Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

Apart from Iran and Israel, few other states from West Asia have keen interest in space technologies. Many of them could be viewed as the beginners in this field. Some of them are making significant investments in the space arena by fully being appreciative of the potential of this technology in various fields. This segment analyses the developing space programmes of few more states from the region.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a federation of seven states, has found steadily building a portfolio of space resources. It has put one satellite in orbit with a two more on order. DubaiSat-1, a remote sensing satellite with 5 m resolution built by South Korea and weighing in at 200 kg [12], was launched in 2009 by the Russian Dnepr-1 vehicle. Second satellite DubaiSat-2 is slated to be launched in 2012, and UAE expects a completely ‘made in the UAE’ satellite Dubai-Sat-3 to be launched in near future.

UAE’s capital Abu Dhabi is an advanced city in the region in regard to its infrastructure facilities. Virgin Galactic, a space enterprise of the Virgin Group, is interested in building a spaceport in Abu Dhabi (subject to approval from the US authorities). In fact Abu Dhabi’s Aabar Investments has already acquired 32% stake in Virgin Galactic by paying $280 million. Virgin Galactic is proposing to build a commercial space visit facility here after their spacecraft becomes operational in near future. It may cost $200,000 for a trip to space. The company envisages having six passengers and two pilots to fly up into suborbital space, stay there for 5 min and return. Six UAE residents have booked their seats for first suborbital flight [13]. Apart from commercial interests in the space field, the UAE administration is also keen to develop technical expertise in various disciplines of rocket science. They have an ongoing initiative to help train UAE’s aerospace engineers with NASA. They have organised few conferences on space issue to be in more awareness on the subject and also to establish associations with the other business and government organisations in this field. In short, the UAE is keen to develop Abu Dhabi as a major space port. UAE appears to have identified ‘space’ as a major sector for future investments and is found systematically making efforts in that direction.

On April 23,2011, a ‘built in’ UAE satellite Y1A was successfully launched from the European Space Center in Kourou, French Guiana. It was built by Yahsat, the Emirates’ Al Yah Satellite Communications Co., and a wholly owned subsidiary of

Mubadala Development Company, the Abu Dhabi-based Investment and Develop­ment Company. Yahsat has commissioned two satellites to create regionally focused capacity to manage the expanding requirements for government, commercial and consumer satellite communication services. A second satellite, Y1B, is likely to be launched in 2012 to complete the $1.66 billion Yahsat programme. Y1A and Y1B will also provide commercial communications across the West Asia, Africa, Southwest Asia and Europe.[26]

Saudi Arabia is another country in the region having potential (and interest) for growth in space field. Their interest in this field goes back to early 1980s. Two in­teresting events of that period need a mention. Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Salman Abdel Aziz Al-Saud was the first Arab to fly in space for 7 days in 1985 in shuttle Discovery (the second Arab was a Syrian cosmonaut who spent 8 days in 1987 at Mir station). The other incident is that Riyadh, the capital and largest city of Saudi Arabia, is the headquarters of the Arab Satellite Communications Organization which operates the Arabsat GEO telecommunications system since 1985 with more than 20 member countries. Arabsat was created to deliver satellite-based, public and private telecommunications services to the Arab States, in accordance with international standards, and currently five satellite platforms (Arabsat-2B, BADR-4, BADR-5, BADR-6 and Arabsat-5A) are performing this task.[27]

The major investments by Saudi Arabia have been in the field of low orbit micro­communication satellites. SaudiComsat 1 to SaudiComsat7 satellites were launched with the help of a Russian launcher Dnepr-1 during 2004-2007.[28] Saudi Arabia has launched 12 satellites till date from the Baikonur site in Kazakhstan.22 Presently, Saudi Arabia is found keen in developing its own space agenda and make additional investments.

In 2010, they have signed agreements with India and Ukraine. With India, the agreement is of cooperation on peaceful use of outer space. Indian space agency is helping them to develop an indigenous space programme. Under commercial agree­ment, India is also expected to help Saudi Arabia to launch their satellites in near future. The agreement with Ukraine stipulates that Saudi Arabian and Ukrainian scientists will cooperate in fundamental space research and a range of applied sciences, particularly geophysics. The agreement offers broad opportunities for scientists from the both countries to hold joint symposiums and conferences, share results of experiments. Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan have signed an agreement

for bilateral cooperation in space exploration on November 20, 2011. They would be cooperating on satellite telecommunication research and space exploration for peaceful purposes.[29]

For a state like Turkey living in a geopolitically rough neighbourhood, the strategic utility of space systems is obvious. Turkey’s interests in satellite arena are mainly concentrated towards putting them in use for the communication purposes which has both civilian and military utility. Their various communication satellites belong to the Turksat series. Amongst Turksat 1A, Turksat 1B, Turksat 1C, Turksat 2A[30] and Turksat 3A satellites launched so far the first launch in 1994 of Turksat 1A had to witness failure because of the malfunction of the rocket. Turksat 1C had encountered some problems after a successful launch, but the agencies were successful in keeping it in operational conduction for 14 years but went of use in 2010. Turksat 3A was launched during June 2008 and is presently functioning well.

To cater for its imagery requirements, Turkey being a NATO member has some access to information from US satellites, and they can also buy imagery on the open market from Spot Image, DigitalGlobe, or others. However, Turkey understands that depending on allies has its own limitation. Theoretically, Turkey requires all-weather radar imaging system and multi – and hyperspectral capability [14]. Appreciating such type of needs and few other emerging strategic, social and commercial needs, Turkey has started making more investments into various satellite technologies.

Turkey’s first national earth observation satellite, RASAT, was launched success­fully on August 17,2011. This 100-kg satellite with a design life of 3 years has been designed and manufactured by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey—Space Technologies Research Institute (TUBITAK-UZAY).[31] The satellite was launched by Russian Dnepr space launch vehicle. Turkey has an ambitious plan for sending indigenous communication satellite in space by 2015. This launch also could be viewed as learning experience for various future satellite launches. Turkey has devised a 10-year satellite strategy and has plan for few launches during 2015 and 2017 period.[32]

Turkey during March 2011 has signed a US$571 million deal with Japanese firm Mitsubishi Electric Corporation to procure and launch two communications

satellites by 2014. Turkey plans to place Turksat 4A into orbit by the last quarter of 2013 and launch Turksat 4B in 2014, with the two satellites having a lifespan of 30 years. Turkish engineers are also starting to produce another satellite Turksat 5A in cooperation with the Japanese firm.[33]

Turkey’s plans of launching Gokturk satellites have raised concerns from their neighbour Israel. As per the available information Telespazio, a Finmecca – nica/Thales company, has won in December 2008 a tender as prime contractor, supported by Thales Alenia Space (a Thales/Finmeccanica company), from the Turkish Ministry of Defence for the Gokturk 1 satellite system. This agreement allows the supply of an Earth observation satellite equipped with a high-resolution (0.8 m) optical sensor, an integration and test centre for satellites to be built in Turkey. Telespazio will also provide all satellite launch and test services.[34] No further details about this mission are available. However, what is causing concerns in certain quarters is the proposal regarding the launch of Gokttirk-2 satellite.

It has been reported that China will launch Turkey’s first intelligence satellite, Gokttirk-2, for US$20 million. Goktlirk-2 is expected to detect the movements of objects smaller than even 1 m2, will help capture terrorists infiltrating Turkish borders. The optical camera for the satellite has been bought from South Korea, while all the other parts have been produced and manufactured in Turkey. Goktlirk-2 is expected to be launched in 2012. Its civilian uses include control of forestland, tracking illegal construction, rapid assessment of damage after natural disasters, determination of agricultural boundaries and geographical data gathering.[35] This satellite (technically a commercial satellite) is likely to become operational by 2012/2013 and would sell images of objects more detailed than 2 m (6 ft) across— currently the finest grain available when it comes to pictures of Israel. This capability is expected to become a bone of contention in future. All these years Israel had a support of the ‘shutter control’ policy adopted by the USA. A 1997 amendment to the US National Defence Authorisation Act bans dissemination of satellite images of Israel of a grain higher than that available from non-American commercial sources. The basic agreement was for 2-m resolution.[36] Unlike with other nations that have fielded commercial satellites which can make the imagery of Israel available with great accuracy, Israel has little leverage over Turkey. Turkey has frozen relations with Israel and has no intentions to exercise any form of ‘shutter control’ when their satellite becomes operational. The resolution of this satellite is expected to be less than a metre, and this proposed launch by Turkey is definitely making Israel uncomfortable.

Many states from West Asia are expected to confront challenges from domestic politics to socioeconomic issues to interventionist policies of the West in future. At the same time, states in the region are keen to develop economically and bring in social development in their respective countries. To put in a nutshell, the states with the region understand that space technologies have various utilities and also dual-use significance. Hence, West Asian states are found keenly working towards administering space in their development and security agenda.

Japan is one state which has been involved in undertaking interplanetary missions for many years. These missions involve robotic trips to other planets. So far they have not attempted any manned 3 interplanetary missions.[126] Japan entered into the arena of deep space missions in mid-1980s. This was the period after the beginning of space age when for the first time spacefaring nations had an opportunity to study the characteristics of a comet of significant importance which was to make its presence felt in the inner solar system. It was the most famous Halley’s Comet.[127] Japan used this opportunity to organise its deep space mission by launching two probes for studying this comet: a path finder and a main probe (MS-T5 and Planet A). Very useful information was provided by this mission; however, these probes received very less publicity at global level.

Japan has focused on studying the characteristics of the Sun for the deeper understanding and also that of our planetary system. Studying Sun is technologically challenging and scientifically important endeavour. It is the only fixed star available for any study. The knowledge about its evolution and other properties is essential to know more about the mechanisms of various processes taking place in the universe. Japan puts a major emphasis on solar studies. Till date, they have launched two satellites to unravel some of the mysteries and mechanisms of the activities taking place in the solar corona. The first satellite was launched during end August 1991, and this was followed by second satellite during 2006. The second satellite is approximately at an altitude of 680 km. Countries like the US and UK have also contributed in these missions.[128]

Japan was the first country to launch a spacecraft towards the Moon since the erstwhile USSR (Luna 24—Aug 1976). Japan’s first Moon probe Muses A[129] (the mother craft was called Hiten) was launched on January 24, 1990. This experiment

had a major learning value for the Japanese scientists. The basic purpose behind launching this dual satellite was to practise for future interplanetary spaceflights (probes to mars and asteroids). Hiten was the Earth-Moon-orbiting spacecraft and had released a small orbiter called Hagoromo into lunar orbit. Hiten was not programmed for entering lunar orbit and was to act as a relay for Hagoromo. Both the crafts were not programmed for Moon landing. Unfortunately, Hagoromo developed a technical snag (probably radio failed), and its entry into Moon’s orbit was verified only based on the observations from the optical telescope.

Because of this failure, the Japanese scientists along with NASA scientists decided to salvage this mission. It was not possible to change the Hiten’s position form the Earth’s orbit to Moon’s orbit due to fuel shortages. Hence, the route to reach the moon’s orbit was changed, and low-energy lunar transfer was carried out (it took many months). To do this, first ever aerobraking manoeuvre in deep space was carried out. Finally, Hiten was made to hit the moon. The Muses-A[130] mission gave Japan precious experience in targeting orbits and in the use of swingbys[131] to guide future spacecraft travelling to distant planets. Japan’s Kaguya space mission (2007) has been discussed in detail in another chapter of this book.

Japan also had devised an ambitious deep space mission Akatsuki (Dawn/Venus Climate Orbiter) to Venus with the aim to analyse the planet’s atmosphere. This was the first interplanetary weather satellite with a lifetime of 2 years. This 1,058- lb robotic probe was launched aboard an H-2A rocket on May 21, 2010. It was expected to reach Venus by December 2010. It was to enter an equatorial orbit around Venus stretching from just above the planet’s blanketing atmosphere to an altitude of nearly 50,000 miles. Six experiments were planned to peer deep into the planet’s atmosphere and even study surface activity [16].

Unfortunately, this mission failed to reach Venus on December 7, 2010. It was to enter orbit around the planet (an elliptical orbit ranging from 300 to 80,000 km from Venus) but the planned attempt to initiate orbit insertion operations by igniting the orbital manoeuvring engine failed (the engines fired for 3 min only when they were required to fire for 12 min period). Now, JAXA is developing plans to attempt another orbital insertion burn when the probe returns to Venus in 6 years by keeping the probe into hibernation for the time in-between [17, 18].

This was Japan’s second interplanetary mission after the Nozomi spacecraft that twice missed entering orbit around Mars after launching in 1998. Nozomi was launched during 1998 to understand more about the atmosphere around the Mars; however, the mission failed because it could not gain sufficient velocity and achieve the required orbit.

Japan also has a significant interest in asteroid mining. They had launched Hayabusa (MUSES-C) capsule on May 9, 2003 which rendezvoused with a near­Earth asteroid[132] called 25143 Itokawa in mid-September 2005. Hayabusa surveyed the asteroid surface from a distance of about 20 km. Afterwards this spacecraft moved closer to the asteroid surface and further approached it for a series of soft landings and for the purposes of collection of samples. The capsule re-entered to the Earth’s atmosphere on June 13, 2010. By October 7, 2010, it was announced by JAXA that approximately 100 particles with a size smaller than 0.001 mm were collected by the sample canister, and some of them could even be cosmic materials.[133] Presently, scientists are researching on them and have also come out with some of initial findings.

India has designed an Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) to provide itself and neighbouring countries with the position navigation and timing (PNT) service. This project has been approved by the government and may become operational by 2014. Initially, the system will have seven satellites, and the number will later go up to 11 [8]. It would be an independent seven satellite constellation built and operated by India with indigenous capability—three in GSO and four in non-GSO (inclined 29° with equatorial plane) [9]. India was expected to start launching satellites by end of 2011 with a frequency of one satellite every six months; however, it appears that some delay in happening. The IRNSS would provide an absolute position accuracy of approximately 20 m throughout India and within a 2,000-km region around it.[222]

India is developing the GPS-aided geo augmented navigation (GAGAN) system. GAGAN will be interoperable with GPS and provide greater reliability than GPS alone. GAGAN has been designed primarily for civil aviation over India and is expected to be completed in 2013. GAGAN would especially be useful in aircraft landing where a 6-m accuracy is desirable.[223] GPS services have some limitations in this regard which forced India to develop GAGAN. The IRNSS is expected to cater for the presence of GAGAN. It would be designed to maintain interoperability between GAGAN and other regional augmentations to the GPS for global navigation [9].

India had some setbacks because of the failure to launch the GSAT-4 satellite. The first GAGAN transmitter was integrated into the GSAT-4, which was part of the launch mission that failed on April 15, 2010.[224] Subsequently, the first GAGAN navigation payload was launched on May 21, 2011, on board the GSAT – 8 communications satellite. With this satellite in position now, the process of certification has begun for India’s Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and is expected to get over by June 2013.[225]

Like many other states, India is also using GPS for various operations. India had taken a keen interest in the Galileo programme too. However, after an initial commitment for investing in the programme, India appears to have dissociated itself. The EU wanted to renegotiate with India in 2007,34 but nothing significant appears

to have emerged from the deliberations. On the other hand, India’s engagement with GLONASS appears to be progressing well.

Under various pacts signed in December 2004, and subsequently, India and Russia have agreed to closely cooperate in the development of new-generation GLONASS-K navigation satellites and launch them from the Indian space centre to speed up the completion of the GLONASS system amid growing competition.[226] On Feb 26, 2011, the first GLONASS-K satellite was launched by Russia but not with India’s help. India has its own pressing needs to launch its satellites, and hence it looks unlikely that any future GLONASS satellites would be launched by India.

India and Russia also signed an agreement (Dec 2010) to share high-precision signals from the GLONASS for defence as well as civilian use. As per the agreement, Russia will provide access to the GLONASS high-precision navigation signals to India. In 2010, India has also signed deal to set up a joint venture for providing navigation and information services on the GLONASS platform.[227] During Indian prime minister’s Dec 2011 Russia visit, both the sides have expressed mutual interest in the use of Russia’s global satellite navigation system GLONASS and have also expressed the intentions to promote cooperation in this area, including joint production of satellite navigation equipment and services to civilian users.[228]

However, overall there is a less amount of clarity with regard to how India intends to benefit from both IRNSS and GLONASS when both the systems will be available at the same time and capable of doing almost the same job.

Today, the contemporary Asia’s security environment is essentially different from that of the Cold War era when Asia was considered basically a mediocre security region dominated by the influence of either the US or the erstwhile Soviet Union. In twenty-first century Asia has emerged as a hub for various global activities. The dynamics of security in Asia is more dependent on the interaction of interests and priorities of states in the region than getting dominated by the interests of major powers [3]. Asia is encountering various security challenges which fall in realm of both military and non-military threats. The direction of any regional conflict and the process of conflict resolution are having their moorings largely in regional and local dynamics. Simultaneously, most extra-regional actors are found attempting to influence the conflicts in Asia. In various cases such powers are found unable to manage the conflict but at the same time are found continuing with their efforts and not ready to surrender their interests. Because of their bilateral and multilateral relationships with some Asian states, their position to influence the conflict and dependence of few Asian states on their military strengths is not allowing their influence to wither. Also, their interests in Asian affairs to support the sustenance and growth of defence industry back home should not be disregarded. However, over last few years with overall economic growth witnessed by Asia and with the rising power status of few states in Asia their relevance in conflict resolution is getting limited. Also, in certain cases their manipulative behavior to suit their interests is becoming too obvious, making Asian states to distance themselves.

The impact of globalisation on Asia’s security calculus has been noteworthy. The nature of this impact is complex. Few parts in the region have acquired immense benefits from this process and economic development has lessened the reasons for conflict. It has been observed that the interdependence enforced by globalisation compels states to cooperate with each other. Hence, globalisation has potential to bring in the shift in the balance of power. However, it is important to note that the conflicts in the region are for varying reasons from territory to governance. Also, there are certain interstate and intrastate conflicts. Communal violence and terrorism are the major threats the region is encountering for the last few years. The region also suffers widespread environmental degradation and resource scarcity. Other security challenges from human security, food security to energy security are dominating the existing security concerns. Hence, only economic prosperity is not the solution for conflict resolution in Asia.

Security dynamics of the region is significantly influenced by the nuclear realities. Existing nuclear powers like China, Israel, India, and Pakistan; a dwarf nuclear power like North Korea; a prospective nuclear power like Iran; and a state hinted to be interested to become a nuclear power like Myanmar (Burma) reside in Asia. Also, Japan is one country in the region probably with a ‘wild card’ credentials in nuclear weapons arena. Nuclear deterrence dictates the security scenario of certain parts in the region. Also, presence or likely presence of nuclear weapons with certain states in the region is dominating the global security discourse.

Asia has witnessed some of the significant revolutions of the twenty-first century. Such revolutions have occurred, owing to various reasons—autocratic leadership, military regimes, corruption, patronage, nepotism, etc. The Jasmine Revolution during 2010-2011 started outside Asia in Tunisia but ended up playing a ‘motivating’ role in altering the political landscape of West Asia (Middle East). A major upheaval beginning in Egypt on January 25, 2011 successfully uprooted the government in power for more than 30 years. The cries for democracy become dominant in the region after the uprising in Egypt. Presently, the entire region is witnessing the agitations against mostly the autocratic regimes in the power. Part of the region is witnessing leadership vacuum, and the lack of alternative political structures is a major cause of concern. Few military leaderships of the region had shown considerable amount of restrain during the phase of uprising. However, it cannot be guaranteed that few states in the near future would not witness the re­emergence of military rule.

The major security worry of Asia attracting global attention is the Israel – Palestine conflict. This conflict could be traced back to many years in the history. This essentially a Zionist versus Arab conflict is about the claims to the area called Palestine by two parties, the Palestinians and Israel. This is more of a unique conflict which could be viewed through the prisms of interstate or intrastate conflict. There are non-state actors involved in the conflict, and various acts carried out during the conflict have been viewed as acts of terrorism.

Part of Asia has been under intense global scrutiny post the September 11, 2001 attack on the might of the sole superpower in the world. Parts of West Asia and South Asia have been at the centre of the US global war on terror. Osama bin Laden, the

most wanted fugitive of the century, was found and killed in South Asia. Asia has witnessed/is witnessing one of the major military campaigns in the recent history. The 2001 and 2003 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are (were) being fought by the extra-regional powers, mainly by invading these countries. Almost one decade has gone by since the beginning of these military campaigns, but the security situation of this region has only shown only marginal improvements. The rise of the Taliban has not remained restricted to Afghanistan alone, and Pakistan also has a Taliban operative from their soil. These forces are found fighting intense and bloody battles.

India has fought four wars since its independence in 1947. The most recent war fought by India was the Kargil conflict (May to July 1999)—it was a full – scale war. Actually, it was the battle fought to stall the infiltration of militants and Pakistani soldiers acting as militias on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC-a de facto border in India and Pakistan in the Jammu and Kashmir region). Unresolved border disputes have been the main reason for the continuation of tension between India-Pakistan and India-China. There are few other issues of differences involved amongst these states like unresolved water dispute, etc. It is important to remember that all these three powers are nuclear powers. Both India and Pakistan are found to be the victims of terrorism. However, unfortunately, Pakistan itself is using terrorism as a covert state policy to wedge a war against India.

Korean peninsula is another region of active conflict volcano. One of the major conflicts fought during the early years of the Cold War was the 1950-1953 war which divided North and South Korea near the 38th parallel. This war actually ended with an armistice rather than any official formal peace treaty agreement. For many years, a number of skirmishes are happening; however, in recent past, acts of provocation against South Korea have increased significantly. Both the Koreas were and are supported by external powers. Unfortunately, while helping the process of conflict management and conflict resolution, these powers are found using this opportunity to gain geostrategic advantage for themselves too. No solution to the problem appears to be in site.

In parts of East Asia, Southeast Asia and South China Sea region, certain old disputes are continuing. A century-old border dispute between the Cambodian – Thai people has resurfaced again since June 2008. Indonesia is fighting terrorism while the US forces are involved in assisting Philippines to tackle insurgency and terrorism. China, Vietnam and few other states are yet to resolve their disputes over a number of small islets and reefs in the South China Sea. China is witnessing unrest in the region dominated by the Uighur Muslims and also in part of Tibet Autonomous Region. The major flashpoint in the region could be the issue of Taiwan. Currently, this issue is in the semi-dormant state. This one issue has potential to affect the Sino-US security dynamics totally.

Asian states are also facing various nontraditional security challenges. Cyber warfare is one area making states in the region more responsive. Certain parts of Asia are facing ever-increasing threats from transnational crime, money laundering, fake currency business and drug trafficking. Natural disasters associated with the issues related to climate change, and public health epidemics have potential to challenge the security apparatus of the states.

For centuries many Asian states have followed a tradition of non-interventionist and non-interfering powers. The present threat matrix of Asia could alter its security environment over the next few decades. The possibility of any full-scale war amongst the powers within the region is unlikely. However, maintaining and increasing the status of military preparedness by states would remain an important instrument of policy. To maintain regional stability, militaries will play an important role, and hence, their growing importance is eminent. The dependence of these militaries on technologies is obvious.

The purpose behind analysing the security milieu over Asia over here is not to get into the micro details of Asia’s security challenges but just to undertake delineation in order to contextualise the relevance of militarisation and weaponisation of space. This becomes important mainly because the European discourse of security including space security at times takes a very idealistic position without appreciating the differences between the European and Asian security milieu. Any form of military expansion and participation in arms race by a state is essentially its response to the security environment and the same could be true in respect of space. Hence, it is essential to appreciate the security connotations of the region before contextualising space in the military realm.

The states in the region are probably looking at space at two levels: one, as an instrument for intelligence collection and an aid in communication and navigation and two, a tool for political bargain brinkmanship. The challenges for Asian states particularly in geopolitical and geo-economic theatres are different than many other regions of the world. The overall military investments made by states in Asia are based on their own threat perceptions. It is important to appreciate that space assets are viewed (also) as an instrument to enhance the military potential of a state. Space technology is all pervasive, and its dual-use nature makes it more attractive for the militaries. This technology has potential to challenge the existing notion of deterrence. Hence, investment in space for military should not be viewed with a narrow prism only as additional equipment for the armed forces, but it has a potential to bring in a modern security paradigm. Space weaponisation could also lead to the space arms race. Asian ‘military’ investments in space need to be looked at the backdrop of various above discussed realities.

Only three Asian states (Japan-China-India) have so far attempted deep space missions, and they have been discussed in detail elsewhere in this book. All these states have a definitive roadmap regarding their future Moon missions. They are preparing themselves for robotic and human landings on Moon/Mars. The USA and Russia are associating themselves with the deep space mission programmes of these states. However, the present approach of these states indicates that they are likely to pursue mostly an independent path for their Moon programme but are keen to undertake collaborative programmes for Mars missions.

The interests of these states regarding Moon range from pursuit of scientific activities, exploration of resources to establishment of human colonies. Moon missions offer them opportunities to test various technologies which could have strategic, technological and commercial relevance. Any significant success in the field of deep space could even play some role (in whatever limited form it may be) in changing the present unipolar world into one with multiple power centres.

South Korea also has plans to land a probe on Moon by 2025. However, the present scale of growth of their space programme does not offer much of confidence. By 2030, China may succeed in putting human on the Moon. Japan has plans of developing a Moon base for further planetary exploration missions. Any mission failures in this arena during next two decades could bring a significant technological setback to these states.

Space discipline has attracted the attention of many for more than six decades. I first got allured to space science and astronomy as a student of Physics. Subsequently, as a part of my profession as an aviation meteorologist over a decade and half, I was the user of space technologies. For a decade or so, while working in a policy think tank on international relations and security issues, I am trying to juxtapose the theme of strategic technologies on a security domain. This book is an attempt to contextualise these efforts to develop an explicit idea.

This book attempts to describe the current state of space programmes of various Asian states. It provides a summary of their programmes and highlights their major contributions. This work also deliberates about the strategic significance of various Asian space programmes. It is an attempt to find a connection between technology, interests, strategic relevance and power with regard to Asia’s space agenda.

I owe my gratitude to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and my previous and present Directors General Mr N S Sisodia and Dr Arvind Gupta for encouraging me to undertake research on this subject. The IDSA library, a large storehouse of information I have ever came across, made my job simpler. I would like to thank particularly Mr Pitambar Datt and Mr Mukesh Kumar Jha for all the assistance provided to me in obtaining various material and data. Over the years, I have been interacting with various policy makers and academicians both within and outside India. I am grateful to them for many useful discussions.

Lastly, my gratitude to my parents and wife Pramada and son Nipun for their support. The contents of this manuscript reflect my own personal views.

South Asia is the region of immense richness and diversity with great cultural heritage. Over centuries, it had developed trade and cultural links with the rest of the world. In the twentieth century, the region was destabilised by the cold war machinations, and in the twenty-first century, the region is facing the second Afghan War. The region is famous because of the India-Pakistan rivalry, and the US dilemma is taking Pakistan’s help to fight the global war against terrorism. In this region, mainly affected by boundary wars and internal conflicts, India is found emerging as an island of prosperity. India is the only spacefaring nation from this region. This chapter and next chapter discuss the space agendas of two important states within the region, namely, Pakistan and India.

Investments in space technologies for states like Pakistan need to be viewed at the backdrop of strategic realities of the region. Military parity with India has been an obsession of many Pakistani rulers in the past. Because of its strategic intimacy with global powers like the US and China, to an extent, Pakistan has succeeded in procuring some of state-of-the-art technologies in military hardware to match India. Presently, Pakistan has, to a certain degree, achieved missile prowess and, most importantly, a nuclear weapon possessor status. Such achievements were possible only because it could, either overtly or covertly, borrow these technologies from other states. But, at the same time, the strategic vision shown by the Pakistani leadership for ‘managing’ these technologies should be commended.

Based on current trends in acquisition of new weapon technologies by Pakistan, it could be safely concluded that it is investing in the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Interestingly, Pakistan has made limited progress in space technology field. Compared to India’s space programme, Pakistan’s space programme seems diminutive. In the present RMA era, when space is regarded as the fourth dimension of warfare, what is the Pakistan’s standing in the field of space technologies and other related technologies? This chapter attempts to address these questions. It

This chapter is an updated version (with few additions) of Ajey Lele, Pakistan’s Space Capabilities, Air Power, New Delhi, Spring 2005, pp. 129-148.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_4, © Springer India 2013

is argued that in near future Pakistan may not go all out for the development of indigenous space technologies and may depend more on joint collaborations with countries like China and also on commercially available satellite-derived products.

Pakistan has unique security considerations. It is a state which appears to be always under the perpetual threat of conflict in some form or other. The state appears to have developed somewhat lopsided security policies. It continues to suffer from terrorism within but at the same is using terrorism as tool (covertly) to address differences with its both western and eastern neighbours. Post 9/11, the most wanted global fugitive Osama bin Laden was found staying in this country for many years, and finally, the US had to launch a secret mission on Pakistani soil to eliminate him (without taking the Pakistani government into confidence). There are concerns at global levels about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. In spite of threat from terrorism within and knowing fully well that its adversary India has no territorial ambitions, still Pakistan is making significant investments in its conventional security infrastructure and also covertly developing asymmetric strategies. Because of such peculiar security milieu, this chapter attempts of undertake the analysis of Pakistan’s space programme bit differently than the treatment given in other chapters to understand the space discourse of other states within the region. This chapter attempts to understand the Pakistan’s space investments mainly at the backdrop of the defence connotations of such investments.

Southeast Asia a humid tropical region is located around the equator and also has various geographic contrasts too. Since the sixteenth century, the region has been under European and Japanese colonisation for many decades. Various countries in the region regained their independent existence approximately four to five decades ago. The region, in general, has been characterised by high economic growth and closer regional integration.

In space arena, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam have made important investments. They are mainly focusing towards the communica­tions, control of resources and educational aspects of space technologies. Varying degrees of investments are being made by these and few other states within the region mainly depending on their science and technology support and economic situation. Some of them are just in the process of starting their space programmes, while some have been making investments for long. Various states in the region are fully aware that they being the late starters they should attempt to reinvent the wheel but derive benefits from the already developed technologies. They are found using various commercially available space applications and also making an attempt to obtain dedicated satellites services for themselves by launching their own satellites with the help of other spacefaring nations. States like the USA are found helping many in the region. It has already launched satellites for Vietnam and has sealed deals with Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines backed by loan guarantees. China has promised to build and launch a communications satellite for Laos. India has helped Indonesia to launch their satellite.

Various states in the region are found making both bilateral and multilateral agreements in the space arena. Indonesia has signed the APSCO[135] (Asia-Pacific

Space Cooperation Organization) convention. States like Malaysia and the Philippines also have interest in this organisation. Following sections of this chapter offer the present status of the space programmes of the few important states within the region.

The third UN conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in 1999. During this conference, it was asserted that ‘there is a need to improve the efficiency and security of transport, search and rescue, geodesy and other activities by promoting the enhancement of, universal access to and compatibility of, space-based navigation and positioning systems’. As a reac­tion to this, in 2001 the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) established the Action Team on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) under the chairmanship of Italy and the USA. India, China, Japan and Malaysia were the action member states in this team (38 member states and 15 intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations).[229] Subsequently, the UN

along with the USA organised an international meeting on the use and applications of global navigation satellites in Vienna in December 2004. Here, West Asian states like Egypt, Syria and Turkey were also present. The meeting addressed various issues relating to the institutional framework with relating to service providers and made recommendations regarding specific global navigation satellite systems applications. The chief recommendation was for the creation of an international committee on global navigation satellite systems (ICG).[230] This committee was formed in Vienna in December 2005, and its members work on voluntary basis as part of an informal body for the purpose of promoting and cooperating on matters of mutual interest related to civil satellite-based navigation and value-added services, as well as compatibility and interoperability among the GNSS systems, while increasing their use to support sustainable development, particularly in developing countries.[231] Various meetings of ICG have been held till date—India hosted the second meeting (2007). The navigational systems of India, China and Japan are part of these arrangements. Asian states are playing their role to enhance compatibility and interoperability among current and future system providers.[232]

For more than five decades, space technologies are being used for the pur­poses of earth observation, remote sensing, space photography, surveillance and reconnaissance, navigation, communication, broadcasting, meteorology, education, astronomy and scientific experimentation. Such usage falls in the realm of ‘civilian uses of space technologies’. All such activities have become possible because of the rapid growth in the technology. The nature of data collected in twenty-first century is far more accurate than the earlier period because of the progress made in satellite resolution and contrast-matching technologies. Also, improvements in various sensor technologies have taken place over the last few years. This more accurate data availability has widened the client base. The dual-use nature of these technologies is allowing nation-states to consume them for military purposes too.

Along with the rocket science and sensor technologies, the simultaneous progress made in information technologies and information sciences has significantly helped the satellites to improve their performance. Along with this, the process of data management and interpretation has improved largely, owing to the developments in information technology. With the advent in revolution in military affairs (RMA), the importance of technologies has increased multifold for the militaries. Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveil­lance (C4ISR) systems have become central to various armed forces and have brought in various doctrinal changes. The C4ISR strategies and policies are heavily technology dependent. Such command and control systems operate on various transformative principles essentially focusing on the use of space technology for communication services and military information networking and for purposes of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.

Major technology development programmes for various nation-states would mostly have a military DNA, and the same should be the case with space programmes. However, normally it has been observed that like nuclear weapons pro­gramme, the (military) space programmes are also developed typically away from public eye. In recent years, few states are found openly discussing about the military utility of the space assets. In Asian context, various states are dependent on the major powers outside the region for technology assistance. Most of them are found abiding by various international regimes in regard to technology acquisition and transfer. They are found cooperating with the major powers in respect to the international arms control or disarmament provisions. In regard to the strategic utilisation of the space assets, various non-spacefaring states from Asia are found noncommittal. They fully understand the importance of space utilisation for influencing the warfare on earth but, because of their technological and geopolitical limitations, are not found taking any hard positions. Also, since the space security domain is still in an embryonic stage, these states are probably reluctant to take any firm positions. By doing this, they are also keeping their potential enemies guessing.

South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam are found investing in satellite resources for the purposes of communication services, television broadcasting, resource management and education. Other small states in the region also have more or less similar interests. All these states are depending on spacefaring nations to help them to provide technological assistance to manufacture satellites and also to launch them. Some of them are not making any significant investments in satellite technology but probably are directly depending on outside agencies for supply of information based on various satellite-derived products. Under such circumstances, a significant reliance of these powers on space inputs for the purposes of military use looks distant. They could receive the inputs which are openly available in the market for the military purposes. Their dependence on their own assets could be minimal mainly because their systems have been manufactured by outside powers for specific civilian purposes. They could exploit the duel-use nature of this technology like others. The threat index to these regions and investments made by them into state-of-art military hardware which is mostly dependent on satellite technology indicates that particularly states like South Korea and Pakistan must be feeling the pinch of non-availably of indigenous space architecture to operate such systems to their fullest potential.