Category The Chinese Air Force

One might have expected the ascendance of fighter generals to result in the U. S. Air Force abandoning the concept of airpower as an independent war­winning instrument, but that was not the case. In 1988, Colonel John Warden, an F-15 pilot, published a book entitled, The Air Campaign: Planning for Com­bat, based on a thesis he wrote as a student at National Defense University.59 Warden’s argument in that treatise was reasonably evenhanded, balancing the need for offensive and defensive operations and conceding that in some conflicts the chief use of airpower might be “the destruction—or neutralization through maneuver—of some or all of the enemy’s forces.”60 Nevertheless, the very title of the book ruffled Army feathers in the suggestion that an air campaign might be fought separate from an Army-led joint campaign. To the Army’s growing irrita­tion, Warden’s ideas would soon become much more provocative.

By 1990, Warden had become chief of Checkmate, the Headquarters Air Force strategy analysis center. There, he developed the idea that an enemy state is a system, somewhat akin to a human body, with eyes, nerve centers, a brain, and other subsystems to provide infrastructure, organic essentials, and defense mechanisms. Warden proposed that one need not destroy an enemy’s infra­structure, organic essentials, or even his defenses to defeat him. The most effi­cient way to victory would be to attack selected “centers of gravity” (COGs), key nodes in essential subsystems, particularly the enemy’s brain and nervous system.61 If the correct COGs were struck simultaneously, the enemy system would be unable to adjust to compensate for the failure of multiple functions. It would go into “strategic paralysis” or collapse. Warden asserted that pre­cision weapons had provided airpower the ability to carry out such “parallel attacks” and thereby defeat enemy systems quickly, with less blood and trea­sure expended on both sides.62

Another prominent airpower thinker who emerged in the same era was David Deptula. As a lieutenant colonel, he was Warden’s deputy in Checkmate and, after the latter’s retirement, continued in the Air Force, reaching general officer rank.63 Deptula, who served in Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice’s Secretarial staff group, had been principal author of the service’s Global Reach – Global Power strategic planning framework, issued in June 1990 and subse­quently forming the conceptual framework for the restructuring of the Air Force over the next 3 years. Deptula championed Warden’s ideas and carried them a step forward, emphasizing the need to conduct “effects-based opera­tions”—that is, identifying the correct COGs and striking them to create the system effects Warden advocated, versus striking targets simply to destroy the enemy’s materiel.64

Warden and Deptula got the first test of their ideas in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, which hinted strongly at the conceptual convergence of opera­tional and strategic airpower. At the request of Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General John M. Loh, the Checkmate team developed an air-targeting con­cept called “Instant Thunder” which they believed would be sufficient to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. The Instant Thunder plan entailed rapid, intense attacks on command, control, and communications systems to paralyze Sad­dam’s ability to coordinate his forces and additional attacks on industry and infrastructure targets to compel him to withdraw from Kuwait. Warden briefed the plan to Loh, then to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Pow­ell, and then, at Powell’s request, to U. S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander General Norman Schwarzkopf, who requested that Warden fly to Saudi Arabia and brief the U. S. Central Air Force (USCENTAF) Commander, Lieutenant General Charles Horner.65 Horner accepted elements of the plan as a starting point, but considered it inadequate as it stood, putting its emphasis on the putative coercive effects of strategic attack without considering whether the Iraqi army, if unmolested from the air, might go on the offensive. There­fore, he sent Warden back to Washington, though retaining Deptula in theater to work with USCENTAF planners under the direction of Brigadier General Buster Glosson to flesh out a broader air strategy in support of the USCENT – COM plan for Operation Desert Storm.66

On January 17, 1991, USCENTCOM launched Desert Storm, and for the next 38 days, coalition airpower subjected Iraq to one of the most concentrated aerial bombardments seen in history. Over the first week, air strikes focused largely on strategic targets in the original Instant Thunder plan, dismembering the air defense system and hitting electrical power and command, control, and communications nodes in and around Baghdad. Then the emphasis shifted to interdiction targets and, increasingly, to Iraq’s Republican Guard and regular army forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait.67

On February 24, USCENTCOM launched its ground offensive, follow­ing 38 days of air attack. With AirLand Battle Doctrine guiding U. S. Army operations, airpower was employed in support of coalition ground forces while continuing strategic attacks against Iraqi command, control, and infra­structure targets. The application of combined arms was devastatingly effec­tive. One hundred hours into the ground operation, with Kuwait liberated and Iraqi forces in a desperate rout to escape envelopment in the now famous “Hail Mary” maneuver, all political objectives were accomplished and President George H. W Bush called the offensive to a halt.

Over the years, the PLAAF developed a unique political culture that has not only influenced its development, but is crucial to understanding the Chinese air force. The PLAAF is accustomed to use the Chinese leadership’s instructions and speeches as guidance to define its doctrine, mission, and force structure in order to maintain political support. This PLAAF tradition continues to influ­ence thinking and efforts to pursue development of a modern air force. Despite their long revolutionary experience, Chinese leaders, particularly Mao Zedong, the founder and strategist of the PLA, had no knowledge of air and naval war­fare. Even so, the PLAAF codifies their sporadic instructions as profound mil­itary thought guiding the development of Chinese airpower.14 This approach is attributed partly to traditional Chinese filial piety and partly to the Chinese Communist Party’s highly doctrinaire and centralized institutional system.

At the onset of its establishment, the PLAAF used the chairman’s mes­sage of encouragement to the air force, “creating a powerful air force to elim­inate the remnant enemy [the KMT legacy forces that had evacuated the mainland for Taiwan] and consolidate national defense,” to characterize the air force’s contemporary and future task.15 While recognizing the importance of airpower in national consolidation and development, none of the Chinese leaders offered any systematic thinking on the air force and airpower employ­ment. One common view shared by these political and military leaders was the use of air force to ensure command of China’s airspace through air defense. Although a few of them occasionally talked about the use of bombers to strike deeply into the enemy’s rear positions, they never seemed to imply any offen­sive action beyond China’s own territory.16

Studies of the military thoughts of Chinese leaders on the air force and its employment dominated the PLAAF’s theoretical inquiry. As a result, for most of its existence until recently, no serious efforts were made to explore the differ­ing means of employing airpower within the framework of China’s defense strat­egy. Even now, PLAAF studies still incorporate the military thoughts of these past political leaders in their current pursuit of modern airpower theory. Thus, PLAAF thinking and doctrine are still imbued with the PLAs traditional politi­cal jargon. This at-best pseudoscientific approach accounts for the PLAAF’s fail­ure to ascribe the military thoughts of the earlier leaders to the PLAAF’s long­time perception of itself as a homeland defense force, whose task was, first and foremost, to defend China’s airspace and thus maintain only a limited role and modest capability to support the army and navy.17 The legacy of the Chinese leadership’s minimalist understanding of the actual role that airpower can play is evident in the PLAAF’s self-perpetuating view of itself in an unbroken string of memories about victories and heroism in the past, including a claim that it is the only air force in the world to have ever defeated the USAF. The PLAAF’s self-aggrandizing depiction, however intellectually dishonest it may be, has nev­ertheless become an important component of its service tradition.18

The PLAAF’s Equipment Department and its second-level departments down to the regiment level are responsible for the PLAAF’s equipment man­agement system (^^вИФФІ).117 Historically, the equipment management sys­tem dealt primarily with aircraft maintenance, while the logistics system dealt with nonaviation equipment. For example, the fourth PLAAF department was known as the Aeronautical Engineering Department (КЙІШнР) and then the Equipment Technical Department until 1998.118 In 1998, when the PLA created the General Armament Department, the PLAAF merged support for all equip­ment from birth to death into the Equipment Department. The structure of the current Equipment Department was discussed earlier. The PLAAF equipment management system also includes military representative offices assigned to regions and individual nonmilitary research institutes and factories.119

The Air Force Encyclopedia states that the primary purpose of equipment technical support is to inspect, refurbish, maintain, repair, and

improve the PLAAF’s equipment and weapons systems for all its branches and specialty units.120 These components are managed by the second-level depart­ments within the PLAAF Equipment Department’s system down to the regi­ment level. As noted above, however, some of these functions for aircraft sup­port are incorporated under the field station’s management. Officers involved in this system come from the equipment and technical support career tracks.

Xu’s comment that “the boundary of security should extend to wher­ever there are national interests”6 is firmly rooted in the strategic guidance pro­vided by the PLA under the banner of the “New Historic Missions.” The New Historic Missions were first introduced by President Hu Jintao in 2004—the same year the PLAAF introduced its concept of integrated air and space opera­tions—and ratified by the Communist Party in 2007. They direct the PLA to carry out four missions:

■ Guarantee Chinese Communist Party rule. The PLA is to remain the ultimate backer of the Communist Party.

■ Safeguard the strategic opportunity for national development. The PLA is to serve as a powerful defensive force that can deter aggres­sion against China and protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity so that China may develop economically.

■ Safeguard national interests. The PLA must defend China’s interests, not only within its land borders, territorial waters, and territorial air space, but also in distant waters, outer space, and in the electromag­netic sphere.

■ Play an important role in world peace. China will maintain a defensive military strategy and will participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions and international cooperation on counterterrorism.

The New Historic Missions reflect the Chinese leadership’s intention to have the PLA protect the Communist Party’s and country’s interests by meet­ing the challenges of the 21st century. While the New Historic Missions direct the PLA to continue with its legacy missions of guaranteeing Communist Party rule and maintaining territorial integrity, they expand the PLAs missions in important ways. For the first time, the PLA is directed to defend China’s eco­nomic interests, not only within China’s borders but also in the new areas of distant waters, outer space, and the electromagnetic sphere. In this respect, these missions are partly aspirational, serving as a guide for the development of operational concepts and capabilities.

Space plays two roles in the Historic Missions context, constituting both a domain in which China has interests, and a domain through which China defends its interests. Not surprisingly, China’s interests in outer space are becoming more pronounced and varied as it becomes more vested in space. China’s increasingly robust and varied space program is made up of commu­nications satellites, remote-sensing satellites, and navigation and positioning satellites that not only provide military benefits but also commercial oppor­tunities. Communication satellites can relay voice and television transmis­sions and support credit card transactions. Remote-sensing data can be used in urban planning and environmental studies. Navigation and positioning sat­ellites have given rise to commercial and private navigation products and ser­vices. Outer space also holds vast natural resources, such as those deposited in asteroids or on the surface of the moon. One of the primary reasons for Chi­na’s lunar exploration program is to search for Helium-3, touted as a potential source of clean energy.7

Indeed, a common theme in Chinese writings is that outer space and its associated technologies are of increasing economic value. Chinese space industry representatives cite reports, such as those by The Space Foundation, that revenue from the global space industry increased 7 percent to $261.61 bil­lion in 2009.8 According to one source, the value of a spacecraft and rocket is $150-200 million. If a satellite is lost, not only is there the monetary loss of a satellite that cannot be easily replaced, there is also the loss of the services it provides.9

As a result, space takes on a much more strategic character than its mil­itary applications alone would suggest.10 PLAAF writers assert that if China does not develop space capabilities, it will neither be able to exploit the bene­fits of space nor will it be able to defend itself from threats from countries with strong space capabilities.11 Furthermore, those countries that have strong space capabilities will be able to garner higher international prestige and more influ­ence from which to promote military, economic, science and technology, and cultural interests.12

In fulfilling the Historic Missions, Xu states that the air force will face “numerous difficulties” in “scientifically planning” its innovative develop­ment.13 Indeed, air force analysts state that the service is required to transform itself from being homeland defense-oriented to being offensively and defen­sively capable, from being mechanized to being informatized, from being air – oriented to being air – and space-integrated, and from being a tactical and cam­paign-oriented force to being a strategic force.14

The concept of the PLAAF as a strategic air force was codified at the same time as the New Historic Missions during the 17th Communist Party Congress held in November 2007. The Party Congress called on the PLAAF to strive “to build a modernized strategic air force that will be compatible with the international stature of our country and capable of carrying out the historical mission of our armed forces”15 Being a strategic air force requires the PLAAF to participate in joint operations as well as independent strategic actions to support the military and national development strategy of the country.16 The PLAAF intends to carry out its strategic mission through the use of “integrated air and space operations.”

The dramatic effectiveness of coalition operations in Desert Storm set off a heated debate between U. S. military professionals as to which element of the plan was most responsible for the triumph. The Air Force was ebullient, its sen­timent captured by the U. S. Air Force Historian Richard P Hallion who wrote “Simply (if boldly) stated, airpower won the Gulf war”68 Army leaders, on the other hand, argued that airpower alone had failed to achieve coalition objec­tives—after 38 days of concentrated bombing, Iraqi forces remained in Kuwait until rooted out by ground forces. Even within the Air Force, officers debated whether the war’s successful outcome resulted more from the application of air – power against strategic targets or in support of coalition ground forces before and after the ground offensive began.69 Some maintained that Desert Storm sig­naled the onset of a “military-technical revolution” or “revolution in military affairs” (later simply called, “transformation”), while others argued it was just another benchmark in the evolutionary advance of U. S. military technologi­cal capabilities. But wherever individual airmen stood in the debate, the one thing on which nearly all of them agreed was that airpower had been instru­mental in winning the Gulf War and was destined to be the decisive force in all future conflicts. Afterward, two coercive air operations in the troubled Balkans not only reinforced airmen’s conviction that airpower had become the premier expression of American military might, but also convinced some U. S. politi­cal leaders, for the first time since the Vietnam War, that airpower could be wielded as a potent and convenient instrument of political coercion.

From August 30 to September 14, 1994, NATO carried out Operation Deliberate Force, the air campaign against Serbian forces in the Bosnian civil war. This operation was NATO’s response to a series of Serbian atrocities over the preceding months, which included attacks on UN peacekeepers and the sacking of Srebrenica, and culminated with the August 28 shelling of a Sara­jevo marketplace, killing 37 civilians and wounding 85 others.70 Over the next two weeks U. S. and allied aircraft struck Serbian military positions, allowing a combined ground force of Croatians, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims to make territorial advances against the Serbs and ultimately compelling Ser­bian leaders to accept a NATO-brokered partition plan and enter formal peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio.71 In this case, airpower was applied against oper­ational military forces in a way that created strategic effects.

Four and a half years later, NATO carried out another coercive air cam­paign, Operation Allied Force, in response to Serbia’s refusal to accept UN accords regarding the treatment of Albanian Muslim citizens in Kosovo. In this operation, running from March 24 to June 10, 1999, NATO air forces began by bombing Serbian army units in the province of Kosovo and then, as more strike aircraft arrived in theater, escalated the campaign in intensity and target selec­tion, moving to industrial and infrastructure targets in Serbia proper. After 78 days of bombing, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic withdrew his army and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and agreed to NATO terms. Although Milosevic’s capitulation was undoubtedly influenced by factors in addition to the bombing, airmen were quick to point out that, unlike prior cases, in this episode, conventional airpower had brought an adversary to terms before ground forces were engaged in the fight.72 Here, airpower was applied as an independent instrument, and it only achieved its effect after being redirected from tactical military targets to those historically categorized as “strategic.”

The consistency with which U. S. airpower was successfully employed in the 1990s only added to a growing confidence fostered by advances in technol­ogy during that period, resulting in acceleration in the development of war­fighting theory. The dramatic outcome of the Gulf War had already convinced many analysts that the combined effects of stealth technology and precision weapons had placed the United States on the cusp of a military transforma­tion. In the several years following the Gulf War, the United States crossed additional technological thresholds, adding even more to its military capabili­ties. The global positioning system (GPS) satellite constellation achieved full operational capability in 1995, providing precise position, navigation, and tim­ing data everywhere in the world and empowering a new generation of all­weather precision-guided munitions. Conventional forces were granted much more access to near real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data, providing them greater situational awareness than most adversar­ies they expected to encounter in future wars. And advances in computer net­working, supported by a worldwide, omni-present backbone of satellite com­munications, enabled an ever-increasing ability to network operational forces together to share situational awareness and coordinate their actions in high­speed maneuver warfare. All of this fed a new generation of transformation theory based on concepts of network-centric warfare (later called net-centric warfare or NCW) in which every platform would be a sensor and all operators would share information in near real-time.

Network-centric warfare marked a further convergence of airpower thought. It was theorized that command-and-control hierarchies would flat­ten to accelerate decisionmaking and flexibility, thereby maximizing the abil­ity to respond to rapid changes in the operational environment.73 Whether this is so, advocates and critics alike have since argued that such flattening would also effectively erase the lines between the operational and strategic levels of war. Strike aircraft directly supporting surface forces would create strate­gic effects. Aircraft striking strategic targets, such as command-and-control nodes, would often do so to inhibit the enemy’s ability to coordinate its mili­tary forces, thereby creating operational effects. All the while, networked sen­sors and communications would empower command authorities to monitor tactical operations in real-time and govern them directly whenever they chose to do so.74

These ideas had profound implications for the concept of airpower. As airpower is the most flexible, responsive, and far-ranging means of applying kinetic force, it would constitute the primary strike element of NCW in all applications across the breadth and depth of the battlespace. Airpower is fun­gible in target selection—strike assets tasked to service operational targets can be re-tasked against high-priority strategic targets en route when network sen­sors detect perishable intelligence on their whereabouts. In fact, strikers can be tasked against operational and strategic targets in the same sortie and can even launch before tasking and take target direction en route or while loitering in the battlespace. In the NCW concept, operational and strategic applications of airpower converge as one. Airpower as a concept was finally approaching unity… at least in theory.

The West tends to see the PLA as having too much autonomy in China’s civil-military relations. In fact, as commanders of a Party-controlled armed service, senior PLA leaders, socialized by the unique Party-army relationship that has also rewarded them with promotion to the higher ranks, are unlikely to seek greater autonomy. Thus the PLAs political culture subordinates the military to the Party leadership for decisions at the time when the use of force is considered. It is interesting to note that Chinese military thought today still regards the primary use of airpower as deterrence, deferring to the political leadership sole authority to determine whether, in fact, airpower should be used. The role the air force can play is thus more as a tool to serve national pol­icy than as a component of national policymaking.

There have been three major occasions in the PLAAF’s history during which the Chinese leadership has had to contemplate the employment of the air force and airpower beyond Chinese-controlled territory. The first was during the Korean War in February 1952. In that case, Zhou Enlai personally cancelled a PLAAF bombing mission aimed at Kimpo airfield near Seoul only minutes before takeoff. Zhou feared a Chinese raid south of the 38th parallel would upset an implicit mutual understanding that the United States would not extend its bombing campaign north beyond the Yalu River into Chinese territory.19

The second incident occurred during 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis when the Chinese leadership was very uncertain about the PLAAF’s strike capability. Again, Zhou raised concerns about potential Nationalist bombing retaliation against the mainland should the PLAAF undertake an air bombardment of Jin – men island. He felt that the inability of the PLAAF to reciprocate by bombing Taiwan in return would signal Chinese weakness to the world. He thus strongly advised the CMC not to bomb Jinmen.20

The last came during China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979, when the PLAAF engaged in a brief combat action against its southern neighbor. Despite several instances where the PLA ground forces requested air support, Beijing authorities refused to grant such permission lest the use of airpower escalate the conflict; instead, the General Staff ordered the army to rely exclusively on artillery fire support.21

These three episodes merit careful analysis for any inquiry into what role the PLAAF could potentially play in national policymaking. Political con­cerns and the insufficient capability of the air force constitute the true reason for the PLAAF to have undertaken no offensive roles in military actions since its establishment. Further examination suggests that the real problem was the Chinese leadership’s failure from the creation of the PRC in 1949 to appreci­ate the centrality of airpower in modern warfare and, hence, the critical role it could play. The PLAs subsequent war experience in Korea seemingly con­firmed the leadership’s position that airpower could have, and in fact had, only little impact on the victory claimed by China in that war. We should thus not be surprised that Chinese political and military leaders have long maintained the view that war will continue to be conducted in the context of dominant ground operations, with airpower used in a supporting role, to supplement the power of the army.

Furthermore, given their confidence in the human factor—that men could overcome weapons, a belief reinforced by their own guerrilla war expe – rience—Chinese leaders were convinced that their ground forces could over­whelm any opponent and win any war. Consequently, the PLAAF had long argued that ground operations would determine the air force’s contribution to final victory. The development of such thinking was supported by the objective reality confronting the PLAAF. While the PLAAF was one of the world’s larg­est air forces, its equipment was outdated, limited in capability, and not even equal to that of some countries surrounding China. Since the creation of the PLAAF, to address technological deficiencies and maintain the air force’s over­all combat capabilities, China favored an air force based on quantity instead of quality.22 When it did engage in aircraft development, the aircraft produced were outright copies or simple derivatives or extrapolations of Soviet designs such as the Ilyushin Il-28, Tupolev Tu-16, and the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG – 17, -19, and -21.23 The sheer numerical superiority of the PLAAF compared to its potential regional opponents convinced the Chinese that the PLA had built an adequate and credible air defense force capable of deterring and, if neces­sary, resisting any attack into Chinese air space.

Such a view was shattered by the dominant role airpower played in Desert Storm and the military conflicts since the 1991 Gulf War. Even so, one political legacy remains: the latest PLA campaign theory holds that the employment of airpower is more a political matter than a military one, sub­ordinate to the needs of China’s political and diplomatic struggles. If its use is required, it will be the political, not military, leadership that will make the decision. This perhaps explains why the development of the air force still requires the personal involvement of the Chinese political leadership.24 The question remains whether fourth – and fifth-generation Chinese political leaders, unlike their predecessors, will not hesitate to throw the air force into harmful situations.

The PLAAF’s personnel management system (A#®l) consists of sepa­rate organizations for the officer (cadre) corps and the enlisted force. The Polit­ical Department’s Cadre Department down to the regiment level is responsible for managing officer records, promotions, and appointments.121 Meanwhile, the Headquarters Department’s Military Affairs Department is responsible for managing the enlisted force records and appointments, while the political offi­cer system is responsible for gathering information on the enlisted personnel, and the Party Committee system is responsible for their promotions. One key point is that the PLAAF does not have a central promotions board. Instead, the Party Committee at the corps to regiment levels is responsible for promoting all officers and enlisted personnel at the next lower level.122 One of the reasons for this is that most personnel remain in the same unit most of their career.

The Air Force Encyclopedia has several entries for the PLAAF’s mobiliza­tion system (ййІФФО reserve forces (й^ЛИШ).123 The PLAAF’s mobiliza­tion system consists of an air force mobilization organization and reserve forces, which support the air force’s reserve power transition from peacetime to wartime, and for its personnel, materials, and financial power to serve operations.124 In the 1950s, the PLAAF created a Mobilization Division (^M&) within the Head­quarters Department and a similar organization in each Headquarters Depart­ment down to the regiment level. In 1998, however, the PLAAF abolished all of these organizations and placed the mobilization responsibility under the Military Affairs Department within the Headquarters Department. In 2002, the Mobiliza­tion Department created an Air Force National Defense Mobilization Committee Comprehensive Office (^¥ВК^М©М#Іт^&&Й) to manage mobilization issues. This office coordinated with the air forces Military Affairs Departments, as well as local governments and army units from the military district level down.125 PLAAF mobilization includes expanding the size of units, as well as mobilizing troops and their equipment, furnishing logistics support, and providing technical service support.126 It is not clear how much the PLAAF has been involved in mobi­lization work. Shortly after a new National Defense Mobilization Law became effective in July 2010, however, the PLAAF conducted its first-ever mobilization exercise involving militia using construction equipment to repair a “damaged air­field following a surprise enemy attack.”127

The concept of PLAAF reserve forces is fairly new. The PLAAF translates the terms houbei (й#) andyubeiyi ffiWix) as “reserve,” causing confusion when using only the English term. Houbei is a generic term for reserve forces includ­ing personnel, equipment, technology, civilian aircraft, and materials. Various definitions imply that PLAAF yubeiyi reserve personnel are part of the houbei system.128 In 2004, the PLAAF began developing reserve forces in three particu­lar areas: field station flight support personnel, surface-to-air missile regiments, and radar battalions. In January 2010, the PLAAF issued “Air Force Reserve Unit Work Regulations” codifying the changes in its organizational structure.129

Implications of the PLAAF Organizational Structure upon Its Future Development

As has been explicated, the PLAAF’s organizational structure has multiple components and layers, many of which overlap, generating redundancies. From an overall perspective, the structure has not changed appreciably over the past 30 years. While some organizations and departments have been abolished or merged as a result of force reductions, the remaining ones have stayed largely intact, serv­ing the needs of the service even as the world around it has changed dramatically.

Perhaps because of this unchanging quality, it is invariably significant— and thus important to note—when a change does occur. For example, when the PLAAF downgraded all the corps leader-grade headquarters in 2004 to either corps deputy leader-grade or division leader-grade CPs, it altered the com­mand structure vertically within the PLAAF and horizontally with the other services. Specifically, under the new structure, the division leader-grade CPs cannot command an air division, which is at the same level, or interact as an equal with a group army, which is a corps-level organization. Even the corps deputy leader-grade CPs are still not at the same level as the group armies. The PLAAF is still working out the mechanics of this major change.

Unsubstantiated reports out of Hong Kong have indicated the PLA may undergo a major restructuring to replace the seven MR Headquarters with four theater commands.130 In addition, since the PLA has already had 10 major force restructurings since the early 1950s, the last of which occurred in 2004, there is a good possibility another downsizing will occur before or shortly after the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Either or both of these events will most likely alter the PLAAF’s force structure, especially the MRAF Headquarters, with major implications for the PLAAF’s overall command and control structure.

In terms of its air order of battle, the PLAAF has reduced the num­ber of air divisions from a high of 50 in the late 1980s to 29 today. This reduction occurred in conjunction with a drop in the total number of aircraft, the incorporation of newer models, and establishing a transition training base in each of the seven MRAFs in 1986. While some air divisions today field more than one type of combat aircraft, most regiments have only one type so as to simplify logis­tics and maintenance. The new units are still in the early stages of conducting dis­similar aircraft training, but the diverse organizational structure within each air division has made it easier to do. Given the current distribution of air divisions among the seven MRAFs, the number of divisions will probably remain the same over the next decade, but the composition and number of subordinate regiments will probably change as older aircraft are taken out of the inventory and replaced by a fewer number of modern multirole aircraft.

It is not clear how many SAM units, especially long-range SAMs, the PLAAF has, but the number is apparently growing and the units are being deployed in more MRAFs.

Another important example of change is that the PLAAF has gradually incorporated its electronic countermeasures mission and organizational struc­ture with the radar forces. Significantly, the PLAAF Headquarters merged man­agement of the two types of specialty forces into an Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department subordinate to the Headquarters Depart­

ment and combined research for them into the Air Force Radar and Electronic Countermeasures Research Institute under the Air

Force Equipment Research Academy. In addition, the Air Force Radar College has an Electronic Countermeasures Academic Department that provides

education and training for officers and NCOs assigned to operational unit elec­tronic countermeasures billets. Besides merging radar and ECM administrative and research functions as noted above, the PLAAF began merging several radar regiments into brigades during the 2003-2004 force restructuring. Although it is now easier to command more company-level radar sites as a result of information technology, the PLAAF is still concerned about span of control from a geographic perspective. Restructuring of the Equipment Department in 1998 and creation of the Equipment Research Academy in 2004 have had important implications for consolidating and managing all of the PLAAF’s equipment and weapons systems. No significant organizational changes are anticipated to these two organizations in the next 5 years. That said, however, the biggest change within this system will be the inclusion of new officers and enlisted personnel who received their undergrad­uate education at civilian academic institutions rather than PLAAF institutions.

The education and training system will most likely undergo some more restructuring over the next decade. The Air Force Engineering University was created in 1999 and the Air Force Aviation University was created in 2004 with the goal of consolidating basic education for cadets in specific fields and then providing specialty training at subordinate colleges. In addition, the Guilin Air Force College, which had always trained AAA cadets, began educating and training the PLAAF’s airborne officer cadets in 1999. Given that the goal was to have 60 percent of all new PLAAF officers in 2010 graduate from civilian colleges, including from the Defense Student Program, and that the PLA most likely did not meet this goal, the PLAAF’s academic institutions will most likely undergo some more restructuring as the number of cadets is reduced to meet the 60 percent goal.131

Finally, the PLAAF does not have an extensive reserve program, a cir­cumstance which most likely will not change over the next few years. However, following the implementation of the new National Defense Mobilization Law in July 2010, the PLAAF most likely will become more involved in mobilizing civilian organizations to support it. At the same time, however, the PLA has implemented some personnel changes that have allowed PLAAF flag officers to assume a few key national-level leadership positions as shown in table 4-7.

To put narrative to these data points, in 2003, the CMC appointed Lieu­tenant General Zheng Shenxia to become the first air force commandant of the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS).132 He received his third star in 2004. Upon his retirement in 2007, another PLAAF flag officer, Lieutenant General Liu Chengjun, assumed his position, receiving his own third star in 2010. Since 2004, the commander of the PLAAF (along with the commander of the PLA Navy and Second Artillery) has been a member of the CMC—the national command authority for the PRC. General Qiao Qingchen was appointed in 2004 and was replaced by Xu Qiliang in 2007. Only two PLAAF officers, Liu Yalou (1956-1965) and Zhang Tingfa (1977-1982), had previously served as CMC members. Since 2006, the CMC has assigned the first PLAAF offi­cers as commandant and political commissar at the National Defense Uni­versity. In 2006, the CMC appointed Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian as the first PLAAF officer to serve as commandant.133 In 2007, Ma became one of the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff with the important portfolio of intelligence and foreign affairs for the entire PLA. He received his third star in 2010 and will most likely have to retire in 2012. In 2010, the CMC appointed Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou as the first PLAAF officer to serve as NDU political com­missar. Prior to that, he was one of the PLAAF’s deputy political commissars.

Since 2006 (and as shown in table 4-7), the CMC has appointed PLAAF flag officers as one of the three or four deputy directors in the GPD and one of the four or five deputies in the GLD.134 As a result, the PLAAF is increasingly involved in developing PLA-wide policies to a greater degree than in the past; however, these do not appear to be permanent air force billets. For example, in 2006, Lieutenant General Li Maifu became the first PLAAF deputy director of the GLD. However, when he retired in late 2009 or early 2010, it does not appear that he was replaced by a PLAAF officer.135 No PLAAF (or PLAN) officers have served as a deputy in the GAD, which implies that the GAD is less “joint” than the other three general departments. Each MR Headquarters has an average of five deputy commanders. Since 1988, each MRAF commander and fleet commander has served concurrently as an MR deputy commander; however, no PLAAF offi­cers have served as the director of an MR first-level department and only a few PLAAF personnel apparently hold positions in any of the departments.136

Based on this history, if the PLA does restructure its Military Region system into strategic theaters, there is a high probability army officers will still dominate the leadership positions in the Central Military Commission, Gen­eral Departments, and Theater Headquarters, while PLAAF officers will rotate in and out as the head of the Adademy of Military Science and the National Defense University. The PLAAF will make its way onward into the 21st cen­tury, aided—and encumbered—by its unique and ever-fascinating organiza­tional structure and culture.

Xu’s call for the air force to establish a concept of “air and space security” is directly related to its strategy of integrated air and space operations. Inte­grated air and space operations refer to the organic combining of airpower and spacepower to form an integrated air-space force. According to PLAAF ana­lysts, the air and space battlefield is the main domain for information collec­tion in which the space component plays an important role. Spy satellites, for example, can legally conduct reconnaissance over other countries. Navigation satellites can provide accurate positioning data. Communication satellites can provide global communications support.17 In addition, seizing air and space superiority prevents the enemy from gaining strategic air and space superior­ity.18 According to two prominent PLAAF researchers, “military activities in the air and space battlefield have already matured into the main military force of high technology local wars.”19

Research on integrated air and space operations began in 1990 when Dong Wenxian at PLAAF Headquarters proposed “the control of high-altitude three-dimensional territorial airspace”—a euphemism for operations in outer space.20 In 2000, a project championed by the President of the Air Force Engi­neering University, Major General Cai Fengzhen, was initiated with Senior Colonel Tian Anping as the project lead. This project was inspired by a book published by the PLA Navy (PLAN) entitled Looking Toward the Pacific (Й^ ¥>¥Ш). These researchers realized that while the navy was extending its look horizontally, the air force had to extend its look vertically, to outer space.

This project resulted in two monographs entitled The Air and Space Bat­tlefield and China’s Air Force (Й^К±^ФНЙ¥) published in 2004, and Inte­grated Air and Space Operations Studies (Й^—ФІТК^) published in 2006. At the same time, in 2003, Li Rongchang (Dean of the Telecommunications Engineering School at the Air Force Engineering University) published Inte­grated Air and Space Information Operations (Й^—ФІШ^ТТК), as one of the projects of the air force’s 10th Five-year Plan for military theory research. Since then, researchers at the Air Force Command College, including Wang Ming – liang (Deputy Department Head of Research), Ji Yan (Deputy Director of the Institute’s Strategic Research Office), and strategist Major General Qiao Liang, among others, have also researched integrated air and space operations.21

Integrated air and space operations are defined differently by various sources, but all involve the integration of battlespace, forces, and activities. A 2003 article defines integrated air and space operations as:22

air forces, structure, and operational activities integrating aviation and space, air defense and space defense. Integrated air and space warfare refers to aviation and space offensive and defensive equipment merged into one to conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive operations. It includes aircraft, cruise missiles, and to different degrees includes ballistic missiles, satellites, orbiting space stations, and space planes. At the same time it includes aviation interceptors, all types of ground-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, and new concept weapons such as high power lasers, high power microwave weapons, and particle beam weapons.

The Air Force Informatized Work Office and the Air Force Informatized Expert Advisory Committee, in the book Air Force Informatized Knowledge: Concept Volume, define integrated aerospace operations as:

integrated aviation and space forces in the atmosphere and outer space as well as related terrestrial integrated operations. Its characteristic is “three integrations” under a unified command, namely the integration of oper­ational space, operational forces, and operational activities.

1. Integration of operational space. Although physical differences exist between the atmosphere and outer space, there is no defi­nite line that distinguishes them. The air and space battlefield is a seamless whole that is an integrated battlefield in which different platforms and methods can be used to carry out identical military activities.

2. Integration of Operational Forces. The organization, training, and command and control of aviation and space forces are basi­cally the same. It includes using aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, satellites, space stations, space planes, interceptors, bal­listic missiles, spacecraft, missiles, kinetic energy weapons, and lasers. Space forces are responsible for global reconnaissance, seiz­ing the information initiative, launching spacecraft, and achieving space supremacy.

3. Integration of operational activities. The integration of aviation and space operations as well as ground forces that directly support aviation and space forces.

The authors of Strategic Air Force offer a similar definition in which air and space integration refers to integration of aviation and space in terms of structure, and the management of air defense, missile defense, and space defense in order to build a “new concept air force” made up of air and space forces. The integration of air and space is based on the lack of a boundary between the atmosphere and space, which leads the authors to conclude that an air and space integrated force is inevitable from the standpoint of technol­ogy, operations, environment, and experience.23

According to Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping, integrated air and space operations are “operations in which aviation and space forces are the main operational components. It includes other operational forces related to inte­grated air and space operations and is represented by joint operations in the air and space battlefield”24 In another venue, these authors define the air and space battlefield as an “integrated and information-oriented land (sea), air, and space battle arena, which fully connects organizationally fused and organically com­bined space and aerospace and related capabilities in the domains of the sur­face of the Earth, and the land (sea).”25 Cai and Tian also describe the air and space battlefield as the principal battlefield.26

These various definitions, if differing somewhat in scope and precision, nevertheless present important common and cohesive themes regarding the integration of the air and space battlespace and the integration of air and space forces and operational activities.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, put the United States in a quandary. An elusive nonstate actor based in Afghanistan, a country very difficult for the United States to reach with conventional military power, had confronted the Nation with deadly force. When Taliban authorities in Kabul refused to arrest and extradite Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, the Bush administration decided that the United States would use military force to impose regime change on Afghanistan and bring the terrorists to jus­tice. But that raised the question of how it could do that in a timely manner in a region of the world that was so inaccessible. After considering the options, U. S. leaders decided to conduct an air campaign against the Taliban and send paramilitary and special operations forces to fund and advise the Northern Alliance—a collection of militant factions that had for several years waged an unsuccessful civil war—and provide them air support in an effort to change the balance of power in Afghanistan.75

The campaign was a rapid success. On October 7, 2001, Operation Enduring Force began with airstrikes against air defense, command-and-con – trol, and other military targets in and around Kabul. Over the next 2 weeks the target list expanded, and on October 28, with heavy U. S. air support, the Northern Alliance launched a major offensive, which culminated on Novem­ber 13 when the Taliban was driven out of Kabul. U. S.-led military operations continued the rest of that year and into the next to mop up fleeing enemy forces and pockets of resistance, but unfortunately, bin Laden and other key al Qaeda and Taliban leaders evaded capture.76

Airpower continued its triumphal performance in conventional opera­tions. When the Bush administration later decided to impose regime change on Iraq, the successful use of airpower in support of indigenous forces in Afghan­istan prompted a debate about whether to use a similar approach against the Baathist regime. Kurdish factions in northern Iraq had challenged Baghdad authority for years, and some analysts argued that, empowered by U. S. mili­tary advisors and airpower, the Kurds could defeat Saddam’s forces just as the Northern Alliance had defeated the Taliban.77 Further study, however, con­vinced U. S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the Iraqi army was too large and heavily armed for the Kurds to defeat by themselves, even with U. S. air support. Therefore, while he did agree to provide Kurdish forces U. S. advisors and air support to engage the Iraqi forces in the northern sector of the country, Rumsfeld ordered USCENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks to plan a conventional invasion of southern Iraq to defeat the main force of the Iraqi army and capture Baghdad.

Once again, U. S. leaders wanted to move more quickly than a typical deployment would allow. Even before September 11, Rumsfeld had reviewed Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1003-98, the standing war plan for Iraq, and found it unsatisfactory. Largely a replay of the first Gulf War, it called for a time­consuming deployment of about half a million troops. The Secretary worried that such an approach would allow Saddam time to manipulate world opin­ion against the United States and also threaten U. S. forces and regional friends with weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, his instructions to Franks called for an innovative plan employing a much smaller force focusing on speed, surprise, and shock. The objective would be to quickly decapitate Iraq—that is, either kill Saddam and other key Baathist leaders, or sever their ability to com­mand and control their forces—and so shock the regime that it would collapse, capitulate, or fall to a popular uprising.78

Sixteen months after planning began, time consumed largely in efforts to raise a coalition and get UN approval for the use of force, U. S. and coali­tion forces executed Operation Iraqi Freedom. On March 18, 2003, a day after President Bush issued a 48-hour ultimatum, U. S. leaders received intelligence that Saddam was staying at Dora Farm, one of his properties outside Bagh­dad. The President authorized a strike on that location, which was carried out with Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions dropped from F-117 fighters, on March 19, immediately after the ultimatum expired. Saddam was not at Dora Farm when the strike occurred. The ground invasion began on March 20, and the full-fledged air attack kicked off about 12 hours after that.79

The air strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom supported the Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine-based ground scheme of maneuver and also strongly reflected Warden’s theory that parallel attacks would cause strategic paralysis, the general principle of which, by then, had been accepted as U. S. Air Force doctrine. According to Bob Woodward, who interviewed White House and Pentagon officials after the war, planners organized the targets for kinetic, elec­tronic, and information attacks into nine prioritized groups according to what they believed to be Iraq’s centers of gravity. Strikingly similar to the five-ring diagram that Warden used to prioritize the COGs in his theory, the nine COG categories identified for Iraqi Freedom were:80

■ The leadership, the real inner circle of Saddam and his sons, Uday and Qusay

■ Internal security and the regime intelligence, including the close-in ring of bodyguards in the Special Security Organization (SSO); the command, control, and communications network

■ Weapons of mass destruction infrastructure

■ Missile production, maintenance, and delivery capability

■ The Republican Guard divisions and the Special Republican Guard that protected Baghdad

■ Land territory inside Iraq where pressure could be exerted such as the northern Kurdish area that was effectively autonomous

■ The regular Iraqi army

■ Iraqi commercial and economic infrastructure; and the diplomatic infrastructure abroad that included Iraqi agents working out of their embassies

■ The civilian population.

As was the case in Afghanistan, the major combat operation against Iraq in March and April 2003 was a rapid success. Although the parallel attacks nei­ther caused Iraqi leaders to capitulate in shock nor paralyzed their ability to command and control their forces, the heavy aerial bombardment in coordina­tion with the rapid mechanized advance of coalition ground forces had devastat­ing effects on Iraqi regular and paramilitary forces. With Iraqi forces destroyed from the air whenever they attempted to mass and decimated by ground attack whenever they dispersed, coalition ground forces easily overcame all resistance in their drive to Baghdad. The operations plan had projected up to 125 days of “decisive combat operations” to defeat Iraq, but U. S. Marines were helping Iraqi citizens pull down a statue of Saddam in downtown Baghdad on April 9, only 20 days after the invasion began.81 Three weeks after that, on May 1,2003, President Bush declared Operation Iraqi Freedom successfully accomplished.

Fighting amorphous groups of unconventional adversaries poses its own frustrations. One could argue that stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have gone almost as poorly as the major combat operations of 2001 and 2003 went well. While analyzing the many problems encountered in those efforts is a challenge beyond the reach of this paper, it is worth considering the frustrations that they have presented to the U. S. and allied air forces involved. Counterin­surgency, stability, and nation-building operations are intrinsically ground­intensive efforts, with Army and Marine forces taking the lead. But military leaders have occasionally resorted to using air strikes with precision munitions against known or suspected terrorist safe houses, sometimes in urban areas, in efforts to kill key enemy leaders. Unfortunately, such actions have often proven counterproductive, with civilian casualties publicized on CNN and al Jazeera, radicalizing sympathetic Muslims locally and abroad, thereby fueling further unrest and violence.82

Starting about 2004, as sectarian violence and insurgencies began to gain momentum in Iraq and Afghanistan, U. S. Air Force leaders became increas­ingly interested in finding ways that airpower could be used more effectively in support of efforts to stabilize those countries. After tasking the RAND Cor­poration to study the issue, they were informed that history has shown that insurgencies are rarely won by outside powers; therefore, the best roles the U. S. Air Force could play in counterinsurgency operations, in addition to provid­ing airlift and ISR support to coalition ground forces, would be in advising, training, and equipping partner air forces.83 Such advice is a hard pill to swal­low for a military institution whose doctrine has historically emphasized win­ning the Nation’s wars through the lethal application of airpower.

The early 1990s awakened the PLAAF to the realization that China had fallen far behind the West in both technology and doctrinal thinking about air – power. Time and space were no longer the allies of those who were once so con­fident that China’s existing air defense systems could prevent any attacks deep into the nation’s heartland. Serious doubts were raised about the traditional interpretation of China’s defense capabilities, including the common belief that an inferior force could overcome a superior enemy. Drawing on lessons learned from Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, the Chinese central military leadership pointed out that “a weaker force relying solely on the defensive would place itself in the position of having to receive blows,” and that only by “taking active offen­sive operations” could the weaker force now seize the initiative.25

China’s evolving security interests, including the longstanding prospect of a decisive confrontation with Taiwan, also favored consideration of aug­menting the PLAAF’s offensive capabilities. Since 1993, Beijing has adopted a new military strategy, placing an emphasis on fighting and winning a future regional war under high-technology conditions along China’s periphery. The momentum of the independence movement in Taiwan was simultaneously viewed as an increasingly serious challenge to China’s sovereignty and secu – rity.26 The central military leadership made the proper readjustment to the air force’s strategic missions, requiring it to maintain strong capabilities not only for defensive operations, but also for offensive ones.

The air force’s new mission requirements include securing air dominance over China’s own airspace, supporting the army and the navy, and directing paratrooper operations, as well as carrying out independent air campaigns. In an offensive campaign, it should be able to launch attacks against the enemy’s air assets on the ground in a potential local conflict along China’s coast.27

In early March 1999, Jiang Zemin, former secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and president of China, explicated the air force’s stra­tegic objective: to transform gradually from a homeland air defense force to one that was capable of both defensive and offensive operations. He then charged the air force to “bear the brunt of, and be employed throughout the entire course” of the conflict, and “to complete certain strategic missions independently.”28 To achieve these objectives, China later that year adopted a three-step implementa­tion strategy for air force development over the next several decades.29

According to its 2008 Defense White Paper, China expected to lay a solid foundation for the development of the PLA into a more high-tech and more balanced network-centric joint force by 2010, to accomplish mechanization and make major progress in informatization by 2020, and to reach the goal of modernizing national defense and the armed forces by the middle of the 21st century.30 This constituted a logical follow-on to a strategic vision the PLAAF introduced in 2004. That year, the PLAAF enunciated a new strategic vision calling for the development of a long-range strategic air force and the active involvement of integrated air and space (Й^—Ф) operations with information and firepower systems (®,Л®Л_Ф).31

Under the guidance of such a developmental strategy, the PLAAF embarked on a two-stage transformation. The first stage is laying a framework for a force capable of both offensive and defensive operations by increasing the number of high-performance offensive aircraft, combat support aircraft, and advanced surface-to-air missile systems. The second stage is wielding fighter air­craft, surface-based defense, and command, control, communication, and intel­ligence elements into an integrated operational system that is able to conduct both air offensive and defensive operations under “informatized” conditions.

The development of China’s air force capabilities focuses on four areas:32

■ offensive capability to protect national security and national interests from the air and space

■ integrated air defensive and antimissile capability for monitoring both air and space flying objects and attacking them

■ superior capability over its main opponent (presumably Taiwan) and certain counter-information capability against its strategic opponent (presumably the United States)

■ strategic airlift capability to conduct both airlift and airdrop opera­tions.