Richard P. Hallion
The ever-accelerating transformation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the years since the era of Mao Zedong, particularly in its economic and military growth, has been nothing short of remarkable. Developments over the last quarter-century—effectively since the tragedy of Tiananmen Square and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact alliance—have been more so still. The relationship of this increasingly robust and growing power to the established global community is a complex one, and no thornier aspect of that relationship can be found than the uneasy interplay among the PRC, Taiwan, and the countries that deal with both.
For years, professional “China watchers” scoured publications, broadcasts, and other bits of evidence for clues to what was happening within the PRC, its leadership ranks, its stance toward neighbors and the world around it, and its intentions, particularly toward Taiwan. The opening of China to the outside world—with the easing of travel and access restrictions, rapid proliferation of communications and transportations links, and consequently increasing interchanges of official and unofficial visitors, business people, academics, students, and tourists—has vastly increased awareness, appreciation, and understanding of the many interrelated challenges surrounding China’s rise from a regional to a global power and its relationship to the global community.
The nature of the PRC-Taiwan relationship is one of the greatest of these challenges. For decades, both sides operated on a hair-trigger state of alert, ever ready to go to war over seemingly the slightest provocation. Numerous clashes illuminated the underlying antagonism and fulfilled the bellicose exchanges between leaders of the two countries, most notably the Yijiangshan Island campaign of 1954-1955 (the first Taiwan Strait crisis), and then the battles over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu (now Jinmen and Mavzuv, the second Taiwan Strait crisis), which ushered in the era of air-to-air missiles. In the years since, there have been encouraging signs that the violence seen in years past is receding. Cross-strait dialogue is replacing bellicosity, and exchanges are replacing saber-rattling. Today, the contrails criss-crossing the Taiwan Strait are not combat aircraft climbing to battle, but civil air transports linking the two separated communities, totaling over 500 cross-strait flights per week, something inconceivable just a generation ago. When a devastating earthquake struck Sichuan
province in the PRC in 2008, Taiwan’s relief assistance, including direct flights by China Airlines to Chengdu, exceeded that of all other nations, reaffirming the depth of affection and shared heritage of the peoples bordering the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, the prospect of violence, however increasingly distant, remains, in this era of ballistic and cruise missiles, precision weapons, and cyber warfare, a daunting one.
One of the crucial areas of concern is the force disparity between the PRC and Taiwan. Even as political rhetoric softens, bringing the two sides closer, the force disparity grows ever wider, particularly in their respective airpower capabilities. Today, the traditional technological edge that Taiwan’s military air – power forces enjoyed over the mainland is a thing of the past. Where a decade ago, Taiwan’s airmen flew aircraft that were at least one, and in some cases two, technological generations superior to those of the PRC, today they are already in a position of inferiority, with their aging F-16A/B, AIDC F-CK-1 Ching – Kuo, and Mirage 2000 fighters increasingly outclassed and outnumbered by newer PRC aircraft such as the Su-27, J-10, J—11, and Su-30 aircraft. Where a decade ago, Taiwan’s airmen could operate with relative impunity over the Taiwan Strait, facing a limited-range surface-to-air missile threat built around derivatives of the then 40-year-old Khrushchev-era SA-2, today they face far more dangerous S-300 (SA-10/20) systems that deny access over the strait, and the prospect of the S-400 which, installed along the coast of the PRC, will reach across the strait and beyond Taiwan itself.
Coupled with the PRC’s introduction of precision air-to-surface munitions, air refueling, airborne early warning, large numbers of short – and medium-range ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles, and an increased emphasis on electronic and cyber warfare, the challenges facing Taiwan’s air defenders have never been graver than at the present time. Significantly, because of the longstanding ties between the United States and Taiwan, any prospect of cross-strait conflict carries with it the implicit risk of igniting a broader and even more devastating conflict. Clearly, it is in the interest of all parties to ensure that the PRC-Taiwan relationship evolves in a peaceful, mutually beneficial fashion.
To that end, in late October 2010, a distinguished international group of experts on airpower, military affairs, and the PRC-Taiwan relationship gathered in Taipei to examine the present state and future prospects of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The conference was the latest in a series of international conferences on the affairs of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cosponsored by the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), the U. S. National Defense University (NDU), and the RAND Corporation. Over 3 days, speakers presented 14 papers on aspects of airpower, the PLAAF, and the implications for Taiwan, and panels discussed and debated the presentations, taking questions and comments from an audience of 115 registered attendees, with many others dropping by. The conference organizers and presenters met with President Ma Ying-jeou and other Taiwan officials, as well as civil and military representatives of the American Institute in Taiwan; they also visited Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) Air Base, home of Taiwan’s 527th Tactical Fighter Wing, operating the aging indigenous AIDC F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo lightweight fighter, for a study tour and briefing on the state of Taiwan Strait air defenses.
This book is a compilation of the edited papers, reflecting comments and additions stimulated by the dialogue and discussion at the conference. As lead editor, I wish to thank the various authors for their patience and willingness in preparing their papers for this publication. For the record, there has been no attempt to “homogenize” the papers, or to seek a uniform outlook. The authors have been free to address their topics to whatever depth they chose, and to present their views without censorship or attempts to find a common view. Nevertheless, as the reader will quickly perceive, there is a remarkable congruency of thought and outlook. The conference presentations were arranged in four broad themes: concepts; PLAAF organization, leadership, and doctrine; PLAAF equipment, personnel, education, and training; and industry and military implications. That same arrangement has been followed in the four-Part structure of this book.
Forrest E. Morgan, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, opens Part I with a wide-ranging survey of airpower doctrine from the time of the “Great War” to contemporary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; he presents a classic tour through airpower theory and practice, stressing its enduring value, and making reference to the great theorists of airpower, particularly Britain’s Hugh “Boom” Trenchard, Italy’s Giulio Douhet, and America’s William “Billy” Mitchell. He concludes that “As airpower enters its second century, it will remain the most important instrument of international security” noting that
most analysts now agree that airpower is the quintessential strike element in a force-projection network able to conduct parallel attacks to create effects that are simultaneously tactical, operational, and strategic.
. . . Propositions about airpower have generated more study and debate than have propositions about most other instruments of military force.
They will continue to do so in the future, keeping the field vibrant and innovative. Clearly, the concept of airpower will remain not only relevant, but central to international security and stability as nations advance in the 21st century.
Next, Mark A. Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, presents an intriguing survey of the PLAAF’s quest for joint-service aerospace power, examining the strategic drivers underpinning its quest, evolving Chinese concepts of joint aerospace power, the challenges of force modernization, the range of technological and acquisition choices facing the PLAAF, and PLAAF interest in advanced weapons concepts such as hypersonic missiles and spaceplanes, space-based systems, and cyber warfare. He concludes:
The gradual expansion of China’s long-range precision strike capabilities is altering the regional strategic landscape. The PLA Air Force and Second Artillery are making modest progress in developing advanced capabilities with an eye toward expanding their operational range into space and into the Asia-Pacific region. For the PLA Air Force, the ability to carry out strategic strike missions at ranges of 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles) or more is viewed as the key to becoming a truly independent service, rather than one dependent on the Second Artillery or a supporting player to the ground forces. Despite the PLAAF’s aspirations to develop a force capable of an independent air campaign around China’s periphery and speculation of subordination of Second Artillery conventional ballistic missile units to the PLAAF, senior PRC political and military authorities will likely continue to rely on the established capabilities of the Second Artillery for coercion, strategic strike missions, and suppression of enemy air defenses for some time to come.
. . . Beijing’s missile-centric strategy presents a number of challenges for regional stability. Barring the fielding of effective countermeasures, Chinese conventional aerospace power, specifically short – and medium – range ballistic and extended-range land attack cruise missiles, may over time give the PLA a decisive advantage in future conflicts around China’s periphery.
Xiaoming Zhang, associate professor in the Department of Leadership and Strategy at the U. S. Air Force’s Air War College, furnishes a valuable historical introduction to the PLAAF, from its roots in fighter-centric defensive air warfare before and after the Korean War era, and its evolution since that time as an army air service dominated by the PLAs surface-centric thought and leadership. He traces how, over its history, the PLAAF’s ability to undertake deep strike and even cross-border air support operations has been heavily constrained by the PRC’s political decisionmakers. While its modern capabilities— exemplified by aircraft such as the J-10 and Su-27—have left the legacy MiG – 17 (J-5), MiG-19 (J-6), and MiG-21 (J-7) era far behind, he stresses “What has not changed is the PLAs political culture, service tradition, older ways of doing things, and outdated organizational system,” concluding:
The PLA is a titanic bureaucratic amalgamation with a leaden hand of tradition that can often block innovation. Changes in doctrine, training practices, force structure, and equipment are underway, yet many traditions and cultural characteristics of the 83-year-old PLA are rigorously maintained. On top of that, there is the Party-controlled political culture and the ground force-centric predominant organizational tradition of the PLA. Both serve as constraining mechanisms that not only restrict the PLAs drive to autonomy, but also ensure its loyalty to the Party and obedience to the Party’s policy.
In Part II of this volume, Kenneth W. Allen, a senior research analyst at Defense Group Incorporated, offers an in-depth examination of the PLAAF’s organizational structure, noting how it has adjusted to accommodate changes in equipment, force structure, and the transformation of modern military power. Increasingly, the PLAAF has emphasized the planning and execution of joint operations. The shift toward joint operations accelerated in the early 2000s, when, as Allen notes, “PLAAF officers began to assume key joint billets, including membership on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Military Commission (CMC), commandant of the Academy of Military Science, commandant and political commissar of the National Defense University, and deputy director billets in the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), and General Logistics Department (GLD).” But, if much of this organizational transformation is, on the surface, quite impressive, Allen, like Xiaoming Zhang before him, highlights the traditionalist aspects of the PLA that continue to dominate the perspective of the PLAAF. He notes that “the army still dominates the majority of the leadership and working billets in all of these organizations, along with the General Armament Department (GAD), which has yet to have a PLAAF (or PLA Navy) deputy, and all seven of the Military Region (MR) Headquarters. There are no indications this pattern of army domination will change in the next decade.” Murray Scot Tanner, a China security analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, offers a detailed examination of three of the PLAAF’s mission areas: deterring infringement of China’s critical national security interests, carrying out offensive operations, and maintaining China’s air and space defenses. Tanner traces the PLAAF’s evolution from a pre-1990s emphasis upon largely tactical air defense to a gradually evolving appreciation after Operation Desert Storm of airpower’s suitability for executing a broader range of strategic defensive and offensive missions. In 2004, the Party’s Central Military Commission approved
PLAAF plans to “integrate air and space; [and] be simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations.” Three years later, Zhang Yuliang pronounced that “the Air Force should give full play to its powerful aerial mobility, rapid speed, and long-distance strike capabilities, as well as its advantages in conducting multiple types of aerial missions.” Tanner concludes:
Chinese air and space analysts have devoted increasing attention to promoting China’s preparation for offensive missions and its efforts to seize and maintain the initiative in combat [including] efforts to develop a ladder of signals of increasing intensity to ward off potential adversaries [stressing] the increased importance of offense in PLAAF missions. . . targeting what they see as the fragile “systems of systems” that constitute enemy combat information systems [and placing] a growing emphasis on counterattacks as a means of seizing and holding the initiative in the face of near certain large-scale air attacks.
Roger Cliff, a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, presents a thorough review of the doctrinal development of the PLAAF, relating it to historic milestones in its development, and in the political history of the PRC. Cliff notes that the PLAAF’s future success, like that of other air forces, will depend upon how well it has mastered modern airpower doctrine and thought, not simply advanced weapons technology. He notes the importance of Deng Xiaoping who, after becoming China’s leader in 1978, mandated rapid military modernization, particularly of the PLAAF (though Deng, as Cliff emphasizes, was motivated as much by a desire to place the airmen under strict Party control—they had proven “politically dangerous” in the days of Lin Biao—as by a desire to improve its combat capabilities). While noting PLAAF weaknesses and deficiencies, Cliff concludes:
The United States and Taiwan would likely find the PLAAF to be an aggressive opponent in the event of a conflict___________________________________ Especially at the begin
ning of a war, the PLA will endeavor to attack enemy air bases, ballistic – missile bases, aircraft carriers, and warships equipped with land-attack cruise missiles before enemy aircraft can take off or missile attacks can be launched . . . . By 2015 or so, the weapons systems and platforms that China. . . is likely to have [would] make a Chinese air defense campaign. . . highly challenging for U. S. air forces [and] enable China to conduct offensive operations far into the western Pacific.
In the next chapter, Kevin Pollpeter, China program manager at Defense Group Incorporated, assesses the PLAAF’s growing interest in space operations. He notes that in 2009, Xu Qiliang, commander of the PLAAF, stated the following:
The air and space era and information era have arrived at the same time and the domain of information and domain of space and air have become the new commanding height for international strategic competition competition among armed forces is moving toward the air and
space domain and is extending from the aviation domain to near space and even deep space.
Pollpeter finds that Xu’s quest for “air and space security” is intrinsically bound with the PLAAF’s concept of integrated air and space operations, which envisions the air and space battlespace as a “seamless whole.” The “ultimate goal” he believes the PLAAF is seeking is a “network-centric force in which disparate forces, divided by function and distance, will be fused into an organic whole through the use of information technologies” to achieve air and space superiority, precision strike, rapid maneuver, and multidimensional support to PLA forces. The PLAAF’s interest in assuming command over the PLAs space presence has not met with universal support, and its notions of space presence (including a somewhat surprising level of interest in manned spacecraft) are not universally accepted either. However space doctrine and application evolve within the PLA and PLAAF, enunciating and fulfilling a national space security policy will remain a crucial goal for both, particularly as China increasingly asserts its place among the world’s spacefaring peoples.
Part III begins with David Shlapak, a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, who offers a cogent survey of the PLAAF’s drive to modernize and reequip its combat forces, evocatively terming it “a Long March to modernity” Shlapak traces the transformation of the PLAAF’s order of battle across two crucial decades, from 1990 to 2010. Over that time, its force structure of fighters, fighter-bombers, ground attack, and bomber aircraft has steadily declined, from approximately 5,000 aircraft in 1990 to approximately 1,500 in 2010. But while overall numbers have dropped, today the PLAAF possesses the world’s third-highest number of advanced fourth-generation (third-generation, by PLAAF’s categorization of fighter aircraft technology) fighters, behind the United States and Russia. Matching this has been an equivalent upgrading in air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, surface-to-air missiles, sensors, avionics, air refueling, and airborne early warning and control. Shlapak concludes:
The progress made in recent years by the PLAAF is impressive. . . . As late as the early 1990s, it was likely too weak to have even defended China’s home airspace against a serious, modern adversary. . . . [Now] the revolution in the PLAAF’s order of battle is over. It has made up the four decades separating the MiG-17/MiG-19 generations from the Su-27SK
Su-30MKK generation in just 15 remarkable years. Whether or not the PLAAF can close the remaining gaps between its capabilities and those of the most advanced air forces remains to be seen. But given how it has transformed itself over the last 15 years, one would be foolish to bet heavily against it.
You Ji, an associate professor at the School of Social Science and International Studies, University of New South Wales, Australia, presents a detailed examination of the individuals comprising the PLAAF’s senior leadership— those approximately three-dozen officers at or above full corps rank—tracing how, over time, the PLAAF’s senior leaders have increasingly come from the ranks of airmen, particularly fighter pilots from the most prestigious and accomplished fighter regiments and air divisions. As his chapter shows, the leadership of the PLAAF is surprisingly “elderly,” with a coming massive reshuffle in favor of slightly younger commanders coincident with the coming 18th Party Congress in 2012. The transformation of the PLAAF from the era of the J-5 (MiG-17) and J-6/Q-5 (MiG-19) to the era of the J-10, Su-27, and J-11 “has placed,” he believes, “huge pressure for the air force to groom, select, and place talented commanders at various levels.” The author concludes that the PLAAF leadership selection process
is increasingly based upon meritocracy and even “expertocracy” . . . [reflecting] a sophisticated, institutionalized, and comprehensive personnel selection and promotion system. . . . The candidates for top leadership are inevitably well-trained, learned, and internationally exposed.
The level of professionalism is very high, both in terms of their careers as airmen, and their experience as commanders. Mediocre officers simply do not make it to the top, given the extremely tough competition among peers.
Kevin Lanzit, a senior analyst with Alion Science and Technology, Incorporated, reviews the PLAAF’s professional military education and training. As the PLAAF modernizes force structure and operational doctrine, it continues to modernize its education and training as well, seeking, as Lanzit states, “to transform its legacy mechanized force into a force that will be capable of fighting and winning in modern, informatized conditions.” Lanzit begins with an overview of training in the Chinese air service in the pre-Communist era. Training deficiencies in the early days of the PLAAF resulted in ill-trained aircrew compared to their Soviet advisors and Western opponents, and, later, to the Taiwan airmen facing them across the Taiwan Strait. The societal disruptions accompanying the infamous “Cultural Revolution” of the late Mao era took their own toll on PLAAF competency as well. Thanks first to the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, followed by those of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and continuing to the present, the PLAAF is today more rigorously (if imperfectly) trained than at any previous time. Even so, Lanzit concludes that although progress has been “substantial,” the PLAAF still “has not yet achieved the development goals it seeks for officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers].”
Beginning Part IV, Shen Pin-Luen of the Prospect Foundation delineates the past, present, and likely future of the Chinese aircraft industry, discussing how the PRC’s drive to modernize led not only to strenuous transformative efforts within the PLAAF, but also to a transformation of the Chinese aircraft industry. Its transformation resulted in a more globally inquisitive industry, one looking for inspiration in foreign design practice, but also, over time, more confident of its own abilities to pursue advanced technology programs, even complex fighter development efforts such as the J-8, J-10, J—11, and JH-7. This confidence became evident in mid-2008 with the establishment of the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. (COMAC), and, slightly later, with the merger of China Aviation Industry Corporation I (AVIC I) and China Aviation Industry Corporation II (AVIC II) into the China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC), and was reaffirmed by the first flights of the Chengdu J—20, a prototype stealth fighter roughly equivalent to the American YF-22/YF-23 of 1990, in January 2011. “The overhaul of the aviation sector is an indication that the pace of development and reform in China’s aviation industry is picking up,” Shen concludes, warning that “China’s determination and injection of resources into the industry should not be underestimated by the outside world.” Next, Phillip C. Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Joshua K. Wiseman, a research analyst at the center, probe into the Chinese aviation industry and the PLAAF’s acquisition efforts to reveal a pattern of technology acquisition they summarize as “buy, build, or steal.” “Chinese leaders aspire to build a defense industry capable of producing advanced military weapons systems without dependence on foreign suppliers,” they note, “but the limited capacity of China’s overall economy and technological limitations on its military aviation sector have made access to foreign aircraft and technology necessary.” They trace the “ongoing tension between the desire for self-reliance in defense and the need for access to advanced foreign technologies,” across five periods in the evolution of China’s military aerospace industry.
The first period was that of Soviet assistance from 1950 to 1960, which gave the PRC its initial experience in license-producing Soviet fighters, bombers, and transports. The second, from 1960 to 1977, was that of the Sino-Soviet split, during which China made do with incremental product refinement and development of derivatives (such as the Q-5) from existing designs. The third, from 1977 to 1989, marked China’s turning to the West, during which it gained some access to Western technologies. But the Tiananmen Square repression bought this period to a close. China initiated the fourth period when it turned back to a cash-strapped Russia—and even Israel—to secure advanced fighter and missile technology exemplified in the Su-27 and J — 10. The fifth (and current) period began in 2004. Since then, Western nations and Russia have become increasingly reluctant to share technology with the PRC. As a consequence, the authors conclude:
The likelihood that China will have no foreign source of advanced military aviation technology supports two important conclusions. First, the Chinese military aviation industry will have to rely primarily on indigenous development of advanced “single-use” military aviation technologies in the future [and] China will likely rely more heavily on espionage to acquire those critical military aviation technologies it cannot acquire legitimately from foreign suppliers or develop on its own.
Next, Hsi-hua Cheng, an instructor at the Taiwan National Defense University, addresses the grim prospect of military encounters over the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility, however remote, of a forceful seizure of the island of Taiwan by an all-out PLA amphibious assault. He undertakes his analysis by studying PLA, PLAN, and PLAAF doctrinal pronouncements, the pattern of military activity, and the respective force structures on either side of the strait. While noting that since May 20, 2008, when Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou took office, the cross-strait policies of both sides have become more peaceful and friendly, he nevertheless pointedly notes that “the PRC has never renounced the use of military force against Taiwan, and, indeed, as it has steadily modernized its forces, the PRC has continued to maintain an aggressive posture toward Taiwan.”
Examining various uses of coercion and escalatory force, the author stresses the PLAAF and Second Artillery’s belief in the use of joint, overwhelming power. For its part, he argues that Taiwan must employ its airpower only for self-defense. “As long as they don’t step on our territory and impede our lifelines,” he asserts, “they don’t win and we don’t lose, and our national security is secured.” Under no circumstances, he believes, should Taiwan engage in a preventive strike, as “Taiwan can’t afford the international liability of initiating the war.” It is essential, then, that Taiwan shape its defensive forces so that they can survive a first strike, enabling defenders to “concentrate Taiwan’s limited airpower to a critical time and place.” Taiwan, he believes, “must construct a mobile, diffuse, and widespread air defense umbrella covering point, area, and then theater air defense,” exploiting as well the synergy of advanced aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial systems, V/STOL (vertical and/or short takeoff and landing) technologies, hardening airfields and command facilities, and developing “a decentralized network-centric command and communication structure.” Finally, the author recommends that Taiwan “adopt a ‘Starfish’ strategy to enhance its survivability,” noting that starfish can regenerate lost arms and that Taiwan’s defense leaders “should try to apply this strategy to decentralize the commanding activity to the very basic units of its organizations, equipment, facilities, or personnel, to ensure that sustainability and survivability will expand.” Above all, he notes, Taiwan must work to ensure “that the PRC has no excuses to justify an invasion of Taiwan.”
In the final chapter, David Frelinger, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Jessica Hart, an analyst at a defense contractor, offer a provocative assessment of the PLAAF’s modernization and its influence upon the U. S.-China military balance. They posit an “alternative framework” looking beyond the “ossified” bipolar nature of the Cold War, noting the U. S.-China relationship “is not yet mature, and there are multiple, competing narratives about interests and goals on both sides.” They employ three analytical games: the “Game of Influence” (Chinese and American military power advancing their respective national interests); the “Battle over a Third Party” (Chinese and American military power employed in a two-party conflict over Taiwan); and the “Great Power Game” (unlike the others, a zero-sum game in which military power is “the central aspect” of the U. S.-China relationship), noting that both America and China have “largely confined” themselves to the second game, the Battle over a Third Party. They conclude:
The United States has a wide range of options that do not necessarily require a new force structure or more defense expenditures, but instead may call for an altered military and political emphasis. . . . If the United States chooses to continue to play the same game in the same way it has since the end of the Cold War, the results may be to China’s advantage.
But if the United States chooses to play another game where its significant military and political assets can be more fully utilized, PLAAF modernization may lead to a Pyrrhic victory for the Chinese.
Taken as a whole, the chapters of this volume provide a comprehensive picture of China’s progress in building a modern air force. This effort is most visible in PLAAF investments in aircraft and in China’s efforts to develop a capable military aviation industry. However, as several chapters demonstrate, improvements in organization, personnel, training, and doctrine have been equally important in terms of PLAAF development and expanding operational and combat capabilities. The overall impression is that the Chinese air force has made great progress on its “Long March to modernity.”
Finally, on a personal note, this book is dedicated to a remarkable airman, Major General John R. Alison, USAFR (Ret.), who died on June 6, 2011, at the age of 98. Aside from being an extraordinary pilot and military leader (and co-founder of America’s first Air Commandos), “Johnny” Alison was a fiercely dedicated patriot, whose love of country and affection and admiration for its people were matched by his affection and admiration for the people of China. As a fighter pilot in China during World War II, Alison was moved by the suffering, courage, and daily sacrifice of the Chinese people, whose optimism, passionate dedication to their homeland, and faith in its future he greatly admired. After the war, as a postwar U. S. Air Force officer, international businessman, and aviation executive, he maintained his interest in China and its citizens. All who knew him—and this editor was privileged to know him well—will recall how often he spoke of the necessity of finding a means to ensure lasting peace for the Taiwan Strait, a peace characterized by mutual respect and dignity. In a conversation less than 3 months before his death, he stressed the critical importance of promoting a stronger and beneficial unity between Taiwan and the mainland, and between the American and Chinese people, believing both would work to further the stability of East Asia. May his life serve as both example and encouragement to all those who, whatever their nationality and background, seek today to blaze a path to permanent peace so that the Taiwan Strait never again experiences the dismal and bitter horrors of civil war.
