Category AN AIRIINE AN0 ITS AIRCRAFT

N73ITW

unnonmrmnoomon поооооооооОооп’ОдооздппгГГкпопа

This picture epitomizes the beginning of the Jet Age. T. W.A.’s Boeing 707-131 N731TW is pictured on the ramp at San Francisco early in 1959, and parked next to a United Air Lines Douglas DC-7, symbol of a former era. The handsome airport building does not yet have the air bridge

connection, and the crew stands ready with the mobile staircase.

‘ Nomed London Town and inaugurated Idlewild—Heathrow – Frankfurt service, 23 Nov 1959.

BOEING 707-33IB

(All aircraft sold to Boeing Military Airplane Co.)

* Cockpit was destroyed by a bomb in Damascus 29 Aug 69. New nose section built by Boeing and trans­ported to Damascus ond installed. Reregistered as N28714 24 Dec 69 after threats to destroy tbe same aircraft were made.

BOEING 707-33IB (A)

(Except where noted, all sold to Boeing Military Airplane Co.) * Hijacked from Frankfurt, Germany 6 Sep 70.

* Flew JFK – O’Hare-Kansas City as T. W.A.’s last commercial 707 flight, 31 Oct 83.

BOEING 707-373C (H)

BOEING 707-338C (H)

BOEING 720-05IB

This Boeing 707-33IB (Advanced) had the new ‘outlined’
TRANS WORLD marking, and a revised logo style on the tail.

The 707 “Intercontinental” had a longer fuselage, larger improved wing, taller vertical fin, and a ventral fin below the tail. Note the ‘blow-in doors’ on the “Dyna-Fan” engine nacelles’ forward section.

Progressive Improvement

With the 707 series, Boeing became the world’s leader in airliner manufacturing. The classic Boeing 707 came in several forms. Initially, the -100 was a comfortable transcontinental air­liner, but was limited across the Atlantic, having to stop at Gander or Shannon in the westbound direction. Its Pratt & Whitney JT4A-9 straight jet engines were known, rather unkindly, as the “Ole Smokies.” The -300, with JT3Cs and a slightly longer fuselage, was much better, and the -300B with JT3D turbofans and improved wing better still. The -331B(A-H) (Advanced – Heavy) had a heavy-duty landing gear, allowing a gross take-off weight up to 335,000 lb. They had more range, more capacity, and were more profitable than previous versions. The greater power enabled the -300 to be able to cut about half a mile from the take-off distance required by the other Boeings.

T. W.A.’s Decision

Having demonstrated considerable ingenuity and initiative, not to mention technical confi­dence, in launching its transcontinental jet service with a single Boeing 707-131 on 20 March 1959 (page 67). T. W.A. did not rush immediately to match Pan American on the trans-Atlantic route. It elected to await the availability of the longer-ranged -331, and meanwhile concen­trated on expanding its domestic network so that T. W.A. Boeings were competing with Amer­ican’s at all the major cities. Ultimately, the -331s were deployed on the New York-London-Frankfurt route on 23 November 1959. T. W.A. had lost a whole year to its arch­rival Pan American, and with other problems of a non-technical or operational nature, the air­line had a long fight on its hands.

Engines Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3 (18,000 lb. thrust) x 4 Length 153 feet

MGT0W 335,0001b Span 146 feet

Range 4,000 miles Height 42 feet

The Smaller Boeings

To meet a requirement for routes of lower traffic density, Boeing produced a shorter-bodied version, the 720, 8 feet shorter than the -100, but with the same wing. T. W.A. also had one Series -138, which was 10 feet shorter than the basic type, and designed for the Australian airline QANTAS, with extra tankage for maximum trans-Pacific range. T. W.A. operated a total of 133 Boeing 707s, and made good use of them all over the world.

T. W.A. introduced the Boeing 767 on the Los Angeles-Washington route on 2 December 1982. The first of the Douglas DC-9-80s (MD-80s) entered service on 3 May the next year, and on 31 October 1983, the last T. W.A. Boeing 707 made its final flight from New York to Kansas City. The airline expanded its route system but in February 1984, it once again became a separate cor­poration and, in a deteriorating financial situation, T. W.A. tightened its belt (see page 90).

Another T. W.A. First

Nevertheless, and possibly overshadowing these events in a wider airline context, was another claim to firstliness that T. W.A. could add to its already impressive list of such pio­neering events. On 1 February 1985, it became the first U. S. airline to fly a twin-engined airliner, the Boeing 767, across the Atlantic in scheduled passenger service. This was under the EROPS program certificated by the F. A.A. (See page 88). Today, more Boeing 767s fly across the Atlantic than all the other aircraft types combined — and many of the latter are twin-engined too.

TWA’s 767 VARIANTS

Enter Howard Hughes

After Charles Lindbergh, and sharing fame with Amelia Earhart, Howard Hughes was America’s most famous avia­tor personality in the 1930s. He was admired by the public, respected by politicians who were aware of the power of his wealth, and recognized by the aviation community for his achievements. His wealth had been inherited from his parents who had died in the early 1920s, and at the age of 18 he began to expand the family business, the Hughes Tool Company, which held close to a monopoly of oil drilling bits.

Tlie Phenomenon

Taking to the business world like a duck to water—one com­mentator said that he ran his entire operation “out of his hip pocket for nearly 40 years”—he worked hard and played hard. He made films, including such epics as Scarface, Hell’s Angels, and The Outlaw. He romanced movie stars and flew airplanes. Everything he did was at the highest level of attain­ment, and this included his flying activities. Having won the Sportsman’s Trophy in 1934, he founded the Hughes Air­craft Company and built—and flew—a racing airplane, the H-l, and beat the world’s landplane speed record in 1935. The following year, in a Northrop Gamma, he broke the transcontinental speed record, and in 1937 broke it again, in his H-l. In this latter case, he flew at an altitude of 14,000 feet, using oxygen, and received the Harmon Trophy. In July 1938, in a Lockheed 14, he flew around the world in less than four days, averaging 202 mph. He had made meticulous preparations, and demonstrated systems of radio communica­tion, weather reporting, and navigation that were in advance of their time. The aircraft was known as The Flying Labora­tory,’ and for this flight, he received the Collier Trophy from President Roosevelt himself.

Into the Airline Fray

Howard came into the airline industry, therefore, with impressive credentials. By 1937, T. W.A. had passed out of the control by the Pennsylvania Railroad and North American Aviation (by the conditions of the 1934 Air Mail legislation) and was owned by Yellow Cabs’ John Hertz and Lehman Brothers, the investment bankers. T. W.A. President, Jack Frye, did not apparently like the control and approached Hughes with a view to starting another airline, which Hughes would finance and Frye would manage. Howard had another idea. In April 1939 he bought 25% of T. W.A. stock and by 1940 had increased this to a dominating 78%. He took over a great airline and set about the task of making it even better.

This picture epitomizes the tremendous impetus given to the United States airline industry during the latter 1930s. The busy scene can be contrasted with that of what was then a modern airport in the late 1920s (page 19), only a decade earlier. The DC-3 was truly the first transport airplane that could be called a modern airliner; and but for T. W.A. it might never have happened.

Up to the Limit

The progress of air transport, since its establishment as an industry in the 1920s, had been char­acterized by an emphasis on speed. In 1950, the jet-powered de Havilland Comet almost dou­bled the speed, at 500 mph, of the best piston-engined airliners, and in 1958 the Boeing 707 (and later the Douglas DC-8) took this to 600 mph. By this time, there were thoughts of a supersonic airliner as a longer-term successor to the Big Jets, as they were called; but the air­lines still sought higher speeds from the currently-available technology. Theoretically, the designers felt that, even if they could not penetrate the sound barrier, they could come close to it, so that, with an airliner that could approach 650 mph, this would be worth a significant saving of time on a long-distance route, and give the operating airline a competitive advantage.

No Room (or Three

The post-war piston-engined rivalry between Douglas and Lockheed had now given way to a Jet Age rivalry between Boeing and Douglas. Throughout airline history, a third contestant had never been able to make its mark; and economic studies have demonstrated that the full bene­fits of competition on any route are invariably achieved by two competitors, not necessarily three. And all too often, the third contestant cannot achieve an adequate share of the market. Similarly, a third manufacturer can end up with financial losses because of insufficient sales. No doubt, this consideration was in Lockheed’s mind when it decided not to build a rival to the 707 or DC-8, but turned to a prop-jet (turboprop) airliner, the Model 188 Electra.

The Convair Challenge

The Consolidated-Vultee, or Convair, company of San Diego, flush with its huge success in building the Liberator bomber and other military aircraft, had entered the commercial market after the War with its short-haul “DC-3 Replacement,” the Convair 240/340/440. In the mid – 1950s, the company decided to enter the Big Jet market. Its entry, the Convair 880 (see next page) was similar in design to the 707 and the DC-8, in that its engines were suspended in pods under a swept wing. Its speed was marginally faster than those of its rivals. This caught the interest of American Airlines, which ordered an even faster version, the Convair 990. The latter’s speed, however, was not significantly greater.

T. W.A.’S CONVAIR 880 (MODEL 22-1) FLEET

A fine shot of N815TW inflight.

New Brooms

The final exodus of Howard Hughes from T. W.A. occurred in 1966 (see pg 73). The big lenders, Equitable Life and Metropolitan Life, now held the pursestrings, taking effect from 1 January 1961, when the voting trust controlled the directions of invest­ment. The crisis was overcome. Ernest Breech, formerly with the Ford Motor Com­pany, took over as chairman on 27 April 1961, Charles Tillinghast having replaced Warren Lee Pierson as president on 17 April. They made a top-level team, respected in Wall Street as well as in Washington. The Lockheed L-1011 program got under way, and service began in 1972. The fleet consisted of 19 Boeing 747s, 104 Boeing 707s, 72 Boeing 727s, 25 Convair 880s, and 19 Douglas DC-9s. The total of 239 air­liners comprised a formidable armada.

Diversification

Back in 1967, T. W.A. had purchased the Hilton Hotel chain, matching Pan Ameri­can’s move in buying Intercontinental Hotels. Now, “having lost sight of their objec­tives, they redoubled their efforts.” On 12 October 1978, the shareholders approved the organization of the Trans World Corporation, as a holding company for the air­line; the Canteen Company (an on-board catering service, acquired on 10 August 1973); and Century 21 (areal estate organization). A week later, thirteen more aircraft were ordered, including three Boeing 747SPs. On 9 June 1979, this latter aircraft was able to offer nonstop service from New York to Cairo; but this was after, on 2 March 1975, T. W.A. had agreed to a route exchange with Pan American, in which T. W.A. suspended service on the trans-Pacific route, and abandoned service at Bangkok, Bombay, and Frankfurt. The SPs never earned their keep. (See pages 84-85)

Post-Deregulation Oligopoly

The Airline Deregulation Act of 24 October 1978, had been expected to launch new initiatives, mainly with lower fares, for the benefit of the travelling public. About 150 companies applied for certificates from the Department of Transportation; only about a third of these ever started service; and a mere handful lasted more than a year or two. Meanwhile, the big airlines became more concentrated that ever before. After a decade of deregulation, a higher percentage of U. S. air traffic was in the hands of fewer air­lines than when when the industry was regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Meanwhile, TWA tightened its belt. The early 1980s witnessed a period of Survival of the Fittest, as the competition was frequently almost self-destructive. T. W.A. survived, but at a cost. On 1 September 1983, all salaried personnel and management accepted a 10% pay cut, and on 30 November ALPA, the Air Line Pilots Association — nor­mally involved in seeking pay increases — took a similar reduction.

Divorce

On 1 February 1984, Trans World Airlines once again became a separate corpora­tion, when it was broken clear from the parent company, which had been established on 12 October 1978 —just in time for Airline Deregulation (see above). Other units of the Trans World Corporation were profitable, unaffected by the changing regula­tory scene. But T. W.A., out of whose heritage the conglomerate had sprung, now “suffered from lagging sales, high debt load, and high operating costs.” The omens in the mid-1980s were not good.

LaMott T Cohu After Jack Frye resigned in February 1947, after a disagreement with Howard Hughes, Cohu became president.

During that period, Hughes and the Tool Company controlled T. W. A. affairs. Cohu resigned on 1 June 1948.

Warren Lee Pierson had been chairman and managing director of T. W. A. Internat­ional in April 1947, and came into promi­nence again when he became acting president on 9 January 1958, before Charles Thomas took over (see below).

Carter Burgess became president of T. W.A. on 23 January 1956, after Ralph Damon died on 4 January 1956 (see page 61). Damon had been a good partner for Hughes, but Burgess never even met his chief He lasted only until the end of the year.

Charles Thomas took over the presidency on 15 July 1958, after a hiatus during which T W. A. had been a ship without a sail. He resigned on 27 July 1960, providing the reason for Hughes’s ouster by the voting trust (see

page 73).

Charles Tillinghast became president of
Trans World Airlines on 17 April 1961, and
was to guide its fortunes for the next two
decades. He was at the helm when the
Trans World Corporation was formed on
12 October 1978.

Ernest Breech was the experienced business
leader, formerly chairman of the Ford Motor
Company, who had taken over the front
office of T. W.A. on 27 April 1961. He and
Tillinghast kept the airline on course.

Nostalgic Comfort

That an airline with such a history of pioneering and achieve­ment as T. W.A. to have fallen upon hard times was cause for sadness. Adding up the figures over the course of half a cen­tury, not a single penny of accumulated profits could be iden­tified in the true sense of the term. Yet the airline had sponsored new generations of aircraft (of which the entire industry benefitted). Perhaps another fascinating connection with technical progress is to trace T. W.A.’s record of its con­nection with the motion picture industry.

Hand-Cranked

Not long after T. W.A.’s ancestor, Transcontinental Air Transport (T. A.T.) started coast – to-coast service in July 1929 (see page 24), an announcement in the showbiz publi­cation Billboard of 19 October stated “Last week the T. A.T. ship leaving Port Columbus, on its westward hop to Waynoka, carried projection equipment, a program of Uni­versal Pictures, and an operator. The show was given during the flight to Waynoka and again on the second hop of the trip between Clovis and Los Angeles.” The projector used 16mm film and was set up on a board across the arms of two seats in the back row of the Ford Tri-Motor. The Duograph projec­tor, the lightest on the market, and housed in aluminum, was “of the hand-crank style, altho future installations will prob­ably be motor driven.”

The article speculated that this experiment would become a regular feature, but more than 30 years were to pass before the amenity was adopted by the airlines, and T. A.T. s successor, T. W.A., was the prime innovator.

In-Flight Movies

With the wide-bodied aircraft providing more headroom than in the piston-engined aircraft, the airlines had, in the early 1960s, experimented with showing motion pictures, mainly to relieve boredom on long transcontinental and trans-ocean flights. Trans-Atlantic passengers were treated to various types of screen and different viewpoints. Once the idea was promoted, every self-respecting major airline had to have them. Trans World Airlines introduced the first successful permanent system, on 19 July 1961. The movie was By Love Possessed, starring Lana Turner.

Carl Icahn

Like many a self-made man, Carl Icahn did not have wealthy parents. But he had the Midas Touch. He began on Wall Street in 1961, and founded Icahn & Company in 1968 with his own savings and some borrowed capital. His seat on the New York Stock Exchange was worth $150,000. By the mid-1980s, this had increased by 1,000 percent to $150 million. In 1985 he became interested in the airline industry and the opportunities offered by the liberal climate of airline deregulation.

First Overtures

On 9 May 1985, Carl Icahn filed a registration statement with the S. E.C. (Security Exchange Commission) to state that he had accumulated 6,745,000 shares, or 20.5%, of T. W.A. common stock, a process that he had begun earlier in March. A week later, this percentage had increased to 23%, drawing a comment from T. W.A. that this “transfer of control was uninvited and undesirable.” The next day, on 15 May, T. W.A. filed suit in the New York District Court, alleging that Icahn was in violation of the federal securities laws. The day after that, the airline filed a petition with the Department of Trans­portation to investigate the fitness aspects of the take-over bid, questioning Icahn’s managerial skills and technical abil­ities, regulation compliances, capital resources, and the lack of an operational plan.

Carl’s response, on 20 May, was an unsolicited proposal to T. W.A. shareholders of $18.00 per share, and T. W.A. coun­tered on 23 May with a request to the D. O.T. for emergency action, and also sought support in the corridors of political power on Capital Hill. The battle for control heated up. On 28 May the T. W.A. board recommended the pursuance of a better offer, possibly an employee buyout; but lost an appeal for restraint in the New York U. S. District Court. The Circuit Court of the County of St. Louis then issued a restraining order, prohibiting Icahn from acquiring additional shares.

Challenge from Lorenzo

On 13 June, a new player entered the skirmish for control of T. W.A., whose employees and management were now mere bystanders. Frank Lorenzo, whose Texas Air Corporation controlled Continental Airlines and New York Air, announced that he had won unanimous approval of a “definite merger agreement, providing for T. W.A. to become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Texas Air.” The offer was $19.00 in cash, plus 14-1/2% cumulative non-convertible preferred stock. On 25

June, Richard D. Pearson succeeded C. E.Meyer as airline president and C. E.O. He was to play a small part in persuad­ing the directors to make up their minds.

Carl Icahn Wins

On 5 August 1985, Icahn renewed his efforts, offering $19.50 cash, plus $4.50 of a 14.5% stock issue. On 13 August, Lorenzo raised his offer to $26.00 per share. But on 7 September he agreed to withdraw, in exchange for surrender­ing the Texas Air Corporation’s option on 6.4 million T. W.A. shares for $43 million. This was somewhat reminiscent of Lorenzo’s coup in collecting a similar profit when wrestling with Pan American to take over National Airlines.

On 14 June a Boeing 727 was hijacked in North Africa and the aircraft was not returned until 16 August. This was not a way to greet the new owner, who settled into his new occupation, and went through the necessary legal processes to pave the way for a merger agreement between Icahn & Company and Trans World Airlines, consummated on 26 September 1986. He had already made a good move. On 27 February of that year, he purchased Ozark Holdings, Inc., the parent company of St. Louis-based Ozark Air Lines, for $224 million. The story of this Local Service airline, and its valu­able regional route network and fleet, is told in the next six pages of this book

8 seats • 160 mph

Marquette’s Stinson A wore the original American Airlines blue and orange color scheme with the addition of the Marquette winged logo on the aft fuselage.

Stinson A Trimotor

In January 1938, Midwest Airlines was formed in St. Louis. The name was changed almost immediately to Marquette Air Lines (named after a French missionary-explorer of Upper Michigan) and it promptly leased four Stinson Model A tri-motors from American Airlines. It began service on 20 April of that year under Mail Contract AM 58 on a route St Louis- Cincinnati-Dayton-Toledo-Detroit.

Important Route Extension

Within a few months, the directors approved the purchase of the stock by T. W.A. which leased the route from 14 August 1940. The Civil Aeronautics Board delayed giving the takeover its blessing for two years, but the purchase was completed on 5 December 1941. The 564-mile route, which gave T. W.A. an important link from Detroit to its transcontinental trunk line, cost $350,000.

85 seats *610 mph

TWA

Another example of “Machat’s Law” is T. W.A. і Convair 880 nose radome in either all-black, light gray with black nose dot, or all-light gray. The original delivery scheme is illustrated here.

N804TW on the ramp at Phoenix in 1964, in T. W.A. ’s handsome paint scheme, with the slogan Superjet
at the rear of the fuselage, together with the twin-hemisphere logo, (photo: Roger Bentley)

The four-engined jet was at first called the Convair-600, then the Skylark, or the Golden Arrow, and was originally intended to challenge the 707 and the DC-8 on domestic routes. It was sponsored by T. W.A., still strongly influenced by Howard Hughes, who, late in 1955, placed an initial order for 30 Convair 880s, as the new airliner was eventually called. Delta Air Lines also ordered the 880 and was the first into service, on 15 May I960.

This was because T. W.A.’s owner, Howard Hughes, was running into difficulties. The air­line was in an unusual position in that its aircraft were owned by Hughes’s powerful Hughes Tool Company (Toolco) to which it paid a rental of about one million dollars per year per air­plane. But even Toolco’s pockets were not bottomless, and could not finance T. W.A.’s purchase of the Convair 880s. As a consequence of the legal delays, which had far-reaching conse­quences (see page 73) T. W.A. did not begin Convair 880 service until 12 January 1961.

The First Ozark Airlines

On 1 September 1943, a Missouri bus operator, Laddie Hamilton, with support from a colleague, Floyd W. Jones, incorporated Ozark Airlines in Springfield. This followed the initiative of L. Welch Pogue, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, by order dated 22 March 1943, to investigate the possibilities of extending air service “to the nation as a whole, including provision for local service to small communities.”

On 11 July 1944, the C. A.B. permitted operations on a strictly local basis. After sporadic operations with a few Fairchild and Stinson monoplanes, Ozark began scheduled service on 10 January 1945 on a triangular route wholly within the State of Missouri, using at first a couple of Beech F17D “Staggerwings,” and then two Cessna UC-78 twin – engined “Bamboo Bombers.” The whole affair had been somewhat cavalier in its approach, and lasted only until 28 November of the same year, because of apparent irregulari­ties in the registration process.

Parks Air Transport

Meanwhile, another aspirant to operate a local airline was Parks Air Transport, organized by Oliver L. Parks, founder
of Parks Air College at East St. Louis in 1927. On 1 Novem­ber 1946, it was selected by the C. A.B., in the Mississippi Valley Service Case, to operate a network from Tulsa to Chicago, via St. Louis and other small cities. In July 1949, the Board opened the Parks Investigation Case, as Parks had not opened service. Eventually, on 15 June 1950, Parks Air Lines started to fly from St. Louis to Chicago (see map) on the Inter Urban Grain Belt Route, but it was a case of “too little, too late.” The C. A.B. cancelled Parks’s certificate on 28 July, and simultaneously granted Ozark Air Lines a three-year experimental one.

Ozark Air Lines Begins

The rejuvenated Ozark began operations with a small fleet of Douglas DC-3s on 26 September 1950, taking over the Parks routes and immediately expanding service to almost every small community within a 200-mile radius from St. Louis. Concentrating on connections to, from, and between St. Louis and Chicago, the network reached as far west as Wichita by 1953, and Sioux City by 1955, and as far east as Louisville and Nashville. By the mid-1950s, Ozark was pro­viding good service not only to the small towns but also to every major city in six states of the Midwest.

28 seats • 190 mph

The Challenger 250

During the post-war period, when the airline industry was developing rapidly on all fronts, there was much talk about the dream of building a replacement for the pre-war twin-engined Douglas DC-3, or the military C-47, that had proved to be a versatile maid-of-all-work.

Several attempts were made by manufacturers to build a replacement, but they were unsuccessful, mainly because thousands of the old DC-3s were still perfectly operational, and threatened to go on for ever. To build a brand-new DC-3, with improvements, was too costly, although a few “Hyper-DC-3s” were tried out. Ozark Air Lines elected to compromise, by extensive modifications to the old Gooney Bird: new wheel-well doors, flush antennas, a new oil-cooler scoop, new wing fillet fairings, aileron gap covers, shorter exhaust stacks, and better engine cowlings. The Ozark DC-3s were called Challenger 250s and although heavier than the standard versions, their aerodynamic improvements gave them an extra 20 mph.

This particular aircraft was built as a DST (see page 41), and was only the sixth DC-3 off the production line in Santa Monica, California. At one time it held the record for being the oldest DC-3 in commercial service. Note the streamlined “Super DC-3” landing gear doors.

OZARK’S DOUGLAS DC-3S

Up, Up, and Away

T. W.A. had been experimenting with high-altitude flying for most of the 1930s, ever since ex-Naval Lieutenant D. W. “Tommy” Tomlinson started serious work in 1934 with the Northrop Gamma (see page 27). During the two years 1935­1936, he was estimated to have done more flying (with oxygen equipment) at altitudes above 30,000 feet than all other pilots, military and civil, combined. His experience— in practical terms exclusive to T. W.A.—led to the conclusion that 95% of all weather problems occurred below 16,000 feet, so that an aircraft that flew at 20,000 feet would be much smoother in flight, and faster.

Improved Comfort Level

The full benefit that such an innovation brought to the airline clientele is sometimes forgotten. Unpressurized DC-3s, which were flying 85% of the airline mileage in the United States by 1940, were a great improvement over the old Fords; but they still had to fly at low altitudes and through weather that was too often very turbulent, mainly because of low
clouds that could not be avoided. The term “air pocket” was used to describe sudden, sometimes violent, changes of alti­tude, in which the aircraft would drop suddenly, and so would the passengers, except for their stomachs. Air sickness, rare today, was a common occurrence in the 1930s.

T. W.A. Does It Again

The introduction of the Boeing 307 Stratoliner, described on the opposite page, was the first commercial aircraft to incorporate cabin pressurization to eliminate the discomfort of low altitude flying. Even though the differential against sea level pressure was only 2-1/2 lb/square inch, this was enough to enable the 307 to cruise at 20,000 feet “above the weather.” Although on the transcontinental route, two stops still had to be made, and sometimes three, when T. W.A. inau­gurated the service on 8 July 1940, it cut the coast-to-coast time to less than 14 hours, some four hours quicker than the DC-3’s. One of the economies for the airline was a marked decline in the budget allocated for the purchase of sick-bags, and, in those days, sick-cups.

Confident Start

T. W.A. had entered the North Atlantic airways artery in 1946, to face two incumbent airlines from the United States, and, by 1948, seven national airlines from Europe. The United States contingent, comprising Pan American, American Overseas (A. O.A.), and T. W.A., was dominant, carrying about 60% of the total annual passengers, which, by 1950, had exceeded 300,000. In that year, thanks to the popularity of the Constel­lation, T. W.A. had almost overtaken Juan Trippe’s Pan Am, with 66,000 V. 69.000 passengers. But no sooner had Howard Hughes changed the name to Trans World Airlines, he was confronted with the merger of Pan American and A. O.A., which accounted for 40,000 passengers. This enabled Pan Am to maintain its lead, although T. W.A. was comfortably in second place until 1958.

Obstacles to Progress

When the Jet Age began, however (and as described on page 69) T. W.A. was not prepared for the North Atlantic onslaught. Financial stringency had obliged it to concentrate on the domestic network, while awaiting the long-range Boeing 707s, and a year’s delay cost it dearly. The British B. O.A. C., which had really started the Jet Age, temporarily, with the

Comet in 1952, got into its stride, and pushed T. W.A. into third place for several years. One reason was that both Pan American and B. O.A. C. operated the splendid Boeing 377 Stratocruisers which had great appeal for the trans-ocean air traveller, with its luxury amenities that included a downstairs cocktail bar. And in addition to the Boeing 707, B. O.A. C. had also introduced the Bristol Britannia turboprop ‘Whispering Giant’ to provide added capacity.

T. W.A. Takes the Lead

But during the 1960s, with new ownership and management T. W.A. began to reassert itself. It built up the Boeing 707 fleet energetically, and eventually 133 aircraft—almost as many as Pan Am. By 1969, it had overtaken the hitherto unas­sailable Pan Am, and continued to maintain at least parity throughout the 1970s. Indeed, many regular trans-Atlantic travellers habitually expressed a preference for the T. W.A. operation and service standards, a reputation that was main­tained until in more recent times British Airways gradually claimed ascendancy, and Pan American’s demise was accom­panied by T. W.A. owner Carl Icahn’s sale of the coveted London routes in 1991 and 1992.

This chart shows the change of leadership on the North Atlantic
air route during the 1960s.