Category A VERTICAL EMPIRE

The strongest political personality that looms out of this story is Duncan Sandys, who made an early reputation for himself during the Second World War in the context of German guided weapons. He was an effective if abrasive Minister, being Minister of Supply in the early 1950s, then Minister of Housing and Local Government. In that context he was also responsible for setting up the Civic Trust. In 1957 he was appointed Minister of Defence by Macmillan, and was arguably the first to get a grip on the Ministry with its divergent Service interests. Before Sandys there had been a rapid turnover of Ministers, who did not have time to stamp their authority on their Ministry. Certainly, he retains a considerable notoriety among aircraft buffs for the 1957 Defence White Paper, with its unspoken ‘no more manned aircraft’ philosophy. Given the speed of the White Paper, he was probably implementing policy that had been already laid out by others, principally Sir Frederick Brundrett, Chief Government Scientist at the Ministry, and also Chairman of the influential DRPC. A further motive behind Sandys’ appointment was to cut the cost of defence in general, and he was not a man to be easily deflected from his objectives. Certainly, he reduced defence expenditure to 7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at which level it broadly remained for many years. Part of the increased dependence on nuclear weapons was to cut the cost of conventional defence.

Sandys started the ball rolling for Blue Streak whilst Minister of Supply, and he remained a vigorous proponent whilst at Defence. At the end of 1959, he was moved to a new Ministry, Aviation, which took over many of the functions of Supply. It has been asserted that Macmillan appointed him to this post to start the rationalisation of the aircraft industry. It also cleared the way for a new Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, to cancel Blue Streak. Watkinson’s ministerial career was relatively short. It is quite likely that the fallout from the cancellation led to Sandys’ sideways move to Colonial Secretary, although this too was a post that would require a man not afraid to take unpopular decisions. As Aviation Minister he was succeeded by Peter Thorneycroft, who had previously resigned from the Macmillan Government as Chancellor over the level of government spending, and it was Thorneycroft who began the Anglo-French talks which later led to ELDO. Thorneycroft later became Minister of Defence.

The Wilson Government, despite its rhetoric of the ‘white heat of technological revolution’ cannot be seen as a government that pushed British technology. Beset by economic problems, research and development (R & D) is an easy target for politicians looking for economies. Few in his Government were scientists or technologists: to make Frank Cousins, a trade union boss of the old school, Minister of Technology was no doubt politically astute, but can be seen as typical of the political cynicism with which Wilson operated. He was succeeded as Minister of Technology by Tony Benn, who seems to have had enthusiasm for but not a great deal of understanding of modern technology.

Crossman, another important Minister of the Wilson Government, writing in his diaries, bemoans time spent in cabinet discussing Black Arrow. Technology had no appeal for him either. But how was Britain going to survive in the latter part of the twentieth century without exploiting advanced technology?

The Wilson Government from 1964 onwards brought a number of economists in to evaluate programmes on a cost-benefit analysis basis (Wilson himself had been an economics don at Oxford). The problem was that research programmes were analysed for their economic benefits, and this is a difficult if not impossible task. One of the points of starting research programmes is that their outcome is not always predictable, since the object of research is to look at matters that are uncertain or unknown.

Surprisingly, the greatest number of files on Blue Streak in the Public Record Office relate to the Foreign Office. This is as a consequence of the attempt to convert Blue Streak into a European satellite launcher. Hence it is not surprising that the Foreign Office were firm advocates of the project irrespective of any technical or economic merit.

The US comes into the picture indirectly, since, with its vastly greater resources, it had covered most of the ground in space and rocket technology before the UK. The warheads that would equip Blue Steel and would have equipped Blue Streak were of American origin, as was a good deal of the technology that went into Blue Streak. Competing with the US in space research or satellite launching was also often thought by those in Government to be pointless, given the progress that had been made in America and the resources available to the American Government. The closeness of the US and UK defence, intelligence and research establishments also often meant that the UK concentrated on certain rather narrow areas (for example, re-entry research) so as to have useful information to trade with the US. (The US would never give information away for nothing, but it would exchange information on a fairly generous basis.)

The SR53 was a relatively small aircraft, only weighing 7,400 lb empty, but 18,400 lb fully fuelled. It was an extremely elegant aircraft, its only drawback in looks being a slightly tubbiness in the fuselage as a consequence of the large amount of fuel that needed to be carried. The wing span without missiles was 25 ft 1 inch, and it was 45 ft long.

The P177

This project grew from the realisation of the limitations of the SR53. It would have been a larger aircraft, with a much more powerful jet engine: the balance of jet and rocket would be almost equal. In addition to the de Havilland Spectre motor, capable of 8,000 lb thrust, it would also have a de Havilland Gyron Junior turbojet, also of 8,000 lb thrust. In addition, it was given a limited Air Interception capability, which extended the range of weather conditions and night time operations. Coincidentally, the Navy was looking for a high-flying supersonic interceptor at the same time, and both Services, rather unusually, concluded that the same aircraft would suit them both. Proposals were sent to the Ministry of Supply in March 1954 and a design contract was placed with the company in May 1955. With remarkably little fuss, development of the P177 began in autumn 1955, and work proceeded steadily throughout 1956.

A memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty in April 1956 set out the Navy’s case for the aircraft5:

The P.177 is a single seat high altitude fighter capable of operating at a sustained speed of M = 1.4 in the 40,000 to 60,000 ft height band; its ceiling will be in the region of 75,000 ft and it will be capable of reaching M = 2 for short periods. It will be armed with 2 Blue Jay Mark 3 air to air Guided Missiles, with unguided rockets as an alternative armament. It will be equipped with AI [AI = airborne interception] and will have a limited capacity for night operations…

The P.177 was selected by the Naval Staff because:-

(i) It is one of the very few British aircraft likely to be better than anything American when it comes into service.

(ii) It is the only aircraft required by both the Navy and the RAF.

(iii) Its engine, radar and weapons are already being developed for other air-craft, so that the development costs should be comparatively low.

(iv) It is smaller and cheaper than the N.113 [Supermarine Scimitar] and its early substitution for that aircraft will save production expenditure.

However, two factors now intervened to threaten the project. One was a change in defence policy with regard to manned aircraft, and the second was a need to reduce the UK’s defence spending. With the arrival of Duncan Sandys at the Ministry of Defence, and the resultant 1957 Defence White paper, the RAF version was cancelled forthwith. As the White Paper put it:

Work will proceed on the development of a ground-to-air missile defence system, which will in due course replace the manned aircraft of Fighter Command. In view of the good progress already made, the Government have come to the conclusion that the R. A.F are unlikely to have a requirement for fighter aircraft types more advanced than the supersonic P1, and work on such projects will stop.

Given the extent to which the RAF was threatened, the P177 was relatively small fry, and the P1 interceptor, or Lightning as it became known in service, gave many years of service in a very similar role.

However, the Navy was still very insistent that they needed the P177, and at the same time, Aubrey Jones, who was Minister of Supply, wanted to keep the project going since there was some German interest in the aircraft. A prolonged Whitehall battle then ensued. Sandys told the Navy quite firmly that the aircraft, irrespective of merit or the Navy’s need, could not be afforded. In the same way he told Jones that if the Ministry of Supply wanted to keep the project under way then it would have to go on his budget, not Sandys’.

All this wrangling cannot have helped the progress at Saunders Roe, or the prospect of trying to sell it to the German Air Force. After all, if the RAF version had been cancelled and then the Naval version, this cannot have inspired confidence in the project. In addition, not everyone wanted to sell it to the Germans. Sir Frederick Brundrett, Chief Scientist at the Ministry of Aviation is on record as saying that the German requirement.

.. .was for a high-altitude quick climbing defensive weapon. There was no doubt that they would be best satisfied with a guided weapon and in his view the right course was to interest them in our own Stage 1 and Stage 1 and a half guided weapon developments rather than the P.177.

The Germans did not share his view, however, and in December 1957 the project was finally cancelled.

Would the P177 have lived up to expectations? There is a strong probability it would have done: its smaller sibling, the SR53, did all that was expected of it. The RAF was left with the Lightning, the Navy with nothing. It could be argued that the P177 would have been too specialised for the Navy: it would not have been able to maintain a continuous Combat Air Patrol as its endurance was too limited, although it was intended to fit a probe for air-to-air refuelling. But that was not its function: it was intended to by-pass the patrolling function by its ability to reach high fast targets quickly. The concept was never put to the test, but by the late 1950s it was becoming obvious that jets such as the Lightning with re-heat on the engines could do the job as effectively as rockets.

The Lightning, however, went on to prove its usefulness against the Soviet aircraft that during the 1960s and 1970s attempted to probe British airspace. A manned aircraft does have some advantages over missiles, as the Falklands demonstrated. In reality, both are needed since they are complementary.

The Germans went on to buy Lockheed F-104 Starfighters, as did many other NATO countries. Saunders Roe was a minnow by comparison with Lockheed, and whether as many P177s would have fallen out of the sky as F-104s is also an interesting question. But the most fascinating image is of the P177 in Luftwaffe colours!

The P177 was a good deal less elegant in appearance than the SR53, the rather bulbous fuselage and pointed nose above the air intake detracting from its appearance. It was twice the weight at 14,500 lb empty, and 28,000 lb at extended load. The span was 27 ft, and it was 50 ft 6 inches long. It was within about six months of its first flight6 when the project finally cancelled in December 1957.

A history of the SR53 and P177 projects written by the Air Ministry can be found in Appendix A. [2]

One way round this limitation was to use a high energy upper stage, and so at the same meeting in December 1960 Saunders Roe were asked to consider a liquid hydrogen third stage with 4,500 lb of propellants. The brochure they produced was up to their usual high standard, laying down the problems clearly, and describing the solutions equally clearly. This design and that of RPE has been described in the chapter on rocket motors, so no more about the designs themselves need be said here. The cost of developing a liquid hydrogen stage for the BSSLV was put at between £5.5 million and £7 million.

Saunders Roe did hedge their bets somewhat at the instigation of RAE: the design might have been tailored to the BSSLV, but it was also drawn up with the possibility of mounting it on the French second stage which was now being negotiated. The prolonged European negotiations were slowly getting somewhere, although it would take many more months before any clear shape would emerge. At a meeting in March 1961 at Cowes, the RAE had to tell Saunders Roe that it had now been definitely decided that the second stage would be of French design. Saunders Roe and Bristol Siddeley were to continue with the design for the third stage, with particular emphasis on liquid hydrogen. At the same meeting, Saunders Roe reported that manufacture of the second stage tank structural test specimen was about 25% complete. Although it might seem that the work on the HTP second stage had been wasted, it carried through first to the 54-inch Black Knight and then to the second stage of Black Arrow.

In a further Design Study Progress meeting in July, the chairman noted that the situation was very vague (which, given the ELDO negotiations, was probably an understatement). He hoped that Saunders Roe would play a part in any future design studies and that they would continue to maintain a design study team. At the same meeting, Saunders Roe presented a brochure for the HTP/kerosene third stage, which would involve both high thrust and low thrust stages; a 2V hour period of low thrust was mentioned, and in addition, there was a further report on their liquid hydrogen stage. But this is effectively where work on Black Prince, or BBSLV, comes to a halt. Instead, attention turned to ELDO and Europa.

It might be thought that the creation of ELDO would have finally put the lid on any further thoughts of a BSSLV, but RAE was still doing its best to resurrect the idea. Throughout 1963 and 1964, meetings were being held between RAE and Saunders Roe on ‘medium energy upper stages’. This is a euphemism for HTP stages. In a meeting in June 1963, the chairman of the Working Party, H. G.R. Robinson of RAE, stated that ‘a study of upper stages for Blue Streak were needed as a back-up of the system studies for the E. L.D. O. launching vehicle, in case the latter was not available, or unsuitable’10.

The RAE was considering designs for circular equatorial orbits of either 13,740 km or 36,060 km height – i. e. 12-hour or 24-hour orbits. This would need an apogee motor for a final stage. In a follow up meeting, Saunders Roe were told that they would be given design contracts for ‘An Investigation on British End Stages in combination with the Blue Streak Launcher Vehicle’, and ‘in view of possible ELDO
involvement, RAE recommended that the proposed body diameter be 2 metres (i. e. 6.5 ft.)’11. Although Saunders Roe duly undertook the design studies as requested, they never went past the paper stage. On the other hand, the link to what would become Black Arrow becomes more obvious.

During 1963 and 1964, the design for what would become Black Arrow was evolving. Amongst all the imperial measurements of feet, inches and pounds is a first stage diameter of 2.0 m! This mixing of units not only seems odd but also would seem to have no connection with Blue Streak. However, the ELDO vehicle was being designed with a French second stage, which was also to be of

2.0 m diameter. The idea was then that if the Blue Streak interstage were to be suitable for the French vehicle, it would also be suitable for Black Arrow. In the event, there was a problem, since the Blue Streak side of the interface was much wider; the French stage was to have a skirt that would mate with the lower stage. So this odd metric feature was included in case, as seemed possible in 1963, ELDO did not go ahead, or, for whatever reason, was not a success.

Figure 60 shows a comparison between Blue Streak with Black Arrow mounted on top and Europa. The 54-inch diameter of the payload shrouds may have been a problem for a conventional satellite, although not for a communications satellite, where the payload might be quite small. The other problem was that Blue Streak might have been struggling to lift the 40,000 lb weight of Black Arrow.

But the design for Europa did materialise, and it might then be thought that all further suggestions for a solely British launcher might have died forever. However, there was one enthusiast for space exploration in the House of Commons, the Conservative MP Neil Marten, who asked a Question in the House about the possibilities of the Blue Streak/Black Knight combination. This might well have been a put up job, but it gave RAE the excuse to work the figures for a Ministerial reply, a task they set to work on with eagerness.12

This was in March 1968, when Europa, despite problems with its second stage, still looked viable. Two versions were considered. The first employed the first stage only of Black Arrow, with four of the eight chambers and one of the turbopumps deleted. The payload estimate was for 1,800 lb in a 200 NM polar orbit (750 kg at 500 km); however, extended nozzles on the motors (as in the Black Arrow second stage) resulted in an improvement on this of ‘some 20% to 25% giving a performance appreciably greater than ELDO A’. Adding the third stage of Black Arrow – the Waxwing motor – would increase payloads ‘by about
200 kg’. This would put the maximum payload up to 1,100 kg. Development costs were put at £1 million, and the unit cost per vehicle at £1.5 million.

A follow-up note gives some interesting comparisons between ELDO A and the Blue Streak/Black Arrow combination.

* from stage itself (m/s) ** from stage when used as part of multi-stage vehicle

This shows the potential of a Blue Streak/Black Arrow combination. It also shows up very clearly the structural efficiency of Black Arrow as opposed to the ELDO second stage.

Equally interesting are the costings, for what they are worth:

HSD for work on Blue Streak:

Rolls Royce for work on Black Arrow motor: Westland – Black Arrow modifications Motor bays

Ground equipment modifications:

Modifications at Woomera say Total

[sic – total is actually £860k!]

Cost of first flight vehicle: Blue Streak £1000k

Black Arrow £400k – say £1500k total.

To carry out the modifications and launch one test vehicle for £2Уг million seems a touch on the optimistic side.

There were, of course certain snags. To do this in parallel with Europa would have been politically unacceptable (but it would have been interesting to see the reactions if the Blue Streak/Black Arrow combination had reached orbit by 1970). There was also the question of payload – but the Perigee Apogee System (PAS) design could have been adapted from ELDO to give a geostationary capability.

At around the same time, Saunders Roe produced their own brochure for a Blue Streak/Black Arrow combination. The skirt to the engine bay was flared out to match the Europa interface, as originally intended. They went through all the permutations with their usual thoroughness, considering eight chamber and four chamber variants, two – and three-stage versions, and also reviving the liquid hydrogen third stage possibility. Their payload calculations were on the optimistic side, however, since they estimated that Blue Streak and Black Arrow together could put as much as 3,000 lb in low earth orbit, and even a few hundred pounds in a geosynchronous orbit.

It is interesting to note that Saunders Roe were obviously thinking of communications satellites as an application for the launcher. Under the payload shroud the satellite is sketched with two solid fuel motors: one which would convert a low Earth circular orbit into a highly elliptical geotransfer orbit, and the second of which would then act as an apogee motor to convert the elliptical orbit into a circular geosynchronous orbit. In this context, it should be noted also that although the US was prepared to sell launchers to other countries, this offer was subject to considerable restriction and would almost certainly not have included commercial communications satellites. Britain’s military communications satellites, Skynet, were launched by the US only as a result of the close military ties between the two countries. Thus Britain might have been able to produce a low cost launcher for communication satellites – but not a very powerful one.

However, there was a considerable divergence in views between the establishments and the Ministries. The RAE and its associated establishments were constantly producing ideas based on Blue Streak, yet it was obvious that the Ministry of Technology, as the Ministry of Aviation had then become, was firmly set against any idea of a British-based launcher, and certainly, as already mentioned, it would have been politically unacceptable whilst ELDO was still in existence. It would also have been financially unacceptable as far as the Treasury was concerned.

Single stage. Launched 7 February 1961 at 22:16. Apogee 427 miles.

BK13 was a single-stage vehicle with a double cone eroding head similar to BK05 and BK06 except for the substitution of a low-power telemetry beacon plus a tape recorder in place of the normal telemetry sender (BK05) or tape recorder (BK06), the use of a cine camera for filming the head wake during re­entry, and the deletion of the recovery parachute system. As in BK07, further measurements were made in the motor bay to investigate base heating and pressures.

Propulsion was good and a re-entry velocity of 10,870 ft/second was achieved at 200,000 ft. The flaps over the base bleed holes opened before take-off and closed later as in BK07. The kerosene level sensor and HTP probes worked and
propellant usage in flight was determined. The head separation, turnover and spin systems were faultless, as were the pyrotechnic flashes on re-entry.

Unfortunately, due to an incorrect setting of the switch, the tape recorder in the head started too soon and the tape had run out before re-entry; for the same reason the camera in the head did not record the re-entry wake. The durestos nose cone and materials specimens were recovered and erosion measurements were made. The electronic flashes were observed clearly but the tracking lamps were not seen.

R0 – 28 June 1968

R0 was launched on a trajectory to the north west, towards Talgarno in Western Australia. The first two stages were live; the third stage was inert.

The launch procedure was that the vehicle was held down on the launch pad by a ball and claw mechanism, the engines were started, and when full thrust was reached, which took around 4 seconds, the vehicle was released. But as soon as it cleared the pad, the vehicle immediately developed a large rolling oscillation. The cause of the fault was an open circuit in the feedback loop that controlled one of the pairs of motors: a wire had probably broken.

At about 64 seconds into the flight, the control system could not cope and the vehicle tumbled. One of the payload fairings broke away, followed by the payload, then the Gamma 8 first stage motor stopped working. The vehicle was destroyed by ground command when it was at an altitude of 9,000 ft on its descent.

The response of the motor pair concerned was normal up to about 4.1 seconds after opening the first stage engine start valve, 0.5 seconds before the release jack was opened. Loss of the signal meant that the pair of motors concerned would swing to their full extent and back again on receiving a correction, instead of the small deflection needed to put the vehicle back on to its correct course.

This can be seen quite clearly in the film of the launch, where one of the set of rocket exhausts can be seen swinging from side to side. Figure 115 shows the vehicle a few seconds after lift-off, and one of the sets of exhausts can be clearly seen pointing to one side.

Eyewitness statements were taken from those who had been watching the flight.

One, by Ken Smith of RAE, reads as follows:

Ignition was seen to occur just after zero time, and the vehicle lifted off as expected a few seconds later. The ascent appeared normal, and the downrange pitch programme was clearly occurring. Just after the time count of 60 seconds, two or three glowing fragments were detached and fell away from the ascending vehicle.

Immediately afterwards, the clean flame pattern changed to an intense white smoky trail. The vehicle pitched violently, then appeared to recover to its original path, but the rate of ascent diminished. Then tumbling began; the vehicle turning slowly nose over tail several times and beginning to descend. The intercom call was made ‘vehicle descending’. The FSO announced that break-up would be initiate when the vehicle reached 9,000 ft on the descent. After a short interval, the vehicle still falling and tumbling, he announced break-up ‘NOW’. An instant later the vehicle disintegrated in a bright luminescent explosion. The loud sharp detonation was hard several seconds later.17

There is a reference made in a file in the Public Record Office1 to a telephone conversation in which the RAE was asked by an official at the Ministry of Aviation in October 1961:

What has the RAE done on solid propulsion and what has been done on smaller rockets? (Opinion and any possible objections).

The context is not entirely clear, but Dr Schirrmacher of RAE sent a fairly lengthy reply, and part of this reads:

(b) For smaller satellites two solutions are worth mentioning:

Black Knight boosted by two Ravens and carrying a Rook as 2nd stage with a Cuckoo as 3rd stage. One will get 100lb into a 200mile orbit. Present development at Westcott for an improvement of the mass fracture [sic – probably ‘fraction’] indicates that the payload could probably be increased by a factor 2 [sic].’

Dr Schirrmacher was referring to a report which was written at RAE in January “ 1961 as part of a more general paper on the

possibilities of using Black Knight as a satellite launcher, and the study was based around what might be called the ‘Dazzle’ Black Knight – i. e., the 36-inch vehicle with a lift-off thrust of 21,6001b.2

It is also interesting to note, in the Black Knight context, that Saunders Roe’s Aerodynamics Department and Computing Department had produced a joint report of a vehicle which they christened LOVER, standing for Low Orbit Vehicle for Experimental Research. This was

nothing more than the 54-inch Black Knight together with the Kestrel motor (but pointing upwards). Somewhat optimistically, it concludes that

The proposed satellite launcher using a 4′ 6" diameter Black Knight as a first stage and a “Kestrel” powered second stage can be used to inject a small satellite into orbit at an altitude of between 100 and 200 n. miles.. .3

The 54-inch Black Knight is a rather more plausible contender for a satellite launcher than original 36-inch version, and in the context of what might have been possible in 1963, some performance figures would be helpful:

Why 1963? This was the time when the design which would become Black Arrow was evolving. Instead of Black Arrow, this section will consider the possibilities of a launcher using Black Knight as a central core and adding assorted solid motors, both as strap-on boosters and as upper stages.

Adding solid fuel boosters to Black Knight:

Initial Thrust Total impulse (lb) (lb. seconds)

36-inch Black Knight + 2 Ravens 36-inch Black Knight + 4 Ravens 54-inch Black Knight + 2 Ravens 54-inch Black Knight + 4 Ravens Black Arrow

The total impulse could be increased even further by ‘stretching’ the Black Knight stage – that is, increasing the size of the fuel tanks. The Raven is the most suitable, since it has a relatively long burn time, so that the central core has had time to burn off some of its fuel. Total impulse is, of course, not the only criterion by which a rocket motor should be judged, but it is useful in this context as a rough and ready guide.

There would be very little extra development work needed to be done, since by 1961, the Raven, Rook and Cuckoo were fully developed – the Raven and Cuckoo were in use on the Skylark rocket, and the Cuckoo II was also the second stage for the 36-inch Black Knight. The Kestrel was to have been the second stage for the 54-inch Black Knight, and so if we have the 54-inch Black Knight, we also have the Kestrel. Waxwing is the only rocket not available in 1963, since it was developed specifically as the apogee stage for Black Arrow.

In a launcher which has several stages, it helps if they are well matched in weight. For reasonable performance, very roughly the first stage might be around 60% of the all up weight, the second stage perhaps 30%, and the third stage 10% or so. They also need to be matched in thrust: if the first stage only has a limited thrust, it cannot lift the upper stages. One of the points of the strap-on boosters is to give that extra thrust, so that when they have burnt out, the main stage has used up enough fuel to carry on by itself.

Another consideration is geometry, and this is where the idea of using the Rook and Cuckoo as second and third stages falls down. The Rook had a diameter of only 17 inches (at this time, 17 inches was the largest solid motor made in the UK). The Kestrel would have had a 24-inch diameter. The largest motor made in the UK was the Stonechat at 36-inch, but this would have been too heavy to use as a second stage. Larger diameter solid fuel motors were produced on an experimental basis at Westcott in the 1960s. Bristol Aerojet Ltd (BAJ) produced high strength steel tubes using the helical welding process, and Westcott developed the propellant charge design. Tubes up to 54 inches in diameter were produced, and one such tube was filled and fired at Westcott.4

Fitting a 17-inch motor onto a 54-inch stage would have been awkward, but the bigger limitation would have been in the size of satellite carried. Even the smallest satellite would have been more than 17 inches across, and so an extremely bulbous fairing would have to be fitted on top. Even with a Kestrel, the geometry looks awkward, as the diagrams in Figure 121 demonstrate.

The Rook would seem to be better than the Kestrel on grounds of total impulse, but was less structurally efficient. On the other hand, there is no reason why two or even three Kestrels could be used – two Kestrels give nearly the same impulse as the Rook, they are structurally more efficient, and staging improves that efficiency.

In either case, the payload would be in the region of 200 lb or so – possibly more. In fact, the payload could be increased further: the total mass of the launcher would have been in the region of 29,000 lb or so, whereas the lift-off thrust was 75,000 lb. As mentioned, this gives the possibility of ‘stretching’ the Black Knight stage by lengthening the tanks to carry more fuel. By the time the boosters have burned out, the extra fuel will also have been burned off. This is quite efficient – the extra structural weight added is merely that of the thin walled tank.

Why is this a good deal cheaper than developing Black Arrow? There is very little in the way of development costs. By the time of the cancellation of the re­entry experiments, BK26, the first 54-inch Black Knight, was quite well advanced in construction. The development costs of the Black Knight and the Kestrel would already have been absorbed by the re-entry programme. One of the major development costs for Black Arrow was the design and testing of the Gamma 8 and Gamma 2 motors. Developing more capable solid fuel motors is a good deal cheaper.

So, it might well have been possible to develop a Black Knight launcher costing not much than around £2 million which might have been able to put 200­300 lb into orbit, compared with Black Arrow costing £10 million… and which could put around 150 lb into orbit.

1 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1567. ELDO satellite launcher system.

2 Black Knight as a Satellite Launcher. AP Waterfall, Guided Weapons Department, RAE. 18 January 1961 (Science Museum Library and Archive).

3 Black Knight LOVER, Saunders Roe, May 1963.

4 Moore PO, 1992. Stonechat, JBIS, Vol 45, pp.145-148.

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[1] R. Maudling. Memoirs. (1978). Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd.

2 The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) DEFE 7/2245.

Development of Blue Streak.

3 TNA: PRO DEFE 13/193. Development of Blue Streak missile.

4 TNA: PRO DEFE 7/2245. Development of Blue Streak.

5 Ibid.

6 TNA: PRO AVIA 92/24. Blue Streak: correspondence leading to the Cabinet decision to cancel as a weapons system.

[2] WJ Boyne, Clash of Wings. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

2 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/546. SR53 Finance and Policy. The details of the proposed improvements are outlined in a series of papers in this file.

3 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/287. F138D Saunders Roe rocket interceptor aircraft for RAF.

4 TNA: PRO BT 233/40.

5 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/649. Saro rocket interceptor: RN aircraft NA 47.

6 Ibid.

[3] TNA: PRO AVIA 65/91. Propelled air-to-surface missiles for ‘V’ class bombers: application to Vulcan aircraft.

2 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1687. Blue Steel. Development programme.

3 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/91. Propelled air-to-surface missiles for ‘V’ class bombers: application to Vulcan aircraft.

4 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1289 Blue Steel. Main propulsion unit.

5 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1467 Blue Steel. Management Board.

6 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1468 Blue Steel. RAE Study Group.

7 Ibid.

8 TNA: PRO AIR 20/12143. Proposals for OR 1149.

9 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1697. Stand off bomb, OR 1159: research and development.

[4] TNA: PRO AIR 2/13206. ATOMIC (Code B, 12): Long range surface to surface weapons.

2 TNA: PRO AVIA 48/7. Rocket Research Panel: minutes of meetings.

3 TNA: PRO DEFE 7/2245. Development of Blue Streak. The Operational Requirement for a Medium Range Ballistic Missile system. Note by DCAS 9 August 1955.

4 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1193. Warhead for a medium range missile: Air Staff requirement OR 1142 Orange Herald (DAW plans action). This file is the source for all the quotes in this section.

5 Ibid.

6 TNA: PRO AIR 2/13745. Warhead for medium range ballistic missile Blue Streak (OR 1139 and 1142).

7 TNA: PRO AIR 20/10299. Ballistic missiles: minutes of Joint US/UK Medium Range Ballistic Missile Advisory Committee and related papers.

8 TNA: PRO AVIA 6/17210. Application of solid propellant motors to medium range ballistic missiles. Technical Note RPD 156. WR Maxwell, December 1956.

9 TNA: PRO AVIA 54/2141. Blue Streak development: A1 Coordination Panel; minutes of meetings.

10 TNA: PRO AVIA 54/2146. Blue Streak development: Joint US/UK Advisory Committee; technical correspondence.

TNA: PRO DEFE 7/2245. Development of Blue Streak.

[5] TNA: PRO AVIA 68/23. Work supporting development of an underground launching system for Blue Streak. RPE Technical Note No. 170. BWA Ricketson and ETB Smith.

2 Ibid.

[6] was surprised and encouraged today that amongst those who are advising both the PM & the Chancellor there is a pronounced feeling that if we are to go on with the deterrent it should only be on the basis of Polaris.

[7] TNA: PRO AVIA 65/352. Space research vehicle design and performance: potential of reconnaissance satellites.

2 TNA: PRO DSIR 23/25364. Preliminary assessment of an earth satellite reconnaissance vehicle (RAE TN GW 393).

3 TNA: PRO AVIA 6/19852. Technical report G. W.455. The Use of Blue Streak with Black Knight in a Satellite Missile. D. G. King-Hele and Miss D. M. Gilmore. May, 1957.

4 TNA: PRO AIR 20/10573. Blue Streak: possible use as satellite launcher.

5 Science Museum Library and Archive

6 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/351. Space Research Vehicle Design and Performance: British Studies.

7 Saunders Roe Technical Publication 435.

8 TNA: PRO AVIA 66/4. Blue Streak as a satellite launcher.

9 TNA: PRO DEFE 7/1397. UK space research programme. 19 December 1960

10 RAE Communication Satellite Study. Working Party No. 2 meeting of 10 June 1963. (Science Museum Library and Archive)

[8] RAE Communication Satellite Study. Working Party No. 2 meeting of 17 June 1963. (Science Museum Library and Archive)

12 TNA: PRO AVIA 13/1351. Space policy: Black Arrow review 1967.

13 TNA: PRO DSIR 23/39853. Blue Streak/Centaur launcher.

1 TNA: PRO AVIA 66/4. Blue Streak as a satellite launcher.

Ibid. 3 Ibid.

Ibid.

5 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1708. Blue Streak satellite launcher development: European co­operation.

6 TNA: PRO AVIA 66/7. Blue Streak satellite launcher project: Pt B.

7 Ibid.

8 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1708. Blue Streak satellite launcher development: European co­operation.

9 TNA: PRO AVIA 66/4. Blue Streak as a satellite launcher.

10 Anglo-French technical proposals for the development of a satellite launching vehicle system / Propositions techniques Franco-Britanniques pour la mise au point d’un porteur de satellite; document elabore par le Ministere de l’aviation du Royaume-uni et le Ministere de l’air francais.

[10] TNA: PRO AVIA 66/8. Blue Streak satellite launcher project: Pt C.

Historical Archives of European Union, Florence, ELDO 118. Technical Definition of the Initial launching System. October 1963.

13 TNA: PRO EW 25/52. Review of UK space policy including European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO).

14 Ibid.

15 HAEU, Florence, ELDO 828. Alternative Development Programme.

16 TNA: PRO T 225/2765. Ministry of Aviation space programme: future policy.

17 TNA: PRO EW 25/52. Review of UK space policy including European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO). FR Barratt, 26 March 1965.

18 HAEU, Florence, ELDO archives.

19 TNA: PRO AVIA 92/259. UK withdrawal from European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO).

20 Private communication.

21

Ibid. 23 Ibid.

[11] This is the mean thrust (in the original French ‘la pousee moyenne – 550 kN’ as opposed to ‘la pousee maximum – 630 kN’).

[12] to geostationary orbit

As can be seen from the figures for the estimated performance, the boosters produce a useful payload increase – but even 300 kg is distinctly inadequate for a

[13] HAEU, Florence, ELDO 80.

2 Design Studies On A High Energy Third Stage For The European Launch Vehicle. Dietrich Koelle, May 1963. (Private collection.)

3 TNA: PRO DSIR 23/31973. Flight trial of F1 of EUROPA 1 (ELDO satellite launcher system – first stage). RAE TM Space 45, August 1964.

4 HAEU, Florence, ELDO. F6/1 launch, September 1967.

5 HAEU, Florence, ELDO archives.

6 Ibid.

7 HAEU, Florence, ELDO 3569. E. L.D. O. B1 & B2 Vehicles Oxygen/Hydrogen Upper Stages. Rolls-Royce Thrust Chamber Design Study to E. L.D. O. Contract CTR/17/7/10. February 1967.

8 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1567. ELDO satellite launcher system.

9 HAEU, Florence, ELDO 3515.

10 HAEU, Florence, ELDO 3035.

[14] HAEU, Florence, ELDO 1561. Low cost launchers – conclusions of the EUROPA II AD HOC group. 30 May 72.

12 HAEU, Florence, ELDO 4287. Europa IIIC with 4 RZ 2 engines.

[15] TNA: PRO AVIA 92/128. Policy and financial control of Westland Aircraft Ltd on Black Knight project,

2 TNA: PRO AVIA 48/58. Black Knight: trials. Preliminary Post Firing Meeting Friday October 3rd, 1958. Guided Weapons Department, RAE.

3 TNA: PRO AVIA 13/1268. ‘Black Knight’: hot tests on inertia navigator head. Summary of Direct Kinetic Heating Measurements on Black Knight, Dommett RL and Peattie IW. Guided Weapons Department RAE, 3 November 1961.

4 Interim Report on the Range Safety Proving Trial. Space Department, RAE. 2 January 1964. (Science Museum Library and Archive)

5 TNA: PRO DSIR 23/35658. Project dazzle Pt 5.

6 Minutes of a meeting at Osborne House 19 July 1962. (Science Museum Library and Archive.)

7 TNA: PRO AVIA 65/667. ‘Black Knight’ project: policy and financial control. PD Irons of Saunders Roe to WG Downey at the Ministry of Supply, 30 October 1958.

8 TNA: PRO T 225/2124. Space and general guided projectile research: Black Knight test vehicle; Ministry of Aviation firing programme. Memo by JA Marshall, 2 January 1961.

9 Ibid.

[16] If RAE had decided to go ahead with Crusade and the 54-inch Black Knight, but adapted as a launcher using solid motors as described earlier. Now let us imagine a timeline thus:

[17] If the French proposal for dropping ELDO A and going straight to ELDO B had won the day in 1965. One can sympathise to some extent with the Government’s position on ELDO, but again it lacked the courage of its own

[18] TNA: PRO AVIA 65/1851. WS-138A: Skybolt policy.

2 Ibid.

3 TNA: PRO DSIR 23/ 31835. Performance capability of Black Knight rocket in various roles (RAE TN Space 60).

[19] TNA: PRO AVIA 66/7. Blue Streak satellite launcher project: Pt B.

2 TNA: PRO CAB 129/127. Space Policy. Report by the Official Committee on Science and Technology. November 1966.

Whilst the major policy issues were the province of the politicians, the day-to­day or month-to-month work was carried out by officials at the various Ministries. One of the most influential, by virtue of his post, was CGWL, or Controller of Guided Weapons and Electronics at the Ministry of Supply and its successors. For almost all the period, with a break of two years, Sir Steuart Mitchell held the post. From the Ministry papers he appears to be a sensible and capable administrator. Dr Robert Cockburn filled the break.

However, delving deeper into the Ministries, one drowns in a soup of alphabetic titles: in the RAF there was VCAS (Vice Chief of the Air Staff, who dealt with nuclear matters); DCAS, the Deputy Chief; DCAS (OR) Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Operational Requirements). There was DRAE (Director of the Royal Aircraft Establishment); DDRAE (his deputy); DAWRE (Director of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment) and DDAWRE, his deputy. Then there are all the Ministry and Establishment departments with their heads: Guided Weapons, Space Department, and so on. Ministries have Private Secretaries (PS), Permanent Under Secretaries (PUS), and varieties of subordinate secretaries. It was part of their job to turn policy into hardware. But they were also responsible for the papers that went to Ministers, and, as a result, a good deal of the policy was made at a lower level than is often supposed.

If Britain had built the V bombers as strategic bombers which were capable of launching a nuclear attack, then it was logical to think that the countries threatened would take care to defend their cities against such an attack. In the Second World War, this had been done by means of night fighters equipped with radar, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns. But a new weapon was appearing on the scene: the guided missile, such as the Bristol Bloodhound, which would be deployed from 1958 onwards. Bloodhound was radar controlled, used a ramjet engine and had a range of up to 50 miles. There were even proposals at one stage to equip them with nuclear weapons to increase their destructive power. But threat implies counter-threat, and the Air Staff was working on the assumption that from about 1960 onwards the V bombers would be unable to penetrate the

Moscow air defences – in other words, that Moscow would be protected by guided weapons similar to Bloodhound.

The next question was then how to deliver the Bomb from the time the defences became too formidable for the V bombers to penetrate. In the early 1950s, ballistic missiles were not yet an option. Britain had invested heavily in the V bomber force, so that any ideas to prolong their active life would be very welcome. Hence the idea of a ‘flying bomb’ evolved. Initial ideas in the late 1940s had centred on a system called Blue Boar, which was a television guided glide bomb. This proved too limiting, since cloud and bad weather could obscure the television picture, whilst the radio link between missile and aircraft could easily be jammed. Instead, thoughts turned to a longer range powered device. This was not a flying bomb in the V1 sense, whose guidance had been extremely limited, but one that would be able to deliver its payload with considerable accuracy. Nor would it be a cruise type missile, since the technology for long- range guidance, terrain following radar or satellite navigation also did not exist at that time. Instead, inertial guidance would be used, which could be accurate enough at relatively short ranges. The missile would be released from the aircraft, immediately climb to a considerable height, cruise at high speed – around Mach 2 or so – then dive down onto the target.

The theory was all very well, but in 1954 reality was something else. Britain was still working on its first fusion bomb, so it was difficult to estimate what payload size and weight would have to be carried. The next problem was the inertial navigation. As the US was discovering with Snark, Matador and Regulus, navigation over considerable distances was a problem. This was one of the reasons why a range of 100 nautical miles was chosen for Blue Steel. The problem was made more difficult since it would be launched from a moving aircraft whose own position might be uncertain. A further problem with cruise type missiles is their relative vulnerability to enemy defences unless they fly at a very low level, which was, again, not possible in 1954. Hence OR 11321 specified a speed of Mach 2.5 at 70,000 ft or higher for the vehicle, although in 1954 supersonic speeds were an area still fraught with unknowns, and supersonic wind testing was still very difficult. Yet another problem was that at these speeds the skin of the vehicle would start heating up as a result of friction with the air. Aluminium airframes would not be suitable at high Mach numbers (this is one of the reasons why Concorde and similar aircraft are limited to around Mach 2.2) and the only real alternative was stainless steel, which was difficult to work with. This was more unknown territory.

All of this was summed up by a memo from the Ministry of Supply, appropriately enough on 5 November 1954, by saying:

Present estimates are that medium range GW defences will make it excessively dangerous for the V bombers to fly over, or within about 50 miles of the target in I960… The requirement is therefore for a flying bomb which will have its maximum use between 1960 and 1965. It is expected that a fusion warhead will be available by 1960 and it seems generally agreed that the bomb should be designed to carry this warhead.2

[GW = Guided Weapons. In this context, the reference is to surface-to-air missiles.]

The time period is significant – it is assumed that by 1960, the V bombers will no longer be able to attack the target directly. The next assumption is that by 1965 some other form of delivery will have taken over, although this is still too early for the Air Staff to be thinking specifically of ballistic missiles.

The early files note that in some respects the project is almost equivalent to building a fighter aircraft. It would have no instruments and so on, but certainly was aerodynamically novel, and with an autopilot connected to the inertial navigator in place of a human pilot. As a further minute of November 1954 put it:

This bomb is indubitably much simpler than a fighter aircraft in the range of equipment that has to be provided. On the other hand it is a big step to go from the present speed range to Mach Numbers of 2 and above and again in comparison with the development of a manned fighter, it is to be expected that the production of the many vehicles required for firing trials will lengthen the development time.

Late in the Blue Streak saga, HSD published a brochure which was interesting technically, even if the chances of the British Government being interested in it were remote. The brochure has the look and feel of one put together in a hasty or cursory fashion – all the text is in block capitals – and does not really do justice to the proposal, except in the artwork.13

The proposal was for a Blue Streak launcher with an American Centaur D1 upper stage, built in Europe under licence (rather cannily, the brochure says ‘Europe’ rather than ‘Britain’!). Optional French L17 strap-on boosters were proposed as an optional extra. As to the payload, the brochure states:

Performance in geostationary orbit

– without strap-on boosters

– with two L17 boosters

– with four L17 boosters

(grouped in two pairs)

More tellingly, it goes on to say ‘Typical payload ranges are quoted – actual capability for specific payload requires detailed study of optimised trajectory and earliest permissible fairing jettison time’ – in other words, the figures quoted are estimates rather than being the result of any precise calculations. They do seem reasonable, and the brochure says ‘performance capability is higher than the proposed Europa III’ – which was true up to a point. There is a drawback in the sense that the vehicle has been stretched as far as possible, and had really reached the limit of its performance.

The proposed launch site was Kourou in French Guiana, which, like the rest of the proposal was technically feasible but politically completely impractical.

One technical side note: Centaur was the only other rocket stage, apart from Atlas and Blue Streak, built using pressurised stainless steel ‘balloon’ tanks. Centaur was originally designed to go on top of Atlas, hence the similarity in construction. In that sense, Blue Streak and Centaur were well suited. The Centaur stage had some teething problems, but by 1970 was a well-tested and proven design.

BLUE STREAK VEHICLE PLUS 2xL17 BOOSTERS WITH

CENTAUR UPPER STAGE

Figure 61. HSD’s proposal for mounting the American Centaur stage on Blue Streak.

The other major advantage of the proposal was that by comparison with the ELDO design, and any possible Europa III designs, all the components were flight-proven, and the bugs ironed out. But interesting though the idea might have been, it was a product without a customer. The UK was determined to have nothing more to do with launchers; any new European launcher would be French led, and use of an American stage, even built under licence, would have been a non-starter. [7] [8]

Two stage. Launched 9 May 1961 at 21:37. Apogee 258 miles.

BK14 was another two-stage vehicle with second stage and head similar to that of BK08. The initiation of the second stage light-up was to be by means of a Phillips ionisation gauge as on BK09. Upper atmosphere experiments carried out

were a cosmic ray scintillation counter and electron temperature measurement.

The supply of kerosene ran out early, at 128 seconds, and this was followed by 14 seconds of ‘cold’ burning (i. e. HTP only). The final shut-down occurred at the correct time. Subsequent analysis of records indicated that a leak had developed in the kerosene supply system which accounted for the excessive kerosene flow rate.

Initiation of second stage separation was dependent on the operation of an inertia switch, and as a result of a drop in first stage performance, associated with cold burning, the acceleration was not high enough to operate the switch. Because of this, events following burnout, such as second stage separation, spin, ignition, head

separation and recording did not take

place. Had the second stage operated, the resultant re-entry velocity would have been adequate for a satisfactory experiment.

In view of this, alternative methods for arming second stage separation, not dependent on first stage performance, were subsequently employed.