MIRV

A multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology is a set of nuclear weapons carried on a single missile (intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic missile). MIRV or multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV)[189] allow striking several targets in a single launch. This system is designed in such a fashion that the damage caused by several small warheads amounts much more than the damage caused by a single warhead. During the launch, the main rocket of this system pushes the set of warheads up in the atmosphere at different intervals. Each warhead can engage a separate target. Such missiles are multistage missiles where during its ballistic path every stage gets separated at a predetermined time after the launch. Along with every stage, one or more warheads get fired. A four-stage missile could fire eight to ten warheads on the targets. The post-boost vehicle which separates from the missile prepares for re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere. During all these manoeuvres, warheads get fired after a gap of few seconds at pre-identified targets. The exact technology of firing sequence and how it actually happens has, for obvious reasons, always been kept a secret by states possessing this technology.

MIRV technology is not a new technology. Rather it is a technology of the 1960s and was first developed by the USA, followed by the USSR. It is not the purpose over here to discuss the details of MRIV technology. The idea is to bring to the fore its impact on the space domain. Here, parallels could be drawn with the technology developed and demonstrated by few Asian states when a single SLV is used for undertaking multiple satellite launches. There have been cases where a state has launched around eight to ten satellites in one go. The satellites launched by single SLV are positioned in different orbits in space, while in case of MIRV, the warheads re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere and fire on the target. The other major difference is that a missile requires far greater accuracy. An SLV could afford putting a satellite into the orbit a kilometre higher or lower than planned. However, each warhead in MIRV should impact within 40 m of its target [20]. Hence, in overall analysis, the capability to undertake multiple satellite launches with a single rocket indirectly demonstrates a partial MIRV capabilities.

In Asia, China is believed to have achieved significant MIRV connected capa­bilities. In an attempt to safeguard its second strike capability, China is expected to have a programme to develop MRV/MIRV technology.

China has probably started its work towards development of MRV/MIRV technology in the early 1980s. During Sep 1981, China successfully delivered three satellites with one launch vehicle: two satellites were delivered in the nose cone and one was delivered during stage separation. This event may have been China’s first foray into the area of MRV/MIRV development. China’s MIRV development is further supported by a classified 1996 Air Force National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) report which states that China has designed an upper rocket stage called the ‘Smart Dispenser’ (SD) for a new space launch vehicle ‘for the purpose of accurate and simultaneous deployment in orbit of two US-made iridium mobile telecommunications satellites’. The report concluded that ‘a minimally modified SD stage could be used to deploy multiple re-entry vehicles (RVs)’ and that ‘the SD stage can be considered a ‘technology bridge’ to a viable post-boost vehicle (PBV)’. The SD could be modified for use on DF-4 and DF-5.[190] They are known to have tested this technology during Dec 2002. However, it may be noted that China need not take a satellite launch route to test and demonstrated its MIRV capabilities.

Some unconfirmed reports have stated that as per a Japanese source probably China has successfully conducted the MIRV test on December 2002 using Dong-Feng 31 missile. This is apparently the first Chinese success of the MIRV missile test.

India appears to have interest in MIRV technology too. There have been statements from the DRDO during 2008 to that effect. Agni-III and its future variants, with a diameter of 2 m, will be the first Indian missiles having the potential to be equipped with MIRV.[191] Over the last few years, India has also undertaken few single SLV multiple satellite launches. One such significant launch was carried out by the four-stage vehicle PSLV-C9 on Apr 28, 2008. In this single launch, total ten satellites were successfully released. The total weight was about 820 kg with two main satellites weighing 690 and 83 kg, respectively. Rest eight were nano satellites.[192] Japan also has launch vehicles like H-II (a two-stage rocket) which could launch simultaneously two geostationary satellites weighing about 1 ton each.[193] However, since the state has no interests in the nuclear arena (till date!), developing such launch vehicle technologies could not be viewed as counterfeit to MIRV intentions.

Assessment

Reaching outer space by launching satellites has got direct military connotations because the launch technology in regard to satellites could be easily translated into ballistic missile technology. And this is one of the reasons for limited international cooperation in this field. Various arms control regimes and other legal structures like Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in regard to transfer of technology have influenced the international space technology cooperation for many years. The concerns in regard to the attempts of satellite launch by Iran and North Korea have originated because of the ‘ballistic missile DNA’ of the satellite launch technology.

SLVs have linkages with missile delivery systems which are natural extensions of nuclear weapon programmes. All NWSs outside NPT are from Asia. For many years, this region has been the centre of gravity of global nuclear discourse. For all these years, issues related to space security have mostly remained subservient to nuclear policies. Few states in Asia are using space activities as a cover to demonstrate their nuclear/missile intentions. All such activities make nuclear and missile issues play a central role in various multilateral space deliberations.

Unfortunately, there is no globally accepted multilateral regime in missiles arena; hence, missile testing could go unchallenged if a state decides to do so. MTCR has been not able to prevent covert missile trade. In the past, big powers were successful to stall the genuine space aspirations of state like India by denying the cryogenic technologies by using the MTCR boggy, while on the other hand, the proliferation did take place in case of Pakistan and North Korea.

Space also plays a fundamental role in the multilateral missile defence debate because of its unique legal status. Missile defence capability also allows the state to develop/strengthen their ASAT capability. The Indian investments in this field and their goal to accommodate ASAT under this architecture will have regional implications. Also, various claims made by states like North Korea and Iran should be checked for authenticity, and cases of self-glorification needs be verified. At the same time, missile development should not be viewed as the only reason for states like North Korea and Iran to invest in space technologies. Doing a satellite launch would help them to expand their scientific trajectory, bring socioeconomic advantages and enhance prestige. Particularly, Iran’s space programme demon­strates a will to do more in this field and hence should not be bracketed as a rouge programme.

In years to come, the process of establishment of any international space regime would have to muddle through the nuclear and missile realities. The real challenge would be to establish a balance and realise strong and globally accepted space security architecture.