China’s Soft (Space) Power Persuade

State’s interests are normally shaped by its power calculus. China is a rising power both economically and militarily. To a great extent, the much debated ‘rise of China’ has already taken place. At the same time, China suffers from an ‘image deficit’. The reasons for this could be many, from communism to human rights violations

to supporting states with dubious records to dismal arms control, disarmament policies, etc. In the arena of technology development, China is normally blamed for their covert policies of reverse engineering. However, since the last few years, China is gaining acceptance as a major, respected and even at times an envied actor in international arena. It is actively pursuing multilateral approaches for trade and investments. It is building up new security relationships. China as a state and society is in a position to influence foreign investments. China’s charm offensive in Asia, Africa and Latin America has resulted in providing major benefits to the state. At the same time, concerns have been expressed by few about the nature and manner in which China’s developmental plans are progressing. In general, various surveys conducted in many countries particularly after 2000 suggest that majority in most countries seem to have favourable view of growing China [14]. Such surveys are found offering similar results both in the Western world and amongst Asian states.

Analysts and thinker communities have provided various arguments (differing at times) about the future of the rising power. China is viewed by some as a threat to status quo power and regional peace and stability. It is important to note that just because the rise of China is a reality (peaceful or otherwise?), it does not qualify to emerge as a threat to international system. Any perception-based analysis in this regard could offer erroneous conclusions.

China’s official stance about its developmental policies is that of a peaceful growth and to avoid confrontation. However, Robert Kagan an American historian and foreign policy commentator argues that China will become a threat to the West because it is positioning itself as a ‘political power’ in the international arena. Such actions follow a pattern established by other states who have sought to challenge global powers throughout modern history [15]. Mostly, the rising powers have traditionally been considered as revisionist powers in realist international relations theories. However, it is not necessary that rising China’s foreign policy should hold such conventional wisdom [16]. For China to achieve the great power status, it is important to look beyond undertaking military modernisation and conducting economic offensive. If they have to ‘manage’ the maximum redistribution of power presently concentrated in the hands of few developed powers, then they have to make themselves more relevant globally. They will have to attempt for a new order by engaging various states. It could be done by engaging such powers on diplomatic, cultural and science and technology front. This is what soft power is all about.

The idea of soft power is not new to China; maybe the expressions used to describe it in the past were a bit different. Since the era of Sun Zi (544-496 BC) and Mo Zi (470-390 BC), idealism has provided a counterpoint to realism. Confucianism advocates that a state should obtain its leadership status by setting an example and by opposing imposition of one’s values on others. The idea of ‘culture winning over enemy’ and ‘winning a battle before it is fought’ does find references in ancient China’s strategic culture. In recent times after 1990s, with Joseph Nye’s formulation of soft power formulation and possibility at the backdrop of the global reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown 1989, Chinese scholars and policymakers are found engaged in studying the concept of soft power and identifying its relevance for the state [16, pp. 262-264] . Slowly, political and military leadership is found contextualising this concept under the Chinese settings. In his speech at the 17th CPC Congress (2007), President Hu Jintao called for enhancing culture as part of soft power [17]. While formulating the China’s International Status Report 2005, for the first time, the strengthening of soft power was used as one of the criteria to estimate China’s national power. It was observed that in the year 2004 China’s soft power had increased because of the new attempts at institutional building. The Chinese could be viewed to have started appreciating the importance of soft power theory in their framework particularly after the induction of the peaceful rise theory in 2003 and the Beijing Consensus in 2004.2

It’s important to note that at international level, there has been significant amount of debate in regard to China’s soft power potential. The 2007 World Economic Forum held in Dalian, a coastal city in China’s Liaoning Province, addressed the issue of China’s soft power. The then Australian Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd presented Joshua Kurlantzick’s book Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World to the US President George W. Bush to remind him ‘why the US has been losing influence.’ The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) had conducted two comprehensive studies on China’s soft power influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the first half of 2008 [18].

The increasing Chinese influence in the region and also in various others of the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century is indicative of the fact that the Chinese policies have grown beyond coercion. Today, China is a state with considerable soft power resources. Its soft power is increasing in respect of its resources in areas of culture, political value and diplomacy. China is yet to fully translate these resources successfully in desired foreign-policy outcomes. Nevertheless, such resources are also growing simultaneously [19]. Technology is one such area. Interestingly, in the Chinese understating the realm of S&T is not strictly compartmentalised as soft power. Party Chief and President Hu Jintao, for instance, noted at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on Jan 4, 2006, that the increase of China’s international status and influence depends both on hard power, such as the economy, S&T and defence, and on soft power, such as culture [18]. However, science and technology as a source could be viewed to have different tenets. When viewed with the prism of its importance of defence, it could be argued to have the shades of hard power, but when approach is to contrast [313] [314]

its importance as a tool in socioeconomic development, it could be viewed as an element of soft power, for example, any technological pursuit undertaken in the field of green technologies or disaster management technologies.

Post 2008, there has been a debate in regard to China’s hosting of Beijing Olympic Games as a strategy to increase its soft power status. This single event has contributed significantly towards the world forming a positive opinion about the contemporary China. Similarly, China’s investments in space arena and the significant success achieved by them particularly post 2000 have contributed significantly towards enhancing its prestige in the world. Olympic was the singular event while space is an area for continuous progression. Since the beginning of the space era in 1957, the USA and the erstwhile USSR (now Russia) have been viewed as the space superpowers. Now, China is making its presence felt in this field. Achievements like sending human missions to space, astronauts undertaking spacewalk and launching of a space station are unique acts only performed by the USA and Russia in the past but not any longer with China doing the same. Recently, China has also undertaken two Moon missions and has major plans of undertaking first unmanned and later manned Moon landings and also a mission to Mars. All these activities put China in a coveted category in space field.

China has identified investments in space technologies as one of the key areas of its focus. For China, such investment is important for various reasons in addition to technological and socioeconomical benefits. It offers strategic advantages and binds the people with the sense of nationalism. Over the years, China has earned a reputation of supplier of cheap technology lacking in quality and with a limited life span. A notion has emerged that they are the producers of low-technology and low-value items. It is important for China to change this image and make the correct projection of their success by displaying their space achievements. Such ‘image makeover’ is essential to attract business. Largely, it would also help them to ascertain their soft power credentials.

To contextualise the significance of space technologies from a soft power perspective, it’s important to identify the overall Chinese interests in various regions of the world. Knowledge of such interests could help appreciate the need for adopting soft power approach by China. This could further help for realising why space is being used as one of the sources for soft power wielding.

Chinese soft power is a relatively new concept in Chinese foreign policy [20]. Beijing has been promoting this idea at various levels and attempting to create an atmosphere to exhibit their interest in varying fields from culture, development and trade to energy and sports. As a key player on the world geopolitical vista, China is developing its ‘soft’ credentials in various parts of the world.

Chinese presence in Africa is illustrative of Beijing’s efforts to create a paradigm of globalisation in their favour. China’s political-economic bilateral goals and rela­tions in Africa are enumerated in an official 2006 document titled China’s African Policy.3 China proposes to develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa. It [315] outlines need for high-level reciprocal leadership visits and economic collaboration. Economic assistant, technological cooperation and supporting agriculture are the key features of this relationship. Apart from various other issues like culture and health assistance, the document also seeks increased science and technology cooperation.[316] On geopolitical front, China has undertaken a diplomatic offensive to peruse one China policy and deny Taiwan any international recognition. Their international assistance and aid policies have a subtext of their Taiwan policies. For example, China’s deployment of 90 peacekeepers to Liberia in Dec 2003 occurred 2 months after Liberia switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. It is important to note that Chinese technical aid to Africa is becoming increasingly important in building China’s influence in the region. Beijing prefers technical support over financial aid because such support has a chance at providing returns (sale-purchase of technology) than direct aid and loan programmes [21].

Latin America is another geographical region where China is found making investments. In recent past, China began the engagement policy with the Apr 2001 President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day tour of Latin America. Here the strategies are twofold: first is economic, to secure access to the primary materials that are required for its economic growth and to find a market for its manufactured goods. The second is a political strategy: to obtain diplomatic recognition from those countries still recognising Taiwan as the government of China. This region is important for China to gain greater access to resources—like various ores, soybeans, copper, iron and steel and oil—through increased trade and investment.[317]

The most successful Chinese investment in Latin America has been that of Brazil. Their engagement with Brazil has withstood the test of time. In 1988, the China – Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS) programme was conceptualised. Under this programme, three CBERS multispectral, high-resolution satellites have been launched from China. Here sensors are specifically designed from the point of view of gaining inputs for the management of the Earth resources, forests, geology and hydrology. The cooperation between the two countries has showed an authentic effort, from both sides, to break down the developed countries’ prejudice against advanced technology transfer [22].

China is also engaging states much closer to home. East Asia and North-east and Southeast Asia are the regions of (major) interest to China. China is employing a broadly peaceful strategy motivated by the domestic concerns and with a desire to project soft power characterised by a vague, subconscious, Confucian conception of

a Chinese world order. It has sought to project soft power by offering economic assistance to developing countries [23]. China’s growing influence (soft power) in Southeast Asia is largely economic (China is a major source of foreign aid), trade and investment.[318] It is also important to note that the region also constitutes of developed states like Japan and South Korea. Here economic assistance could not become a Chinese soft power trump card, and diplomacy has a larger role to play. Japan is a state which China has to deal more cautiously due to certain geopolitical compulsions. Also, in regard to technology transfer, not much of scope exits with Japan. Here S&T may not become a major factor for development of relationship, but initiatives like joint collaborations could help the improvement of relationship.

In all the regions discussed above, China is found making significant investments in space arena. The purpose over here is not to discuss the micro details of such investments but to flag them in order to make the larger point that space has become an instrument for China’s soft power projections. Presently, China is positioning itself as a space patron to the developing world—the same countries in some cases, whose natural resources China covets. China is helping Nigeria and Venezuela with their satellite programme. It is also developing an earth observation satellite system with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand [24, 25].

Chinese investments in Nigeria’s space programme need critical analysis. During May 2007, China launched a US$300 million communications satellite for Nigeria called the NigComStat-1. This launch is an expression of how China is establishing itself as a space benefactor to the developing world. It is intelligently using outer space as an arena for spreading its influence. This satellite was designed and constructed by Chinese engineers. A space industry from China is monitoring the satellite from China and also training Nigerian engineers to operate a tracking station in Nigeria. Above all to help pay for the satellite, China has loaned Nigeria US$200 million in preferential buyer’s credits. It is important to note that China provides Africa with economic and financial assistance. It is involved in building of roads, hospitals and airports, and in return, Africa is happy to sell oil and other commodities to China. China is using space also as a component to enhance this assistance.[319]

Unfortunately, the NigComStat-1 project has not progressed as planned. China had to face a failure with the NigComStat-1 within 1 year after its launch. During Nov 2008, this satellite was switched off since it lost both of its solar arrays [26]. This satellite was meant to function of a minimum of 15 years. In order to keep its ongoing partnership with Nigeria intact, China had promised to

launch a replacement satellite.[320] China fulfilled its promise by launching Nigerian Communication Satellite-1R during Dec 2011. This is bound to strengthen the relationship between both the countries further. This would also help to project China as a reliable partner and also keep their space prestige intact.

Under an agreement signed in Nov 2005, a Chinese industry was to de­sign, manufacture, test and put into orbit the VENESAT-1 (DFH-4 satellite) for Venezuela. This satellite having utility for telecommunication and education needs was launched by China in 2008 and is reported to be in good health.[321] The exact pattern of investment is not known; however, the investment is expected to be around US$400 m. China has also agreed to build and launch a communications satellite for Laos and to build a satellite control centre. An agreement to this effect was signed during Sep 2009. The Dongfang Hong (The East is Red) model satellite would be launched by a Long March rocket. No date for this launch has been finalised yet.10 To improve communication in rural areas and boost indigenous pride, Bolivia has decided to take help from China for its first satellite launch, expected to take place by 2013. Bolivia hopes China will cover most of the estimated $300 m costs. It will also seek donations and loans from other countries [27]. Apart from such investments far away from the Chinese mainland, the state is also engaging island nations like Sri Lanka closer home. Sri Lanka is trying to put communications satellite in space since 2007 and now has finalised its plan for launching two satellites with the help from a British company. China has agreed to provide financial and technical assistance to Sri Lanka with their space ambitions [28].

The Chinese assistance to the space programmes of various states helps them to extend their technological footprint globally. This also enables them to establish intergovernmental cooperation in different regions of the world. Beijing’s space programme is found serving various practical interests like raising cash and making alliances. As per Mr. Dean Cheng of The Heritage Foundation, ‘it’s no accident that Venezuela and Nigeria… of course, both have oil. And Bolivia, interestingly, is one of the world’s largest sources of lithium, which if you think we’re all going to drive electric cars, is going to be a vital source’ [29].

China is found making an interesting mix of investments in various regions of the world in space arena. Every investment made by China should be viewed not only from a soft power perspective but also from a strategic angle. China’s assistance to the North Korean efforts for launcher development is known [30]. Similarly, China’s assistance to Pakistan in satellite technology arena has shades of commercial and strategic dimensions. On Aug 12, 2011, China launched Pakistan’s first communications satellite (PAKSAT-1R) on a Long March-3B carrier rocket. This event demonstrates the deepening technological cooperation between these two

states. Pakistan’s inadequacy in the space field offers China an opportunity to take their strategic partnership to a higher plane and also simultaneously maintain its own commercial interests [31]. China’s satellite navigation programme may also assist Pakistan in military realm.

Assessment

In the overall global discourse on soft power, the focus of debate essentially revolves around the relevance of cultural, political and economic features. However, in the twenty-first century, the role of S&T is also gaining prominence as an additional basis for generating soft power influence. S&T is increasingly being viewed as a key instrument of soft power. States understand that the leadership in technology adds to their global prestige. Amongst the various stems of technologies, space technology emerges central to bestow the soft power status. This is not to argue that no other technology has similar capabilities. However, space technology could be viewed to have a greater say in this regard for various reasons. First, the enormity and visual manifestation (say human landing on moon) is almost unmatched. Second, expertise in rocket science puts the state at higher pedestal in comparison with others, and expertise in this science has significant strategic implications too. Third, the technology if viewed in isolation is more of an exclusive and costly technology; however, the output delivered by this technology has significant social relevance. Fourth, the economic relevance and significant growth potential of this technology is gargantuan. Fifth, it is a strategic technology with dual-use ability.

Many smaller states in the world are found rushing to develop space capabilities. Major spacefaring states in Asia have fastened the pace of their development with a view to capture the rapidly emerging space market. Asian spacefaring states have understood that space is a socioeconomic enabler and could also act as a catalyst for advancing state’s foreign policy vision in the digital age. They understand that a vast gap exists amongst space-haves and space have-nots. This gap is both economical and technological. They have sensed an opportunity over here which could offer them multiple benefits both in short and long term. This chapter has analysed one such ‘power’ for its space credentials to acquire soft power status. China’s policies are found distinctly showcasing their space endeavours to realise soft power.

China is found strategically locating itself as a focal point for various activities, from providing financial assistance to manufacturing of satellites, to helping in infrastructure development and training and to providing launching facilities for states in Asia, Africa and South America. This approach has multiple benefits including amassing soft power status. They are found developing a ‘web of space help’ to garner various economic, political and strategic advantages.

It is important to note that there are some limits to exercise this soft power. Particularly, for the state like China which suffers from ‘image deficit’, impressing other states is a challenging proposal. China’s inter – and intracontinental outreach is not believed by many as an entirely benign exercise. Also, China’s political system, their relationship with states having dubious image, opaque economical system, quality of technology and human rights record are problematic for many. Apart from such China-centric issues, there are certain general issues which highlight the limitations of soft power. Mainly the quantitative measurement of the sources of soft power is a difficult task, and understanding the actual effect of soft power would always remain in the realm of subjective assessment. Economic assistance made to other states does not guarantee their continuous support to the donor’s political actions. No effective deterrence mechanism exists with soft power to engage/dominate other powers. Most importantly, soft power is not an alternative to hard power.

In Asia, apart from China, space achievements of India and Japan are also noteworthy. These two states could also use their expertise in the field as a source for their soft power policies. In the case of Japan, most of their geopolitical policies have ‘invisible’ US bias. They could use their space pre-eminence as an instrument to engage friends in the region either alone or in collaboration with the USA.

India could take a leaf out of Chinese experience to expand its ‘soft power’ by using space technology as an instrument. India could be viewed to have already made humble beginning in this (soft) power projection game. However, there appears to be less hype about India’s efforts to engage other states in space diplomacy. India’s Antrix Corp, the commercial arm of the Indian space agency ISRO, has made modest forays in the global space market for launch services, sale of satellite resources data and spacecraft hardware and components in addition to mission support service. So far, India has launched satellites for few states under a commercial arrangement. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has offered to make available Indian satellite resources data to Southeast Asian countries for managing natural disasters. He has also offered Indian help in launching small satellites built by them. India has developed a global market for sale of Indian remote sensing satellite (IRS) imageries [32]. But definitely India has to do much more to generate geopolitical returns from its space achievements.

The human quest for exploring the universe is unending. Space technologies have their own glamour. These technologies are frontier technologies and have also been responsible for development of various other technology sectors too. They have wider applicability and global acceptability. ‘Rocket science’ being a niche field, very few states in the world are in a position to exploit its fullest potential. Many states in the world are attracted towards these technologies because of their social, commercial and strategic utilities. All this offers the states in possession of these technologies a special status. Various possessors of space technologies are found shearing and selling these technologies to other states. The discussions in this chapter clearly elucidates that the space technology has a soft power potential. Various developing (Asian or otherwise) states are getting attracted towards the space technologies for their socioeconomic utilities. The case study (China) undertaken in this chapter suggests that space technologies have remarkable soft power potential. What is important is to correctly exploit this expertise to realise the state’s aims. The ‘soft power repute’ would come automatically.