Category The Chinese Air Force

Yuan’s definition of the offensive mission reflects a growing consensus among PLA air – and spacepower theorists (including the authors of The Sci­ence of Campaigns in 2007) that a primary objective of offensive missions is to destroy or undermine the capability of the enemy’s command and control, sur­veillance, and other information systems to function together effectively. This mission is to be accomplished by sudden, carefully targeted attacks on “key – point” (zhongdian, Фй) or “critical” (yaohai, ШШ) targets. A critical aim is to disable enemy air defenses and induce paralysis, blindness, or isolation in these key combat systems at least long enough for PLAAF forces to establish and exploit corridors to carry out their main attacks.

A number of PLA air – and spacepower analysts portray these enemy information systems as fragile, interdependent “systems of systems” that are potentially subject to something like cascade failure, rather than as intercon­nected systems with a robust level of redundancy built in. Analysts Cai Feng – zhen and Tian Anping contend that, properly carried out, “an attack on one point can paralyze the entire situation” (ji qiyidian tanhuan quanju, фй—,йШ Йй^).29 This perspective that the enemy is a vulnerable “system of systems” is spelled out in a number of other analyses as well.30

Toward this end, PLA analysts increasingly emphasize the critical role that achieving information superiority (xinxi youshi, and under­

taking successful information operations plays in the offensive mission to incapacitate enemy systems while protecting China’s own systems.31 They distinguish three aspects of information operations that play a critical role in the overall offensive mission—reconnaissance, attacks, and defense:32

■ Information reconnaissance involves expanding the campaign com­manders’ capability for gathering intelligence materials on enemy information operations.33

■ Information attacks involve seeking information superiority by dis­rupting the enemy’s flows of key information. A major purpose of these operations is “to completely blind the enemy’s air defense sys­tem” and “to open a gap in the enemy’s air defense system to make it difficult for the enemy to organize effective interception actions.” PLA analysts note two forms of “soft” information attacks—electronic jamming and deception and computer network attacks—and “hard” attacks involving firepower destruction of enemy information assets.34 Key targets include enemy reconnaissance and early warning satellites, airborne early warning and control aircraft, ground-based long-range warning and fire-control radars, surface-to-air missile radars, and command guidance systems.35 The Science of Campaigns specifically recommends that attack planners assign a portion of China’s most capable fighters to attack enemy airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes in order to “chop down one of the enemy’s important information pillars” (qieduan di de zhongyao xinxi zhizhang, ЩІШШ МШШШ^^Й).36 Some analysts contend that China’s electronic jam­ming and deception resources are limited at present, and hence these information attacks are likely to rely more heavily on air attacks.37 This strongly suggests that Chinese forces may be forced to place much greater emphasis on destroying enemy warning and command and control and guidance systems through use of firepower destruction.

■ Information defense involves organizing defensive operations to pre­vent enemy jamming, firepower destruction, and computer network attacks.

Q-5. The last second-generation aircraft in combat service with the PLAAF is the Q-5 Fantan. The Q-5 evolved from the J-6, which itself was a Chinese-pro­duced MiG-19; it first flew in 1965 and entered service in 1970. In keeping with what we will see is PLAAF practice, the Q-5—nearly obsolescent already by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Warsaw Pact standards at the start of its operational career in China—has been modified and updated several times over the years. The newest variant, the Q-5L, has been fitted with a conformal belly fuel
tank and a laser designator under the nose, and Chinese Internet photos show it equipped with a targeting pod on a ventral pylon and laser-guided bombs hung on the wings. Despite its age, the Q-5L could be an effective light attack aircraft if employed in a very forgiving air defense environment.

1st Generation

2d Generation 3d Generation 4th Generation

J-7. A reverse engineered MiG-21, the J-7 Fishbed was put into produc­tion in the early 1960s, entered PLAAF service in 1965, and has since been pro­duced in a bewildering variety of subtypes.6 It is still the most numerous type of fighter in the PLAAF’s inventory; the latest (and probably last) model, the J-7G, first flew as recently as 2002. In production for nearly 4 decades—a time span that likely will never be approached, let alone surpassed, by another com­bat aircraft—the J-7 has been improved over time, including several upgrades to its radar, addition of a head-up display (HUD) and other updated avion­ics, a larger, double-delta wing, and integration of more modern air-to-to air missiles (AAMs), including the infrared (IR)-guided PL-8. Production of the J-7G reportedly continued at least into 2009.

J-8. Originally an enlarged, twin-engine development of the J-7, the J-8 Finback is yet another PLAAF aircraft that has been progressively upgraded since its introduction in 1981.7 A major redesign was undertaken in the late 1980s, which saw the forward fuselage with its MiG-21-style nose intake give
way to one featuring a solid nose—accommodating a more powerful radar— and two lateral air intakes, one on each side of the aircraft. It is this version, the J—8II or J-8B, which continues to serve and has also been the platform for several generations of progressively more capable models. The latest con­firmed variant is the J-8F, which has been equipped with new cockpit avionics, more powerful engines, and a probe for in-flight refueling.8 The most signifi­cant upgrade is the installation of a newer radar that enables employment of the PL-12 active homing radar-guided “fire and forget” medium-range AAM (MRAAM). Although not as capable as the most modern aircraft in its arsenal, these late-generation J-8s provide the PLAAF another, presumably cheaper, platform capable of using its most up-to-date air-to-air weapons.

JH-7. The JH-7 Flounder is an indigenously designed twin-engine attack fighter that entered PLAAF service by 2004.9 The current production model is the JH-7A, equipped with improved radar, digital flight controls, and modernized cockpit instrumentation. The aircraft’s empty weight has been reduced via utilization of composite materials and the number of stores hard – points increased from 7 to 11. The JH-7A can be equipped with navigation, targeting, and data link pods mounted under the forward fuselage and is capa­ble of carrying a wide array of land attack and maritime strike weapons of both Chinese and Russian origin. It, too, has been photographed carrying the PL-12 MRAAM. There are reports that a second update, the JH-7B—with improved engines and some radar signature reduction—is under development, although no solid evidence of this has yet appeared.

J—10. The J—10 is a single-engine multirole aircraft developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC). First flown in March 1998, the J-10 reportedly entered PLAAF service in 2003. A tailless design with canard foreplanes, the J-10 strongly resembles the cancelled Israeli Lavi fighter though it is unclear how much design assistance, if any, CAC received from either Israel or Russia (although the latter has to date provided the J-10’s engine). It has 11 weapons stations and has been photographed with what appear to be navigation and targeting pods mounted ventrally just aft of the underslung air intake, and with a removable fixed air refueling probe on the starboard side of the fuselage. Around the time that the first J-10s were being deployed by operational units, development began on an upgraded version of the aircraft. Dubbed the J-10B, the new model features a simplified engine inlet ramp that reduces weight and improves the aircraft’s radar signature. The J-10B also adds an electro-optical targeting system (EOTS), visible as a bulge forward and to the starboard side of the canopy. Featuring an infrared search and track (IRST) sensor and a laser rangefinder, the EOTS allows a pilot to passively detect and target enemy air­craft without requiring telltale signals from the J-10’s radar.

Su-27SK/UBK, J-11A. The first variants of the Sukhoi Flanker to join the PLAAF were the single seat Su-27SK and the two-seat operational trainer, the Su-27UBK.10 These were also the first fourth-generation combat aircraft to enter PLAAF service when they appeared in the mid-1990s. Initially, the PLAAF purchased its Flankers from the Russian production line, but these have been supplemented over time by more than 100 aircraft built from Rus­sian-supplied kits by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), aircraft that are designated J-11A. Chinese assembly of these J-11A kits was ended about half­way through the planned 200 aircraft run because PLAAF requirements had reportedly evolved such that the single-role air superiority Su-27/SK/J-11A no longer suited the service’s needs. As originally built, China’s Su-27SK/J-11 fighters can carry neither the Chinese PL-12 nor the Russian R-77 (AA-12) active-homing MRAAMs. There are, however, reports that at least some of these aircraft have been fitted with the radar modifications needed to fire the R-77/AA-12. Like the J-10B, all Flankers feature an EOTS mounted in front of the canopy. In an intriguing development, the PLAAF apparently sent sev­eral Su-27/J-11 aircraft to Turkey in October 2010 to participate in an exercise called “Anatolian Eagle.” This is the first time a NATO country has hosted an exercise that included the PLAAF.11

J-11B. The J-11B is SAC’s response to the PLAAF’s requirement for a true multirole Flanker variant. Based on the Su-27SK airframe, the J-11B fea­tures Chinese-manufactured engines and avionics, including indigenous radar, and can be armed with a wide variety of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, including the PL-12 MRAAM. Among other improvements, SAC claims that the radar cross-section of the J-11B has been reduced by 75-80 percent from the Su – 27SK by reconfiguring the engine intakes and employing radar-absorbing paint. This degree of signature reduction may strain credulity absent more substantial changes to the airframe, but the assertion alone indicates that the PLAAF under­stands the advantages afforded by stealth. The J-11B appears to have entered PLAAF service in 2007. A two-seat version, the J-11BS, is under development.

Su-30MKK. The Su-30MKK is yet another derivative of the Flanker family, a two-seat multirole aircraft developed from the Su-27 for the PLAAF. China has reportedly purchased 76 of these Russian-manufactured fighters, which incorporate improved avionics, including a more advanced radar with improved air-to-ground capabilities. The Su-30 can be fitted with a wide array of “smart” and “dumb” weapons and munitions, and it also features a retract­able refueling probe. Licensed production of the Su-30 in China was once expected but now appears unlikely, with the two-seat J-11BS potentially occu­pying what might otherwise have been the Su-30’s “strike fighter” niche in the PLAAF force structure.12

China’s Fifth-Generation Fighter (J-20).13 The first public flight in Janu­ary 2011 of a stealthy new Chinese fighter, the J-20, came as a surprise to many observers who had agreed with then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that China would “have no fifth-generation aircraft by 2020” and only “a handful” by 2025.14 The flight took place while Gates was in China, an irony that may or may not have been intended by the Chinese.

The J-20 appears to be a large airplane, estimated to be about the size of an F-111 by at least two analysts. Its appearance shows that substantial care was taken in the design to shape the jet for low observable (LO) char­acteristics.15 At this point, all performance specifications are wholly specu­lative, but the J-20 is thought to have two internal weapons bays and to be capable of “supercruising” flight. In both regards, the aircraft resembles the USAF F-22.

Some accounts report that J-20 prototypes had been flying at a PLAAF test center for several months before the fighter’s official debut in January, and that a total of four airframes are being used in the test program.16

Late in 2009, the PLAAF’s deputy commander, General He Weirong, said that a new fighter would soon “undertake its first flight” and be in ser­vice “8 to 10 years” after that.17 This schedule would appear to bring the jet into service around 2016, earlier than previous intelligence assessments had projected.

H-6. The H-6 Badger is the PLAAF’s only true bomber, a twin-engine medium-range aircraft copied from the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 of the mid – 1950s, with which it shares the same Western reporting name, Badger. The H-6 has been built in a number of versions for both air force and naval use since its first delivery in 1969.18 The newest versions in PLAAF use are the H-6G, which is the carrier platform for China’s first air-launched land attack cruise missile (LACM), the KD-63, and the H-6K, which can carry up to six smaller Tomahawk-like LACMs. The H-6K in particular appears to be a fairly radical reworking of the Badger, with modern turbofan engines appar­ently replacing the less powerful and less efficient turbojets that powered all previous models, composite materials being used to reduce weight, a modern “glass” cockpit installation, improved avionics, and a thermal-imaging sensor under the nose.

Special Purpose Platforms. The PLAAF has long sought to acquire an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform along the lines of the U. S. E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). A program to buy four A-50I aircraft—a Russian Il-76 Candid airframe equipped with Israeli radar and mission equipment—collapsed in 2000 when Israel suc­cumbed to substantial U. S. pressure and dropped out of the deal. After this disappointment, China moved forward with its own aircraft, also based on the Il-76 platform, but with an indigenously developed mission suite. At least four of these KJ-2000 AWACS aircraft are in active service with the PLAAF, provid­ing it with its first sophisticated airborne battle management assets.19

Another area of interest to the PLAAF is aerial refueling, which is a necessary competence if China intends to extend the reach of its airpower beyond its immediate environs. Today, the PLAAF possesses a fairly rudi­mentary capability, owning about a dozen H-6U tankers equipped with a “probe and drogue” refueling pod under each wing. Relatively few of China’s combat aircraft can be refueled in the air: some late-model J-8s have probes fitted, and a fixed probe can be installed on the J—10. The PLAAF’s Su-30s have retractable refueling probes, but their system is allegedly not compatible with the H-6U.20

In 2005, China ordered 34 additional Il-76 Candid transports and four Il—78 Midas tankers from Russia, but none have been delivered to date due to a dispute between the Russian export company and the factory responsible for building the aircraft.21 The PLAAF needs not only additional tankers but also more strategic airlifters—if not from Russia, then from its own aviation indus­try—to achieve any aspirations it might have for possessing a credible power projection capability. In fact, a new large transport aircraft, sometimes called the “Y-20” is reportedly under development; a first flight “around 2012” has been suggested.22

The PLAAF has also developed about a dozen specialized platforms based on the Y-8 four-engine turboprop transport.23 The “Gaoxin” series includes another AEW&C aircraft, a maritime surveillance variant, an air­borne command post, and a number of platforms for various electronic war­fare functions, such as jamming and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Unmanned Aerial Systems. Table 8-3 lists unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) deployed or under development in China. They range from a copy of the Vietnam-era U. S. Firebee reconnaissance drone to the Xianglong high-alti­tude long endurance (HALE) UAS that bears a passing resemblance to the U. S. RQ-4 Global Hawk.

In the past decade, China has displayed a dizzying array of various UAS models at air and trade shows; many if not most seem never to have gone into production. A look at the table suggests that China is experimenting with many classes of UAS, mostly for surveillance and reconnaissance. Of particular interest is the Harpy, an Israeli-made antiradiation drone. It flies to a target area and loiters until an appropriate target begins to emit, at which point it dives into the target and detonates. Harpy is an interesting hybrid of UAS and cruise missile, somewhat akin to the cancelled American AGM-139A Tacit Rainbow program of the late 1980s.

Air-to-air missiles: Table 8-4 lists air-to-air missiles (AAMs) in service with the PLAAF. As can be seen, for many years the PLAAF was equipped with obsolete AAMs. Through to the mid-1980s, the most common missile in its inventory was the PL-2, a Chinese copy of the Soviet AA-2 Atoll AAM, itself a copy of the first-generation U. S. AIM-9B Sidewinder. But, in the early 1990s, this began to change. Along with Russian Su-27s came modern Rus­sian missiles: the R-27/AA-10 Alamo radar-guided medium-range air-to – air missile (MRAAM) and the R-73/AA-11, short-range AAM (SRAAM), which at the time was probably the best visual range “dogfight” missile in the world. As well, China developed two indigenous infrared homing SRAAMs, the PL-8 and PL-9. The PLAAF fielded its first indigenous MRAAM, the PL-11 semiactive radar homing missile, developed from the Italian Aspide (which Beijing had purchased in small numbers) around the turn of the cen­tury. Along with its Su-30s, China procured a number of R-77/AA-12 “fire and forget” MRAAMs from Russia. Shortly thereafter the PLAAF also began fielding the PL-12, an indigenous active-homing MRAAM compatible with most of its modern fighters.24

Both the AA-11 and the PL-9 are reportedly compatible with helmet – mounted sights, which allow the missile to be locked onto an air target when the pilot looks at it. When combined with the missile’s “off boresight” capabil­ity—it can be fired at targets to one side or another of the launching aircraft up to some specified limit—the sighting system streamlines the engagement dynamics of close-in aerial combat.

Looking ahead, it has been reported that China is working on at least three new AAM designs: an extended-range ramjet powered version of the PL-12, a short-range active radar homing missile, and the PL-ASR, an IR mis­sile employing thrust vector controls which would provide greater agility to the weapon.25

Air-to-surface missiles: Table 8-5 lists air-to-surface missiles (ASM) reportedly fielded by the PLAAF. They range from the Hellfire-class AR-1 to the HN-1, a Tomahawk-like long-range cruise missile (LRCM). In addition to these missiles, China is also beginning to deploy laser- and satellite-guided bombs, although it is not clear whether they are yet available in operationally significant quantities.26

Surface-to-air missiles. The PLAAF operates China’s long-range strate­gic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); as table 8-6 shows, these are a mix of indig­enous and Russian designs. While the HQ-2 is obsolete, the HQ-9, HQ-12, and SA-300 variants are all very capable systems. Of particular interest is the HQ-12, which appears to have been designed expressly to attack AWACS – type aircraft and jamming platforms; it is unique in being a surface-to-air anti­radiation missile (ARM). The table includes the new S-400 SAM system that has entered service in Russia. No exports of this very long-range SAM—the intended successor to the S-300 series—are as yet reported, but China, which is said to have paid for a substantial portion of the system’s development, is likely to be an early customer for it.

Measuring Up: The PLAAF’s Equipment versus the United States

Consider the circumstances had U. S. and Chinese fighter pilots encountered one another in the skies near Taiwan in 1995. The American would have been flying a fourth-generation F-15, F-16, or F/A-18, armed with AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) and AIM-9L/M short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAMs). The U. S. pilot would almost certainly have been supported by a controller in an E-3 AWACS, and would have found a KC-135 tanker orbiting nearby in the event that fuel became an issue.

For his part, the PLAAF pilot would most likely have flown a MiG-21 variant without any medium-range missiles, being armed instead with only obsolescent PL-2 or PL-5 short-range IR weapons. While a ground control­ler back on the mainland would have helped manage and inform the PLAAF pilot’s sortie, that controller’s picture of the relevant airspace would have been substantially inferior to the one being monitored inside the AWACS as it cruised high above. And there would have been no tankers available to pro­vide additional fuel should that have been necessary or desirable. In short, the Chinese airman would have been flying an obsolete aircraft carrying anti­quated missiles, have modest situational awareness, and, as is discussed else­where, would himself have been the product of inferior training and prepara­tion compared to the U. S. pilot. Thus, he would have been overmatched and outgunned.27

Now fast-forward 15 years. While the U. S. pilot would most likely be in essentially the same plane with essentially the same weapons and essentially the same support, the picture on the PLAAF side would be very different. Consider the following changes:

The PLAAF Now Has Platforms Comparable to U. S. Platforms

The PLAAF’s Su-27/J-11s are often compared to the U. S. F-15, the J—10 to the F-16, and the Su-30 to the F-15E. As table 8-7 shows, these compar­isons are not far-fetched; though hardly identical, the two sides’ jets clearly seem to fill parallel slots in their respective force structures.

The similarities between each side’s “fourth-gen” fighters go beyond static comparisons of size and payload. Plotted in figure 8-2 are two factors for each of eight aircraft: weight-to-thrust and wing loading. The first shows the relation­ship between an aircraft’s weight and the power of its engines, and the second the relationship between its weight and the surface area of its wings.28 These fac­tors help determine a fighter’s maneuverability in both the horizontal (banks and turns) and vertical (climb and dive) dimensions. Lower is better for each factor, so the farther down and to the left an aircraft lies, the better.

Unsurprisingly, the USAF F-22—seen in the figure’s lower left corner— is superior on both counts; in the upper right are the F-16C and the F/A— 18E/F, which trail the pack in these two regards. Clustered in the middle are five aircraft, the F-15C, F-15E, F-35, J—10, and J—11, which are in more or less the same neighborhood on these two important characteristics. While weight – to-thrust ratio and wing loading vary over the course of a mission as fuel is burned and ordnance expended, these platforms themselves start out broadly similar in these important factors.

The J-10B and Flanker variants are equipped with passive IRSTs. These sensors can permit a pilot—without emitting a radar signal— to detect another aircraft by “seeing” the heat from its engines, the friction produced as it moves through the air, or the heat signature from the launch of a powered missile. Sukhoi claims that the OLS-35—developed for its Su-35 advanced Flanker— has a front hemisphere detection range of 50 kilometers (30+ miles), and as much as 90 kilometers (55+ miles) in the rear hemisphere, where it is “look­ing” at the hot exhaust of a target aircraft.29 While the OLS-27 and OLS-30 that equip China’s Su-27/J-11s and Su-30s, respectively, are less capable, it is worth noting that no current generation U. S. fighter has an IRST at all, not even the F-22.30 The forthcoming F-35 (now in advanced flight testing) will mount an IRST, and programs are underway to retrofit both the F-15C and F/A-18E/F.31

In my assignment as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, I had the responsibility of monitoring air forces around the world. There is no question which country has made the greatest strides in developing its airpower capabil­ity. Over the last two decades, Chinas air force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), has transformed itself from a large, poorly-trained force oper­ating aircraft based on 1950s Soviet designs to a leaner and meaner force flying advanced Russian and indigenously produced fourth-generation fighters. This remarkable transformation is still a work in progress, but China has made up a lot of ground in a short time.

China’s civilian and military leaders grasped the centrality of airpower in modern warfare as early as the mid 1970s, a lesson reinforced by the stunning success of the U. S.-led coalition during the first Gulf War. They set the goal of building the PLAAF into a world class, high-technology air force capable of pre­vailing against sophisticated adversaries in regional conflicts. China’s expanding airpower capability has had a profound impact on the Asia-Pacific region (and beyond), causing countries to reassess their own air force modernization needs.

China’s successful 2011 test flight of a stealth fighter prototype, the J-20, demonstrates just how ambitious its airpower goals have become. The United States and Russia are the only other countries deploying or developing true fifth-generation fighter aircraft; Beijing is now seeking to match the capabili­ties of the two most established aerospace powers. In addition to stealth fighter development, the Chinese aviation industry already produces two fourth-gen­eration fighters (the indigenous J-10 and China’s Su-27 copy, the J-11) which are roughly equivalent to the aircraft that make up the bulk of the existing U. S., Russian, and Western air force fleets. China has also successfully test flown a fourth-generation fighter (J-15) that can be launched from an aircraft carrier.

More sophisticated combat aircraft are just one component of the expan­sion of Chinese airpower. Chinese military planners are focused on development of antiaccess/area denial capabilities with an eye toward negating any potential threat to their dominance in the Western Pacific. Chinese efforts to develop an “informatized” military include a focus on integrating and networking aero­space systems, using airborne early warning and control aircraft together with space-based assets. China plans to field a large fleet of remotely piloted aircraft

(RPAs) with both combat and surveillance missions. The deployment of RPAs will enhance and extend the range of China’s area denial capabilities, challeng­ing the ability of other nations’ forces to operate in the Western Pacific.

China’s Second Artillery Corps now possesses a large arsenal of increas­ingly accurate cruise and ballistic missiles that could strike air bases in Japan and islands throughout the Pacific, and target U. S. aircraft carriers. Nonstealthy air­craft attempting to operate near China will be confronted with an increasingly capable land-based air defense network. PLAAF training has advanced in parallel with technological improvements, resulting in a better-educated and more pro­fessional cadre of officers and enlisted personnel. Even in an era of constrained resources, China’s comprehensive expansion of its airpower capability should be a matter of great concern to U. S. civilian and military leaders and to U. S. friends and allies in Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

I was honored and privileged to take part in the October 2010 conference in Taipei on the Chinese Air Force, which was jointly organized by Taiwan’s Council for Advanced Policy Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the U. S. National Defense University, and the RAND Corporation. The organiz­ers did a superb job in assembling a first-rate group of international experts on airpower and the Chinese military. The conference papers were discussed and debated at length as experts sought to assess Chinese air force current and future capabilities and the trajectory of the air balance across the Taiwan Strait and in the Western Pacific. The current volume contains substantially revised versions of the papers presented at the conference, benefiting greatly from conference dis­cussions and careful editing by Richard Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip Saun­ders. Together, the chapters offer a complete picture of where the Chinese air force is today, where it has come from, and most importantly, where it is headed.

This book should be of keen interest to policymakers, senior military leaders, the intelligence community, academics, and China watchers of every stripe. However, it is of particular relevance to senior U. S. civilian and military leaders as they make difficult decisions about funding U. S. air and naval capa­bilities in an environment of constrained defense resources. It is also impor­tant reading for U. S. Air Force and Navy officers, who need to understand the progress China has made in modernizing its air force, and to consider the ways Chinese leaders might employ air power in the future.

David A. Deptula, Lt General, USAF (Ret.)

Senior Military Scholar Center for Character and Leadership Development United States Air Force Academy

The concept of strategic strike serves as the principal rationale for cre­ation and sustainment of a military service organization independent and dis­tinct from ground or naval forces. For example, strategic strike serves as the raison d’etre for an independent U. S. Air Force. The strategic strike mission is the principal driver for the Second Artillery’s existence as an independent force, and a vision for the PLAAF.25 From a U. S. perspective, strategic strike seeks to “weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition.”26

The Second Artillery’s conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missile force has been at the forefront of the PLA’s strategic strike capa­bility for almost 20 years. As the 2008 Defense White Paper notes, the “Second Artillery Force is a strategic force under the direct command and control of the

CMC [Central Military Commission], and the core force of China for strategic deterrence.” In addition, “the conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is charged mainly with the task of conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against key strategic and operational targets of the enemy.”27 The PLA leadership depends upon its ballistic and land attack cruise missile force—the Second Artillery—to deter potential adversaries and defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In­creasingly accurate conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) are the optimal means for suppressing enemy air defense and creat­ing a more permissive environment for subsequent conventional air operations due to their relative immunity to defense systems. Along these lines, ballistic missiles function similarly to U. S. stealth assets. In a conflict, they can be sup­ported by electronic attack assets which reduce early warning and confuse en­emy commanders. In addition, space-based, airborne, and ground-based sen­sors can facilitate command and control and provide crucial strategic intelli­gence, theater awareness, targeting, and battle damage assessment information.

For integrated attack-defense operations and coercive air campaigns to­day, the PLAAF depends upon the Second Artillery for suppression of enemy air defenses and missions that would enable a more permissive operating envi­ronment. As time goes on, however, the PLAAF may become less reliant on Sec­ond Artillery support as it evolves “relatively independent” capabilities through economical “leapfrogs” (S*SS) in technology development.28 The PLAAF has been diversifying its roles and missions, moving away from a force that once was almost exclusively responsible for air defense, interdiction, and close air support toward a service whose primary mission is deterrence and strategic attack. The PLAAF’s diversification is grounded in a body of theory stipulating that an inde­pendent air strike campaign could support national objectives.29 According to China’s 2008 Defense White Paper,

the Air Force is working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its ca­pabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build it­self into a modernized strategic air force.

The PLAAF is characterized as “a strategic service of the PLA, and the main force for carrying out air operations. It is responsible for such tasks as safeguarding the country’s territorial air space and territorial sovereignty, and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide.”

With the White Paper stopping short of enshrining the strategic strike mission, PLAAF representatives have made no secret that the service’s long-term vision is to be able to conduct an independent air campaign to achieve decisive strategic effects.30 Such a goal should not be surprising. Since the publication of Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air in 1921, airpower pro­ponents have envisioned the transformation of warfare through long-range strategic strikes. PLAAF representatives have argued in favor of a gradual tran­sition from supporting roles and predominantly defensive counterair missions and close air support, to joint operations, and finally to a fully independent service able to conduct strategic strike missions at extended ranges.31 Accord­ing to one detailed Taiwan assessment, the PLAAF had set a goal to be able to conduct an air campaign within a 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) radius of China’s periphery by 2010—one that has not been successful to date—and extend the range to 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles) by 2030.32

The PLAAF has long struggled to assert its relevance within the PLA. In January 1979, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping enshrined airpower as a key component of overall force modernization by stating that “without air superi­ority, success in future war is not possible… give priority to the development of the air force… invest in the aviation industry and air force to ensure air su­periority.” However, as John Lewis and Xue Litai have noted, Deng’s advocacy had a secondary motive, which was to assert his authority over a service that had been perceived to be politically questionable.33

Strategic strike is intimately related to a coercive aerospace campaign. The strategic center of gravity in a coercive aerospace campaign is the opposing lead­ership. Coercive force seeks to affect the amorphous and unquantifiable variable of national will, morale, and resolve, or to manipulate a leader’s decision calcu­lus by ensuring he understands that the costs of continuing a particular course of action outweigh the benefits. The challenge is to shatter the will and morale of an opponent or affect his decision calculus. In theory, an effective aerospace campaign would degrade an adversary’s capabilities to such an extent that suc­cess looks impossible, defeat looks inevitable, further resistance appears futile, and the costs of continuing to resist outweigh the costs of surrendering.34

In a coercive aerospace campaign, PLA observers highlight the utility of well-planned preemptive strikes as a means to shock an opponent, paralyze his ability to conduct operations, and force a political solution soon after initiation of hostilities. PLAAF doctrine stresses rapid mobility, “paralysis warfare” (ЯЙ $), concentration of its best assets, surprise, and pre-emption. A fundamental PLA guiding concept is to compel a political concession swiftly, using only the minimal force necessary.35

A more ambitious offensive air campaign is conceived as having two general phases: first strikes and follow-on strikes. PLA first-strike opera­tions would involve Second Artillery conventional missiles, the concentrated application of the PLAAF’s best assets, as well as aviation assets from other ser­vices. In theoretical operational analysis, first strikes would consist of multiple waves in order to suppress enemy air defenses. This includes preventing key enemy aviation assets from taking off, effectively preventing ground-based air defenses from organizing resistance along specific corridors, and eliminating enemy early warning assets. Achieving air superiority will facilitate follow-on air activity or landing operations.36

Force should be concentrated against those targets whose destruction or suppression would have the greatest strategic and operational effects. Howev­er, planning should take into consideration neutralization of targets that would permit a more permissive environment for follow-on strikes. Flexibility is im­portant, requiring a capable and timely reconnaissance network that can eval­uate results of the first strike. In general, given fundamental economy-of-force considerations, fewer aircraft are needed for follow-on strike operations. One assessment concludes that for deep-strike operations, ballistic and extended – range cruise missiles may be preferable to aircraft in order to avoid the com­plexity of first attaining air superiority and to take advantage of the inherent surprise aspects of missile operations.37

In some circumstances, an offensive air campaign would be the precur­sor to establishment of a coercive “air blockade.”38 As a relatively new mission, an air blockade is viewed by authoritative PRC sources as an effective means to compel an adversary to accede to Beijing’s demands. A blockade could “create internal struggles and societal collapse.” Air blockades involve strikes against ports and navigation routes to shut down air and maritime traffic and cut off contact with the international community as a means to achieve specific po­litical or military objectives. Operations also include efforts to counter an en­emy’s attempt to break the blockade. An air blockade can weaken an enemy’s capacity for operations, or compel him to accede to Beijing’s demands short of war. An air blockade can take many forms, including suppressing air and naval bases, halting land transportation, or, in the case of Taiwan, cutting off traffic in the Strait. An air blockade can be carried out in conjunction with a maritime blockade or quarantine.39

In seeking an independent strategic strike capability, the PLAAF appears to be encroaching upon a conventional mission that the Second Artillery has monopolized for almost two decades. However, the Second Artillery serves in a supporting role in the PLA’s strategy for suppressing adversary air assets on the ground or at sea. Augmenting traditional airpower, Second Artillery assets fa­cilitate the occupation of the air domain and offset weaknesses of the PLAAF. To be sure, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles offer advantages over traditional airpower due to an assured ability to penetrate defenses, ability to prepare and launch with little warning, short time of flight, and lower mission support costs. However, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles are unable to sustain flight, are not reusable after launch, and therefore are relatively inflexible.40

Familiarity with the PLA’s 15-grade and 10-rank structure, which applies to officers and organizations for all the services and branches, is the key to understanding the PLAAF’s organizational structure. The current system became effective in 1988 and is based on ground force terminology. Although this paper refers to the grade and rank system only in passing, it is important to understand the basics of the system as it provides the basis for hierarchical and cross-organizational relationships throughout the PLA.19

According to PLAAF 2010, there are four key differences between the U. S. military and the PLA in terms of their use of grade and rank. First and most importantly, in the PLA, rank is not as important as grade. The PLA uses rank insignia primarily as a visual cue to identify an individual’s approximate sta­tus; military grade is the more accurate reflection of one’s status.20 Second, the PLA assigns billets based on one’s grade, not rank. Third, promotion in grade, not rank, is what determines how one moves up the career ladder. For example, moving from senior colonel to major general while remaining in the same grade is not as important as moving from one grade to the next, even if one retains the same rank. Finally, the PLA assigns every organization, not just officers and billets, a grade, as shown in table 4-1. The grade system is what defines the organizational structure and the relationship among organizations.

Chinese analysts contend that penetrating enemy air defenses to estab­lish corridors through which the main assault forces can reach their targets (kongzhong tufang, ЙФ^ІЙ) is one of the most difficult tasks of the offensive mission. But they also underscore the importance of this task to the success­ful execution of the overall mission.39 Their assessments are heavily influenced by their very high evaluation of the air defense systems of the countries of their most likely prospective adversaries (the United States, Taiwan, and prob­ably Japan), as well as by their concerns about the shortcomings of China’s own forces. Some argue that penetration will be extremely difficult because “presently our main operational targets are the established and tightly inte­grated long, medium, and short range, and high, medium, and low altitude air defense systems.” They also argue that the PLAAF should expect to encoun­ter enemy air defenses with advanced intelligence warning systems, continu­ous 360-degree monitoring of the battlespace, and other features that create an “unprecedented” level of battlespace transparency. All of these, they contend, will make the execution of penetration very difficult.40

In order to penetrate advanced air defenses, Chinese analysts have advo­cated using a combination of “stealth penetrations” and “storm penetrations.” Stealth assaults emphasize deception, concealment, flying at ultra-low levels and a variety of other radar avoidance techniques to avert detection and mislead enemy defenses. Storm assaults involve preceding and escorting the actual attack group with as many as five other groups assigned to such tasks as reconnaissance, electronic interference, air defense suppression, screening, and support.41

To maintain China’s initiative following the initial assault, Chinese ana­lysts urge preparations to launch quick follow-on attacks. They emphasize that this requires very rapid assessment of the damage inflicted by the first wave, which, in turn, places a heavy burden upon all surveillance and recon­naissance assets—air, space, naval, ground, and other assets—to quickly sup­ply data for follow-on assaults.42

Another aspect of the assault that Chinese analysts emphasize is the early and continuous preparation to defeat enemy counterattack operations. In addi­tion to defending the security of key war zone targets, these analysts stress that preparing to block counterattacks is critical to allowing Chinese forces to remain on the offensive and facilitate the overall “smooth progress” of the mission.43

Many individuals deserve credit for ensuring the success of the 2010 International Conference on People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Affairs, particu­larly conference organizers Arthur Ding, Secretary General, Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies; Roger Cliff, Senior Political Scientist of the RAND Corporation; Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chi­nese Military Affairs at the U. S. National Defense University (NDU) Institute for National Strategic Studies; and Michael Swaine, Senior Associate, Carn­egie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP). The conference could not have succeeded without the hard work of Yi-su Yang of the Chinese Coun­cil of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), who superbly managed the travel and logistics arrangements and coordinated meetings with Taiwan and U. S. mili­tary and government officials. The editors would also like to thank Teresa Yen and the staff at the Far Eastern Plaza hotel in Taipei.

The presenters and panelists deserve great credit for taking time from very busy schedules to prepare provocative and thoughtful papers rooted in Chinese sources and rigorous analysis, illuminating the current state and likely future of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The editors would like to thank discus­sants Xiaoming Zhang of the U. S. Air War College, Air University; Richard P Hallion; Paul Godwin, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Benjamin Lambeth, RAND Corporation; Alexander Huang, Tamkang University; and Andrew Erickson, U. S. Naval War College for their comments on individual papers. We are also grateful to panelists Michael Swaine, Sze-Wei Chang, Taiwan Univer­sity of Science and Technology, and David Deptula, RAND Corporation, for their observations on the PLAAF.

This volume also benefited greatly from the questions, comments, and discussions of conference participants, who represented nearly fifty official and unofficial think-tank, academic, political, business, and military organi­zations and associations. In addition to CAPS, CEIP, NDU, and RAND, these included the following:

Academia Sinica

Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation

Alion Science and Technology

American Chamber of Commerce

American Institute in Taiwan Ancer Technology Asia Centre

Australian Commerce and Industry Office Center for Naval Analyses Defense Group Incorporated European Union Centre in Taiwan Foreign Policy Research Institute Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies French Institute in Taipei Genco International, Inc.

German Institute in Taiwan

India-Taipei Association

Institute of Chinese Communist Studies

Israel Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei

Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission

Nanyang Technological University

National Policy Foundation

National Chengchi University

National Taiwan University

Phoenix Satellite Television Ltd.

Project 1049 Institute

Prospect Foundation

Singapore Trade Office in Taipei

Taipei Medical University

Taiwan Brain Trust

Taiwan Legislative Yuan

Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Taiwan National Defense University

Taiwan Society for Strategic Studies

Taiwan University of Science and Technology

Tamkang University

U. S. Air Force Air War College

U. S. Air Force Pacific Air Forces

U. S. National War College

U. S. Naval War College

U. S. Pacific Command

University of New South Wales

Yuan-Ze University.

Richard Hallion would also like to thank Andrew Erickson, Associate Professor, U. S. Naval War College; Xiaoming Zhang, Associate Professor, U. S. Air Force Air War College; Polly Shen, Research Associate, Taiwan Council of Advanced Policy Studies; Maj. Gen. Tsai-mai “Mike” Tien, Superintendent, Taiwan Air Force Academy, Gangshan; Edward Chuang, Chairman, Genco International, Inc.; and Sun Tai Hsiang, Director, Aviation Museum of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Taoyuan International Airport. Each con­tributed to the understanding of China’s aerospace heritage, and to the issues and concerns that are examined in this work.

The editors would like to thank George Maerz (copy-editing), Frank Hoffman, and Jeff Smotherman at NDU Press and Guy Tom (cover design) and Jessica Reynolds (layout) at the Government Printing Office for their hard work in turning the draft manuscript into a finished book. National Defense University Research Analysts Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman and Budget Analyst Debbie Jefferson provided administrative and other support for the conference and subsequent efforts to publish and distribute this book.

A more ambitious and long-term force development airpower concept is “integrated air and space (aerospace) operations” (Й^—Ф). As a preface, definitional and translation issues are important. Air and space have tradition­ally been viewed as separate domains, with “near-space” occupying the realm between the two. Traditional airbreathing platforms operate in accordance with the laws of aerodynamics, and are flexible and responsive. Space systems are governed by orbital mechanics, cover a broader expanse of Earth, and in the case of satellites, offer a more continuous presence. However, with air and space being defined as a single operational medium, and with an emphasis on capabilities that blur the distinction between traditional boundaries, the term aerospace may be more appropriate than “air and space” in describing PLA fu­ture ambitions.

China’s traditional concept of airpower is centered upon air superiority (ФІЙІХ) in support of ground and naval forces. However, due to what is viewed as the near inevitable militarization of space, observers stress the need to view the air and space domains as a single realm.41 Aerospace implies that air and space function as a single, integrated medium. From a Chinese R&D perspec­tive, integrated air and space operations conceptually link two defense indus­trial organizations: aviation (^Й) and space and missiles (ffi^).

At least as early as 2002, opinion leaders called for establishment of a “national aerospace security system” (Й^й^Ф^). The PLAAF appears poised to become the country’s principal custodian of an evolving aerospace defense system.42 As PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang argued in a recent media interview, an integrated approach to aerospace operations is needed to ensure strategic dominance on the sea and ground.43 PLAAF-affiliated analysts out­line intent to leapfrog in the service’s ability to conduct integrated aerospace operations.44 With the concept of aerospace operations still in its infancy, ob­servers note that technological and legal issues constrain the pace of develop – ment.45 Nevertheless, as one senior PLAAF official noted, “space control is a reasonable extension of air control.”46

The PLA’s concept of integrated aerospace operations includes the zone between the atmosphere and outer space, known as “near-space.” Chinese ana­lysts view the near-space realm (often termed the “transatmosphere” in West­ern aerospace thought) as an area of future strategic competition. Near-space is generally characterized as the region between 20 and 100 kilometers (12.4 to 62 miles) above the earth’s surface. The 100-kilometer altitude point, some­times called the Karman Line, is a rough border dividing the earth’s atmo­sphere and outer space. The near-space realm is too high for fighter jets and too low for orbiting satellites, though winged boost-glide craft and high-super­sonic and hypersonic transatmospheric craft such as North American’s X-15 research airplane and Scaled Composites’ SpaceshipOne have transited it.47

Both the PLAAF and Second Artillery indicate their intent to establish space operations as a core competency. While writings assume space assets would naturally support air operations, uncertainty surrounds the role of the PLAAF, Second Artillery, or other entities in managing space operations, in­cluding planning, programming, and budgeting functions; satellite launch, tracking, and control; ground processing; and counterspace operations. An­other possible contentious issue could be future flight vehicles that operate in or transit all domains of space, near-space, and the atmosphere.48

Both the PLAAF and Second Artillery appear to make arguments in favor of organizational control over space-related policy, budget, and peace­time operational control. Today, China’s space assets appear to be controlled by the headquarters-level General Staff and General Armaments Departments. Requirements development and ground processing and analysis of satellite im­agery for military consumers appear to be the responsibility of the General Staff Department Second Department Technology Bureau.49

The PLAAF’s argument is premised upon the concept of integrated aerospace operations, that air and space are a single integrated medium, and that space is a natural extension of air. However, its vision appears set upon control of the entire aerospace domain (f’JS^fX). Senior prominent space and missile industry authorities associated with the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Second Academy appear to advocate on behalf of the PLAAF, arguing that aerospace assets should be concentrated under a single military service, and that a space force should be built upon the founda­tion of an air force, similar to the United States, Russia, and others.50 In addi­tion, the battlespace for air defense operations should be extended beyond the atmosphere and into space and over sea, yet integrated under a single air de­fense command organization.51 In addition to the air force, an internal Second Artillery text references a potential “Second Artillery space operations unit” (“Й^ЙІТіКнРРА) with an operational support function.52

Ownership of satellites now and in the future remains unclear. Products and services, including imagery and communications, are national assets and thus made available for military purposes. Space launch and satellite tracking and control services in peacetime appear to be under the control of the Gen­eral Armaments Department (GAD). However, the PLA likely assumes that satellite assets and perhaps even static space launch facilities could be vulner­able during a conflict. Therefore, prudence dictates that satellite reserves are in place, as well as mobile launchers, most likely derivatives of the DF-21 me­dium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). For logistical reasons, Second Artillery could be a service provider in contingency situations due to its inherent opera­tional responsiveness.

Integrated aerospace defense also includes an ability to counter foreign space-based surveillance, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles, and hyper­sonic aerospace strike vehicles in the future.53 After outlining a 15-year, three – phased missile defense development plan in 1996, China’s space and missile industry conducted successful tests in January 2007 and January 2010, thus demonstrating an ability to intercept satellites in low Earth orbit and rudimen­tary medium-range ballistic missiles during the mid-course portion of flight.54

Insufficient information is available to assess which service would be equipped with aerospace intercept systems once a viable capability is fully operational. Presumably, however, the Equipment Department of either the PLAAF or Second Artillery is overseeing R&D. One analysis explains that the aerospace defense domain would be divided along the Karman Line—the PLAAF would assume the air defense mission for threats below 100 kilometers (62 miles) while the Second Artillery would be responsible for threats above 100 kilometers.55

The PLAAF organizational system includes PLAAF Headquarters (ё¥ / ¥SS¥), seven MRAFs (^ЖЙ¥), four branches (Й#), operational units C№i№hPPA), and logistics support units (й’ШЖВнРРА).22 The PLAAF further divides it into two separate systems based on missions (ft#) and work char­acteristics (Ц^’йШ). The mission-based system is discussed below; the work characteristics system is discussed in the leadership and command section.

The role of PLAAF Headquarters is a crucial one. Unfortunately, no PLA or PLAAF definition or specific information about the overall roles and mis­sions of the headquarters is readily available. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume the role of the headquarters is to conduct “Air Force Building” (Й^Шій).23 Air Force Building includes organizing, manning, educating and training, equip­ping, providing logistics and maintenance support, and providing operational, political, and support policy guidance for the strategic, operational, and tacti­cal levels of conflict to the PLAAF during peacetime and wartime.24 While the Party Committee system limits the role of the commander during peacetime, during wartime the commander enjoys expanded responsibilities and authori­ties consistent with his responsibility for implementing the war plan that the Party Committee has already approved during peacetime.

** The chairman and civilian vice chairman do not wear military rank insignia.

Although the PLAAF and the U. S. Air Force (USAF) are organized com­pletely differently, table 4-2 provides a rough comparison between their head­quarters structures.

According to the Air Force Encyclopedia, the PLAAF’s mission-based systems consist of four components.25 These are the department system (ft^ {ф$і|), which is organized into different types and levels;26 the unit system (SPPA ІФФІ);27 the academic institutions system (ІйЙІФФІ); and the scientific research system (ftW$$[|).

A few air – and spacepower analysts have been increasingly frank in dis­cussing the future role of space orbital attacks as a means of seizing the ini­tiative and rapidly gaining air and space superiority, although the studies reviewed for this chapter also insist that China has an overall peaceful space policy. These analysts have outlined space orbital attacks as an important future means of disrupting, crippling, or destroying an adversary’s satellites and other space-based assets. Some also speculate about more futuristic attacks by space-based weapons. Writing in 2006, analysts Zhang Zhiwei and Feng Chuangjiang recognized the critical connection between control of space and seizing initiative, arguing that space would ultimately become “the true first battlefield” in modern war, with countries using the first wave of attacks to induce satellite paralysis and seize space supremacy.44 Chinese NDU Professor Yuan Jingwei has taken this analysis a step further, spotlight­ing three potential methods of carrying out these space orbital opera­tions: physically destroying satellites and other enemy targets, using lasers, bursts of electromagnetic energy, directed energy weapons, armed satel­lites, or antisatellite/antiballistic missiles; disabling the target’s ability to function, employing low-energy lasers, particle beams, or “space junk”; and even seizing (МЙ) an enemy space vehicle or other target, using one’s own space vehicles.45

Yuan has argued that this type of warfare represents the future of inte­grated air and space combat, and that Russia, the United States, and “every mil­itarily powerful country” are engaged in research on weapons systems for car­rying out space orbital attacks. He maintains that in the future “these attacks will be one of the principal methods of combat for seizing space supremacy.”46 Although Yuan stops short of voicing the obvious policy conclusion, his impli­cation almost certainly seems to be that China must also develop such weapons and capabilities if it is to avoid being left behind.