs] are not apparently shared by D. E.A. Ministers, including Peter Shore. The least enthusiasm was shown by Sir Solly [Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government], but he gave qualified support and clearly did not brief the Lord President to oppose.

2. I should in fairness add that Tony Benn put his case very attractively. It clearly has some merit and while I suspect there may be a considerable degree of optimism influencing the supporters of Black Arrow, I doubt if the Treasury arguments however skilfully deployed, will sway other Cabinet members.

3. In the circumstances I would suggest that a last ditch fight by the Treasury against Black Arrow in Cabinet could be mistaken. It might undermine the Treasury’s general position on more hopeful causes. I feel a tactically more rewarding line would be for you and the Chief Secretary to say that having looked at the proposals you feel that there is merit in them (including the proposal for a British launcher) and that you do not propose to object.20

The Ministry of Aviation had been subsumed into the Ministry of Technology in February 1967. It was further reorganised with the advent of the Conservative Government lead by Edward Heath in 1970, becoming part of the new Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). But after all the attacks on Black Arrow by the Treasury, it was actually the Aviation department of the Ministry of Technology which began the process by which Black Arrow would be cancelled. The memo in question is undated, but seems to have been written around October 1970:

As I mentioned the other day, I feel there might be considerable advantage in arranging an impartial examination of the National Space Technology Programme in the light of the recent Black Arrow launch failure [the R2 launch].

It is of the utmost importance that the next firing of Black Arrow, currently scheduled for May 1971, should be successful. We, RAE and Industry are already engaged in analysing the technical causes of the failure, but we have to recognise that there are also wider implications. Another failure, and our national technological competence as well as the future of the National Space Technology Programme would be in question. Examination of the programme as a whole by an outsider of suitable qualifications could be useful in ensuring that it develops from this point on in the best possible way.

The examination would have to take as a starting point an acceptance of our primary objective in space, which is to attain the capability in satellite technology enabling us to offer space hardware, internationally and on an industrial scale. The investigation should in addition not question the broad institutional framework of the Programme-in other words it would be accepted that the effort was a joint Government and Industry one. Within these constraints, however, the investigation should be given the widest possible remit to examine the means we have employed to reach our objective.

The formal terms of reference might be on the following lines:-

To assess the relevance and appropriateness of the Programme, in its present form, to the goal of establishing a significant national competence in satellite technology.

To study in particular the role of the national launcher (Black Arrow) in the programme; the level of effort needed to develop it into a dependable vehicle; and the cost of alternatives to it.

To report on the management of the Programme, with special reference to the launcher element.

And to make recommendations.

I believe that an examination along these lines could be of a very real help to us, especially in providing the answer to two questions — is the level of spend on the Black Arrow launcher programme a sensible one, or ought it to be increased very substantially in order to achieve real gains; and, whatever the level of sensible expenditure on a national launcher programme might be, would it be preferable and more economic to use an American launcher?

The difficulty, of course, is to find a man of sufficient managerial and technical qualification within the UK who was not already involved in the space programme. We are already separately engaged in the discussion of suitable names. My present purpose is therefore to seek your approval of the terms of reference set out above, on the basis of which we might approach a suitable candidate.21

The question was who among what have been termed as ‘the great and the good’ would be willing and available, although one stumbling block was the requirement for some technical knowledge. In the event, an impeccably qualified candidate was identified and, on 1 October 1970, accepted the invitation to undertake the inquiry: William Penney.

William Penney is best known for his work on Britain’s atomic weapons, although he had many other scientific accomplishments to his name. He won a scholarship to study at the University of London, winning the Governor’s Prize for Mathematics and graduating with First Class Honours in 1929. In 1944 he joined the British mission to Los Alamos, working on the use of the atomic bomb and its effects. On his return to England, he was put in charge of the British atomic bomb project, and saw the project through to the test of the first bomb in 1952. At this point Penney was offered a Chair at the University of Oxford. Always more inclined toward the academic life, he was keen to accept this post, but he was persuaded that the ‘national interest’ required him to continue as director of the AWRE at Aldermaston until 1959. From 1954 Penney served on the Board of the Atomic Energy Authority, becoming Chairman in 1964. He retired as Chairman in 1967, and then became Rector of Imperial College.

Given these achievements, it was unlikely that his findings would be disputed, and given his expertise in running demanding experimental programmes, he would have seemed to be the ideal man for the job. Being retired from any form of Government research meant he had no axe to grind, and would be widely seen as an impartial observer.

A briefing note for the Minister after Penney had submitted his report noted that:

Lord Penney’s approach to his inquiry was informal. By meeting the people in industry and government concerned with Black Arrow, and discussing the project with them, he aimed to make personal assessment of the management of the programme at the same time as briefing himself on the details of the project. He made two visits to industry, to see the major Black Arrow contractors – British Hovercraft Corporation on the Isle of Wight, and Rolls-Royce at Ansty, Coventry. He visited RAE Farnborough on two occasions, and had a number of discussions with the staff of space division and other headquarters divisions with an interest in Black Arrow. For details of the alternative launchers to Black Arrow he relied on information supplied by the department: he made no visits abroad in the course of the inquiry.

As might be expected, the report was thorough and comprehensive, stretching to 24 pages and 68 sections. He fulfilled his brief admirably, looking at Black Arrow and its alternatives, then considering the viability of Black Arrow within the larger framework of British space policy. His conclusions and recommendations are worth quoting:

My conclusions are as follows:

The disappointing performance of Black Arrow launcher R2 in September 1970 was not due to poor project management, bad fundamental design, or low grade effort. We know we were taking a gamble in trying to make do with so few test launches, and the gamble went against us.

The cost of launching of the X3 satellite on the R3 vehicle is almost fully incurred, and the best policy would therefore be to launch X3 in July 1971 as planned. But in spite of all the work being done to follow up the R2 failure, we cannot be sure that the gamble will not go against us again on R3. The Ministry has neither the time nor the resources to build up greater confidence in Black Arrow before X3 is ready for launch.

It is probable that with the present launch rate of one Black Arrow a year, we will still not be fully confident of its reliability by 1974 when we are planning to launch X4, the second major technological satellite. Even if the Ministry agreed to fund an increase in the launch rate, only one or two extra Black Arrows could be built and launched by 1974.

There is a three-year gap between X3 and X4, but Black Arrows are being built at the rate of one a year. This mismatch between the production rates of launchers and worthwhile satellites may well continue beyond X4, and cannot easily be remedied by adjustments to the launcher programme which is already running at about the minimum level for efficiency…

The current programme gives us too few Black Arrows to establish the vehicle as a proven launcher in a reasonable timescale, and too many to meet our requirements for satellite launches. It is therefore not a viable programme at present, and there is no easy way out of the dilemma.

And on the subject of alternative launchers, he notes:

Black Arrow has no alternative use, and the nation would have much to gain and little to lose if it were cancelled in favour of American launchers. We would be abandoning a certain political independence and a guarantee of commercial security payments, but on these two points satisfactory safeguards should be available from the US authorities.

Unless a formal approach is made quickly to the inhabitants on the availability of Scouts and other launchers for our technological satellite programme, further commitments will have to be made on Black Arrow vehicles as an insurance move.

As soon as we are satisfied that we can get the launchers we need from the Americans on acceptable terms, the Black Arrow programme be brought to a close as soon as possible. However, the launching of X3 on the R3 vehicle should proceed, and there may be a need for a further launch if problems arise with X3/R3.

I therefore recommend that:

The Ministry should make a formal approach to the US authorities as soon as possible about the availability of launchers for X4 and subsequent satellites in the National Space Technology Programme, and terms on which they can be provided.

Commitments on R5 and subsequent Black Arrow vehicles should be kept the minimum possible level while the Americans are being approached, and all work on them should be stopped as soon as satisfactory arrangements have been made for the supply of US launchers.

The X3 satellite should be launched as planned on the R3 Black Arrow vehicle in July 1971; the R4 vehicle should be completed in all major respects and used as a reserve for R3 up to the launch.

If X3 goes into orbit successfully and functions as planned, the Black Arrow launcher programme should be brought to a close without further launches.

If X3 fails to go into orbit successfully or fails to work in orbit, the Ministry will have to decide whether to bring the launcher programme to a close at that point or repeat the X3 experiments by launching the X3R on the R4 vehicle. Unless they are sure that the R4 vehicle has a better chance of success than the R3, and it is worth spending кШ million to repeat the satellite experiment, a further launch should not be sanctioned.

The X4 satellite should be launched on Scout; and Scout or Thor Deltas should be bought as necessary for later satellites in the series.

The Ministry should determine at a high level the views of British industry on the value of a technological satellite programme. If no such value can be identified the programme should be brought to a stop. If it is established that the programme is worthwhile, a plan should be drawn up for a series of future satellites so organised as to give the maximum benefit to British firms in their attempts to win contracts in the international market.22

It is difficult to argue with his conclusions, or, indeed, with his recommendations. As he correctly points out, there was a ‘mismatch between the

production rates of launchers and worthwhile satellites’. Making fewer launchers was not economic; there were not the resources to make more satellites.

The report was submitted to the Minister in January 1971, and made its way up the government hierarchy, culminating in a meeting held in the Prime Minister’s room at the House of Commons at 5:15 pm on Monday 6th July, 1971.

Those present were the Prime Minister (Edward Heath), the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Geoffrey Rippon), the Lord Privy Seal (Earl Jellicoe), the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (John Davies), the Minister for Aerospace (Frederick Corfield), the Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Maurice Macmillan), and Sir Alan Cottrell, Chief Scientific Adviser. An excerpt from the minutes of the meeting reads:

The Lord Privy Seal recalled that on 24 May the Ministerial Committee on Science and Technology had approved the proposals by the Minister of Aerospace that the Black Arrow programme should be stopped, that we should support the full development of the X4 satellite and that for the launching of small satellites we should in the future rely on the American Scout launcher. The Prime Minister had been doubtful about the impact of this decision on future European collaboration in science and technology, particularly as the French were developing their own launcher the Diamant. Since then however the political difficulties have largely dissolved. The Diamant programme had now been deferred and the French were themselves using the Scout launcher this year.

The Prime Minister and the other Ministers present agreed that the proposals originally approved by the Science and Technology Committee in May should now be implemented. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said he did not think that the cancellation of Black Arrow would be deemed inconsistent with anything the government had said when in opposition; there had been no commitment to back any project which was not successful.

The Minister for Aerospace said he thought that the announcement of the decision would not cause great surprise and could be done by an Answer to an arranged Written Question.

The Prime Minister agreed to this and suggested that the announcement should be as late as possible.23

Three weeks later, the following exchange appears in Hansard for 29 July 1970:

National Space Technology Programme

Mr. Onslow asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what progress has been made with the review of the National Space Technology Programme; and if he will make a statement about the future of the Black Arrow Launcher.

Mr. Corfield: The first phase in the review of the National Space Technology Programme has now been completed. Plans to launch the X3 satellite on a Black Arrow vehicle later this year have been confirmed, but it has been decided that the

Black Arrow launcher programme will be terminated once that launch has taken place.

We have come to this decision on Black Arrow mainly because the maintenance of a national programme for launchers of a comparatively limited capability both unduly limits the scope of the National Space Technology Programme and absorbs a disproportionate share of the resources available for that programme.

We hope to complete our review in the early months of 1972. Meanwhile work is continuing in industry on research into basic satellite technology and on the development of the X4 satellite. X4 is planned to be launched in 1974 on a Scout vehicle to be purchased from N. A.S. A.

The curious (or perhaps not so curious) feature of the announcement is how little attention it received. True, Black Arrow always had had a low profile, but neither in Parliament nor in the press was there any great comment. Perhaps the last word should be given to the New Scientist magazine, which had this to say in August 1971:

Despite considerable success with small launchers – notably Skylark – the modern sport of rocketry evidently rouses little excitement in British hearts. The now- promised demise of the Black Arrow programme, the erstwhile Black Knight venture, is unfortunate only because its death throes have been so prolonged. Announcing last week that, after a final launching later this year when it hopefully will put the X 3 satellite into orbit, Mr Frederick Corfield, Minister for Aerospace, said that henceforth Britain’s need to pursue experiments in space technology would be met with US launch vehicles. The reason essentially is that nearly all foreseeable space applications are going to require satellites in high geostationary orbits; Black Arrow falls far short of this requirement, being able to lift some 260 lb only into a near-Earth orbit.