Reverse Engineering and Independent Production

China received licensing rights for the MiG-21F-13 and its Tumansky turbojet engine, but transfer of other MiG-21 technical information ended with the Sino-Soviet split.69 Despite incomplete information, China managed to produce various models of the J-7/F-7, as well as the Tumansky engine, in the 1960s and 1970s. Some variants featured limited upgrades and improve­ments. SAF had taken possession of several completed models of the MiG-21, along with a number of assembly kits, before the USSR withdrew assistance. This provided a decent base to start from, though SAF only succeeded in pro­ducing upgraded J-7/F-7 fighters through intense efforts at reverse engineer­ing.70 The original J-7 experienced numerous teething problems before mak­ing its maiden flight in 1966, but was reworked and ultimately entered service with the PLAAF, and was exported as the F-7A. Both the Tanzanian and Alba­nian air forces operated this aircraft.

SAF later came out with the upgraded J-7I that featured a variable air intake with translating shock cone, an indigenous add-on developed due to missing information in the Soviet manufacturing documents.71 The PLAAF operated the J-7I interceptor along its southern borders during the Viet­nam War, where it shot down six U. S. combat aircraft that entered Chinese airspace.72 The J-7 program demonstrates that although China was unable to design and produce its own fighters, it had mastered coproduction and reverse engineering well enough to produce reasonably capable (though by no means state-of-the-art) fighters without Soviet assistance. This produc­tion capability allowed China to produce F-6 (MiG-19) and F-7 (MiG – 21) variants to customers seeking low-cost fighters. The J-6 export variant (F-6C) was produced from complete Soviet blueprints and with initial Soviet assistance.

Although China had not received a license to coproduce the Il-28 bomber, it ultimately decided to try to reverse engineer and independently produce the bomber as the H-5 (or B-5). As a result, China did not possess the same level of design information and Soviet technical support as with its fighter aircraft or the H-6 bomber. When the project finally began in 1963, there were some significant design alterations in the Chinese version.73 Chinese-produced H-5 bombers did not enter service with the PLAAF until 1967.74

The result of forced reliance on indigenous production and reverse engineering was a PLA Air Force equipped throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s with large quantities of obsolete aircraft based on 1950s vin­tage Soviet designs that were all the Chinese aviation industry could pro­duce. Although PLAAF leaders (and to some extent Chinese civilian lead­ers including Deng Xiaoping) were aware of the extent to which China was falling behind advances in Western and Soviet military aviation technology, they had few options available to rectify the situation. In addition to limited access to international aircraft and aviation technology potential, the loss of Soviet support highlighted the importance of self-reliance in military tech­nology for Chinese political leaders and reinforced the interest of key civilian and military leaders in building a defense industry capable of independently designing and producing advanced systems. The result has been an enduring tension between PLA leaders focused on equipping the military with techno­logically advanced systems (acquired from abroad if necessary) and civilian and defense industry leaders focused on the Maoist goal of building an inde­pendent, indigenous defense industry (even if the weapons it produced fell well short of state-of-the-art Western systems).

New Windows of Opportunity (1977-1989)

Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as China’s top leader and the initiation of economic reforms and opening in 1978 offered new opportunities for the Chi­nese economy generally, and for the defense industry in particular. An ini­tial focus of the reforms was the Four Modernizations campaign (Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology, and National Defense). Although defense was the last of the Four Modernizations and given lower priority than the first three, the strategies used to modernize China’s national defense were consis­tent with the broader economic development strategy’s emphasis on opening and reform. Creating a self-sufficient Chinese national defense infrastructure based on a modern technology base had been a goal since the first five-year plan.75 The pursuit of air superiority and the role the Chinese military avia­tion industry played in this pursuit took on a new level of importance once Deng became Chairman of the CMC in 1977.76After consolidating all top posi­tions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and becoming “paramount leader,” Deng continued to develop his case for airpower, stating to the CMC in January 1979: “Without the air force and air domination, winning a future war is out of the question. . . . Stress investment in the development of the aviation industry and the air force to ensure air domination.”77

China’s ten-year plan for developing both the national economy and the science and technology base was published on February 26, 1978.78 The plan outlined many of the key elements necessary to produce modern mili­tary equipment: more raw materials, better understanding of modern scien­tific techniques, and access to foreign technology and production practices. China would increase trade by opening its economy, allowing foreign direct investment, and purchasing capital goods and technology from the devel­oped world. Investment from abroad would be obtained by expanding China’s export-oriented light industries (i. e., textiles, clothing, and handicrafts), which required low amounts of capital, could be rapidly established, and had “high foreign exchange earnings potential.”79 Earnings originating from light indus­tries could then be recapitalized to continue expanding that sector, applied to the import of advanced foreign technology, or both. China was also in a posi­tion to leverage its ample energy resources to finance technology acquisition from abroad. This was the basis of an 8-year, 20 billion dollar agreement signed with Japan in 1978.80 Casting military modernization in a subordinate role to the other three modernizations inverted Mao’s “superpower” strategy, which stressed building national defense as the first imperative in elevating China to great power status. The more pragmatic reform-era leadership understood that national defense capability improved as a function of overall economic prog­ress. Moreover, it realized that to achieve self-reliance in the long term, China would have to pursue the transfer of advanced foreign military and dual-use technologies in the near term.

China continued to refine its industrial policy throughout the 1980s, with the goal of developing a modern, science and technology-driven economy in the first half of the 21st century. Evan Feigenbaum notes the contributions of scien­tists involved with China’s nuclear program in the 1950s and 1960s in crafting and pushing forward the set of policies establishing a new national development trajectory.81 Prominent nuclear scientists like Zhang Jingfu and Song Jian were among a small group of Chinese technical personnel involved in Mao era pro­grams requiring “‘scientific’ decision analysis.”82 This gave them valuable experi­ence organizing research and development to meet specific scientific objectives, and applying lessons learned in the process to other related areas. Observing the state of global technological innovation in the late 1970s and early 1980s led the group of scientists advocating China’s new industrial policies to the conclusion that novel state-of-the-art technologies (semiconductors, integrated circuits) would be increasingly dual-use in nature and thus result in a “spin-on” paradigm.83 Because commercial and military technologies would be inextricably linked in the future, China would have to reengineer its entire state R&D system and not focus solely on developing military technologies. The Chinese government’s efforts to bridge the technology gap with Western military powers rely on spurring inno­vation, stressing market competition, and emphasizing civil-military integration (Junmin Yitihua) to create greater efficiencies. These policies seek to construct an effective dual-use technology base that can support both the civilian economy and the needs of the military.84

China’s opening and reform efforts built upon its rapprochement with the United States and the West in the early 1970s. The primary impetus for rapprochement was strategic, but improved relations also created a favorable climate for China’s economic reforms and, eventually, for defense industrial cooperation with Western countries. Mirroring the Soviet logic of the 1950s, the United States and other Western military powers sought to improve Chi­na’s defense capability as a means of tying down the vast Soviet military. There was obviously not the same strong ideological affinity between China and the West that there had been during the Sino-Soviet partnership. There was, however, a mutual understanding that certain common objectives— namely, undermining Soviet power and influence—could be advanced by assistance to China’s defense industry. China did not view the West as an ally per se, nor did the West expect a close defense relationship to emerge from new circumstances.

The strategic rationale for cooperation was paired with the realization by Western defense industries that significant profits might be available by selling arms to China and assisting in the modernization of China’s backward defense industries. Continuing export controls and legal restrictions on the export of arms and advanced technologies to China also meant that coop­eration expanded at a gradual, modest pace with considerable oversight by Western governments. On China’s side, the opportunity to take advantage of new access to Western military aviation technologies clashed with the desire to build an independent aviation industry and Maoist concerns about self­reliance. As Lewis and Xue write, “The ensuing compromise restricted the definition of self-reliance to the outright purchase of aircraft, while extending the meaning of Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy to permit the acquisition of foreign air-launched weapons and avionics.”85