Category The Chinese Air Force

The PLAAF’s personnel management system (A#®l) consists of sepa­rate organizations for the officer (cadre) corps and the enlisted force. The Polit­ical Department’s Cadre Department down to the regiment level is responsible for managing officer records, promotions, and appointments.121 Meanwhile, the Headquarters Department’s Military Affairs Department is responsible for managing the enlisted force records and appointments, while the political offi­cer system is responsible for gathering information on the enlisted personnel, and the Party Committee system is responsible for their promotions. One key point is that the PLAAF does not have a central promotions board. Instead, the Party Committee at the corps to regiment levels is responsible for promoting all officers and enlisted personnel at the next lower level.122 One of the reasons for this is that most personnel remain in the same unit most of their career.

The Air Force Encyclopedia has several entries for the PLAAF’s mobiliza­tion system (ййІФФО reserve forces (й^ЛИШ).123 The PLAAF’s mobiliza­tion system consists of an air force mobilization organization and reserve forces, which support the air force’s reserve power transition from peacetime to wartime, and for its personnel, materials, and financial power to serve operations.124 In the 1950s, the PLAAF created a Mobilization Division (^M&) within the Head­quarters Department and a similar organization in each Headquarters Depart­ment down to the regiment level. In 1998, however, the PLAAF abolished all of these organizations and placed the mobilization responsibility under the Military Affairs Department within the Headquarters Department. In 2002, the Mobiliza­tion Department created an Air Force National Defense Mobilization Committee Comprehensive Office (^¥ВК^М©М#Іт^&&Й) to manage mobilization issues. This office coordinated with the air forces Military Affairs Departments, as well as local governments and army units from the military district level down.125 PLAAF mobilization includes expanding the size of units, as well as mobilizing troops and their equipment, furnishing logistics support, and providing technical service support.126 It is not clear how much the PLAAF has been involved in mobi­lization work. Shortly after a new National Defense Mobilization Law became effective in July 2010, however, the PLAAF conducted its first-ever mobilization exercise involving militia using construction equipment to repair a “damaged air­field following a surprise enemy attack.”127

The concept of PLAAF reserve forces is fairly new. The PLAAF translates the terms houbei (й#) andyubeiyi ffiWix) as “reserve,” causing confusion when using only the English term. Houbei is a generic term for reserve forces includ­ing personnel, equipment, technology, civilian aircraft, and materials. Various definitions imply that PLAAF yubeiyi reserve personnel are part of the houbei system.128 In 2004, the PLAAF began developing reserve forces in three particu­lar areas: field station flight support personnel, surface-to-air missile regiments, and radar battalions. In January 2010, the PLAAF issued “Air Force Reserve Unit Work Regulations” codifying the changes in its organizational structure.129

Implications of the PLAAF Organizational Structure upon Its Future Development

As has been explicated, the PLAAF’s organizational structure has multiple components and layers, many of which overlap, generating redundancies. From an overall perspective, the structure has not changed appreciably over the past 30 years. While some organizations and departments have been abolished or merged as a result of force reductions, the remaining ones have stayed largely intact, serv­ing the needs of the service even as the world around it has changed dramatically.

Perhaps because of this unchanging quality, it is invariably significant— and thus important to note—when a change does occur. For example, when the PLAAF downgraded all the corps leader-grade headquarters in 2004 to either corps deputy leader-grade or division leader-grade CPs, it altered the com­mand structure vertically within the PLAAF and horizontally with the other services. Specifically, under the new structure, the division leader-grade CPs cannot command an air division, which is at the same level, or interact as an equal with a group army, which is a corps-level organization. Even the corps deputy leader-grade CPs are still not at the same level as the group armies. The PLAAF is still working out the mechanics of this major change.

Unsubstantiated reports out of Hong Kong have indicated the PLA may undergo a major restructuring to replace the seven MR Headquarters with four theater commands.130 In addition, since the PLA has already had 10 major force restructurings since the early 1950s, the last of which occurred in 2004, there is a good possibility another downsizing will occur before or shortly after the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Either or both of these events will most likely alter the PLAAF’s force structure, especially the MRAF Headquarters, with major implications for the PLAAF’s overall command and control structure.

In terms of its air order of battle, the PLAAF has reduced the num­ber of air divisions from a high of 50 in the late 1980s to 29 today. This reduction occurred in conjunction with a drop in the total number of aircraft, the incorporation of newer models, and establishing a transition training base in each of the seven MRAFs in 1986. While some air divisions today field more than one type of combat aircraft, most regiments have only one type so as to simplify logis­tics and maintenance. The new units are still in the early stages of conducting dis­similar aircraft training, but the diverse organizational structure within each air division has made it easier to do. Given the current distribution of air divisions among the seven MRAFs, the number of divisions will probably remain the same over the next decade, but the composition and number of subordinate regiments will probably change as older aircraft are taken out of the inventory and replaced by a fewer number of modern multirole aircraft.

It is not clear how many SAM units, especially long-range SAMs, the PLAAF has, but the number is apparently growing and the units are being deployed in more MRAFs.

Another important example of change is that the PLAAF has gradually incorporated its electronic countermeasures mission and organizational struc­ture with the radar forces. Significantly, the PLAAF Headquarters merged man­agement of the two types of specialty forces into an Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department subordinate to the Headquarters Depart­

ment and combined research for them into the Air Force Radar and Electronic Countermeasures Research Institute under the Air

Force Equipment Research Academy. In addition, the Air Force Radar College has an Electronic Countermeasures Academic Department that provides

education and training for officers and NCOs assigned to operational unit elec­tronic countermeasures billets. Besides merging radar and ECM administrative and research functions as noted above, the PLAAF began merging several radar regiments into brigades during the 2003-2004 force restructuring. Although it is now easier to command more company-level radar sites as a result of information technology, the PLAAF is still concerned about span of control from a geographic perspective. Restructuring of the Equipment Department in 1998 and creation of the Equipment Research Academy in 2004 have had important implications for consolidating and managing all of the PLAAF’s equipment and weapons systems. No significant organizational changes are anticipated to these two organizations in the next 5 years. That said, however, the biggest change within this system will be the inclusion of new officers and enlisted personnel who received their undergrad­uate education at civilian academic institutions rather than PLAAF institutions.

The education and training system will most likely undergo some more restructuring over the next decade. The Air Force Engineering University was created in 1999 and the Air Force Aviation University was created in 2004 with the goal of consolidating basic education for cadets in specific fields and then providing specialty training at subordinate colleges. In addition, the Guilin Air Force College, which had always trained AAA cadets, began educating and training the PLAAF’s airborne officer cadets in 1999. Given that the goal was to have 60 percent of all new PLAAF officers in 2010 graduate from civilian colleges, including from the Defense Student Program, and that the PLA most likely did not meet this goal, the PLAAF’s academic institutions will most likely undergo some more restructuring as the number of cadets is reduced to meet the 60 percent goal.131

Finally, the PLAAF does not have an extensive reserve program, a cir­cumstance which most likely will not change over the next few years. However, following the implementation of the new National Defense Mobilization Law in July 2010, the PLAAF most likely will become more involved in mobilizing civilian organizations to support it. At the same time, however, the PLA has implemented some personnel changes that have allowed PLAAF flag officers to assume a few key national-level leadership positions as shown in table 4-7.

To put narrative to these data points, in 2003, the CMC appointed Lieu­tenant General Zheng Shenxia to become the first air force commandant of the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS).132 He received his third star in 2004. Upon his retirement in 2007, another PLAAF flag officer, Lieutenant General Liu Chengjun, assumed his position, receiving his own third star in 2010. Since 2004, the commander of the PLAAF (along with the commander of the PLA Navy and Second Artillery) has been a member of the CMC—the national command authority for the PRC. General Qiao Qingchen was appointed in 2004 and was replaced by Xu Qiliang in 2007. Only two PLAAF officers, Liu Yalou (1956-1965) and Zhang Tingfa (1977-1982), had previously served as CMC members. Since 2006, the CMC has assigned the first PLAAF offi­cers as commandant and political commissar at the National Defense Uni­versity. In 2006, the CMC appointed Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian as the first PLAAF officer to serve as commandant.133 In 2007, Ma became one of the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff with the important portfolio of intelligence and foreign affairs for the entire PLA. He received his third star in 2010 and will most likely have to retire in 2012. In 2010, the CMC appointed Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou as the first PLAAF officer to serve as NDU political com­missar. Prior to that, he was one of the PLAAF’s deputy political commissars.

Since 2006 (and as shown in table 4-7), the CMC has appointed PLAAF flag officers as one of the three or four deputy directors in the GPD and one of the four or five deputies in the GLD.134 As a result, the PLAAF is increasingly involved in developing PLA-wide policies to a greater degree than in the past; however, these do not appear to be permanent air force billets. For example, in 2006, Lieutenant General Li Maifu became the first PLAAF deputy director of the GLD. However, when he retired in late 2009 or early 2010, it does not appear that he was replaced by a PLAAF officer.135 No PLAAF (or PLAN) officers have served as a deputy in the GAD, which implies that the GAD is less “joint” than the other three general departments. Each MR Headquarters has an average of five deputy commanders. Since 1988, each MRAF commander and fleet commander has served concurrently as an MR deputy commander; however, no PLAAF offi­cers have served as the director of an MR first-level department and only a few PLAAF personnel apparently hold positions in any of the departments.136

Based on this history, if the PLA does restructure its Military Region system into strategic theaters, there is a high probability army officers will still dominate the leadership positions in the Central Military Commission, Gen­eral Departments, and Theater Headquarters, while PLAAF officers will rotate in and out as the head of the Adademy of Military Science and the National Defense University. The PLAAF will make its way onward into the 21st cen­tury, aided—and encumbered—by its unique and ever-fascinating organiza­tional structure and culture.

Xu’s call for the air force to establish a concept of “air and space security” is directly related to its strategy of integrated air and space operations. Inte­grated air and space operations refer to the organic combining of airpower and spacepower to form an integrated air-space force. According to PLAAF ana­lysts, the air and space battlefield is the main domain for information collec­tion in which the space component plays an important role. Spy satellites, for example, can legally conduct reconnaissance over other countries. Navigation satellites can provide accurate positioning data. Communication satellites can provide global communications support.17 In addition, seizing air and space superiority prevents the enemy from gaining strategic air and space superior­ity.18 According to two prominent PLAAF researchers, “military activities in the air and space battlefield have already matured into the main military force of high technology local wars.”19

Research on integrated air and space operations began in 1990 when Dong Wenxian at PLAAF Headquarters proposed “the control of high-altitude three-dimensional territorial airspace”—a euphemism for operations in outer space.20 In 2000, a project championed by the President of the Air Force Engi­neering University, Major General Cai Fengzhen, was initiated with Senior Colonel Tian Anping as the project lead. This project was inspired by a book published by the PLA Navy (PLAN) entitled Looking Toward the Pacific (Й^ ¥>¥Ш). These researchers realized that while the navy was extending its look horizontally, the air force had to extend its look vertically, to outer space.

This project resulted in two monographs entitled The Air and Space Bat­tlefield and China’s Air Force (Й^К±^ФНЙ¥) published in 2004, and Inte­grated Air and Space Operations Studies (Й^—ФІТК^) published in 2006. At the same time, in 2003, Li Rongchang (Dean of the Telecommunications Engineering School at the Air Force Engineering University) published Inte­grated Air and Space Information Operations (Й^—ФІШ^ТТК), as one of the projects of the air force’s 10th Five-year Plan for military theory research. Since then, researchers at the Air Force Command College, including Wang Ming – liang (Deputy Department Head of Research), Ji Yan (Deputy Director of the Institute’s Strategic Research Office), and strategist Major General Qiao Liang, among others, have also researched integrated air and space operations.21

Integrated air and space operations are defined differently by various sources, but all involve the integration of battlespace, forces, and activities. A 2003 article defines integrated air and space operations as:22

air forces, structure, and operational activities integrating aviation and space, air defense and space defense. Integrated air and space warfare refers to aviation and space offensive and defensive equipment merged into one to conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive operations. It includes aircraft, cruise missiles, and to different degrees includes ballistic missiles, satellites, orbiting space stations, and space planes. At the same time it includes aviation interceptors, all types of ground-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, and new concept weapons such as high power lasers, high power microwave weapons, and particle beam weapons.

The Air Force Informatized Work Office and the Air Force Informatized Expert Advisory Committee, in the book Air Force Informatized Knowledge: Concept Volume, define integrated aerospace operations as:

integrated aviation and space forces in the atmosphere and outer space as well as related terrestrial integrated operations. Its characteristic is “three integrations” under a unified command, namely the integration of oper­ational space, operational forces, and operational activities.

1. Integration of operational space. Although physical differences exist between the atmosphere and outer space, there is no defi­nite line that distinguishes them. The air and space battlefield is a seamless whole that is an integrated battlefield in which different platforms and methods can be used to carry out identical military activities.

2. Integration of Operational Forces. The organization, training, and command and control of aviation and space forces are basi­cally the same. It includes using aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, satellites, space stations, space planes, interceptors, bal­listic missiles, spacecraft, missiles, kinetic energy weapons, and lasers. Space forces are responsible for global reconnaissance, seiz­ing the information initiative, launching spacecraft, and achieving space supremacy.

3. Integration of operational activities. The integration of aviation and space operations as well as ground forces that directly support aviation and space forces.

The authors of Strategic Air Force offer a similar definition in which air and space integration refers to integration of aviation and space in terms of structure, and the management of air defense, missile defense, and space defense in order to build a “new concept air force” made up of air and space forces. The integration of air and space is based on the lack of a boundary between the atmosphere and space, which leads the authors to conclude that an air and space integrated force is inevitable from the standpoint of technol­ogy, operations, environment, and experience.23

According to Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping, integrated air and space operations are “operations in which aviation and space forces are the main operational components. It includes other operational forces related to inte­grated air and space operations and is represented by joint operations in the air and space battlefield”24 In another venue, these authors define the air and space battlefield as an “integrated and information-oriented land (sea), air, and space battle arena, which fully connects organizationally fused and organically com­bined space and aerospace and related capabilities in the domains of the sur­face of the Earth, and the land (sea).”25 Cai and Tian also describe the air and space battlefield as the principal battlefield.26

These various definitions, if differing somewhat in scope and precision, nevertheless present important common and cohesive themes regarding the integration of the air and space battlespace and the integration of air and space forces and operational activities.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, put the United States in a quandary. An elusive nonstate actor based in Afghanistan, a country very difficult for the United States to reach with conventional military power, had confronted the Nation with deadly force. When Taliban authorities in Kabul refused to arrest and extradite Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, the Bush administration decided that the United States would use military force to impose regime change on Afghanistan and bring the terrorists to jus­tice. But that raised the question of how it could do that in a timely manner in a region of the world that was so inaccessible. After considering the options, U. S. leaders decided to conduct an air campaign against the Taliban and send paramilitary and special operations forces to fund and advise the Northern Alliance—a collection of militant factions that had for several years waged an unsuccessful civil war—and provide them air support in an effort to change the balance of power in Afghanistan.75

The campaign was a rapid success. On October 7, 2001, Operation Enduring Force began with airstrikes against air defense, command-and-con – trol, and other military targets in and around Kabul. Over the next 2 weeks the target list expanded, and on October 28, with heavy U. S. air support, the Northern Alliance launched a major offensive, which culminated on Novem­ber 13 when the Taliban was driven out of Kabul. U. S.-led military operations continued the rest of that year and into the next to mop up fleeing enemy forces and pockets of resistance, but unfortunately, bin Laden and other key al Qaeda and Taliban leaders evaded capture.76

Airpower continued its triumphal performance in conventional opera­tions. When the Bush administration later decided to impose regime change on Iraq, the successful use of airpower in support of indigenous forces in Afghan­istan prompted a debate about whether to use a similar approach against the Baathist regime. Kurdish factions in northern Iraq had challenged Baghdad authority for years, and some analysts argued that, empowered by U. S. mili­tary advisors and airpower, the Kurds could defeat Saddam’s forces just as the Northern Alliance had defeated the Taliban.77 Further study, however, con­vinced U. S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the Iraqi army was too large and heavily armed for the Kurds to defeat by themselves, even with U. S. air support. Therefore, while he did agree to provide Kurdish forces U. S. advisors and air support to engage the Iraqi forces in the northern sector of the country, Rumsfeld ordered USCENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks to plan a conventional invasion of southern Iraq to defeat the main force of the Iraqi army and capture Baghdad.

Once again, U. S. leaders wanted to move more quickly than a typical deployment would allow. Even before September 11, Rumsfeld had reviewed Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1003-98, the standing war plan for Iraq, and found it unsatisfactory. Largely a replay of the first Gulf War, it called for a time­consuming deployment of about half a million troops. The Secretary worried that such an approach would allow Saddam time to manipulate world opin­ion against the United States and also threaten U. S. forces and regional friends with weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, his instructions to Franks called for an innovative plan employing a much smaller force focusing on speed, surprise, and shock. The objective would be to quickly decapitate Iraq—that is, either kill Saddam and other key Baathist leaders, or sever their ability to com­mand and control their forces—and so shock the regime that it would collapse, capitulate, or fall to a popular uprising.78

Sixteen months after planning began, time consumed largely in efforts to raise a coalition and get UN approval for the use of force, U. S. and coali­tion forces executed Operation Iraqi Freedom. On March 18, 2003, a day after President Bush issued a 48-hour ultimatum, U. S. leaders received intelligence that Saddam was staying at Dora Farm, one of his properties outside Bagh­dad. The President authorized a strike on that location, which was carried out with Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions dropped from F-117 fighters, on March 19, immediately after the ultimatum expired. Saddam was not at Dora Farm when the strike occurred. The ground invasion began on March 20, and the full-fledged air attack kicked off about 12 hours after that.79

The air strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom supported the Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine-based ground scheme of maneuver and also strongly reflected Warden’s theory that parallel attacks would cause strategic paralysis, the general principle of which, by then, had been accepted as U. S. Air Force doctrine. According to Bob Woodward, who interviewed White House and Pentagon officials after the war, planners organized the targets for kinetic, elec­tronic, and information attacks into nine prioritized groups according to what they believed to be Iraq’s centers of gravity. Strikingly similar to the five-ring diagram that Warden used to prioritize the COGs in his theory, the nine COG categories identified for Iraqi Freedom were:80

■ The leadership, the real inner circle of Saddam and his sons, Uday and Qusay

■ Internal security and the regime intelligence, including the close-in ring of bodyguards in the Special Security Organization (SSO); the command, control, and communications network

■ Weapons of mass destruction infrastructure

■ Missile production, maintenance, and delivery capability

■ The Republican Guard divisions and the Special Republican Guard that protected Baghdad

■ Land territory inside Iraq where pressure could be exerted such as the northern Kurdish area that was effectively autonomous

■ The regular Iraqi army

■ Iraqi commercial and economic infrastructure; and the diplomatic infrastructure abroad that included Iraqi agents working out of their embassies

■ The civilian population.

As was the case in Afghanistan, the major combat operation against Iraq in March and April 2003 was a rapid success. Although the parallel attacks nei­ther caused Iraqi leaders to capitulate in shock nor paralyzed their ability to command and control their forces, the heavy aerial bombardment in coordina­tion with the rapid mechanized advance of coalition ground forces had devastat­ing effects on Iraqi regular and paramilitary forces. With Iraqi forces destroyed from the air whenever they attempted to mass and decimated by ground attack whenever they dispersed, coalition ground forces easily overcame all resistance in their drive to Baghdad. The operations plan had projected up to 125 days of “decisive combat operations” to defeat Iraq, but U. S. Marines were helping Iraqi citizens pull down a statue of Saddam in downtown Baghdad on April 9, only 20 days after the invasion began.81 Three weeks after that, on May 1,2003, President Bush declared Operation Iraqi Freedom successfully accomplished.

Fighting amorphous groups of unconventional adversaries poses its own frustrations. One could argue that stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have gone almost as poorly as the major combat operations of 2001 and 2003 went well. While analyzing the many problems encountered in those efforts is a challenge beyond the reach of this paper, it is worth considering the frustrations that they have presented to the U. S. and allied air forces involved. Counterin­surgency, stability, and nation-building operations are intrinsically ground­intensive efforts, with Army and Marine forces taking the lead. But military leaders have occasionally resorted to using air strikes with precision munitions against known or suspected terrorist safe houses, sometimes in urban areas, in efforts to kill key enemy leaders. Unfortunately, such actions have often proven counterproductive, with civilian casualties publicized on CNN and al Jazeera, radicalizing sympathetic Muslims locally and abroad, thereby fueling further unrest and violence.82

Starting about 2004, as sectarian violence and insurgencies began to gain momentum in Iraq and Afghanistan, U. S. Air Force leaders became increas­ingly interested in finding ways that airpower could be used more effectively in support of efforts to stabilize those countries. After tasking the RAND Cor­poration to study the issue, they were informed that history has shown that insurgencies are rarely won by outside powers; therefore, the best roles the U. S. Air Force could play in counterinsurgency operations, in addition to provid­ing airlift and ISR support to coalition ground forces, would be in advising, training, and equipping partner air forces.83 Such advice is a hard pill to swal­low for a military institution whose doctrine has historically emphasized win­ning the Nation’s wars through the lethal application of airpower.

The early 1990s awakened the PLAAF to the realization that China had fallen far behind the West in both technology and doctrinal thinking about air – power. Time and space were no longer the allies of those who were once so con­fident that China’s existing air defense systems could prevent any attacks deep into the nation’s heartland. Serious doubts were raised about the traditional interpretation of China’s defense capabilities, including the common belief that an inferior force could overcome a superior enemy. Drawing on lessons learned from Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, the Chinese central military leadership pointed out that “a weaker force relying solely on the defensive would place itself in the position of having to receive blows,” and that only by “taking active offen­sive operations” could the weaker force now seize the initiative.25

China’s evolving security interests, including the longstanding prospect of a decisive confrontation with Taiwan, also favored consideration of aug­menting the PLAAF’s offensive capabilities. Since 1993, Beijing has adopted a new military strategy, placing an emphasis on fighting and winning a future regional war under high-technology conditions along China’s periphery. The momentum of the independence movement in Taiwan was simultaneously viewed as an increasingly serious challenge to China’s sovereignty and secu – rity.26 The central military leadership made the proper readjustment to the air force’s strategic missions, requiring it to maintain strong capabilities not only for defensive operations, but also for offensive ones.

The air force’s new mission requirements include securing air dominance over China’s own airspace, supporting the army and the navy, and directing paratrooper operations, as well as carrying out independent air campaigns. In an offensive campaign, it should be able to launch attacks against the enemy’s air assets on the ground in a potential local conflict along China’s coast.27

In early March 1999, Jiang Zemin, former secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and president of China, explicated the air force’s stra­tegic objective: to transform gradually from a homeland air defense force to one that was capable of both defensive and offensive operations. He then charged the air force to “bear the brunt of, and be employed throughout the entire course” of the conflict, and “to complete certain strategic missions independently.”28 To achieve these objectives, China later that year adopted a three-step implementa­tion strategy for air force development over the next several decades.29

According to its 2008 Defense White Paper, China expected to lay a solid foundation for the development of the PLA into a more high-tech and more balanced network-centric joint force by 2010, to accomplish mechanization and make major progress in informatization by 2020, and to reach the goal of modernizing national defense and the armed forces by the middle of the 21st century.30 This constituted a logical follow-on to a strategic vision the PLAAF introduced in 2004. That year, the PLAAF enunciated a new strategic vision calling for the development of a long-range strategic air force and the active involvement of integrated air and space (Й^—Ф) operations with information and firepower systems (®,Л®Л_Ф).31

Under the guidance of such a developmental strategy, the PLAAF embarked on a two-stage transformation. The first stage is laying a framework for a force capable of both offensive and defensive operations by increasing the number of high-performance offensive aircraft, combat support aircraft, and advanced surface-to-air missile systems. The second stage is wielding fighter air­craft, surface-based defense, and command, control, communication, and intel­ligence elements into an integrated operational system that is able to conduct both air offensive and defensive operations under “informatized” conditions.

The development of China’s air force capabilities focuses on four areas:32

■ offensive capability to protect national security and national interests from the air and space

■ integrated air defensive and antimissile capability for monitoring both air and space flying objects and attacking them

■ superior capability over its main opponent (presumably Taiwan) and certain counter-information capability against its strategic opponent (presumably the United States)

■ strategic airlift capability to conduct both airlift and airdrop opera­tions.

Murray Scot Tanner

This chapter analyzes the emerging missions of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). It draws on the discussions and debates over these missions contained in recent analyses of airpower and spacepower by Chinese specialists, in particular over the past half-dozen years. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the concept of the “mission” in Chinese airpower and spacepower writings.1

This chapter focuses on one of the most important themes that unify many Chinese analyses of the air force’s emerging missions—the PLAAF’s transition from an air force focused on territorial defense toward an air force that increasingly emphasizes offensive missions and trying to seize and main­tain the initiative in its combat missions.

The increased emphasis on offensive power and initiative in PLAAF missions by Chinese air – and spacepower analysts reflects their assessment of the increasing military and political utility of offensive airpower and conven­tional deterrence, which were two major lessons they have drawn from the use of airpower in the Gulf War, Kosovo, the Iraq War, and the Afghan War. The transition to offense and initiative also reflects their assessment of the mili­tary needs of China’s enduring and emerging national security interests. Coer­cive operations against Taiwan might require the PLAAF to deter or prevent U. S. naval and air forces from intervening in support of Taiwan. PLAAF ana­lysts also contend that in a Taiwan scenario, the air force must be prepared to resist what they regard as the certainty of major U. S. airstrikes against Chinese forces, and try to find a way of using these strikes to regain the initiative against U. S. forces. Chinese security analysts also argue the PLA must be prepared to deter or defend against potential attacks against China’s increasingly populous and wealthy southeastern coast, and strengthen its ability to assert China’s ter­ritorial and resource claims in its coastal waters. Some air – and spacepower analysts also see these missions contributing to China’s struggle against sepa­ratists and terrorists in China’s border regions.

This transition is particularly evident in Chinese security analysts’ discussion of three of the PLAAF’s existing or emerging missions—deter – ring infringement of China’s critical national security interests, carrying out offensive operations, and maintaining China’s air and space defenses. Fol­lowing a brief overview of the PLAAF’s concept of its missions, the chapter focuses on these three specific missions and the recent thinking by air – and spacepower analysts about how the PLAAF should deepen its orientation toward offense and initiative in pursuing these missions.

One of the most important aspects of the concept of integrated air and space operations as it relates to space is the characterization of the air and space bat – tlespace as a “seamless whole.” This characterization is based on the lack of a dis­tinct boundary separating the atmosphere from space. This characterization, how­ever, holds several conceptual problems based on the nature of the atmosphere and space, physics, and operational and legal considerations. First, satellites and most air-breathing engines cannot readily operate between the altitudes of 20 and 100 kilometers. Aerodynamic heating and atmospheric drag inhibit the former, while the increasingly tenuous atmosphere works against any form of air-breathing pro­pulsion other than the high-hypersonic supersonic combustion ramjet (scram – jet). This “nether region” has been largely left unexploited for military use, except as a region to transit into orbit. Second, the different operating environments of air and space vehicles force them to operate in fundamentally different manners. Aircraft are maneuverable, can group together, and can respond to operational demands relatively quickly. Spacecraft, on the other hand, are less maneuverable than aircraft and can only maneuver occasionally through the expenditure of lim­ited quantities of fuel. Third, aircraft and spacecraft are treated differently by inter­national law. Aircraft do not have unrestricted use of a foreign country’s territorial air space whereas overflying a country in space is legal.27

Chinese analysts do acknowledge that there are important differences between outer space and the atmosphere. But Chinese analysts also assert that the integration of air and space operations will lead to a virtual single bat­tlespace. This is reflected in three activities: operations that utilize the force enhancement aspects of space-enabled operations; the use of space and near­space vehicles that operate in the nether region described above; and space – based platforms that attack terrestrial targets.

The foremost activity that promotes the integration of air and space is the use of space-based force enhancement technologies that act as a force mul­tiplier for air force and other service operations.28 Space forces provide recon­naissance, communications, and navigation and positioning capabilities that cannot normally be achieved through other means. These capabilities provide and transmit information to increase the precision of strikes and facilitate long – range strikes. For example, reconnaissance satellites provide high-resolution, global, real time intelligence over a vast area without consideration of national borders; communication satellites provide global communications; and global navigation satellites can provide three-dimensional positioning data for navi­gation and for guiding long-distance precision strike weapons.29

The ultimate goal of the PLAAF’s use of space is to build a network-cen­tric force in which disparate forces divided by function and distance will be fused into an organic whole through the use of information technologies. Net­worked capabilities will allow the air force to carry out four activities: infor­mation, air, and space superiority; precision strike; rapid maneuver; and mul­tidimensional support. These capabilities are intended to achieve information superiority across all domains. In fact, the level of network capabilities is said to define the level of modernization of air forces.30

The capabilities derived from a space-enabled, networked air and space force will also better integrate disparate services into a joint force, an essential prerequisite for winning informatized wars. Jointness is realized in two ways. First, space-enabled air operations allow the air force to provide better opera­tional support to other services, for example, through precision strikes. Sec­ond, the C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities provided by satellites will allow all services to share a common battlefield picture and to better communicate with each other.31 Through the use of these capabilities, practitioners of air and space integrated operations will be able to achieve synergies in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts.32

Technologies that transit through or operate in the nether world of near space between the altitudes of 20 and 100 kilometers, where neither conven­tional aircraft nor spacecraft can operate, likewise facilitate the integration of air and space. These technologies include high-flying balloons and airships, inhabited aircraft such as the venerable Lockheed U-2, and uninhabited, remotely piloted systems such as the Northrop-Grumman Global Hawk that provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capa­bilities at altitudes between 20,000 and 25,000 meters (approximately 65,000 to over 80,000 feet). While the U-2 or Global Hawk may be able to stay above a target for hours or days, high flying balloons can remain aloft for months, although station-keeping of lightly loaded craft in the midst of high-altitude winds poses a significant challenge. These technologies blur the line between the atmosphere and outer space and will result in near space becoming as much of a battlespace as the lower atmosphere is today.

Another technology which blurs the distinction between the air and space mediums is transatmospheric space planes. Space planes, such as the pro­posed U. S. Falcon hypersonic near-space vehicle, are launched into the atmo­sphere and then accelerate to hypersonic speeds (speeds in excess of five times that of sound, Mach 5+) climbing to and cruising at altitudes ranging from 20 to over 100 kilometers (from over 12 to over 60 miles). Space planes include low-hypersonic Mach 5-8 remotely piloted aircraft, missile-launched hyper­sonic penetration systems operating at near-orbital (Mach 25) velocities, and even, well into the future, piloted global-ranging vehicles operating across this velocity range. Chinese analysts believe space planes will ultimately be impor­tant platforms for achieving air and space superiority33 due to their ability to conduct operations in less time and at less cost than spacecraft, aircraft, or even cruise missiles.34 Chinese writers often refer to space planes’ global reach and information-sharing and precision strike capabilities35 as both something China must possess and something which presents a great threat. According to one author, space planes will become “the most serious military blackmailing China has encountered since the invention of the atomic bomb.”36

A third, though less discussed, aspect of integrated air and space opera­tions will be the ability of space-based platforms to strike ground, air, and sea targets.37 This includes the use of orbital bombs, so-called “rods from God,” and directed energy (DE) weapons such as lasers and microwaves.

As airpower enters its second century, it will remain the most important instrument of international security. Although operations against unconven­tional adversaries have put strains, both budgetary and conceptual, on the U. S. Air Force and its allies, the current situation does not typify the most serious threats that the great democracies will likely face in the 21st century. Pundits and prophets may argue that major war between powerful developed nations is a thing of the past and that the only threats to international security now ema­nate from nonstate actors, but they are, quite simply, wrong. Powerful states still exist and new ones are rising. Those states have interests and military forces to pursue them. While few if any national leaders in today’s world overtly seek armed conflict, the interests of some states invariably infringe on those of oth­ers. When confrontations occur, tensions rise and cascading events can lead nations to war even when neither party sees it as a desirable course of action.

The early airpower visionaries understood that airpower is uniquely suited to deter interstate war and win such wars when deterrence fails. They appreciated the inherent value of being able to operate in the vertical dimen­sion, with the speed, range, and flexibility to hold an enemy at risk across the breadth and depth of the battlespace and, if needed, take war to the very heart of his society. Early theorists may have debated whether airpower was most effectively employed against the enemy’s surface forces or against nonmilitary targets in the rear, but the one issue on which virtually all of them agreed was that no army, navy, or government could survive for long if it ceded command of the air above it to an enemy.

Finally, airpower thinking is approaching harmony, if not unanimity. Today’s transformational theories are bringing the opposing lines of thought about airpower together toward conceptual harmony, if not complete unifica­tion. Most analysts now agree that airpower is the quintessential strike element in a force-projection network able to conduct parallel attacks to create effects that are simultaneously tactical, operational, and strategic. Yet those same ana­lysts continue to debate what target sets are most efficacious in creating desired effects, what effects are most desired, and by what mechanisms they will be cre­ated. Such questions may never be fully resolved, and that is probably for the better. Strategy has always benefited from rigorous examination and spirited intellectual debate. Propositions about airpower have generated more study and debate than have propositions about most other instruments of military force. They will continue to do so in the future, keeping the field vibrant and innova­tive. Clearly, the concept of airpower will remain not only relevant, but central to international security and stability as nations advance in the 21st century.

China pursued a “walking on two legs” policy to modernize the air force through purchases of foreign systems and development of domestic technology. China has historically sought to be self-reliant in military produc­tion through either reverse-engineering or incorporating foreign technology. Since the early 1990s, such foreign purchases have been perceived as a stopgap measure for the PLAAF to create a sizeable fleet of fourth-generation aircraft, exemplified by acquisition of the Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30, and co-produced J—11 fighters. After years of effort, the development of domestic systems has borne fruit thanks to the J-10 and JH-7 that have entered service in the PLAAF since 2004. It appears that every year since 2005, one regiment of PLAAF or navy aviation has transitioned into the JH-7A, J-10, and J-11B.33

With its entry into the 21st century, the PLAAF has become smaller. The U. S. Department of Defense reports on Chinese military power registered 5,300 tactical fighters, bombers, and support aircraft in both the PLA Air Force’s and naval aviation’s inventory in 2000. That number declined to 2,300 in 2010.34 As early as 2003, the PLAAF’s operational air divisions had fallen to just 29 divisions, with some of them having only two air regiments.35 Along with this reduction and restructuring, the PLAAF established an additional trans­port division and one special aircraft division, attempting to enhance its long – range airlift and airborne early warning (AEW) capabilities. Thus, although getting smaller, the Chinese air force has become much better equipped and much more technologically sophisticated.36

Like the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force previously, the PLAAF’s leadership seeks to create a mixed force that blends limited quantities of high-performance fighters and larger quantities of less expensive fighters. The ongoing procurement of J-7G and J-8F/H, which are upgraded versions of obsolete second-generation J-7/8s, provides the Chinese air force with less – expensive, less-capable aircraft to serve alongside J—10s and J—11s in a “high/ low” combination.37 One problem which seems to have bothered the PLAAF is that the initially purchased Su-27s and the subsequently assembled Chinese J— 11s are not true multirole fighters capable of supporting the increasingly diverse mission requirements of the PLAAF, particularly the increased empha­sis on offensive as well as defensive roles.38 The real change of its offensive capa­bilities will only come as a significant number of J-10s and J-11Bs enter opera­tional service over the next 5 to 10 years.

For the past 10 years, increasing focus has been placed on informatiza­tion as a leapfrog measure to close the PLAAF’s cyber and electronic warfare (EW) gap with the United States and Western Europe. The development of sophisticated command, control, and communications (C3), or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, has been the PLAAF’s most urgent priority.39 Following earlier experimental trials using an obso­lete Soviet-legacy Tupolev Tu-4 modified with turboprop engines and rudi­mentary search radar in a saucer dome, China has developed two “high-low” versions of an indigenous AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System): the high-end KJ-2000 based on the Russian IL-76MD airframe; and the low – end KJ-200 based on the Y-8F-200 transport platform. These platforms were handed over to the PLAAF in 2005 and 2006, respectively, to coordinate fight­ers and bombers via secure datalinks. Simultaneously, China developed seven other different types of EW aircraft, the High New (Gaoxin) series, likewise based upon the Y-8. Integration of these systems is well underway across the services to increase PLA joint operational capability.40

In retrospect, though the U. S. Government successfully pressured Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon AWACS system to the PLA in 1999, China appears to have pulled together sufficient talents and resources to build its own system despite this seeming setback. The chief engineer and designer of the Chi­nese AWACS project recently claimed that China’s radar technology has reached the same level as that of leading foreign countries and that, in some areas, it is even better.41 Efforts by the United States and European countries to prevent China from obtaining high-tech weapons similarly do not seem to have succeeded.

Yet, the downside of this success in improving the cutting edge of offen­sive and defensive forces has actually worked to delay PLAAF acquisition of transport aircraft and transport-related research and development (R&D). Rus­sia’s failure to deliver 34 IL-76MDs as scheduled in 2008 has kept the PLAAF’s newly created transport division underequipped.42 In the meantime, most of the Y-8 platforms manufactured by Shanxi Aircraft Factory have been committed to the production of the high priority High New series, and development of the Y-9, whose first prototype was begun in 2006, was delayed. (Recently, some sources suggest that the Y-9 project has resumed with first flight expected in 2011). It was not until May 2009 that the new transport division received its first Y-8C aircraft.43 Again, this reflects how the PLAAF is restricted by numerous constraints and obstacles that confront all aspects of its development.

Prior to the 1990s, the PLAAF’s official mission was largely limited to that of a localized defensive force intended to support ground (or maritime) opera­tions on or close to the mainland.2 In recent years, however, Chinese Commu­nist Party (CCP) and PLA leaders have made clear that they envision a greatly expanded combat and noncombat role for the air force. In 2004, the Party’s Cen­tral Military Commission (CMC) approved the air force’s first-ever service-spe­cific strategic concept. This concept clearly suggested a much broader mission than in the past, with a greater emphasis on offense: “Integrate air and space; be simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations” (kongtian yi ti, gongfang jianbei, Й^—1Ф, ЖШШЮ3 Then, in 2008, China’s National Defense White Paper identified the PLAAF as a “strategic service” of the PLA.4

Over the past 5 to 6 years in particular, PLA analysts of air – and space – power have produced an outpouring of articles and in-depth studies analyz­ing and debating the future missions that the world’s most powerful air forces, including China’s, will have to prepare to undertake. This chapter draws heav­ily upon these analyses.5

Some recent Chinese military reference works have tried to clarify and standardize the definitions of concepts such as “mission” and “task” and related terms such as “operations” (xingdong, ТЙ). But most PLA books and articles do not draw clear distinctions among these concepts, nor have consistent def­initions for these terms emerged in recent analyses of air – and spacepower. For example, the most common terms for “mission” (shiming, U#) and “task” (renwu, H%-) are often used interchangeably or in combination.

The Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia and a few other analytical sources provide distinct definitions for air force “missions” (shiming, U#) and air force “tasks” (renwu, fi^).6 The Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia defines airforce mis­sions as:

The important historical responsibilities entrusted to the air force by the state, which are divided into basic missions [jiben shiming, S^U#], special missions [teshu shiming, #^U#], and concrete missions [juti shiming, ДІФШ#].7

Historically, statements of basic PLA missions have been worded as slo­gans or broad statements of political values or goals. The PLAAF’s first state­ment of mission, for example, appears to have been Mao Zedong’s April 1950 inscription for the inaugural issue of the PLAAF’s journal People’s Air Force. It read simply “Create a Strong and Great People’s Air Force; Destroy the Rem­nant Enemy Forces; Stabilize the Nation’s Defenses.”8 Today, statements of the PLAAF’s basic missions tend to be worded in somewhat more concrete terms, but are still not highly detailed. An example is the 2008 National Defense White Paper’s statement that the PLAAF was responsible for “safeguarding the coun­try’s territorial air space and territorial sovereignty, and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide.”9

The Air Force Encyclopedia defines the basic tasks (jiben renwu,

#) of any nation’s air force as “the important responsibilities that an air force assumes in order to carry out its missions.”10 Although “tasks” are supposed to be clearly defined responsibilities intended to carry out PLAAF missions, very few PLA analysts actually make any clear distinction between “tasks” and rela­tively specific or concrete “missions.” Some senior analysts even use the term “tasks”—renwu—jointly or interchangeably with “missions”—shiming—both when they describe some relatively abstract missions (deterrence, for example) and when they describe far more concrete and specific missions or tasks.

For example, two leading analysts have referred to the same undertak­ing by air force personnel—using air and space forces to deter the enemy, for example—as different categories of concepts: one labels this a “task-mission” (renwu shiming; Ї#ШФ), and the other calls some of these activities “opera­tions” (xingdong; ТЙ) in one portion of his study and “tasks” in another.11 This lack of consistency within the PLAAF literature indicates a clear conceptual problem—the PLAAF is presently in the process of defining a new set of mis­sions without a clear, agreed-upon concept of what a “mission” is or how it fits into the structure of PLAAF military thought.

The PLAAF has not publicly released a list of its principal missions. Nor have PLA air – and spacepower analysts over the past several years referred to air force missions using the same list of missions and similar terms for them— something Western analysts would expect to see if an agreed-upon list of mis­sions existed. But a review of recent PLA writings on air – and spacepower suggests that a broad consensus exists among PLA analysts concerning the importance of six core PLAAF air and space missions: deterrence; offense; defense; airlift; airborne; and blockade support. The breadth of this list under­scores the terrific change in the PLA’s overall view of the air force’s mission and utility over the past 15 years or so.

A closer examination of some of these missions demonstrates an impor­tant theme in the PLAAF’s transition away from being a largely defensively – oriented air force. Several of these missions reflect the PLAs focus on devel­oping the air force’s offensive capabilities as well as its capability to retake and maintain the initiative in deterrence and combat missions. The remainder of this chapter focuses on what most analysts would probably agree are the three most important of these missions—deterrence, offense, and defense—with a special focus on this new emphasis on offense and initiative.

Xu’s comments that space is a “new commanding height for interna­tional strategic competition,” that competition in space is an “inevitable trend,” and “having control of space means having control of the ground, oceans, and electromagnetic space” are also common themes in PLAAF writings. PLAAF analysts assess that the role space plays in providing information and in link­ing units together into a networked force will turn the space domain into a contested battlefield. This conclusion is rooted in Chinese military doctrine that now regards the use of information as the main determiner of success on the battlefield. In fact, PLA analysts widely consider space as the domi­nant domain from which to collect intelligence and to facilitate network-cen­tric warfare practices.38

This conclusion is partially based on the U. S. military’s experience in the 1991 Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Chinese analysis, the United States used over 100 satellites during the 1991 Gulf War and 70 satellites during Operation Allied Force. The use of these satellites and the C4ISR systems they supported were the primary reason for U. S. victories. These capabilities allowed the U. S. military to have an asymmetric superiority over its opponents gained through battlefield transparency and long-range precision strikes.39 The primacy of information gained from space has led many PLAAF analysts to conclude that space is the new commanding high ground of the bat­tlefield.40 Because of this, PLA analysts conclude that the primacy of information derived from space will make satellites irresistible targets. As a result, space will become a battlefield and seizing that battlefield will determine the success of air, naval, and ground operations.41 Operations to seize control of space are referred to as space warfare, called tian zhan (^$), taikong zhan (^Й№), or kongjian zhan (ЙЙЙ) in Chinese, involving military engagements that mainly take place in space between two parties trying to seize or maintain space superiority.

Space warfare is described as a new operational method in air and space integrated operations and an important method of achieving military superior­ity.42 Space warfare operations can be divided into space-based, air-based, and ground-based operations. These can include ground-based directed energy strikes and space-based kinetic energy strikes, airborne lasers, and electronic countermeasures. Chinese writers also refer to using space stations and space planes to conduct ASAT attacks.43 Space stations can also serve as a command and control base, a communications node, and a logistics and maintenance hub for spacecraft and as a platform for strategic weapons.44

Including the goal of achieving space supremacy in the definition of space warfare indicates that the PLAAF is attempting to take on the counter­space role. The same source that defined air and space integrated operations defines space supremacy as:45

During times of war, the control of a certain area of space for a certain period of time by one side. Its goal is to ensure one’s freedom of action in space and its full access to space resources and to limit the other side’s freedom of action in space and access to space resources.

Seizing space superiority is also described as one of the necessary condi­tions for achieving ground, naval, and air superiority, leading many analysts to conclude that whoever controls space will seize the initiative.46

This definition of space supremacy is largely consistent with other Chinese definitions of space supremacy, and is, as well, consistent with the U. S Air Force (USAF) definition found in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations: 47

Space Superiority is that level of control in the space domain that one force enjoys over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space superiority may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and persistent. Achieving space superiority is of primary con­cern since it allows control and exploitation of the space domain in order to provide space effects in and through space. The Air Force achieves space superiority through counterspace operations, including offensive and defensive operations, both of which are based on robust space situ­ational awareness.

One important difference between the two definitions is the Chinese ref­erence to space superiority occurring within a certain time and area, whereas the USAF definition states that space superiority “may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and persistent.” The Chinese definition reflects doc­trinal writings, which stress seizing the initiative at a certain place and period of time in order to open a window of opportunity that can be used to strike a decisive blow. This limited goal also recognizes that the PLA, as a weaker force compared to the U. S. military, will most likely not be able to maintain the ini­tiative for long periods of time over an expansive area.