Category The Chinese Air Force

Murray Scot Tanner

This chapter analyzes the emerging missions of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). It draws on the discussions and debates over these missions contained in recent analyses of airpower and spacepower by Chinese specialists, in particular over the past half-dozen years. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the concept of the “mission” in Chinese airpower and spacepower writings.1

This chapter focuses on one of the most important themes that unify many Chinese analyses of the air force’s emerging missions—the PLAAF’s transition from an air force focused on territorial defense toward an air force that increasingly emphasizes offensive missions and trying to seize and main­tain the initiative in its combat missions.

The increased emphasis on offensive power and initiative in PLAAF missions by Chinese air – and spacepower analysts reflects their assessment of the increasing military and political utility of offensive airpower and conven­tional deterrence, which were two major lessons they have drawn from the use of airpower in the Gulf War, Kosovo, the Iraq War, and the Afghan War. The transition to offense and initiative also reflects their assessment of the mili­tary needs of China’s enduring and emerging national security interests. Coer­cive operations against Taiwan might require the PLAAF to deter or prevent U. S. naval and air forces from intervening in support of Taiwan. PLAAF ana­lysts also contend that in a Taiwan scenario, the air force must be prepared to resist what they regard as the certainty of major U. S. airstrikes against Chinese forces, and try to find a way of using these strikes to regain the initiative against U. S. forces. Chinese security analysts also argue the PLA must be prepared to deter or defend against potential attacks against China’s increasingly populous and wealthy southeastern coast, and strengthen its ability to assert China’s ter­ritorial and resource claims in its coastal waters. Some air – and spacepower analysts also see these missions contributing to China’s struggle against sepa­ratists and terrorists in China’s border regions.

This transition is particularly evident in Chinese security analysts’ discussion of three of the PLAAF’s existing or emerging missions—deter – ring infringement of China’s critical national security interests, carrying out offensive operations, and maintaining China’s air and space defenses. Fol­lowing a brief overview of the PLAAF’s concept of its missions, the chapter focuses on these three specific missions and the recent thinking by air – and spacepower analysts about how the PLAAF should deepen its orientation toward offense and initiative in pursuing these missions.

One of the most important aspects of the concept of integrated air and space operations as it relates to space is the characterization of the air and space bat – tlespace as a “seamless whole.” This characterization is based on the lack of a dis­tinct boundary separating the atmosphere from space. This characterization, how­ever, holds several conceptual problems based on the nature of the atmosphere and space, physics, and operational and legal considerations. First, satellites and most air-breathing engines cannot readily operate between the altitudes of 20 and 100 kilometers. Aerodynamic heating and atmospheric drag inhibit the former, while the increasingly tenuous atmosphere works against any form of air-breathing pro­pulsion other than the high-hypersonic supersonic combustion ramjet (scram – jet). This “nether region” has been largely left unexploited for military use, except as a region to transit into orbit. Second, the different operating environments of air and space vehicles force them to operate in fundamentally different manners. Aircraft are maneuverable, can group together, and can respond to operational demands relatively quickly. Spacecraft, on the other hand, are less maneuverable than aircraft and can only maneuver occasionally through the expenditure of lim­ited quantities of fuel. Third, aircraft and spacecraft are treated differently by inter­national law. Aircraft do not have unrestricted use of a foreign country’s territorial air space whereas overflying a country in space is legal.27

Chinese analysts do acknowledge that there are important differences between outer space and the atmosphere. But Chinese analysts also assert that the integration of air and space operations will lead to a virtual single bat­tlespace. This is reflected in three activities: operations that utilize the force enhancement aspects of space-enabled operations; the use of space and near­space vehicles that operate in the nether region described above; and space – based platforms that attack terrestrial targets.

The foremost activity that promotes the integration of air and space is the use of space-based force enhancement technologies that act as a force mul­tiplier for air force and other service operations.28 Space forces provide recon­naissance, communications, and navigation and positioning capabilities that cannot normally be achieved through other means. These capabilities provide and transmit information to increase the precision of strikes and facilitate long – range strikes. For example, reconnaissance satellites provide high-resolution, global, real time intelligence over a vast area without consideration of national borders; communication satellites provide global communications; and global navigation satellites can provide three-dimensional positioning data for navi­gation and for guiding long-distance precision strike weapons.29

The ultimate goal of the PLAAF’s use of space is to build a network-cen­tric force in which disparate forces divided by function and distance will be fused into an organic whole through the use of information technologies. Net­worked capabilities will allow the air force to carry out four activities: infor­mation, air, and space superiority; precision strike; rapid maneuver; and mul­tidimensional support. These capabilities are intended to achieve information superiority across all domains. In fact, the level of network capabilities is said to define the level of modernization of air forces.30

The capabilities derived from a space-enabled, networked air and space force will also better integrate disparate services into a joint force, an essential prerequisite for winning informatized wars. Jointness is realized in two ways. First, space-enabled air operations allow the air force to provide better opera­tional support to other services, for example, through precision strikes. Sec­ond, the C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities provided by satellites will allow all services to share a common battlefield picture and to better communicate with each other.31 Through the use of these capabilities, practitioners of air and space integrated operations will be able to achieve synergies in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts.32

Technologies that transit through or operate in the nether world of near space between the altitudes of 20 and 100 kilometers, where neither conven­tional aircraft nor spacecraft can operate, likewise facilitate the integration of air and space. These technologies include high-flying balloons and airships, inhabited aircraft such as the venerable Lockheed U-2, and uninhabited, remotely piloted systems such as the Northrop-Grumman Global Hawk that provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capa­bilities at altitudes between 20,000 and 25,000 meters (approximately 65,000 to over 80,000 feet). While the U-2 or Global Hawk may be able to stay above a target for hours or days, high flying balloons can remain aloft for months, although station-keeping of lightly loaded craft in the midst of high-altitude winds poses a significant challenge. These technologies blur the line between the atmosphere and outer space and will result in near space becoming as much of a battlespace as the lower atmosphere is today.

Another technology which blurs the distinction between the air and space mediums is transatmospheric space planes. Space planes, such as the pro­posed U. S. Falcon hypersonic near-space vehicle, are launched into the atmo­sphere and then accelerate to hypersonic speeds (speeds in excess of five times that of sound, Mach 5+) climbing to and cruising at altitudes ranging from 20 to over 100 kilometers (from over 12 to over 60 miles). Space planes include low-hypersonic Mach 5-8 remotely piloted aircraft, missile-launched hyper­sonic penetration systems operating at near-orbital (Mach 25) velocities, and even, well into the future, piloted global-ranging vehicles operating across this velocity range. Chinese analysts believe space planes will ultimately be impor­tant platforms for achieving air and space superiority33 due to their ability to conduct operations in less time and at less cost than spacecraft, aircraft, or even cruise missiles.34 Chinese writers often refer to space planes’ global reach and information-sharing and precision strike capabilities35 as both something China must possess and something which presents a great threat. According to one author, space planes will become “the most serious military blackmailing China has encountered since the invention of the atomic bomb.”36

A third, though less discussed, aspect of integrated air and space opera­tions will be the ability of space-based platforms to strike ground, air, and sea targets.37 This includes the use of orbital bombs, so-called “rods from God,” and directed energy (DE) weapons such as lasers and microwaves.

As airpower enters its second century, it will remain the most important instrument of international security. Although operations against unconven­tional adversaries have put strains, both budgetary and conceptual, on the U. S. Air Force and its allies, the current situation does not typify the most serious threats that the great democracies will likely face in the 21st century. Pundits and prophets may argue that major war between powerful developed nations is a thing of the past and that the only threats to international security now ema­nate from nonstate actors, but they are, quite simply, wrong. Powerful states still exist and new ones are rising. Those states have interests and military forces to pursue them. While few if any national leaders in today’s world overtly seek armed conflict, the interests of some states invariably infringe on those of oth­ers. When confrontations occur, tensions rise and cascading events can lead nations to war even when neither party sees it as a desirable course of action.

The early airpower visionaries understood that airpower is uniquely suited to deter interstate war and win such wars when deterrence fails. They appreciated the inherent value of being able to operate in the vertical dimen­sion, with the speed, range, and flexibility to hold an enemy at risk across the breadth and depth of the battlespace and, if needed, take war to the very heart of his society. Early theorists may have debated whether airpower was most effectively employed against the enemy’s surface forces or against nonmilitary targets in the rear, but the one issue on which virtually all of them agreed was that no army, navy, or government could survive for long if it ceded command of the air above it to an enemy.

Finally, airpower thinking is approaching harmony, if not unanimity. Today’s transformational theories are bringing the opposing lines of thought about airpower together toward conceptual harmony, if not complete unifica­tion. Most analysts now agree that airpower is the quintessential strike element in a force-projection network able to conduct parallel attacks to create effects that are simultaneously tactical, operational, and strategic. Yet those same ana­lysts continue to debate what target sets are most efficacious in creating desired effects, what effects are most desired, and by what mechanisms they will be cre­ated. Such questions may never be fully resolved, and that is probably for the better. Strategy has always benefited from rigorous examination and spirited intellectual debate. Propositions about airpower have generated more study and debate than have propositions about most other instruments of military force. They will continue to do so in the future, keeping the field vibrant and innova­tive. Clearly, the concept of airpower will remain not only relevant, but central to international security and stability as nations advance in the 21st century.

China pursued a “walking on two legs” policy to modernize the air force through purchases of foreign systems and development of domestic technology. China has historically sought to be self-reliant in military produc­tion through either reverse-engineering or incorporating foreign technology. Since the early 1990s, such foreign purchases have been perceived as a stopgap measure for the PLAAF to create a sizeable fleet of fourth-generation aircraft, exemplified by acquisition of the Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30, and co-produced J—11 fighters. After years of effort, the development of domestic systems has borne fruit thanks to the J-10 and JH-7 that have entered service in the PLAAF since 2004. It appears that every year since 2005, one regiment of PLAAF or navy aviation has transitioned into the JH-7A, J-10, and J-11B.33

With its entry into the 21st century, the PLAAF has become smaller. The U. S. Department of Defense reports on Chinese military power registered 5,300 tactical fighters, bombers, and support aircraft in both the PLA Air Force’s and naval aviation’s inventory in 2000. That number declined to 2,300 in 2010.34 As early as 2003, the PLAAF’s operational air divisions had fallen to just 29 divisions, with some of them having only two air regiments.35 Along with this reduction and restructuring, the PLAAF established an additional trans­port division and one special aircraft division, attempting to enhance its long – range airlift and airborne early warning (AEW) capabilities. Thus, although getting smaller, the Chinese air force has become much better equipped and much more technologically sophisticated.36

Like the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force previously, the PLAAF’s leadership seeks to create a mixed force that blends limited quantities of high-performance fighters and larger quantities of less expensive fighters. The ongoing procurement of J-7G and J-8F/H, which are upgraded versions of obsolete second-generation J-7/8s, provides the Chinese air force with less – expensive, less-capable aircraft to serve alongside J—10s and J—11s in a “high/ low” combination.37 One problem which seems to have bothered the PLAAF is that the initially purchased Su-27s and the subsequently assembled Chinese J— 11s are not true multirole fighters capable of supporting the increasingly diverse mission requirements of the PLAAF, particularly the increased empha­sis on offensive as well as defensive roles.38 The real change of its offensive capa­bilities will only come as a significant number of J-10s and J-11Bs enter opera­tional service over the next 5 to 10 years.

For the past 10 years, increasing focus has been placed on informatiza­tion as a leapfrog measure to close the PLAAF’s cyber and electronic warfare (EW) gap with the United States and Western Europe. The development of sophisticated command, control, and communications (C3), or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, has been the PLAAF’s most urgent priority.39 Following earlier experimental trials using an obso­lete Soviet-legacy Tupolev Tu-4 modified with turboprop engines and rudi­mentary search radar in a saucer dome, China has developed two “high-low” versions of an indigenous AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System): the high-end KJ-2000 based on the Russian IL-76MD airframe; and the low – end KJ-200 based on the Y-8F-200 transport platform. These platforms were handed over to the PLAAF in 2005 and 2006, respectively, to coordinate fight­ers and bombers via secure datalinks. Simultaneously, China developed seven other different types of EW aircraft, the High New (Gaoxin) series, likewise based upon the Y-8. Integration of these systems is well underway across the services to increase PLA joint operational capability.40

In retrospect, though the U. S. Government successfully pressured Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon AWACS system to the PLA in 1999, China appears to have pulled together sufficient talents and resources to build its own system despite this seeming setback. The chief engineer and designer of the Chi­nese AWACS project recently claimed that China’s radar technology has reached the same level as that of leading foreign countries and that, in some areas, it is even better.41 Efforts by the United States and European countries to prevent China from obtaining high-tech weapons similarly do not seem to have succeeded.

Yet, the downside of this success in improving the cutting edge of offen­sive and defensive forces has actually worked to delay PLAAF acquisition of transport aircraft and transport-related research and development (R&D). Rus­sia’s failure to deliver 34 IL-76MDs as scheduled in 2008 has kept the PLAAF’s newly created transport division underequipped.42 In the meantime, most of the Y-8 platforms manufactured by Shanxi Aircraft Factory have been committed to the production of the high priority High New series, and development of the Y-9, whose first prototype was begun in 2006, was delayed. (Recently, some sources suggest that the Y-9 project has resumed with first flight expected in 2011). It was not until May 2009 that the new transport division received its first Y-8C aircraft.43 Again, this reflects how the PLAAF is restricted by numerous constraints and obstacles that confront all aspects of its development.

Prior to the 1990s, the PLAAF’s official mission was largely limited to that of a localized defensive force intended to support ground (or maritime) opera­tions on or close to the mainland.2 In recent years, however, Chinese Commu­nist Party (CCP) and PLA leaders have made clear that they envision a greatly expanded combat and noncombat role for the air force. In 2004, the Party’s Cen­tral Military Commission (CMC) approved the air force’s first-ever service-spe­cific strategic concept. This concept clearly suggested a much broader mission than in the past, with a greater emphasis on offense: “Integrate air and space; be simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations” (kongtian yi ti, gongfang jianbei, Й^—1Ф, ЖШШЮ3 Then, in 2008, China’s National Defense White Paper identified the PLAAF as a “strategic service” of the PLA.4

Over the past 5 to 6 years in particular, PLA analysts of air – and space – power have produced an outpouring of articles and in-depth studies analyz­ing and debating the future missions that the world’s most powerful air forces, including China’s, will have to prepare to undertake. This chapter draws heav­ily upon these analyses.5

Some recent Chinese military reference works have tried to clarify and standardize the definitions of concepts such as “mission” and “task” and related terms such as “operations” (xingdong, ТЙ). But most PLA books and articles do not draw clear distinctions among these concepts, nor have consistent def­initions for these terms emerged in recent analyses of air – and spacepower. For example, the most common terms for “mission” (shiming, U#) and “task” (renwu, H%-) are often used interchangeably or in combination.

The Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia and a few other analytical sources provide distinct definitions for air force “missions” (shiming, U#) and air force “tasks” (renwu, fi^).6 The Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia defines airforce mis­sions as:

The important historical responsibilities entrusted to the air force by the state, which are divided into basic missions [jiben shiming, S^U#], special missions [teshu shiming, #^U#], and concrete missions [juti shiming, ДІФШ#].7

Historically, statements of basic PLA missions have been worded as slo­gans or broad statements of political values or goals. The PLAAF’s first state­ment of mission, for example, appears to have been Mao Zedong’s April 1950 inscription for the inaugural issue of the PLAAF’s journal People’s Air Force. It read simply “Create a Strong and Great People’s Air Force; Destroy the Rem­nant Enemy Forces; Stabilize the Nation’s Defenses.”8 Today, statements of the PLAAF’s basic missions tend to be worded in somewhat more concrete terms, but are still not highly detailed. An example is the 2008 National Defense White Paper’s statement that the PLAAF was responsible for “safeguarding the coun­try’s territorial air space and territorial sovereignty, and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide.”9

The Air Force Encyclopedia defines the basic tasks (jiben renwu,

#) of any nation’s air force as “the important responsibilities that an air force assumes in order to carry out its missions.”10 Although “tasks” are supposed to be clearly defined responsibilities intended to carry out PLAAF missions, very few PLA analysts actually make any clear distinction between “tasks” and rela­tively specific or concrete “missions.” Some senior analysts even use the term “tasks”—renwu—jointly or interchangeably with “missions”—shiming—both when they describe some relatively abstract missions (deterrence, for example) and when they describe far more concrete and specific missions or tasks.

For example, two leading analysts have referred to the same undertak­ing by air force personnel—using air and space forces to deter the enemy, for example—as different categories of concepts: one labels this a “task-mission” (renwu shiming; Ї#ШФ), and the other calls some of these activities “opera­tions” (xingdong; ТЙ) in one portion of his study and “tasks” in another.11 This lack of consistency within the PLAAF literature indicates a clear conceptual problem—the PLAAF is presently in the process of defining a new set of mis­sions without a clear, agreed-upon concept of what a “mission” is or how it fits into the structure of PLAAF military thought.

The PLAAF has not publicly released a list of its principal missions. Nor have PLA air – and spacepower analysts over the past several years referred to air force missions using the same list of missions and similar terms for them— something Western analysts would expect to see if an agreed-upon list of mis­sions existed. But a review of recent PLA writings on air – and spacepower suggests that a broad consensus exists among PLA analysts concerning the importance of six core PLAAF air and space missions: deterrence; offense; defense; airlift; airborne; and blockade support. The breadth of this list under­scores the terrific change in the PLA’s overall view of the air force’s mission and utility over the past 15 years or so.

A closer examination of some of these missions demonstrates an impor­tant theme in the PLAAF’s transition away from being a largely defensively – oriented air force. Several of these missions reflect the PLAs focus on devel­oping the air force’s offensive capabilities as well as its capability to retake and maintain the initiative in deterrence and combat missions. The remainder of this chapter focuses on what most analysts would probably agree are the three most important of these missions—deterrence, offense, and defense—with a special focus on this new emphasis on offense and initiative.

Xu’s comments that space is a “new commanding height for interna­tional strategic competition,” that competition in space is an “inevitable trend,” and “having control of space means having control of the ground, oceans, and electromagnetic space” are also common themes in PLAAF writings. PLAAF analysts assess that the role space plays in providing information and in link­ing units together into a networked force will turn the space domain into a contested battlefield. This conclusion is rooted in Chinese military doctrine that now regards the use of information as the main determiner of success on the battlefield. In fact, PLA analysts widely consider space as the domi­nant domain from which to collect intelligence and to facilitate network-cen­tric warfare practices.38

This conclusion is partially based on the U. S. military’s experience in the 1991 Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Chinese analysis, the United States used over 100 satellites during the 1991 Gulf War and 70 satellites during Operation Allied Force. The use of these satellites and the C4ISR systems they supported were the primary reason for U. S. victories. These capabilities allowed the U. S. military to have an asymmetric superiority over its opponents gained through battlefield transparency and long-range precision strikes.39 The primacy of information gained from space has led many PLAAF analysts to conclude that space is the new commanding high ground of the bat­tlefield.40 Because of this, PLA analysts conclude that the primacy of information derived from space will make satellites irresistible targets. As a result, space will become a battlefield and seizing that battlefield will determine the success of air, naval, and ground operations.41 Operations to seize control of space are referred to as space warfare, called tian zhan (^$), taikong zhan (^Й№), or kongjian zhan (ЙЙЙ) in Chinese, involving military engagements that mainly take place in space between two parties trying to seize or maintain space superiority.

Space warfare is described as a new operational method in air and space integrated operations and an important method of achieving military superior­ity.42 Space warfare operations can be divided into space-based, air-based, and ground-based operations. These can include ground-based directed energy strikes and space-based kinetic energy strikes, airborne lasers, and electronic countermeasures. Chinese writers also refer to using space stations and space planes to conduct ASAT attacks.43 Space stations can also serve as a command and control base, a communications node, and a logistics and maintenance hub for spacecraft and as a platform for strategic weapons.44

Including the goal of achieving space supremacy in the definition of space warfare indicates that the PLAAF is attempting to take on the counter­space role. The same source that defined air and space integrated operations defines space supremacy as:45

During times of war, the control of a certain area of space for a certain period of time by one side. Its goal is to ensure one’s freedom of action in space and its full access to space resources and to limit the other side’s freedom of action in space and access to space resources.

Seizing space superiority is also described as one of the necessary condi­tions for achieving ground, naval, and air superiority, leading many analysts to conclude that whoever controls space will seize the initiative.46

This definition of space supremacy is largely consistent with other Chinese definitions of space supremacy, and is, as well, consistent with the U. S Air Force (USAF) definition found in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations: 47

Space Superiority is that level of control in the space domain that one force enjoys over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space superiority may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and persistent. Achieving space superiority is of primary con­cern since it allows control and exploitation of the space domain in order to provide space effects in and through space. The Air Force achieves space superiority through counterspace operations, including offensive and defensive operations, both of which are based on robust space situ­ational awareness.

One important difference between the two definitions is the Chinese ref­erence to space superiority occurring within a certain time and area, whereas the USAF definition states that space superiority “may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and persistent.” The Chinese definition reflects doc­trinal writings, which stress seizing the initiative at a certain place and period of time in order to open a window of opportunity that can be used to strike a decisive blow. This limited goal also recognizes that the PLA, as a weaker force compared to the U. S. military, will most likely not be able to maintain the ini­tiative for long periods of time over an expansive area.

Mark A. Stokes

The desire to fly higher, faster, and farther is shared by airmen around the world, and unimpeded access to the skies over a region convincingly dem­onstrates national power. Spurred by a global diffusion of technology and a de­sire to develop a military commensurate with its growing economic might, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is developing capabilities that could alter the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Shaping the future strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, aerospace power traverses vast distances and places a premium on speed and agility that defy the laws of gravity.

Aerospace power—the strategic and operational application of military force via platforms operating in or passing through air and space—is emerging as a key instrument of Chinese statecraft. Control of the skies is a critical en­abler for dominance on the Earth’s surface. Gaining and maintaining air supe­riority and space control could provide a political and military leadership with the operational freedom needed to coerce an opponent to make concessions in political disputes. Freedom of action in the skies can offer a decisive edge on the surface. Chinese observers view air and space as a single operational me­dium of the future, with the English term aerospace best describing the merg­ing of the twin domains.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly advancing its capacity to apply aerospace power in order to defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Constrained by a relatively underdeveloped aviation establishment, the PLA is investing in aerospace capabilities that may offset shortcomings in the face of a more technologically advanced adversary.

Refining its concepts of airpower and integrated aerospace operations along with rapidly advancing technology, the PLA is embarked upon a quest to extend its operational military power vertically into space and horizontally be­yond its immediate periphery. The PLAs concept of airpower is broader than its air force. Conventional manned fixed-wing air assets are only one possible means of delivering firepower at extended ranges. To date, PLA convention­al air platforms have been insufficient by themselves to suppress air defenses, conduct strategic strike missions, or gain air superiority around the Chinese periphery.

Today, the PLAs growing arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal ballis­tic and land attack cruise missiles serves as its primary instrument of aerospace power projection and strategic attack. Theater missiles, defined as conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 ki­lometers (310-3,410 miles), also enable the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) to com­pensate for its shortcomings in suppression of enemy air defenses needed to at­tain limited air superiority, conduct strategic strike, and perform other roles and missions. Over the longer term, the PLAAF aspires to gain the ability to conduct independent strategic attack missions as well as integrated air and space—that is, aerospace—operations. Whether independent or joint, a persistent surveil­lance network is a critical enabler for PLAAF and Second Artillery delivery of firepower against selected strategic and operational targets with precision and at increasingly extended ranges. Looking toward 2025, Chinese technical writings outline a vision for a conventional global precision strike capability.

Key drivers shaping PLA concepts of aerospace power as an instrument of national power include gaining an ability to enforce territorial claims and resolve sovereignty disputes on terms favorable to Beijing. Threat perceptions are also in­fluencing PLA operational concepts and force modernization. A more efficient and effective system for leveraging military-related technologies is also shaping new operational and organizational concepts that best accommodate new capa­bilities, such as long-range precision strike and counterspace systems. Over the longer term, successful development and deployment of intermediate – and inter­continental-range conventional ballistic missiles and other precision strike assets would offer the PRC political leadership a flexible deterrent that could achieve strategic and operational effects against an enemy in a crisis.

The emergence of China as a major economic, technological, military, and political player is changing the dynamics within the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Various drivers energize China’s evolving aerospace power theories, and can be examined through the prism of four central con­cepts associated with joint aerospace operations: integrated offense-defense; integrated information-firepower; strategic strike; and integrated air and space (aerospace). Various aspects of technological development and force modern­ization are narrowing the gap between aspiration and future capabilities.

Strategic Drivers

Four key drivers shape PRC concepts of aerospace power:

■ territorial integrity

■ asserting sovereignty

■ threat perception

■ technology diffusion.

In great measure, the PLA’s rapid advance in its capacity to apply aero­space power is driven by the requirement to defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In enforcing sovereignty claims over the last 20 years, conventional ballistic missiles have been one of the most effective tools of PRC political and military coercion. As a symbolic metric of intent, the PRC’s expanding arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait is intended to deter political support in Taiwan for de jure independence and coerce the island’s population to support unification with China on Beijing’s terms. Whoever dominates the skies over a given geograph­ic space, such as Taiwan, disputed territories in northern India or Japan, and the South China Sea, has a decisive advantage on the surface. Over the last 15 years, conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles have been perhaps the most visible and central element of PRC’s coercive strategy against Taiwan. Over the next 10-15 years, more advanced conventional air assets, integrated with persistent surveillance, a single integrated air and space picture, and sur – vivable communications architecture, could enable greater confidence in en­forcing a broader range of territorial claims around China’s periphery.

Traditional concepts of air defense have evolved into a broader concept for a “national aerospace security system” as a means to defend against perceived threats. At least one key driver of aerospace power development is a require­ment to be familiar with and have countermeasures against advanced U. S. long – range precision strike capabilities expected to be in place by 2025.1 To quote one long-time China watcher, “the Chinese armed forces are obsessed with defend­ing China from long-range precision air strikes.”2 Applicable American technol­ogy efforts that fuel Chinese concern over long-range precision strike include the joint program of the Air Force, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and Lockheed-Martin called the Force Application and Launch from the Continental U. S. (FALCON) Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2) program. Under this concept, the Minotaur solid-fueled launch vehicle boosts an unmanned, maneuverable, hypersonic flight vehicle into near-space, which glides back through the atmosphere at speeds exceeding Mach 20. The launch ve­hicle also could be capable of launching microsatellites into space on short notice. Another program of interest is the U. S. Air Force (USAF)-Boeing X-37B Orbit­al Test Vehicle first boosted into space in April 2010.3 Yet another is the USAF – Boeing-Pratt & Whitney-Rocketdyne X-51A WaveRider supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) demonstrator, which is dropped from a B-52 and boosted to high supersonic speeds by a rocket before its scramjet engine is initiated. The

X-51A completed its first flight in May 2010, the first successful demonstration of a hydrocarbon-fueled scramjet engine in aviation history.

A more immediate goal appears to be developing the means to deny or complicate the ability of the United States to intervene in a regional contingency around its periphery. Chinese analysts may view an expansion of the battlespace and disruption of U. S. ability to project conventional power in response to Chi­nese use of force to resolve territorial or sovereignty claims as a legitimate force modernization requirement. Authoritative Chinese writings indicate research into, and development of, increasingly accurate and longer range conventional strategic strike systems that could be launched from Chinese territory against land – and sea-based targets throughout the Asia-Pacific region in a crisis situa­tion. Observers appear concerned over vulnerability to first strike against Chi­na’s nuclear deterrent. As a corollary, Chinese force planners may be emulating or mirroring United States aerospace power concepts and programs, based on a perceived requirement to narrow the technological gap and attain a global status commensurate with the country’s rising economic power.4

Technological diffusion constitutes an important driver for Chinese aerospace power. The more efficient and effective means for leveraging mil­itary-related technologies shape new operational and organizational concepts that best accommodate new capabilities, such as long-range precision strike and counterspace systems. If the technological capacity exists, the incentives to develop systems to expand the country’s aerospace power may prove irresist – ible.5 As a result, unforeseen breakthroughs in disruptive technologies and so – called trump card capabilities indeed could change strategic calculations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.6

Means of diffusing aerospace technology include formal and informal organizations intended to facilitate collaboration between the PLA, industry, and academia; enabling technological breakthroughs via innovative organiza­tional changes within the PLA’s acquisition and equipment system and aero­space industry; and decisive steps taken to develop new internationally com­petitive industries involving large, complex systems such as commercial avia­tion.7 Indeed, China’s defense research and development (R&D) establishment is breaking down barriers that previously hampered ability to field the complex “system of systems” characteristic of contemporary advanced aerospace power.

A conventional academic consensus is that instituting change in military organizations is at best difficult. It is perhaps even more challenging to institute change in the PLA organization. In their 2007 study, Saunders and Quam look at tradeoffs in current PLAAF modernization efforts and future force structure including the allocation of roles and missions among services and branches, the balance between domestic and foreign procurement, the mix of low-tech­nology and high-technology systems, and the relative proportions of combat aircraft and support aircraft.44 But the PLA’s political cultural tradition, system­atic constraints, and the emergence of service cultures also influence the pace of modernization and the size of the air force.

Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow note that organizational culture is a factor influencing leaders to favor maintenance of the status quo.45 China’s Party-army relationship, a relic from its founding, demands the PLAs absolute loyalty to the Party. The PLAAF is no exception to this. The current and future development of the air force is obligated to be framed within the ideological bounds of the military thinking of the Chinese leadership.

As mentioned, the PLAAF leadership has always maintained a pseudo­scientific attitude in characterizing their leadership’s sporadic instructions as profound military thought on airpower, and then using those instructions as guidance. “Being prepared for offensive and defensive operations” had been long debated by air force theorists since the late 1980s. It was not until 1999 that Jiang Zemin endorsed the expression. The PLAAF felt itself officially blessed and subsequently claimed the concept to justify the strategic goal of the air force and, furthermore, to characterize it as a vital piece of Jiang’s mili­tary thought on airpower.46

Chinese leaders are accustomed to devoting significant personal, auton­omous attention to defense projects. Their involvement influences the allo­cation of resources as well as air force procurement decisions. The PLAAF, reportedly, has been unenthusiastic about the J-8 as its air superiority fighter, and would prefer to suspend its procurement as the J-10 becomes available. But Jiang Zemin personally took charge of this focal-point project, calling the J-8 aircraft a credit to the China’s aviation industry.47 Since then, the air force has had little choice but to continue purchasing upgraded versions of J-8 fight­ers, though in limited numbers.

Currying favor with the leadership is a cultural phenomenon in any political system dominated by absolute authority and arbitrary decisions by key individuals. It represents not only air force subordination to the Party (strongly entrenched in Chinese military culture), but also demonstrates the political reliability and loyalty of the air force to individual senior Party leaders. In return, the PLAAF leadership could be confident that, when they brought requests to the Party leadership’s personal attention, they would receive favor­able approval. Nothing should upset the continuity of this entwining Party/ military bondage of mutual support.

Another well-known organizational constraint goes to the so-called “great land army” (^й¥) complex, which refers to army-centric thinking and leadership that have long dominated the Chinese military system.48 The four general departments—the General Staff Department, General Political Depart­ment, General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department— serve concurrently as the PLA’s joint staff, and as the headquarters for all ser­vices, namely the ground force, navy, air force, and Second Artillery force. These departments are still staffed primarily by army officers. Because there is no gen­eral headquarters for ground forces, the General Staff Department is assigned to perform the functions of ground force headquarters. Its overarching army bias has inevitably influenced all military aspects from force size, structure, and com­mand and control to logistics, equipment, R&D, and procurement.49

Nowadays, increasing numbers of personnel from other services are assigned to “joint” positions at headquarters department levels, as well as at military region headquarters levels. This change enables the expertise and knowledge of other services to be brought into the joint and higher headquar­ters command environment. Though such personnel wear the uniform of their own services, they are, in fact, no longer controlled within the personnel sys­tems of their own services. This separation keeps their representation of paro­chial service-specific interests in these headquarters departments at minimal level. Over the years, air force general officers have been appointed to deputy positions at the headquarters departments and to the commandership or polit­ical commissarship of the PLA Academy and National Defense University. A growing leadership role for other services within the PLA looks more symbolic than substantial as long as the existing organizational system continues.50

The organization of the Chinese air force along military regional lines, with an operational command in each military region, is another typical reflec­tion of the predominant ground force institutional system of the Chinese mili­tary.51 Military regional leadership organizations traditionally have been a com­mand organization for ground troops and education institutions, while playing a concurrent leadership role for the personnel of other services located within their regions. Only ground force officers have commanded military regions, and the commanders of other services can only serve as their deputies.52 Since there is no permanent joint organization at the military region level, when a joint command organization must be formed, air force officers can only assume assistant (hence subordinate) positions. Thus, even though China’s most likely conflict scenarios involve possible sea and air fights over Taiwan and in the East China and South China Seas, no navy and air force general officer has been yet assigned to command either the Nanjing or Guangzhou Military Region.

In 2000, Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou, former deputy political com­missar of the air force and currently political commissar of the PLAs National University, proposed Chinese military authorities consider reorganizing the PLAAF into functional air commands, separating the air force from the PLA military regional system, and thus making it a truly independent service. In order to make it a more offensively oriented air force, he further recommended the use of the U. S. Air Force’s “expeditionary force” model to organize air force units into air strike groups with a mix of fighters, bombers, and EW aircraft.53 Liu has been recognized as the “Douhet of China” because of his reputation as a daring thinker of airpower theory that goes against the PLAAF’s tradition, though a better analogy might be that he is a Chinese equivalent of Lieuten­ant General David A. Deptula or Colonel John A. Warden III. Not surprisingly, given the ground-centric traditionalism of the Chinese military system, Liu’s advocacy for eliminating the ground-centric military system has received lit­tle support from the PLA military establishment. Current evidence suggests that, in a joint operation or campaign, the air force will continue to play a sup­port role rather than an independent or leading role.54 Although the PLAAF currently enjoys the benefits of favorable military investment, as long as the

General Logistics Department continues to control military finances, PLAAF funding is unlikely to reach levels desired by air force officers.55

The rising importance of the navy, air force, and Second Artillery forces has facilitated the emergence of rival service cultures, which, in turn, have brought not only competition with the ground force tradition, but also rival­ries among the other services and branches. In particular, the PLAAF’s adop­tion of air and space integration as part of its development has instigated a struggle within the PLA over the control of space operations. China’s space assets are controlled by the General Armaments Department, while the Sec­ond Artillery possesses strategic missiles. The PLAAF has been contending that it should be in control of space operations because air and space constitute a single integrated medium. But the PLAAF has been unpersuasive in making this case, and so has lost recent debates about whether these capabilities should be placed under its control.56 It concurrently concentrates on building facilities and institutions to receive satellite services for communication, weather, navi­gation, and global positioning. Taking this tack, the PLAAF believes it will be able to make the transition from being a traditional air force to one enabled by space-based information (communications, positioning, navigation, timing, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities.57

China’s present-day security interests—preventing Taiwan from seced­ing and supporting the country’s claims to islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea—have brought PLA naval aviation into competition with the PLAAF for the limited R&D and production capabilities of the Chinese defense industry. For example, the JH-7 fighter-bomber was initially made for PLAN aviation. The air force did not commit to this aircraft until the improved variant, the JH-7A—upgraded with two more powerful domestic-made tur­bofan engines and a new fire control system capable of launching precision strikes using antiradiation missiles and laser-guided bombs—became avail – able.58 Since 2004, its acquisition has been a priority for the PLAAF which has had to share its production with naval aviation, receiving one regiment every other year. As a result, the PLAAF’s replacement program to phase out its obsolete fleet of aging Q-5 attack aircraft—a J-6 (Chinese version of the MiG-19) derivative—will stretch beyond 2015. This PLAN-PLAAF competi­tion extends to other domestically manufactured aircraft, such as the J-10 and J-11B, produced by Chengdu and Shenyang aircraft factories, respectively.59 With the air force increasingly training over water, the competition in terms of division of responsibility and procurement will be intensified as maritime strike missions traditionally assigned to PLAN are increasingly prosecuted by the PLAAF, echoing similar institutional struggles between the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Army Air Corps in the 1930s.60

For more than a decade, PLAAF doctrinal writings, defense white papers, and analytical studies have placed increasing emphasis on “deterrence” as one of the PLAAF’s most important missions. The PLAAF’s capability to achieve an important strategic goal of the state such as deterrence—either act­ing independently or as the lead service in joint operations—is an important aspect of what PLA analysts mean when they refer to the PLAAF becoming a “strategic air force” or a “strategic air and space force.”

Recent PLA studies have also argued that conventional air and space forces have become increasingly effective as deterrent forces since the end of the Cold War.12 One part of this contention is that the speed, range, precision and “ferocity” of modern precision-guided munitions make them especially well-suited for deterring hostile behavior by a prospective enemy.13 Chinese analysts argue that these weapons, in addition to their battlefield effectiveness, can have a powerful political effect by dissolving the willpower of the enemy’s civilian population and government to support continued warfare. Some ana­lysts, moreover, have argued that compared to nuclear weapons, conventional air and space weapons are more controllable and flexible, cause less collateral damage, and have fewer or shorter lived aftereffects, all of which make them politically less risky to employ.14 Apparently implicit in this last point is the assumption that the most likely opponent to be targeted by such operations is, itself, a nuclear power.

Toward a ladder of deterrence intensity. Over the past 6 years, in an appar­ent effort to promote China’s capacity for initiative and control in its conven­tional air – and space-deterrence operations, several major studies of air – and spacepower have tried to develop what might be called a “ladder of intensity levels” for deterrence. These studies describe increasingly serious periods or stages in a crisis, and recommend increasingly harsh corresponding actions China could take to signal its military power, preparation, and determination to its prospective adversaries. During peacetime precrisis periods, these include many routine activities associated with China’s buildup of military forces.

At the highest, most intense stages of a crisis, some analysts have even sug­gested the use of actual first strikes as a means of warning an opponent to desist in its actions.

A powerful implicit theme in these discussions of a ladder of deter­rence is that China will be able to maintain control and initiative, selecting among these options based on the nature of the threat it faces. Unpredictable or uncontrollable responses by enemy forces are not addressed.

Low-intensity deterrence operations. During peacetime or the very early stages of a crisis, PLA analysts recommend the use of an array of “low-inten­sity” deterrence operations and activities. These include several gradual, non­violent, noncoercive, and even commonplace peacetime military activities whose purpose is to communicate to a potential enemy the increasing strength of the country’s air – and spacepower, as well as its resolve to use it if need be. Examples include publicizing the country’s air – and spacepower buildup, train­ing and exercises, international arms sales expositions, and testing of new weapons and equipment.15 Analyst Yuan Jingwei of China’s National Defense University (NDU) cites the publicity surrounding a reported 2001 U. S. space warfare exercise as an example, claiming that the exercise was far more valu­able to the United States for its deterrent effect on potential enemies than as an actual military exercise.16

Medium-intensity deterrence operations. During the early or “deepen­ing” stages of crises, analysts recommend undertaking more open and asser­tive deterrent measures. The purpose of these measures is to signal much more forcefully to a potential enemy the strength of China’s capabilities, its inten­tions, and its resolve. Possible deterrent activities might include carrying out realistic exercises and weapons tests, redeploying troops, establishing no-fly zones, or undertaking intrusive patrols or reconnaissance activities.17

High-intensity deterrence operations. Analysts recommend these opera­tions for when “a crisis is intensifying, the enemy is clearly making moves to prepare for real combat, and is clearly plotting to carry out an attack.”18 Their purpose is primarily to communicate will and intention to use force in the event the adversary “stubbornly persists” in offensive actions.19

A few PLA air and space analysts have recently begun to blur any dis­tinction between “deterrence” and “actual combat” by explicitly proposing the possibility of launching first attacks to intimidate potential opponents dur­ing the “high-intensity” phase of a crisis. Analyst Yuan Jingwei of the Chinese National Defense University’s Campaign Education and Research Depart­ment contends that a sharp, initial combat blow should be seen not so much as the initiation of full-scale combat, but rather as a signal designed to get the opponent to back down. “Military deterrence,” Yuan argues, “has gradually become an important form for actually carrying out combat.”20 Widely pub­lished air – and spacepower theorists Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping likewise identify forms of high-intensity and even super-high-intensity deterrence operations in which relatively low-intensity combat operations are used to achieve the goals of strategic and campaign-level deterrence.21 Cai and Tian, as well as PLAAF analyst Min Zengfu, argue that this form of deterrence lies somewhere between “deterrence” and “real combat.”22

PLAAF writers conclude that the essential nature of the space battle­field and the central role that the PLAAF will play in conducting operations in outer space make the PLAAF the ideal service to take over the PLA’s space mis­sion.48 PLAAF researchers argue several points in making their case. The first is that the air force is critical to any operation’s success. As one researcher writes, “Seizing air dominance in the war zone relies on the entire military force. Still, it will only succeed by the integrated offense and defense operations in the air assisted by space-based information. Consequently, an integrated air and space force is a crucial force. This is a conclusion we have come to from all high-tech limited wars.”49 Xu makes a similar, if not more ostentatious, statement in pro­moting the superiority of the air force by stating, “Since the air force’s ‘sphere of activity is high up in the heavens,’ it is heaven’s favored one and boasts the com­bination of a science gene, an expeditionary gene, and a military gene.”

A related argument is the characterization of the air force as the most highly technical branch of the military, which makes the air force more suit­able to warfare in the information age than other services.50 Scientific and tech­nological achievements in aviation and space technology have led to dramatic changes in how wars are fought. These achievements have transformed war­fare into a three-dimensional battlefield fought at ever increasing altitudes and eventually in space. This evolution has directly led to the concept of integrated air and space operations and network-centric warfare.51

Another argument used by PLAAF analysts is the requirement for a uni­fied command of China’s space forces. According to this argument, the increas­ing diversity and number of Chinese satellites has increased the difficulty of coordinating China’s space enterprise and only by a unified command can the PLA bring together these disparate functions and organizations into an effec­tive military force.52

In fact, PLA analysts and those involved in the space industry have for some time argued that China requires an organization to unify space efforts.53 They point out that China’s space enterprise is too widely spread out among a number of different organizations, including the General Armament Depart­ment (GAD), the China National Space Administration, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the National Weather Administration. In addition, PLAAF analysts argue that the GAD, while responsible for research and development and the launch and tracking of satellites, is less suited for conducting space opera­tions. According to a PLAAF author, this makes the GAD incapable of meeting the needs of space operations and integrated air and space operations.54 These inefficiencies result in the waste of human, material, and financial resources and the failure to identify priorities and coordinate development. Moreover, the lack of a unified command organization has resulted in a lack of space doctrine at the campaign and tactical levels.55 This was most recently demonstrated during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake which revealed shortcomings in the ability of the Chinese government and military to effectively utilize space-based assets.56

Another compelling rationale for the PLAAF to lead the space mission is the inevitable deployment of space planes and near-space vehicles. Since the PLAAF will be the main organization operating aircraft, space planes, and near-space vehicles, it is thus best suited to control their flights. This also makes the PLAAF the logical organization to defend China from enemy space planes, near-space vehicles, and satellites.57

A final argument made by PLAAF analysts is that every other military in the world places the responsibility for the command of space forces with its air force. As one author writes, “as of today, no country, from the large such as the United States and Russia to the small such as Israel, puts the country’s space force under a service other than the air force, let alone under the establishment of the rocket forces.”58

PLAAF writers acknowledge that not all agree the PLAAF should com­mand the PLAs space forces. According to one account, the PLAAF is accused of a having “too long of a reach.” One analyst, however, argues that the PLAAF is the only logical choice based on military structure, development, and eco­nomic benefits. This author concludes that if the PLAAF’s “reach is too long,” then so is the reach of other air forces, who also happen to be supported by their military leaders; he writes:59

An authoritative report concluded that it is unadvisable to have the Air

Force take on the command of space forces, given its other responsibilities.

The implication is that the Air Force does not have what it takes. I have argued against that conclusion at different conferences. The question comes to: it should fall under the Air Force’s responsibility based on the attributes and inherent function of the service. Foreign countries let their air force take it on. The Chinese air force must be capable of doing it as well. … My view is as follows: our military is currently at a time of rees­tablishing itself as a new air force, so as to transform from a mechanized air force into an informatized air force, an air defense-oriented air force into an offense-defense capable air force, a tactical air force into a stra­tegic air force, and an aviation-oriented air force into an integrated air and space air force. In short, to transform a “small air force” into a “big air force,” and achieving “air force first” as put forward by Deng Xiaop­ing. “Air force first” does not mean the Air Force being the “big brother.”

All services and combat arms were spun from the ground force and nur­tured by the glorious tradition of the ground force. As a result, the army will forever be the “big brother.” “Big air force” refers to breaking away from the traditional mind-set of the Air Force and to build a new model air force called for by the new times, to play a major role in wars, as well as a strategic role in national defense.

Whether the PLAAF’s space force should be an independent force or a force subordinated to a joint organization appears to be under debate, however. One author recommends that the air force should be the PLA’s primary space force that will conduct independent operations as well as operations in support of other services.60 Another researcher, however, argues that the Central Mili­tary Commission (CMC) and General Staff Department (GSD) should estab­lish a joint organization which would command all PLA space forces, includ­ing air force space launch, tracking, situational awareness, operations, and information application units.61

Conclusion

Chinese writings on integrated air and space operations reflect the PLAAF desire to integrate space into military operations. This desire is based on the assertions that space-based information will become a deciding factor in future wars, that space will be a dominant battlefield, and that in order to achieve victory on Earth, one must first seize the initiative in space. This will require China to achieve space supremacy, defined as the ability to freely use space and to deny the use of space to adversaries.

PLAAF analysts acknowledge that the role of space in modern military operations is largely aspirational and is mainly limited to information support

given to air and air defense operations. Nevertheless, as space operational capa­bilities improve, integrated air and space operations will become more effective.62

In making these conclusions, however, PLAAF analysts fail to question their assumptions. In addition to the conceptual problems related to the char­acterization of air and space as a seamless medium discussed earlier in the paper, the description of space as the dominant domain ignores the vulner­ability of space-based assets and the primacy of offense over defense in space. Indeed, while space provides vital force enhancement functions, the fragility of spacecraft and the difficulties in defending relatively unmaneuverable satel­lites suggest that outer space will not remain the dominant domain in the face of counterspace operations. PLAAF analysts also seem inordinately interested in manned space missions on the premise that manned spacecraft are more responsive in combat—a notion discarded by the U. S. Air Force in the 1960s.

Ultimately, PLAAF analysts argue that the primacy of the outer space domain will require the PLA to establish a space force to unify China’s mili­tary space program into a cohesive whole and that the air force is the best insti­tution to take on this mission. In this regard, while PLAAF researchers may firmly believe their conclusions, it cannot be ignored that such arguments also support PLAAF equities in its efforts to expand its mission. In this respect, integrated air and space operations are as much about bureaucratic interests as they are about doctrine.

This approach is not without its risks. RAND Corporation analyst Ben­jamin Lambeth argues that U. S. Air Force claims to the air and space domains under the rubric of an “aerospace force” had opportunity costs. Even though the term aerospace force successfully claimed the two domains for the USAF, the USAF never revised its operational concepts to include space and simply replaced “air” with “aerospace” When the USAF subsequently did become more involved in space, it had a difficult time receiving budget increases to cover its increased activities since its rhetoric had led Congress to believe that it had already been conducting the space mission.63

The case of the PLAAF may be different, however. The PLAAF, though in existence for more than 60 years, is still relatively undeveloped in terms of technology, training, and doctrine. In fact, PLAAF writings refer to the PLAAF as a “new air force” that is just beginning to modernize its technology and doc­trine. Adopting space as an inherent mission for the PLAAF would thus appear to hold less risk since it is not doctrinally wedded to acting as a pure air force. However, this would only be true if the PLAAF can properly balance the obli­gations of its air and space missions.

Whether the PLAAF will or should take over the PLA’s space enterprise is, of course, a different question. Despite the air force’s assertion that the GAD

is not properly suited to take on space military operations, an argument can be made that the GAD’s present role of researching, developing, launching, and operating spacecraft makes it the best organization to run the PLAs space pro­gram. Alternatively, the PLA could divide responsibility for space between the GAD and the services. Under this scenario, the GAD would maintain respon­sibility for launching spacecraft while the air force would operate space planes and air-launched ASAT weapons and the Second Artillery would operate direct ascent ASAT weapons.

Despite these shortcomings, the analysis of PLAAF researchers should not be disassociated from official PLAAF policy and doctrine. In fact, the conformity of the writings of PLAAF researchers with Xu Qiliang’s comments in November 2009 suggests that the concept of space warfare within the context of integrated air and space operations has been officially adopted by the PLAAF. Most of the writ­ings presented in this paper were published well before Xu’s 2009 statements, indi­cating that PLAAF analysts play a critical role in shaping PLAAF doctrine. Doc­trinal assumptions advanced by PLAAF analysts and stated by Xu include outer space as a commanding height, the inevitability of combat extending to outer space, and the seizure of the initiative in outer space leading to victory on Earth.

Moreover, there is evidence that these concepts are being dissemi­nated throughout the PLAAF. In June 2010, the PLAAF organ Air Force News reported that the Air Force Command Academy held a “PLAAF aerospace strategy advanced seminar” which “was aimed at strengthening the research of the major issues concerning the Air Force’s building, development, and strategy implementation in the new stage of the new century so as to lay a good human resources and theory foundation for the Air Force’s capability to ‘move up to space and use space.’” The seminar was designed to “help senior and interme­diate-level Air Force commanders fully and clearly understand the develop­ment tendency of military space technology in the contemporary world and the situation of the international competition in the space domain.”64

While the conformity of PLAAF writings on space with the comments of Xu Qiliang indicates official PLAAF strategy, does official PLAAF strat­egy reflect official PLA and Chinese government doctrine and policy? First, there is no doubt that the PLA is using space’s force enhancement capabili­ties. China’s development of space-based remote sensing and its development of a global navigation system have admitted national security applications. The more important question concerns China’s counterspace efforts. In this regard, any interpretation of Xu’s comments and subsequent Chinese reactions must first recognize that China has an active, if not extensive, ASAT weap­ons program at the same time that it appears to be opposed to them. Accord­ing to the 2010 Pentagon report on the PLA, China is continuing to refine and develop its direct ascent ASAT weapon successfully tested in 2007, and is developing laser, high powered microwave, and particle beam weapons for use in the ASAT role.65 The challenge then is reconciling the seeming contradic­tion among Chinese statements opposing space weaponization, China’s ASAT programs, PLAAF writings, and Xu Qiliang’s statements.

First, a careful exegesis of Chinese statements on ASAT weapons and space warfare must be conducted to determine their exact meaning. China’s official stance on space arms control is opposition to the “deployment of weap­ons in outer space and the threat or use of force against objects in outer space so as to ensure that outer space is used purely for peaceful purposes.”66 Other statements express opposition to an arms race in space and the weaponization of space (Ш^Й^ЬЙШТ^^Йв^ПЙЖІЕ). This policy was stated by the Chi­nese Foreign Ministry in response to Xu’s comments as well as by Xu in his November 11 Nanfang Zhoumo interview.

Chinese policy is widely regarded as unconditionally opposed to all types of ASAT weapons. In fact, official Chinese policy, as well as Xu’s November 11, 2009, statement, only expresses opposition to weapons deployed in outer space and to arms races that occur in outer space. Chinese statements do not oppose the development of terrestrially-based ASAT weapons, such as its direct ascent kinetic kill vehicle. For example, in the draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Place­ment of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)” submitted with Russia to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, China defines “weapon in outer space” as “any device placed in outer space… to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal func­tioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them.” “Use of force” or the “threat of force,” on the other hand, means “any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliber­ately changing their orbit parameters, or the threat of such actions.”

Neither definition constrains or limits the research and development of any ASAT weapon. It neither prohibits the deployment of terrestrially-based ASAT weapons nor the terrestrial storage of space-based ASAT weapons. This treaty would even allow the development of space-based ASAT weapons and their stor­age on Earth. Moreover, the prohibition against the “use of force” or the “threat of force” is nullified during armed conflict. The draft states that nothing in the treaty “may be interpreted as impeding the exercise by the States Parties of their right of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”67

This last condition renders the treaty useless since most countries claim the right of self-defense before going to war.

This point is especially important in the case of China. Indeed, while people tend to regard their country as peace-loving, the Chinese appear to per­ceive their country as more peace-loving than others. This predilection for using peaceful methods to resolve conflicts is historically based and contin­ues to influence China’s contemporary behavior.68 According to China’s 2008 national defense white paper, China pursues a national defense policy that is “purely defensive in nature” and “places the protection of national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national develop­ment, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else.”

China’s national defense policy is reflected in its national defense strat­egy of active defense. Active defense was first formulated by Mao Zedong in the 1930s and is described as “offensive defense or defense through decisive engagements” and is “for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.”69 Active defense involves seizing the initiative through offensive strikes and gaining mastery after the enemy has struck.70 Yet any strategic con­cept that emphasizes gaining mastery only “after the enemy has struck” would seem to have an inherent weakness given the speed in which modern conven­tional warfare is conducted, a detail not lost on Chinese military analysts.

This contradiction is best explained by the little apparent operational difference between China’s active defense strategy and an offensive strategy. Within the context of protecting China’s sovereignty and national interests, Chinese writers make clear that the full range of offensive actions, including preemptive strikes, are permissible.71 As a result, active defense is best thought of as a politically defensive but operationally offensive strategy in which China will rhetorically maintain a defensive posture up until the time that war appears imminent. Thus, any U. S. military support or deployment that is deemed to be a precursor of U. S. action could be grounds for a preemptive strike.72

The inclusion of preemptive strikes within China’s official strategy of active defense indicates that China may initiate armed conflict when it deter­mines that its national sovereignty or interests are at stake. Characterizing this strategy as defensive becomes more complicated when China’s national interests butt up against the interests of other countries. For example, China’s defense of claims in the South China Sea may be viewed as aggressive by other claimants to the area as well as by countries, such as the United States, that have an interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the region.

China’s position against a space arms race also does not necessarily mean that it is opposed to developing ASAT weapons. A space arms race connotes an attempt by China to develop more weapons than an opponent, which could unnecessarily divert resources from other weapons programs, lead to China being unnecessarily provocative, or retard economic growth. It does not pro­hibit China from developing a sufficient number of ASAT weapons of a suf­ficient quality that can both act as a deterrent force and have an operational capability.

In this regard, China’s development of ASAT weapons is akin to its nuclear weapons posture. China has substantially fewer nuclear weapons than the United States and Russia and is not attempting to equal their number. China’s possession of nuclear weapons, however, is meant to deter opponents from threatening and conducting nuclear strikes and, in case deterrence fails, to provide a viable retaliatory strike capability. This operational deployment of nuclear weapons, however, has not prevented China from supporting “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.”73

Xu’s comment that China should develop an air and space force that will help maintain regional stability and world peace suggests that China views its ASAT programs as defensive and partially based on the belief that the United States has at least latent capabilities and intends to use them. Chinese research­ers point to the U. S. ASM-135 direct-ascent ASAT weapon test in 1985,74 the U. S. Alpha space-based laser program,75 and the 1997 U. S. Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) test,76 as evidence that the United States possesses ASAT capabilities. As a result, PLA researchers argue that China must develop its own indigenous ASAT capabilities, especially as China’s pres­ence in space grows. Chinese ASAT capabilities, they believe, can have a deter­rent effect as well as provide warfighting options.

Indeed, Xu’s comments that China is a force for peace is based on the premise that China needs to develop space technologies to thwart U. S. aggres­sion. The U. S. military’s adoption of air – and spacepower and statements that the USAF should achieve space superiority lead PLA analysts to conclude that the U. S. military is intent on seizing a preeminent position in space in order to develop an asymmetric military supremacy over other nations, which will in turn start a space arms race. As two prominent scholars write:77

The American air-space strategy constitutes challenges to the rest of the world. Other developed countries, in order to protect their “air-space” strategic interests and international status, as well as to compete for the possession of larger “capital” in international affairs, also are not content to be left behind and emphatically develop their air-space strength. Rus­sia, Western Europe, Japan, and India, all strive to catch up and over­take one another, thereby making the air-space a new military “wres­tling” ground.

In conclusion, Xu’s remark that China’s policy on space weapons has been consistent and that the air force will carry out the country’s policies is accurate. Neither Xu Qiliang’s remarks, Foreign Ministry statements, nor offi­cial Chinese policy rule out the development, testing, deployment, and use of ASAT weapons. Consequently, Xu’s remarks that China should develop a “sharp sword” and “shield” for maintaining peace are best taken as expressions of support for the development of space-enabled capabilities and ASAT weap­ons and as a proposal for the air force to assume responsibility for developing a “space force” which would be the main military organization responsible for conducting the space mission. In conducting this mission, the PLAAF will fol­low a strategy of “integrated air and space” that is “simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations.”