Integrated Information-Firepower

As early as 2004, a guiding PLA objective for developing its armed forces has been “informatization.” This principle stresses the centrality of information technology in weapons systems and their application.20 The PLA still considers itself in the early stages of integrated information-firepower (й^^Л_Ф) with a goal of achieving its fullest capabilities by 2050.21 The application of Chinese aerospace power against operational targets is likely to be linked with (and thus limited by) the scope and sophistication of its persistent surveillance network and related command, control, and communications system. PLA joint firepow­er operations theory thus envisions the seamless connection between sensors and shooters of the PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, and other firepower custo­dians echoing Western F2T2EA (“Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess”) the­ory and evolving practice undertaken over the past two decades.

The mission of firepower warfare is three-fold. First and most important, air strikes and theater missile operations, supported by information operations, are intended to create the conditions necessary for a decisive attainment of stra­tegic and theater objectives. These conditions include the achievement of the “Three Superiorities” (HfX): information dominance, air superiority, and sea superiority. Achievement of the three superiorities could, in and of itself, cre­ate the necessary conditions for termination of conflict on the PRC’s terms. The second mission of firepower warfare is to support large-scale ground force op­erations through annihilation of or paralyzing the enemy’s effective strength. The final function involves independent firepower operations in direct support of strategic and theater objectives. Independent missions involve demonstra­tions of force or resolve, “strategic deterrence” missions, punishment through long-range air strikes, or a series of Second Artillery strikes that are intended to achieve limited strategic or operational objectives. Firepower warfare would dominate the preliminary phase of a campaign and, under certain conditions, could independently achieve strategic objectives of the PRC.22

Limited firepower assets would be intended for use against targets whose destruction or suppression can achieve the greatest effects. Primary targets for the application of firepower include the command and control system and as­sociated communications; strategic infrastructure; the most advanced capabil­ities of the opponent, including the air defense system; defense industries; and airbases and ports. From the PLA’s perspective, air and conventional theater missile strikes are the most important means of firepower against deep targets.

The PRC views information operations as integral to a successful joint aerospace or firepower campaign. Coercive military operations ultimately are intended to affect the decision calculus and morale of opposing civilian and military leaders. Perceptions and decisions of an opposing leadership are shaped by the quality and amount of information which they possess. Effective military operations rely upon the ability to defend one’s sources of information while exploiting and assaulting an opponent’s information structure. The fo­cus of information operations is the enemy’s command system. The command system serves as the strategic and operational “vital point” (^A), and consists of policymakers at the strategic level, the operational military command, and supporting command, control, and communications systems.

In addition to increasingly accurate and lethal theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles and increasingly sophisticated multirole fighter aircraft, the PLA is prioritizing development of stand-off and escort jammers as well as other electronic warfare assets. At the same time, Beijing is investing in ad­vanced command, control, communications, and intelligence systems while placing greater emphasis on training, particularly through the use of simulators.

Intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological operations are force multipliers that can enhance the effectiveness of air and missile oper­ations in the successful attainment of limited political objectives. These capa­bilities are intended to confuse an adversary and increase the chances of stra­tegic or operational surprise. From a psychological perspective, information operations can magnify the effects of air strikes with detrimental effects on an enemy leadership’s morale and national will. Electronic attack and electronic defense are integral aspects of a PLA joint air campaign.

Electronic warfare is another key aspect of integrated information-fire­power warfare. PLA strategists believe electronic warfare can powerfully affect the results of a military campaign and theater offensives, and perhaps help deter­mine the outcome of a war. The PLA also has been developing a computer net­work attack capability. The most likely target would be automation systems, of­ten referred to as process control systems (PCS) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are critical to the safe, reliable, and efficient operations of critical infrastructure. PCS is used extensively in managing electric power, water, petroleum, natural gas, as well as communications systems. If a PCS system could be affected, there may be no need for physical destruction.

Counterstealth is another aspect of integrated information-firepower warfare. The PLA is seeking to reduce the advantages that low observable air assets enjoy. Most important is the ability to detect, track, and engage aircraft and land attack cruise missiles with low radar cross sections. Also focused on reducing the signature of its own assets, greater knowledge of stealth systems will increase their capabilities against U. S. low observable systems.23

PLA programs to counter potential adversary space capabilities also are an aspect of integrating information with firepower, and essential for denying or degrading adversary C4ISR (command, control, communications, comput­ers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. For electronic defense, the PRC is investing heavily in command automation, tactical data links, electronic attack, and space-based reconnaissance and communications systems. The PLA appears to be applying principles of network-centric war­fare to correlate data from increasingly sophisticated sensor architectures. Net­work-centric warfare equips soldiers, airmen, and soldiers with a common op­erational picture that significantly increases situational awareness. As a result, individuals and units equipped to participate in the network are able to syn­chronize action, without necessarily having to wait for orders, which in turn reduces their reaction time. In addition, the network allows for dispersed and flexible operations at lower cost. Therefore, the introduction of a networked common tactical picture based on an advanced tactical data link program is a paradigm shift that could gradually break down the PLAs traditionally stove – piped, service-oriented approach to defense.24

The PLAs Joint Theater Command structure would direct integrated infor­mation-firepower warfare. The Firepower Coordination Center would coordinate an air and theater missile campaign against key targets in order to achieve strategic and theater objectives. Cells would contain PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, spe­cial operations, and ground force elements that would carry out necessary liaison with their respective corps-level service headquarters. Other supporting facilities would include centers for communications, firepower coordination, intelligence information, electronic countermeasures command, and weather.