The Development of the New Air Force

China pursued a “walking on two legs” policy to modernize the air force through purchases of foreign systems and development of domestic technology. China has historically sought to be self-reliant in military produc­tion through either reverse-engineering or incorporating foreign technology. Since the early 1990s, such foreign purchases have been perceived as a stopgap measure for the PLAAF to create a sizeable fleet of fourth-generation aircraft, exemplified by acquisition of the Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30, and co-produced J—11 fighters. After years of effort, the development of domestic systems has borne fruit thanks to the J-10 and JH-7 that have entered service in the PLAAF since 2004. It appears that every year since 2005, one regiment of PLAAF or navy aviation has transitioned into the JH-7A, J-10, and J-11B.33

With its entry into the 21st century, the PLAAF has become smaller. The U. S. Department of Defense reports on Chinese military power registered 5,300 tactical fighters, bombers, and support aircraft in both the PLA Air Force’s and naval aviation’s inventory in 2000. That number declined to 2,300 in 2010.34 As early as 2003, the PLAAF’s operational air divisions had fallen to just 29 divisions, with some of them having only two air regiments.35 Along with this reduction and restructuring, the PLAAF established an additional trans­port division and one special aircraft division, attempting to enhance its long – range airlift and airborne early warning (AEW) capabilities. Thus, although getting smaller, the Chinese air force has become much better equipped and much more technologically sophisticated.36

Like the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force previously, the PLAAF’s leadership seeks to create a mixed force that blends limited quantities of high-performance fighters and larger quantities of less expensive fighters. The ongoing procurement of J-7G and J-8F/H, which are upgraded versions of obsolete second-generation J-7/8s, provides the Chinese air force with less – expensive, less-capable aircraft to serve alongside J—10s and J—11s in a “high/ low” combination.37 One problem which seems to have bothered the PLAAF is that the initially purchased Su-27s and the subsequently assembled Chinese J— 11s are not true multirole fighters capable of supporting the increasingly diverse mission requirements of the PLAAF, particularly the increased empha­sis on offensive as well as defensive roles.38 The real change of its offensive capa­bilities will only come as a significant number of J-10s and J-11Bs enter opera­tional service over the next 5 to 10 years.

For the past 10 years, increasing focus has been placed on informatiza­tion as a leapfrog measure to close the PLAAF’s cyber and electronic warfare (EW) gap with the United States and Western Europe. The development of sophisticated command, control, and communications (C3), or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, has been the PLAAF’s most urgent priority.39 Following earlier experimental trials using an obso­lete Soviet-legacy Tupolev Tu-4 modified with turboprop engines and rudi­mentary search radar in a saucer dome, China has developed two “high-low” versions of an indigenous AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System): the high-end KJ-2000 based on the Russian IL-76MD airframe; and the low – end KJ-200 based on the Y-8F-200 transport platform. These platforms were handed over to the PLAAF in 2005 and 2006, respectively, to coordinate fight­ers and bombers via secure datalinks. Simultaneously, China developed seven other different types of EW aircraft, the High New (Gaoxin) series, likewise based upon the Y-8. Integration of these systems is well underway across the services to increase PLA joint operational capability.40

In retrospect, though the U. S. Government successfully pressured Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon AWACS system to the PLA in 1999, China appears to have pulled together sufficient talents and resources to build its own system despite this seeming setback. The chief engineer and designer of the Chi­nese AWACS project recently claimed that China’s radar technology has reached the same level as that of leading foreign countries and that, in some areas, it is even better.41 Efforts by the United States and European countries to prevent China from obtaining high-tech weapons similarly do not seem to have succeeded.

Yet, the downside of this success in improving the cutting edge of offen­sive and defensive forces has actually worked to delay PLAAF acquisition of transport aircraft and transport-related research and development (R&D). Rus­sia’s failure to deliver 34 IL-76MDs as scheduled in 2008 has kept the PLAAF’s newly created transport division underequipped.42 In the meantime, most of the Y-8 platforms manufactured by Shanxi Aircraft Factory have been committed to the production of the high priority High New series, and development of the Y-9, whose first prototype was begun in 2006, was delayed. (Recently, some sources suggest that the Y-9 project has resumed with first flight expected in 2011). It was not until May 2009 that the new transport division received its first Y-8C aircraft.43 Again, this reflects how the PLAAF is restricted by numerous constraints and obstacles that confront all aspects of its development.