Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

From a numerically very inferior position Luftwaffe pilots attacked Allied fighter and bomber formations over the Reich without regard to their own lives and despite increasing heavy losses. Aiter an initial daylight raid on Wilhelmshaven in January 1943 by 55 B-17 bombers, air raids by the Eighth AF became more frequent. On 28 July 1943 its bombers attacked the Fieseler aircraft works at Kassel and the important industrial centre of Magdeburg. Many more examples of carpet bombing were to follow until Germany lay in rubble.

Although the defences scored significant victories against raiders over Schweinfurt and Nuremberg, the immensity of the enemy potential was only too obvious, and the Luftwaffe leadership was forced to recognise that more efficient fighters were urgendy needed. At the time availability was limited to the Bf 109 G-6.

On 14 October 1943 German defenders shot down 77 of 291 Allied machines attacking the important ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt, but more major attacks on industrial centres were soon having their effect. The number of fighters could only be maintained with difficulty. As a rule the air defences were only successful in daylight engagements against bombers crossing the Reich to distant targets without a fighter escort. This changed within a few months when, from the beginning of 1944, P-51 Mustang long-range fighters began to escort Eighth AF bomber fleets. As a result of the mass of bombers arriving by day and night, the Reich fighter force continued to decline. The Bf 109 G-6 standard fighters with which most fighter Staffeln were equipped were increasingly used in the role of pursuer, and were prevented by numerous escort fighters from reaching their objective, the bombers. Of the long awaited Me 262 A-la jets there was still no sign. The general development, especially of turbines, had progressed slower than anticipated, and OKL now expected the aircraft to be available in reasonable

numbers from August 1944. The Bf 109 and Fw 190 therefore remained indispensable for the air defence of Germany until the end.

In 1943 and 1944 the Bf 109 G provided the backbone of the defence by day. This variant was the high point of the breed. Better performance than with the Bf 109 G-10 and G-14 was not to be expected, and since the development of substantially more efficient engines could not reach the hoped-for level, the emergency solution became urgent. The Daimler Benz DB 605L was suitable for both the Fw 190 and Bf 109 but it remained on the test stand and was a long way from series production. As an alternative an attempt was made to improve the DB 605 AS and DB 605 D by the use of a supplementary fuel injection system which it was hoped would provide the Bf 109 G with a slight advantage over the P-51 fighter.

The Bf 109 К was the last of the series to appear in quantity. The design office had chosen the DB 605 L engine with two-stage supercharger to provide a ceiling of about 9,500 metres (31,000 ft) at full pressure, but work was still proceeding to perfect it. The final mass-production programme had been started

at the end of 1942, but not until 1944 were a few fighter Gruppen equipped with this variant. The highly experienced engineer Ludwig Bolkow handled the proceedings from start to finish. The Bf 109 K, together with a fine tuning of other G-variants, was to become the new standard piston-engined fighter. To avoid any risks ten prototypes were ordered on 9 August 1943 to run a brief period of tests. A mock-up was built to check and evaluate all weapons and radio equipment and other components.

Allied air reconnaissance had detected that the WNF Works at Wiener Neustadt in Austria was one of the most important production plants for piston – engined fighters, and on 13 August US bombers attacked the factory. Some 500 workers were killed. Although assembly work was set back for a long period, numerous drawings, plans and assembly files were saved. By the end of 1944, the entire works had been relocated in the Burgenland. The WNF assembly plant, subsidiaries and numerous other firms were co-opted for fighter production, and a number of‘final assembly circuits’ set up in the Vienna-Wiener Neustadt – St Polten area, in Karnten, in the so-called Czech Protectorate and Hungary. Some of the work, such as the railway tunnel Objekt 217 B-C atTischnowitz in

the Protectorate was given a protective roof and turned out the Bf 109 in series production without fear of Allied bombing.

Meanwhile a full-size mock-up for the future Bf 109 K-l had been built by the WNF development team located near the bombed-out plant, and was ready in basic outline in September 1943. On 1 October 1943 the improved G-fuselage was presented to representatives of the KdE and closely inspected. Only a few minor details needed to be improved by WNF. Orders to implement full production of the Bf 109 K-l followed the final inspection of the wooden mock – up on 12 October 1943.

A Bf 109 G-6 (Works No. 18136 BF+QH) from the Erla production line was fitted with a modified airframe and engine for initial test purposes. The early Bf 109 К differed from previous variants by its use of wooden parts, such as for the tail section designed by Wolf Hirth GmbH of Nabern/Teck, and a more powerful engine, the DB 605 AS or D with MW 50 unit. Under licence to the Messerschmitt Works, Hirth GmbH developed wooden wings with integral MK 108 cannon but both here and in the tailplane there were structural problems to be overcome. While building the prototypes it was found that the technology was uneconomic because of the expense in working metal and wood, while a wooden undercarriage was deemed unsuitable for a high performance piston – engined fighter. The crash tests at Augsburg led to the scrapping of the remaining prototype wings and tooling. Shortly before the year’s end the contract for 3,995 pairs of wooden wings was cancelled in favour of the usual metal wings for better stability.

At the beginning of 1944 more talks were held regarding the installation of the MW 50 and GM-1 systems in the fuselage. These systems had been checked with regard to finding a simplified method of construction, and tested by specialists from the Rechlin and Tarnewitz test centres. During the conference with GLZM Milch on 2 March 1944 the continuation of Bf 109 G production and large-scale introduction of the Bf 109 К were discussed.

Whether the initial run of the К variant would be proceeded with was uncertain from the summer of 1944 after Messerschmitt had presented the first plans for the Bf 109 K-4. During the conference of 3 and 4 October 1944 chaired by engineer Roluf Lucht, it was claimed that the series-produced Bf 109 K-4 would be 35 km/hr (22 mph) faster than the later Bf 109 G versions, and accordingly it was decided to stop or cancel some Bf 109 G and К production lines since it was not known when major deliveries of the Me 262 were to be expected. Only the faster Bf 109 models would now have a chance of mass production. The first cancellation was the Bf 109 K-l, a single-seat fighter with the MK 108 cannon, deleted before the July 1944 planned run. The K-2 was also sacrificed because production of its MK 108 and MG 151/20 cannon at Posen (Poznan) was falling and the manufacturer could not meet production targets.

It had been intended to initiate a parallel mass-production run at Erla near Leipzig and in the Messerschmitt works at Regensburg from February 1944, and WNF was to begin production of the new fighter as from April 1944 using a less powerful version of the DB 605 than the L type. After opting for the more powerful Bf 109 K-4, the RLM cancelled the K-2, of which only a single model existed. This machine had served as a trial model for the wooden wings made by Hirth GmbH. The K-2 (Works No. 600056) had an MK 108 gun and was tested at Tarnewitz in the late summer of 1944. The machine was delivered without fixed aileron rods and was grounded after the first flight.

The Bf 109 K-4 was a mass-produced ‘light fighter’with a 9.92 metre (32 ft 6 in) wingspan. Its length was 9.01 metres (29 ft 7 in). Most machines of this type had a DB 605 DCM engine. The right-handed airscrew was manufactured by VDM and had an electro-mechanical auto unit which adapted revolutions to load pressure. Engineers expected a larger reserve at higher speeds by enlarging the cooling system, thus delaying overheating the DB 605 and promising an increase in speed of 15-20 km/hr (9-12.5 mph).

The Bf 109 K-4 had an FuG 16 ZY homing receiver with target acquisition and friend-or-foe FuGa recognition unit. Two MG 131 13-mm guns each with

300 rounds fired through the propeller arc. The 30-mm MK 108 motorised cannon had 65 rounds. The former Revi 16B gunsight was to be replaced by the futuristic gyro-stabilised EZ 42 at the instigation of the Chief-TLR. The first prototype Bf 109 K-4 had an MG 151/20 instead of the MK 108. This machine (Works No. 330112) was completed at Regensburg in October 1944 and shown to KdE representatives who had arrived from Tarnewitz. Afterwards it was to be flown there, but the pilot was forced to make an emergency landing at Brandis with a defect in the cooling system and the machine remained there for some time for lack of spares.

On 30 November 1944 OKL assembled a number of high-performance aircraft including the Bf 109 K-4 at Rechlin. Because the test centre was overwhelmed with more important projects, particularly jets, KdE only carried out basic tests of the K-4 and held back on the weapons testing. It was proposed to combine the trials with those of the K-6, and investigation of the speed potential, the streamlined upper wing design and other modifications were also postponed even though Oberst Edgar Petersen of KdE predicted that the modifications would make the K-4 50-60 km/hr (30-40 mph) faster. The other advantage of the K-4 was that from the outset only tried and tested components had been used, so that long drawn out trials were not necessary.

Immediately after the initial trial the first Bf 109 K-4s were delivered to III./JG 27 in October 1944. The first was lost on 19 October 1944 during delivery. The first engagements occurred at the beginning of November and shortly afterwards IV./JG 27, III./JG 4 and III./JG 77 all received their first K-4s. The K-4 variant with the pressurised cabin requested by pilots and Milch was never provided because the alterations were too expensive.

By the beginning of 1945 the development of the Bf 109 K-6 was relatively well advanced. This variant of‘Karl’was on the WNF drawing boards in the summer of 1944 and was designed to be better armed than the K-4. Besides the two MG 131s it was planned to carry an MK 109 gun together with two MK 108s or MG 151/20s in the wings. A section of the new wing was tried out on a Bf 109 G-6 atTarnewitz on the test stand and in flight. After a number of problems had been resolved, at the end of October 1944Tarnewitz gave the go – ahead for weapons to be mounted in February 1945. Soon afterwards the provisional machine received an EZ 41 reflector gunsight and was released to 1. Flieger-Division for trials on operations with a fighter unit. The performance calculations for the Bf 109 K-6 with DB 605 ASCM/DCM engines worked out at 600 km/hr (372 mph) near ground level and 730 km/hr at 8,000 metres (454 mph at 26,250 ft), but data recorded for a similarly equipped machine were restricted to 530 km/hr and 700 km/hr (330 and 435 mph) respectively. Operational ceiling was calculated to be 12,500 metres (41,000 ft), range about 575 kilometres (360 miles).

It was planned to produce the Bf 109 K-6 in reasonable numbers in the Wiener Neustadt area with the new weapons as from the summer of 1945. The Bf 109 K-4 was to be manufactured at Regensburg and Leipzig. The Messerschmitt Works offered the Bf 109 K-8 as a single-seat short range reconnaissance aircraft. This was welcomed at once by General von Barsewisch, the head of air reconnaissance, as a ‘fast reconnaissance machine with pressure cabin, and met the performance specifications set on 20 January 1944 replacing the Bf 109 G-8, which had meanwhile been judged to be under-powered. An Rb 50/30 camera unit was to be fitted in the fuselage and a BSK camera below the wings. According to the blueprints the Bf 109 K-8 was designed to have an additional 300-litre tank and an MK 108 cannon. No other weapons were planned, in order to keep the weight down. Whether a K-8 prototype was built by the beginning of 1945 is unlikely. Even the Bf 109 K-10, a fighter equipped with two MK 103s in the wing roots, never left the planning stage because the heavy 30-mm guns would not be available in sufficient quantity and were needed more urgently for the Do 335 В Jabo.

Due to problems of supply caused by air raids on industry and the collapsing infrastructure, all manufacturers of the Bf 109 K-4 encountered serious difficulties. Even so, from the end of 1944 the Messerschmitt line set up at

Regensburg in September was well into production, though only after several weeks’delay because of modifications made to the tailplane. Most of the Bf 109 K-4s produced were assembled and flight-tested at Regensburg. By 31 December 1944 857 machines had left the final assembly area, including 221 in November 1944 and 325 the following month. This was only possible using coundess PoWs, foreign labourers and concentration camp inmates. In the nine months to October 1944, more than 80 Bf 109s, about 10 per cent of production, were lost in crashes attributed to sabotage during test and delivery flights.

From 1 January 1945 to 25 April, when American ground forces reached the Danube at Regensburg, more than 300 Bf 109 K-4s were completed there. Some production was also achieved until March at Vilseck and Cham. Most of Bf 109 K-4s had works numbers between 330105 and 335210. In all, 10,888 Bf 109s were built at Regensburg of which barely 900 were К-versions, far fewer than planned. In mid-April the Bf 109 K-4 was to be found at the following units:

a) III./JG 3: 47 K-4s and G-14s. (Major Karl-Heinz Langer: Luftflotte Reich).

b) III./JG 4: 61, plus Bf 109 G-14s and K-14s. (Hauptmann Gerhard Strasen).

c) II. and III./JG 27: 48 assorted Bf 109s (Luftwaffenkommando West).

d) Stab, I. and II./JG 52: 91 Bf 109 G-14s and K-4s. (Oberst Hermann Graf, Luftflotte 6, East Front).

e) III./JG 53: 40 K-4s of which 24 were operational (Hauptmann Siegfried Luckenbach).

f) Three Gruppen of JG 77:100 Bf 109s on 9 April 1945 including Bf 109 G-14s and K-4s of which 81 were operational despite the precarious fuel situation although few flights were possible.

The development of this aircraft dated back earlier than 1944 and 1945. From the summer of 1943 Heinkel had begun to design, in concert with other aircraft manufacturers, a light jet fighter with a single turbine above or below the fuselage. For the mass production of a machine simpler than the Me 262 A-la, the main considerations were the least use of materials and the greatest use of substitutes such as wood and steel plating. This would make production possible in underground factories in enormous numbers at the earliest opportunity.

The Heinkel design office, relocated to Vienna from 1943 under the designation Heinkel-Siid, devoted itself increasingly from the spring of 1944 to this task. By 10 July Project He P 1073 ‘Fast Jet’ had been completed on the drawing board. The machine would have two HeS Oil turbines or failing that Jumo 004Cs. As it was evident to Dr Ernst Heinkel that all He 111 and He 177 production would be stopped, he therefore proposed to Goring the production of a powerful fighter with two HeS Oil turbines. The nimble aircraft would be

armed with three machine guns and make a very difficult opponent. The design was simple to build and the Heinkel development team thought it would be an early success. Time was of the essence. The mock-up was scheduled for completion on 1 October 1944, the first experimental aircraft by 1 December, while mass production could begin simultaneously with the first prototype trials from 1 January.

Heinkels prior work on the design meant that the study was ready within a few days. On 12 July 1944 Obersdeutnant Siegfried Knemeyer of KdE spoke out in its favour and on 8 September the Chief-TLR, Oberst Ulrich Diesing, issued precise guidelines for the T TL-Fighter’, henceforth to be known as the Volksjager. Heinkel-Siid submitted a precise description of the design for the new aircraft which coincided in nearly every respect with the RLM specifications.

The contract was awarded in September 1944 and work commenced ‘with the greatest vigour’. As HeS Oil production at Stuttgart was proceeding haltingly, Chief-TLR decided to fit the original design with the unreliable

BMW 003. The Jumo 004 turbine would have been better, but these were needed more urgently for the Me 262 A. On 15 September Chief-TLR and RLM rejected the design for lack of flying hours of the BMW 003, weak armament and poor operational range. The problems with the BMW turbines were decisive because the engines had already come under scrutiny for their poor reliability. Brushing aside the violent protests of Heinkel director Karl Franke, Chief-TLR now favoured the Blohm & Voss BV P211.01. In the almost daily conferences subsequently, the BV fighter was well promoted, but the Reichsmarschall was provisionally for the Heinkel machine. Shortly after the conference of 21 September 1944 chaired by Roluf Lucht in which progress at Heinkel-Siid was discussed, an improved full-scale mock-up of the He P1073 (designated He 500 from 25 September) was shown to a commission under the chairmanship of Professor Hertel in the presence of Lucht. The pilot would now have far better visibility than in the former version. Except for minor changes in equipment, the Heinkel design had already been cleared at the RLM. The pendulum swung back to the Heinkel design because of aerodynamic problems that had arisen after revisions to the BV P211.02. These were only reservations but came in useful for Heinkel. On 29 September the Jagerstab ordered ‘an immediate start to the Heinkel design. No other competitor awaiting evaluation had a chance.

The Volksjager was not accepted wholeheartedly by General Galland, nor by the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, General Werner Kreipe. Both considered that the Me 262 A-la offered the only possibility of regaining air supremacy over the Reich, even partially. This view was opposed by the Reichsmarschall and Chief of Staff of the Jagerstab, Saur. Wedded to NSDAP ideals, Saur believed that fanatical young pilots of the future Volksjager squadrons would turn the tide of the air war. In view of the losses to be expected and the lack of raw materials, the change-over to easily obtained replacements such as wood or steel plating was also important.

More conferences sought a consensus. The decisions taken to date seemed hasty. Nobody could estimate exacdy when the fighter would be ready for series production, and not until 30 September was the production department in a position to predict that the first mass-production run with the He 162 A-2 could be expected by February 1945. Despite the simplicity of the design, numerous questions and details remained to be resolved, including the installation of the BMW 003 turbine, the form of the wings and tail, the type of undercarriage and the fuel tank unit, all of which were changed again and again to enhance efficiency. There was also in-fighting between Messerschmitt and Heinkel, the former arguing for the monopoly of the Me 262. By October the design had fathered at least 19 different project studies of which the 18 th and 19th were the direct forerunners of the later He 162 A-1.

Requests for modifications continued to arrive from the Chief-TLR, however. After the final inspection of the 1:1 mock-up of the ‘smallest fighter’ by Major Grasser and Fliegerstabsingeneur Rauchensteiner, both with the Galland’s staff, it was agreed that the design work could be rounded off, at least insofar as the first two versions, A-l and A-2, were concerned. The work at Heinkel-Siid would now begin. To make up for the delays staff were putting in up to 100 hours work per week. They slept at their drawing boards and were close to exhaustion. Meanwhile Heinkel had an order for 1,000 He 162s, and this even before a single prototype had flown. To be reasonably sure that the construction would be successful, wind-tunnel trials were undertaken from September 1944 at AVA Gottingen. This was only possible thanks to the great efforts of research engineers. The deadlines for closing reports were very short. This applied also to the final submission of the documentation by 20 October 1944. Nevertheless only 35 per cent of the BMW 003 drawings for the He 162 had been submitted by then. All involved were aware that the BMW 003 was no more than a temporary solution. Though HeS Oil turbines were favoured from the start, work on them was at a standstill and not until March 1945 did the breakthrough come. Unfortunately this coincided with American teams of specialists preparing their own evaluations from the files found in underground storage locations.

By 1 November the project files for the BMW 003-equipped version were completed, and the entire design was to be concluded by 10 December. The optimists reckoned on having the first prototype by 20 January: a second would follow on 1 February. At the end of October 1944 the advent of the Volksjager was announced under the slogan ‘The Fiihrer Fights Back!’ A groundswell of hope surged up. On 30 October the staff at Heinkel-Siid were told: ‘The Heinkel firm will build the aircraft which is to sweep our skies clear of the flying terrorists!’

The infrastructure to achieve such an aim was still lacking. A transport area was prepared, a field railway to Hinterbriihl at Modling (Languste Works) begun and sufficient space made available for a satellite unit of Mauthausen concentration camp near Hinterbriihl, Vienna. Some 2,400 prisoners were to be shipped into the underground Languste facility. This was built on several levels, with the Volksjager metal fuselages to be produced safe from Allied bombing. The SS-WHA (SS Main Office for Industry) played a major role in the project. The wings would be produced at several factories with massive SS support. Human considerations played no role in the underground factories. The limiting factor was the preparation of the necessary raw materials which at that time – unlike forced labour — were only available in limited quantities. The SS had sufficient people, skilled or unskilled, to realise its ambitious plans.

The output rate for Volksjager production was to be increased from 1,000 to 2,000 monthly once several completion shops started up. The SS-FHA (SS Main Office for Management) put SS-Hauptsturmfiihrer Kurt May in charge of resolving all problems relating to obtaining wood and making the wooden parts. Elsewhere the underground Mittelwerk in the Kohnstein mountain (Harz near Nordhausen) was given orders at the beginning of November 1944 to produce another 1,000 He 162 and 2,000 BMW 003 turbines. At first only fuselages were to be turned out, later whole aircraft. Other sections would be produced in large numbers at Heinkel Rostock and Junkers near Stassfurt (Saxony-Anhalt).

o the end of the war, the Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-lOs, G-14s and K-4s, together with the Focke-Wulf 190 A-8s, A-9s and D-9s were the single – engined fighters still operating in large numbers. Of these about 4,800 were delivered to the units between 1 January 1945 and the capitulation. About 3,000 were Bf 109s and 1,800 Fw 190s. The Та 152 C and H played an increasingly minor role once their production centres were overrun by the Red Army. Only Та 152 H-Os continued to run off the assembly lines. The Me 262 A-la grew in significance. By April 1945,1,400 had been turned out, but not all reached Luftwaffe units. During the last three months of the war a second jet, the He 162 Volksjager, was certified operational by OKL. Industry produced 180 of these machines while roughly another 400-500 were still under construction. Powerful armament proved the value of this machine in later operational work, but the entanglement of the SS in armaments was disadvantageous. Himmler reduced the role of the SS-WHA under Gruppenfiihrer Oswald Pohl, a move welcomed by Gruppenfiihrer Jiittner, head of the SS-FHA, and by Gruppenfiihrer Kammler. The latter had proven himself an outstanding success in connection with SS planning and he seemed a suitable choice to handle far more difficult assignments. After being given control of production of V-weapons, Kammler enlarged his sphere of influence within the SS to cover armament procurement as a whole. When he was given additional far-reaching powers by Hitler, the SS could begin to draw up demarcation lines quite openly for its presumed zones, the intention being that it would eventually ensnare in the medium term all aircraft, weapons and especially rocket production.

At the end of 1944, Rheinmetall-Borsig at Unterliiss made initial drawings for a manned Rheintochter flak rocket. This single-seat jet-and-rocket propelled

projectile would have a ceiling of 12,000 metres (39,000 ft). Two variants were planned. The first design had four equal-sized wings and a pair of BMW turbines integral in two of the wings as horizontal propulsion, the other had three wings and an HeS 011 engine below the fuselage. Armament would have been two MK 108 guns or a honeycomb of 32 R4M rockets or four barrel-block rotary magazines containing air-to-air rockets. The first variant would require a launch assembly, the other a disposable chassis. What became of these plans is unknown.

The Unterliiss report is dated 23 June 1947 and was put together by Dr Klein, head of the C-team for the British occupying power.

On 29 October 1941 the first concrete plans for new anti-aircraft weapons were put before the RLM. The flak rocket had an important advocate in Generalmajor Walther von Axthelm, commander of I. Flakkorps, but a number of technical problems prevented a breakthrough. In December 1941 Goring intervened personally against the idea. Along with many of his Great War contemporaries, he believed that Bf 109-equipped fighter squadrons and plenty flak guns were all that would ever be necessary for the air defence of the Reich. At the end of 1941, Generalleutnant Otto Wilhelm von Renz, Commander I. Flakdivision, reported to the HWA that the amount of ammunition expended per enemy aircraft destroyed was disproportionately high, and would deteriorate further as the enemy built faster machines. For each victory, German flak needed: 16,000 8.8-cm (Flak 36) rounds, or 6,000 10.5-cm (Flak 39) rounds, or 3,000 12.8-cm (Flak 40 rounds).

Replacing this wastage, each single flak rocket would either damage or destroy an aircraft. General von Renz was aiming to abandon range/height prediction

formulae in favour of target blanketing, and radar – or radio-controlled flak rockets. In a conference on 6 December 1941 at the Ministry of Aircraft Supply, however, it was decided that rocket-powered interceptor fighters such as the

Fi 166 should be the standard anti-aircraft weapon. Only when a rocket was perfected with a 100 per cent certainty of a hit could this decision be reviewed.

In March 1942 the Flak Rocket Division was set up at Flak Defence Group under Oberstleutnant Dr Haider, and on 5 March Reichsminister Speer called for flak rocket development to be forced through with all energy. This led a month later to the first flak programme to include flak rockets. Because of the rapid growth in Allied aircraft production, the General Inspector of Flak Artillery, General der Flakwaffe von Axthelm, made emphatic demands for flak rockets on the grounds that both the war, and flak rocket development, were likely to be lengthy.

On 5 May 1942 Speer spoke out again on the importance of carrying through the flak programme to completion, and especially flak rocket development. Since new weapons were often greeted with scepticism at the highest level, and in the summer of 1942 it was known that the flak rocket production plan was not presently practical because it required more raw materials than were available, the deliberations were therefore drawn out. Design work on individual projects, interim testing and test-stand trials all made slow progress. Nevertheless, on 1 September 1942 Goring signed the Flak Development Programme which for the first time included rockets for air defence. These were initially spin-stabilised solid-fuel rockets: later some kind of guidance element would be introduced and finally an independent target-finding system. Although General von Axthelm was made project head, Goring appointed himself the ultimate arbiter and gave the OKL command staff the job of drawing up the tactical and technical guidelines for the future weapon. By now Goring was of the opinion that in three to five years the flak rocket would probably be the only ground-based defensive weapon of use against long-range bombers.

On 10 October 1942, a good five years after anti-aircraft rockets were first seriously discussed, the development programme came to HAP (Homeland Artillery Park) 11 at Peenemiinde, and was explained to Wernher von Braun two days later. On 22 October OKL made known its tactical and technical require­ments for the flak rocket. They wanted a target-seeking flak rocket which homed in on the aircraft when near it or better still a radio-controlled, two-stage solid-fuel rocket with a 100-kg warhead. Although no experimental models were available, on 27 October a flak rocket test command was established at Peenemiinde responsible to the Army Experimental Institute (HVA).

Meanwhile Braun and Dornberger had given thought to flak rocket types, leading to the concept of a midget A-4 designated Wasserfall. In a conference on 5 November 1942, General von Axthelm convinced his audience of the importance of the flak rocket. The greatest problem was guidance. Procedures using the Lichtenstein radar, infra-red and passive homing using emissions from electronic equipment aboard enemy aircraft were all mentioned. General von

Renz reported on problems constructing the test stand because supplies of building steel had not increased. On 5 February 1943 a new contract was placed for the supply, and on 17 February Goring approved the construction of Test Stand IX following talks with General von Axthelm. The project was awarded a high priority which attracted funds, and two days later OKL budgeted RM.500,000. A further controversy hindered progress when the RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst) unit handling the construction was withdrawn in April at short notice. Wrangling ensued over whether another RAD unit or forced labour from the east should be employed, and work did not resume until mid-July. The authorities were concerned that too few staff were employed on the target­seeking rocket, and on 6 August 1943 after arguments between OKH and OKL had been resolved, a number of Army personnel engaged on developing the A-4 (V-2) were switched to the Luftwaffe project.

After the devastating air attack on Peenemiinde on the night of 18 August 1943, an urgent discussion considered evacuating the entire flak rocket

development away from Peenemiinde for security reasons, but as the infrastructure was in place it was decided to remain. Most of the technical staff needed by the experimental commando arrived at Karlshagen near Peenemiinde at the beginning of September 1943. What the specialists were to concentrate on was not clear, and further talks with Milch produced no solution on what guidance system was to be developed. On 13 September Milch received the Plenipotentiary for Remote Guidance Research, Professor Friedrich Gladenbeck, who advised that work on the ground-to-air rocket should be abandoned because the air-to-air rocket was simpler and cheaper to produce. But since nobody could decide for certain between two theoretical ideas, the research was instead allowed to proceed down both avenues.

Meanwhile some advances had been made in the technology, and by 15 December 1943 the launchers for the Enzian, Schmetterling, Rheintochter and Wasserfallrockets had been designed. Before the years end both a Feuerlilie (F 25) and a Rheintochter (R 1) had been test-fired, the latter at Test Stand IX. Test firings of the Schmetterling and Enzian were scheduled for the coming weeks. During this critical phase, jurisdiction in armaments was vested in Speer as Minister for Armaments and War Production, who thus became responsible for all air armament projects. The Army, Luftwaffe and armaments groups struggling for more power were now joined by Reichsfuhrer-SS Himmler. He began his campaign at Peenemiinde on 21 February 1944 by attempting to recruit Wernher von Braun to the SS and so expand SS influence on rocket production generally. This move would have isolated General Dornberger. Brauns refusal led to his arrest by the Gestapo on 15 March 1944 for ‘suspected sabotage of V-weapons’. He was detained for a fortnight, but jurisdiction remained with the Army and Luftwaffe.

In April 1944 the experimental Enzian was test-fired from Stand IX at Peenemiinde followed by the first test-firing of Feuerlilie (F 55) on the Greifswalder Oie. The two Feuerlilie versions, F 25 and F 55, were considered to have great promise for future development. The project was revised in the summer of 1944 at Karlshagen with particular emphasis on the problems of control, and on 26 June 1944 an organisational plan worked out. For security reasons HAP 11 was given the cover name ‘Elektromechanische Werke GmbH Karlshagen and provided with virtual autonomy.

On 1 August 1944 a conference with Reichsminister Speer considered the rounds per kill ratio of traditional flak artillery. The extremely high cost of shooting down an enemy aircraft by artillery as against the hypothetical possibility of destroying one bomber with every target-seeking rocket, with all its attendant savings in raw materials was found compelling. On 8 August a comparison was made between the 12.8-cm Flak 40 gun and the as yet most expensive, liquid-fuelled flak rocket Wasserfall. Greater effort was now invested

in the infrastructure for batteries of flak rockets, and on 18 August OKL submitted its design for a cabling system while experts worked to design automatic devices to home in on Allied H2S or H2X ground-mapping radar.

On 9 August 1944 the Completion Committee for Flak Rocket Construction decided that the Schmetterling and Wasserfall were the most promising projects and their pace of development should be stepped up while the Committee would be kept informed regarding Enzian, Rheintochter (R 3) and various other missiles. In order to guarantee production, the Buchenwald satellite camp Mittelbau was made independent at Nordhausen and in time 30 outworker parties assembled. These prisoners were to create the infrastructure for V-2 and flak-rocket production in large underground workshops in the Himmelberg (Woffleben) and Kohnstein (Niedersachswerfen). Thousands of prisoners died in the appalling conditions.

On 30 October 1944 at Peenemiinde Speer witnessed the firing of flak rockets for the first time. After watching the start of two Wasserfall from Stand IX, he decided immediately that the project should be continued together with research into the supersonic possibilities. He also said that Rheintochter should be further tested although he had not seen this rocket fired. The two subsonic missiles, Enzian and Schmetterling, on the other hand should be completed as soon as

possible and made operational. Another prospect was the Taifun, which to everybody’s surprise Goring had classified as important. On 4 November 1944 in compliance with Hider’s order work was stepped up on the production of flak ammunition and new rockets, while Speer (and later Himmler) received instructions to guarantee individual types. To consolidate the ground organisation for the various rocket designs, a number of modifications were introduced: for example, from mid-November 1944 the same launcher could be used for the Enzian or Rheintochter. The Wasserfall launcher did not have a revolving turntable, and for the comparatively light Hs 117 Schmetterling only a very light firing assembly was needed.

It was clear that the protective screen of flak rockets would not extend to cover the whole area of the Reich and for this reason on 6 December 1944 the order was given to erect emplacements in central Germany to protect important industrial installations, particularly oil refineries and the synthetic fuel factories. A limited number of cities would also be included in the screen. Despite the ever-worsening situation no decision had been taken by the end of December as

to which flak rockets should be produced, even though some were bound to be abandoned for lack of raw materials. Because of reservations about Schmetterling, OKL decided to press forward with Wasserfall, since this was based on the already proven A-4 artillery rocket.

On 5 January 1945 Speer decreed immediate measures for air defence in which, besides the greatest possible increase in the production of flak guns and ammunition of all kinds, preparations should be made for flak rocket mass production, and Arbeitsstab Dornberger was formed on 12 January to push ahead with flak rocket development. Based at Schwedt on the Oder, it was to provide coordination. On 14 January Gruppenfuhrer Kammler took overall charge of V-weapons production on Hitler’s order, this being Himmler’s first step in his attempt to bring all ‘high-technology weapons’ under his own control. On 27 January Arbeitsstab Dornberger met to choose whichever rocket would be readied first, and next day Himmler ordered all flak rocket work to be concentrated at Mittelwerk near Nordhausen in order to protect the programme in the underground factories there. The transfer caused a four-week delay before the schedule resumed, but the need for the measure spoke for itself.

When Peenemiinde and Karlshagen were partially evacuated on 31 January 1945, Himmler gave Kammler command of Armeekorps zbV (‘for special purposes’) which now became the overseer of all rocket warfare. At the beginning of February Arbeitsstab Dornberger was forced by the military situation to remove from Schwedt to Bad Sachsa. As an immediate measure OKL relinquished 5. Flakdivision to the Waffen-SS to begin flak rocket operations. For this purpose the ‘Luftwaffe Staff to Break the Air terror’ was formed and transferred to the Harz Trutzgau, the ‘Defensive region of the Reich’. On 6 February Himmler issued a comprehensive order regarding the use of giant rockets (like the V-2) and the further development of flak rockets. All projects not close to final testing were to be discontinued. Only a smaller version of Wasserfall, the basic Schmetterling and the non-guided, spin-stabilised Taifun thus survived.

Riistungsstab leader Saur went to Mittelwerk in mid-February 1945 to help coordinate flak-rocket development. Besides moving Elektromechanische Werke GmbH from Karlshagen to Nordhausen, he ordered the motor department of the Hellmuth Walter firm to transfer to Bleichrode in the southern Harz. On 17 February 1945 the evacuation of Peenemiinde began in earnest and the first train to leave the installation headed for Nordhausen. Despite these steps, it was obvious from the Reich Research Council conference on 26 February, when the possibilities of overcoming the ‘air terror’ were discussed, that no flak rocket would be operational until late summer 1945, should the fronts hold that long. Nevertheless, development went on, and on 28 February Arbeitsstab Dornberger met to consider the use of rangefinders and target computers although the possibility of turning out this kind of complex equipment was very doubtful.

In March the transfer of HVA Peenemiinde and the Karlshagen annexe was concluded with the evacuation of the remaining technical personnel. All development work on flak rockets was now abandoned except for the non-guided Taifun and the radio-controlled Wasserfall, Schmetterling and Enzian having been struck from the Fiihrer-Programme. SS-Gruppenfuhrer Kammler accumulated more titles when, in addition to his other offices, he was made ‘Commissioner for Jet Aircraft’and on 17 March ‘Fiihrer’s Commissioner to Break the Bombing Terror’. This meant that Himmler had reached his goal of directing and controlling air armaments, on paper at least, so far as the situation allowed.

On 3 April 1945 Arbeitsstab Domberger moved from Bad Sachsa to Ober – ammergau in Upper Bavaria. Next day probably the last Jagerstab conference was chaired by Saur. The talk was centred on jet aircraft and the hopes for flak rockets in the short term. In view of the collapsing fronts there was little optimism. The same day in a heavy air raid on Nordhausen and the surface area of Mittelwerk there was serious loss of life amongst townspeople and camp prisoners, and serious material damage. As a result, 24 hours later a start was made to transfer the most important rocket and weapons specialists from Nordhausen to Oberammergau and other destinations in Bavaria. Leading scientists moved for the last time aboard the ‘Reprisal Express’as they jokingly termed it. On 10 April 1945 American forces arrived at Bleichrode and occupied the ruins of Nordhausen. Next day they stood before the open gates of the formerly top secret Mittelwerk.

At the latest by the summer of 1944 the realists at OKL must have admitted, at least to themselves, that – failing a miracle – the defence of the Reich was entering its final stage. Only by significantly increasing the percentage of enemy bombers shot down was there a possibility of retrieving the situation.

The quality of the Reich (non-flak) air defence was governed by three factors: pilots, aircraft and fuel. A shortage of pilots meant a reduction in the number of machines aloft, but a shortage of fuel meant closing the book no matter how fanatical the pilots or advanced the aircraft. There were other lesser factors, but they all added up to the same thing. Everyone involved in air defence, from

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Goring to the youngest Flieger, had to doubt victory. After several years of a war of attrition, the Allies were no longer faced by the invincible Luftwaffe of 1940. With the exception of the Fw 190 D-9, D-ll to D-13 and above ah the Та 152 H-l, most of the piston-engined aircraft were no longer the worry they had once been for Allied escort fighters and bombers. The Luftwaffe work­horses, the Bf 109 G-6, G-14 and K-4 were still good, but not superior.

The enormous, ever-present Allied air armadas dominated the skies over the Reich. From the end of 1944 they roamed where they wanted, reducing refinery after refinery, aircraft factory after aircraft factory, town after town to ash and rubble. They cut transport routes and thus the supplies of new material to the front, slowly but surely bringing air defences to a stop. Once the Reich railway network was ruined, the beginning of the end was reached. From 1944 there was only one slight hope, and this was the construction of the greatest number of jet fighters possible. By means of Me 262 A-la fighters, relatively cosdy to produce, Allied mastery of the air might perhaps begin to fall away by the summer of 1944. Yet the small production runs of these aircraft resulted initially in relatively few operational units, such as JG 7, receiving the new fighter. Sorties by groups of 30 or more machines therefore remained the exception to the very end. Sections of OKL pinned their hopes on the He 162 Volksjager to turn the tide at the last minute. Using thousands of these small jet fighters, taking off with rocket assists from virtually anywhere, the Luftwaffe could have wounded Allied air supremacy fatally within months. That was the plan, but plans change and He 162 production was overshadowed by the Me 262. Thousands of machines planned by the Riistungsstab were cancelled.

Of greater concern was the supply of fuel for impending operations. The shortage caused a fall in fighter operations from month to month. Attacks on Allied operations towards the war’s end, for example by night fighters, were only possible using veterans and aces, for inexperienced pilots could never have found their way through the defence. The day fighters received the last of the fuel. Since the refineries were wrecked and no more benzine was forthcoming, resort was had to the last reserves. Finally a mix of various grades of benzine was supplied for the most urgent flights. Some J-2 fuel was available for most jet flights, although the modest quantities allowed no operations on a large scale.

New personnel arriving at the fighter units did not have the lengthy training period of former days behind them, and from 1944 they were cannon fodder. The leadership was keener than hitherto on a fanatical commitment to destroying that ‘special target’. Youths, completely without combat experience and ignorant of tactics, were to spring into the breach. They would man new aircraft such as the Natter or Volksjager for what amounted to little more than kamikaze missions. With rocket-driven ‘midget fighters’ and ‘local installation protectors’, OKL would make a final attempt to guard core areas of armaments

production, above all the fuel industry. But for that, most aircraft were not in the least suitable.

The suicide pilot ushered in a new phase of total war. Veteran, highly decorated men and also raw beginners were to ram their opponents if all else failed during the attack. Operation Elbe was the prime example. German losses were so high that it could not be termed a success despite the toll in enemy aircraft, and the bulk of successes were achieved by veteran pilots in piston – engined fighters and the jet escort.

Even the more senior operational pilots who flew in the last days rarely landed undamaged once enemy fighters had learned to patrol the home airfields waiting to pick off the soft target presented by a landing Me 262. The consequences of too short a period of initial training, or jet-conversion training, often made themselves felt. Most had to make do with a few minutes’ conversion flying in the Me 262 or He 162 for lack of aviation fuel. Learning to handle the new turbines outweighed the basic techniques, which had to be assimilated during operations.

Realists within the General Staff and OKL felt at the beginning of 1945 that the prospects for victory had receded into the far distance, and the main job now
was to bring as many civilians as possible to central Germany from the east and so protect them against the Red Army. Fighting on was the means to that end. That it would not be easy to slow down the advance of enemy ground forces was clear to all. Because of its lack of bombers, the Luftwaffe could promise no miracles. In the spring of 1945 only a few pilots could be sent even on such important missions as destroying major bridges since the necessary aircraft simply did not exist.

Ground successes were achieved mainly by Fw 190 F-8s in the Jabo role and Me 262 Blitzbombers in the face of too little fuel and too few airworthy machines. Sufficient pilots were available, but against massed Soviet tank armies with thousands of T-34s and Stalins, mere Staffeln of aircraft were not enough even when armed with the recendy introduced Panzerblitz or Panzerschreck rockets. Although during the closing phase of the war countless Soviet tanks were destroyed, it hardly changed the overall picture. Now a new dimension became unmistakable, but the ‘total mission would do little more than win the pilot a posthumous decoration or promotion. Operations such as Freiheit, the sacrificial attack on the Oder bridges, or Bienenstock, the small Panzerfaust-armed training machines, were hopeless from the outset, as were the Mistel attacks. Because of tactical problems, particularly the lack of air superiority in the battle area, not to mention the immense groups of Soviet flak batteries, these special aircraft did not obtain the successes predicted of them, and neither did the Hs 293 and other ‘wonder’ weapons.

Despite all setbacks and doubts there persisted through the last six months of World War II an underswell of hope for, or rather a vague belief in, Endsieg – ‘Final Victory’. It received new impetus once the Waffen-SS began to involve itself increasingly in air armaments. Thanks to its vast army of slaves, the SS was a power to be reckoned with. After it had begun to complete the underground factories, it moved in step by step to take over the rocket projects, while SS – Obergruppenfuhrer Jiittner proposed to enlarge the trawl to cover general aircraft production as well. The main aim of the SS, the last trump, was to get the remote – guided ground-to-air flak rocket operational. The necessary technology was not advanced sufficiendy, however, and at the end of 1944 industry was still not in a position to develop and mass-produce reliable systems, while Allied air raids brought the manufacture of synthetic fuels to a standstill. By March 1945 it was clear that the necessary fuels for flak rockets could not be made available in sufficient quantity, and this applied also to high-value materials needed especially for engines and electronic control equipment.

What remained was basically a belief in a miracle, for the desperate situation in which the German Reich now found itself could not be saved by Plenipotentiary Kammler. All his efforts were in vain, especially his pressure to have built the supersonic flying-wing fighter designed by the Horten brothers
towards the end, and for which capacity was lacking. Allied forces broke through to the heart of Germany too rapidly, and industry had no further chance to realise its ambitious plans. At the end, its futuristic prototypes littered the boundaries of airfields, half complete and draped in camouflage netting, awaiting discovery by the victors. For them these would be interesting finds, although the files with the mathematical data were of much higher value.

After traditional machines failed the Germans, mainly for lack of fuel, there was nothing left except the weapons of mass destruction. The miracle explosive never appeared, and neither did the chemical and nerve gases which Hitler refused to countenance. Thus the Luftwaffe leaders were reduced to planning for the eventuality that for some inexplicable reason the Allied advance might grind to a halt until the autumn of 1945, allowing some of the new weapons below ground to become ready, particularly new jet fighters and synthetic fuel. This would have allowed the war to proceed for a while. The Allies did not oblige, however, and seized all the plans for themselves.

Besides the various versions of Bf 109 G-6, G-10, G-14 and K-4, and the late Fw 190 variants A-8 to A-10, the Fw 190 D-9 fighter and Та 152 were seen to be the most significant piston aircraft for Reich defence. After the Fw 190 A-8 run was finally completed in January 1945 at Fieseler Kassel, Ago at Ochsersleben and in the Norddeutsche Werke at Wismar, the A-9, which had been in production since September 1944, grew in importance. By February it had taken over from the A-8 series in the Focke-Wulf works at Cottbus and Aslau and at Dornier Wismar. The better armoured machine had an engine which differed little from its forerunner. Because Fw 190 ‘Dora’ fitted with a Jumo 213 was tactically superior, production of the Fw 190 A-9 with a BMW 801 engine gave way to it in February 1945. All succeeding Fw fighters were to be converted as soon as possible to the more powerful Jumo 213 E-l and F-l.

From mid-1944 the Fw 190 D-9 had been an outstandingly reliable fighter which was now replacing the Fw 190 A-8 and A-9 in the fighter units on a large scale. The planned series production of the A-10 and D-10 was cancelled in favour of improved versions of the D-9.

Fw 190 D-9 to D-13 variants fitted with the Jumo 213 A to F engines were amongst the best German fighter aircraft at the war s end. Shortly beforehand the first D-ll appeared, an outstandingly efficient fighter with Jumo 213 E-l/F-1 engine and turbocharger. The first prototypes were manufactured at the end of September 1944 at Adelheide (Delmenhorst), and by April 1945 20 machines, some fitted with the new EZ 42 gunsight, had been completed.

In the previous October Roluf Lucht had demanded an immediate production run of engines with two-stage chargers for all modern piston-engined fighters. As the first major production run, the Fw 190 D-12 was to be equipped from the outset with the Jumo 213 F-l and MW 50 high pressure installation. This involved a slight modification of the Jumo 213 E-l engine. The aircraft were to have an MK 108 and only two MG 151s in the wing roots. In the spring of 1945 series production of this version fell by the wayside with the preference for the D-13 and the loss of the MK 108 manufacturing plant at Posen to the Soviets.

Five prototypes of the Fw 190 D-13 with Jumo 213 F were built. Series production was scheduled for March 1945 but was abandoned due to the war

This Fw 190 D-12/R5 attached to a training unit for future Staffel-leaders was abandoned near Bad Worishofen.

These Fw 190 D-9s and D-lls of the‘Parrot Staffer took over the immediate protection of Galland’s Jagdverband 44.

situation. The difference from the D-12 was its MG 151 cannon. A number of D-13 variants had two MK 108s as additional weapons in the wings. In March 1945 three machines were ready for the front and presumably at the beginning of April a few others became available with variations in the fixed weaponry.

Focke-Wulf built probably only two, possibly three Fw 190 D-14 prototypes up to April 1945. The last variant evaluated by the Chief-TLR in January 1945 was the D-15. As with the D-14, this machine would have had a DB 603 E or LA engine instead of the Jumo 213 A, E or F. By the wars end the only captured D-15 prototype (Works Number 500645) was fitted with only a DB 603 G engine but had a larger tailplane as did the Та 152.

Amongst the last operations flown with the Fw 190 D was the protection of the jet units transferring to southern Germany, mainly the remnants of JG 7, KG 51 and KG(J) 54 together with the legendary fighter unit JV 44, which withdrew to Innsbruck via Munich and Salzburg. Some Та 152 pilots landed on airfields in Schleswig-Holstein, where their machines were captured by British forces.

The manufacture of fuselages, wings and tailplanes began simultaneously. At the beginning of November 1944 the first frames for the He 162 V-l forward fuselage were on the belt at Languste. The first wing hurriedly completed at Franken was faulty. The tail and components were to be rushed out and delivered from Lower Austria. On 7 December assembly of He 162 V-2 started. Delays in the supplies of tailplanes and wings held back the construction of further prototypes.

On 6 December 1944 Engineer Gotthold Peter, leading test pilot at Heinkel – Siid, flew the He 162 V-l (M-l) for the first time. The second test, an exhibition flight for General Commissioner Kessler and Chief-TLR Oberst Diesing, ended in disaster. Due to defective bonding the starboard wing leading edge was

ripped away. The aircraft immediately started rolling, the starboard aileron and wingtip then broke off at 735 km/hr (455 mph) damaging the tailplane and causing the machine to spin out of control and crash just beyond the perimeter of the airfield at Fischamend. The pilot was killed. An immediate enquiry was ordered. An air safety commission investigated and made its recommendations within a few days. He 162 V-3 was subjected immediately to vibration testing to ensure the integrity of the structure. Consideration was given to replacing the wood surfaces with metal.

The next completed prototype was gone over with a fine-tooth comb. As a result, in mid-December the He 162 was grounded for nine defects. Between 16 and 20 December a commission was set up by the Chief-TLR to examine the structural integrity and flight safety of the design. On 22 December director Karl Franke gave the He 162 V-2 a clean bill of health for its maiden flight, and staff engineer Paul Bader flew the aircraft at 500 km/hr (310 mph). He found the rudder and ailerons too weak and criticised the engine, but was otherwise satisfied. By 15 January, pilots Schuck and Kennitz had been trained to fly the Volksjager and made further flights. He 162 M-3 was listed for electronics testing and flew at Heinkel-Siid on 16 January. By the 22nd of the month the machine had completed 13 flights totaling 80 minutes duration. The design was revised to strengthen the wings and tailplane by the end of December, He 162 M-4 being the first of the improved machines. After the Heidfeld controllers examined the fuselage on 28 December, they discovered fifty different defects,

and the maiden flight was therefore delayed until 16 January. Ten flights totalling almost three hours were made in the month. A minor crash occurred on one landing. On 22 January He 162 M-6 and the first pre-series machine, He 162 A-01, were scheduled for pilot training. Next day Pawolka, Bader, Franke, Schuck and Wedemeyer flew the sixth prototype. It was noted that suspension was unnecessary for the nose-wheel and this was eliminated in the series production.

On 4 February He 162 M-6 crashed, killing Oberleutnant Wedemeyer. He 162 M-7 was fitted with a braking parachute as a safety measure for high­speed flights. He 162 M-3, M-4 and the first A-0 were tested in flight for stability in the vertical axis, the Dutch roll moment and the effect of various tailplane combinations.

By 30 January M-2 to M-7 and the first three pre-series aircraft were clear for testing. When this was suspended at the beginning of February because of persistent ground mist, the time was used to repair the damaged nose-wheel of M-6 and exchange the A-02 tail flaps. M-7 was ‘shaken after the braking parachute was fitted and given the all-clear for testing. By 5 March the prototypes had made 63 starts totaling 10 hours 57 minutes: 15 pilots had flown the He 162, some of them only В-2 licence holders and thus relatively inexperienced with high-performance machines.

Shordy afterwards engineer Full achieved a speed of 800 km/hr (Mach 0.65) at 8,000 metres (500 mph at 26,000 ft). Following heavy vibrations the turbine stopped and Full was slightly injured while making a forced landing in snowy terrain. In order to improve stability, the fuselage was lengthened and the dihedral of the wing tip curves lessened. It was decided that an enlarged rudder and modified tailplane were needed. Once the main weaknesses of the aircraft had been identified, from 15 February all existing models underwent modification. The first, He 162 M-3, was flown by Full in mid-February at 880 km/hr (550 mph), the prototype proving fully stable. At the end of February the wing angle was raised by 2 degrees and the fiiselage/wing joint adjusted. In his last flight, Full used the ejector seat to bale out from He 162 M-3 after the turbine caught fire. At 200 metres (650 ft) he was too low for his parachute to deploy in time.

Tests continued and by 25 February Heinkel-Siid had made 166 flights totaling 40.5 hours. The fuel situation was deteriorating almost daily and this, combined with the frequent air raid warnings, held back the tempo of Volksjager development considerably. After He 162 M-25, one of the machines with lengthened fuselage, received 60 per cent damage during a flight on 2 March, works pilot Denzin also lightly damaged another machine. By 11 March the number of He 162 flights had risen to 211 (51 hours 13 minutes). Next day Feldwebel Wanke’s He 162 M-8 hit the runway too early, overturned and caught fire. The pilot survived, injured and badly burned. On 14 March the He 162 of

Unteroffizier Daus of Auffangsstaffel Heidfeld 2./JG 1 collided with barrels near the runway and was killed. He was one of at least 18 He 162 pilots to lose his life in accidents with the aircraft.

The last Heinkel-Siid weekly report is dated 26 March 1945. By then there had been 259 Volksjager flights at Heidfeld alone, totalling 65 hours. Continual modifications in the preceding months had kept most machines grounded. Once the improvements were completed, the last involving the fuel installation, the He 162 was declared operational at the beginning of April 1945.

By now Soviet units were approaching Vienna. To pull back west of the city, or better still into southern Germany or the Harz seemed advisable. On 30 March director Franke went to Saur’s office to plead for a transfer to Bad Gandersheim. This was granted and on 1 April a special train set off for the Harz. After being held three whole days at Eger, the train was re-routed to Jenbach in the Tyrol, arriving there on the night of 5 April. A few hours before, Modling and the underground facility at Languste had been occupied by the Soviets: one day later Schwechat district and the Heidfeld airfield also fell into their hands. The works management had begun to remove some of the instructional documents and installations for the He 162 A-2 to Heinkel Jenbach while the staff went to Lent near Salzburg. The design office was eventually relocated from Jenbach/Tyrol to Landsberg/Lech, arriving there on 14 April,

thirteen days before American forces did so, and thus brought the Volksjager development to its end.

From the beginning of 1944 remote-controlled and spin-stabilised rockets grew in importance in aerial warfare. They were initially simply aimed by eye (Werfergranate WGr 21), but later a whole series of guided and spin-stabilised missiles was developed. Except for the R4M none was ever even partially ready

for a series run by the war’s end because of problems in obtaining materials and Allied domination of the skies over the shrinking Reich.

As further development of midget fighters, special aircraft and manned rockets had not provided the hoped-for results, at the end of 1944 the Chief-TLR turned to more reliable machines. A significandy improved Me 163 had greater range and a retractable undercarriage to make it easier to handle, but, as its potential was seen as limited, the Me 262 Heimatschiitzer also received fresh impetus.

Ju248 – Further Development of the Me 263

The Ju 248 was the Me 263 renamed, the work having been passed to Junkers because the Me 262 had exhausted Messerschmitt’s capacity. In view of the tactical successes of the Me 163, OKL had decided on an improved version with

longer endurance and a retractable undercarriage. The new machine, equipped with a more powerful rocket motor, was based on experience with the Me 163 В and was developed by Junkers as the Ju 248 from the late summer of 1944. The line was set up at Dessau Slid Waggonfabrik at the end of the year. The first wings were to be manufactured by 10 January 1945 at Puklitz/Zeitz, while the firms of Kronprinz and VDM were responsible for the undercarriage. Many of the other parts were duplicates from the Me 163 B. However, the fuselage would not take the Walter engine and had to be extended by 0.5 metres, thus ruining the timetable.

On 13 January OKL pressed hard for the series run even though work on the first experimental machines had come to a halt, and therefore on 29 January OKL considered abandoning the whole project: JG 400 would receive the He 162 in the short term. The decision was reversed at the beginning of February when the first prototype, Ju 248 V-l, was ready and Flugkapitan Pancherz flew it on 8 February under tow by a Bf 110 (pilot Karl Went). After a second test flight, Pancherz flew six more times on 11 and 13 February and by 19 February the aircraft had been in the air on 13 occasions.

On 7 March the Junkers engineers admitted that the Ju 248 was not so well ahead as might appear, for example the Walter motor ordered for Ju 248 V-2 had not arrived. The daily air raids on the Junkers Werke had destroyed many documents including material being prepared for the Japanese. By mid-March 1945 the undercarriage, part of the electrical system and some instruments were still awaited. In view of the fact that rocket fuels could not be produced in sufficient amounts, on 20 March OKL decided that the Me 263 would have to be cancelled, leaving the field theoretically to the He 162. Three days later Junkers Dessau advised the Chief-TLR that the Walter motor had finally been mounted in the first prototype, but important elements were still missing so that the first rocket-powered ascent was now postponed to the end of the month, and ultimately no test was possible because the front line arrived at Dessau. Most of the documents were destroyed at Ragun School to thwart their seizure by US forces. At least one of the two Me 263s had been blown up shortly before. Dessau was occupied on 24 April 1945.