Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The Department of Transportation gave its approval to the Eastern takeover by Texas Air later that year. That Eastern was a basket case was known, but, like Frontier, it had not been appreciated just how bad the situation was. Phil Bakes had performed well for Lorenzo after the Continental takeover. Under Bakes, Continental had been turned around and was profitable again. Like Continental, the most pressing problem facing Eastern was labor costs. But the labor problems at Eastern could not be handled like they were at Continental four years before by simply filing under Chapter 11, then unilater­ally abrogating the labor contracts in place with the unions. Congress had passed legislation in 1984 that restricted the effect of the holding in Bildisco, so that the debtor in possession (the bankrupt airline) could no longer unilaterally cancel labor agreements.3

Bakes relocated to Miami and took over the helm at Eastern. The magnitude of Eastern’s problems dwarfed those encountered at Conti­nental. The culture was different, the personnel were hostile, and the history of labor relations was dismal. Eastern’s record of labor relations over the years was largely a chronicle of the intransigence of the International Association of Machinists, whose leader was the powerful Charlie Bryan. Without a solution to the labor problem, for starters, there did not appear to be any way to salvage the airline.

Judging by subsequent developments, it appears that Lorenzo also came to that conclusion early; there likely was no way to salvage Eastern. Even as Bakes worked to solve the company’s seemingly insurmountable problems, Lorenzo began the systematic dismantling of Eastern for the benefit of Texas Air and its viable holdings. Eastern’s computer reservation system had been appraised for an amount between $250 million and $450 million, an astonishing fact when it is realized that the entire purchase price for the company was $615 million. Lorenzo had financed the purchase in such a way that less than half of the purchase money came from Texas Air, the rest of the money came from Eastern itself, validating once again the old leveraged buyout strategy that had worked so well. The computer reservation system was sold to Texas Air for the insider bargain price of $100 million, but the terms were even better: Texas Air put up no money, but gave Eastern a promissory note for the purchase price, payable at the end of a

period of 25 years at a severely discounted rate of interest. Texas Air then leased back the system to Eastern for a fee of $ 10 million a month.

w As a businessman, Frank Lorenzo gives capitalism a bad name.»

William F. Buckley

Lorenzo next transferred Eastern’s newest airplanes to Continental, paying Eastern again by promissory note for part of the payment. Conti­nental then sold the airplanes for cash, and at a profit. Continental bought 11 Eastern Air Lines gates at Newark Airport for half price, again paid for by promissory note. The purchasing of fuel was outsourced to a subsidiary of Texas Air at a cost to Eastern of $1 million per month. Eastern paid Continental another $2 million per month for the training of non-employee pilots who, ironi­cally, would be used to replace Eastern’s pilots in case of a labor disruption.

Eastern’s service was also being curtailed for lack of cash flow, and was stopped com­pletely at New Orleans, Seattle, and San Diego. Then came the sell-off of the routes, begin­ning with Eastern’s shuttle, which was sold to Donald Trump. The expected machinist strike came in March 1989, which marked the absolute beginning of the end. Although Eastern imme­diately went into Chapter 11, the reorganization amounted to little more than the gradual selling off of all remaining assets in order to raise oper­ating cash. The bankruptcy court took control of the reorganization from Eastern in April 1990, appointing as Trustee Martin Shugrue, former Continental president. The court used the oppor­tunity to judicially note that Lorenzo’s stew­ardship of Eastern had been a catastrophe. The reorganization was turned into a liquidation of Eastern’s assets and, in 1991, the charade finally ended. Eastern Air Lines was no more. Creditors were left holding the bag to the tune of almost $3 billion, and even the lawyers were shorted their fees, a most uncommon occurrence.

m Pilots are a rare kind of human. They leave the ordinary surface of the world, to purify their soul in the sky, and they come down to earth, only after receiving the communion of the infinite.»

Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, President of Ecuador

hen Congress passed the Airline Deregu­lation Act in 1978, there existed no empir­ical data, nor any experience, to reliably predict what would happen to the U. S. air carrier indus­try under economic deregulation. During the three years that Congress held hearings on the matter before the Act was actually passed, scores of proponents and opponents testified. The argu­ments made for deregulation were largely just that, arguments, and they were premised on anec­dotal data. Economic theory was given much cre­dence, but it was still just theory. The effect that economic deregulation would have on the airline industry and on the nation was simply unknown.

In the following chapters we will examine some of the specific, unexpected developments that deregulation produced and their impact on the promise of deregulation. But here, let us take an overall look at how the progression of deregu­lation has unfolded since the passage of the Act.

33 Airline Fares

A study conducted by the Government Account­ing Office (GAO) in the early 1970s concluded that airline fares under the CAB regulated system were anywhere from 22 percent to 50 percent
higher than they would be under a deregulated system. By 2010, domestic fares had actually declined more than 40 percent in inflation – adjusted dollars since 1978. Fares have declined the most in long-distance and heavily trafficked markets, and the least in shorter-distance and less – traveled markets. Figure 30-1 provides a com­parison of the cost of air travel versus the cost of other goods and services as of 2010.1

Historically, airline fares have been the standard used in the airline industry and by government to track travel costs and to set taxes on travel services, in order to determine how much it costs a passenger to go from Point A to Point B. Since 2008, a new development has arisen in the legacy airlines that calls into question this time-worn standard for evaluat­ing passenger travel cost. This new develop­ment, the addition of add-on fees by all carriers, requires airline fares to now be compared with the more realistic totality of “cost of travel,” which includes not only basic airfares but also all the other costs charged to the passenger by the airline while getting from Point A to Point B. This will be discussed below.

For many years after deregulation, most of the price benefit in reduced fares went to

leisure travelers, who were not required to fly on short notice, like the business traveler. Due to computer reservation systems and the yield management programs available to the incum­bent airlines, ticket prices were discounted most heavily for those who could purchase early, stay longer, and travel at non-peak times. The airlines were able to charge much higher fares for those who could not plan very far ahead and were oth­erwise constrained in their travel options.

In the early years of deregulation, the com­puter generated systems of yield management and other competitive pricing schemes resulted in an almost indecipherable pricing regimen, where the passenger in 20A, for example, may find that his fare is twice that of his seatmate in 20B, for no discernible reason. Business fares actually increased after deregulation, at one time by as much as 70 percent over similar fares charged during the CAB era.2

Recent evidence, however, discloses that businesses that were punished by the economic downturn beginning in 2000 began to resist such disparate pricing. Corporate travel offices were set up for the express purpose of econo­mizing on costs of air travel. By 2002, airlines began to reduce fares across the board, and an increased corporate use of the Internet caused some tempering of fare disparity. Fares still remain higher at “fortress hubs,” where one or two airlines have disproportionate market share, and at some small airports where there is little or no competition.

The DOT’s jurisdiction over mergers terminated effective December 31, 1988, and the DOJ then assumed sole responsibility for airline merger
review. The DOJ now has primary authority in air carrier cases to enforce all antitrust laws. Although there were few merger proposals after 1988 (see Figure 32-1), it was clear that the days of merger accommodation were over. The Justice Department approach to antitrust activity was going to be very different from that of the Department of Transportation.

In 1998, when Northwest, then the fourth – largest carrier in the United States, proposed to acquire a controlling interest in Continental, then the fifth-largest air carrier, the DOJ opposed the action. The challenge of the DOJ was based on the fact that the two carriers are each other’s most significant competitors (or only competitors) in nonstop service between cities where they main­tain their hubs. In its complaint filed in federal court against the carriers, the DOJ asserted that the proposal would cause higher ticket prices and diminished service for millions of passengers. This proposed merger did not occur.

In 2000-2001, United proposed to acquire US Airways. The DOJ opened an investigation into the merger and concluded that it would be highly anticompetitive for a number of rea­sons. These carriers were the only competitors between the District of Columbia area and a number of cities; they were the most significant nonstop carriers in numerous hub-to-hub mar­kets; only they connected several northeastern cities; and the merger would have lessened com­petition in several transatlantic markets. When the DOJ announced that it would sue to block the transaction, the airlines abandoned their merger plans.

Proposals that have been reviewed without adverse action by the DOJ include US Airways – America West (2005), Northwest-Delta (2008), and United-Continental (2010).

Traditionally, airports have been viewed as nui­sances and environmental threats that are toler­ated in order to accomplish travel purposes and shipping necessities. This thinking has essen­tially shut down new airport building in the United States and Europe. But a new concept has been articulated for the future: it is called the Aerotropolis.

Coined by John D. Kasarda, Kenan Distin­guished Professor of Strategy and Entrepreneur­ship at the University of North Carolina Business School, it is a concept that is already being built in other parts of the world, like Dubai, Seoul – Inchon, and Hong Kong. The concept describes the creation of airport-linked commercial facili­ties concentrically arranged around air gateways, and consisting of time-sensitive manufacturing and distribution facilities, hotel, entertainment, retail, convention, trade and exhibition com­plexes, offices that house professionals and exec­utives, and even permanent dwellings.

While the perfect aerotropolis can only be constructed at newly or recently built facilities, utilizing urban planning and strategic infrastruc­ture, the concept can be approximated at existing airports by urban planners adapting expressway links, express trains, and the addition of special truck lanes to connect airports to major regional business and residential concentrations. While it is without question that aerotopolises will develop around existing major airports, the ques­tion is whether they will form in an intelligent manner, minimizing logistical and environmental problems so as to maximize the concept’s ben­efits to the airport, its users, businesses, and sur­rounding communities.

These results will not come about using current airport area planning and development. A new, synergistic approach is necessary to pro­duce a more economically efficient and aestheti­cally pleasing business and social community. Kasarda, in his book, Aerotropolis: The Way We’ll Live Next,’1 suggests that failure to adapt to these coming certainties will spell doom for older cities. This is true, in part, due to the fact that the global network will make communities more relevant to their distant trading and business part­ners than to their own locale.

Even today airport terminals are evolving into luxurious shopping malls and artistic and rec­reational areas. Appealing to the volume of busi­ness and recreational travelers, airports have gone from offering magazine and newspaper shops to upscale restaurants, brand-name boutiques, cul­tural attractions, and high-end retail.

The concept is catching on faster in other parts of the world. Hong Kong International has 30 designer clothing shops. Singapore Changi pres­ents theaters, saunas, and a tropical butterfly forest. Frankfurt has the world’s largest airport medical clinic, seeing over 36,000 patients annually.

Large airport terminals can boast 85 million passengers passing through annually, while even large shopping malls see only 8 to 12 million people flowing through. On the landside areas of the airport, developers are adding hotel, office, conference and exhibition centers, and facili­ties for processing time-sensitive products to be shipped from the airport. Nonaeronautical activi­ties at Dallas, Atlanta, Hong Kong, and Schiphol provide some two-thirds of total airport revenues.

Forward-looking airports are changing their management approaches to include the establish­ment of commercial and real estate divisions to develop landside areas and to promote develop­ment beyond airport boundaries.

Asia is leading the world in airport city and aerotropolis development. One reason this is true is that government bodies control the develop­ment process and the financing without social or severely restrictive environmental barriers. Hong Kong International, a 2,700-acre site cre­ated from two islands and by dredging the bay bottom, and South Korea’s Inchon Airport, a 15,000-acre complex set 42 miles from Seoul, are examples. With room to expand landside development, and with high-speed rail connect­ing the aerotropolis to nearby cities, these may become the paradigm for the future.

In India, the Delhi International Airport spans 5,000 acres and is being developed with a hospitality and retail district composed of a 5-star hotel, premium apartment hotels, condo hotels, office and retail space, and a pedestrian arcade with a metro station surrounded by hotels, offices, and retail shops.

In this new world, businesses will be drawn to developing aerotropolises as multi­modal transportation and advanced communica­tions infrastructure are installed. Accessibility to global markets will drive this development, and that will depend on access to the airport and, through the airport, access to those markets.

One intriguing option that has yet to be tried, or even mentioned, is whether the constitutional eminent domain powers of municipalities, states, the federal government, and in some cases the airport authority itself, may not become a way to clear areas adjacent to existing airports by condem­nation to facilitate the concepts mentioned here.

Endnotes

1. There has been a downturn in passenger enplanements since 2007 ascribed to the global recession beginning in 2008.

2. U. S. Department of Transportation, FAA/OST Task Force, Airport Business Practices and Their Impact on Airline Competition, October 1999.

3. See pg. 214 for the history of the Airport Improvement Program.

4. PFCs were raised from $3.00 to $4.50 under AIR-21 in the year 2000.

5. With the exception of some small airports that receive subsidies from local governments.

6. This was because of long-standing constitutional prin­ciples which limited federal interference with the rights of the states and their subdivisions, as confirmed by the United States Supreme Court case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943).

7. Parts of this section are based on the research and writ­ings of Robert Poole, The Reason Institute, and the Cato Institute, with appreciation.

8. Title 49 United States Code section 47134.

9. OIG report discussed in Reuters, “Cost Increases, Delays Cited in FAA Programs," Washington Post June 1, 2005, p. A17.

10. McDougall, “Commercializing Air Traffic Control: Have the Reforms Worked?”, Legal Studies research Paper Series, Research Paper 09-11, Suffolk University Law School, February 17, 2009.

11. Budget of U. S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011, Appen­dix—Government Printing Office, 2010—p. 936.

12. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2011.

The survival of the air carrier industry in the days after 9/11 was no sure thing. Passenger volumes plummeted. Fares were lowered in an intensified competition for what traffic there was. Enhanced airport security procedures, with attendant delays, contributed to the problem. Added costs to the airlines included cost of security (e. g., for­tified cockpit doors), increased insurance premi­ums, and increased taxes. Fixed airline costs, like airplane lease payments and debt service, ran on. There was talk of nationalization of the industry or, at least, re-regulation. Gloom prevailed.

The airlines did what they could within the limits of management discretion, but that gener­ally was not enough. It was not enough even with the payouts made by the Air Transportation Stabi­lization Board, which paid out $7 billion in direct assistance to the airlines and many billions more in indirect assistance in the form of loan guaran­tees to selected airlines. Aid included a tax holi­day and pension relief. Still, it was not enough.

US Airways

On August 11, 2002, US Airways was the first carrier after 9/11 to seek bankruptcy protection. US Airways was the largest carrier at Washing­ton Reagan Airport, and as such was severely impacted by the airport’s closure for an extended period of time. In Chapter 11, U. S. Airways made significant changes to its operating model. It became the first U. S. airline to eliminate the pen­sions of its pilots, affecting some 6,000 employ­ees. It became the first legacy carrier to eliminate complimentary meal service on domestic flights. As a part of its reorganization, it began a process of de-emphasizing its hub and spoke system, particularly in the Eastern United States, in favor of point-to-point service similar to Southwest’s successful model. While in bankruptcy, the airline received a government-guaranteed loan under the Air Transportation Stabilization Board.

Input from all stakeholders is necessary to design the NextGen system so that it will work for everyone and provide the most benefits.

The FAA is also working with selected air carriers to obtain ADS-B data for operational, training, and experience purposes, including JetBlue along the east coast and United Airlines over the Pacific Ocean. Tests, trials, and experi­ments are on-going at all times in various places in a joint effort between the FAA and stakehold­ers, particularly the airlines, to find better and new ways to utilize the new technology.

Commercial air carriers and the FAA have established an unprecedented system of sharing proprietary information (from the airlines) and internal data from the FAA under the acronym

ASIAS (Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing), from which 65 databases have been created from 43 commercial carriers, accounting for more than 95 percent of commercial opera­tions in the NAS. These databases are used to evaluate safety in emerging systems, and point to the cooperative and joint effort of government and private enterprise to enhance safety in the air transportation system.

Concepts are evaluated and tested for inte­gration at the William J. Hughes Technical Cen­ter in Atlantic City using simulators for aircraft cockpits, air traffic control tower interiors, airline operations centers, and unmanned aircraft system ground control centers. Test bed facilities, which is a term used to describe a platform for experi­mentation, have been established in Florida and

Improved Airport Surface Operations and Airspace Access in 2011

FIGURE 36-2 FAA-designated Metropiex areas.

North Texas, with the Department of Defense Research and Engineering Network being added in 2012. The training of the FAA workforce is also in process.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, member states of ICAO endorsed a global plan for strengthening aviation security, to include a review of legal instruments in aviation security to identify gaps and inadequacies in relation to emerging threats. It was concluded that the use of aircraft as weapons, suicide attacks, electronic and computer-based attacks, chemical, biological and radioactive attacks, were not adequately cov­ered by existing agreements.

It was also concluded that existing law focused mainly on persons who actually perpe­trated the attacks, usually on board the aircraft or at the airport, without considering the people who might be responsible for organizing, direct­ing, or financing the attack.

The Beijing Convention and the Beijing Pro­tocol may be considered together as two new coun­terterrorism treaties that promote and improve aviation security. These agreements criminalize the act of using civil aircraft as a weapon, and of using dangerous materials to attack aircraft or other targets on the ground. The unlawful transport of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons is a pun­ishable offense, as well as conspiracies to carry out such attacks. Making threats against civil aviation is also covered. The effect of these provisions is to require signatories to criminalize these acts.

After entry into force, the Beijing Con­vention of 2010 will prevail over the Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Protocol signed in Montreal in 1988.

As a part of the SES initiative, SESAR repre­sents the technological dimension of the plan, which will incorporate state-of-the-art innovative technology.

SESAR might be compared to the Next – Gen program in the United States and, like the Joint Planning and Development Office (JDPO), the planning segment of NextGen in the United States, it is a forward-looking program that involves all of the entities that operate within the air transport system. These include civil and mili­tary agencies of government, legislators, indus­try, operators, and users. These entities will be central to the defining, committing to, and imple­menting of a pan-European ATM system.

The SESAR program is separated into three sequential phases:

Definition Phase (2005-2008), now completed Development Phase (2008-2013), like Next­Gen, under development.

Deployment Phase (2014-2020), like Next­Gen, under development.

During the first phase, a European Master Plan was presented, bringing European ATM stakeholders together to produce and validate a common view of the future of European ATM. The updated second phase takes into account the global financial crises that began in 2008 after the Master Plan was published. It pro­poses to seek an impact statement to confirm that the Master Plan is affordable and can be done and to update the Plan in light of devel­opments. This is a work in progress, as is the remainder of the SESAR program. Fast-mov­ing technological developments, as well as global financial developments, will affect the deployment effort. The implementation phase will depend on accomplishing the goals of the second phase.

SESAR will incorporate the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) known as Galileo, into the ATM system to be launched. Details of the manner and means by which the new system will operate have not been disclosed, but it might be presumed that it will evolve in a similar manner to the NextGen plan in the United States. Part of the U. S. plan, in fact, is to reach out to the global community so that the several systems now on the drawing boards might be developed with the requirements of the others in mind. It makes sense that these satellite – based air traffic control systems be compatible to the extent possible so that the globalization of the air transport system will extend, not only to marketing and governmental policy develop­ments, like deregulation and Open Skies, but to operational considerations, like air traffic control, to enhance the seamless transition of air transport operations over the globe.

Harmonic Convergence

The United States and the EU are working simul­taneously on the complete transition of their air traffic control systems from land-based naviga­tion to satellite navigation. The fact is that these programs are being carried out separately, under separate management and with distinct chal­lenges; yet the hundreds of flights that travel between the two continents daily demand that these separate systems be compatible and that the flights be operationally seamless and safe.

There are also distinctions between the two systems that reflect the political and cultural dif­ferences between the United States and the coun­tries of Europe. The U. S. system is a federal one, while the EU must still deal with the concerns of 27 sovereign states. The controlling governmental entity for the United States is the FAA, while that for the EU is the SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU), which consists of Eurocontrol, the European Commission, and 15 more member organizations.

The tentative nature of some aspects of each of the programs, partially because of still unde­veloped technological systems, unknown pricing, and even undetermined commitment, have caused skepticism and doubts among stakeholders (pri­marily airlines, on both sides of the Atlantic, who must equip their aircraft). All of this has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis, which has manifested itself in a very divisive manner in the EU and its separate Member States.

The uncertainties inherent in each of the programs contribute to difficulties in harmo­nization. There can be no doubt that each side understands that the systems must, in fact, be compatible and consistent, but both programs at this point still involve a lot of theory, unproven development, and the possibility of a change in course that will affect the financial conditions of both the private and governmental sectors.

Final developments cannot be stated with certainty under these conditions. There appears to be a bona fide commitment to accomplish the stated goals of both the United States and the EU, and hard work is proceeding in many quarters in the United States and in Europe; indeed, includ­ing private enterprise all over the world. Air traf­fic management systems are obsolete and must be fixed. Exactly what will develop, and when it will develop, remains to be seen.

Endnotes

1. Minestere Public v. Lucas Asjes, 3 C. L.R. 173, Eur. Ct.

R. 1425.

2. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) p. 202.7 (1978).

3. Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communi­ties regarding application of their Competition Laws, 1995 0. J. (L95) 47.

4. See discussion in Chapter 37.

5. Most developed countries have their own regulatory author­ity that is equivalent to the FAA. Here are some world­wide certification agencies: Canada—Transport Canada; Brazil—СТА; EU—EASA (27 countries); Kenya—KCAA; Russia—Aviation Register; China—CAAC; Japan—JCAB; Australia—CASA.

6. Lipinski, William 0., An Evaluation of the U. S.-EU Trade Relationship <http://www. house. gov./lipinski/ aviation. htm>.

7. Competition in the U. S. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U. S. House of Representatives, July 26, 2001, U. S. Govern­ment Printing Office.

8. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

“The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod­ies,” or the Moon Treaty, is yet another follow-on treaty that proceeds from the first space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty. Each of the treaties that have been adopted since the Outer Space Treaty has added more detail and definition to the gen­eral principles enunciated in the first treaty. The Moon Treaty, however, is considered by most as a “failed” treaty because the specific, additional language used has met with opposition from the major space-faring countries.

The basic stumbling block in the treaty is the use of the words “common heritage of man­kind” to describe the nature of the moon and its resources, as well as the other celestial bodies. The treaty provides for the establishment of an
international regime to govern the exploitation of these resources when such exploitation becomes feasible.

The general interpretation of this language is that all nations of the world have equal rights to the resources of the heavens, irrespective of whether or not they put forth any effort or incur any risk, financial or otherwise, in development of ways and means to recover those resources. Any plan to develop these resources would osten­sibly require approval of all nations on earth, which would be impracticable.

The rejection of the Moon Treaty follows a similar rejection of the terrestrial Law of the Sea Treaty (referred to gleefully by its detractors as LOST). In 1982, the United Nations conceived the Law of the Sea Treaty as a means of con­trol and governance of the world’s oceans. The breadth of the treaty was such that it sought to

biotechnology), physics (including fluid physics, materials science, and quantum physics), astron­omy, and meteorology. The goals of this research include developing an understanding of, and the technology to deal with, long-term human pres­ence in space, developing methods for the more efficient production of materials, developing new ways to treat disease, achieving more accurate measurements than is possible on earth, and a better understanding of the universe.

1 NASA and the United States
Space Program-А Review

Created by the National Aeronautics and Space Act on July 29, 1958, during the Eisenhower Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration replaced the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) which had been researching flight technology for more than 40 years. NASA’s mission continued the work of aeronautics research, but also specifi­cally assumed the responsibility for research in aerospace and for the overall civilian space pro­gram for the nation, including the human space flight program.

The United States space exploration and development program has included both manned and unmanned launches, and unmanned launches designed specifically as precursors of human space flight. Included in these are Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, the Space Shut­tle, Skylab, and the International Space Station.23

ince the award of the Langley Medal to the Wright brothers three years ago, there has been great activity in the field of aviation. The war departments of the differ­ent nations have been constantly at work, but little is known concerning the character of the advances made. So far as the public are aware the chief progress has related to details of con­struction and improvement in motive power. The advance has been much greater in the art than in the science.

There has, however, been considerable advance in the science of aerodromics along the lines laid down by our late Secretary, Dr. S. P. Langley, and by M. Gustave Eiffel, Director of the Eiffel Aero-Dynamical Labora­tory in Paris.

In 1907 M/Eiffel published the results of experiments made at the Eiffel Tower; in 1911, he published the results of his experiment at the aerodynamic laboratory in Paris on the resistance of the air in connection with aviation, and these
results have been of great value to aerial engineers in designing and construction flying machines. Indeed his works upon the subject have already become classical.. ..

In spite of the great advances that have been made in the art of aerodromics we are confronted with a long list of fatalities to avia­tors, for whose protection there remains a great deal yet to be done. There has been one very notable development in this direction, made by an American, Mr. Glenn R. Curtiss of Ham – mondsport, N. Y.

In 1908, the Aerial Experiment Associa­tion, of which Mr. Curtiss was a member, dis­cussed the advisability of have flying machines so constructed as to enable them to float, and to rise from the water into the air, as an element of safety. In pursuance of these ideas, the Associa­tion’s aerodrome No. 3, the “Curtiss June Bug” was attached to pontoons and an experiment was made on Lake Keuka on November 6, 1908. Although the speed on the water appeared to be
satisfactory, the machine failed to rise in the air, but the occasion formed the starting point for Mr. Curtiss’ independent researches.

After the dissolution of the Association, March 31, 1909, Mr. Curtiss continued his exper­iments to find a practical solution of the prob­lem, and in May 1910, he made that remarkable flight from Albany to New York City over the Hudson River, a distance of 152 miles in 2 hours 52 minutes, with two light pontoons attached to his machine, to enable it to float should it come down into the water.

In 1911 Mr. Curtiss continued his efforts to construct a machine that would not only float, but would rise from the water into the air, and in January 1912, he succeeded in doing this in San Diego Bay, California. “On January 26, 1912” he says “the first success came”: and on January 27, 1912, the Aero Club of America awarded him the Collier Trophy for his accomplishment.

In February 1912, he demonstrated the use to the Navy of such machines by flying to the U. S. Armored Cruiser “Pennsylvania” . . . alighting in the water beside the vessel. The machine was hoisted up on the vessel’s deck, and then again lowered into the water without damage, showing the possibility of handling such machines without special equipment. He then rose from the water and flew back to the starting point.

By July 1912, he had developed the remark­able machine he calls “the flying boat,” which represents the greatest advance yet made along these lines. It develops great speed upon the water and also in the air, and is equally at home in either element. The world is now following Mr. Curtiss’ lead in the development of flying machines of this type.

Great experience in the handling of aer­ial machines is necessary before aviators can safely make extended flight over land, where a fall might be fatal. The successful develop­ment of the hydro-aerodrome now enables this experience to be gained over water without seri­ous danger to life or limb; and marks a notable advance in the direction of safety that might well be recognized by the Smithsonian Institution by the award of a Langley Medal to Mr. Glenn M. Curtiss.