Category . LOCKHEED’S BLACK WORLD SKUNK WORKS

Rolling down Beale’s runway 14, in ‘977, on October 1968, new pilot/RSO team Majs Abe Kardong and Jim Kogler were approaching VI when a wheel failed, throwing shrapnel into the fuel cells and causing a fuel fire. Abe aborted take-off at high speed, causing the remaining tyres on that leg to burst. The brake ’chute blossomed only to be consumed immediately by the fire. With one wing low and the aircraft off-centre to the runway, ’977’s sharp inlet spike knifed through the barrier cable at the end of the runway, rendering it useless. Now on the overrun, Jim ejected while Abe rode out the high­speed sleigh ride. When the dust settled, he was helped from the cockpit by the Mobile Control crew for that day, Willie Lawson and Gil Martinez. Despite four 9th SRW aircraft losses between 13 April 1967 and 10 October 1968, Category III ‘Operational’ Testing ended in December 1968 and the wing was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for meeting the challenges of bringing the most advanced reconnaissance system of its day to operational readiness.

On 11 April 1969, Lt Col Bill Skliar and Maj Noel Warner lost SR-71A, 64-17953 on the Edwards runway

following an incident similar to the loss of ‘977. ‘Dutch 69’ had just rotated when one of the left main gear tyres blew. With the aircraft at max gross weight, the other two tyres on that leg also blew. Bill aborted the take-off, but red hot shrapnel from the disintegrating wheel hubs punctured the fuel tanks and triggered a fire which engulfed the entire aircraft. Once at a standstill Bill exited the aircraft to the right and assisted Noel from his rear cockpit. ‘953 never flew again and after this accident the Goodrich tyres were ‘beefed up’.

A third pitch-up accident happened on 18 December 1969, when Director of the Test Force, Lt Col Joe Rogers and RSO Lt Col Gary Heidelbaugh were acceler­ating and climbing ‘953. They heard a loud explosion which was accompanied by a loss of power and severe

Above Darrell Greenamyer and Steve Belgau first flew the ‘Big Tail’ conversion of 17959 on I I December 1975.The redesign increased reconnaissance gathering capacity but was not pursued on the operational fleet. (Paul Crickmore Collection)

Left The last operational SR-71 to be lost was 17974 on 21 April 1989. Pilot Maj Dan House and his RSO Capt Blair Bozek ejected safely. (Paul Crickmore Collection)

Right Detachment 4 (Det 4) of the 9th SRW was created at RAF Mildenhall on I April 1979. (Paul Crickmore)

Bottom right Another Det 4 sortie gets underway. (Paul Crickmore)

control difficulties. As the aircraft decelerated, its angle of attack continued to increase, despite Joe ‘firewalling’ the control stick. Realising they’d entered an irrecoverable corner of the flight envelope, ten seconds after the explo­sion, Joe ordered “Let’s get out Gary” and both men safely ejected; ‘953 crashed at the Southern end of Death Valley. The cause of the explosion remains unknown.

On 17 June 1970, the 9th lost another SR-71A, serial ‘970, following a mid-air collision with a KC-135Qshort­ly after taking aboard 35,000 lbs of fuel. The Habu hit clear air turbulence (CAT) and the entire nose of the aircraft smashed into the rear of the tanker. No one aboard the tanker was injured and Buddy Brown and Mort Jarvis were able to eject safely – although the former sustained two broken legs during the ejection.

At MOOhrs on 6 October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian artillery barrages on the state of Israel spelled the begin­ning of the Yom Kippur War. With Israel caught off guard, the Arabs made substantial gains both in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In view of the grave situation faced by Israel, the US decided to step up intelligence efforts and used the SR-71 to provide a hot-spot recon­naissance capability. CINC SAC General John Meyer ordered Col Pat Halloran (9th SRW Commander) to prepare for missions that would be flown from Beale
across the war zone and recover into RAF Mildenhall, England. However, the Heath government denied the SR – 71’s use of Mildenhall in a move designed to safeguard the supply of Arab oil to the United Kingdom.

Instead, round-robin missions would be flown from GrifFiss AFB, New York; accordingly, two SR-71As, ‘979 and ‘964, were despatched to the east coast air base where they arrived on 12 October. At 0600 a secure teleprinter clattered out details of the first sortie which was to be flown just 22 hours later. The belligerent attitude of usually helpful allies necessitated that JP 7 fuel and tanker crews be re-positioned from Mildenhall and Turkey to Zargoza in Spain and emergency landing sites were proving all but impossible to find. Nevertheless, Jim Shelton cranked ’979’s engines on cue and lifted off from Griffiss and headed east at 0200hrs. Just off the east coast he made good the first of many ARCP’s (Air Refuelling Contact Points), he topped-off and continued east to the

next cell of tankers awaiting the thirsty Habu just beyond the Azores. Returning again to speed and altitude they made a high-Mach dash through the Straits of Gibraltar and let-down for a third air refuelling just east of the heel of Italy. Due to its proximity to the war zone and Libya, the US Navy provided a CAP (Combat Air Patrol), from carrier-based aircraft on station in the Mediterranean. They then climbed and accelerated to coast-in over Port Said. Gary Coleman, the RSO: “There was no indication that anything launched against us, but everyone was painting us on their radars as we made our turn inbound. The DEF panel lit up like a pin-ball machine and I said to Jim, ‘this should be interesting.’”

In all ‘979 spent 25 minutes over ‘denied territory’. Entering Egyptian airspace at 1103 GMT, they covered the Israeli battle fronts with both Egypt and Syria before coasting out and letting down towards their fourth ARCP, which was still being capped by the US Navy. Their next hot leg was punctuated by a fifth refuelling, again near the Azores, before a final high-speed run across the west­ern Atlantic towards New’ York. Mindful of his own fatigue, Gary was in awe of his pilot who completed a text book sixth air refuelling, before greasing ‘979 back down at Griffiss after a combat sortie lasting ten hours eighteen minutes (more than five hours of which was at Mach 3 or above) and involving eleven tanking operations from the ever dependable KC-135Qs Their reconnais­sance ‘take’ was of high quality and provided intelligence and defense analysts with much needed information concerning the deposition of Arab forces in the region, which was then made available to the Israelis.

Aircraft ‘979 paid a second successful visit to the Yom Kippur war zone on 25 October, this time being crewed by Majs Al Joerz and John Fuller. A third mission was chalked up by the same aircraft eight days later. Majs Jim Wilson and Bruce Douglas took’ 964 on its first sortie to the Mediterranean on 11 November. The ten hour 49-

minute flight departed Griffiss and terminated as planned at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, where the detachment had migrated to avoid the New York winter weather.

Despite hostilities between the factions officially ending with a Soviet-backed motion in the United Nations on 24 October, fierce fire-fighting continue to break out at regu­lar intervals and it was to cover disengagement that the SR-71’s monitoring system continued to be called upon, with five further marathon flights being flown from Seymour Johnson AFB.

In total, these nine flights represent a pinnacle of oper­ational professionalism and serve as a tribute, not only to the dedication of the aircrews, but also to that of the staff planners, tanker crews and of course the unsung heroes, that small group of top ground technicians who main­tained the SR-71s away from home. The sorties also stand as a testament to the long-reach capability of the aircraft and its ability to operate, on short notice, with impunity in a high threat environment.

Early in the Senior Crown Programme, Cuban reconnais­sance sorties became a task for the 9th SRW. Flown from Beale and initially code-named Giant Plate, the designa­tion was later changed to ‘Clipper’. Most sorties were ‘stand-ofF runs, flown abeam the island in international airspace. Such a mission would typically take three and a half hours to complete and was considered very routine. Occasionally however, the track was modified to take the aircraft directly over Cuba. W hen the Carter administra­tion entered office, they suspended all overflight actively in an act of ‘goodwill’. In 1978 however, a reconnaissance satellite photographed a Soviet freighter in Havana harbour surrounded by large crates that were being moved to a nearby air base where aircraft were being reassem­bled. It appeared that 15 MiG-23s had been supplied to Castro’s Air Force. The MiG-23BN Flogger H Model was known to be capable of carry ing nuclear weapons and if it was this variant that had been exported, then the shipment violated the 1962 Soviet pledge not to deploy ‘offensive’ weapons on Cuba. Two sorties were flown by SR-71s over Cuba in November 1978. These verified that

Above Map used by Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger at a White House briefing shows route details of Operation Eldorado Canyon, the US strike at Libya on 15 April 1986.

(DoD)

Below Lt Cols Jerry Glasser and RSO Ron Tabor return 17980, callsign Tromp 30, back to Mildenhall following the successful completion of their Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) flight.

(Paul Crickmore Collection)

Opposite above After the raid, some degraded shots were released to the press. Although never officially acknowledged, they originated from the SR-71’s camera system. (DoD)

Opposite, bottom Just before 17980 returned to the US on completion of its TDY stint at Det 4, three dark red camel emblems were applied to the left nose gear door, in recognition of its part in the Eldorado Canyon sorties. (Paul Crickmore )

they were in fact MiG-23Ms Flogger Es, optimised for air defence; evidence which substantiated Soviet claims.

Det 4, Mildenhall

Not long into Senior Crown, the total number of opera – tial SR-71s was scaled down. The two flying squadrons became one in April 1971. Then as the US disengaged itself from Vietnam, the number of unit-authorised aircraft also declined. By 1977, the number of SR-71A Primary Authorised Aircraft (PAA) stood at six and fund­ing was reduced proportionately. Despite being tasked by national agencies to support a variety of theatre intelli­gence requirements, this extremely expensive aircraft operation was funded by the Air Force. HQ^ SAC were hostile to Senior Crown because it diverted funds away from its bomber and tanker mission and national intelli­gence agencies had become enamoured with satellite generated products. SAC’s Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), for the unthinkable needed SIG1NT to keep it up to date, and the SR-71 wasn’t capable of gathering ‘long-on-station’ samples of SIGINT like the RC-135s and U-2Rs. The loss of its SAC patronage left Senior Crown increasingly isolated and vulnerable. To survive

continued budgetary raids, it was apparent that the SR – 71’s utility had to be improved in order to become competitive with overhead systems. This required an updated sensor package, particularly an air-to-ground data link system coupled to its Synthetic Aperture Radar.

A ‘marketing package’ was assembled which included details of the SR-71’s performance and imagery capabili­ties. In the mid-seventies, Senior Crown advocates embarked on a PR campaign within the Washington intel­ligence community to gather support for the program. Following a briefing to intelligence officers of the Navy’s Atlantic fleet, interest was expressed in the SR-71’s sea­scanning radar capabilities to detect submarines in their home ports in the Baltic and Arctic areas. The possibility existed that a new requirement could arise which would give Senior Crown a second lease of life. Two missions were flown over the Soviet Pacific fleet near Vladivostok to test the concept and the results were impressive.

Eighteen months after aircraft ‘972 had established a new transatlantic world speed record, the same aircraft returned to England and flew two aborted missions in a bid to obtain SLAR imagery of the Soviet Northern fleet. The ten-day deployment was an intelligence gathering failure, however important lessons were learned about aircraft operating procedures in Arctic air masses.

Aircraft ‘962 arrived during Exercise Teamwork on 6 September 1976, and flew’ the very next day on a ‘Barents Sea Mission’ codenamed Coldfire 001. Majs Rich Graham and Don Emmons flew that and another round – robin sortie out of RAF Mildenhall, Suffolk, before returning ‘962 to Beale on 18 September. The SR-71’s SLAR and camera systems ‘to gather simultaneous, synoptic coverage’ of the Soviet submarine fleet based on the Kolskiv Polustrov, in Murmansk and bases on the Baltic had been validated. After nearly two years of short TDY deployments, Detachment 4 (Det 4) of the 9th SRW was activated and two SR-71s were permanently based at RAF Mildenhall.

Above All battened down and ready for a mission, the crew of 17964 awaits signals from a ground marshal in December 1987.

(Paul Cnckmore)

Opposite, top 17962 formates with two RAF Jaguars of 41 Recce Squadron, based at RAF Coltishall. (Crown Copyright)

The name of an 11th Century Holy Roman

Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, King of Germany, is etched forever in contemporary’ history.

At dawn on 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. As its Panzer Divisions rolled east, smashing everything in their path, Soviet industry sought protection deep within the Motherland. Hitler’s maps would have been good enough to show him supply lines of a thousand miles to Moscow… When, after WWII, ‘An iron curtain… descended across the Continent’ and relations between the victorious east and western powers chilled into the Cold War, it was soon discovered that the accuracy of maps and target intelligence held by Britain and the US
was woefully inadequate. With limited human intelligence (HUMINT) being provided by agents in the field, large gaps remained in the knowledge of Soviet industrial and military capability. Stand-off aerial reconnaissance of peripheral targets provided a partial solution to the problem, but the vastness of the Soviet Union left only one option, given the level of technology available at that time – overflight. So began the so called PAROP program – Peace-time Aerial Reconnaissance Operations.

For several years such sorties were conducted utilising converted bombers manned by extremely courageous air crews. De Havilland Mosquito PR.34s flying with 540 Sqn, based at RAF Benson in Oxfordshire, conducted reconnaissance flights from altitudes in excess of 43,000 ft

over such places as Murmansk and Archangel. Operations from such heights provided a haven from interception by Soviet fighters and continued until at least 1949.

In June 1948, the Soviet Union enforced a food blockade upon the western zones of Berlin. The allies responded by mounting a round-the-clock airlift; the United States highlighted the seriousness of the situation by redeploying bombers back to Britain. As allied reconnaissance operations continued, it was only a question of time before such actions provoked the ultimate response. It first occurred on 11th April 1950, when a US Navy Consolidated PB4Y Privateer, operated by VP-26 and with a crew of ten onboard, was shot down and crashed into the Baltic, off Soviet Latvia.

World destabilisation esealateded when at dawn on 25 June 1950, communist North Korea invaded its southern neighbour and in so doing, sparked off the Korean War. In Europe, surveillance operations against the USSR
continued; the 5th Strategic Reconnaissance Group (SRG), from Travis AFB, operated Boeing RB-29s from RAF Sculthorpe and Burtonwood. Like the RAF Mosquitos, their high-altitude performance and long range made them ideal photographic and Electronic intelligence (PHOTINT and ELINT), gathering platforms. In February 1951, a small detachment of four RB-45 Tornados from the 91st SRG, from Lockbourne AFB, Ohio were ‘loaned’ to Great Britain, painted in RAF markings and were utilised by a mixed USAF/RAF crew on high-altitude, night time overflights of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries for nearly three years. No aircraft were lost during these nocturnal forays, however, by 1954, developing Soviet anti-aircraft capabilities made it prudent to stop using RB-45s in this role and they were transferred back to USAF control.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union were becoming increasingly sensitive to Western incursions into its

airspace and retaliated by pressing home a series of attacks on any aircraft suspected of violating its sovereignty. In April 1952, an Air France DC-4 was attacked and damaged in the Berlin corridor and less than two months later a Swedish Air Force C-47 was downed into the Baltic Sea east of Gotland. Even search and rescue PBY was attacked whilst looking for survivors; the Russians certainly meant business. Four months later, MiG-15s destroyed a reconnoitring RB-29. On 10 March 1953, a USAF F-84 Thunderjet was shot down over Bavaria by Czech MiG-15s. Two days later an RAF Lincoln (RF-531) of the central gunnery school, was shot down in the Berlin Corridor by MiG-15s; seven crew lost their lives. On 15 March 1953, an RB-50 of the 38th SRS, 55th SRW, flown by Lt Col Robert Rich was intercepted by Soviet MiG-15s. The gunner, T/Sgt Jesse Prim, returned fire and the MiG withdrew. However, on 29 July, another RB-50 from the same wing was not so lucky. Attacked by MiG-15s during a reconnaissance flight near the Soviet border, the RB-50 lost a wing and fell into the Sea of Japan. Co-pilot Capt John E Roche was the only survivor.

As the cost in air crew’s lives continued to mount it became apparent that a new approach to gathering such vital intelligence was needed. With high altitude having already been established as the ‘operational environment’ for such missions, it was a US Air Force Major who articulated the way forward. Having spent some time as an aeronautical engineer with Chance Vought, John Seaberg had been recalled to active duty following the outbreak of the Korean War. It was whilst serving as Assistant Chief in the New Developments Office, Bombardment Branch, at Wright Field, near Dayton, Ohio, that he mapped out high altitude strategic reconnaissance philosophy, proposing to mate an aircraft with an extremely efficient high-aspect-ratio wing to the new generation of turbo jet engines. Utilising such a union, he believed an aircraft would be capable of cruis­ing at altitudes far in excess of any other then in service.

Spurred on by his new boss, William Lamar, Seaburg had, by March 1953, created a formal specification, requiring the aircraft to cruise at an altitude of 70,000 feet, possess a range of 1,500 nautical miles, whilst carry­ing a camera payload weight of up to 7001bs, to be in

Above Undoubtedly two of the world’s greatest aeronautical engineers, Kelly Johnson (right) and his protege, Ben Rich.

(Lockheed Martin)

Below Heavily shrouded for security reasons, the prototype U-2 is disgorged from а С-124 at Area 51. (Lockheed Martin)

Bottom Resplendent with ‘star and bar’ markings, prototype 001 is photographed at Area 51 during very early flight tests.

(Lockheed Martin)

Above The Type A camera system consisted of three Fairchild HR-724, 24-inch cameras carried in the aircraft’s ’Q-bay’.

(Lockheed Martin)

Top This CIA, U-2 overflight of Engles Air Base, in the Soviet Union, captured 32 Myaseshchev M/4 Bisons and 30 other aircraft dispersed around the airfield. (CIA)

service by 1956. These initial proposals were subsequently released to just three of the smaller aircraft manufacturing companies; the rationale being that as large-scale production was not envisioned, the project would receive a higher priority than if placed with the larger players.

Bell and Fairchild were requested to submit proposals for the design and construction of a totally new aircraft; whilst Martin were asked to apply improvements to the

B-57 (a design built under licence by them, but actually developed by the English Electric Company and known in RAF service as the Canberra). In July 1953, six-month study contracts had been agreed with each company and the project, identified as MX-2147, was given the classified code name of ‘Bald Eagle’.

Developments in camera and film technolog)’, required to gather surveillance data from high altitude, had been proceeding in parallel with those made by the aerospace industry. Having established the Photographic Laboratory at Wright Field before the Second World War, Brig Gen George Goddard recruited two individuals, Cols Richard Philbrick and Amrom Katz, who continued in service after the war. Renamed the Aerial Reconnaissance Laboratory, Goddard also helped establish a group of optical research specialists that formed the Boston University Optical Research Centre. These included its director. Doctor Duncan MacDonald. In addition, there were notable industrialists and academics serving on various presidential panels who also played a key role in the development of high altitude reconnaissance imagery; people such as Harvard astronomer Doctor James Baker, Edwin Land, inventor of the Polaroid camera, Allen Donovan and Col Richard Leghorn, an airborne reconnaissance expert from Eastman Kodak. However, it was Jim Baker who had, by the end of WAVII, produced the first 100-inch focal length precision lens for an aerial camera. This work was continued at Boston by Dune MacDonald and his team in the early post-war years and culminated in a massive 240-inch focal length lens which, at fourteen feet, could only fit into an RB-36!

As US fears of a possible surprise Soviet ICBM attack continued to mount, the Air Force set up a study group at Boston to look further into the aerial reconnaissance
problem. Code named ‘Beacon Hill’, it was chaired by Carl Overhage, and first assembled in May 1951. Bringing together Baker, Land and Donovan, some of this team also became members of the so-called Killian committee, set up by President Eisenhower in 1954. It served under James R Killian, and would drive the decision to build a light-weight reconnaissance aircraft.

By January 1954, Bell, Fairchild and Martin had completed their studies and submitted them to Wright Field for evaluation. Apart from all three companies nominating the new Pratt & Whitney J57 axial flow – turbojet engine (with high altitude modifications, the full designation would become J57-P-37), the design submissions varied considerably. As requested, Martin’s proposed Model 294 was a big wing version of the B-57; Bell’s Model 67 was a frail-looking twin-engined craft, whilst the single-engined Fairchild M-195 featured an over-the-fuselage intake and a stub-boom mounting for vertical and horizontal tail surfaces.

By March 1954, engineers at Wright Field had nominated Martin’s B-57D as the interim design, whilst the Bell proposal was felt to be the more suitable, longer-term design. Consequently, a list of B-57 modifications was sent to Air Research and Development Command (ARDC.) Headquarters, to enable urgent Air Force intelligence requirements in Europe to be met.

In April, Seaburg briefed all three designs to ARDC and Strategic Air Command (SAC). This was followed a month later by vet another briefing, this time to Air Force Headquarters in Washington DC. Shortly afterwards Seaburg received approval to proceed with the B-57D and tentative approval for the Bell Model 67; however, on 18th May an unsolicited proposal originating from Lockheed hit his desk!

It was perhaps inevitable that someone in the Pentagon would leak details of the classified high-altitude recon­naissance proposal to Lockheed’s Advanced Development Projects boss, aircraft design genius, Clarence L ‘Kelly’ Johnson. However, after a short but detailed review, Seaburg and his staff rejected the Lockheed design, desig­nated CL-282, and in June 1954 Kelly received a letter

Left When initially delivered to the Air Force, the U-2As were operated in natural metal finish and standard markings.

(Lockheed Martin)

Middle left and bottom left Starting life as a U-2A, Article 393 was converted to a dual control U-2CT trainer in 1973.The elevated second cockpit was accommodated in what was formerly the Q-bay. (Paul Crickmore)

Right In the cramped confines of early U-2 cockpits, partial pressure suits were worn. Here NASA pilot Jim Hoyt under­goes a check in his S100 suit. (Paul Crickmore)

Below Unusually for a military aircraft of its size, the U-2’s ailerons and elevators are controlled via a yoke.

(Lockheed Martin)

officially rejecting his proposal. Undaunted, Kelly decided to pursue funding from alternative sources. Shortly after­wards he therefore presented a refined design submission to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study committee.

With the Killian Committee having been briefed earlier on all four ‘Bald Eagle’ contenders and the CIA becom­ing increasingly enamoured of the idea of establishing its

Above Type A system, three Hycon HR-73224 cameras.

own airborne reconnaissance capability, Kelly met with the Government Advisory Board on 19 November 1954. During the course of that meeting he was told that he… “was essentially being drafted for the project”.

The Killian Committee’s decision to back the refined CL-282 proposal was communicated to Secretary of Defence, Charles Wilson and CIA Director, Allen Dulles. They subsequently briefed President Eisenhower and sought authorisation for a programme to produce twenty aircraft at a total cost of 835 million. This was duly sanc­tioned.

A day later Dulles recruited Richard Bissell (a brilliant economist who lectured at both Yale and MIT), to manage the programme. That same day, Kelly received a phone call giving him the go-ahead for project ‘Aquatone’. Within days, Lockheed’s ADP office, better known as ’the Skunk Works’, had by default become a full-scale, advanced design, engineering and production facility. The requirement for absolute secrecy meant that in the years ahead, the Skunk Works team were assured a high degree of autonomy from the rest of the Lockheed Corporation; additionally, the high level of specialised support required to run the programme, coupled with the lack of CIA expertise in this field, ensured Lockheed’s participation in the programme for the life of the aircraft. With one decision, a series of precedents had been set for future aircraft programmes.

The Skunk Works had come into being back in 1943, following Lockheed’s successful bid to build the United States first jet fighter. Kelly recruited the finest engineers from the Burbank facility and put them to work in an area isolated and secure from the rest of the plant – building the XP-80 in just 143 days! The high level of secrecy surrounding the Facility’s activities, together with its location – adjacent to the unit’s aw’ful-smelling, plastics manufac­turing plant, caused Ervin Culver, a talented engineer on Kelly’s team (who later invented the rigid rotor system for helicopters), to habitually answer the telephone using the name ‘Skunk Works’, after a location in a popular war rime comic strip, written by Al Capp – the name stuck.

The team Kelly recruited to design and build the new aircraft included Dick Boehme (project engineer), Art

Above The Itek Iris II Panoramic camera.

Viercck (head of manufacturing), Ed Baldwin and some fifty other key engineers. Kelly nominated Tony LeVier (chief test pilot on the XF-104), to be the projects chief test pilot, but his first task wras to find a secret site from which to conduct flight tests. After flying around fbr two weeks with Dorsey Kammerer, in Lockheed’s V-tailed Beech Bonanza, Tony presented a short list of three possi­ble sites to Kelly, who chose the one at the top of the list – Groom Lake. The site fell within the boundaries of the main Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) nuclear test site. Therefore the area had been cleared, fenced off and granted a restricted airspace zone. Within three months, under the auspices of Richard Bissell, a large team of AEC construction crews worked round the clock to transform the site into a basic test facility, consisting of a tarmac runway, two hangers and a number of accommo­dation trailers. An additional veil of secrecy w as provided when it was agreed that all information released into the public domain would state that the aircraft had been developed as a high-altitude research tool, in service primarily with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA, later redesignated NASA).

To ensure that ‘Kelly’s Angel’ (as the design was being referred to by some in the Skunk Works), maintained a competitive edge over its rival, the Bell 67 (now officially designated X-16 by the Air Force as a cover), Kelly promised that his design would be airborne in no more than eight months after the first metal was cut. The initial batch of twenty aircraft wrere built at the Burbank plant, thereafter further production was moved to Oildale, near Bakersfield, California. On 15 March 1955, wind tunnel testing of the design had been successfully completed and on 21 May, the fuselage of ‘Article 34Г, the prototype, was removed from the jig. On 20 July, the completed aircraft was handed over to inspection for final checks. The next day it was disassembled and put into loading carts. At daybreak on 24 July, Article 341 was loaded into an Air Force C-124 and flown to Groom Lake, or Area 51. There it was reassembled in the semi- completed hangars and three days later static engine runs were initiated. With taxi tests completed – the third of which culminated in the aircraft inadvertently getting

Above This is one of a series of shots taken by an ‘Agency’ U-2 overflight of Cuba on 29 August 1962, when concerns were raised that Soviet MRBMs had been deployed on the island.

(CIA)

Below left and below right Surveillance of Cuba continued throughout the crisis, providing decision makers with vital information of the build-up and later deactivation of weapons systems. (CIA)

airborne, to a height of 35ft. The first scheduled flight took place at 15:55 hrs on 4 August 1955. Witnessed by several key Skunk Works and ‘Agency’ people, Tony LeVier, (using the call sign Angel 1), was chased by a Lockheed operated C-47, flown by company test pilot Bob Matve accompanied by Kelly Johnson (Matye would be the second pilot to fly the aircraft). Kelly had insisted that Tony should land the aircraft in a nose-level-main – gear-first attitude. However, after five attempts Tony abandoned this technique and landed the aircraft, having been airborne for 45 minutes, using a conventional tail – wheel-first landing.

It was during phase one of the flight test programme that the aircraft was officially designated U-2, the U for Utility, again designed to obscure the aircraft’s true mission. Bell’s X-16 had also been progressing well, with construction getting underway in September 1954 and its

Right The pledge given by President Eisenhower and repeated by Kennedy, that the US would conduct no more manned over­flights of Soviet territory following the Gary Powers shoot down, implicitly excluded other Communist Bloc countries and the People’s Republic of China. In early 1959 the first of sever­al cadres of Chinese Nationalist pilots arrived at laughlin to begin U-2 flying training. From I960 to 1968 these brave pilots conducted numerous overflights, gleaning vital intelligence relating to the Republic’s emerging nuclear capability – several aircraft were shot down and put on display at the Peking People’s Museum. (Paul Crickmore Collection)

Be/ow In Late 1968, the U-2R entered service under the auspices of the Agency and was primarily employed in opera­tions conducted by the Nationalist Chinese over the Republic of China. (Lockheed Martin)

first flight scheduled for early 1956. However, with the Agency, not the Air Force, now responsible for high-alti – rudc reconnaissance, the X-16’s raison d’etre had disappeared. Consequently, two months after the U-2 _ took to the air, a decision was made to terminate the X – 16 contract – it was a bitter blow for Bell and one that had serious financial implications for several years.

The first of six RB-57s were delivered to SAC, under Project Black Knight, in March 1956. Operated by the 40S0th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SRW), 4025th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS), located at Turner AFB, Georgia, the unit conducted its first opera­tional deployment, under Operation Sea Lion, just four months after activation. Most of these early operations were Electronic Intelligence/Signal Intelligence (ELINT/ SIGINT) missions, flown from Operating Locations (OLs), at Yokota AFB, Japan and, briefly, Eilson AFB, Alaska.

Highly classified, these ferret sorties utilised specialist equipment designated Model 320 or SAFE (Semi – Automatic Ferret Equipment), which had been tested during 1956 and 1957, under the Blue Tail Fly project; thereafter it was declared operational and deployed. In addition, the unit conducted high altitude sampling, during which particles were collected from the upper atmosphere, following nuclear tests undertaken by China
and the Soviet Union. This enabled scientists to ascertain the weapons’ characteristics: yield, efficiency etc.

In February 1957 the 4025th relocated from Turner to Laughlin AFB, Texas and one month later they received the last of twenty RB-57Ds ordered by the Air Force.

For six month, s further air sampling flights were conducted, this time from Eniwetok Proving Grounds, on the Marshall Islands. Then, in early 1959, under Operation Bordertown, the unit deployed to Europe, where they continued to conduct air sampling and ELINT/SIGINT missions, before returning to Laughlin and deactivating in mid-1959.

Back at Area 51, Tony LeVier had completed a total of twenty flights in the U-2 and on 1 September, he left Project Aquatone, having been promoted to Director of Flying, back at Burbank. Planning flight tests became the responsibility of Ernie Joiner and these were now flown by test pilots Bob Matye and Ray Goadey.

Technical Overview

The original CL-282 design submission consisted of a slightly modified XF-104 Starfighter fuselage and tail assembly, a large span high aspect ratio wing and a General Electric J73 – GE-3 non-afterburning turbo jet. However, the J73 was an unknown (and in the long run 15

Above Bill Park carrier-qualified the U-2R aboard USS America
‘ (CVA-66) in 1969. A similar exercise had taken place in early
1964. when Bob Schumacher qualified a modified U-2, redesig-
nated U-2G, aboard USS Ranger (CVA-63). (Lockheed Martin)

Left One-third larger than the earlier U-2A/C versions, the U-
2R brought with it major improvements in mission capability,
payload capability, range and crew comfort. (Lockheed Martin)

Below Operated by NASA as an ER-2 (Earth Resources), seri­al 708, this aircraft began life asTR-l serial 80-1069. Apparent is the more commodious cockpit. (Paul Cnckmore)

unsuccessful) power plant. Acceptance of the CL-282 design concept became conditional upon it being powered by the J-57. During this enforced redesign, the fuselage was both lengthened and widened to accommodate the new engine. The F-104 ‘T’ tail was replaced by a conventional unit and the cockpit pressurised.

To achieve the required operating altitudes, the design was aerodynamically clean and the quest for weight reduction almost obsessive – the aircraft’s unladen weight being just 12,000 lbs. Conventional flight control surfaces on the U-2 consisted of ailerons with a travel of 16 degrees up and 14 degrees down; elevator that travelled 30 degrees up and 20 down and a rudder that deflected 30 degrees left and right. Due to wing flex, the flaps are segmented into four sections on each wing and are actuat­ed to a maximum of 35 degrees down by two hydraulic – motors, interconnected b a flexible synchronisation shaft. Integral with the flap system is the U-2’s unique gust
control system, this enables both ailerons to move 10 degrees and the Haps 4 degrees simultaneously when flying through turbulent air or when cruising at higher speeds in smooth air.

The U-2A’s single Pratt & Whitney J57-P-37 non afterburning turbojet produced 10,500 lbs of thrust at take off and 8,100 lbs at normal cruise. This axial flow, dual compressor unit featured a nine-stage low pressure assembly followed by a seven-stage high pressure unit.

Air was then supplied to the can annular combustion chamber, where a special low v apour pressure kerosene, developed by Shell Oil, designated LF-1A by Lockheed and JP-TS (for Thermally Stable) by the military, was ignited in eight burner cans (two spark igniters were located in cans 4 & 5 and ignition in the remaining cans was achieved utilising connecting flame tubes). The gas stream then entered the turbine section, the first stage being used to drive the high pressure compressor via a hollow shaft; the second and third turbine stages driving the low pressure compressor via a concentric shaft located through the hollow, high pressure compressor shaft. A gear box, driven off the high pressure compressor shaft, provided power for the starter, tachometer, fuel pump and fuel control unit. The turbine high velocity gases were then discharged through a fixed area exhaust nozzle.

As payload weights increased, in 1958 it was decided to uprate the U-2’s propulsion system to the Pratt & Whitney J75. The two variants of this engine, the J75-P – l. iA and the later J75-P-13B, increased available take-off thrust to 15,800 lbs and then to 17,000 lbs, for normal cruise thrust this increased to 13,900 lbs, then to 15,100 lbs respectively.

The U-2 has both an AC and a DC electrical system. The AC system is provided by a 750-YA inverter for normal operation with an additional 750-YA inverter as back up. In emergencies a 100-VA inverter and a 10-KYA engine driven AC generator arc provided. DC power is produced by one 400 amp, 28 volt, engine-driven genera­tor. A 35 amp/hour, nickel cadmium battery prov ides emergency DC power. Should the main generator fail in latc-build aircraft, a single AC/DC generator, backed up by an AC alternator driven from the hydraulic system, provides power to all essential equipment. The hydraulic system is a constant 3,000 psi pressure type, incorporating an accumulator and self-regulating engine-driven pump. The air-charged accumulator stores pressures for peak demands, thus reducing fluctuations in pump loading. It operates the landing gear, speed brakes, wing flaps, fuel boost pump drive motor; and on the U-2F, the latch reci­procal mechanism on the air refuelling system (on late model aircraft this system also operates the pitch trim and spoilers).

Retracting forward, the titanium, zero track landing gear, is of bicycle layout, consisting of twin main and tail wheels. Pogos, or outriggers, are located under each wing at about mid-semi-span, to provide support during ground handling; these too, have twin tyres and are gravi­ty-pull-jettisoned, shortly after the wings begin to generate lift. The main gear tyres are conventional high

Below With the advent of theTR-1 /U-2R, pilots were at last able to wear full-pressure suits. This is the David Clark Company’s S1031 suit. (Lockheed Martin)

pressure units, however, both the Pogo tyres and those of the tail wheel arc of solid rubber construction, requiring no inflation. Ground steering is achieved using the rudder pedals, which are interconnected by cables to the tail wheel.

The size of the U-2’s cockpit, varies significantly with variant, however, the general layout is common to all types. Perhaps the two most immediate features upon entering the cockpit are the aircraft’s control yoke (which looks as if it was stolen off the C-130 production line) and the Baird Scientific drift sight, which dominates the upper centre of the front instrumental panel. Utilising a system of mirrors and prisms, the drift sight, with its 360

Above U-2R 80-1067 lines up at Palmdale. (Lockheed Martin)

Below As the long wings get airborne, the pogos or outrigger wheels, are detached and recovered by ground support staff.

(Lockheed Martin)
degree, horizon to horizon scanning head, enables the pilot to visually check the aircraft’s ground track. A rubber cone attached to the display eliminates stray light when viewing the scope. The cockpit is pressurised to maintain an equivalent pressure altitude of 28,000ft. Although the aircraft was initially flown without ejector seats, all aircraft were later re-configured to accommodate a limited capability Lockheed-developed seat, which utilis­es a ‘low-g’ catapult to minimise compression injuries.

In earlier model U-2s, the mission payload was located in a cavernous, pressurised area, behind the cockpit, known as the Q4>ay. As previously mentioned, the acqui­sition of photographic intelligence (PHOTINT), was to be the aircraft’s primary mission. Dr Jim Baker proved to be pivotal in the conceptualisation of the camera system deployed for the U-2. Three camera systems were worked up; the Type A, was primarily refurbished Air Force stock and a stop-gap. The type C, with its 180 inch focal length lens, would be overtaken by events. However, the Type В camera would prove to be Project Aquatone’s workhorse. Optimising a 36-inch focal length lens, its large format film (18 xl8 in) was loaded on to two 6,500 foot rolls. When the system was activated, the camera imaged onto two 9.5-inch wide frames, through a single lens, thereby providing very high resolution, stereo cover­age of the collection area w ith a 50-70% overlap. Manufactured by the Hvcon Corporation, the Type В camera system weighed about 500 lbs, including film.

Also located in the Q. bay was a 35mm tracker camera. This scanned from horizon to horizon throughout the flight, thereby providing the photographic interpreters with an accurate ground track of the aircraft’s flight path.

During the early spring of 1979, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of Yemen were strained to the point where the US intelligence community’ believed that the Republic was on the brink of invading its northern neighbour. As a result, on the morning of Monday 12 March, Majs Rich Graham and Don Emmons deployed 972 from Beale to Det4 inorder to furnish deci­sion makers with the necessary intelligence information.

After two early morning ground aborts due to cloud cover over the ‘collection area’, the mission finally got underway. Buzz Carpenter and his RSO, John Murphy got airborne and headed for their ARCP off Lands’ End. Unfortunately, Buzz suffered a violent attack of diarrhoea while on the tanker boom, but despite his discomfort, he elected to continue the mission. Having completed the full fuel off-load they accelerated due south; since France had denied them the right to overfly, it was necessary to skirt the Iberian peninsula, entering the Mediterranean Sea through the Straits of Gibraltar. They then complet­ed a second refuelling before returning to high Mach flight and overflying the Suez Canal, before a third tanker rendezvous over the Red Sea. The planned double-loop coverage of the collection area was interrupted by the ANS, which tried to initiate a pre-programmed turn pripr to reaching the correct destination point (DP).

Recognising the error, the crew flew the aeroplane manu­ally while trying to work out what had caused the AUTONAV ‘glitch’. As a result of the miscue, they over­shot the turn point, but completed the rest of the route and made their way back to the tankers for another Red Sea top-up. A fifth air refuelling was completed east of Gibraltar and an hour-and-a-half later they recovered ‘972 back to Mildenhall after a full ten-hour mission.

This mission had generated considerable interest within the 9th SRW as well as at SAC Headquarters and in Washington. As a result, Buzz and John were greeted by a large number of their colleagues as they stepped off the gantry (including Col Dave Young, the 9th SRW vice commander), who presented Buzz-with a brown SR-71 tie tack to commemorate the in-flight incident when, to mis­quote a well known phrase, ‘the world fell out of Buzz’s bottom’.

When the ‘take’ was processed, it was of exceptional quality and the incident which had delayed their turn had yielded the most important information. That unexpected success made additional flights to the area unnecessary.

Consequently, Rich Graham and Don Emmons returned 972 to Beale on 28 March. Deployments to Suffolk continued throughout the early eighties, the main ‘collec­tion areas’ being the Barents and Baltic, in support of US Navy intelligence requirements. On 9 July 1983, British aviation enthusiasts ‘manning’ the many off-base vantage points of Mildenhall noted the arrival of aircraft ‘962, an aircraft that had ‘pulled’ TDY at the base on previous occasions. In fact Majs Maun’ Rosenberg and ‘ED’ McKim had just completed a seven hour operational flight from Beale to Mildenhall via the Barents/Baltic areas in the Palmdale flight test aircraft ‘955. The false serial number had been applied to ensure unwelcome attention was not drawn to the unique operational test deployment then undenvay.

In its detachable nose section, ‘955 was equipped with Loral’s Advanced Synthetic Radar System (ASARS-1), a system that provided a quantum leap in radar resolution. With maritime data collected during the inbound flight, Majs ‘BC’ Thomas and John Morgan conducted a 2.6 hr ASARS operational test sortie of land-based targets in East Germany nine days later. On 21 July, Maury and ED took their turn on a four hour mission. The final ASARS operational proving flight was conducted by BC and John on 30 July, when they flew ‘962, ie ‘955, on a 7.3 hr flight back to Beale, again via the Baltic and Barents Seas. The series of tests were extremely success­ful and following further tests back at Palmdale, two production radar sets for the operational fleet were fund­ed and deployed.

All Agency pilots recruited into Project Aquatone came straight from the Air Force, on a ‘suspended contract’, in which their ‘grey suit’ time counted towards their time served in the military. Two of the initial cadre of six pilots, Marty Knutson and Carmen Vito, were both F-84 ‘jocks’, assigned to the 31st Strategic Fighter Wing, locat-

ed at Turner AFB, Georgia. Having passed various inter­views, conducted by mysterious civilians at insalubrious hotels, they next spent a week undergoing one of the most rigorous medicals ever devised, at the Lovelace Clinic, Alburquerque, New Mexico. In all, about 25 pilots, in three intakes, would be recruited into the Agency programme.

Early U-2 training flights w’ere punctuated by a number of flameouts, a situation that continued until Pratt & Whitney engineers perfected high altitude opera­tion of the J57. Such events required the pilot to seek out denser air at 35,000 feet, in order to effect a relight. On a few occasions, when pilots were unable to get a relight, it became necessary to divert. But despite a number of such occurrences, Aquatone remained in the black.

A unique facet of U-2 piloting, was flight in that part of the envelope known as ‘coffin comer’. Having climbed rapidly to 60,000 feet the aircraft would then follow a cruise-climb schedule; as fuel was burned off and the aircraft became lighter, it could climb higher – as high as

Top left NACA/NASA association with the U-2 can be traced back to the beginning of the programme. Initially a CIA paper exercise, designed to cover the aircraft’s true mission, NASA received two U-2Cs (56-6681 and 56-6682 redesignated NASA 708 and 709 respectively), on the 3rd and 4th June 1971, to form its High Altitude Missions Branch (HAMB), based at Moffett Field, California. (Paul Crickmore)

Top right When U-2C 56-6681 was retired in June 1987, its NASA designation, 708, was transferred to an ex-Air Force TR – I (80-1069), which served alongside the purpose-built ER-2 prototype NASA 706 and the remaining U-2C, NASA 709.

(Paul Crickmore)

Above NASA U-2C 709 was retired in April 1989 and at the time of writing, following delivery of the second ER-2, NASA 709, the fleet consists of two ER-2s (now redesignated U-2ERs) and the ex-Air Force TR-1 (U-2R). (Lockheed Martin)

75,0
feet in some flight conditions. However, in the rarefied air above 60,000 feet, the never exceed speed curve virtually meets the aircraft stall speed curve. This crucial difference could be as little as lOkts. At high altitude with the engine at full power and in a banked turn, it was possible for the high wing to reach Mach bullet w hilst the inside wing approached stall buffet – exceed Mach buffet by more than four knots and it was possible that the fragile U-2 would disintegrate!

During the Geneva Summit, on 21 July 1955,

President Eisenhower had proposed that an ‘Open Skies’ plan should be considered between the United States, the Soviet Union and other participating countries, wherein a limited number of annual reconnaissance overflights w ould be made in order to verify claims of declared force strengths. Surprised by the proposal, the Soviet delega­tion reacted favourably and agreed to confer with their Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. He however refused to either sign-up to, or reject the proposal. Such prevari­cation ensured that ‘Open Skies’ failed one month later, when a vote was taken in the United Nations.

By June 1956, it was judged that initial flight test and

Above left Unique to U-2 operations is the ‘howdah’, which was designed to protect crew members from the sun’s heat.

(Lockheed Martin)

Below U-2R. 80-1082 equipped with short nose but super-pods is seen complete with tail-art at Beale AFB in November 1986.

(Paul Crickmore)

Above Slow sink rate, due to the high aspect ratio wing, has always caused problems when landing U-2s; as a result, every landing – including touch-and-goes, are accompanied by two ‘mobile’ U-2 pilots, one in radio contact, in a fast car. As the U – 2 crosses the threshold it is chased and height-to-go is called-off. (Paul Crickmore)

Right Airborne in just over 1,000ft of runway, the U-2’s climb rate has always been impressive; with lighter, earlier models reaching 50,000ft in just 10 minutes. (Paul Crickmore)

training objectives of the U-2 programme had been completed; accordingly six operational pilots, together with ten U-2s, were deemed ready for operational deploy­ment. The death of Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ proposal led the President to sanction, for an initial ten-day peri­od, a program that would have a profound impact within the intelligence fraternity and on international power poli­tics – Operation Overflight. In anticipation of these events, two U-2s had been air-freighted to RAF

I. akenheath, England on 30 April 1956, where the first of three Agency detachments was formed, under the entirely fictional designation of 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). Known within the

‘inner circle’ as ‘Detachment A’ and consisting of Agency, Air Force and contracted civilians, no operational sorties were flown from the UK and the unit redeployed to W iesbaden, Germany on 15 June. This new location was situated close to Camp King, the Agency’s main West German intelligence gathering facility, within which intel reports from defectors were collected and then used as a basis for U-2 overflight requests.

The first operational U-2 sortie was flown just four days after Det A’s arrival at W iesbaden. Piloted by Carl Overstreet, the platform overflew Warsaw, Berlin and Potsdam, before recovering back into W iesbaden without incident. Image quality provided by the Type В camera surpassed anything previously seen, and the stage was set for ‘Overflight’ to begin operations against the Soviet Union. This was achieved by Ucrvey Stockman, flying Article 347 on US Independence Day, 4 July 1956.

He flew over East Berlin then across northern Poland via Poznan, onward to Minsk and Leningrad, before exiting via the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, landing again without incident back at Wiesbaden after a flight lasting eight hours 45 minutes.

The very next day Article 347 was again airborne, this time with Carmen Vito at the controls on an overflight which included the Soviet capital, Moscow. Again, image quality was exceptional, but on this occasion Soviet fighters tried, unsuccessfully, to intercept the flight.

Yet another mission was successfully completed the following Monday, by which time the Soviet ‘diplomatic cage’ was well and truly rattled. On 10 July the Soviet Ambassador in Washington delivered a formal, public – protest against the flights. Eisenhower was very concerned at the level of provocation that these flights inevitably caused and insisted that henceforth, ten-day blanket clearances were rescinded, and instead replaced by a policy of one clearance, one flight.

The imagery secured by these first sorties was developed and duplicated at Wiesbaden, before one set was despatched by special courier aircraft to Washington (the other set was retained at Wiesbaden in case the first was lost or damaged in transit). Once in Washington, they ended up in a run-down neighbourhood where Art Lundahl, of the Agency’s Photographic Intelligence Division, had set up a secret process and interpretation centre, on the upper floors of an auto repair shop, aptly codenamed ‘Auto Mat’.

The vast amount of quality imagery collected by ‘Overflight’ soon put the Agency at odds with gloomy Air Force predictions about the strength of the Soviet bomber fleet, which forced a downward reappraisal of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). One disturbing aspect revealed by the flights however was the ease with which Soviet radar was. able to track them with early warning and height finding radars. This in turn led the Skunk Works to undertake a series of evaluations using various techniques to reduce the U-2’s Radar Cross Section (RCS). Utilising Article 341 up at Area 51, Project Dirty Bird first saw the aircraft’s planform framed by wires of different dipole lengths running from tail to wing.

Another used Radar Absorbent Material (RAM), in the

Top right U-2R, serial ‘1074 of the 99th SRS turns base-leg at Beale during a training sortie – highly expensive mission equip­ment is removed for such flights. (Paul Crickmore)

Right 1082 taxies to a halt on completion of a low altitude training sortie. Note the externally mounted rear-view mirror, located on the left side of the cockpit canopy. (Paul Crickmore)

Below On 2 August 1988, General Rogers, then Commander-in­Chief of Strategic Air Command, experienced at first hand a high altitude familiarization flight in a TR-1B. (Paul Crickmore)

form of a metallic grid, known as a Salisbury Screen. Attached to 341’s lower surfaces, this was then covered in ‘Echosorb’ – a microwave-absorbent coating based on black rubber foam; but neither technique proved effective.

It was during a Dirty Bird test flight on 4 April 1957, that Article 341, the U-2 prototype, was lost. Having suffered a flame out at about 72,000 feet. Bob Sieker’s pressure suit inflated, unfortunately the clasp securing the bottom of his face plate failed. With 70 lbs of internal pressure exhausting through the front of the helmet, it would have been almost impossible for Bob to resecure the clasp and within ten seconds he lost consciousness. Article 341 descended in a flat spin, and upon reaching denser air, it appears that Bob revived and attempted a bail out. The aircraft’s wreckage remained more or less in one piece and was eventually found about ninety miles from Area 51. Bob’s body was recovered about fifty feet away, suggesting he may have managed to clear the aircraft just before impact. Kelly Johnson redesigned the face plate clasp and re-evaluated the decision not to equip U-2s with an ejector seat – had this aircraft been so equipped, it is probable that Bob would have survived.

In August 1956, the second cadre of Agency pilots had completed their training up at Area 51 and were shipped to Incirlik AB, Turkey, where they formed ‘Detachment B’, which consisted of seven pilots and five aircraft.

A third U-2 operating location – Det C, was established at Atsugi airfield near Tokyo in 1957 and in February that same year, the last Agency pilots graduated and were dispersed to the three Dets. By now Det A had again moved, this time to Giebelstadt, just south of Wurzburg and shortly afterwards it was merged with Det B. As the 1950s drew to a close, Agency U-2s had successfully completed about thirty overflights of the Soviet Union and considerably more peripheral and training missions.

From its inception, Lockheed, the Agency and DoD otficials all believed that the U-2’s overflight life would last about two years. But as year three drew to a close, there still appeared to be a gap between the U-2’s ability

to overfly denied territory and the Soviet’s to build a weapons system capable of successfully intercepting the intruder. Certainly the program’s accomplishments were approaching legendary status; in addition to revealing the truth about the Soviet bomber fleet, it had, while operating out of Lahore and Peshaw ar, Pakistan, discovered the location of a new 1CBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), test site at Tyuratam, which turned out to be the primary test facility for the new R-7 ICBM (later known by NATO as the SS-6 Sapwood).

The potential threat represented by the Soviet’s SA-2

Below A high accident rate during flight training led to two U – 2As being converted into U-2CT configuration. These were both retired and replaced by three TR-1 Bs. (Paul Crickmore)

Bottom With the instructor pilot (IP) seated in the raised rear cockpit, a student brings 1065 over the Beale threshold. Ten feet ‘off the deck’ and 200 feet in the overrun, with a I Okt head­wind, the throttle is brought to idle and the aircraft ‘driven down’ to just one or two feet, where it is held until it stalls. (Paul Crickmore)

Above Not long after their arrival at Beale, the white training birds were painted black. Later their designation was changed fromTR-IBs to U-2RTs. When re-engined with the FI 18,they became U-2 STs; and finally today they are designated TU-2Ss.

(Paul Crickmore)

Right Designed to fit on an aircraft carrier’s elevator, the outer 6 feet of a U-2R’s wing folds inboard. (Paul Crickmore)

Guideline, surface to air missile (SAM) system, touting a kill pattern of about 400 feet, was certainly appreciated by U-2 mission planners, who gave known sites a berth of up to 30 miles. Further precautions saw the introduction of a rudimentary Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) suite. Designated System 9, this simple range gate pull-off (RGPO) device, was located in a small aft-facing compartment at the root of the vertical fin. Switched on by the pilot upon entering denied territory, it had the capability of breaking lock if illuminated by an airborne intercept radar. Additional comfort came from the first major U-2 upgrade which had just been initiated; five aircraft were reworked into U-2C models, powered by an uprated Pratt & Whitney J75 engine, which enabled the aircraft to climb an additional 5,000 feet.

On the diplomatic stage a visit by Khrushchev to the United States prompted a reciprocal invitation for Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union during 1960.

In the meantime, it was agreed a summit would be held in Paris, to which both the British and French would be invited. A thaw in the frosty relationship between the two super powers seemed in prospect. However, all this was about to change.

Tension between the United States and much of the Arab world continued, and after a series of incidents, President Reagan’s patience came to a violent end. On 15 April 1986, operation Eldorado Canyon, a coordinated strike on targets in Libya, by air elements of the US Navy and

Above and below Just as Senior Crown closed down, Lockheed photographer Eric Schulzinger shot for posterity a masterful series of photographs of the Habu. Here 17968 has had a Dolby X logo applied to its tail. (Eric Schulzinger)

eighteen USAF F-llls from RAF Lakenheath, was mounted. Lt Cols Jerry Glasser and Ron Tabor took off from Mildenhall as scheduled at 0500 hrs in SR-71 ‘980 (callsign Tromp 30). Their mission was to secure photo­graphic imagery for post-strike bomb damage assessment (BDA). To achieve thus it would be necessary to overfly targets hit earlier, but this time in broad daylight and with the sophisticated Libyan defence network on full alert. Such was the importance of the mission that SR – 71 A 960 (Tromp 31) flown by Majs Brian Shul and Walt Watson, launched at 0615 hrs as an airborne spare, should Tromp 30 abort with platform or sensor problems. In the event all aircraft systems – the two chine-mounted Technical Objective Cameras (TEOCs) for spot coverage and the nose-mounted, Optical Bar Cameras (OBC) for horizon-to-horizon coverage, worked as advertised aboard the primary aircraft and ‘960 was not called upon to penetrate hostile airspace. Despite SAM launches against ‘980, the SR-71 proved yet again that it could operate W’ith impunity in such high threat environments, and at 0935 hrs Tromp 30 landed safely back at ‘the Hall’. The missions ‘take’ was processed in the Mobile Processing Centre (MPC), located within one of Mildenhall’s disused hangars. It was then transported by a KC-135 (Trout 99) to Andrews AFB, Maryland, where national-level officials were eagerly awaiting post-strike briefings.

Two further missions over Libya were conducted on both 16 and 17 April, with minor route changes and different call signs. This intense period of reconnaissance activity scored many new ‘firsts’ for Del 4: first occasion that both aircraft were airborne simultaneously; first time KC-lOs had been used to refuel SR-71s in the European theatre; first time that photos taken by the SR-71s were released to the press (although the source was never offi­cially admitted and the image quality was purposely, severely degraded to hide true capability). All in all, the missions were a great accomplishment by the Det’s

support personnel under the command of ex SR-71 RSO, Lt Col Barn – MacKean.

One of the most ambitious sorties planned for the U-2 was a nine hour flight covering 3,800 miles (2,900 of which would be over denied territory). Launched from Peshawar, Pakistan, the flight would recover into Bodo, Norway. The mission’s objective was to locate a new missile base near Plcstsk that the photo interpreters at Auto Mat had been searching for in vain since 1958.

In addition, the route offered an opportunity of gaining additional material from Tvuratam and the military industrial complex around Sverdlovrk.

Above The U-2R still retains the early high altitude air sampling capability; here the unit is being bolted into 69-10338’s Q-bay.

(Paul Crickmore)

Right Nose-art, or in this case, tail-art, has been a feature of US combat aircraft since WWII. This particular example, applied in chalk, adorned the tail of aTR-l B. (Paul Crickmore)

The plan was reluctantly approved by President Eisenhower, who insisted that it should be flown before 25 April. However, due to bad weather across much of the intended route, Eisenhower agreed to extend the deadline to 1 May. On Wednesday 27 April, improving met conditions prompted a detachment from Det В consisting of two pilots and support personnel to deploy via C-130 from Incirlik, to Peshawar. Scheduled attempts to launch on 28, 29 and 30 April were made. However,

01091

all were aborted well before take-off, due to adverse weather in the collection areas. Finally, at 06:26 local time, on May 1 1960, Francis Gary Powers got airborne in Article 360 and headed for the border. To help draw attention away from the deep penetration mission, a diversionary, peripheral flight left from Incirlik. After three hours and 27 minutes of flight, Powers was stunned to feel and hear what seemed to be a dull explosion, below and behind his aircraft. Almost immediatelv
afterwards the sky turned bright orange and seconds later 360’s right wing dropped. Turning the control yoke left, Powers managed to correct the roll, but then the nose pitched downward – due to damage sustained by the horizontal tail. As the U-2 pitched violently forward, both wings were ripped from the fuselage. Powers face plate frosted over, his partial pressure suite inflated and «hat was left of the aircraft entered an inverted flat spin. Centrifugal forces pinned the pilot to the instrument

Above The 17th Reconnaissance Wing and its flying component, the 95th Reconnaissance Squadron, were activated at RAF Alconbury on I October 1982 and became operational five months later. (Paul Crickmore)

Right Steve Nichols lines-up ‘KONA 17’ an ASARS configured aircraft, prior to departure from Alconbury. (Paul Crickmore)

panel which prevented the use of the ejector seat. Glancing at the unwinding altimeter. Powers noted he was descending through 34,000 ft. Reaching up he pushed the canopy open, unlatched his seat harness and was thrown forward. Now only half out of the cockpit, he realised he’d failed to disconnect his oxygen hose. He then attempted to re-enter the cockpit. When this failed, he began pulling on the hose in an effort to break it. Finally his efforts were rewarded and he was clear; almost immediately his chute was successfully deployed by a barometric sensor – set to activate at 15,000ft. Powers was captured after landing in a field and four days later the political impact of the shoot down reverberated across the front pages of newspapers all around the world.

Operation Overflight, the United States’ most clandestine reconnaissance operation, had literally been blown apart at the seams. An immediate cessation of U-2 overflights followed, backed up later by the retraction of all U-2 operations around the world.

On 10 February 1%2 Frank Powers and the notorious master spy, Rudolf Abel silently passed one another on the Glienicker Bridge in Germany, in a pre-arranged exchange of prisoners. But with 90% of all photographic data on Soviet military developments originating from U – 2 imager)’, the question remained: how, or with what, would it be replaced?

The ‘Senior Crown’ programme was living on borrowed time without an electro-optical backplate for the camera system and a data-link system which would permit camera imagery and radar data from ASARS-1 to be down-linked in near real time. Eventually, funds were appropriated for the development of Senior King, a secure data link via satellite, but its development would prove too late to save the SR-71.

By the late eighties the list of those articulating an anti SR-71 posture was as long and varied as it was powerful. By 1988 it looked as though the efforts of the antagonists would be successful. But all was not quite lost: Admiral Lee Baggott, Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) required SR-71 coverage of the Kola peninsula as there were no other means of obtaining the quality of coverage required. He took the battle to retain the SR-71 in Europe right to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and obtained funding for Det 4 for a further year. Meanwhile, the SR-71 PEM and his action officer were able to secure a commitment from a staffer on the Senate Appropriations Committee for S46 million to keep Kadena and Palmdale open for another year. By now however, it was only a question of time before these valiant rearguard actions faced the inevitable. What was to be the final flight of an SR-71 took place on 6 March 1990, when Ed Yeilding and JT Vida flew ‘972 on a Wcst-to-East coast record-breaking flight across the United States, before landing at the Smithsonian National Aerospace Museum, Washington DC, where the aircraft was handed over for permanent display. Thereafter, SR – 71As (‘962, ‘967 and ‘968), were placed in storage at Site 2 Palmdale. Two SR-71As (‘971 and ‘980), together with the sole surviving SR-71 В (‘956) were loaned to NASA, the remaining 13 aircraft (including the hybrid trainer designated SR-71C which consisted of the forward fuse­lage from a static specimen mated to the wing and rear. section of YF-12A, 60-6934), were donated to museums throughout the US. Despite more than forty members of Congress, and many other well placed officials and senior officers voicing their concern over the decision.

During the course of the Gulf War, two requests were made to reactivate the Senior Crown programme, both however were turned down by the same SECDEF who had presided over the aircraft’s shutdown – Dick Cheney. That Desert Storm was an overwhelming success for coalition forces is beyond despute; however there were lessons to be learned from the 41-day campaign, not least of which was the lack of timely reconnaissance material available to General Schwarzkopfs field commanders.

It wasn’t until March/April 1994 that events in the international arena once more took a turn. Relations

Right, top, middle and bottom SR-71A 17968 is caught on anoth­er sortie. The aircraft first flew on 3 August 1966, with Bill Weaver in the front and George Andre in the back; it was retired on 12 February 1990. having accumulated 2,279 flight hours. (Eric Schulzinger)

between North Korea and the United States, at best always strained, reached a new low over the north’s refusal to allow inspection of their nuclear sites. At this point Senator Robert Byrd took centre stage. Together with several members of the Armed Services, and various members of Congress, he contended that back in 1990 the Pentagon had consistently lied about the supposed readi­ness of a replacement for the SR-71. The motivation behind such commitments was not the usual politicking, but one of genuine concern for the maintenance of a plat­form capable of broad area synoptic coverage.

The campaigning and lobbying paid off as noted in the ‘Department of Defence Appropriations Bill 1995’, report 103-321, dated July 20, wherein provision was made for a modest, ‘three plane SR-71 aircraft contingency recon­naissance capability’, at a cost of SI00 million, for fiscal year 1995 (FY95). Of the three SR-71As placed in deep storage at Site 2, Palmdale, only ‘967 was called to arms. The other A model to be recommissioned was ‘971 which had been loaned to NASA, re-numbered 832 and regular­ly ground tested but never flown by its civilian caretakers. Pilot trainer SR-71B, together with the brand new flight simulator, would be shared between the Air Force and NASA, and in a further move to keep operating costs to a minimum the new detachment, designated det 2, would,
like NASA, operate its aircraft from Edwards AFB, California.

Aircraft reactivation began on 5 January 1995 and seven days later, at 11:26 hrs, NASA crew Steve Ishmael and Marta Bohn-Meyer got airborne from Edwards in ‘971 on a 26 minute ferry flight which terminated at Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works, Plant 10 Building 602, Palmdale. Over the next three months ASARS and other sensors previously in storage at Luke AFB, Arizona were installed. At 10:18 hrs on 26 April, NASA crew Ed Schneider and Marta completed a 34 minutes FCF on ‘971. A month later Ed and Marta’s husband Bob Meyer conducted 971’s second and final FCF which lasted 2.5 hours. It took seven further FCFs to wring out all the glitches in ‘967, the final one successfully completed on 12 January 1996.

Three Air Force crews were selected to flv the aircraft, pilots Gil Luloff, Tom McQeary and Don Watkins together with RSOs Blair Bozek, Mike Finan and Jim Greenwood, the plan being that two crew’s would always be Mission Ready qualified and the third crew. Mission Capable. Whilst crew proficiency training got underway in the simulator and the ‘B’ model, R&D funds were used to develop and install the long overdue data-link, the antenna for which is housed in a small radome, just

Left On program shut down, Eric, with the help of friends in the 9th SRW, captured this memorable image of eleven SR-71 s.

(Eric Schulzinger)

Below Of the two SR-71 As loaned to NASA after USAF oper­ations were initially terminated on 22 November 1989, 17971, renumbered NASA 832, was called back to arms and 17967 was pulled from Air Force Site 2, deep storage, Palmdale. (Paul

Crickmore)

/

forward of the front undercarriage wheel well. A digital cassette recorder system (DCRsi) provided recording and playback of both FLINT and ASARS data. Near-real – . time data could be provided if the aircraft was within 300n ml line-of-sight range of a receiving station; if not, the entire recorded collection could be downloaded in ten minutes once within station range.

As qualified Air Force crews began to acquaint them­selves with their operational aircraft, the long-running battle between the various factions supporting or oppos­ing the resurrected programme came to a head. Exploiting a complex technical loophole in the legislation concerning the deployment of funds which had been assigned by the Senate Appropriations Committee in the FY1996 Defence Appropriations Bill, but not authorised in two other pieces of supporting legislation, it was decided that tech­nically it was illegal to operate the SR-71. Consequently at 23:00 (Z) on 16 April 1996 a signal was despatched from the Pentagon, suspending SR-71 operations with immediate effect. The war between various Senate Committees then escalated, when supporters of the SR-71 program serving on the Senate Appropriations Committee threatened to eliminate section 8080 of the Appropriations Act and defeat the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY97. This would effectively ensure that all intelligence
activities for FY97 would grind to a halt – one can imag­ine the sheer panic this action would have produced in AF, DIA CIA and NSA circles!

Perhaps not surprisingly the tactic worked. Of the S253 billion Defence Budget for 1997, S30 million was allocat­ed for SR-71 Operations & Maintenance and a further S9 million for procurement. This spend was ratified and signed off by President Clinton and the three flight crews once again worked their way up to full proficiency and the ASARS-1 data link worked extremely well. The next major sensor enhancement update involved the develop­ment of an electro-optical backplate for the TEOCs by Recon Optical, located in Barrington, Illinois. This would have replaced film and instead enabled high quality, close-look imagery, to be transmitted, also via the data link, in real time, directly to theatre commanders. Unfortunately, political prevarication continued and in October 1997, President Clinton line vetoed the release of further SR-71 funds. On 30 September 1999, the end of the military fiscal year, remaining monies ran out and Senior Crown succumbed. Kelly’s prophesy that the SR – 71 would prove invulnerable to shoot-downs until at least 2001, failed to take cognisance of the weaponry mustered against the program by various politicians and (self) inter­est groups within the ranks of his fellow countrymen.

With the Agency U-2 operation up and running, the Air Force began recruiting pilots for its program largely from the same source; namely, the two recently deactivated SAC F-84 wings at Turner AFB, Georgia. Having under­taken ground crew and pilot training at Area 51, Col Jack Nole, commander of the 4028 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS), led the first of two three-ship U-2 formations down to their new home at Laughlin AFB, Texas on 11 June 1957. Part of the 4080 SRW, their
sister squadron, the 4025th SRS, were equipped with Martin RB-57Ds. Seventeen days later disaster struck. Shortly before 9am on Friday 28 June, Lt Ford Lowcock crashed his U-2 near Del Rio, a few miles from Laughlin, and was killed, just three days after his first U-2 flight. Then, three hours later, Lt Leo Smith crashed his U-2 about thirty miles north of Abilene, Texas. He too was killed. Accident investigations determined that fuel imbalance in the wing tanks was probably a contributory factor in both incidents.

During September, the 4028th received five more U-2s which were assigned to the Air Force project HASP (High Altitude Sampling Program), sponsored by the Defence Atomic Support Agency (DASA). The objective was to determine the role played by the stratosphere in the worldwide distribution of fusion products resulting from nuclear explosions. In all the program lasted five years and involved some 45,000 flying hours – almost all in U-2s. Eventually DASA published its results, making its findings available to the UN. The result was a ban on all ‘air burst’ testing of nuclear weapons.

During July and August 1962, John McCone, Director of the ‘Agency’ (he replaced Allen Dulles after the CIA – sponsored ‘Bay of Pigs’ affair), received a number of increasingly disturbing accounts concerning a Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. On 22 August he went directly to President Kennedy stating that it was his belief that Cuba were receiving intermediate range

Be/ow left During the‘bad old days’ of the Cold War, Alconbury based aircraft would usually take up station over Germany, reaching 60,000ft about 30 miles south of Amsterdam, where­upon they would turn off their mode ‘Charlie’ height read-out.

(Paul Crickmore) .

Be/ow The 95RS used ROOK as its call sign for all training sorties. Here Maj Blaire Bachus, flying ‘093, Rook 32, climbs away after another touch and go. (Paul Crickmore)

ballistic missiles. The President demanded corroborative evidence of such aggression before taking further action. Consequently, CIA U-2 overflights of the island were stepped up, with flights on the 28th August, 5, 17, 26 and 29 September and the 5 and 7 October. However, only evidence of SAM construction sites and increased fighter activity including the delivery of MiG-2 Is was detected. It was an alert photo-interpreter in the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), who noticed that the layout of some of these SA-2 sites on Cuba matched those deployed to protect offensive ballistic missile sites in the Soviet Union. When the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) reconvened on 4 October, further coverage of western Cuba was requested. Despite the risks, again it was decided to use the U-2. However, as a potential military conflict seemed to be brewing on the island, the Air Force, with support from the Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, insisted that it should fly all future U-2 sorties over Cuba. A view which, after some squabbling, was upheld, and on Wednesday 10 October the President sanctioned a resumption on U-2 flights over western Cuba.

It had been agreed that Agency U-2Cs would be used by the Air Force, as these were equipped with both System 9 and System 12 ECM units – the latter was a Radar Homing and Warning Receiver (RHAW), which warned the pilot if he was being tracked by SAM radars.

Majors Anderson and Heyser were chosen to conduct the flights as they had both checked out in the ‘C’ model, so they were packed off to Edwards North Base to join up with their mounts. Early on the morning of 14 October, Steve Heyser took off from Edwards and headed towards Isla de Pinos and then north toward the Cuban mainland. The most critical portion of the mission was the run from San Cristobal, which lasted approximately five minutes, after which Heyser set course for McCoy AFB, Florida – from where it had been agreed, future sorties over the island would be based. Upon landing, the

film was rushed to the National Photographic Interpretation Centre (NP1C), at Washington via a wait­ing Air Force jet. At about 5.30 on the afternoon of the 15th, Arthur Lundahl, the head of NPIC, passed the news to CIA headquarters – now located in Langley, Virginia – that Heysev’s film had captured the required evidence. Khrushchev was in the process of deploying SS-4 MRBM’s (NATO codename Scandal), right in America’s back yard. Shortly before 9am on Tuesday the 16th, McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s assistant for National Security Affairs, showed his president the photos. For the next thirteen days, Kennedy and a circle of his closest advisors became embroiled in a crisis that took the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust.

Early on the morning of 15 October, Randy Anderson had launched from Edwards and conducted a sortie simi­lar to that of Heyser, but it was appreciated that two U-2Cs would not be nearly enough resource for the job in hand. With its U-2s participating in the HASP and therefore stationed all around the globe, the 4028th SRS faced the challenge of gathering together enough aircraft to provide national command authorities with the vast amount of timely imagery upon which crucial decisions would be based. However, with extraordinary effort, the Air Force managed to muster ten aircraft and eleven pilots. At 4am on Tuesday 16th, three U-2 As were launched in blinding rain from Laughlin to conduct further overflights – like the preceding U-2Cs, they also recovered into McCoy.

As analysis of U-2 imagery continued, NPIC were able to confirm two MRBM sites near San Cristobal, each equipped with a regiment of eight SS-4s on launches with eight more ready for a second salvo, and that both sites were operational. Another regiment of SS-4s was discovered near Sagua La Grande; they were expected to become operational within a week. Finally the interpreters were convinced that they had also found two sites, near Guanajav, that were intended for the 2,200 mile-range

Top and above The original plans for the 17RW involved basing 12 aircraft at Alconbury and six at Weathersfield, two TR-ls were then to orbit over Central Europe 24 hours a day. In the event, Alconbury never operated more than eleven aircraft before the Cold War melted away. (Paul Crickmore Collection)

Right Returning from the Gulf War, these six U-2Rs were dispatched to Plant 2 at Palmdale, where Lockheed Martin provides support. (Lockheed Martin)

SS-5s (Skean), which, they predicted, would be operational in six to eight weeks – these missiles touted a range capability that threatened US ICBM bases in the north of the country. On top of all this, 4028th surveillance also discovered crates containing Ilyushin 11-28 bombers at San Julian airfield and thirty nine MiG-2 Is at Santa Clara.

In the cabinet room at 9.45 on Friday 19th October, Kennedy met with his joint Chiefs of Staff. The ever bullish Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Curtis Le May, was in no doubt what should be done, … “ take out the missiles, I think you’ve got to take out their air with it, and their radar, communication, the whole works. It just doesn’t make any sense to do anything but that.”

Luckily for humanity, the result of a long-running meeting at the State Department on Saturday formed the basis of a more rational policy, which was accepted by Kennedy on Monday; namely, that the island would be blockaded and the United States would pledge to Khrushchev the withdrawal of US Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey, in exchange for a quid pro quo withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

That same day, following further meetings with the JCS and briefings to Senior Democrat and Republican

leaders of Congress, Kennedy delivered a televised address to tens of millions of anxious viewers across the United States, the speech was then re-broadcast and distributed in many languages around the world.

Now the crisis was in the public domain, low-level photo recce sorties by Air Force RF-101 Voodoos and US Navy RF-8 Crusaders were also authorised. On Wednesday 24th October, the first signs that sense was beginning to prevail emerged when Soviet freighters, en route to Cuba, were seen to heave to in mid Atlantic.

Three day’s later, Randy Anderson got airborne from McCoy in Article 343 for another overflight. Flying along the northern coast of Cuba, despite carrying the System 12 SAM radar warning receiver, he was taken by surprise by a salvo of SA-2s fired from Banes naval base, at the eastern end of the island. One missile exploded above and behind the aircraft.

Shrapnel penetrated the cockpit and Anderson’s pressure suit. It is believed he was killed when the cockpit depressurised and his suit failed to inflate.

Less than a day after the loss of Major Anderson, Khrushchev announced on Moscow Radio that the Cuban missiles would be withdrawn, thus bringing to an end the most serious east/west standoff of the twentieth century.

Having moved from Laughlin to Davies-Monthan AFB, Arizona on 12 July 1963, the 4028th SRS compli­ment of reconnaissance gathering platforms increased substantially when an international agreement was reached to discontinue all above ground nuclear weapons testing and all HASP aircraft were re-configured accordingly.

31 December 1963 saw the beginning of another U-2 chapter when President Johnson granted his approval for its deployment to South Vietnam, under the SAC code name Dragon Lady. And so on 14 February 1964, four aircraft touched down at Bien Hoa, near Saigon, thus creating the detachment known as OL-20. Their mission was to provide covert surveillance of North Vietnam’s border areas, particularly Vietcong infiltration routes and develop a contingency list of targets inside ‘the North’ should the war escalate – how prophetic such planning would prove to be…

During the air war over Vietnam, the most lethal threat facing US air elements was radar directed surface to air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). It was extremely disruptive, often result­ing in attack aircraft missing their targets in order to evade SAMs or dodge AAA. Latterly, during the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Israeli Air Force lost 109 aircraft in just eighteen days, virtually all falling victim to radar guided SAM or AAA batteries. With the Soviet Union having developed a highly sophisticated, integrated defence network, US planners estimated that if the Israeli loss ratio were extrapolated into a NATO/War Pact scenario, NATO Air Forces would be decimated in just over two weeks. Clearly, what was needed was a funda­mental rethink on how to redress this imbalance.

In 1974, Ken Perko in the Tactical Technology Office (TTO) at the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), requested submissions from Northrop,

McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, Fairchild and Grumman, addressing two considerations:-

1. What were the signature thresholds that an aircraft would need to achieve to become essentially undetectable at an operationally useful range?

2. Did those companies possess the capabilities to design and produce an aircraft with those necessary low signatures?

Fairchild and Grumman declined the invitation to partici­pate, while General Dynamics emphasised the continued need for electronic counter measures. Submissions from McDonnell Douglas and Northrop however demonstrated a grasp of the problem, and consequently, they were awarded contracts worth approximately SI00,000 each during the closing months of 1974 to conduct further studies.

On 17 January 1975, ‘Kelly’ Johnson’s protege, Ben Rich, became president of the Skunk Works. It was while Ben was still Kelly’s Deputy that the former became aware of the low observability study. Lockheed hadn’t
been one of the five original companies approached by the DARPA team, simply because it hadn’t produced a fighter for nearly ten years (the F-104 starfighter). Ben however, obtained a letter from the CIA, granting the Skunk Works permission to discuss with DARPA the low observable characteristics of the A-12 and D-21 drone. After much negotiating, Lockheed were allowed into the competition without a Government contract – a move that ultimately paid a handsome dividend.

In early 1975, the initial Skunk Works Project Team consisted of Ed Martin (Project Manager), Dick Scherrcr and Denys Overholser. Ovcrholser had joined the Skunk Works from Boeing in 1964 and recalls, “When Dick Scherrer asked me, ‘How do we shape something to make it invisible to radar?’ I said, ‘Well, it’s simple, you just make it out of flat surfaces, and you tilt those flat surfaces over, sweeping the edges away from the radar view angle, and that way you basically cause the energy to reflect aw’ay from the radar, thus limiting the magni­tude of the return.’” Such radical thinking had its origins in a discussion Overholser had had with his then boss,

Bill Schroedcr some years earlier, concerning the mathe-

Top left This early model of Have Blue already depicts several of the type’s characteristics: highly facetted, intakes above the wing, inboard cantered tails and highly swept leading edge.

(Lockheed Martin)

Left Covered in foil, this wooden model is undergoing RCS tests in Lockheed’s anechoic chamber at Rye Canyon.

(Lockheed Martin)

Above Phase I of the XST programme culminated in RCS eval­uations between the two contending designs at the Air Force’s Radar Target Scatter (RATSCAT), test range, located at White Sands, New Mexico. (Lockheed Martin)

matics and physics of optical scattering. The two had concluded that detectable signatures could be minimised utilising a shape composed of the smallest number of properly orientated flat panels. In addition, Schroeder believed that it was possible to develop and resolve a mathematical equation capable of calculating the reflection from a triangular flat panel; this in turn he hypothesised could be applied in a calculation relating to RCS. As a result, Overholser hired his ex-boss out of retirement and as Schroeder’s mathematical computations became avail­able, Overholser and his team of two engineers were able to use these to write the computer programme that could evaluate the RCS of prospective design submissions nominated by Dick Scherrer and his group of preliminary design engineers. Denys and his team worked night and day and in just five weeks produced an RCS prediction programme known as ‘Echo Г. As tests proceeded, it was determined that the edge contributions calculated by Echo 1 weren’t exactly correct, due to a phenomenon known as diffraction. However, shortly after developing Echo 1, Denys became aware of a publication entitled Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction, published in an unclassified technical paper in the Soviet Union in 1962 by Pyotr Ufimtsev, Chief Scientist at the Moscow Institute of Radio Engineering. The paper had been translated by Air Force Systems Command’s Foreign Technology Division in 1971, and Denys was able to incorporate elements of its theory into a refined version of the Echo 1 programme. The resultant model was a facetted delta wing design which drew a healthy share of scepticism from within the Skunk Works, some in aerodynamics referring to the shape as “The Hopeless Diamond”. However, with S25,000 procured from the Lockheed board, two, one-third scale, wooden models of the Hopeless Diamond were built, one was used by the aerodynamists, the other to measure RCS values in Lockheed’s anechoic chamber. The first series of tests, conducted in June 1975, demonstrated that its RCS ‘spikes’ matched precisely those predicted by Echo 1. The model was then moved outdoors to a radar test range near Palmdale, in the Mojave Desert. Yet again, test results conformed well with Echo 1 predictions, creating greater levels of confidence in both the computer programme and the facetted design concept.

Lockheed submitted two proposals to DARPA, one included the predicted and measured signature data for the Hopeless Diamond, the other provided the predicted data for an air vehicle of flyable configuration. This came about in response to DARPA issuing proposals to the three competitors for what was to become known as the Experimental Survivable Testbed (XST) programme, which was informally requested in the late summer of 1975.