Integrated Attack-Defense Operations

Like most defense establishments, the PLA characterizes its moderniza­tion efforts as defensive in nature. To this end, aerospace power is viewed as a vital element of territorial air defense with offensive air operations as a means to suppress adversary strike capabilities at their source. As the PRC’s 2008 De­fense White Paper explains:

China pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive in na­ture. China places the protection of national sovereignty, security, ter­ritorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else.16

The concept of integrated defense and offense is primarily in the context of the joint air defense. Indeed, most aerospace industry studies address an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability in the context of defending against sea-based assets, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles and other strike systems. Integrated at­tack and defense (^KS#)is intimately related to the concept of a joint counter­air strike campaign (К-^йЙЖШё:). In doctrinal writings, counterair strike op­erations theory is divided into passive defense (ШЯ), territorial air defense (K ф), and offensive counterair operations (йф). The PLAAF and Second Artillery envision holding at risk facilities and assets around China’s periphery, including air bases, aircraft carriers and other surface assets, and missile-related facilities.17

A general concept appears to be to develop the ability to conduct offen­sive counterair strikes out to a range covered by persistent surveillance assets as far as Guam, at a distance of 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles) from the east coast of China. Second Artillery and PLAAF force modernization appears to be fo­cused on systems able to suppress air operations on Guam, throughout the South China Sea, and other locations by the middle of this decade. Systems are under development which may place U. S. military facilities on Guam at risk by 2015.18 To test theories, in the summer of 2009, the PLAAF and Second Artil­lery conducted one of the first large-scale joint live-fire exercises involving ele­ments from four missile brigades and two PLAAF air divisions.19

In the traditional PLA operational lexicon, air and/or conventional mis­sile operations are viewed within the context of an integrated joint firepower campaign that consists of strike aviation, theater missiles, and/or long-range ar­tillery. PLA analysts view an air campaign as an integral component of “joint fire­power warfare” operations (К-^^Лі№) involving the coordinated use of PLA Air Force strike aviation assets and Second Artillery conventional theater missiles.