Employing the Air Force in the Taiwan Strait: Some Thoughts

As the PLA’s descriptions of amphibious landing invasion phases and scenarios are more deeply examined, considerations of employing airpower in the Taiwan Strait emerge more clearly. Reviewing all the phases of amphibious landing operations in the Taiwan Strait, we may conclude several points:

Taiwan’s purpose for employing airpower is for self-defense only, not for offense. Taiwan’s airpower forces must be employed in accordance with the agreed Taiwan defense strategy, and for the purpose of self-defense. Indeed, it may not be necessary to kill the enemy or to destroy enemy air bases, missile sites, naval ports, etc. To speak more clearly and practically, Taiwan’s purpose in employing airpower is to keep enemy forces out of its territory and lifeline. As long as the enemy does not step on Taiwan’s territory and impede its lifelines, they don’t win and Taiwan doesn’t lose, and its national security is secured. Any operations out of this scope would be a waste of resources, attrite limited assets, and could prove disastrously counterproductive. After all, national defense strategy is not about a matter of face, but about economy of force.

Taiwan must employ its airpower after the PLA initiates the first strike. To be consistent with the first point, it is impossible to apply airpower to attack the enemy prior to its first move. The reason is simple: Taiwan can’t afford the international liability of initiating the war. During the period of any preliminary operations and the embarkation phase, all targets are shielded under the PLAs layered and integrated air defense umbrella. Taiwan would need to penetrate these defenses prior to prosecuting any attacks on those radars, missile sites, and air force bases—facilities that are typically hardened or well-protected by intensive air defense firepower. It is most unwise to conduct such a mission, which would simply consume Taiwan’s airpower assets for nothing in return. Even in the name of a preemptive defense attack (such as Israel conducted in June 1967 against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan), it is unnecessary. Indeed, any Tai­wan offensive operations prior to the PLAs first raid would furnish an excuse for the PRC to invade Taiwan and thus work to legitimize the invasion.

Retaining substantial airpower is dependent upon Taiwan’s critical air assets surviving the PLAs first strike. Although it may seem counterintuitive, Taiwan’s force-structure airpower and air defense inventory prior to the PLAs first raid may not count. Instead, we need to take the PLAs preliminary opera­tions into account, considering what assets would likely remain following the opening SRBM attack. We need to deduct those which are not mobile, bomb­proof, invisible, loss-tolerable, or quickly recoverable. Frankly, sooner or later all fixed facilities will be destroyed. This means most of Taiwan’s major air – power assets will be eliminated in the opening strike, leaving its defenders with only a few sheltered aircraft, mobile radars, mobile air defense missiles, and (hopefully) some recovered runways (if the PLAs raid frequency or lack of accuracy allows this). Therefore, a mobile defense is needed to ensure Taiwan’s forces survive the PLAs missile and air strikes.

Taiwan’s limited airpower should be concentrated to a critical time and place. Avoiding attrition of Taiwan’s limited resources of airpower little by little is important. We should join the navy and army’s resources and apply airpower only at a decisive time such as during the PLAs crossing of the Strait, select­ing amphibious ships as the core targets. They are the “center of gravity,” and must be struck before personnel debarkation by joint-service antiship weap­ons employed by the joint land, sea, and air forces. There is a historical prece­dent: the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in February 1943, in which American and Australian land-based attack forces destroyed a vital Japanese convoy carry­ing troops and supplies to New Guinea, effectively dooming Japanese plans to retain control of New Guinea.

Taiwan’s should broaden its air defense by connecting all mobile radar and antiair weapons of all services. Taiwan must construct a mobile, diffuse, and widespread air defense umbrella covering point, area, and then theater air defense. It is technically workable and economically affordable. One example of this approach would be data-linking truck-mounted and sea-based radars and air-to-air missile launchers to provide air defense against follow-on PLA raids.

Taiwan should develop a multifunctional airforce using advanced aircraft, helicopters, and UAS vehicles. Taiwan requires advanced aircraft for air superi­ority especially since the PLA now has more and more new, advanced aircraft of its own. But Taiwan also needs aircraft that can take part in countersea oper­ations. In this regard, Taiwan should have some attack helicopters which can deliver antiship weapons, making a vertical take-off from a hidden point and flying at tree-top height. And it should have some small or unmanned aircraft taking off in a short distance to cruise and observe along Taiwan’s coastline to search for important targets and collect information for use in antiship opera­tions by land – and sea-based forces.

Taiwan should develop a decentralized, network-centric command and com­munication structure. Understandably, Taiwan’s command, control, communica­tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system constitutes a high-priority target for initial strikes by the PLAAF, Second Artillery, and special operations forces. Since Taiwan’s current command and communica­tion system is fixed in place (although there are some back-up systems), there is a high probability it will be quickly destroyed, thus not lasting long enough to be a significant element in Taiwan’s defensive operations. To ensure the command and communication function will survive the opening missile and air strike, Taiwan should duplicate it by decentralizing and duplicating the command and commu­nication center downward through the defense infrastructure, and possibly com­bining the military and civilian communication systems.

Taiwan’s current airpower assets should be enhanced. Airpower is inher­ently powerful, speedy, and flexible. While this is its strength for an attacker, it is also its vulnerability for a defender. In cross-strait conflict, due to the vul­nerability of runways, shelters, radars, and missile sites, there is very high risk to Taiwan’s current facilities. Taiwan should improve current facilities to with­stand future air and missile attack. This can be done in several ways: increasing the strength of runways, shelters, and other facilities likely to be raided; under­taking structural strengthening, increasing material preparedness, and practic­ing repair and recovery operations to quicken post-raid recovery and reconsti­tution;54 and researching and developing new facilities or equipment to reduce runway dependence, such as RATO (rocket-assisted take-off), catapult launch, VTOL (vertical take-off and landing), STOL (short take-off and landing), and naval-style arrested landing systems.

Taiwan should adopt a “Starfish” strategy to enhance its survivability. Star­fish usually have five or even more arms. Their multi-arms not only can tolerate more damage, but also can regenerate automatically. Once its arm is cut, the body will regenerate another arm to become a normal starfish again. Also, the separated part of the arm will regenerate to become another small starfish.55 Applying this to Taiwan’s defense system means that when some part of its force is hit by the enemy, it will not be paralyzed but will survive and fight independently if it cannot recover to its original body (unit). Taiwan should try to apply this strategy to decentralize the commanding activity to the very basic units of its organizations, equipment, facilities, or personnel, to ensure that sustainability and survivability will expand.

In conclusion, many articles study the balance of airpower across the Taiwan Strait, with a consensus that Taiwan has lost both its quality and quan­tity advantages of airpower. There is no evidence to show that the balance of airpower across the Taiwan Strait will get better in the near future. Accordingly, when facing a continually modernizing airpower projector like the PLAAF, Taiwan should become more creative and think beyond the traditional scope of airpower options. Taiwan shouldn’t limit its imagination just to airpower. It needs to prevent cross-strait conflict by any means, even those other than air – power, like political or cultural power. For example, Taiwan can create a peace­ful atmosphere by cultural power and economic power; it can construct a firm government by psychological power, and employ soft power so that the PRC has no excuses to justify an invasion. It will take joint efforts to fight this war: joint air force, navy, and army partnership will strengthen defensive airpower. Joint airpower, sea power, and land power will strengthen Taiwan’s overall defensive power. Then, joint efforts linking hard power with soft power will form smart power, ensuring everlasting peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Notes