Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

Japan’s space programme initially revolved around technology imported from the United States [9]. In 1969, Japan and the United States signed an agreement allowing the transfer of unclassified technology for launch vehicles from US firms to Japan (re-exporting of this technology was not permitted) [5]. Dependence on the US firms was found not only with the launcher technology but also in regard to some elements of satellite fabrication.

Japan’s dream of indigenous satellite development programme could not be materialised initially because of the US policies. The US administration was of the opinion that the Japanese authorities were following unfair trade practices which is bringing difficulties for the US industry to penetrate Japanese market. The three basic reasons for subsequent Japanese space ‘apartheid’ at the hands of the US could be: First, the trade sense during 1980s—the USA strongly objected to the proposed Japanese government assistance (in form of concessions) to Japanese firms in satellite development. It even threatened ‘Super 301’[118] [119] sanctions against Japan if it went ahead with its plans in this area in the 1980s. Japan buckled under to this pressure. Second, the USA got worried that if Japan starts building its own satellites, then one day eventually it could end up developing its own military infrastructure leaving the US alliance framework. Third, the USA feared that the Japanese development of surveillance satellites might compromise the US policy of greater cooperation between Japan and them towards the development of missile defence [10].

Perhaps, the formulation of US-Japan satellite procurement agreement where the Japanese Government agreed for procurement procedures for non-R&D satellites that are open, transparent and non-discriminatory has adversely impacted the growth of the Japanese satellite industry.[120] But, alternatively, it also created the work for the Japanese satellite industry mainly by offering R & D contracts. Overall, the Japanese response to US pressure was not found very strategic. Under the US pressure, Japan shifted to international cooperation, abandoning the autonomous development policy it had sought for almost 40 years [11]. For a technologically developed state like Japan, such approach has affected adversely in regard to the process of indigenisation. However, the Japanese space programme should not be viewed as a programme fully controlled by the USA. On their own, the Japanese have made attempts to follow their independent path.

The USA was almost forced to support publicly the Japan’s surveillance satellites programme when Japan announced autonomously that it would develop such capabilities. Subsequently, the USA took a stand that Japan should purchase satellites from them but later compromised with an agreement that some US-made components would be incorporated in the domestically produced system [10]. The period of 1980s saw Japan looking for more indigenisation of space programme with some dependence on the USA in regard to supply of few components. Japan could indigenously develop its own launcher (H-2) by 1994.

In 1996, a new 15-year space plan was published called Fundamental Policy of Japan’s Space Activities. This advocated the requirement for pursuing space policy by encouraging private sector interest in the space. Over the years, Japanese business people are seen interested in development of various space activities. This is demonstrated by the presence of the Federation of the Economic Organizations (Keidanren) on a council for promotion of space activities. Also, traditional strong relations between manufacturers and research institutes and universities which are partly funded by business houses have played a role towards greater coherence. Their space industry is built up upon the experience of big electronic firms of yesteryears [12].

Japan has a two-pronged approach to satellite navigation. First, to make use of the globally available US GPS System by incorporating additional features to make it more accurate and applicable for their area of interest and secondly, to develop a regional network of own satellites.

The topography and terrain of Japan does not permit the GPS signals to penetrate every portion of the country, resulting in the underperforming of the GPS system. In this nation of mountains and skyscrapers, at times the strength of signals gets depleted, and navigation systems particularly those used on the ground in various types of vehicles are found ineffective. To augment the strength of GPS, Japan has developed the MSAS (MTSAT[206] Satellite-based Augmentation System). It is essentially an overlay system for increasing the accuracy of the GPS navigation by transmitting differential information.[207] This system was conceived during the 1990s, and the first satellite MTSAT-1 was launched in 1999; however, there was a launch failure of H2 launch vehicle. The MTSAT system is designed to consist of one or two satellites, depending on the time frame and two Ground Earth Stations (GES) per MTSAT.

Finally, the first satellite in the MSAS space segment, MTSAT-1R, went into orbit in 2005. Japan launched its second Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT-2) on February 18, 2006, thus opening a new phase of precision air navigation and air traffic control (ATC) over the western Pacific Ocean. This five-ton satellite is the

heaviest ever launched by Japan and is operating in a circular geostationary orbit. The on-board transponders of this satellite offer another link for Japan’s MSAS, relaying differential GPS corrections and integrity messages to suitably equipped users. One interesting feature of this satellite is that being a multifunction satellite, first the meteorological payload of MTSAR-1R was operational for five years, and later during July 2010 meteorological payload of MTSAT-2 became prime which was earlier placed into standby mode (summer of 2006) until the end of 5 years. The system is supposed to seize off in 2015/2016.

The major beneficiaries of the MSAS are the aircraft operating on routes across the Pacific. The improved navigation accuracy and associated communication links allow the planes to operate close together along the most travelled routes. In addition to the GPS navigation data, MSAS provides data links to and from ATC control centres and facilitates the automatic transmission of aircraft locations to controllers when they are out of the range of ground-based ATC radars. In addition to the L-band GPS broadcasts, MTSAT provides voice and data communications over Ku- and Ka-band frequencies. This satellite also provides weather-related inputs.[208]

In 2000, Japanese Regional Navigation Satellite System (JRANS) concept was developed by the Japanese industry and was discussed and debated with the government representatives as well as the US government and industry personnel. Its purpose was to satisfy current and future operational requirements and assure full compatibility and interoperability with GPS.

After much deliberation during 2003, Japan has started a new project of Quasi­Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). This system consists of three satellites meant to provide a regional satellite positioning service as well as communication and broadcasting services. The configuration is such that each satellite is in three different orbit planes, which are obtained by inclining the geostationary orbit (GEO) by about 45°. At least one satellite is expected to stay around the zenith for about eight hours and would be visible with a higher elevation angle in mid-latitude area (e. g. at least 80° in Tokyo) than in case of using a satellite in GEO. This characteristic would be beneficial for large cities with several tall buildings which block the signal from satellites in GEO. This would vastly improve the satellite positioning and mobile communication services.[209]

The project is devised as a public-private partnership. The proposal is to develop a programme in a two-phase build-up of quasi-zenith (QZO), then another quasi­zenith and geostationary orbiting satellites (QZO and GEO). Phase one will have three satellites in quasi-zenith orbit, and Phase two will have four satellites in QZO andGEO [2].

Currently, Phase one of this project is underway. In QZSS, satellites are meant to orbit in a figure of eight patterns over Japan and the East Asian region. They would

be at a high elevation angle over Japan. This would make extra positioning signals available in urban Japan. The first of the QZSS satellites (known as Michibiki) was successfully launched in September 2010. The full operational status is expected by 2013.[210]

Michibiki (a name that means ‘guidance’ in Japanese) operates from an altitude of about 40,000 km. Japan has developed this satellite as a multipurpose satellite for aircraft, tsunami detection and ground traffic management. But the Michibiki alone cannot be the solution. As mentioned earlier, each satellite would be above Japan for about 8 h each day; hence, all three satellites are required for 24-h coverage.

Japan has a cooperative agreement with the USA since 1998 for use of GPS for civilian purposes. This was reviewed on January 13, 2011. During this meeting, the extent of cooperation was extended to include Japan’s Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT), Satellite-based Augmentation System (MSAS) and Quasi­Zenith Satellite Systems (QZSS).[211] Japan’s policy appears to be to develop its own regional system and also have maximum benefits from the GPS.

Space is playing a growing role in military activities across the globe. The 1991 Gulf War has played a significant role towards showcasing and popularising the relevance of space technologies in the military campaigns. Amongst the various satellites orbiting the Earth, some are being used for specific military purposes. However, almost all satellites have certain capabilities which could be exploited for security purposes in some form or other. This is possible because of the dual­use nature of technologies. Hence, civilian satellites could be optimally utilised for enhancing the war-fighting capability of the armed forces.

Various spacefaring nations from Asia have demonstrated their abilities in regard to communications, remote sensing, weather monitoring, navigation and reconnaissance. Many satellites belonging to Asian states are operational in space and are carrying out such tasks essentially for civilian purposes. All these activities could also find their place in security domain too. The various military campaigns in the twenty-first century be it Afghanistan (2001) or Iraq (2003) have suitably demonstrated the advantage the space assets offer both in tactical as well as strategic phases of war. States have used remote sensing satellite systems mainly for reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering purposes. While navigational satellites could be used for guiding weapons systems for accurate engagement of targets. Communication satellites could be effectively used for military communication purposes with due diligence. Hence, satellite systems are found getting key focus for military activities both globally and to a certain extant in Asia too. On the other hand, the antisatellite (ASAT) systems and jamming technologies are also being tested by few states (overtly and covertly), raising fears about the likely weaponisation of the space. This chapter outlines some of the investments made of Asian states towards militarisation of space. This chapter also debates the issues related to and weaponisation of space.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_13, © Springer India 2013

One of the major foci of Asian states is to develop space programmes for the purposes of socioeconomic development. Their requirements have been in areas of meteorology, communication, disaster management and remote sensing. This technology becomes a powerful tool for resources management, food security, fisheries, rural development, health care and education. Japan-China-India have achieved much of the success in all these fields and are expected to make further improvements in their existing sensor technologies. They are likely to own enhanced imaging capability in near future. With issues related to climate change taking a centre stage, the future satellites would be launched for continuous observation to

monitor global warming and climate change. In 2009, Japan launched a satellite (‘Ibuki’) for monitoring greenhouse gases around the world. India is also planning to launch by 2012 a satellite to monitor greenhouse gas emissions.12 States like China and India which have become global ‘punching bags’ on the subject of climate change would require to have own systems in space for monitoring climate change. This may also allow them to challenge false claims (if any) against them by the western world. It is important to note that space technology could help in to bring transparency in the system.

The states in Asia are presently at varying levels of proficiency regarding the use of space for broadcasting, communications, meteorology and mapping. They are found using either their homebuilt or other foreign satellites in conjunction with their own ground stations [7]. In near future, space novice Asian states would mostly depend on powers like USA, Russia, EU and China for their requirements. On the whole, for all states in Asia, satellite technology is expected to continue to play an important role as a tool for socioeconomic development. Role of technology is expected to increase significantly in the field of data monitoring for weather observations, climate change and for the purposes of disaster management.

On March 26, 1979, the historic peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed in Washington, DC. This peace treaty is considered as a watershed event in the geopolitics of West Asia. Interestingly, this peace treaty was indirectly instrumental towards founding of Israel’s space programme. After agreeing to abide by the provisions of the treaty, the Israel’s government realised that they do not have adequate technological capability to verify Egyptian compliance with the treaty regulations on the aspects like demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula. Israel was politically constrained to use reconnaissance aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) because as per the accord, they were not in a position to violate the territorial sovereignty of a now friendly neighbour. To overcome this difficulty, Israeli government approved the development of information gathering satellites and thus the space programme began.[19]

However, this does not mean that the thinking and the experimentation in the arena of space only started then. The Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities had established National Committee of Space Research (NCSR) during 1960s. Interestingly, even then Egypt was one of the reasons for Israel thinking ‘space’. On July 5, 1961, a solid two-stage sounding rocket was tested with metrological payload. One of the purposes behind this launch was to demonstrate to superiority of Israeli rocketry to the Egyptian rocketry [3, pp. 386-87]. Subsequently, almost after three decades, Israel became spacefaring nation during 1988 with the launch of Ofeq-1, a reconnaissance satellite using own launcher called Shavit. This was preceded by the formation of Israel Space Agency (ISA) in 1983 in affiliation to the Ministry of Science, Culture and Sport. Presently, the emphasis continues on building a broad space infrastructure. The space programme caters for both military

and civilian requirements. Israel’s growing space industry could be viewed as a natural outgrowth of the defence industrial infrastructure [4]. Strategic implications of the Israeli space agenda is evident from the fact that many scientists employed with the civilian space infrastructure and space industry have military sector background [5, pp. 90-6].12

Israel compared to its neighbouring Arab countries has a very small geographical extent. Israel’s relationship with most of their neighbours is not harmonious. Because of such geopolitical and geographical concerns and also because of other safety concerns, Israel can launch satellites only westwards, over the Mediterranean

[5] . For any westward launch, significant amount of energy is lost (eastward launch—the launch in the direction of the rotation of the earth is always the best option) which forces the launcher-state for various fuel and weight compromises. This puts Israel’s space programme into a huge disadvantage and severely limits po­tential operational trajectories, such as polar and equatorial orbits [3, p. 386]. Since westward launch demands production of satellites less in weight, compromises with number of sensors and life of a satellite are required to be made. Such limitations indicate that Israel has no option but to invest in small satellites.

Probably, Israel ranks fourth in the world in scientific activity. It puts Israel behind Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark in terms of the number of scientific publications per million citizens. One report mentions that Israel’s role in global scientific activity is ten times larger than its percentage of the world’s population

[6] . On the whole, Israel’s investments and achievements in science and technology have been noteworthy for many years. Various research and academic institutions in Israel has been undertaking research into space activities and related issues since the 1960s. The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities formally established the National Committee for Space Research in 1963. The Academy has observer status at the European Science Foundation. The decision to establish a separate space agency for the purposes of satellite manufacture came much later. The Israel Space Agency (ISA) was established in 1983 with a wider mandate of inclusive of the initiation of international space projects to projects of the UV telescope for astronomical observations to support various private space activities.

Israel formally pierced into the Space Age with the launch of its first satellite, Ofeq-1, from the locally built Shavit launch vehicle on September 19, 1988. Sub­sequently, during last two decades, Israel has since made significant contributions in a number of areas in space area. They have handled multiple areas including laser communication, study into embryo development and osteoporosis, monitoring pollution and mapping geology, soil and vegetation in semi-arid environments [7].

Ofeq series is a reconnaissance satellite series, and till date the last satellite launched in this series is Ofeq-9 which was launched on June 22, 2010. First three launches of this series (till Ofeq-3) were successful. Ofeq-3 was launched with an advanced electro-optical payload. This system more than doubled its expected lifespan and successfully sent images of superior quality. However, Ofeq-4 was a not

success story. This satellite encountered problems in the second stage of its January 1998 launch.[20] It burned up, affecting Israel’s satellite reconnaissance programme significantly. Ofeq-6, launched September 6, 2004, was also a failure. The launch failed due to the launcher failure: the third stage of the Shavit launcher failed.

Subsequently, Israel had asked India to launch Ofeq-8 under commercial com­mitment. This satellite was launched by the India’s PSLV launcher on January 21, 2008. This satellite called TecSAR is synthetic aperture radar satellite fitted with a large dishlike antenna to transmit and receive radar signals capable of penetrating darkness and thick clouds [8]. Israel had multiple reasons for asking India to launch this satellite. In case of the launch from the Israeli soil, the required orbit could not have been reached because of the geographical location of the Israel and their political compulsions to undertake the launch from a particular direction. Also, they were not very comfortable to use a vehicle like Shavit because of its partial success rate. Probably, the cost of launch charged by the Indian space agency is lesser than Israeli launching systems. Iran had criticised India for undertaking this commitment because Iran is convinced that this is a spy satellite directed against them.

Apart from reconnaissance satellites programme and communication satellite programme, Israel has also made investments in few other space endeavours. In early 2003, the US flight-space shuttle Columbia carried the first Israeli astronaut to the international space station where he lived for 16 days along with six other crewmembers but unfortunately could not get back to the earth because of the Columbia shuttle disaster.

Amos or AMOS is the Israeli communications satellites series developed by the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and operated by Spacecom. The latest in the series called Amos-5 was launched on December 11, 2011, by a Russian rocket. This satellite has joined the satellites Amos-2 and Amos-3 which are already operational. It is the first Israeli satellite not produced by IAI. The communications services offered by Spacecom till now were covering West Asia, Europe and the USA; however, with Amos-5 now Africa has also been covered. This is one region where largest communications market exists.[21] Amos-5 has significant commercial utility. Over 55% of Amos-5 capacity was sold before the launch to a variety of customers, including broadcasters, telecom providers, communications companies and government agencies.[22] By 2014, one to two more satellites in this series are expected to be launched. The first satellite in this series Amos-1 was launched on May 16, 1996.

EROSs (Earth Resources Observation Satellite) are the Israeli commercial earth observation satellites, designed and manufactured by the IAI, with optical payload

provided by El-Op. These satellites are owned and operated by an Israeli company, ImageSat International. The first in the series, EROS-A, launched on December 5, 2000, is the lightest commercial high-resolution imaging satellite weighing only 250 kg providing high-quality digital imaging for a wide range of commercial applications. EROS-B was launched on April 25, 2006. Work on Eros-C system has probably began in 2011 [9, 10].

It is important to note that Israel is not forwarding its space agenda by isolating itself from others and working alone. Understanding the need to have country’s stakes in an international navigation constellation, Israel has signed an agreement with the EU during July 2004 to become a partner in the Galileo project. The investments for the Israeli side are expected to be to the tune of US$30-$50 million.[23] It has also undertaken few bilateral agreements and is participating in few new multilateral initiatives. In June 1999, NASA and ISA signed an agreement to share information through NASA’s Earth Observation System Data Information System (EOSDIS). Here, ISA gets information from EOSDIS useful for weather prediction, agriculture and meteorology. From its side, Israeli universities and research institutes contribute their own Earth observation data.[24] Israel is also making attempts to expand its space development and space industry base and has signed a cooperation agreement with ESA on January 30,2011. The objective of this agreement is to allow Israel and ESA to create the framework for more intensive cooperation in ESA projects in the future.[25] Israel has also established scientific research collaboration with the Indian space agency. One on the satellite launched by India to cater for their security needs in 2008 called RISAT-2 is built by the Israel Aerospace Industries.

Israel’s space programme is also suffering from various limitations too. Some projects are found lagging behind the schedule. Projects like French-Israeli micro­satellite VENUS (based on the Israeli satellite design-proposed launch was to take place in 2008) are still incomplete. It has been reported that this project is experiencing certain difficulties because of the problems in cooperation between Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries. However, the basic reason for the slowdown of the overall space programme appears to be financial. The ISA is a very small and poor institution and has limited budgetary support. This organisation has signed various pacts with other agencies, but their future solely depends on the Israeli government’s financial backing [11]. Various Israeli officials directly or indirectly related to the space programme are of the opinion that there is a requirement to do more in this field and formulate a clear-cut policy and establish a well thought off-road map.

In sum, Israel’s space programme is a story of small but proficient programme basically an offshoot of a military initiative. The main investment in this field has been from the point view of intelligence gathering and surveillance. The state has succeeded in establishing few important international collaborators to achieve quicker progress and is also found exploiting the commercial angle of this technology. The country has concentrated more towards developing microsatellites weighing 300-400 kg and is expected to concentrate in this field in future too.

Since the beginning of its space programme, peaceful utilisation of space has been the Japanese mantra. Japan’s security forces were prohibited from involvement in space development under a strict interpretation of a 1969 parliamentary resolution limiting the use of space to peaceful purposes. However, subsequent to North Korean missile launch in 1998 into Japanese airspace, the country decided to launch few spy satellites (IGS-Intelligence Gathering Satellites) during 2003-2007. Also,

it provided the rationale for Tokyo to ramp up its participation in US missile defence [3]. But, the spy satellites have limitations in regard to its resolution in comparison with military satellites operated by other countries.[121] These Intelligence Gathering Satellites are controlled by the civilian administration. To conceal the military nature of these satellites, they are put under the control of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) within the Cabinet Intelligence Office (CRIO) [13].

Japanese policymakers started thinking differently from their 1969 spelt position about peaceful use of space by 1980s. In 1980s, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone began to push for constitutional revision calling for a ‘final settlement of accounts for postwar politics’. He also brought in major change in Japan’s space use policy (1985). It was decided that the SDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces or JSDF, also referred to as JSF or SDF) could use the civilian satellites for their requirements, and a decision towards development of Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) system was taken [14]. During 2005, a group of powerful Japanese politicians issued a report on constructing a national space strategy. This report recommended the establishment of a new decision-making structure in regard to space issues. With this came the concept of creation of a new Basic Law of Space Activities. This was born out of the need to shift the focus of space policy from technological development to applications [15].

During June 2007, considering the growing importance of the space sector in terms of industrial and military growth, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito Party submitted a bill of basic space law to the lower house of parliament demanding an amendment of the space law. It was made clear that the new basic space law will adopt the concept of ‘nonaggressiveness’, enabling military purpose applications.[122] After few deliberations the bill was finally enacted in May 2008. ‘The law says that the use and development of space should be done in accordance with the pacifist sprit of the Japanese constitution and benefit the security of Japan and the international community’.[123]

Subsequently, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development was formed within the cabinet. This is aimed at promoting the measures concerning the development and utilisation of space in a comprehensive and systematic manner. On January 15, 2009, a basic policy for space development and utilisation was formulated, and it was announced that space is important for strengthening functions of C4ISR3 in light of the emphasis of building up of defence capabilities.[124] Strategic headquarters announced the Basic Plan on Space Security on June 2, 2009. The key elements of the plan are based on the Basic Space Law and include realising a safe, secure and affluent society. It also proposes to strengthen the national security through the development of space.[125]

China’s interest in satellite navigation technology dates back to the late 1960s. It was not able to overcome the various technical difficulties in this field for many years. Also, lack of funding could have added to their difficulties. However, all this is history now. China is found systematically developing their navigational architecture in planned phases. Their approach is to possess both a regional as well as global navigational system. As of 2011, China has fully operationalised their regional system and is rapidly progressing towards building a global system.

Chinese scientists developed the ‘Twin-Star’ regional navigation theory in the mid-1980s. It was tested on two DFH-2A communications satellites in 1989. This test showed that the precision of the Twin-Star system was comparable to the publicly available signals of the United States Global Positioning System (GPS).[212] The government approval for the development satellite navigational system was granted during 1993-1994 period. China’s first regional navigational system was called Beidou or Beidou-1.

The China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) was instrumental in de­veloping the Beidou system. The system is capable of providing all-weather, two-dimensional positioning data for both military and civilian purposes. It can also undertake communication functions. The first two satellites for this system were launched during 2000, and in late 2001 the system began providing navigational support. The third satellite (backup) was launched during 2003, and the network covers a major portion of East Asia region (between longitude 70°-140° E and latitude 5°-55° N) and has been made available to civilian users since April 2004. China is only the third country in world to possess an operational space-based navigational network. The fourth satellite in this constellation was launched during 2007, and the system works at with 20 m accuracy.[213]

After successfully operationalising the Beidou system for the Chinese region (by 2007), the state began working on its more ambitious project of developing the navigational system with a global footprint. This system is known as Compass (Beidou-2) and has 35 satellites—of which five are proposed to be placed in geostationary orbit and 30 in medium Earth orbit (MEO). On Sep 19, 2012, China has launched 14th and 15th satellites for the Beidou/Compass system.[214] So far, out of these fifteen satellites, one was launched for the purposes of testing, and one satellite has drifted off its track.[215] The entire system is expected to become operational by 2020. Initially, there were some apprehensions regarding China’s Compass system, but the programme is in a good shape and making significant progress.

By Dec 2011, China has launched (declared operational) a limited positioning service of Beidou for providing services for China and ‘surrounding areas’. The system has begun providing initial positioning, navigation and timing operational services. Beijing would launch another six satellites in 2012 to expand it to most of the Asia-Pacific region. Now, the system offers its civilian users positioning information correct to the nearest 10 m, measure speeds within 0.2 m per second and provide clock synchronisation signals accurate to 0.02 millionths of a second. The Chinese military is expected to obtain more accurate data. Experts are of the opinion that Beidou could be used to target cruise missiles against Taiwan in case of requirement. It could also be used to guide drones to destroy foreign naval forces.[216] On commercial front, this system is expected offer reach dividends to China. The annual output value of China’s satellite navigation industry is estimated to reach

more than 35 billion US dollars in 2015. Already, more than 5,000 Chinese Arms and organisations are involved in the application and services of satellite.[217]

Interestingly, apart from its RNSS and GNSS programme (Beidou-1 & 2), China has also developed another less known regional navigation satellite system called CAPS (Chinese Area Positioning System). This project was initiated in 2002. It is a passive one-way system in which satellites broadcast the navigation messages and receivers are the ‘listeners’.[218] This concept is different from conventional navigational systems. Here, all the navigation-related facilities are all located on the ground from where the messages are generated. These messages are sent to the communication satellites which only act as a transponder. The CAPS constellation is not specifically launched for navigational purposes but works on bandwidth rented on commercial communications satellites. It consists of commercial geo­stationary (GEO) communication satellites and inclined geosynchronous orbit (IGSO) communication satellites. China took three years to develop a validation system for CAPS and uses four commercial GEO communication satellites.[219] Such constellation cannot provide 3D positioning because all satellites are located in orbit over the equator. The height estimate can be provided by incorporating a barometer into the receivers [3].

The Beidou-1 system became operational during 2003, however; probably, China also continues to use the GPS and GLONASS signals both for commercial and military purposes. China is also a member of the Europe’s Galileo system which unfortunately is running much behind schedule and has not lived up to its expected potential because of financial constraints [4]. Sensing an opportunity, China decided to join this programme in 2003 and committed A230 million to the project. However, the ESA made it clear that China would not get any preferential rights in this system for using it for the military purposes. It was feared that irrespective of this, China could factor Galileo in its military doctrines. Today, with China being an ‘ASAT weapon state’ it is possible to believe that it could effectively neutralise American GPS signals over the theatre of operation (say China-Taiwan – India region) while using the Galileo system.

Initially, the Galileo system was envisaged without any military role. However, during 2006, the European Union Commission articulated the importance of Galileo system (with a promised accuracy of less than a metre) for military purposes.[220] China’s intentions in space navigation from a weaponisation point of view were

discussed immediately after it joined Galileo [5]. However, it appears that China has moved beyond Galileo. There could be various reasons for this. First, the project is unduly delayed, and the financial investments in this system are worthless when a cost-benefit analysis is made. Third, the USA would continue putting pressure on the EU to minimise China’s role in this system. Fourth, China’s Compass navigational system has reduced the importance of Galileo for it.

A decade later, it appears that Chinese involvement in Galileo is more embarrass­ing than rewarding. China’s interests in Galileo had political, military and economic dimensions. Maybe China was aiming to get launch contracts (Long March booster) for launching Galileo satellites. Also, being part of the project, they expected to get a technological and scientific insight into navigational system [6]. But, with the EU deciding that China cannot be given full membership in their programme, China’s interest in the programme dwindled. Moreover, frequency overlay issues are also expected arise from time to time.

Since China is developing its own Compass system, a clash of interest with the EU constellation is inevitable. As per the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) database, 36 satellite slots have been registered for Compass: 14 in geosynchronous orbits and 22 in the medium orbits traditionally used for navigation systems. Generally, there is a tendency to register for more slots with the ITU.[221] Under ITU policy, the first country to start broadcasting in a specific frequency has priority to that frequency.29 Naturally, Compass has the advantage because of the delays in the Galileo programme. With China making rapid progress in launching satellites for Compass constellation, it is not expected to face in problems in this regard.

Apart from Compass emerging as a competitor to Galileo, it is possible that it would serve a purpose beyond navigation. It could be used for detecting nuclear explosions or for electronic or signals intelligence. It has been argued by some that the Compass satellites will have so much extra power on board that they could be used as space-based jammers and could even target Galileo apart from GPS [7]. For China, the military utility of Compass is undisputed. Initially, China’s joining of Galileo was a win-win for both parties. It allowed the EU to snub the USA and get economic backing for the project. It was important for China too because it demonstrated the acceptance of China’s geopolitical, technological and economic might by the international community. However, the delay in the Galileo programme has changed the situation.

It is important to recognise the fine distinction between the terminologies militarisa­tion and weaponisation of space before beginning any further discussion. Identifying this difference is more important because at times it has been observed that some use the word militarisation interchangeably with weaponisation. It is also viewed by few that ‘militarisation’ of space is an imprecise phrase. This is because space has been militarised for decades. For many years, satellites have been used for intelligence gathering, and ballistic missiles are flying through space. Some bracket these issues and issues like killing satellites by using kinetic weapons together as the militarisation of space. At times, this also involves putting weapons in space which could be used for targets on Earth [1]. There are few nonlethal ways of targeting satellites by using jamming techniques. Also, it is very difficult to really define the space weapons. No universally accepted definition is available in this regard. Generally, it is perceived that space weapons are the devices which could damage or obstruct the functioning of any space system. However, the dynamic nature of technology and rapid developments happening in space realm are making it difficult to define the space weapons. Various technologies used for civilian purposes could be misused as weapons too. For example, a micro – or a nano-satellite could be converted into a space mine. The systems developed for the purposes of missile defence could be reconfigured for attacking satellites. All this clearly indicates that the term militarisation of the space, if made all inclusive, will have limitations in regard to clearly confirming the actual purpose behind any act. This demands a nuanced distinction to recognise the intent.

The term militarisation of space means ‘the use of assets based in space to enhance the military effectiveness of conventional forces or the use of space assets for military purposes. The military purposes of space expected to include communications, electronic intelligence, photoreconnaissance, meteorology, early warning, navigation and weapons guidance. The militarization of space is distinct from the weaponisation of space. It is defined as either weapons based in space or weapons based on ground with their intended targets being located in space’ [2].

Various other chapters in this part of the book have mostly followed the structure which essentially revolves around discussing the country-specific investments in various arenas of space technologies. However, it is important to appreciate while discussing the military utility of space assets that, for the purposes of military use, it is not necessary to own satellite systems in space and/or on ground. A state could acquire the required inputs either by purchasing data from the commercial satellite agencies or under bilateral/multilateral agreement a spacefaring nation could share it with them. Also, it is important to appreciate that the information gathered by using satellite technologies for peaceful purposes or for defensive purposes could also find utility for the military purposes depending upon the nature of data gathered and type of military requirement. It is obvious that the satellites meant for communication, remote sensing and navigation will have certain military usages. These are essentially dual-use systems. No detail discussion of such systems is done in this chapter. The basic intend of this chapter is to identify the space systems which are predominantly designed for the military usages. However, certain overlap with the civilian systems looks obvious because few states in the region are not open about identifying certain satellite systems in their possession as military-specific systems. They are designating them as civilian systems but their military-specific utility is becoming far too obvious.

As mentioned frequently in this book there are three major space powers in Asia having significant investments made in civilian space sector. Few other powers in the region could be termed as promising players with major futuristic plans. For states like Israel which is not a part of big three troika also uses satellite technology for military purposes. Few non-spacefaring states with the region also use satellite technology of strategic purposes. For few states in the region security threats are so overarching that they are not left with any option but to depend of multiple methods for handling these threats and space technologies become one of the sought-after option. Hence, before deliberating the militarisation and weaponisation policies of the states in the region, it is important to contextualise the threat perceptions of the states within the region and the dependence and requirement of space technologies for this purpose.

Missiles and space launch vehicles belong to the family of basic rocket technologies. In yesteryears, the US space launchers were developed from missiles. The basic difference between these two different genre of missiles arise from the goal of placing a nuclear weapon payload in a ballistic (i. e. reentering) trajectory, versus placing a satellite payload in orbit. Launch trajectory, size and number of stages all have a role in distinguishing the two different uses [8]. The capability to launch a satellite indirectly demonstrates the potential of a state to develop a missile. Certain states that are under constant international scanner due to their defiance of certain global nonproliferation/arms control norms find it difficult to conduct missile testing to prove their prowess and hence follow a ‘satellite launching’ route. A detailed discussion regarding this issue has been done elsewhere in this book.

Today, almost half of global nuclear weapon powers (within and outside NPT) are from Asia. Suitable delivery platform for launching of a nuclear weapon is a prerequisite for establishment of any nuclear force. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is an important component of any nuclear weapon architecture, globally. In Asia, nuclear-capable countries like China, India and Pakistan already have a reasonably well-developed missile infrastructure. Amongst them, China has proven ICBM capability (Dong Feng). There have been unconfirmed reports that India plans to develop the 8,000-km range ICBM called Surya. India has successfully tested 5,000-km range Agni-V (the strike envelope is whole of Asia, 70% of Europe

and other regions) missile during April 2012. North Korea has unsuccessfully test fired a missile called Taepodong-2 in 2006 with a range of around 4-4,500 kms. States like Japan have an active commercial space launch programme and hence have technology ‘available’ which could provide the basis for a long-range ballistic missile programme.

Currently, Iran and North Korea are being viewed as states using satellite programme as a frontage for their missile ambitions. North Korea has already conducted nuclear tests, and Iran could be on its way. Hence, the space programmes of these states are being viewed with suspicion. However, it could be inaccurate to dismiss their space programme only as a front end for missile testing.

In 1959, Tehran became a founding member of the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). In initial years, Iranian political leadership viewed space technology as a tool to improve their political, social and economic standing. Leaders like Rafsanjani and Khatami wanted to modernise the country. Khatami issued various reforms to modernise the country to include reinvigorating efforts for the nation to become more active in space. He gave the country a vision of becoming a space power as a vehicle for modernity [9]. Its space programme began in 1998 [10] with a stated aim to use this technology for socioeconomic development. During February 2009, Iran successfully launched its first domestically produced satellite using indigenously built rocket launcher. They have also another satellite during February 2012. North Korea did a launch during April 2009. However, in spite their claims of success, there is no evidence available to corroborate their claim. Indonesia is also interested in launching its own satellite with own launcher. Its space agency Lapan, set up in 1964, is collaborating with the military to develop more efficient rockets. Few years back, they have inked a formal technology transfer agreement with China (2005) for the development of missiles [7]. Space programmes of these states are being viewed with some suspicion for their missile ambitions.

Another reason to doubt the intentions of Iran and North Korea is because undertaking unimpeded space launch is possible only if the state’s geography offers it that luxury and that is not the case with these states. Geography puts major compulsions on Iran to undertake any launches. It is surrounded by states both on its western and eastern border which are unlikely to grant over flight permissions to their launches. Even with friendly states in north, Iran cannot evade the issues of liability and public and environmental safety. Only possibility of undertaking safe launches (not 100%) could be from region close to Chah Bahar [11]. If this be the case then why is Iran interested in developing launch vehicle technology? Is it in support of their increasing nuclear ambitions? North Korea also faces similar challenges. The best option for both of them could be to have cordial relations with other states that can provide them launching facilities.

By and large, Iran and North Korea needs ‘fake’ satellite launches to develop their own missile programme. On the other hand, both the states understand that satellite technology in itself is important for socioeconomic development and also has military utility. Hence, these states are likely to continue investing in both satellite manufacturing as well as launcher technologies with more bias towards missile-specific technologies. China and Russia could help North Korea to satisfy its genuine requirement of having access to space. North Korea’s space ambitions could be used as a tool to engage that state in the post-Kim Jong-il era. A regime change in Iran could bring a possibility of third party interlocutors-under such scenario India could play a role towards helping Iran to launch its satellites (presently India is avoiding such requests from Iran).