Category The Chinese Air Force

Prior to the 1990s, the PLAAF’s official mission was largely limited to that of a localized defensive force intended to support ground (or maritime) opera­tions on or close to the mainland.2 In recent years, however, Chinese Commu­nist Party (CCP) and PLA leaders have made clear that they envision a greatly expanded combat and noncombat role for the air force. In 2004, the Party’s Cen­tral Military Commission (CMC) approved the air force’s first-ever service-spe­cific strategic concept. This concept clearly suggested a much broader mission than in the past, with a greater emphasis on offense: “Integrate air and space; be simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations” (kongtian yi ti, gongfang jianbei, Й^—1Ф, ЖШШЮ3 Then, in 2008, China’s National Defense White Paper identified the PLAAF as a “strategic service” of the PLA.4

Over the past 5 to 6 years in particular, PLA analysts of air – and space – power have produced an outpouring of articles and in-depth studies analyz­ing and debating the future missions that the world’s most powerful air forces, including China’s, will have to prepare to undertake. This chapter draws heav­ily upon these analyses.5

Some recent Chinese military reference works have tried to clarify and standardize the definitions of concepts such as “mission” and “task” and related terms such as “operations” (xingdong, ТЙ). But most PLA books and articles do not draw clear distinctions among these concepts, nor have consistent def­initions for these terms emerged in recent analyses of air – and spacepower. For example, the most common terms for “mission” (shiming, U#) and “task” (renwu, H%-) are often used interchangeably or in combination.

The Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia and a few other analytical sources provide distinct definitions for air force “missions” (shiming, U#) and air force “tasks” (renwu, fi^).6 The Chinese Air Force Encyclopedia defines airforce mis­sions as:

The important historical responsibilities entrusted to the air force by the state, which are divided into basic missions [jiben shiming, S^U#], special missions [teshu shiming, #^U#], and concrete missions [juti shiming, ДІФШ#].7

Historically, statements of basic PLA missions have been worded as slo­gans or broad statements of political values or goals. The PLAAF’s first state­ment of mission, for example, appears to have been Mao Zedong’s April 1950 inscription for the inaugural issue of the PLAAF’s journal People’s Air Force. It read simply “Create a Strong and Great People’s Air Force; Destroy the Rem­nant Enemy Forces; Stabilize the Nation’s Defenses.”8 Today, statements of the PLAAF’s basic missions tend to be worded in somewhat more concrete terms, but are still not highly detailed. An example is the 2008 National Defense White Paper’s statement that the PLAAF was responsible for “safeguarding the coun­try’s territorial air space and territorial sovereignty, and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide.”9

The Air Force Encyclopedia defines the basic tasks (jiben renwu,

#) of any nation’s air force as “the important responsibilities that an air force assumes in order to carry out its missions.”10 Although “tasks” are supposed to be clearly defined responsibilities intended to carry out PLAAF missions, very few PLA analysts actually make any clear distinction between “tasks” and rela­tively specific or concrete “missions.” Some senior analysts even use the term “tasks”—renwu—jointly or interchangeably with “missions”—shiming—both when they describe some relatively abstract missions (deterrence, for example) and when they describe far more concrete and specific missions or tasks.

For example, two leading analysts have referred to the same undertak­ing by air force personnel—using air and space forces to deter the enemy, for example—as different categories of concepts: one labels this a “task-mission” (renwu shiming; Ї#ШФ), and the other calls some of these activities “opera­tions” (xingdong; ТЙ) in one portion of his study and “tasks” in another.11 This lack of consistency within the PLAAF literature indicates a clear conceptual problem—the PLAAF is presently in the process of defining a new set of mis­sions without a clear, agreed-upon concept of what a “mission” is or how it fits into the structure of PLAAF military thought.

The PLAAF has not publicly released a list of its principal missions. Nor have PLA air – and spacepower analysts over the past several years referred to air force missions using the same list of missions and similar terms for them— something Western analysts would expect to see if an agreed-upon list of mis­sions existed. But a review of recent PLA writings on air – and spacepower suggests that a broad consensus exists among PLA analysts concerning the importance of six core PLAAF air and space missions: deterrence; offense; defense; airlift; airborne; and blockade support. The breadth of this list under­scores the terrific change in the PLA’s overall view of the air force’s mission and utility over the past 15 years or so.

A closer examination of some of these missions demonstrates an impor­tant theme in the PLAAF’s transition away from being a largely defensively – oriented air force. Several of these missions reflect the PLAs focus on devel­oping the air force’s offensive capabilities as well as its capability to retake and maintain the initiative in deterrence and combat missions. The remainder of this chapter focuses on what most analysts would probably agree are the three most important of these missions—deterrence, offense, and defense—with a special focus on this new emphasis on offense and initiative.

Xu’s comments that space is a “new commanding height for interna­tional strategic competition,” that competition in space is an “inevitable trend,” and “having control of space means having control of the ground, oceans, and electromagnetic space” are also common themes in PLAAF writings. PLAAF analysts assess that the role space plays in providing information and in link­ing units together into a networked force will turn the space domain into a contested battlefield. This conclusion is rooted in Chinese military doctrine that now regards the use of information as the main determiner of success on the battlefield. In fact, PLA analysts widely consider space as the domi­nant domain from which to collect intelligence and to facilitate network-cen­tric warfare practices.38

This conclusion is partially based on the U. S. military’s experience in the 1991 Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Chinese analysis, the United States used over 100 satellites during the 1991 Gulf War and 70 satellites during Operation Allied Force. The use of these satellites and the C4ISR systems they supported were the primary reason for U. S. victories. These capabilities allowed the U. S. military to have an asymmetric superiority over its opponents gained through battlefield transparency and long-range precision strikes.39 The primacy of information gained from space has led many PLAAF analysts to conclude that space is the new commanding high ground of the bat­tlefield.40 Because of this, PLA analysts conclude that the primacy of information derived from space will make satellites irresistible targets. As a result, space will become a battlefield and seizing that battlefield will determine the success of air, naval, and ground operations.41 Operations to seize control of space are referred to as space warfare, called tian zhan (^$), taikong zhan (^Й№), or kongjian zhan (ЙЙЙ) in Chinese, involving military engagements that mainly take place in space between two parties trying to seize or maintain space superiority.

Space warfare is described as a new operational method in air and space integrated operations and an important method of achieving military superior­ity.42 Space warfare operations can be divided into space-based, air-based, and ground-based operations. These can include ground-based directed energy strikes and space-based kinetic energy strikes, airborne lasers, and electronic countermeasures. Chinese writers also refer to using space stations and space planes to conduct ASAT attacks.43 Space stations can also serve as a command and control base, a communications node, and a logistics and maintenance hub for spacecraft and as a platform for strategic weapons.44

Including the goal of achieving space supremacy in the definition of space warfare indicates that the PLAAF is attempting to take on the counter­space role. The same source that defined air and space integrated operations defines space supremacy as:45

During times of war, the control of a certain area of space for a certain period of time by one side. Its goal is to ensure one’s freedom of action in space and its full access to space resources and to limit the other side’s freedom of action in space and access to space resources.

Seizing space superiority is also described as one of the necessary condi­tions for achieving ground, naval, and air superiority, leading many analysts to conclude that whoever controls space will seize the initiative.46

This definition of space supremacy is largely consistent with other Chinese definitions of space supremacy, and is, as well, consistent with the U. S Air Force (USAF) definition found in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations: 47

Space Superiority is that level of control in the space domain that one force enjoys over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space superiority may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and persistent. Achieving space superiority is of primary con­cern since it allows control and exploitation of the space domain in order to provide space effects in and through space. The Air Force achieves space superiority through counterspace operations, including offensive and defensive operations, both of which are based on robust space situ­ational awareness.

One important difference between the two definitions is the Chinese ref­erence to space superiority occurring within a certain time and area, whereas the USAF definition states that space superiority “may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and persistent.” The Chinese definition reflects doc­trinal writings, which stress seizing the initiative at a certain place and period of time in order to open a window of opportunity that can be used to strike a decisive blow. This limited goal also recognizes that the PLA, as a weaker force compared to the U. S. military, will most likely not be able to maintain the ini­tiative for long periods of time over an expansive area.

Mark A. Stokes

The desire to fly higher, faster, and farther is shared by airmen around the world, and unimpeded access to the skies over a region convincingly dem­onstrates national power. Spurred by a global diffusion of technology and a de­sire to develop a military commensurate with its growing economic might, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is developing capabilities that could alter the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Shaping the future strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, aerospace power traverses vast distances and places a premium on speed and agility that defy the laws of gravity.

Aerospace power—the strategic and operational application of military force via platforms operating in or passing through air and space—is emerging as a key instrument of Chinese statecraft. Control of the skies is a critical en­abler for dominance on the Earth’s surface. Gaining and maintaining air supe­riority and space control could provide a political and military leadership with the operational freedom needed to coerce an opponent to make concessions in political disputes. Freedom of action in the skies can offer a decisive edge on the surface. Chinese observers view air and space as a single operational me­dium of the future, with the English term aerospace best describing the merg­ing of the twin domains.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly advancing its capacity to apply aerospace power in order to defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Constrained by a relatively underdeveloped aviation establishment, the PLA is investing in aerospace capabilities that may offset shortcomings in the face of a more technologically advanced adversary.

Refining its concepts of airpower and integrated aerospace operations along with rapidly advancing technology, the PLA is embarked upon a quest to extend its operational military power vertically into space and horizontally be­yond its immediate periphery. The PLAs concept of airpower is broader than its air force. Conventional manned fixed-wing air assets are only one possible means of delivering firepower at extended ranges. To date, PLA convention­al air platforms have been insufficient by themselves to suppress air defenses, conduct strategic strike missions, or gain air superiority around the Chinese periphery.

Today, the PLAs growing arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal ballis­tic and land attack cruise missiles serves as its primary instrument of aerospace power projection and strategic attack. Theater missiles, defined as conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 ki­lometers (310-3,410 miles), also enable the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) to com­pensate for its shortcomings in suppression of enemy air defenses needed to at­tain limited air superiority, conduct strategic strike, and perform other roles and missions. Over the longer term, the PLAAF aspires to gain the ability to conduct independent strategic attack missions as well as integrated air and space—that is, aerospace—operations. Whether independent or joint, a persistent surveil­lance network is a critical enabler for PLAAF and Second Artillery delivery of firepower against selected strategic and operational targets with precision and at increasingly extended ranges. Looking toward 2025, Chinese technical writings outline a vision for a conventional global precision strike capability.

Key drivers shaping PLA concepts of aerospace power as an instrument of national power include gaining an ability to enforce territorial claims and resolve sovereignty disputes on terms favorable to Beijing. Threat perceptions are also in­fluencing PLA operational concepts and force modernization. A more efficient and effective system for leveraging military-related technologies is also shaping new operational and organizational concepts that best accommodate new capa­bilities, such as long-range precision strike and counterspace systems. Over the longer term, successful development and deployment of intermediate – and inter­continental-range conventional ballistic missiles and other precision strike assets would offer the PRC political leadership a flexible deterrent that could achieve strategic and operational effects against an enemy in a crisis.

The emergence of China as a major economic, technological, military, and political player is changing the dynamics within the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Various drivers energize China’s evolving aerospace power theories, and can be examined through the prism of four central con­cepts associated with joint aerospace operations: integrated offense-defense; integrated information-firepower; strategic strike; and integrated air and space (aerospace). Various aspects of technological development and force modern­ization are narrowing the gap between aspiration and future capabilities.

Strategic Drivers

Four key drivers shape PRC concepts of aerospace power:

■ territorial integrity

■ asserting sovereignty

■ threat perception

■ technology diffusion.

In great measure, the PLA’s rapid advance in its capacity to apply aero­space power is driven by the requirement to defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In enforcing sovereignty claims over the last 20 years, conventional ballistic missiles have been one of the most effective tools of PRC political and military coercion. As a symbolic metric of intent, the PRC’s expanding arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait is intended to deter political support in Taiwan for de jure independence and coerce the island’s population to support unification with China on Beijing’s terms. Whoever dominates the skies over a given geograph­ic space, such as Taiwan, disputed territories in northern India or Japan, and the South China Sea, has a decisive advantage on the surface. Over the last 15 years, conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles have been perhaps the most visible and central element of PRC’s coercive strategy against Taiwan. Over the next 10-15 years, more advanced conventional air assets, integrated with persistent surveillance, a single integrated air and space picture, and sur – vivable communications architecture, could enable greater confidence in en­forcing a broader range of territorial claims around China’s periphery.

Traditional concepts of air defense have evolved into a broader concept for a “national aerospace security system” as a means to defend against perceived threats. At least one key driver of aerospace power development is a require­ment to be familiar with and have countermeasures against advanced U. S. long – range precision strike capabilities expected to be in place by 2025.1 To quote one long-time China watcher, “the Chinese armed forces are obsessed with defend­ing China from long-range precision air strikes.”2 Applicable American technol­ogy efforts that fuel Chinese concern over long-range precision strike include the joint program of the Air Force, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and Lockheed-Martin called the Force Application and Launch from the Continental U. S. (FALCON) Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2) program. Under this concept, the Minotaur solid-fueled launch vehicle boosts an unmanned, maneuverable, hypersonic flight vehicle into near-space, which glides back through the atmosphere at speeds exceeding Mach 20. The launch ve­hicle also could be capable of launching microsatellites into space on short notice. Another program of interest is the U. S. Air Force (USAF)-Boeing X-37B Orbit­al Test Vehicle first boosted into space in April 2010.3 Yet another is the USAF – Boeing-Pratt & Whitney-Rocketdyne X-51A WaveRider supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) demonstrator, which is dropped from a B-52 and boosted to high supersonic speeds by a rocket before its scramjet engine is initiated. The

X-51A completed its first flight in May 2010, the first successful demonstration of a hydrocarbon-fueled scramjet engine in aviation history.

A more immediate goal appears to be developing the means to deny or complicate the ability of the United States to intervene in a regional contingency around its periphery. Chinese analysts may view an expansion of the battlespace and disruption of U. S. ability to project conventional power in response to Chi­nese use of force to resolve territorial or sovereignty claims as a legitimate force modernization requirement. Authoritative Chinese writings indicate research into, and development of, increasingly accurate and longer range conventional strategic strike systems that could be launched from Chinese territory against land – and sea-based targets throughout the Asia-Pacific region in a crisis situa­tion. Observers appear concerned over vulnerability to first strike against Chi­na’s nuclear deterrent. As a corollary, Chinese force planners may be emulating or mirroring United States aerospace power concepts and programs, based on a perceived requirement to narrow the technological gap and attain a global status commensurate with the country’s rising economic power.4

Technological diffusion constitutes an important driver for Chinese aerospace power. The more efficient and effective means for leveraging mil­itary-related technologies shape new operational and organizational concepts that best accommodate new capabilities, such as long-range precision strike and counterspace systems. If the technological capacity exists, the incentives to develop systems to expand the country’s aerospace power may prove irresist – ible.5 As a result, unforeseen breakthroughs in disruptive technologies and so – called trump card capabilities indeed could change strategic calculations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.6

Means of diffusing aerospace technology include formal and informal organizations intended to facilitate collaboration between the PLA, industry, and academia; enabling technological breakthroughs via innovative organiza­tional changes within the PLA’s acquisition and equipment system and aero­space industry; and decisive steps taken to develop new internationally com­petitive industries involving large, complex systems such as commercial avia­tion.7 Indeed, China’s defense research and development (R&D) establishment is breaking down barriers that previously hampered ability to field the complex “system of systems” characteristic of contemporary advanced aerospace power.

A conventional academic consensus is that instituting change in military organizations is at best difficult. It is perhaps even more challenging to institute change in the PLA organization. In their 2007 study, Saunders and Quam look at tradeoffs in current PLAAF modernization efforts and future force structure including the allocation of roles and missions among services and branches, the balance between domestic and foreign procurement, the mix of low-tech­nology and high-technology systems, and the relative proportions of combat aircraft and support aircraft.44 But the PLA’s political cultural tradition, system­atic constraints, and the emergence of service cultures also influence the pace of modernization and the size of the air force.

Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow note that organizational culture is a factor influencing leaders to favor maintenance of the status quo.45 China’s Party-army relationship, a relic from its founding, demands the PLAs absolute loyalty to the Party. The PLAAF is no exception to this. The current and future development of the air force is obligated to be framed within the ideological bounds of the military thinking of the Chinese leadership.

As mentioned, the PLAAF leadership has always maintained a pseudo­scientific attitude in characterizing their leadership’s sporadic instructions as profound military thought on airpower, and then using those instructions as guidance. “Being prepared for offensive and defensive operations” had been long debated by air force theorists since the late 1980s. It was not until 1999 that Jiang Zemin endorsed the expression. The PLAAF felt itself officially blessed and subsequently claimed the concept to justify the strategic goal of the air force and, furthermore, to characterize it as a vital piece of Jiang’s mili­tary thought on airpower.46

Chinese leaders are accustomed to devoting significant personal, auton­omous attention to defense projects. Their involvement influences the allo­cation of resources as well as air force procurement decisions. The PLAAF, reportedly, has been unenthusiastic about the J-8 as its air superiority fighter, and would prefer to suspend its procurement as the J-10 becomes available. But Jiang Zemin personally took charge of this focal-point project, calling the J-8 aircraft a credit to the China’s aviation industry.47 Since then, the air force has had little choice but to continue purchasing upgraded versions of J-8 fight­ers, though in limited numbers.

Currying favor with the leadership is a cultural phenomenon in any political system dominated by absolute authority and arbitrary decisions by key individuals. It represents not only air force subordination to the Party (strongly entrenched in Chinese military culture), but also demonstrates the political reliability and loyalty of the air force to individual senior Party leaders. In return, the PLAAF leadership could be confident that, when they brought requests to the Party leadership’s personal attention, they would receive favor­able approval. Nothing should upset the continuity of this entwining Party/ military bondage of mutual support.

Another well-known organizational constraint goes to the so-called “great land army” (^й¥) complex, which refers to army-centric thinking and leadership that have long dominated the Chinese military system.48 The four general departments—the General Staff Department, General Political Depart­ment, General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department— serve concurrently as the PLA’s joint staff, and as the headquarters for all ser­vices, namely the ground force, navy, air force, and Second Artillery force. These departments are still staffed primarily by army officers. Because there is no gen­eral headquarters for ground forces, the General Staff Department is assigned to perform the functions of ground force headquarters. Its overarching army bias has inevitably influenced all military aspects from force size, structure, and com­mand and control to logistics, equipment, R&D, and procurement.49

Nowadays, increasing numbers of personnel from other services are assigned to “joint” positions at headquarters department levels, as well as at military region headquarters levels. This change enables the expertise and knowledge of other services to be brought into the joint and higher headquar­ters command environment. Though such personnel wear the uniform of their own services, they are, in fact, no longer controlled within the personnel sys­tems of their own services. This separation keeps their representation of paro­chial service-specific interests in these headquarters departments at minimal level. Over the years, air force general officers have been appointed to deputy positions at the headquarters departments and to the commandership or polit­ical commissarship of the PLA Academy and National Defense University. A growing leadership role for other services within the PLA looks more symbolic than substantial as long as the existing organizational system continues.50

The organization of the Chinese air force along military regional lines, with an operational command in each military region, is another typical reflec­tion of the predominant ground force institutional system of the Chinese mili­tary.51 Military regional leadership organizations traditionally have been a com­mand organization for ground troops and education institutions, while playing a concurrent leadership role for the personnel of other services located within their regions. Only ground force officers have commanded military regions, and the commanders of other services can only serve as their deputies.52 Since there is no permanent joint organization at the military region level, when a joint command organization must be formed, air force officers can only assume assistant (hence subordinate) positions. Thus, even though China’s most likely conflict scenarios involve possible sea and air fights over Taiwan and in the East China and South China Seas, no navy and air force general officer has been yet assigned to command either the Nanjing or Guangzhou Military Region.

In 2000, Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou, former deputy political com­missar of the air force and currently political commissar of the PLAs National University, proposed Chinese military authorities consider reorganizing the PLAAF into functional air commands, separating the air force from the PLA military regional system, and thus making it a truly independent service. In order to make it a more offensively oriented air force, he further recommended the use of the U. S. Air Force’s “expeditionary force” model to organize air force units into air strike groups with a mix of fighters, bombers, and EW aircraft.53 Liu has been recognized as the “Douhet of China” because of his reputation as a daring thinker of airpower theory that goes against the PLAAF’s tradition, though a better analogy might be that he is a Chinese equivalent of Lieuten­ant General David A. Deptula or Colonel John A. Warden III. Not surprisingly, given the ground-centric traditionalism of the Chinese military system, Liu’s advocacy for eliminating the ground-centric military system has received lit­tle support from the PLA military establishment. Current evidence suggests that, in a joint operation or campaign, the air force will continue to play a sup­port role rather than an independent or leading role.54 Although the PLAAF currently enjoys the benefits of favorable military investment, as long as the

General Logistics Department continues to control military finances, PLAAF funding is unlikely to reach levels desired by air force officers.55

The rising importance of the navy, air force, and Second Artillery forces has facilitated the emergence of rival service cultures, which, in turn, have brought not only competition with the ground force tradition, but also rival­ries among the other services and branches. In particular, the PLAAF’s adop­tion of air and space integration as part of its development has instigated a struggle within the PLA over the control of space operations. China’s space assets are controlled by the General Armaments Department, while the Sec­ond Artillery possesses strategic missiles. The PLAAF has been contending that it should be in control of space operations because air and space constitute a single integrated medium. But the PLAAF has been unpersuasive in making this case, and so has lost recent debates about whether these capabilities should be placed under its control.56 It concurrently concentrates on building facilities and institutions to receive satellite services for communication, weather, navi­gation, and global positioning. Taking this tack, the PLAAF believes it will be able to make the transition from being a traditional air force to one enabled by space-based information (communications, positioning, navigation, timing, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities.57

China’s present-day security interests—preventing Taiwan from seced­ing and supporting the country’s claims to islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea—have brought PLA naval aviation into competition with the PLAAF for the limited R&D and production capabilities of the Chinese defense industry. For example, the JH-7 fighter-bomber was initially made for PLAN aviation. The air force did not commit to this aircraft until the improved variant, the JH-7A—upgraded with two more powerful domestic-made tur­bofan engines and a new fire control system capable of launching precision strikes using antiradiation missiles and laser-guided bombs—became avail – able.58 Since 2004, its acquisition has been a priority for the PLAAF which has had to share its production with naval aviation, receiving one regiment every other year. As a result, the PLAAF’s replacement program to phase out its obsolete fleet of aging Q-5 attack aircraft—a J-6 (Chinese version of the MiG-19) derivative—will stretch beyond 2015. This PLAN-PLAAF competi­tion extends to other domestically manufactured aircraft, such as the J-10 and J-11B, produced by Chengdu and Shenyang aircraft factories, respectively.59 With the air force increasingly training over water, the competition in terms of division of responsibility and procurement will be intensified as maritime strike missions traditionally assigned to PLAN are increasingly prosecuted by the PLAAF, echoing similar institutional struggles between the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Army Air Corps in the 1930s.60

For more than a decade, PLAAF doctrinal writings, defense white papers, and analytical studies have placed increasing emphasis on “deterrence” as one of the PLAAF’s most important missions. The PLAAF’s capability to achieve an important strategic goal of the state such as deterrence—either act­ing independently or as the lead service in joint operations—is an important aspect of what PLA analysts mean when they refer to the PLAAF becoming a “strategic air force” or a “strategic air and space force.”

Recent PLA studies have also argued that conventional air and space forces have become increasingly effective as deterrent forces since the end of the Cold War.12 One part of this contention is that the speed, range, precision and “ferocity” of modern precision-guided munitions make them especially well-suited for deterring hostile behavior by a prospective enemy.13 Chinese analysts argue that these weapons, in addition to their battlefield effectiveness, can have a powerful political effect by dissolving the willpower of the enemy’s civilian population and government to support continued warfare. Some ana­lysts, moreover, have argued that compared to nuclear weapons, conventional air and space weapons are more controllable and flexible, cause less collateral damage, and have fewer or shorter lived aftereffects, all of which make them politically less risky to employ.14 Apparently implicit in this last point is the assumption that the most likely opponent to be targeted by such operations is, itself, a nuclear power.

Toward a ladder of deterrence intensity. Over the past 6 years, in an appar­ent effort to promote China’s capacity for initiative and control in its conven­tional air – and space-deterrence operations, several major studies of air – and spacepower have tried to develop what might be called a “ladder of intensity levels” for deterrence. These studies describe increasingly serious periods or stages in a crisis, and recommend increasingly harsh corresponding actions China could take to signal its military power, preparation, and determination to its prospective adversaries. During peacetime precrisis periods, these include many routine activities associated with China’s buildup of military forces.

At the highest, most intense stages of a crisis, some analysts have even sug­gested the use of actual first strikes as a means of warning an opponent to desist in its actions.

A powerful implicit theme in these discussions of a ladder of deter­rence is that China will be able to maintain control and initiative, selecting among these options based on the nature of the threat it faces. Unpredictable or uncontrollable responses by enemy forces are not addressed.

Low-intensity deterrence operations. During peacetime or the very early stages of a crisis, PLA analysts recommend the use of an array of “low-inten­sity” deterrence operations and activities. These include several gradual, non­violent, noncoercive, and even commonplace peacetime military activities whose purpose is to communicate to a potential enemy the increasing strength of the country’s air – and spacepower, as well as its resolve to use it if need be. Examples include publicizing the country’s air – and spacepower buildup, train­ing and exercises, international arms sales expositions, and testing of new weapons and equipment.15 Analyst Yuan Jingwei of China’s National Defense University (NDU) cites the publicity surrounding a reported 2001 U. S. space warfare exercise as an example, claiming that the exercise was far more valu­able to the United States for its deterrent effect on potential enemies than as an actual military exercise.16

Medium-intensity deterrence operations. During the early or “deepen­ing” stages of crises, analysts recommend undertaking more open and asser­tive deterrent measures. The purpose of these measures is to signal much more forcefully to a potential enemy the strength of China’s capabilities, its inten­tions, and its resolve. Possible deterrent activities might include carrying out realistic exercises and weapons tests, redeploying troops, establishing no-fly zones, or undertaking intrusive patrols or reconnaissance activities.17

High-intensity deterrence operations. Analysts recommend these opera­tions for when “a crisis is intensifying, the enemy is clearly making moves to prepare for real combat, and is clearly plotting to carry out an attack.”18 Their purpose is primarily to communicate will and intention to use force in the event the adversary “stubbornly persists” in offensive actions.19

A few PLA air and space analysts have recently begun to blur any dis­tinction between “deterrence” and “actual combat” by explicitly proposing the possibility of launching first attacks to intimidate potential opponents dur­ing the “high-intensity” phase of a crisis. Analyst Yuan Jingwei of the Chinese National Defense University’s Campaign Education and Research Depart­ment contends that a sharp, initial combat blow should be seen not so much as the initiation of full-scale combat, but rather as a signal designed to get the opponent to back down. “Military deterrence,” Yuan argues, “has gradually become an important form for actually carrying out combat.”20 Widely pub­lished air – and spacepower theorists Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping likewise identify forms of high-intensity and even super-high-intensity deterrence operations in which relatively low-intensity combat operations are used to achieve the goals of strategic and campaign-level deterrence.21 Cai and Tian, as well as PLAAF analyst Min Zengfu, argue that this form of deterrence lies somewhere between “deterrence” and “real combat.”22

PLAAF writers conclude that the essential nature of the space battle­field and the central role that the PLAAF will play in conducting operations in outer space make the PLAAF the ideal service to take over the PLA’s space mis­sion.48 PLAAF researchers argue several points in making their case. The first is that the air force is critical to any operation’s success. As one researcher writes, “Seizing air dominance in the war zone relies on the entire military force. Still, it will only succeed by the integrated offense and defense operations in the air assisted by space-based information. Consequently, an integrated air and space force is a crucial force. This is a conclusion we have come to from all high-tech limited wars.”49 Xu makes a similar, if not more ostentatious, statement in pro­moting the superiority of the air force by stating, “Since the air force’s ‘sphere of activity is high up in the heavens,’ it is heaven’s favored one and boasts the com­bination of a science gene, an expeditionary gene, and a military gene.”

A related argument is the characterization of the air force as the most highly technical branch of the military, which makes the air force more suit­able to warfare in the information age than other services.50 Scientific and tech­nological achievements in aviation and space technology have led to dramatic changes in how wars are fought. These achievements have transformed war­fare into a three-dimensional battlefield fought at ever increasing altitudes and eventually in space. This evolution has directly led to the concept of integrated air and space operations and network-centric warfare.51

Another argument used by PLAAF analysts is the requirement for a uni­fied command of China’s space forces. According to this argument, the increas­ing diversity and number of Chinese satellites has increased the difficulty of coordinating China’s space enterprise and only by a unified command can the PLA bring together these disparate functions and organizations into an effec­tive military force.52

In fact, PLA analysts and those involved in the space industry have for some time argued that China requires an organization to unify space efforts.53 They point out that China’s space enterprise is too widely spread out among a number of different organizations, including the General Armament Depart­ment (GAD), the China National Space Administration, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the National Weather Administration. In addition, PLAAF analysts argue that the GAD, while responsible for research and development and the launch and tracking of satellites, is less suited for conducting space opera­tions. According to a PLAAF author, this makes the GAD incapable of meeting the needs of space operations and integrated air and space operations.54 These inefficiencies result in the waste of human, material, and financial resources and the failure to identify priorities and coordinate development. Moreover, the lack of a unified command organization has resulted in a lack of space doctrine at the campaign and tactical levels.55 This was most recently demonstrated during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake which revealed shortcomings in the ability of the Chinese government and military to effectively utilize space-based assets.56

Another compelling rationale for the PLAAF to lead the space mission is the inevitable deployment of space planes and near-space vehicles. Since the PLAAF will be the main organization operating aircraft, space planes, and near-space vehicles, it is thus best suited to control their flights. This also makes the PLAAF the logical organization to defend China from enemy space planes, near-space vehicles, and satellites.57

A final argument made by PLAAF analysts is that every other military in the world places the responsibility for the command of space forces with its air force. As one author writes, “as of today, no country, from the large such as the United States and Russia to the small such as Israel, puts the country’s space force under a service other than the air force, let alone under the establishment of the rocket forces.”58

PLAAF writers acknowledge that not all agree the PLAAF should com­mand the PLAs space forces. According to one account, the PLAAF is accused of a having “too long of a reach.” One analyst, however, argues that the PLAAF is the only logical choice based on military structure, development, and eco­nomic benefits. This author concludes that if the PLAAF’s “reach is too long,” then so is the reach of other air forces, who also happen to be supported by their military leaders; he writes:59

An authoritative report concluded that it is unadvisable to have the Air

Force take on the command of space forces, given its other responsibilities.

The implication is that the Air Force does not have what it takes. I have argued against that conclusion at different conferences. The question comes to: it should fall under the Air Force’s responsibility based on the attributes and inherent function of the service. Foreign countries let their air force take it on. The Chinese air force must be capable of doing it as well. … My view is as follows: our military is currently at a time of rees­tablishing itself as a new air force, so as to transform from a mechanized air force into an informatized air force, an air defense-oriented air force into an offense-defense capable air force, a tactical air force into a stra­tegic air force, and an aviation-oriented air force into an integrated air and space air force. In short, to transform a “small air force” into a “big air force,” and achieving “air force first” as put forward by Deng Xiaop­ing. “Air force first” does not mean the Air Force being the “big brother.”

All services and combat arms were spun from the ground force and nur­tured by the glorious tradition of the ground force. As a result, the army will forever be the “big brother.” “Big air force” refers to breaking away from the traditional mind-set of the Air Force and to build a new model air force called for by the new times, to play a major role in wars, as well as a strategic role in national defense.

Whether the PLAAF’s space force should be an independent force or a force subordinated to a joint organization appears to be under debate, however. One author recommends that the air force should be the PLA’s primary space force that will conduct independent operations as well as operations in support of other services.60 Another researcher, however, argues that the Central Mili­tary Commission (CMC) and General Staff Department (GSD) should estab­lish a joint organization which would command all PLA space forces, includ­ing air force space launch, tracking, situational awareness, operations, and information application units.61

Conclusion

Chinese writings on integrated air and space operations reflect the PLAAF desire to integrate space into military operations. This desire is based on the assertions that space-based information will become a deciding factor in future wars, that space will be a dominant battlefield, and that in order to achieve victory on Earth, one must first seize the initiative in space. This will require China to achieve space supremacy, defined as the ability to freely use space and to deny the use of space to adversaries.

PLAAF analysts acknowledge that the role of space in modern military operations is largely aspirational and is mainly limited to information support

given to air and air defense operations. Nevertheless, as space operational capa­bilities improve, integrated air and space operations will become more effective.62

In making these conclusions, however, PLAAF analysts fail to question their assumptions. In addition to the conceptual problems related to the char­acterization of air and space as a seamless medium discussed earlier in the paper, the description of space as the dominant domain ignores the vulner­ability of space-based assets and the primacy of offense over defense in space. Indeed, while space provides vital force enhancement functions, the fragility of spacecraft and the difficulties in defending relatively unmaneuverable satel­lites suggest that outer space will not remain the dominant domain in the face of counterspace operations. PLAAF analysts also seem inordinately interested in manned space missions on the premise that manned spacecraft are more responsive in combat—a notion discarded by the U. S. Air Force in the 1960s.

Ultimately, PLAAF analysts argue that the primacy of the outer space domain will require the PLA to establish a space force to unify China’s mili­tary space program into a cohesive whole and that the air force is the best insti­tution to take on this mission. In this regard, while PLAAF researchers may firmly believe their conclusions, it cannot be ignored that such arguments also support PLAAF equities in its efforts to expand its mission. In this respect, integrated air and space operations are as much about bureaucratic interests as they are about doctrine.

This approach is not without its risks. RAND Corporation analyst Ben­jamin Lambeth argues that U. S. Air Force claims to the air and space domains under the rubric of an “aerospace force” had opportunity costs. Even though the term aerospace force successfully claimed the two domains for the USAF, the USAF never revised its operational concepts to include space and simply replaced “air” with “aerospace” When the USAF subsequently did become more involved in space, it had a difficult time receiving budget increases to cover its increased activities since its rhetoric had led Congress to believe that it had already been conducting the space mission.63

The case of the PLAAF may be different, however. The PLAAF, though in existence for more than 60 years, is still relatively undeveloped in terms of technology, training, and doctrine. In fact, PLAAF writings refer to the PLAAF as a “new air force” that is just beginning to modernize its technology and doc­trine. Adopting space as an inherent mission for the PLAAF would thus appear to hold less risk since it is not doctrinally wedded to acting as a pure air force. However, this would only be true if the PLAAF can properly balance the obli­gations of its air and space missions.

Whether the PLAAF will or should take over the PLA’s space enterprise is, of course, a different question. Despite the air force’s assertion that the GAD

is not properly suited to take on space military operations, an argument can be made that the GAD’s present role of researching, developing, launching, and operating spacecraft makes it the best organization to run the PLAs space pro­gram. Alternatively, the PLA could divide responsibility for space between the GAD and the services. Under this scenario, the GAD would maintain respon­sibility for launching spacecraft while the air force would operate space planes and air-launched ASAT weapons and the Second Artillery would operate direct ascent ASAT weapons.

Despite these shortcomings, the analysis of PLAAF researchers should not be disassociated from official PLAAF policy and doctrine. In fact, the conformity of the writings of PLAAF researchers with Xu Qiliang’s comments in November 2009 suggests that the concept of space warfare within the context of integrated air and space operations has been officially adopted by the PLAAF. Most of the writ­ings presented in this paper were published well before Xu’s 2009 statements, indi­cating that PLAAF analysts play a critical role in shaping PLAAF doctrine. Doc­trinal assumptions advanced by PLAAF analysts and stated by Xu include outer space as a commanding height, the inevitability of combat extending to outer space, and the seizure of the initiative in outer space leading to victory on Earth.

Moreover, there is evidence that these concepts are being dissemi­nated throughout the PLAAF. In June 2010, the PLAAF organ Air Force News reported that the Air Force Command Academy held a “PLAAF aerospace strategy advanced seminar” which “was aimed at strengthening the research of the major issues concerning the Air Force’s building, development, and strategy implementation in the new stage of the new century so as to lay a good human resources and theory foundation for the Air Force’s capability to ‘move up to space and use space.’” The seminar was designed to “help senior and interme­diate-level Air Force commanders fully and clearly understand the develop­ment tendency of military space technology in the contemporary world and the situation of the international competition in the space domain.”64

While the conformity of PLAAF writings on space with the comments of Xu Qiliang indicates official PLAAF strategy, does official PLAAF strat­egy reflect official PLA and Chinese government doctrine and policy? First, there is no doubt that the PLA is using space’s force enhancement capabili­ties. China’s development of space-based remote sensing and its development of a global navigation system have admitted national security applications. The more important question concerns China’s counterspace efforts. In this regard, any interpretation of Xu’s comments and subsequent Chinese reactions must first recognize that China has an active, if not extensive, ASAT weap­ons program at the same time that it appears to be opposed to them. Accord­ing to the 2010 Pentagon report on the PLA, China is continuing to refine and develop its direct ascent ASAT weapon successfully tested in 2007, and is developing laser, high powered microwave, and particle beam weapons for use in the ASAT role.65 The challenge then is reconciling the seeming contradic­tion among Chinese statements opposing space weaponization, China’s ASAT programs, PLAAF writings, and Xu Qiliang’s statements.

First, a careful exegesis of Chinese statements on ASAT weapons and space warfare must be conducted to determine their exact meaning. China’s official stance on space arms control is opposition to the “deployment of weap­ons in outer space and the threat or use of force against objects in outer space so as to ensure that outer space is used purely for peaceful purposes.”66 Other statements express opposition to an arms race in space and the weaponization of space (Ш^Й^ЬЙШТ^^Йв^ПЙЖІЕ). This policy was stated by the Chi­nese Foreign Ministry in response to Xu’s comments as well as by Xu in his November 11 Nanfang Zhoumo interview.

Chinese policy is widely regarded as unconditionally opposed to all types of ASAT weapons. In fact, official Chinese policy, as well as Xu’s November 11, 2009, statement, only expresses opposition to weapons deployed in outer space and to arms races that occur in outer space. Chinese statements do not oppose the development of terrestrially-based ASAT weapons, such as its direct ascent kinetic kill vehicle. For example, in the draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Place­ment of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)” submitted with Russia to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, China defines “weapon in outer space” as “any device placed in outer space… to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal func­tioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them.” “Use of force” or the “threat of force,” on the other hand, means “any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliber­ately changing their orbit parameters, or the threat of such actions.”

Neither definition constrains or limits the research and development of any ASAT weapon. It neither prohibits the deployment of terrestrially-based ASAT weapons nor the terrestrial storage of space-based ASAT weapons. This treaty would even allow the development of space-based ASAT weapons and their stor­age on Earth. Moreover, the prohibition against the “use of force” or the “threat of force” is nullified during armed conflict. The draft states that nothing in the treaty “may be interpreted as impeding the exercise by the States Parties of their right of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”67

This last condition renders the treaty useless since most countries claim the right of self-defense before going to war.

This point is especially important in the case of China. Indeed, while people tend to regard their country as peace-loving, the Chinese appear to per­ceive their country as more peace-loving than others. This predilection for using peaceful methods to resolve conflicts is historically based and contin­ues to influence China’s contemporary behavior.68 According to China’s 2008 national defense white paper, China pursues a national defense policy that is “purely defensive in nature” and “places the protection of national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national develop­ment, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else.”

China’s national defense policy is reflected in its national defense strat­egy of active defense. Active defense was first formulated by Mao Zedong in the 1930s and is described as “offensive defense or defense through decisive engagements” and is “for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.”69 Active defense involves seizing the initiative through offensive strikes and gaining mastery after the enemy has struck.70 Yet any strategic con­cept that emphasizes gaining mastery only “after the enemy has struck” would seem to have an inherent weakness given the speed in which modern conven­tional warfare is conducted, a detail not lost on Chinese military analysts.

This contradiction is best explained by the little apparent operational difference between China’s active defense strategy and an offensive strategy. Within the context of protecting China’s sovereignty and national interests, Chinese writers make clear that the full range of offensive actions, including preemptive strikes, are permissible.71 As a result, active defense is best thought of as a politically defensive but operationally offensive strategy in which China will rhetorically maintain a defensive posture up until the time that war appears imminent. Thus, any U. S. military support or deployment that is deemed to be a precursor of U. S. action could be grounds for a preemptive strike.72

The inclusion of preemptive strikes within China’s official strategy of active defense indicates that China may initiate armed conflict when it deter­mines that its national sovereignty or interests are at stake. Characterizing this strategy as defensive becomes more complicated when China’s national interests butt up against the interests of other countries. For example, China’s defense of claims in the South China Sea may be viewed as aggressive by other claimants to the area as well as by countries, such as the United States, that have an interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the region.

China’s position against a space arms race also does not necessarily mean that it is opposed to developing ASAT weapons. A space arms race connotes an attempt by China to develop more weapons than an opponent, which could unnecessarily divert resources from other weapons programs, lead to China being unnecessarily provocative, or retard economic growth. It does not pro­hibit China from developing a sufficient number of ASAT weapons of a suf­ficient quality that can both act as a deterrent force and have an operational capability.

In this regard, China’s development of ASAT weapons is akin to its nuclear weapons posture. China has substantially fewer nuclear weapons than the United States and Russia and is not attempting to equal their number. China’s possession of nuclear weapons, however, is meant to deter opponents from threatening and conducting nuclear strikes and, in case deterrence fails, to provide a viable retaliatory strike capability. This operational deployment of nuclear weapons, however, has not prevented China from supporting “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.”73

Xu’s comment that China should develop an air and space force that will help maintain regional stability and world peace suggests that China views its ASAT programs as defensive and partially based on the belief that the United States has at least latent capabilities and intends to use them. Chinese research­ers point to the U. S. ASM-135 direct-ascent ASAT weapon test in 1985,74 the U. S. Alpha space-based laser program,75 and the 1997 U. S. Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) test,76 as evidence that the United States possesses ASAT capabilities. As a result, PLA researchers argue that China must develop its own indigenous ASAT capabilities, especially as China’s pres­ence in space grows. Chinese ASAT capabilities, they believe, can have a deter­rent effect as well as provide warfighting options.

Indeed, Xu’s comments that China is a force for peace is based on the premise that China needs to develop space technologies to thwart U. S. aggres­sion. The U. S. military’s adoption of air – and spacepower and statements that the USAF should achieve space superiority lead PLA analysts to conclude that the U. S. military is intent on seizing a preeminent position in space in order to develop an asymmetric military supremacy over other nations, which will in turn start a space arms race. As two prominent scholars write:77

The American air-space strategy constitutes challenges to the rest of the world. Other developed countries, in order to protect their “air-space” strategic interests and international status, as well as to compete for the possession of larger “capital” in international affairs, also are not content to be left behind and emphatically develop their air-space strength. Rus­sia, Western Europe, Japan, and India, all strive to catch up and over­take one another, thereby making the air-space a new military “wres­tling” ground.

In conclusion, Xu’s remark that China’s policy on space weapons has been consistent and that the air force will carry out the country’s policies is accurate. Neither Xu Qiliang’s remarks, Foreign Ministry statements, nor offi­cial Chinese policy rule out the development, testing, deployment, and use of ASAT weapons. Consequently, Xu’s remarks that China should develop a “sharp sword” and “shield” for maintaining peace are best taken as expressions of support for the development of space-enabled capabilities and ASAT weap­ons and as a proposal for the air force to assume responsibility for developing a “space force” which would be the main military organization responsible for conducting the space mission. In conducting this mission, the PLAAF will fol­low a strategy of “integrated air and space” that is “simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations.”

The PLA and supporting defense industry are in the midst of a potentially dramatic transformation in aerospace concepts and capabilities. While still in a state of flux, basic aerospace concepts appear to be guiding an ambitious force modernization program. Heavily influenced by American and other foreign strategists, basic Chinese aerospace theory is founded upon the notion that un­impeded access to skies over a region not only enables operational success on the surface, but also has intrinsic value as an instrument of national power.

Aerospace power is among the most flexible and effective of coercive tools available to political decisionmakers. At the strategic level, airpower, and more broadly aerospace power, have the potential to influence the cost-benefit calculus of an opposing political leadership. Aerospace power seeks to achieve effects at the strategic, theater, or tactical level. Unlike surface warfare, airpow – er is usually concentrated to directly achieve objectives with theater-wide sig­nificance, bypassing tactical objectives. Airpower, if used properly, can serve political as well as military objectives. A single airstrike may have strategic sig­nificance, in that it can produce a political outcome. In measuring the effec­tiveness of a coercive air campaign, one relies more on judgments of strategic, rather than tactical, effectiveness, e. g., how well bombs, missiles, and electron­ic attack affect targets. Strategic effectiveness describes how the destruction of target sets attains political goals.

At the operational level, air superiority determines success in a campaign for sea control, an amphibious invasion, or physical occupation of territory. As time goes on, the same may be said for space control. In a conflict, the side that enjoys unimpeded access to the skies over a region gains an overwhelming ad­vantage on the surface.8 Colonel John A. Warden III, a key architect of modern U. S. airpower thought and doctrine, once observed, “no country has won a war in the face of enemy air superiority, no major offensive has succeeded against an opponent who controlled the air, and no defense has sustained itself against an enemy who had air superiority.” As Warden noted, “to be superior in the air, to have air superiority, means having sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and, on the other hand, to be free from the danger of serious enemy air incursions.”9

The PLA, led by the Second Artillery and increasingly the PLAAF, un­derstands the potential role aerospace power plays in strategy and modern warfare. For a PLAAF seeking to integrate more offensive roles and missions, the goal in a conflict is to gain local or limited air superiority, which permits freedom of flight over a limited area for a finite period of time. Limited air su­periority is differentiated from theater air superiority, or supremacy, in which air assets can operate anywhere within the entire combat theater with impu – nity.10 Attainment of air superiority requires neutralizing or suppressing as­sets that can interfere with air operations, including fighters, ground-based air defenses, sensors such as radar systems, jammers, and various supporting in­frastructure. Like all other systems, air defense has points of failure that could have system-wide effects if neutralized. For countering fighters and other long-range precision strike assets, history has shown that targeting runways, logistical support, aircrews, and aircraft on the ground is more cost-effective than fighting air battles, if operational surprise can be achieved.11

The PLA strategic studies community notes that the predominant trend transforming traditional notions of airpower (ЙФЛж) is the seamless integra­tion of the air and space domains, expansion of the strategic battlespace, as well as nonmilitary uses of airpower such as disaster relief.12 A key focus is develop­ment of long-range precision strike capabilities in order to gain strategic lever­age in future crises, complicate the ability of the United States to intervene (e. g., “counterintervention” (ST^) operations), and ensure air superiority in terri­torial disputes around its periphery. Developmental efforts include extended range aerodynamic platforms and follow-on variants of conventional ballistic missiles, including those able to engage moving targets at sea. Over time, as its persistent sensor, data fusion, and command and control architecture increas­es in sophistication and range, the PLAs ability to hold at risk an expanding number of targets throughout the western Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, and elsewhere around its periphery is expected to grow.13

Over the years, the PLA has made significant advances in developing a force capable of applying aerospace power in a joint environment.14 Expansion of Second Artillery conventional missile infrastructure, PLAAF long-term force modernization, and a conceptual body of literature suggest that the PLA is in the midst of a fundamental shift in joint aerospace power doctrine. PLA analysts have traditionally viewed application of aerospace power as a form of “firepow­er warfare,” which involves the coordinated use of PLAAF strike aviation assets, Second Artillery conventional theater missiles, and information warfare.

The PRC’s ballistic missile forces could operate independently in support of a deterrent or coercive campaign or in support of air, maritime, or informa­tion operations. The Second Artillery’s most important mission likely would be suppression of enemy air defenses in order to facilitate air superiority and follow-on air strikes. Centrally commanded and controlled at the theater lev­el, the Second Artillery’s basic principles stress surprise and preemption, con­centration of resources, and rapid reaction. The Second Artillery’s force mod­ernization program requires a significant increase in accuracy and increased numbers of ballistic missiles. At the same time, it is developing sophisticated warheads that could increase the destructiveness of the ballistic missile force.

Four evolving theoretical concepts of aerospace power shape the opera­tional requirements needed to support national security needs:

■ integrated attack-defense operations

■ integrated information-firepower

■ strategic strike

■ integrated air and space (aerospace) operations.

While degree of emphasis varies between services, all reflect a belief in the expanding nature of the battlespace that drives long-range operational re­quirements, and possibly a future realignment of roles and missions.15

The growing capability of the PLAAF raises the question of its influence within the PLA and what role it currently plays in national policymaking. An analysis of the PLAAF’s missions versus those of other services is illuminating. In his “Essences for an Offensive and Defensive Chinese Air Force” essay, Lieu­tenant General Liu Yazhou argues that the air force must be capable of play­ing a major role in a variety of military operations against Taiwan—including air and missile attacks, a naval blockade, or even an outright invasion of the island.61 Over the last decade, the PLAAF has striven to develop the capability for carrying out all-weather, day-night, high-intensity, simultaneous offensive and defensive operations. The 2006 Science of Campaigns by the PLAs National Defense University identifies the following major PLAAF missions:62

■ military deterrence

■ offensive air operations (including air-blockade, airborne forces inser­tion, informatized operations, and special operations)

■ air defense

■ assisting ground and navy forces in offensive-defensive operations

■ assisting the Second Artillery force in missile attacks

■ resisting a more powerful enemy’s attack

■ participating in United Nations operations.

In discussing air offensive campaign categories, Science of Campaigns pinpointed three objectives that the PLAAF is expected to achieve:63

■ seizing air control by annihilating or crippling the enemy’s offensive and defensive airpower forces

■ creating favorable conditions for the army and navy to operate by destroying a large number of ground troops and the communication systems

■ attacking the enemy’s political, military, and economic targets to weaken his war potential or to achieve specific strategic objectives.

Two major concerns are intrinsic within PLA campaign theory: one is the presumption that the air force’s offensive capability remains limited, both in terms of the quantity and quality of PLAAF forces; and the other is that the enemy—specifically Taiwan—has built up such a sophisticated air defense sys­tem (consisting of radars, EW aircraft and satellites integrated with fighters, antiaircraft missiles, and artillery) that it will be difficult for PLAAF or PLAN strike aircraft to break through it.64

An important discontinuity of thought is inherent within how the PLAAF and the PLA perceive the PLAAF’s combat role and capabilities. While the PLAAF holds that the air force should be capable of being used through­out a conflict from the beginning to the end, PLA campaign theory argues otherwise, suggesting that the PLAAF should be employed in offensive oper­ations at the critical time (M^B^).65 This may reflect an intriguing fact: the officers responsible for writing PLA campaign theory come mainly from the army. Thus it is likely that this difference represents the army’s influence within PLA doctrinal circles and, consequently, its own interpretation about the mis­sion and current capability of the PLAAF. Furthermore, it explains why the PLA has attached great importance to land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs versus winged atmospheric (hence PLAAF) attack. Competition for resources between the PLAAF and Second Artillery is inevitable as the PLA pursues developing a long-range strike capability, particularly as strategic pro­jection remains a major deficit of PLAAF capability. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, according to PLA campaign doctrine, the Second Artillery is defined as a primary player of the joint strike force to conduct preemptive attacks (&ФФ1 Й) against enemy targets from long range.66

In contemplating regional conflict, China’s greatest concern is confront­ing an American intervention. Over the years after the first Gulf War, Chi­nese defense experts raised serious doubts whether the country could with­stand air and missile attacks similar to those that had shattered Iraq’s military structure and capabilities. The subsequent emphasis of the “three attacks and the three defenses” required the development of air defense systems that are capable of attacking stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters (the “three attacks”), and protecting against precision strikes, electronic jamming, and elec­tronic reconnaissance and surveillance (the “three defenses”).67 The 2008 defense white paper characterizes the PLAAF as a mixed force of aviation, ground-based air defense, airborne, signal, radar, electronic countermeasures (ECM), techni­cal reconnaissance, and chemical defense.68 This mixed-force structure will con­tinue to complicate China’s air and space decisions, particularly with regard to training, allocating roles and missions among the services and branches, and influencing resource allocations for Chinese air force modernization.

Division of responsibility across the services in air defense also challenges the PLAAF’s effort to build an integrated air defense system. The PLAAF is pri­marily responsible for the air defense mission. It not only operates most of Chi­na’s fighters and also most of its ground-based air defense systems, such as sur­face-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). The PLA ground force and navy units also operate antiaircraft systems (short-range antiaircraft missiles and antiaircraft artillery, and navy fighters) to protect themselves. The question is to what extent the possession of air defense systems by other ser­vices represents an old service cultural preference for embracing every possible capability, particularly since many of these ground-based air defense weapon­ries have proven ineffective in recent warfare.69

The PLAAF’s Science of Modern Air Defense describes air defense as an integrated air-space operation in all dimensions (air, sea, space, cyber, and ground), and requires joint operations of all services.70 Yet against this con­fident assertion, evidence out of China is confusing. The PLAAF air defense forces operate the most sophisticated long – and middle-range SAM systems, the Russian made S-300 and China’s indigenously developed HQ-9/12 series. However, the bulk of Chinese SAM batteries remain equipped with the obso­lete HQ-2 systems as well as outdated Stalinist/Mao-era antiaircraft artil – lery.71 Perhaps what is even more significant is that no single national air com­mand system has ever been established equivalent to the former Soviet Union’s PVO-Strany, or the United States’ North American Aerospace Defense Com­mand (NORAD). Lieutenant General Liu has suggested creating a Chinese “NORAD” to command China’s air defense based around the Beijing Military Region Air Force. The recent Vanguard-2010 exercise suggests that the army air defense forces are attempting to assert their independent role in China’s national air defense system, however it develops.72

Conclusion

With the existence of a ground force-dominated culture and the emer­gence of other cultures for the other services, the PLAAF’s relationship with other services and organizations has been complicated, but not significantly changed since its earliest days. The PLAAF is a separate service (junzhong) along with the PLAN and Second Artillery under the CMC. The General Staff Department is responsible for operations, military affairs, training, and mobilization for the entire PLA. Allocation of missions is under the purview of the General Staff. As a result of bureaucratic politics, an analysis of mis­sions divided between the air force and other services does not suggest that the PLAAF’s role and influence are likely to change in the future, despite changes in China’s security interests, technological developments, and other areas.

The growth of China’s airpower in recent years has naturally raised great Western interest in comprehending the PLAAF’s influence within the PLA, its relationship with other services, and the role it currently plays in national policy­making. Change is clearly underway within the ranks of the PLAAF, which has embraced a new concept of operations that emphasizes development of an air force capable of both offensive and defensive operations, fielding an increasing number of fourth-generation multirole fighters, early warning and electronic warfare aircraft, and long-range surface-to-air missiles. The force structure is being radically reshaped to become a smaller, yet more technologically capa­ble, service. For military organizations to be able to take dramatic changes, they must also have appropriate personnel policies, organizational structure, service culture, and leader development programs. What has not changed is the PLAs political culture, service tradition, older ways of doing things, and outdated organizational system. All these form relentless constraints that will undoubt­edly continue to hinder the PLAAF’s modernization efforts.

In sum, then, the PLA is a titanic bureaucratic amalgamation with a leaden hand of tradition that can often block innovation. Changes in doctrine, training practices, force structure, and equipment are underway, yet many traditions and cultural characteristics of the 83-year-old PLA are rigorously maintained. On top of that, there is the Party-controlled political culture and the ground force-cen­tric predominant organizational tradition of the PLA. Both serve as constraining mechanisms that not only restrict the PLAs drive to autonomy, but also ensure its loyalty to the Party and obedience to Party policy. No military reformation can be expected to undermine the Party’s control over the military (with the CMC on the top, assisted by four headquarters departments, though not organized in Western fashion as true joint command and control apparatuses).

If new mission requirements and an emphasis on joint operations are forcing the PLAAF to rethink itself and its role, to reduce its force size, to acquire new aircraft and weapons systems, and to strengthen its command and control by informatization, none of these changes has seriously posed challenges to the existing organizational system of the PLA. The political culture and the military system of the PLA continue to ensure the Chinese air force remains as it has been—consisting of aviation, surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artil­lery, radar, and airborne troops, while space assets and strategic missiles remain separate from it. Despite the PLAAF’s vision of being capable of both offensive and defensive operations, the PLAs current campaign theory defines the Second Artillery force as a preemptive strike force and projects the PLAAF to carry out offensive operations at critical, necessary moments. Thus, although the PLAAF is in the midst of a dramatic transformation with new weapons systems and growing capabilities, its role and influence remain limited within the contempo­rary, army-dominated, Chinese military system. As in other nations previously, differing and conflicting service cultures contribute frictions between services, though, in China, that has not brought any fundamental change of relationship among the land-air-sea forces. The continued existence of political constraints on when and how airpower should be used further limits and frustrates any role the air force can play in national policymaking.

Historically, the Chinese leadership has repeatedly demonstrated hesita­tion in employing its national airpower for offensive purposes. This was partly attributed to the Chinese leadership’s misunderstanding of the PLAAF’s actual experience in the Korean War and in homeland air defense operations during the Cold War, and to their ignorance (for various reasons) of the actual role that airpower can play in modern conflict. The other factor was because the PLAAF had been incapable, in any case, of conducting offensive operations, again for a variety of reasons such as available force structure, capabilities, and training.

The potential of a U. S. intervention is always seen as a major variable of a regional security equation, particularly in a crisis over Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. While the PLAAF’s modernization efforts may close the gap between its aircraft and avionic capabilities and those of the United States, its overall capa­bility will continue to be inferior to that of the U. S. Air Force. The current and future Chinese leadership will continue to face and confront the same dilem­mas as have its predecessors over the extent that political considerations and the PLAAF’s restricted capabilities work to constrain Beijing’s national security calculation and decisionmaking.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the PLA’s warfighting potential has grown in parallel with China’s economic surge. Assuming its economy contin­ues along a steady trajectory, China will be able to commit further resources to the more challenging aspects of the three-step strategy, particularly infor­matization. Should these goals be realized, the United States and other powers will face a genuine challenge in preparing themselves to encounter increasingly capable Chinese aerospace power over the coming decades. This perhaps is the key rationale fueling continued interest in studying the steady evolution of the PLAAF as it progresses through the 21st century.

A major transformation in thinking among PLA air – and spacepower analysts since the early 1990s has been their increasing emphasis on offen­sive missions and operations, and their growing faith in the broad strategic, campaign, and political utility of the offensive mission. Longtime PLAAF ana­lyst Min Zengfu traces this change in thinking, noting that during the 1970s and 1980s, the two major tasks set forth by the Central Military Commis­sion that defined the PLAAF’s mission were air defense of the national terri­tory and providing support for military combat operations of the infantry and navy. In the early 1990s, however, as part of China’s reorientation of its “pri­mary strategic direction” away from defense against the former Soviet Union and toward preventing Taiwan independence and securing China’s interests along its southeast coast, the PLAAF’s missions were redefined and expanded to include more offensive operations.23 Along with deterrence and air defense, the PLAAF’s capability to carry out offensive operations is now one of the three missions that attract the greatest emphasis and focus among analysts.

This increased emphasis on the offensive mission is reflected in the 2007 edition of the National Defense University’s The Science of Campaigns. The text notes that the PLAAF’s service mission of “being simultaneously prepared for offense and defense” (gongfang jianbei, ЖШШ%) is a combined offensive and defensive mission, but the authors then proceed to urge that the air force place greater focus on the active, offensive aspects of this mission.

The Air Force should implement the operational thinking of emphasiz­ing offense [zhuzhong jingong, while being simultaneously pre­

pared for offense and defense. The Air Force should give full play to its powerful aerial mobility, rapid speed, and long-distance strike capabilities, as well as its advantages in conducting multiple types of aerial missions.24

PLAAF analysts Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping echo these thoughts, calling upon the air force to expand the role and power of offense and labeling this an “urgent task.”

China needs to readjust its attack-and-defense structure. The urgent task facing China is to increase the ratio and power of its offensive combat strength and to increase the quality of its defense, while at the same time reducing the scope of its defense. To be able to simultaneously attack and defend has become a short-term objective for China to achieve.25

David Shlapak

Since the early 1990s, and rapidly accelerating after the latter half of that decade, China has undertaken an ambitious program of military mod­ernization, one that continues vigorously today.1 A primary focal point of this effort has been to update and upgrade the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which for the first 40-plus years of its existence had been a backward force, equipped with numerous but antiquated aircraft flown by poorly trained pilots. While it has yet to completely outgrow this modest past, the PLAAF has undergone a remarkable transformation over the last 20 years, a process that seems certain to continue through the foreseeable future.

This paper addresses one aspect of the PLAAF’s ongoing evolution: its air­craft and weapons. This assessment leads to a conclusion that the point of the PLAAF’s spear—its fleet of modern combat aircraft along with their munitions— has mostly caught up to the standards of other advanced air forces. In terms of its physical hardware, the PLAAF will soon have the ability to credibly challenge the United States over the nearby waters of the Taiwan Strait, if it is not capa­ble already. However, the PLAAF’s ability to project airpower against a first-rate adversary in an arena farther from China’s shores—over the South China Sea or beyond—remains more doubtful, although this could change in the next decade.

Equipment is of course only one piece of the airpower puzzle; without adequate doctrine, leadership, training, and ground support, the most modern aircraft and equipment are at best a static display and at worst a target array. So, this paper’s judgment of China’s air force must be partial; larger and more integrated assessments are needed to understand the PLAAF more thoroughly. What can be said is, should the PLAAF falter in a Taiwan contingency, its lead­ers will be hard put to lay the blame on their tools.