Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

Technology development is crucial for the growth of nation-states. Globalisation has made technology central to the process of development. Technology helps to improve leaving standards, increase productivity, generate new industries and employment opportunities, and create more competitive products in world market. In general, technology is knowledge applicable to the practical problems.[3] Technol­ogy development necessitates investment from both the public and private sector. Particularly, the public sector Research and Development (R&D) has played a vital role in developing some of the key technologies of the twentieth century both globally and in Asia, including aeronautics, electronics and nuclear power.[4] It has also played a significant role in the development of space technologies. The bulk of the space technologies in various parts of world have been developed in response to the explicit and strong government support.

Technology programmes are as vulnerable to the pulls and pushes of politics as other socioeconomic programmes. The governmental stake in developing tech­nologies indirectly plays a role to decide the future of these technologies. Both political and financial backing is essential for any large-scale development of technology. It is important for the space agency managers (technocrats) to control their political environment or their programmes become its victims. It is important for them to negotiate the process of developments of technical programme with the political system. For this purposes, many a time they engage in certain metaphorical and coalition-building strategies. The metaphorical strategies allow them to garner wide public support by making a technology compatible/comparable with some overarching value that is easily understood. The strategies of coalition building also involve expression of another kind where an idea and requirement of collaborating with other states is presented to the political authorities [5, p. 64].

Developing a new technology is mostly a complicated affair, given the myriad technical uncertainties. The expense of large-scale technologies increases economic uncertainties. When a technology has government as its primary developer, a host of political uncertainties arise. This could happen mainly when various government departments are involved simultaneously in the process of technology development. Such situation at times ends up in making design of technology problematic. Also, political conflict can stop a technology from being successfully developed or, if developed, productively applied. A process of technological change is also dependent on political decision-making concerning that technology [5, p. 47].

It is important to appreciate that certain technological experimentation has faced the favour from of the world, and in certain cases, the world has overlooked few inventions. The availability of technology with one state has brought in a paradigm shift into the policies of others. The ‘Space Age’ was born with the launch of first artificial Earth satellite Sputnik by the erstwhile USSR in the autumn of 1957. The only event in recent history which can match Sputnik in general public awareness was the exploration of atom bomb in 1945 [6, p. 555]. Sputnik launch had shaken the USA’s confidence about their technology and military strength [6, p. 570].

It perhaps reversed the foundations of the post-World War II international order. ‘The launch promised imminent Soviet strategic parity, placed the US under direct military threat for the first time since 1814, triggered a quantum jump in the arms race, and undermined the calculus on which European, Chinese, and neutralist relations with the superpowers had been based. The space and missile challenge was then mediated by massive state-sponsored complexes for research and development, in the US and throughout the industrial world, into institutionalized technological revolution and, hence, accelerating social, economic, and perhaps cultural change. Space technology altered the very proportions of human power to the natural environment in a way unparalleled since the spread of the railroads’ [7, p. 1010]. This concept of having a technology which could view the Earth dispassionately from a distance brought a momentous change in both policy and scientific thinking. The idea of operating and experimenting in negligible/zero gravity was caught on by the scientific community. It probably made a major impact in regard to growth of natural sciences.

The four areas most often cited as the loci of revolutionary change in the Space Age are ‘(1) international politics (2) the political role of science and scientists (3) the relationship of the state to technological change and (4) political culture and values in nations of high technology’ [7, p. 1011]. In early years after the launch of first satellite, the growth of space technologies was rapid. During 1961, with the first human visiting the space, the USSR supremacy in this field was restated. Yuri Gagarin’s space flight came as a ‘bolt from space’ for the USA. This ‘loss of face’ forced the USA to significantly increase NASA’s budget. One positive outcome of the superpower rivalry in space was the Apollo programmes, which led to the overall development of space and rocket science. When Neil Armstrong became the first man to reach the moon, the USA believed that it had stolen a march on the USSR in the space race. It could be said that in the Cold War era, the relevance of space supremacy had social, political and scientific tenets.

In present era, the interest of various governments towards supporting any technology development is essentially dependent on its assessment about its utility mainly for socioeconomical progress. The Cold War era race was the outcome of the superpower rivalry and the investments in technology were made from the one – upmanship standpoint. In the post-Cold War era, particularly in Asian context where the developments in space technologies started much later, such compulsions were non-existent. The political support in Asian context towards the development of space sciences emerged mainly out of the social and scientific reasons. In twenty – first century, this development is also found taking place for the economic and military reasons. Also, states are attempting to find the availability of resources on the other planets, and certain space efforts are directed in that direction too.

East (Eastern) Asia is an extremely important region of Asia. Almost one fourth of the world’s human population live over here. The world’s second and third largest economies reside over here, and the region comprises of the only Asian state which is the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This chapter and following two chapters discuss the space polices of few important states within the region. This chapter highlights on the space policies of the two Koreas and Taiwan, and subsequent chapters discuss the space policies of China and Japan.

The future of two Koreas has great influence on the security landscape of the East Asian (North-east) region. For many years, the two Korean regimes are found facing both internal and external challenges and opportunities [1]. The future of Korean peninsula mainly depends on the management of internal contradictions within the North Korea and the level of their engagement with the outside world. North Korea’s approach in deciding the future of its nuclear policies would play an important role towards deciding the geopolitical and geostrategic future of the region.

In regard to North Korea, only time would tell whether the mercurial and enigmatic North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s death during Dec 2011 could lead to greater instability on the divided Korean peninsula or brighten the prospects of peace in the region. A new era of political rapprochement and economic opening could strengthen and broaden the global development partnership in the region.

The growth of science and technology in both the Koreas during last few decades could be viewed as a mixed bag of intense growth as well as stagnation and failures. The strategic requirement of both Koreas appears to have played a significant role towards deciding the trajectory for the technology development.

North Korea

North Korea is perhaps the world’s most militarised, isolated and strictly controlled communist state [2]. The state has naturally harsh terrain and experiences various natural disasters frequently. The country’s corrupt political (military) system is

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_6, 69

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unwilling to undertake any major economic reforms, and their entire focus remains to make investments in technologies of strategic significance. Albeit being viewed as an isolationist country, they have (limited) association with states like Russia and China. These states may not be called as North Korea natural allies, but they do have some influence on them. North Korea also has connections with Iran and Pakistan and over the years has looked at these states for a mutual defence technology and hardware business.

Being a state driven by military ambitions, their investments in the military hardware are significant in nature. North Korea believes that as a pariah state, they need to arm themselves ‘expansively’ to make their ‘presence’ evident regionally and bring in the element of deterrence upfront.

For last two decades, the North Korean government has promoted its nuclear and missile programmes as strong pillars of national defence and prominent symbols of scientific nationalism. This is probably because universally such military technolo­gies are being used for showcasing country’s greater scientific accomplishments. Such technologies along with space technology also become the basis of nationalis­tic pride. For North Korea investments, such programmes are representative of the national effort to build a ‘strong and prosperous country’ (kangsngdaeguk) under the political and military leadership of the country. The term kangsngdaeguk first appeared in August 1998 in reference to Kim Jong Il having provided ‘on-the – spot guidance’ in Chagang Province in February 1998 and is now established state doctrine.1

Prior to the 1980s, North Korea had a clear military advantage over South Korea, but the balance of conventional forces has turned against Pyongyang, especially after the end of the Cold War. During the famine of the mid-1990s, the North Korean leadership increasingly relied on the military to manage government affairs, and it introduced a ‘military first’ policy in 1998 to coincide with Kim Jong Il’s official rise to power. Since economic woes have made it impossible to compete with neighbours in conventional forces, Pyongyang has had a strong incentive to retain and expand its asymmetric capabilities.2 North Korea’s investment in space arena needs to be viewed at the backdrop of military influence on the policy-making practices of North Korea. As discussed elsewhere in this book, North Korean space programme is generally perceived as an offshoot of its missile programme. There is no clarity yet in regard to the future road map of North Korea’s space programme. Space programme could be useful for North Korea in some sense to expand its missile capability mainly in the medium-range missile arena. However, it could be prudent to study their space programme and missile programme as separate domains in order to have better understanding because few issues beyond missiles also demand attention.

It is important to note that the state has established the Korean Committee of Space Technology (KCST) probably sometime during 1980s and is agency responsible for various activities in space from research to satellite manufacture and launching. The agency also manages the country’s rocket launch sites.

On Sept 04, 1998, the Korean Central News Agency broadcasted a report claiming the successful launch of the first North Korean artificial satellite, Kwangmyongsong-1 (Brightstar-1). This very small satellite was launched into the orbit on Aug 31,1998. The initial claims by Russian military space forces about the success of the launch were very encouraging. On Sept 06, 1998, they confirmed that the satellite was in orbit [3], but these claims were subsequently withdrawn. Various civilian and military agencies in the world (particularly in the US) track various activities in space, and they failed to observe the presence of this satellite into the space. It is generally perceived that this was the test of North Korea’s first medium-range Taepodong 1 ballistic missile.

Including the 1998 test, till date (early 2012) North Korea has done three attempts to put satellite in the space, and as per various international assessments, none of them have succeeded. However, North Korea has made certain claims of success particularly with its 2009 test which is found tenuous.

In 2000, the North Korean authorities had unilaterally decided to observe a mora­torium in missile flight testing. However, on the occasion of the US Independence Day on July 4, 2006, North Korea had undertaken multiple missile tests (probably six in number). It has been identified that one of the liftoff was the first Taepodong – 2 rocket, perhaps topped by a satellite. The rocket was launched on a minimum energy-saving trajectory close to 41° out of the launch sit heading in a direction of the Pacific Ocean and Hawaii islands. This was a typical satellite launch trajectory. However, the launch failed after around 50 s of flight. The satellite was presumably named Kwangmyongsong-2.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea proceeded with its announced satellite launch against the increasing international pressure for not to do so. International com­munity, particularly its neighbours Japan and South Korea along with the USA, was of the opinion that this so-called satellite launch was a facet and North Korea has actual plans of testing the Taepodong-2 ICBM. It was announced by the North Korean government that an Unha-2 rocket had carried the satellite. The launch was a failure, and the rocket had landed into the Pacific Ocean.

Interestingly, North Korea had claimed that the three-stage rocket had put a satellite into space, and it was circling the Earth transmitting revolutionary songs. They had reported that their scientists and engineers have succeeded in sending satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 into orbit by way of carrier rocket Unha-2.[83] But, various agencies from South Korea, Japan, Russia and the USA declared this test as a failure. The negative impact of this test was that the North Korea withdrew from six-party talks. They cited the criticism by the US President Barack Obama about this test as a reason for their withdrawal. Obama has expressed opinion that test has violated the international norms and action must be taken against North Korea for this violation.[84]

Politics has always been at the forefront of the North Korea’s space programme. Probably, the origin of the North Korea’s space programme has not been rooted as a need for social reasons but more as a response to the South Korean space programme. Another possibility is that they could have attempted to follow the Iran model to use space agenda as a means to exhibit the missile capabilities. Particularly, during the last decade after undertaking the nuclear tests, probably North Korea appears to have become more ambitious in space arena to use it as an instrument for power projection.

Understanding the importance of engaging North Korea constructively in the past, the US administration had attempted to use the space card as one of the option. During 2000, the then President Clinton had offered a satellite launch deal in exchange for terminating their ICBM programme. However, during his first term of presidency, President Bush had dropped the idea due to verification issues [4]. In the year 2009, Russia had also shown readiness to launch North Korean communication satellites and assist its space programme.[85] Particularly after the withdrawal of North Korea from the six-party talks, now it looks unlikely that the state would accept any international assistance in this regard.

The satellite imagery assessment based on the Feb 2011 images indicates that North Korea has developed a new sophisticated satellite launch side.[86] It could serve the double purpose, either for launching a satellite or it could be turned into an ICBM facility. North Korea has also announced its intentions to undertake manned space flight and Moon mission in the future. Nonetheless, the current status of their space programme indicates that they would have to overcome many hurdles to reach that level of technology sophistication. The basic question which arises at this point in time is: ‘Is North Korea’s space agenda a mere propaganda or they have interest in reaching higher heights in space realm’ ? The answer to this question is probably both.

Since, the World War II the issue of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology has dominated the global strategic calculus. Various issues related to space regimes and nuclear regimes have mostly been linked (directly or indirectly). More so because the global security discourse has been dominated by nuclear issues for all these years the matters related to space security occasionally get debated under the nuclear shadow. Hence, it is important to examine the interconnection amongst nuclear and space issues.

Under the rubric of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China is the only Asian nuclear weapon state (NWS). However, states like India and Pakistan have demon­strated their nuclear weapon potential during 1998. Also, North Korea has tested nuclear weapons during 2006.[164] Israel is also known to have developed (but not tested) nuclear weapons during 1970s. However, Israel’s nuclear policy is of nuclear ambiguity/nuclear opacity, total non-acknowledgment and secrecy [2]. Apart from these known nuclear weapon states, few other states in the region have certain (covert) interests in investing into nuclear technology from the point of view of making a weapon. Particularly, Iran’s investments into nuclear technology for the purposes of energy are being viewed with suspect, and also some doubts are being raised about Myanmar’s nuclear intentions.

Interestingly, all nuclear weapon states (official or unofficial) are not spacefaring nations. States like Pakistan have made significant investments in the nuclear and missile arena, but in comparison their investments in space field are minimal.

North Korea has made certain claims in regard to successful launch of satellite, but their claims have been disputed. The other nuclear weapon states from the region, namely, China, India and Israel are established spacefaring nations. Few states within the region (with no nuclear weapon aspirations) also aspire to become spacefaring nations.

For understanding this interdependence in Asian context, it is important to reason it under the global settings. This is mainly because disarmament and arms control issues both in nuclear and space arena have certain commonalities, and any Asia – specific discussion needs to have the global backdrop.

Various treaties in space field actually have ‘nuclear’ origins. Majority of analyst and policy maker community since the 1940s generally never have viewed space as an ‘independent’ entity. Particularly, during Cold War period, the NWSs mostly looked for the ‘nuclear’ relevance of space technology—meaning how satellites and launch vehicles could be used effectively to carry forward the nuclear agenda. They realised that space technology could help the process of putting weapons of mass destruction in space and also testing of nuclear weapons could be undertaken in outer space. This made arms control and disarmament lobbies to work towards stopping/restricting likely ‘nuclearisation’ of outer space. Hence, various space security agendas got formulated mainly under nuclear settings.

The most prominent space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty (OST 1967), is more about restricting the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space than addressing the issues related to space. The UN Moon Treaty (1979) also emphasises that the state parties shall not put nuclear weapons on or around the trajectory of the moon. Various debates and discussion in the UN bodies like Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS-set up by the General Assembly in 1959) and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) highlight that space issues are difficult to bifurcate from nuclear issues.

Another area where space regime is being held hostage to the nuclear issues is negotiations on the FMCT (fissile material cut-off treaty). China is linking the issue of negotiations on FMCT with the PAROS [3]. China wants the conference on disarmament (CD) to negotiate both FMCT and PAROS concurrently. However, the USA opposes this idea [4]. This has prevented the CD from undertaking any serious negotiations on space issues. Overall, the Chinese position is having a bearing on the various international negotiations in space domain.

The nuclear policies of non-NPT signatory states have put them under interna­tional sanctions regime. Imposition of sanctions has denied them export of space technology too. States like India suffered technological isolation because of their nuclear policies and the nuclear testing undertaken by them during 1974 and 1998. The state had to suffer of technology apartheid, and space technology was a prominent element of such embargo. Space technology was not traded with India for many years. A particular case in point is the transfer of cryogenic technology by Russia to India. During 1992, Russia was pressurised by the then US administration in this regard because it was felt that India would use this technology for its missile programme in violation to MTCR requirements. Indian space programme has suffered significantly because of this and is yet to indigenise the cryogenic

technology. Space agenda of India has been always held hostage for nuclear matters. Only after the successful negotiation of the Indo-US nuclear deal (2005) by the year 2010/2011, the USA had removed various embargos put against India’s space agency.

Table 12.1 summarises few details of the first Moon missions of Japan, China and India.

Table 12.2 lists important sensors which are part of the Moon missions of the three Asian countries. Here, an attempt has been made to present them in a comparative fashion (as far as possible) in regard to their functions. However, it may be noted that the design approaches and designing agencies for all these sensors are different. Also, the characteristics of some sensors vary. Hence, only a partial comparison is possible.

The civilisation has mostly equated power with strength. Power could be viewed as their ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the desired outcomes. This shaping the behaviour of others could be carried out by using different instruments. It could be done by economic engagement or by attraction or by coercion. Usually, nation-states are found using carrot and stick policy to retain or increase their authority.

It would be incorrect to believe that only the conventional instruments like military or economic might be useful to acquire power. There exists a possibility that at times using these instruments could even prove counterproductive. It is possible in certain cases to get the desired outcome without tangible threats or payoffs. This process of achieving results could also be referred as ‘the second face of power’. This allows a state to achieve the desired outcomes because other states respect its

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values, follow its model and aim to reach its level of prosperity and openness. This is what the soft power is all about. It involves attracting others to crave for the results that you desire.

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. However, it involves much more than mere influencing others. It is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It involves the ability to attract, and this attraction could lead to acquiescence [2]. Soft power resources are the possessions that could create such attractions. Apart from state actors, the soft power could also be put into effect by non-state actors like major NGOs (nongovernmental organisations), MNCs (multinational corporations), various subnational entities and global institutions.

It is important to appreciate that there are various confines of the soft power. It does not allow you to take any active control of the other state or a group. It is not about ‘owning’ everything. The reasons for ‘attraction’ could vary from situation to situation and target to target. The eagerness of the recipient and his/her zeal to ‘comply’ plays an important role in this power dynamics.

There is an opinion that the concept of soft power is more theoretical in nature. It could also be argued that power is ultimately a power, and there is nothing hard or soft about it. A former New York Times columnist Leslie H. Gelb argues that there are no examples found in recent history where leaders of a country have changed their position on a major interest to them because they were persuaded to such an extent that they realised that the pursuing power had understood their interest better than they did. In reality such things just don’t happen.1

The soft power argument based on the ‘mechanism of attraction’ looks problem­atic for some. There is an opinion that the concept of attraction does not form a suitable foundation upon which to base a category of analysis [3]. It is also argued that to presume attraction as a natural force feasible or logical in the context of world politics may not be correct. Rather in the ‘context of world politics it makes far more sense to model attraction as a relationship that is constructed through representational force—a nonphysical but nevertheless coercive form of power that is exercised through language. Insofar as attraction is sociolinguistically constructed through representational force, soft power should not be understood in juxtaposition to hard power but as a continuation of it by different means’ [4].

Such critical reviews about Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power are neces­sary to take the debate further. It is important to note that Nye is not discussing about the attraction in isolation. His argument is that soft power is about the capacity to change what other countries want, and it could be connected with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. He also argues that the soft power of a country has three primary sources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policies [5, 6]. Soft power also includes the capacity to shape

international organisations and agendas. It’s not always the state, but any major industrial house or even great philosophers or actors who wield influence on the polity and population of other states could also be recognised as sources of soft power.

For any nation-state, the various foreign policy initiatives are mostly undertaken to address various foreign policy challenges. These initiatives are mainly diplomatic and economic in nature. In certain situations, states are found using military diplomacy as an instrument of policy initiative. The concept of soft power when viewed under such settings demands a nuanced debate and discussion on one of the most important but often less discussed tenets of soft power that is the role of science and technology (S&T). Limited attempts [7] have been made either by Nye’s supporters or critics to contextualise the importance of science and technology as an element of soft power projection. In general, there is an absence of debate either for or against the relevance of S&T in wielding the soft power. The criticism to Nye’s postulation has emerged mainly from the community of social scientists who have different yardsticks to judge the effect of attraction. Nye’s hypothesis of attraction argues well when looked at the backdrop of S&T as a key instrument of soft power.

In 2030/2040, Asia will continue to exhibit a rapid growth of development in the field of space. Japan, China and India will continue to be the leading Asian space powers. At global level, they would remain as tier two space powers. However, China would succeed in putting the human on Moon. India would overtake China and Japan in Mars missions.

China and India would have their own global/regional navigational systems op­erational. China-Japan-India would have much improvised remote sensing systems with state-of-the-art sensors giving day/night and all weather and all terrain im­ageries with resolutions in few centimetres. Their astronomical and environmental satellites would be fully operational. India would have fully developed the capability to put 6-8 ton satellites in the space and would be having fully matured cryogenic technology. Iran’s space programme (as missile programme) would grow further and would limit itself to use their satellite launches to demonstrate their missile capabilities.

Many rich Asians would visit space. Japan/Singapore/South Korea would have major stakes in global space tourism business, while India would be a major player in transponders. Indian satellite launching facilities would offer best economical options but would face competition from China. South Korea would be a beginner in this field.

China’s military space station would have lived its life, and based on this experience, they would have launched one more such station. China’s international space station would be under construction with participation from APSCO members as junior partners. Indian and Japanese satellites would face temporary blackouts because of jamming from unknown sources (la 2009-10 cyber attacks).

Non-nuclear Iran would make a slow but steady progress in space field and would have positioned its own satellites mainly in LEO. South Korea and Indonesia would have independent launch facilities. Many of the SE Asian states would remain dependent on regional and global powers for support of their space ambitions and would have numerically more satellites in space. Many Asian states would have more number of small (mini/micro/nano/piceo) satellites. Space would play a prominent role towards enhancing the soft power status of Japan, China and India.

Progress in science and technology (S&T) has been responsible for vast improve­ments in the physical conditions and living standards of the majority of the world’s population. In a way, technological advancement has played a major role towards the global transformation and has offered competitive advantages to the states. Progression of technology has allowed cultures to communicate with each other and learn more about each other. It has also been responsible in bringing economic interdependence which indirectly could be viewed as one of the important cause for the cessation of conflicts.[5] All this has been possible because of the social, political and economic support gathered by various fields of technology development.

In recent times, mostly after the Second World War, states have started making significant investments in technologies in various parts of the world. The same has been the story in Asian context too. States in the region have understood the significant social, economical, political and strategic advantages for acquiring and developing various new technologies. However, technology progress assessment in regards to Asia as a whole tends to present a serrated image. Particularly during the Cold War period, Japan was the only Asian country making a mark on the global level. Subsequently, few of East Asian and Southeast Asian states like China, Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines and Singapore made rapid technological developments. The level of development in technologies in states like India and Israel has also been noteworthy. At the same time, there are various other states in the region which are technologically reticent.

In overall analysis, it is very important to do a nuanced distinction amid the sci­entific and technological independence of the nation states. ‘Scientific independence

is the capacity of a country to create and sustain its own scientific institutions, traditions and programmes in the process of making significant and original con­tributions to the advancement of world science. Technological independence at the national level means national autonomy in technology acquisition and technological innovation; it is the capacity of domestic firms to forecast, assess, select, acquire or generate, and commercialize the technologies they need to create and sustain competitive advantages for themselves and self-sustaining growth for the national economy. Technological independence can be attained by a country through the adoption, imitation, learning and improvement of foreign technologies. Such tech­nological independence, however, can be easily undermined by countries that have the capacity to become technological leaders and pioneers through the continuous creation of new technologies from endogenous research and development (R&D). Hence, a country cannot sustain its technological independence unless it also has scientific independence. Technological independence that is not based on scientific independence will sooner or later be reduced to technological followership; techno­logical independence that is supported by scientific independence can develop into technological leadership’ [8].

Appreciating the limits of technological independence, the countries in Asia are found making independent efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. Few states in the region like India have undergone technological apartheid for many years for various political reasons. Particularly the decade 1995-2005 has witnessed dramatic increase in government spending by many Asian states. The research contributions by the Asian scholars working in Asian research institutes have increased multifold, and also a sharp increase in number of PhD holding scientists and engineers is on the rise [9]. Strengthening of research infrastructure of many states has also attracted the native talent back to the motherland from the Western countries. The economic instability in the West particularly after the 2008 global financial has also contributed to the process of reverse brain drain. Alternatively, understanding the economic importance of the region, developed states have started selectively tweaking their rigid technology denial positions and policies. The 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal is the case in point.

South Korea is a key US alley in East Asia. This fastest growing country is the fourth largest economy of Asia. South Korea and North Korea could be regarded as states separated at birth. Technically, South Korea is at war with North Korea for the last many years. Since its inception in 1948, North Korea has mostly be a part of the list of countries unfriendly with the USA and its allies. Over the years, North Korea has been called ‘names’ like the State Sponsor of Terrorism, Rogue State, part of Axis of Evil and even at times Outpost of Tyranny. Evaluation of South Korea’s progress or retreat in any field is mostly done by factoring the North Korean angle.

Like any other developing state, South Korea is keen to invest in space tech­nologies for its socioeconomic benefits. At the same time, appreciating the typical security circumstances they are embroiled in and the nature of investments they are doing in military hardware, it becomes obvious that space is and would be an important element of their military preparedness particularly since they are a part of a US military alliance.[87] The US militaries’ dependence on space technologies is well-known. Presently, ‘South Korea has been caught between political and historical legacies and emerging complex threats, while searching for a new strategic paradigm and operational concepts that would allow greater flexibility and adaptability under conditions of strategic uncertainty. The changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula has arguably decreased the effectiveness of South Korea’s traditional deterrence and defence strategies. In this context, their military has attempted to adapt selected US RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) concepts as a part of broader military modernization to counter the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with US forces, and eventually attain self-reliant defence posture’ [5]. Various Western, South Korean and Japanese spy agencies are using human and technical intelligence as a means to learn more about internal situation and military preparedness of this hermetic country. Today, South Korea suffers from a typical security dilemma, and this makes them to spend approximately 2.5-3 % of their GPD for the defence.

Any assessment of the South Korean investments in the space technologies needs to be carried out at the backdrop of regional geopolitical realities. Apart from the civilian and commercial benefits of space technologies, its relevance for satisfying South Korean strategic requirements needs to be appreciated. The RMA philosophy of South Korea revolves around making significant investments in the area of command, control and surveillance systems (C4ISR). Importance of space technologies (either developed indigenously or otherwise) to carry this agenda further is obvious.

In mid-September 2005, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defence announced a Defence Reform Plan designed to modernise ROK military equipment and achieve a higher level of professional military personnel. The most crucial aspect of the plan was the massive investment in battle management assets focusing on C4ISR, all of which are essential for network-centric warfare. This Defence Reform 2020 plan has mandated the acquisition of theatre operational command facilities, communication networks and military communication satellites [6].

South Korea started late in the space arena in comparison with other important space actors in the region. They started with their various activities in space arena in late 1980s. It’s interesting to note that they started ‘thinking big’ in the initial stages of development of their space programme only and announced its ambitions to work in astronautics and other space fields. During Aug 1989, the state established Satellite Technology Research Centre (SaTReC). The centre started with their associate with the Surrey Satellite Technology Limited in area of micro-satellites. Within 3 months after the creation of centre, South Korea established its national space agency called Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) [7]. The first South Korean satellite Kitsat-1 was launched on Aug 10, 1992, onboard an Ariane launcher, and satellite manufacture was facilitated by the Surrey systems.

South Korea’s first indigenously produced satellite, KOMPSAT-1, was launched in 1999 aboard a Russian-produced rocket. Since then, the KARI has launched several advanced communications, imaging and weather satellites [8]. The KARI has also been involved in the development its own rockets too. Apart from successful launching of various satellites in space (with outside support), the other notable achievement by South Korea has been to launch its first astronaut into space with Russian assistance in 2008. The biggest limitation of the South Korean space programme so far has been its inability to successfully develop its own satellite launch capability.

By the 1990s, South Korea had developed an independent capability to manu­facture solid propellant rocket motors of up to 1-ton mass. In 1990, KARI had built the first indigenous sounding rockets, flown as the KSR-I and KSR-II. In December 1997, KARI was planning the development of liquid oxygen/kerosene rocket motor for an orbital launcher, but this idea was discarded because by then the South Korean government had proposed to try to be amongst the top ten spacefaring nations by 2015 and they wanted to leapfrog the technology curve. They decided to follow the route of international collaboration for rapid progress. Hence, they engaged with Russian companies to assist in building a new space launch centre together with a large space launch modular booster. This multibillion dollar programme got underway in 2004.8

The first two attempts by South Korea with its indigenous launching system to launch satellites have failed. South Korea had launched its first space rocket during Aug 2009, but the satellite it was carrying failed to enter into its proper orbit.

South Korea’s two-stage Naro rocket had Russian liquid-fuelled first-stage while the second stage, burning a solid fuel, was produced by South Korean engineers. The rocket could place the satellite into orbit but not followed its intended course. The satellite had reached an altitude of 360 km, rather than separating at the intended 302 km. South Korean agencies had described this as a partial success/half success.[88] The second attempt during Jun 2010 was a major failure when the rocket exploded 137 s after the takeoff.[89] These two successive launch failures have put South Korea satellite programme under pressure, and they are yet to realise the dream of becoming spacefaring nation.

Even though South Korea is not able to successfully develop a launch system, still their success with satellite design and manufacture is noteworthy. Till now, they have launched 12 different satellites. From strategic context, their investments in KoreaSat are significant. This series of satellites are basically for commercial purposes (communication and broadcasting). Amongst the four satellites launches so far, KoreaSat-5 (Aug 2006) has an integrated communication system for military purposes [9]. They also have a KOMPSAT/Arirang series satellite for Earth observation purposes. All these satellites are mainly devised for civilian uses; however, their defence utility could not be ruled out. Their requirements for spy satellites or dedicated military observation satellites are obviously being met by the systems available under the US command.

Limited achievements in space arena have not deterred the South Korea from continuing ‘thinking big’. As per their Ministry of Science and Technology, they are proposing to develop a large-sized rocket capable of carrying 300 ton of freight into space by 2017. They also have plans to develop a space shuttle launching system by 2020. The state is keen to undertake missions in the deep space arena and has plans to send an unmanned probe to the Moon’s orbit in 2020 and land a probe on the Moon’s surface in 2025.11

Like any other developing state, South Korea’s space agenda also suffers from the budgetary limitations. They understand that presently there is disconnect between their ambitions and achievements. Exact reasons for their inability to successfully develop launch vehicles are difficult to identify. From the technological perspective in the business of rocket science, two consecutive failures are not desirable but definitely tolerable. For many years, the USA is having concerns about South Korea’s ballistic missile intentions. Probably, that is the reason they could be (secretly) unhappy to the South Korean inroads into rocket technology. This also could have had certain impact on the progress of South Korea in developing launcher technologies.

After making years of investments in space arena, now it is unlikely for South Korea to discard its space programme just because of few failures. They

understand that space is an integral element of a modern international power and has connotations both for national pride as well as international standing. They are also keen to exploit the economic and strategic benefits of this technology. The state is expected to quickly learn for its failures and make rapid progress in near future.

In Asian context, some states could be viewed to have taken the path of space launches to showcase their capabilities in missile arena. The missile systems particularly the ballistic missile systems are an important element of military hardware for NWSs or states with interest in developing one. Possession of a nuclear-capable missile advances the deterrence potential of the NWSs. At times, few Asian states are found undertaking space launches as a roundabout way to announce to the rest of the world about their missile capabilities.

Analogous efforts undertaken in regard to space launch vehicle and ballistic missile development are considered as a major dilemma towards judging the intensions of a state. ‘SLVs and ballistic missiles are derived from virtually identical and interchangeable technologies, and the similarities between SLVs and ballistic missiles extend from subcomponents to production facilities. SLV programmes can allow a country to test propulsion systems, stage separation, and some guidance and control technology, and provide a path to gain access to controlled, missile-related technologies and materials under the guise of peaceful space ambitions’.[165]

By 2010/2011, missile capabilities of various Asian states particularly those who are spacefaring nations have expanded significantly. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed account about the missile capabilities of various states in the region. In fact, as mentioned earlier, it really does not matter if states are using their space launcher knowledge to develop missiles because they are technically not violating any space treaty regime (since none exists!). Still the discussion on this subject merits attention because of the investments in space launch vehicles indirectly demonstrate the ability to field long-range ballistic missiles. There is a significant amount of technology commonalty in both the systems. For scientists and engineers working on either of the systems, shifting focus from space to missiles to missile to space becomes possible. This allows the state to use the expertise generated in one field to the development of other. It is also important to note that because of the apprehensions about the objectives of ballistic missile programme of few states, international sanctions have been put on them on specific occasions.

The overall politics behind missile issues has been more intriguing. Both the parties—the NPT group and the anti-NPT states—have their individual (but differing) assessments about the missile subject. The development of missile technology has mostly remained a complex task for many states mainly due to geopolitical, technological and logistical reasons. It is important to note that foreign technology has remained an important factor for various regional actors in regard to the development of their operational ballistic missile or space launch vehicle programmes [5, p. 19]. Particularly, various third-world missile or space launch vehicle programmes are mostly found developed mainly based on technology transfer or hidden purchase/ theft of technology from other states or agencies.

A basic problem in the missile field is that no comprehensive and widely agreed norms have been established which defines what is ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ in this arena. The international community is found criticising specific activities by individual countries on a case-by-case basis without any official multilateral instrument [6]. The MTCR (1987) is an informal and voluntary export control regime to limit the proliferation of missile platforms, UAVs and rocket systems. It is about controlling the design, development and testing of missiles that can deliver a payload of 500 kg or more to a range of 300 km or more. The scope of MTRC was extended in 1993 to include missiles capable of delivering WMDs. However, no restrictions on national space programme could be put as long as they do not add to the development of the delivery systems for WMDs [7] MTRC has no universal acceptability. In Asia, only Japan is a member of MTRC. States like India consider MTRC mechanism as discriminatory.

Apart from MTCR, another multilateral arms control mechanism (not under the UN authorization) is in vogue called International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)/The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC). This agreement also highlights the issue of SLV versus missiles. It demands ‘necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to SLV programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes’.[166] It also outlines few transparency measures in this connection.

Universally, there always has been assistance from the space programmes of the state to further its missile programmes (taken either overtly or covertly) and vice a versa. However, any direct evidence to link space vehicles and missiles would be hard to come in various cases, and there is a need to ‘read between the lines’ to appreciate how missile technology could have got developed in certain cases. Several states have supplemented their missile programmes by diverting knowledge and paraphernalia from the space programme. Technically, space launch vehicles (SLVs) are actually ballistic missiles used in surface to space mode. Satellites are nothing but the payloads delivered by missiles from the surface to Earth orbit. Such SLVs could be converted into ballistic missiles by adding re-entry vehicles and suitable guidance and control packages.

In Asian context, such similarities could be viewed in the programmes of Israel and India during the 1960s. In 1961, Israel launched the Shavit II multistage rocket 50 miles into the ionosphere for metrological measurement purposes. Almost, within a gap of few years, Israel was simultaneously working in space launch field as well as on its project Jericho a designation given to the Israeli short-range ballistic missiles programme. Probably, Shavit was a derivative of Jericho. India is known as the first developing country (sixth in the world) to orbit a satellite using indigenously developed rocket SLV-3 during 1980. Roughly around the same time, India started the development of Agni IRBM. Few analysts are of the opinion that this missile’s propulsion system was based on SLV-3. In regard to China, analysts note that they were successful in putting their first satellite into orbit during the 1970s and within a decade’s time possessed an ICBM capability [5, pp. 24-25]. It is also important to note that in certain cases, missile systems have been modified into space launchers (probably, Iran modified its missile Shahab-3 to blast a satellite).

In Asia, nuclear and space policies of North Korea and Iran have always been a suspect. The USA and its allies are of a firm convection that satellite launches by these states actually establish their expertise to develop long-range ballistic missile systems. There also has been a past history of technology transfer in the missile arena between North Korea and Iran. Space programmes of North Korea and Iran are being looked with suspicion for their demonstrative missile designs. However, it is important to note that both these states had entered into the missile arena much before conceptualisation of their space programmes. Hence, it could be incorrect to believe that space launches is the only option for them to display their missile prowess.

North Korea has developed a significant amount of nuclear and missile arsenal. ‘Possibly, it has deployed over 600 short-range Scud variants that can strike South Korea, and as many as 320 medium-range Nodong missiles that can strike Japan. Long-range missiles with the potential to hit the continental United States are still under development. It probably, has somewhere between 6 and 12 nuclear weapons, or at least explosive devices’.[167] Over the years, North Korea has used missile technology for the purposes of economic gains too. It has sold this technology to few states and has also cooperated with Iran to develop long-range missiles and SLVs.

It has been reported that North Korea had supplied an estimated 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran and Syria in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is also known to have exported a smaller quantity of Scuds or Scud components such as engines to Egypt, Syria, Yemen and possibly Libya. What is important from the perspective of this chapter is the sale of Nodong missiles or components to Iran and Pakistan [8].

On Aug 31, 1998, North Korea tested Taepodong space launch vehicle flying a ballistic missile trajectory (rocket meant for intercontinental ranges). It was claimed that Kwangmyngsng-1 satellite was launched by using this launcher. However, experts were of the opinion that the satellite had failed to achieve the orbit and out of three stages of the SLV only two worked. The partial success of this launch was enough to demonstrate the technical capabilities of North Korea in both space rocket and missile arena. For North Korean state, their missile programme became a national priority at par with the nuclear programme during the late 1970s. Their programme has witnessed a speedy growth particularly during the initial decade. The country initiated a multifaceted ballistic missile programme in 1975 [9]. Taepodong-1 is expected to have a range in excess of 2,000 km. North Korea has achieve partial success in respect of Taepodong-2. This missile was first tested in July 2006, and it has been reported that the missile failed in mid-flight, 35-40 s after launch.[168] However, during the second test (April 2009), the missile is reported to have travelled about 3,200 km before landing in the Pacific Ocean east of Japan. This test was declared as an SLV test by the North Korean authorities.[169] The purpose behind this could have been to tell the world (mainly the USA, Japan and South Korea) that it was not a provocative act but an attempt to launch satellites. There is no authentic information about the exact range of this missile. Theoretically, such missiles could have a range of around 10,000 km [10, pp. 179-80]. However, North Korea is yet to prove the capability of reaching such distances.

Since July 8, 1994, till very recently, Kim Jong-II was heading North Korea. He had selectively used missile issues as a bargaining strategy with international community. In the beginning of the twenty-first century (July 2000), he had offered to give up the missile programme in exchange for satellite launch services. It is understood that the symbolic importance of missiles and space launch vehicles would dissuade North Korea from abandoning its programme unconditionally. It was argued that the international community could provide data, satellite launch services or opportunities to participate in other peaceful space programmes as an alternative to the North Korea’s current missile programme.[170] However, such ideas were not taken to any logical conclusions probably because of geopolitical compulsions. Almost for a decade, the concept of limiting the North Korea’s missile programme by providing them assistance in space arena has faded away.

Interestingly, missiles have not been on the agenda in the famous six-party talks mechanism[171] to engage North Korea. In 1999, ‘North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s pledge to lift certain economic sanctions. The deal was later abandoned during the Bush Administration. In 2006, the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 barred North Korea from conducting missile-related activities. North Korea flouted this resolution with its April 2009 test of the long-range Taepodong II’ [11]. It is more or less confirmed that North Korea’s missiles could reach Japan and the surrounding US military bases. Also, the targets on the west coast of the continental USA are likely to be in the range of North Korean missiles in near future. It appears that primarily to work around the UN restrictions, North Korea is keen to undertake satellite launching.

The US administration is of the opinion that their strategy with North Korea of strategic patience has failed. This was elucidated by the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates during his Jan 2011 Asia visit (including South Korea). However, diplomacy being the best answer, it is important for the USA to take the path of negotiations to its logical conclusion. There is a need to engage North Korea and emphasise to them that states like Vietnam and Sri Lanka are in the process to develop their indigenous and peaceful space programmes and are being helped by other powers in their endeavour, and similar policy could be adopted with them also [12]. In order to resolve the North Korean impasse, one element for negotiations could be to make a satellite counteroffer (space diplomacy). Such action could help preventing a genuine nuclear threat in the future [13]. North Korea could be engaged by offering help in space arena with launch facilities and other related assistance. Russia could offer such assistance and prevail on them to give up their long-range missile programme. China has shown keenness to help North Korea to structure their economy. Knowing the strength of the Chinese space programme and the nature of influence it commands over North Korea, it could be prudent for them to engage them on space front too.

North Korea’s space ambitions conceal military aims, and same could be said about Iran too. More importantly, there exists an umbilical relationship between these two states in missile arena. North Korea has been the big brother to Iran in missile field. It has helped Iran with missiles and missile know-how and also with the supply of related hardware. Knowing the nature of relationship and commonality in the technologies, it is obvious that some interaction in space field too must have happened. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons, but Iran is (probably) sometime away from making nuclear weapons. However, it is important to note that particularly in the satellite arena, Iran has overtaken North Korea.

Albeit the country is in denial mode, still Iran’s nuclear ambitions are well – known. Particularly, the US and Israeli intelligence sources are continuously claiming that the various actions by Iran in their so-called quest for producing nuclear energy are actually leading them towards making a nuclear bomb. To carry forward this hidden agenda to a logical conclusion, it has become important for Iran to make investments in the missile field too. This Iran’s quest for missiles also indirectly supports the assessment in regard to their nuclear agenda.

Iran is in possession of missiles which could reach Israel, Turkey, the Arab Gulf States and parts of southern Russia and south-eastern Europe. In November 2008, Iran tested a solid-fuelled Sajjil missile. This system is capable of delivering a 750­kg nuclear payload over 2,500 km distance. Within a span of 1 year, two more successful Sajjil tests were carried out. During Feb 2009, Iran successfully launched a communications satellite, Omid, into orbit by using a long-range missile (Saflr rocket[172] [173]). Iran has proved its expertise in developing liquid-filled missiles such as the Shahab-3 and the Ghadr-1.11 Overall, Iran has succeeded in establishing the industrial infrastructure and technological foundations in missile and space field [14]. Iran’s ballistic missile Ghadr-110 which has better manoeuvrability is said to have a range of 2,000 km [10, p. 178] (few reports in indicate it to be 2,500­3,000 km). On Jun 15, 2011, Iran has launched a satellite named Rassad-1 by using Safir rocket. Safir-B1 rocket can carry a satellite weighing 50 kg into an elliptical orbit of 300-450 km.[174] Iran’s SLVs would be justifiably seen as an indication of potential to develop ICBMs. On the other hand, Iran would not actually need to develop an ICBM. By launching a satellite which could pass above US territory would help them to remind Washington that Iran has come of age and now has a truly global reach [15].

Iran’s efforts in this field indicate that it has successfully established an SLV programme which complements its missile development. For many years, Iran’s MTCR Category I ballistic missile programmes[175] helped it to establish a technology base which must have assessed its development of an SLV programme Safir. Currently, the Safir system is restricted to very small payloads into the orbit but has demonstrated several technical capabilities applicable to longer-range ballistic missile systems, including staging, clustering small engines and using gimballed engines[176] for control of the Saflr’s second stage. It is important to note that various technologies, required to undertake such launches, have been ‘managed’ by Iran by involving multiple layers of intermediaries and frontend companies (deceive export control officials). Probably, they are using the automotive industry as a procurement cover for the missile programmes. Another Asian country, Malaysia is feared to be serving as a procurement hub for missile-related goods and technology. ‘Companies in Malaysia repeatedly have attempted to procure a variety of aerospace-qualified electronics from the US and other MTCR Partner countries on behalf of military- and missile-related end-users in Iran’.[177]

Iran could be said to have become a prime target for MTCR regime. In 2003, restriction was put on its members in regard to the export of items supposed to be used for missile proliferation programmes, such as those at the Iranian facility producing Shahab-3 missiles. China not being a signatory to the MTCR had continued with its business with Iran. However, this became the ground for rejecting the Chinese application of joining MTRC in 2004. On its part, Iran also has obstructed every multilateral arrangement dealing with missile issues. It is the only country to have voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions in 2005 and 2008, endorsing HCoC [14]. On the 23 Dec 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1737[178] (for failure to halt uranium enrichment), prohibiting the transit of missile technology to Iran.

Other nuclear states in the region like China, India, Pakistan and Israel have well – established missile programmes. Amongst this, Pakistan not being a spacefaring nation generally does not become a part of any space-nuclear linkages debate. Israel is known to have most advanced ballistic missile programme, but there is much secrecy surrounding it. It possesses a robust medium-range missile programme and a space launch vehicle that essentially gives it ICBM capability, if it chooses to pursue that option.[179] India is developing most advanced space launch vehicle, the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV), capable of putting a 5,500-lb satellite into geostationary orbit. The British Centre for Defence and International Security Studies estimates that if the GSLV were used as a ballistic missile it would be a major ICBM, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 14,000 km. The first flight of GSLV was successfully flight tested on April 18, 2001 [16]. However, India’s GSLV programme had received setback with two failures in 2010. India is yet to become self-sufficient in regard to the production of cryogenic rocket engine; hence, the exact future of GSLV is difficult to predict.

The mission profile for all the three states involved launching of a satellite which would enter into a lunar orbit and position itself approximately around 100 km/200 km over the Moon’s surface. The sensors onboard of these satellites took various observations. The attempt was to analyse the composition of materials on and below the surface of the Moon. Idea was to know the physical properties of the Moon. Scientists wanted to know more about the terrain characteristics from the point of view of selecting future landing area for unmanned and manned missions. All this information was gathered without landing on the Moon, and the satellites were essentially used as remote sensing systems.

Japan’s Kaguya-1 mission had groupings of sensors meant for elemental distribu­tion, mineral distribution, surface and subsurface structure feature analyses, gaining environment knowledge and understanding gravitational field distribution.[239] China’s Chang’e-1 mission instruments could be roughly divided into mission groupings

like mineral distribution, Moon topography assessment and solar wind understand­ing, while India’s Chandrayaan-1 mission sensors were tasked to undertake terrain and mineralogy mapping of the Moon’s surface, look for availability of water on the Moon and understand more about lunar gravity. In a broader sense, there was much commonality in the missions of all the three states.

In the case of Kaguya-1 mission, the overall mission configuration was somewhat different from others. This Japanese mission constitutes not only of the orbiter but also two 50-kg small satellites (relay satellite and VRAD satellite: The relay satellite is known as Okina[240] and the other is Ouna) which were released by the main orbiter after it had reached lunar orbit. Relay satellite plays a role towards understanding the gravity field. Knowledge of gravity filed is essential to study the evolution of Moon. Here, four-way Doppler measurements of main orbiter by using relay satellite for far-side gravity field are taken.[241] [242] The other VRAD satellite (VLBI RADio source) contributes towards measurements transmission of radio waves which in turn contribute to the accuracy of the gravity field, especially on the lunar limb areas. The ground stations involved towards monitoring and processing the data received from the satellite include National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ) and few others.11

The missions were also tasked to photograph the Earth form their position. It is expected that these missions would gather unknown information in regard to ionosphere and aurora.