Conventional Air and Space Deterrence Missions

For more than a decade, PLAAF doctrinal writings, defense white papers, and analytical studies have placed increasing emphasis on “deterrence” as one of the PLAAF’s most important missions. The PLAAF’s capability to achieve an important strategic goal of the state such as deterrence—either act­ing independently or as the lead service in joint operations—is an important aspect of what PLA analysts mean when they refer to the PLAAF becoming a “strategic air force” or a “strategic air and space force.”

Recent PLA studies have also argued that conventional air and space forces have become increasingly effective as deterrent forces since the end of the Cold War.12 One part of this contention is that the speed, range, precision and “ferocity” of modern precision-guided munitions make them especially well-suited for deterring hostile behavior by a prospective enemy.13 Chinese analysts argue that these weapons, in addition to their battlefield effectiveness, can have a powerful political effect by dissolving the willpower of the enemy’s civilian population and government to support continued warfare. Some ana­lysts, moreover, have argued that compared to nuclear weapons, conventional air and space weapons are more controllable and flexible, cause less collateral damage, and have fewer or shorter lived aftereffects, all of which make them politically less risky to employ.14 Apparently implicit in this last point is the assumption that the most likely opponent to be targeted by such operations is, itself, a nuclear power.

Toward a ladder of deterrence intensity. Over the past 6 years, in an appar­ent effort to promote China’s capacity for initiative and control in its conven­tional air – and space-deterrence operations, several major studies of air – and spacepower have tried to develop what might be called a “ladder of intensity levels” for deterrence. These studies describe increasingly serious periods or stages in a crisis, and recommend increasingly harsh corresponding actions China could take to signal its military power, preparation, and determination to its prospective adversaries. During peacetime precrisis periods, these include many routine activities associated with China’s buildup of military forces.

At the highest, most intense stages of a crisis, some analysts have even sug­gested the use of actual first strikes as a means of warning an opponent to desist in its actions.

A powerful implicit theme in these discussions of a ladder of deter­rence is that China will be able to maintain control and initiative, selecting among these options based on the nature of the threat it faces. Unpredictable or uncontrollable responses by enemy forces are not addressed.

Low-intensity deterrence operations. During peacetime or the very early stages of a crisis, PLA analysts recommend the use of an array of “low-inten­sity” deterrence operations and activities. These include several gradual, non­violent, noncoercive, and even commonplace peacetime military activities whose purpose is to communicate to a potential enemy the increasing strength of the country’s air – and spacepower, as well as its resolve to use it if need be. Examples include publicizing the country’s air – and spacepower buildup, train­ing and exercises, international arms sales expositions, and testing of new weapons and equipment.15 Analyst Yuan Jingwei of China’s National Defense University (NDU) cites the publicity surrounding a reported 2001 U. S. space warfare exercise as an example, claiming that the exercise was far more valu­able to the United States for its deterrent effect on potential enemies than as an actual military exercise.16

Medium-intensity deterrence operations. During the early or “deepen­ing” stages of crises, analysts recommend undertaking more open and asser­tive deterrent measures. The purpose of these measures is to signal much more forcefully to a potential enemy the strength of China’s capabilities, its inten­tions, and its resolve. Possible deterrent activities might include carrying out realistic exercises and weapons tests, redeploying troops, establishing no-fly zones, or undertaking intrusive patrols or reconnaissance activities.17

High-intensity deterrence operations. Analysts recommend these opera­tions for when “a crisis is intensifying, the enemy is clearly making moves to prepare for real combat, and is clearly plotting to carry out an attack.”18 Their purpose is primarily to communicate will and intention to use force in the event the adversary “stubbornly persists” in offensive actions.19

A few PLA air and space analysts have recently begun to blur any dis­tinction between “deterrence” and “actual combat” by explicitly proposing the possibility of launching first attacks to intimidate potential opponents dur­ing the “high-intensity” phase of a crisis. Analyst Yuan Jingwei of the Chinese National Defense University’s Campaign Education and Research Depart­ment contends that a sharp, initial combat blow should be seen not so much as the initiation of full-scale combat, but rather as a signal designed to get the opponent to back down. “Military deterrence,” Yuan argues, “has gradually become an important form for actually carrying out combat.”20 Widely pub­lished air – and spacepower theorists Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping likewise identify forms of high-intensity and even super-high-intensity deterrence operations in which relatively low-intensity combat operations are used to achieve the goals of strategic and campaign-level deterrence.21 Cai and Tian, as well as PLAAF analyst Min Zengfu, argue that this form of deterrence lies somewhere between “deterrence” and “real combat.”22