Category THE RED BARON’S. LAST FLIGHT

The authors of this book gave the Graham/Downs and the Sinclair/Nixon post mortem reports to a highly experienced pathologist who lives in Grimsby, Ontario. Canada. He studied them for some time, discussed them with colleagues and gave the following opinion in non-medical terms which is reproduced below with his kind permission:

There is a noticeable difference in the degree o f medical detail documented in the first two post-mortem examinations.

Without the precise descriptions of the location of the entry wound and of the exit wound given by Colonels Sinclair and Nixon, l could not have determined either of the two possible paths of the bullet. The ribs slope downwards and by themselves are imprecise reference points. The Colonels, by stating that the entry wound was just ahead of where the ninth rib crosses the posterior axillary line, have pin-pointed its position. Similarly, the male nipple, in the vertical plane it is normally on the fifth rib. However, in the horizontal plane its position varies widely from man to man.

The entry and exit wounds as described would place the path of the bullet through the vital organs o f the thorax. The bullet most lihely punctured the aorta if it passed posteriorly fdog-legged via the spine/ or the heart if it passed anteriorly Istraight through I. If we also take into account that the bullet was tumbling as it passed through the body, the injuries would indeed be devastating. The expected result would be massive internal and external haemorrhage.

Regardless of whether this injury caused immediate death or not, it would certainly cause immediate severe functional impairment. It is extremely unlikely for an aircraft pilot with such an injury to retain the ability to control an aircraft in the skilful fashion described by witnesses on the ground.

In summary, the severity of MvR’s injury would be expected to cause profound functional impairment especially including the co-ordination of the eyes with the hands, and death within a matter or seconds, not minutes.

Dr. Jose Segura MDCM (McGill) Pathologist.

Doctor Segura then mentioned a point that had just occurred to him. The type of wound suffered by von Richthofen would most likely result in an immediate spasm of muscular contraction. Such spasms have been mentioned by Lothar von Richthofen (Manfreds brother – 40 victories in WW1 – who survived the war but died in a crash in 1922), by Arthur Gould Lee MC, (later Air Vice-Marshal) and others. This agrees with Private Wormald’s statement: ‘When the Baron was hit, the Triplane began to climb steeply,’ and with Sergeant Derbyshire’s: ‘The Triplane seemed to run into a brick wall.’

Von Richthofen’s reaction to pull back on the stick, and probably move it to the right also – the roll to the right as observed – would logically have been the same at whatever map location the bullet struck him. However, according to Brown, von Richthofen’s response to his burst of fire (‘He went down vertical’) was the exact opposite of the expected initial effect of such a wound. This is a statement of profound significance because it confirms medically that von Richthofen’s fatal wound was not acquired above the mud flats down in the valley beside the southern face of the Ridge. This realization had apparently occurred 40 years ago to the authors of Von Richthofen and the Flying Circus (Harleyford) who found that it could only be explained, within the knowledge available at that time, if Captain Brown had made a second and un­noticed attack upon the Triplane about 20 seconds before it made its rapid descent. They therefore posited that such an attack had taken place about 300 feet overhead and in front of a good 500 soldiers, none of whom noticed it.

Until Doctor Segura referred the present authors to Doctor David L King, the fact that a 0.303" British Army rifle bullet tumbles during a long passage through tissue had not been appreciated by them. This characteristic of a Spitzer-shaped bullet was confirmed by ballistics expert Peter Franks. In the light of this information, which was new to them (and one suspects by many others before us – NF/AB), the authors looked back into medical opinions gathered many years earlier by Frank McGuire and Pasquale Carisella. They agree in principle that the wound was severe, that there would be a strong reaction in the nervous system of the body and that the wound would prove mortal in one minute or less. One of the surgeons said that probable cause of death would have been a massive loss of blood.

In short, the medical evidence as interpreted by Doctor Segura agrees with the testimony gathered by John Column.

A Different Opinion

In the 1980s two or three American doctors and/or surgeons attempted to analyse the effects of such a wound as that suffered by the Baron. They ‘proved’ that he could have lived for two or three minutes and have guided an aeroplane through intricate manoeuvres during that time before suddenly collapsing. One even stated that people shot in such a manner had been known to survive. That misleads by placing‘possibility’ ahead of‘probability’, and not taking the type of bullet into consideration.

Unfortunately, in the USA and Canada, many seem to have to accepted the ‘possibility’ as being what happened in the Baron’s case. A few years ago, the theme was re-cycled in a presentation and an article which required Brown to have attacked von Richthofen from the right near Sailly-le-Sec. When all three inputs to an evaluation are incorrect, the answer hardly merits confidence.

Unlike the commonly cited excerpts, the complete report by these doctors clearly states that their opinion was based upon a shot inflicted on a deer by a bullet from an American deer hunting 0.3" 30/30 cartridge. Whether the bullet passed through the heart from front to back or from side to side was not specified. The effect of the 30/30 is so different from a British Army standard 0.303м rifle bullet as to make any comparison meaningless.

А 0.303м bullet would not have made a hole through von Richthofen’s heart, it would have torn a huge channel through it, whilst, with deflection off the spinal column, it would have carved a chunk out of the aorta and the oesophagus. The final result of either path, when created by a tumbling 0.303" bullet, would have been the same, therefore to argue which one was followed is a wasted exercise. Also, due to the distance travelled through the tissues of the Baron’s body, the exit wound would have had the same appearance in either case; namely the typical shape caused by a 0.303 bullet travelling somewhere between side-first and base-first.

By 1000 hours that morning the drizzle had stopped and, except down in the valley and over Vaux-sur-Somme, the morning mist had cleared enough for each side to send out their recce machines. Vertical visibility was quite good; it was not too bad over the river for even though there was a layer of mist, it was not dense and only about 200 feet thick. Horizontal visibility was about one mile through the mist except to the south where the effect of the sun reduced it to half a mile. Above the mist visibility was somewhat limited by the haze. Vertically, the haze was within the limits of the haze filters fitted to aircraft cameras but horizontally it was quite noticeable, especially when looking upwards to the south-east where the sun was behind it. When asked about the visibility that morning, as many ground witnesses said that i’ was good as said the contrary. Speaking many year – later. an airman said: “On that morning visibilirv was layered.’ In truth, the witnesses’ impressions depended upon where they had been positioned and in which direction they had been looking.

As the weather improved and the sky began to clear, 3 AFC’ Squadron despatched two of their RES observation two-seaters off to the Front froir. their base at Poulainville. Their target area was the German supply dump and troops assembly are^ around Le Hamel. Both machines were crewed b

One of the aerial photos taken by the 3 AFC RE8s just prior to Von Richthofen and Weiss’s attack upon them. Note Le Hamel at the bottom of the picture.

highly experienced airmen who were well- practised in the art of working together. Their progress was noted by German observers who very quickly made a telephone call toJGI at Gappy.

The observer in the leading RES (A3661) was Lieutenant E C Banks, from Mosman. New South Wales, his pilot being Lieutenant T L Simpson, from Hamilton, Victoria. In 1965, Banks wrote a long description of what occurred on this sortie. After taking six photographs (the other crew of Lieutenants S G Garrett, from Box Hill, near Melbourne, and A V Barrow, from Harrowgate, England, also took six), Barrow caught sight of about eight aircraft (there were actually nine) approaching them from the east. Suspecting they would be German, the two observers alerted their pilots and all four men prepared for action. The time was noted as 1045.

The nine hostile aircraft were soon identified as Fokker Triplanes, two of which separated from the formation and headed towards them. The colour of the leading Fokker was noted as red and its pilot selected Garrett and Barrows RES for attention. The second Dr. I which had come from the outer edge of the German formation, attacked Simpson and Banks. The first shots of the day s action were about to be fired.

A duel between experts without surprise being a factor is rarely resolved rapidly. After some minutes of manoeuvring for position and some dose-range exchanges of fire, the red Triplane suddenly rolled over and dived away; it did not return to the fray. This left the second Triplane alone to face two well-handled REHs. Working together, Simpson and Garrett turned their machines so that their observers could concentrate their fire on the German fighter each time it came within range. The manoeuvre was successful and splinters were seen to fly off the Triplanes wings. Then its pilot abandoned hostilities, made a diving turn to the east and quickly disappeared into the distance.

The two REs, not wishing to push their luck with the other Triplanes that must still be around, or even other Germans who may have been attracted by the scrap, took shelter inside a nearby cloud. When they emerged a short while later, the sky was empty and so they resumed their photographic work.

From the description of the formation of Triplanes it has to be assumed that the red Triplane, the formation leader, was flown by von Richthofen and the supernumerary position on the outside edge would probably have been taken by Leutnant Hans Weiss (but see also the end of Appendix G). Weiss had scored his 15th victory the previous day and in fact 21 April saw the award for him of the Knights Cross of the Royal Hohenzollern House Order. The part taken by von Richthofen has not been confirmed, but it is in keeping with the tactics used, that the senior pilots would attack while being covered by the rest of the Staffel. It is known, however, that Weiss returned home alone and early, to Сарру, with his rudder controls half shot away. In a letter to his friend Oberleutnant Heinz Schmauser, about the events of the 21st. Weiss wrote the next day:

Unfortunately I was not there at the time he made his emergency landing. Shortly before, I had attacked a flight of enemy reconnaissance aircraft and a bullet cut a rudder cable. I had to return home because I was unable to turn properly.

Manfred von Richthofen was not famous for abandoning a fight without proper cause. There is a good possibility that the poor ammunition quality problems which were to plague him this day had started to appear and that, being temporarily disarmed, he sought some quiet airspace where he could try to un-jam his guns. By the time he managed to clear one, or both of them, the RESs had vanished so he rejoined Jasta 11 on patrol.

Experienced pilots in WWI would often spend time in selecting the ammunition and helping to fill their own machine-gun belts, or fill a drum for a Lewis gun. This did not eliminate rounds with a defective primer. Each pilot might also select his own mix of cartridges; tracer, incendiary, explosive, armour piercing, or jacketted lead. For balloon attacks special ammunition was generally used – Buckingham in the case of the British, (see Appendix I)

The events which followed give the impression that it was during his efforts to clear the stoppage(s) that the firing pin of the right-hand gun fractured. That he rejoined the patrol indicates that he had at least one gun working. What is certain is that a short time later, von Richthofen, who was renowned for his marksmanship and accurate deflection shooting, and who several times had Lieutenant W R May in a could not miss position, failed to dispatch him.

The RES crews recorded their height when the fight began as 7,500 feet, and although neither crew claimed a Triplane shot down, later events made it seem to 3 AFC’s CO, Major David V J Blake, that his men had downed von Richthofen. He anotated their combat report accordingly with

Above right: RE8 reconnaissance machine of 3 Squadron, AFC. It was an aircraft from this unit that started the day’s action.

Right: While the RE8s were photographing Le Hamel, JCI’s main task was to clear the air in order for German Rumpler CV photo-recce aircraft to locate the Australian batteries beyond the Moriancourt Ridge.

the word ‘Decisive’ and entered it as such in the Squadron Record Book. However, the fight having been fought between about 1040-50, this is too early to have been von Richthofens final action. Oddly enough, when Banks later wrote the story of this fight, he noted the time as being even earlier – 1020, although this is clearly an error of memory.

The waters were further muddied by later events as far as 3 AFC were concerned, for when Major Blake was asked to provide a salvage crew to bring in the wreckage of a downed Fokker Triplane later that day (after lunch), which had crashed near Vaux-sur-Somme, included was the news that the pilot, who had been killed, was none other than von Richthofen. Blake may well have added two-and-two together even if it had not been the Baron, and assumed at this stage the Triplane had been that engaged by his crews that
morning, but as it was the Baron, he would has r been even more keen to do so.

Later interest in the day’s events brought tor* the story that Captain Roy Brown had dived down several thousand feet to rescue two 3 AFC R£v which were being attacked by two Fokk;* Triplanes. Records show that this is incorrect. In his combat report. Brown does not mention. г г RESs, neither does his flying log-book entry, and nor do any of his companion’s reports. And neithrr of the two RE8 crews mention any such rescue bv Sopwith Camels. In fact, post war, the four RE" men denied indignantly that Camels had con.; anywhere near them, let alone rescue them. The.: saviour was good shooting coupled with teamwor». and a nice fluffy cloud in which to hide.

All becomes clear when one discovers the ‘rescue’ occurred not on the 21st but on the 22n^_ One of the REHs (C2270) was crewed К

‘8 SO 26) Will SO—*73 00,000 i-O/WVHWVM’ms/l) Ffrnn/WMIS/O

* 10130—>1107 J.-.II. IKVI ’|)/lf

Combats in the Air.

—– Narrative.

At 10.4Q a. in. while engaged on Photography wo were attacks» by two triplunee uo above. Ono triplane dived on us and the Observer fired 120 rounds in bursts. Ono E. A. >p;-s.,rod V – separate, from the others and alght down but tb<> pilot,.nd

Observer wore too bually engaged with the othar fi. A him down. Tho other h. A. finally withdrew.

Liout. T. L.Sirapnon, Pilot and Liout. fi. C.fiunics. Obsorver

a tat о –

At 10.40 и. ш. whilo proceeding ovoi tie linos ad photogruj wo його attacked near ILUIEL at 7000 feet by 4 fi. A. triplaneo. Її divod on ua and the Observer fired JiOO rounds. Tuo of the Я. А. eppotvred to att_ok Liout. Garrott and Biuut. Barrow in another Ш28 but we were too busily engaged in the fight to see what actually happened.

•J!.JL, SIrtPS0U. Lieut. Pilot. В. С.ВАІГКЗ. Liout. Oboorvor.

3rd Aast. Divisional Artillery report –

At about 10.40 a. rn. several rod-nosed triplanee worn oeen to nttaok two REA’a in the neighbourhood of HA2JSL. One of these triplanes oarae down and eraohed ut J.19b.4.4. .‘Pilot killed. Papers on tho Pilot’s body show hi:,i t. o ho Captain von ЫСНТ0РАУ.

Deaielve.

or,

Сой. і – in • r<; о ;;.<■« і e-i. not. ЛІ;-,} n

Combat Report: Made out by Lieutenants Garrett and Simpson of 3 von Richthofen and jasta 11.

Record Book of 209 Squadron’s final entries for 21 April and initial entries for 22 April. Carbon copies of this page do not show the…’2′ in the 21. The ’22’ in the "22.4.18" is completely missing. This has confused people in the past but the original clearly shows the correct dates. Note that the remarks concerning Captain Brown’s patrol refer to Albatros machines and not Triplanes.

Lieutenants F L Baillieu and E R Rowntree, who reported *… three EA scouts attempted to attack this machine at 3,000 feet over Bois deVaire but three Camels came up from the west and drove the EA back over their own lines. One EA is thought to have been brought down by Camels.’ This action was timed at 0910 hours.

The Squadron Recording Officer of 3 AFC’ (the Adjutant) later sent the day’s page(s) and Combats in the Air reports to RAF 22 Wing HQ. whence they would progress to 3th Brigade HQ. There, if considered to be of sufficient importance, a mention would be included in that day’s Summary of Work, submitted that evening to higher authority, which included the HQ of the British Fourth Army, commanded by General Sir Henry Rawlinson. The Simpson/Banks/Garrett/

Barrow claim, although not listed in the Combat- annex to the 5th Brigade Summary for 21 April. \ – shortly to be brought to the General’s attention.

While 3 AFC’ had been skirmishing with the Fokkers near Le Hamel, 2<>9 Squadron had bet patrolling the Front. Half an hour into their pam Lieutenant Mellersh had dropped out with engine trouble and returned to Bertangles. Here he changed to a spare machine (B6257) and took off: rejoin the others, which he succeeded in doing. about 1020.

At 1025, Oliver LeBoutillier, spotted anc engaged what he believed to be two Albatros two – seaters over Le Quesnel, about ten kilometres south of the Amiens-St Quentin road. Togetht* with Robert Foster and Merril Taylor, a: Englishman and a Canadian respectively, they downed one of the two-seaters in flames and drove, the other off.

This action took place at the southern end o: the Squadron’s assigned patrol line near Beaucoun so once re-formed, they turned and headed north again. C Flight (Lieutenant Redgate) now became separated from A and В and saw no further acnot. in the events that were about to unfold.

Аітт Form W 33*3. .Squadron.

No.. 3rd_

n… 22nd April 191^

RE8 A4404. Captain H. D.E. Ralfe.(P) Dusk Reconn. ,Lt. W. A.J. Buckland (0)>

5.50p. 8.05p.! No movement observed in forward areas, Strong point at P.8d.5.4. seems to be strongly helcl. Enemy trenches betn MARRETT WOOD and J.6a£.6. appear to be In good Order. Flashes and Zone Calls. 6.25p. NF PB|P.10c.2.2.(bacc. 4 yellow flashes) zone call sent, fire observed, corrections MC5. Battery neutrali’sed.

Two pages of 3 AFC’s Record Book for events of 22 April recording an action with EA scouts and Camels. The entry for RE8 C2270 has sometimes been misunderstood as Brown rescuing the RE8s on the 21st. Note that events after 4 pm are recorded on the sheet dated the 23rd.

(The Extra One)

During the Germans March Offensive, and the Allied effort which stopped the Germans from taking Amiens, there had been a scandalous shortage of bandages, dressings and medication in the Field Advanced Dressing Stations and the Main Dressing Stations. This was due, in great part, to the confusion of the retreat and the «к/ hoc measures taken to stem the German onslaught.

A renewal of the German attack was expected towards the end of April (it actually began on the 24th) and Colonel George W Barber, the Deputy Director of Medical Services, (the AlF’s top Medical Services man outside Australia), who was based at Villers Bocage just north of Amiens, was determined that, this time, the AIF men at least would lack for nothing in the way of immediate treatment.

Accordingly, in early April, he began a series of personal inspections of the advanced and the support medical facilities. On 21 April, accompanied by Major C L Chapman AAMC. he inspected the 12th Australian Field Ambulance unit. On the morning of the 22nd he went to Bertangles where he (quote): ‘Conferred with the Officer Commanding |the| 3rd Australian Flying Squadron re his medical requirements.’The officer would have most probably been Major Blake whose aeroplanes were at nearby Poulainville aerodrome.

Upon arrival he learned that Baron von Richthofen s body was at the aerodrome lying in a 3 Squadron tent hangar at Poulainville. His programme for later that morning, to inspect 3 FC‘s Dressing Station, thereupon suffered a short postponement. It was too good an opportunity to allow to pass by.

Colonel Barber and Major Chapman arrived at the tent hangar just as the medical orderlies were cleaning up after the examination by Colonels Sinclair and Nixon. The story of what happened next is best described in Barbers own words in a letter to С E W Bean 1’A years later:

October 23rd, 1935

My Dear Bean,

With reference to your letter of Oct.

14th, I was Inspecting this Air Force

unit and found the medical orderly

washing Richthofen’s body, so I made an examination. There were only two bullet wounds, one of entry and one of exit of a bullet which had evidently passed through the chest and the heart. There was NO WOUND of the head but there was considerable bruising over the right jaw which may have been fractured. The orderly told me that the Consulting Surgeon of the army [the Fourth Army] had made a post mortem that morning. I asked him how he did it as there was no evidence. The orderly told me that the Consulting Surgeon had used a bit of fencing wire which he pushed along the track of the wound over the heart. I used the same bit of wire for the same purpose. So you see the medical examination was not a thorough one and not a post mortem in the ordinary sense of the term. A bullet hole in the side of the plane coincided with the wound through the chest and I am sure he was shot from below while banking. I sent a full report to General Birdwood at Australian Corps and I have often wondered what became of it.

With kind regards. Yours sincerely, George W Barber

P. S. Of course a proper PM might have been made after I saw the body but I never heard of it and do not think so.

In a letter to a British Military Publication circa 1930, Major General Barber supplied information identical to that given above but with one addition:

The report that it [the body] was riddled with bullets is absolutely incorrect. There was one bullet wound only and this was through the man’s chest. I formed the opinion that it had been fired from the ground and struck the airman as he was banking his machine, because the exit of the bullet was three inches higher than the point of entry.

Whatever written contribution Major Chapman made for posterity is also now lost except for a quotation: ‘The bullet came out about three inches higher than it went in and might well have been shot from the ground.’

Because Colonel Barber’s written report appears lost, and without secure knowledge of what was in it, beyond the affirmation that only one bullet had struck the body and that the other so-called wounds were all impact injuries, there are no known actions of his which can be taken as first hand discoveries. His major contribution was ordering Corporal Ted McCarty, the medical orderly, to undress the body completely and thereby setting beyond doubt that there were no other bullet wounds anywhere on it.

It is obvious from the content of Barber’s letter that he had received information from others on the circumstances of the Red Devil’s demise, not the least of which was the bullet hole in the fuselage, which he may or may not have been shown but was obviously told about. Corporal McCarty certainly had watched what Colonel Sinclair had been doing because he knew of the piece of wire and because in later years he mentioned that the bullet had dog-legged inside von Richthofen’s body. It must have been common knowledge amongst all the orderlies that the Fourth Army Consulting Surgeon had said so, and he would carry much more weight with them than the new 22 Wing MO. McCarty still remained quiet about the bullet which he had found in the clothing. One has to wonder about this all the time. If he had been an ordinary‘erk’ one might excuse it, but being a medical orderly he must have known of its possible importance. He was apparently not looking for any trouble that might arise, and the longer he remained quiet the more he would be unable to admit to his find. Initially he had told others there were at least three bullet holes in the body, so perhaps finding just one bullet didn’t seem overly important at the beginning. Or perhaps it was purely a case of having a great souvenir and he was going to keep it!

It could be said that Colonel Barbers letter agrees with Graham and Downs in that the shot came from roughly in the plane of the long axis, although he goes a little further than they did by indirectly pointing out that said axis might well have been inclined at the time. On another point he appears to agree with Sinclair and Nixon for, although there is no record that Colonel Barber’s probing confirmed Sinclair’s conclusions, there are no reports or rumours that he disagreed with them. Not even amongst the post-war recollections of the orderlies.

That afternoon, von Richthofen’s body was interred with full military honours. The pall­bearers were pilots from 3 AFC Squadron, one of them being Lieutenant Banks. The next day, RAF aeroplanes dropped photographs of the grave at useful locations over the German lines. One of the pilots selected was Lieutenant Robert Foster of 209 Squadron.

Back at Сарру, with the realisation that von Richthofen was not coming back. JGIs adjutant, Oberleutnant Karl Bodenschatz, opened a box kept in the office safe, in which he knew there was an envelope for just such an occasion as this. He opened it. There was a single pencil-written sentence, dated 10 March 1918 – just about six weeks earlier:

Solte ich nicht zuriick kommen. so Obit. Reinhard (Jasta 6) die FCihrung des Luftgeschwaders Giber nehman.

Freiherr v Ri chthofen Ri ttmei ster

(Should I not return. Oberleutnant Reinhard (Jasta 6) is to assume command of the Geschwader.)

The Baron’s obituary in Flight magazine was short and elegant: ‘Manfred von Richthofen is dead. He was a brave man, a clean fighter and an aristocrat. May he rest in peace.’

Oberleutnant Wilhelm (Willi) Reinhard led JGI until 18 June 1918. On that date he handed over temporary command to Erich Lowenhardt in order to go to Adlershof, Berlin, to attend a flight test programme of the latest aeroplane designs. The aces were the test pilots and each one flew an aeroplane in mock combat with the others. On 3 July Oberleutnant Hermann Goring landed the Dornier DI, an all-metal framed biplane, and handed it over to Reinhard. During his flight in it, the top wing collapsed and Reinhard was killed in the crash. Thus was altered the course of history. Goring, the Staffelflihrer of Jasta 27, was promoted to lead Richthofen’s JGI three days later, and after the war became Prime Minister of East Prussia, then finally Reichsmarschall. head of the German Luftwaffe, and in September 1939 Adolf Hitler’s designated successor.

Von Richthofen’s dog Moritz was adopted by Leutnant Alfred Gerstenberg, a former pilot in Jasta 11, who took him home to his farm. Many years later Moritz died there of old age. Gerstenberg became a Generalleutnant in the Luftwaffe in WW2 and died in 1959.

The Basic Facts ofVon
Richthofen’s Fatal Wound

1. It was inflicted by a Spitzer-type rifle bullet either fired by a machine gun or a rifle and travelled far enough through the Barons body to begin tumbling. This created a large exit wound but not so large as others which Captain Graham had seen.

2. The general direction of the bullet path through von Richthofens body was upwards. The exit wound (between the 5th and 6th ribs on the left side) was more than two inches higher than the entry wound (through the ninth rib on the right side).

3. The trajectory of the bullet in the vertical plane was slightly upwards relative to the side panels of the fuselage of the Triplane.

4. The trajectory of the bullet in the horizontal plane relative to the side panels of the fuselage was the subject of dispute.

come from slightly behind. Lieutenant Downs did not oppose Graham s opinion although earlier he had expressed doubts.

Colonel Nixon and Colonel Sinclair, after checking the initial permanent cavity direction, decided that the bullet had come from slightly in front.

5. Captain Graham gave the opinion that the bullet had passed in a straight line from entry to exit. Again Lieutenant Downs did not oppose Graham’s opinion, although as before he had doubts.

6. Colonels Nixon and Sinclair, after checking the permanent cavity, stated that the bullet had dog­legged inside the body having been deflected off the front of the spine.

7. Colonel Barbers examination report has been lost – or at least not found. In a letter on the subject he affirmed that von Richthofen had been shot from the right. (See Chapter 14)

Captain Graham, 22 Wing Medical Officer, who did not actually check the initial permanent cavity direction, gave an opinion that the bullet had

Sir Hiram Maxim’s belt-fed machine gun was adopted by several countries, each of which made redesigns to suit circumstances and requirements. However, the basic principle remained the same.

In England, the Maxim gun developed into the Vickers water-cooled machine gun and used the same size Spitzer-type 0.303м (7.69 mm) ammunition as the Lee-Enfield infantry rifle. The bullets (projectiles) were identical.

The Maxim gun, as redesigned in Germany, used the standard German army infantry ammunition, the Spitzer-type Mauser 7.92 mm x 57 cartridge. A light­weight air-cooled version was adopted for use on aircraft and was known as the LMG 08/15, which stood for air-cooled machine gun, type 8, designed in 1915. It was manufactured, principally in the town of Spandau, just to the west of Berlin, by several companies and various different names, however, all parts were fully interchangeable. Apart from the synchronising mechanism and the barrel, the infantry and the aerial versions used identical parts in the feeding, loading and firing systems.

The German and the British machine guns, being the same basic design, responded almost identically to defective ammunition, to wear and tear and to the failure of component parts.

Cartridges were fed, loaded, locked in place, fired
and extracted somewhere between eight to ten times per second, and the lock had to withstand pressure between 45,000 and 55,000 pounds per square inch. The duty cycle of the complicated mechanism was quite heavy, and the moving parts and springs were prone to high rates of wear. In aerial use, the close- tolerance parts were subjected to the extreme cold of high altitude flying in winter; an environment for which the original design was not intended.

It was not uncommon for a fighter pilot, who had finally caught up with a high flying two-seater or airship, to have his machine guns fire just one round and then refuse to reload. The hump on the Sopwith Camel was actually a chamber which directed hot air from the engine onto the breech end of the guns to prevent that from happening.

The crank handles (or cocking handle/lever), which came in various shapes and sizes to suit aircraft types, made one backwards and forwards movement through an arc of about 110 degrees for each round fired. A jam would cause the handle to cease motion in one of four positions. The position in which the handle stopped was a reliable indicator of the basic type of jam which had occurred. Each position was known by a number, and machine-gun jams were described, for example, as ‘a number two stoppage’.

A number 1 or 4 stoppage could be cleared in the

MAXIM-TYPE MACHINE-GUN STOPPAGE POSITIONS

air. The pilot would extrac t the defective cartridge by – pulling the crank handle back to the far stop and then releasing it. The spring return would feed the next cartridge into the firing chamber.

A number 2 stoppage caused by a tight cartridge case could often be cleared in the air. A small hammer, sometimes a wooden mallet, (secured by a strap) was carried in the cockpit, and the pilot would apply it vigorously to the crank arm to force it forwards to position 4. The expression: ‘the pilot hammered his machine gun’, means exactly that; not as portrayed in the movies as beating on the breech with clenched fists.

A number 2 stoppage, caused by the previous cartridge case having separated during extraction, would have the new cartridge telescoped into the broken piece. The crank arm. when hammered, would not move. To clear such a jam was a major operation that could only be performed on the ground.

A number 3 stoppage was generally impossible to clear in the air. Both a number 2 and number 3 stoppage could be caused by the pilot himself, usually a novice who had indulged in over-long bursts of fire. This overheated the breech mechanism thus destroying the lubricant and causing the delicate parts to seize.

A component failure, frozen moisture, dirt and/or congealed lubricant could also cause any one of the four types of stoppages.

British Standard 0.303" Cartridges

With the constant improvement in rifle design, muzzle velocities began to exceed 2,000 feet per minute. The
result was that the soft round-nosed lead bullets such as the British Mark VI then used would disintegrate inside the human body causing really complicated wounds. Fragments of lead were spread over a large body area to no purpose.

The 1907 Hague Convention produced an agreement between the major European powers that lead bullets would have a pointed nose and that the lead would be fully encased in a hard metal jacket. The result is known as a Spitzer-shape (or type) bullet.

The aerodynamic Spitzer shape, when spun by a rifled barrel, was stable in flight and had excellent accuracy.

The British version, the Mark VII cartridge when fired from a 0.303′ rifled barrel, as in Lee-Enfield army rifles or in Vickers and Lewis machine guns, had a nominal muzzle velocity of 2,440 feet per second (1,664 mph) and was spun by the rifling at about 175,800 rpm. In flight the speed and rpm would gradually decrease, but even after having travelled half a mile the bullets were still supersonic. Bullets which passed close by could be heard quite clearly.

Unfortunately at ranges over 300 yards the lighter weight tracer bullet did not conform exactly to the trajectory of the rifle bullet; it lost height rapidly. Pilots who lifted the nose of their fighter to correct their aim. often achieved exactly the opposite of their intent.

In daytime, tracer ammunition could only be seen from directly behind the gun which had tired it for the trace was actually a bright pinpoint of light from inside the bullet. Stories which make reference to ‘seeing flaming tracers’are pure journalistic invention.

The pages of209 Squadrons Record Book which were submitted to 22 Wing at the end of 21 April, showed that 15 pilots, divided into three flights, left Bertangles at 0935,0940 and 0945 hours:

A FLIGHT

Captain A R Brown DSC B7270
Lieutenant W J Mackenzie B7245
Lieutenant W R May 1)3326
Lieutenant L F Lomas D3340
Lieutenant F J W Mellersh D3329

В FLIGHT

Captain О C LeBoutillier D3338 Lieutenant R M Foster B3858 Lieutenant M A Harker B7272 Lieutenant M S Taylor B7200 Lieutenant C G Brock B3328

C FLIGHT

Lieutenant О W Redgate B7250
Lieutenant A W Aird B6311
Lieutenant E В Drake 1)3345
Lieutenant C G Edwards D3331
Lieutenant J H Siddall 1)3327

As far as Wing HQ was concerned a squadrons day began at 1601 hours on one day and ended at 1599 hours the following day, not midnight to midnight. The pages of the various record books, depending on how busy a unit had been, might cover one page one day, several days or merely a few hours. In the case of 209 Squadron at this period, their Record Book page covers both the 20th and 21st, while the 21st also spills over onto a second page covering the 21st only, while the subsequent page covers later events of the 21st and then the 22nd (see page 33).

Upon reaching their assigned altitude, the three flights patrolled the front to discourage any German photographic reconnaissance aircraft from trying to cross the lines. Eventually Redgate s flight became separated from the others by cloud and a little later two of his pilots were forced to return to Bertangles due to engine problems. Redgate and his remaining two men patrolled until the end of the allotted time and then returned to base.

Around K)2(l hours. LeBoutillier s flight saw a

German two-seater recce machine over Beaucourt at 12,000 feet and Lieutenant Merril Taylor, a Canadian, shot it down. Before hitting the ground it caught fire. He identified it as an Albatros C – type but it was probably a Rumpler or LVG CV crewed by Leutnant Kurt Fischer and Leutnant Rudolf Robinius, of FAA203, who were both killed. They came down near Ignaucourt, just to the north-west of Beaucourt, the location given by Taylor for the combat. From a distance. Captain Brown saw the action, followed by an aircraft descending in flames. His testimony was used to confirm Taylors claim.

Here fate took a hand and the path of Captain Browns depleted Squadron crossed with that of Jasta 11. That morning, with von Richthofen leading, they had been joined by a few machines from Jasta 5, Triplanes and Albatros Scouts. At about 1040 hours British time battle was joined in the area of the town of Cerisy, map reference

62D. Q.3.

Both Brown and von Richthofen had a similar habit which endeared them to their subordinates After leading an attack, each would detach himself from any combat which followed, climb above it and be ready to go to the aid of any pilot who was in a tight spot. Von Richthofen even carried a pair of small binoculars on a cord around his neck for better identification of distant aircraft.

Having re-formed themselves after the engagement with the two RE8s, the Fokker Triplanes were once more patrolling behind the German lines looking for British aircraft. Von Richthofen had rejoined and was at the head of one Kette (Flight), flying with his cousin, Leutnant Wolfram von Richthofen, Oberleutnant Walther Karjus, Vizefeldwebel Edgar Scholz and Leutnant Joachim Wolff. It is not known for certain who was leading the second Kette following Weiss’* departure, but one of the pilots was Leutnant Richard Wenzl, formally of Jasta 6. The Fokker pilots saw five Camels coming up from the south, approaching Le Hamel. These were Brown and his four companions. Wolff noted that the Jasta 5 machines were about four kilometres to the north-east, over Sailly-le-Sec, just the other side (north) of the Somme. Moments later Wenzl saw

another Flight of Camels – Le Boutillier s В Flight.

The formations met. Lieutenant Mackenzie, of Brown’s flight, was taken by surprise and wounded early in the fight; perhaps this was Wolffs claim. Mackenzie turned to face his attacker and claimed to have shot him down. He then left the battle and headed back to Bertangles where he landed safely although in the Record Book his landing time is the same as Brown and Co. His copy of the combat report that went to Brigade is interesting because later that afternoon Major Butlers annotation in ink ‘decisive’ was amended in pencil either by 22 Wing or by 5th Brigade, with the prefix ‘In-’ so that the final decision on his claim became ‘indecisive’.

Lieutenant Francis Mellersh. also in Brown’s flight, was engaged by two Triplanes, possibly Joachim Wolff and Walther Karjus, who had him out-manoeuvred. Brown saw this and rescued him successfully. These are the two Triplanes Brown refers to both in his combat reports and log book, almost as an afterthought. Clear of immediate danger, Mellersh fired at a Fokker with a blue tail near Cerisy. He made his first mistake by following it down to be sure of his victory. Two other Triplane pilots saw this and. realising that the attacking Camel was following a predictable flight path (Mellersh’s second mistake), angled down to intercept him. The blue-tailed Triplane, which could not have been from Jasta 11, but more likely from Jasta 5, force landed near Cerisy but as neither unit suffered any fatalities – or men wounded, it is difficult to comment. Mellersh. having become unexpectedly otherwise engaged, claimed the Triplane as ‘having crashed’ in his combat report, and perhaps believed it had. Only Vfw Scholz is known to have been shot up but he returned safely.

In the action were pilots of varying degrees of experience, but two of them stood out, one a Canadian, the other a German. Lieutenant Wilfred Reid ‘Wop’ May, from Edmonton. Alberta, was a month past his 24th birthday. He had joined 209 Squadron this very month, so was still finding his feet, very much the novice. On the other side. Wolfram von Richthofen, aged 22, from Barzdorf, Silesia, and like his famous cousin, a former cavalry (Hussar) officer, had joined Jasta 11 on 4 April, so he too was very much a new boy. Both men had been warned to stay clear of any action and that if danger loomed, they were to break off and head for home – fast.

When the main fight erupted. Wop May, as instructed by his friend and flight commander, Roy Brown (they had known each other back in

Canada), edged away but when he saw a Triplanc tantilisingly close by. decided to take a crack at : This turned out to be Wolfram von Richthofie: himself trying to stay out of trouble. However. :r. r danger to the Fokker pilot had been spotted bv the experienced eyes of the Red Baron, who carne down from his‘guardian angel’position above the fight to help his young cousin. Those de^r. experienced and now concentrating eyes latched onto the Camel. There can be little doubt that the Baron, while intent on saving his cousin, was noting mentally his approaching 81st kill.

It was only May’s third patrol into enerr74- territory and his second taste of combat. For h an inexperienced pilot to encounter the seasor. r.: airmen of Jasta 11, supported by Jasta 5. л *:• decidedly unlucky. Although May later stated tha: botli his machine guns jammed in the fight, th:- not mentioned in any documentation of the dav: Such jamming is only mentioned in a report r~. May concerning another action one week late:

Brown had said to May:‘Keep out of any fig-* Stay above it and watch. If an enemy begins : come towards you. head for home.’

Whatever had happened beforehand. May now lost altitude and decided to head for horr; Unfortunately instead of climbing out of the battle as he should have done, he put the Can.; – nose down a little for more speed and followed і predictable flight path. Two airmen saw this Manfred von Richthofen and Roy Brown.

The First Medical Report was sent to 22 Wing RAF. while the Second Report went to the British 4th Army HQ. After being studied, each one received markedly different treatment.

The Board, referred to by Captain Roy Brown in the plaque made for the Toronto exhibit of the seat from the red Triplane, sometimes called ‘The Board of Enquiry’,‘ The Court of Enquiry’ or either of those preceded by the word ‘Official’, represents the efforts of the Royal Air Force to evaluate the three claims. There is a marked similarity between the so-called official Board or Court of Enquiry and the weather in that everybody talks about it but nobody does anything about it. In the case of the Board of Enquiry (or the Court of Enquiry), historian Frank McGuire told the present authors: ‘Everybody has heard of it, many refer to it, but nobody can produce it.’

Diligent research and advertising in aviation publications concerning the location of the records of it. or even knowledge of it, have obtained no reply. This does not mean that Captain Brown’s reference to a Board is incorrect but simply that ‘the tale improves with the telling’. The Board was simply ‘promoted’ first to a Board of Enquiry and then to a Court of Enquiry.

Listed below are six simple questions concerning the Board or Court of Enquiry. No answer can be found for any one of them.

1. Where was the Board or Court of Enquiry held?

2. On what date(s) was it held?

3. Who were its members?

4. Who testified?

5. What is the exact wording of the finding?

6. On what date were its findings

PROMULGATED?

The many vague references to a gathering, or self – styled Board, of 209 Squadron pilots who put together all the information which they had on the death of von Richthofen, indicate that there was a serious discussion of the events of 21 April at some time after the event. At one time there was a document in the Public Records Office at Kew, in which a mention was made of such a discussion, but unfortunately it was a casualty in the massive theft of WWI papers a few years ago.

However. Norman Franks made some notes from the document back in early 1968 from which we can see that the date of the meeting was 2 May 1918 (after Brown had left the Squadron). It seems that the 209 Squadron pilots who sat down to analyse the available evidence included May, Mellersh and Le Boutillier. These three at least, wrote down their reports, presumably for ‘higher authority’ again confirming that Brown had shot down the Baron. Another reference is still extant. On 15 October 1963, Edmond Clifford Banks, (the 3 Squadron AFC member) mentioned it, almost as an aside, in a letter to historian Frank McGuire which is quoted with his kind permission:

The findings of the post mortem court held at our squadron with over twenty officers present was that von Richthofen could only have been shot down from the air.

Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Foster refers obliquely to such a gathering in his memoirs when he uses the word ‘us’ and not ‘me’, viz:‘To us it was conclusive that the pilot had been killed in the air.’ Another indication of a group discussion is the commonality, in public statements or writings by Foster, May and Brown, of the pronouncement that for the fatal shot to have come from the ground, the Triplane would have needed to have been flying upside – down and backwards!

Descriptions of events can become twisted by retelling and/or passing from mouth to mouth, especially when being dramatised over a few rounds of drinks, but it is not difficult to fathom what is behind the following very strange story written down in 1992 by Wing Commander D L Hart who obtained it first hand in 1957 from one of the 2(19 Squadron officers who participated in the event described:

Richthofen’s body had come into the mortuary, as was the custom, for formal burial the next day. and that night there was a wild celebration at the end of the Red Baron, which they saw as bringing them a new lease of life. Who exactly

killed him was already very much debated, and when the senior officers had gone to bed the young officers argued the points since all who had participated in the fight were present. Eventually, it turned on the direction from which the fatal bullet had come, and after much indeterminate argument they fetched Richthofen’s body from the mortuary, sat it in a chair in a normal flying position and inserted wires down the paths of the bullet wounds, then called upon their doctor to identify which wound had killed him. Once this had been done, they identified who had been in the position to fire it. The RAF claim was based on this evidence.

The Final sentence seems to describe the claim too well to be mere co-incidence. In the main body of the tale, the errors of fact are numerous but do not destroy the premise that a discussion took place. One error, (4 below), indicates that the occasion was before the First Medical Examination was conducted by Captain Graham and Lieutenant Downs of 22 Wing.

1. Von Richthofen’s body was not in 209 Squadrons mortuary but in a tent hangar at 3 AFC Squadrons aerodrome some distance away. However, we do not know whether the 209 Squadron pilots visited 3 AFC’ that evening for a general celebration or merely out of curiosity, and the hangar was merely referred to as the ‘mortuary’ for convenience of telling the tale.

2. The senior officers were very much out of bed between 2300 hours and midnight. The CO and the RO accompanied Graham and Downs during the examination which took place between these hours.

3. Before the examination some 209 Squadron pilots visited the tent hangar. It is tar more likely that the discussion took place right then and there. Because of the wires being mentioned it seems much more likely that the tale is a mixture of this discussion and the doctors’ subsequent examination, especially when mentioning the wounds being probed with wires.

4. Although the use of the word ‘wounds’ might indicate the belief that there were more than one, it can be assumed that all those concerned could see the entrance and exit wounds, provided the clothes on the upper torso were removed or at least opened. Even had they, at this stage, thought there were other, lower, wounds, the 209 Squadron pilots would have undoubtedly concentrated on the torso wounds as the cause of death, even if they thought wounds to the legs had been sustained.

The earlier Chapter, The Wandering Wounds, presented the curious fact that none of the 209 Squadron officers, who later made statements, appeared to know the correct direction of the wound, although the 3 AFC’ officers did. This suggests that the opinion of the 209 officers was formed before the first medical examination. Many 3 Squadron officers were present during that examination, so, logically they would know. That raises the point as to why the 209 Squadron junior officers did not learn the truth by the end of the week. A partial explanation is that the 22nd Wing Medical Examination report moved upwards, so they would not have seen it. Judging by the statements of the junior officers at the time, it appears that they were simply told that the report stated that only one bullet had struck the Baron and that it could only have been fired from the air.

Initially, it seemed to be clear that Captain Brown was the victor. There was a large multiple bullet entry hole in von Richthofens left breast with the apparent choice of exit locations low down in the abdominal area on his right. Gunners Buie and Evans, as per their claim, had fired upwards, frontally and a little from the right; Lieutenant Barrow had fired frontally. Only Brown had fired downwards, from behind and from the left, and provided that von Richthofen had turned his trunk around and was looking behind to his left at the time, which was unlikely but not impossible, by default, he was the man.

That fits with Captain Brown being advised to present a neat report – the second one – and its being accepted higher up the chain of command. By the time the true direction became known to the RAF senior officers, the news had been released to the world that Brown was the hero, but it does not explain the persistent belief that Brown’s bullet had struck von Richthofen in the left shoulder and had headed slanting downwards through his heart and out through his abdomen. There are only two hypotheses that fit. Either the 209 Squadron pilots did not believe the 22 Wing medical report or (as has already been mentioned above) they did not have exact knowledge of its findings.

One event points to the second hypothesis. In 1950, Captain May (his final wartime rank) expressed surprise upon hearing that the bullet had come from the right and had travelled upwards. The circumstances were as follows.

In 1949 a Rochester, New York, writer, Donald Naughton, was assembling information on von Richthofens last flight. He had read what he believed to be Captain Browns version of events in Liberty magazine, and wanted to supplement it with Mays. The Royal Canadian Legion traced May for him and on 22 November, Naughton wrote to May asking him for his story. Mays reply included an interesting statement:

With reference to the medical report, the way you have it down does not add up. The one bullet is correct. It entered his back and went down through or near his heart.

If it had gone in and then come out higher, it would have substantiated the Australian machine gunner’s claim.

From Wilfred Mays phrasing, it appears that he still did not understand what had actually occurred, 31 years later.

In 1918, all information given to the press had first to be released by the Official Censor, that is the origin of the expression ‘a press release’. Major Neville Lytton. who performed that function, had just finished releasing a communique from RAF HQ on Captain Browns victory over the Red Devil when in came the draught of a cable from Captain Charles E W Bean, the Official War Correspondent with the Australian 5th Division, in which the downing of von Richthofen was attributed to ground fire. Major Lytton sensed dangerous waters ahead so before releasing Bean’s cable, he informed RAF HQ of its content. Major-General Sir John Salmond, the Commander-in-Chief of the RAF in France, was certainly aware that Brown had been proclaimed victor because the other two claimants had been eliminated. He was also aware that the ground upon which he stood in supporting the claim was not absolutely firm. The regulation obligatory Confirmation of Claim had not been provided by the artillery officer in charge of the sector where the red Triplane force-landed, in fact he had refused to do so. To make matters worse, the officer in question, Captain P Hutton, was English, not Australian.

The ground confirmation matter came up again in 1935 and Captain Hutton wrote: “Later on the day [21st] the Air Force came to me for confirmation of their claim, which was then the rule, but I could not substantiate it.’ ‘As anti­

aircraft officer on the spot I claim to be in the best

position to judge.’

By this time it was known in high circles that the Official Medical Examination report to the British 4th Army had given an open verdict, so there was neither help nor opposition there. The army was obviously not too sure of its position for there was no plain statement that Captain Brown did not fire the shot.

It is said that Sir John Salmond, who in his youth had heard of Prince Paris and the apple, decided that diplomacy and tact would be advisable. He suggested compromise; the Army and the RAF would share the credit. This has been denied but surviving evidence confirms that it was so.

A letter written by General Hobbs, some years after the war, states that he had passed the suggestion of a shared claim down the chain of command to Gunner Buie for his agreement or otherwise. Buie’s answer was definitely otherwise, and Hobbs declined to repeat the exact words used. The General’s answer to Sir John was a polite refusal.

RAF HQ decided to go ahead with full support for Brown’s claim. It has been suggested that the certain increase in pilot morale would compensate for the possible fuss, which would soon die away. The horrendous loss of experienced fighter pilots to ground fire whilst ground strafing German troops and transport during the German’s March Offensive was reflected in the high percentage of novices fighting in April. The two – seater squadrons too had suffered heavily.

Sir John was actually going out on the proverbial limb, but in view of the Consultant’s open verdict, it did not look as though General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s official enquiry would come up with much, if anything, which might ‘saw it off’.

Unfortunately there was still the proverbial ticking bomb. Sergeant Popkin’s claim remained temporarily dormant in a pile of papers on a desk at 24th Machine Gun HQ. and the sergeant was not very happy about it. In later years he was to write: “I am afraid that my claim did not receive much consideration at the time.’ On the 25th, his claim was to arrive at the top of the pile.

This claim had definitely been overshadowed by the three earlier ones for only a few soldiers had seen him firing and opinion, other than theirs, was that von Richthofen had already been hit by that time. Private Vincent Emery had not yet been questioned on the sequence of the bursts of machine-gun fire and the behaviour of the Triplane at that time.

RAF HQ arc believed to have taken the. lowing precaution. Officers of 209 Squadron. re said to have been ordered not to talk about the ::utter. but beyond a hint from one or two fficers. there is no proof that such an order was. tually given. However, the definite fact remains

• л 209 Squadron did not say much in public that ent beyond the accepted RAF version of what і happened although one definite slip occurred

1931. It was the vast difference between Mellersh and Fosters eyewitness accounts of the irons forced landing. For Mellersh, see Chapter nd for Foster, see Chapter 9.

After the war, Roy Brown was discharged from

• :e RAF on 1 August 1919. He acquired a farm at v utfville, Ontario, and his neighbour, a Mr Brillinger. described him as a quiet and courteous

-n: far from the boor as he has been portrayed in " ".’.They talked about many things concerning

the war, but Roy never spoke of his encounter with von Richthofen. He died suddenly on 9 March 1944 when he was only 50 years old.

For ten years there was peace on the ‘von Richthofen front’. In England and Canada it was generally believed that Captain Brown had ended the Barons life. 209 Squadron even had its official badge approved by the College of Heraldry as a red eagle filling, symbolising the destruction of the Barons red fighter.

In Australia it was generally believed that Gunners Buie and Evans had performed the deed. Then at the end of the 1920s four works of the pen appeared: The Red Knight of Germany; My Fight with Richthofen; the Australian Official History of the War, and the British Official History of the War in the Air. The lines became drawn and battle commenced.

Less than one week after the death of von Richthofen, Major Butler began efforts to obtain an award for Captain Brown. His initial attempt to obtain the Distinguished Service Order was unsuccessful as this high award requires great bravery in heavy fighting or an above average period in action or command producing material results. A suitable award for having shot down Germany’s greatest ace was thought to be a Bar to his Distinguished Service Cross. Had the event not been so close to the formation of the RAF it may well have produced not a Bar to the DSC but the new RAF equivalent to the Navy’s DSC or the Army’s MC. the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Butler’s recommendation was submitted as follows:

Commanding Officer,

22nd Wing,

Royal Air Force

I wish to recommend the under mentioned Officer for immediate award for marked skill and gallantry in aerial fighting during the present operations, particularly on the occasions mentioned below.

Captain A. R. Brown. D. S.C.

April 21st. ‘Dived on formation of 15 to 20 Albatros Scouts D5‘s and Fokker Trі planes, two of which got on my tail and I came out. Went back again and dived on pure red Triplane which was firing on Lieut. May. I got a long burst into him and he went down vertical and was observed to crash by Lieut. Mellersh and Lieut. May.’ Engagement took place over Vaux-sur-Somme at about 11 a. m. Note. This machine crashed in our lines and pilot was subsequently identified as Captain Baron Richthofen.

April 12th. ‘Dived on two Fokker Triplanes over Warfusee-Abancourt followed by Lt’s Mellersh, Mackenzie and Lomas. Lt. Mackenzie dived on one Triplane and fired about 100 rounds. E. A. went down vertical and Lt. Mackenzie lost sight of him. I observed It going down but could not watch him right down. Capt. Brown & Lt.

Mellersh dived on the other Triplane. Each fired about 200 rounds. E. A. then went down vertical and we followed him down. Lt.

Mackenzie & Capt. Brown observed burst of flame come out of him then. Followed him down to 500 feet when he came out of dive. Capt. Brown and Lt. Mellersh opened fire again. E. A. carried on gliding and looked as if pilot was landing or was dead and machine gliding automatically.’ Note. Confirmed in R. A.F. Communique No.2.

April 12th 1 brought down and 1 driven down out of control.

another keeping E. A. from getting above us. Picked one and fired about 100 rounds into him at fairly close range. He did climbing left hand turns right in front of me while I was firing then went into vertical dive and I lost him under left wing.*

Engagement occurred N. E. of Foret d’Houthulst whilst escorting a French Caudron. Confirmed by pilot of Caudron (as per RNAS Communique No 18) to have crashed.

February 2nd. ‘I dived on 2 Albatros two – seaters over Foret d’Houthulst and opened fire on one getting in about 100 rounds when the other two-seater began to get above me. I turned on him and fired about 350 rounds. Both E. A. disappeared in the mist after I had turned to dive again.*

This Officer was awarded the D. S.C.. in October 1917, whilst with this Squadron.

С H Butler. Major Commanding 209 Squadron R. A.F.

In the Field. April 26th 1918.

The award of a Bar was announced in 22 Wing Routine Order No.552. dated 11 May 1918. It was actually presented to Brown in July by the Prince of Wales. The Citation was as follows:

Announcement of award of ‘Bar to the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieut. (Hon. Capt.) Arthur Roy Brown. D. S.C., R. A.F’: in London Gazette, Fourth Supplement to 18 June 1918. published 21 June:

For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. On 21st April, 1918, while leading a patrol of six scouts he attacked a formation of 20 hostile scouts. He personally engaged two Fokker triplanes, which lie drove off; then seeing that one of our machines was being attacked and apparently hard pressed, he dived on the hostile scout, firing the while. ‘Ibis scout, a Fokker triplane nose-dived to the ground. Since the award of the Distinguished Service Cross he has destroyed several other enemy aircraft and has shown great dash and enterprise in attacking enemy troops from low altitude despite heavy anti­aircraft fire.

March 22nd. ‘Dived from 15,000 feet on 7 E. A. two-seaters. At first dived on one after

Von Richthofen saw an easy interception and dived to the attack: this required some rapid menu, trigonometry. In order to finish his dive in a g firing position behind May’s Camel, he had to airr. for a point well ahead of it. Several ground witnesses, mainly those looking east rather than south-east and therefore not into the sun. saw : ; aircraft and then another dive out of the figh: Although there is no evidence whatsoever of th. it is safe, on the basis of combat airmanship ale ne to assume that von Richthofen curved his d: . around to the south so as to have the sun behind him in his approach to the Camel. A11 ‘old hand on either side, would not have done otherwise unless he had lost interest in surviving the war.

According to the Combat Reports and the squadron Record Book entries for Capm: Brown’s fight, map references 62D. Q.2 and 62D. Q.3 (Cerisy) appear. These locations arc : the south-east of where Brown later attacked von Richthofen. Brown initially believed that May, whom he had last seen over the River Somme a short distance to his south, had successfully disengaged. A few seconds later, he noticed that a second aeroplane had also disengaged. It resolved into a Triplane which appeared to be taking an unhealthy interest in Mays Camel.

For a reason which will never be known, von Richthofen failed to make a good interception; lie came out of his dive too fir behind Mays Camel, which gave May the advantage as his machine was the faster of the two.

Tiking Mays later testimony as a basis, it may be concluded that von Richthofen came into maximum firing range of May somewhere between Saillv-le-Sec and Welcome Wood. From the Camel’s flight path von Richthofen had probably suspected that its pilot was new to the game and decided to find out for certain. Even with the occasional defective round of ammunition in his belts that morning, he could safely tackle an inexperienced enemy. If the Camel pilot turned out to be otherwise, a Fokker Dr. I Triplane could out climb a Camel any day. He opened fire to see what would happen. An experienced pilot upon hearing the Rak-ak-ak sound of bullets passing close by or seeing the smoke of the tracer, would, without any hesitation whatsoever turn his machine to face his attacker. A novice would spend vital moments looking around to find his attacker who, if close by, was using those same vital moments to correct his aim! If the novice survived the second and more accurate burst of fire, he would probably begin to zig-zag. The urgency with which Brown regarded the situation may be deduced from the airmanship which he now displayed.

A third aeroplane was seen by ground witnesses to leave the ‘dog fight’ high up over Cerisy and start downwards heading south-west; it was Brown. An ‘old hand’ like him instinctively knew that in an attack from this direction – ie: into the sun with a layer of haze ahead of it – the dice would be loaded against himself. He would be heading into haze made opaque by the sun’s rays, whereas his opponent’s clearest view would be towards him. On the way down there would be time to remedy this and thereby gain the tactical advantage of surprise.

Having detached himself from the fight which was now down to 5,000 feet, Brown performed his own mental trigonometry. A dive from that altitude to ground level required that he start levelling out at 1,000 feet and then stabilise his aeroplane on the final intercepting course. This required about 7,500 feet of forward motion and a lot of good judgement. To use the sun and haze to his advantage, he would need to attack the Triplane from above, behind and on its left. Brown stated in his Combat Report that he was fighting in 62D. Q.2 which would have placed him in a good position relative to the sun and the ground haze to observe the members of his Flight. Starting from 62D. Q.2 it would not be difficult to adjust his course on the way down so as to approach the aircraft from the south-east. Vincent Emery, in his trench at Sainte Colette, saw him do this. If he were then to pass to the south of Vaux-sur – Somme, the mist would help to hide him. After that, on his attack path, he would have the sun behind him. There was a good chance that the

German pilot just might not see him_________

Fundamental to any fighter pilot in any war. it has been estimated that 50% of pilots shot down, never saw the aircraft that attacked them. This is good tactics, giving the maximum result with the minimum risk.

Brown eased his Camel into a 45° dive, adjusted his engine power to obtain 180 mph, which was the maximum safe airspeed, so as not to separate his wings from the fuselage. LeBoutillier later confirmed this angle of dive by saying ‘… I saw him coming in from the right [of Boot’s position) in a steep 45° dive.’

Von Richthofen’s impression that the Camel pilot ahead of him might be a novice had been confirmed. Upon realising that someone was firing at him, May swerved his aeroplane and began to zig-zag. The aerodynamic drag of the turns reduced his speed. The Triplane, which was actually the slower aeroplane of the two, now held the advantage and the distance between them began to diminish. May descended lower and lower until he was, in his own words: ‘Just skimming the surface of the water.’

A careful reading of the reports from the first and second medical examinations shows them both as being serious attempts to be fair and impartial. Apart from the disqualification of the 53rd Battery in the first one, they were otherwise neutral and non-committal.

Concerning official military reports, three points must be borne in mind:

First: official reports move upwards through a chain of command. If another entity is involved, they will cross over at the top and work their way down until someone says: ‘Stop’. Reports written by colonels are rarely seen by captains. In the lack of precise information, incorrect assumptions tend to be made at the lower levels of both ends of the chain of communication.

Second: constant paraphrasing alters the clearest of meanings; eg, ‘Send me the brush which I left on the stairs,’ in two repetitions during transmittal becomes, ‘Send me the broom which I left on the steps,’ and each person will swear that he changed nothing. The ultimate recipient will be looking outside the house for a large object.

Third: once an official attitude has been assumed, to reverse it is rather difficult even if it was flawed at some stage by incorrect assumptions or paraphrasing.

Upon the withdrawal of the claim by 3 Squadron AFC, the medical report written by Captain Graham and Lieutenant Downs left Captain Brown as the only horse in the race, but it did not state that he had won. The RAF, starting from Major Butler and proceeding upwards through 22nd Wing (Lieutenant Colonel F V Holt), 5th Brigade (Brigadier LEO Charlton) and RAF HQ (General Sir John Salmond) chose to interpret it as saying that he had. If the other claiments were not responsible, then obviously Brown was. Who could say when and how the bullet hole was made in the right-hand side of the Triplane, let alone who made it? The matter of how a shot fired obliquely downwards from the left could enter von Richthofen’s abdomen on the right and then pass obliquely upwards through his trunk to exit on the left was not addressed. Captain Brown’s neat-looking Combats in the Air report (the second one) was annotated ‘Decisive’ and started its journey into history. (An interesting point is that the signature on the second document seems to differ from the first one.)

General Sir Henry Rawlinson, upon receiving the open verdict report of his two senior medical officers, decided that further investigation was required. If none of the claimants had fired the shot, somebody else had, and judging by the talk going on, quite a few soldiers of the 5th Australian I )ivision thought that one of their particular shots might have been successful. There was one sergeant in the 24th Machine Gun Company who was said to have filed a claim, but the General had not yet seen the papers.

If the finding of the fatal bullet by the medical orderly had been known to an officer, the field would have been narrowed considerably. With a new German attack known to be due any day, Sir Henry had nobody he could spare for such a seemingly non-essential investigation. He finally decided that the mantle lay on the shoulders of General J T Hobbs, the commander of the 5th Australian Division. His men had been involved, therefore, clearly any investigation fell within his bailiwick. General Hobbs in turn found the ideal man. A captain with no military duties, well educated and who was accustomed to inter­viewing people. Even better, it might get him out of his way for a few days. Not the chaplain, but the Official War Correspondent, Captain C EW Bean.

The investigation is best described in Captain Bean’s own words. His diary entry for 27 April 1918, by which time Sergeant Popkin’s claim had been received, reads:

The British air service – some naval pilot who was half a mile away in the air – has claimed to bring down Baron Richthofen. It seemed to me so trivial a

Roy Brown’s second combat report (with suspect signature [compare it with the earlier report]) and showing that Mellersh and May confirmed the Triplane crashing.

matter who shot him that I had not bothered to investigate the various claims. However, Hobbs asked me to. He says that there is a lot of feeling over it – the German communique says that R was shot from the ground. I said I must see the actual men who claimed to do it.

So they were brought to 5th Division Artillery Headquarters.

Gunner Buie and Gunner Evans say the plane wobbled and swerved to the right, and then speared towards the earth. He crashed about 350-500 yards from the guns. He was hit in chin. neck, chest and left side and right leg. The wound in his neck came out just below the chin. Lt Doyle who was in the [gun] pit could see bits flying off the plane.

Captain Bean’s starting point was the verdict of the Official Medical Examination which had disqualified all three claimants. The 53rd Battery had fired from the wrong angle and even if it had been successful would have put more than one shot into the Triplane’s fuselage. Captain Brown had fired from the wrong side, and Lieutenant Barrow’s claim had been withdrawn, due mainly to timing.

After conversations with scores of witnesses, the possibility developed in Bean’s mind that the two colonels had been too conservative and that the 53rd Battery may indeed have been responsible. Unfortunately he did not have the benefit of a forensic interpretation of von Richthofen’s wound path from the point of view of ballistics; in those days, that science was in its infancy. He was not sure. Someone had done it. but who? With so many soldiers firing at the same time, and nobody with any real idea of exactly which way the Triplane, in a gusty wind, was angled at any given moment, there was no simple answer.

He vacillated between the 53rd Battery and the 24th Machine Gun Company, not to mention scores of men firing rifles. Nobody can fault him, for the Triplane’s passage towards, over, and beyond the 53rd Battery took but a few seconds.

One uncertainty was nevertheless certain; either the person firing the shot was an expert who had correctly calculated a complicated deflection angle, or it was a lucky shot from someone who had made all the usual mistakes and in his haste had fired so wide of the mark that he had actually scored a hit.

Simple mathematics, as taught in anti-aircraft gunnery school, supply the answer. A 0.303"

British bullet tired from a Lee-Entield rifle, a Vickers or Lewis machine gun, leaves the muzzle at about 2,400 to 2,500 feet per second; in round numbers that is 800 yards or about half a mile per second. An aeroplane flying at 80 mph is covering 120 feet per second. So if a gunner is 400 yards away from an aeroplane which is flying directly across his line of fire (at right angles to him), he must aim 60 feet ahead of the aeroplane in order to hit it. But how to measure the 60 feet? That is where knowledge and training come in.

An expert anti-aircraft gunner knows by heart the wing span of the aeroplanes he is likely to encounter. Back in those days, the fuselage length was about 80% of the wing span, so a Fokker Dr. I Triplane with a span of 25 feet (approx) would have a fuselage length of 20 feet; actually it was just over 18 feet. At 400 yards range a machine gunner or a rifleman’s ‘lead’ on such a target flying at 80 mph would have to be THREE full fuselage lengths to allow for the flight time of his bullets. At the 200 yards range during the chase along the Ridge face, when the ground speed would have been about 135 mph (200 feet per second), it would have been necessary to aim at May in order to hit Richthofen, and to do that took a lot of courage. That is why so many shots missed the Triplane.

At 800 yards range the mathematics become a little more complicated. As we have said earlier, the second 400 yards of the bullets’ passage are at a slower speed than the first 400. By 800 yards (half a mile) the speed is down to about 1,000 feet per second, therefore, SEVEN fuselage lengths as per the basic calculation plus a further ONE length to compensate for the bullets’prog­ressively decreasing velocity are required.

The machine gunner or rifleman would need to aim EIGHT fuselage lengths into thin air ahead of the aeroplane in order to hit it in the middle. That takes a lot of confidence and imagination. Additional complications are the drooping trajectory beyond 400 yards’ flight and the effect (on this day) of a strong wind. The latter would require one more fuselage length making a grand total of NINE. To be an anti­aircraft machine gunner was to be a specialist in a difficult art.

Like Privates V Emery and J Jeffrey, Sergeant Popkin of the 24th Machine Gun Company was classified as a Machine Gunner 1st Class. They all had knowledge and the experience to perform accurate deflection shooting. Emery had not fired but Popkin had, and from the required direction and distance. He was a good candidate.

1. Sergeant Alfred George Franklyn

Around 1929 English newspapers carried a report that the real victor over the Red Devil might have been Sergeant A G Franklyn who had been in charge of Section 110, ‘F’; Anti-Aircraft Battery of the Royal Garrison Artillery. The Battery was composed of a number of 13-18 pounder guns mounted on lorries and they took up position on the road where needed. These were 18 pounder guns modified to fire 13 pound AA shells.

The former Sergeant stated that his battery had shot down a German aeroplane on 21 April 1918 and that it had crashed 200 yards from the battery’s position. He further claimed that the pilot had been von Richthofen who had been chasing TWO Sopwith Camels at the time, and that the pilot of one later came to the battery to thank him.

Careful examination of Franklyn’s written claim reveals that the position which he gave for his lorries on 21 April agrees with his description of the area; he was somewhere on the Corbie road about half a mile east of Bonnay (on one occasion he gave his position as 880 yards, and on another 800 yards). The ground between the lorries and a high ridge in front of them was occupied by Australian field batteries. A line drawn on a map certainly places a road as described, but it is the road from Corbie to Mericourt L’abbe, not that from Corbie to Bray.

Upon checking exactly what Franklyn wrote, the simple words ‘Corbie road’ will be found. These words were later clarified by others; they became the ‘Corbie- Bray road’.This so-called clarification, which was not of the sergeant’s doing, moved his lorries from the east side of the Morlancourt Ridge (the Ancre River side) to the west (Somme River) side. Taking the closest point of the Corbie to Bray road to the location described by Franklyn, the unnecessary literary help moved the lorries a minimum of 600 yards south-east from where he had placed them. If we take 200 yards from the crash site as a bench mark, and interpret it as favourably as possible, the lorries will have been moved by almost one mile and into clear German view. It will be recalled that the Corbie to Bray road was considered to be dangerous in daylight and that vehicular traffic either moved along it at night or very rapidly.

The War Diary of the 4th AA Defences records ‘F’ Battery as having shot down a German aeroplane on 22 April. Franklyn’s claim is not helped by another witness. Lieutenant P Hutton, who claims that the two aeroplanes were DeHavilland DH5s. These machines had a very distinctive back-stagger of their top wing but unfortunately, the DH5 was no longer in service in France in April 1918.

Franklyn sent a detailed hand-written account of the action to John Coltman in which he stated that the reports that von Richthofen was flying a Fokker

Triplane were untrue! According to him he had been flying an Albatros biplane. The plain truth is that during a long battle there are no weekend breaks to separate the days and they soon tended to blend together. For one person to recall exactly when something happened, albeit only about ten days earlier, he would often have to ask somebody else or to consult the War Diary. ‘F’ Battery definitely shot down a German aeroplane which crashed nearby, but one day later than the Richthofen affair.

2. Corporal William C Gamble

In June 1984, in Volume 55. No.2 of the Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Victoria, Australia, there appeared an article by Ronald East, on the autobiography, itself unpublished, written in 1978 by former Corporal Gamble who had served with the 25th Machine Gun Company in WW1.

Gamble described how he saw three Triplanes flying between Le Hamel and Villers-Bretonneux. One of them separated from the other two and dived down to attack a British aeroplane which had been flying too low down for Gamble to see. A standard story of von Richthofen chasing May up the cliff and over to the north-east towards the 55th and 53rd Batteries then follows. Gamble did not see Brown attack the Triplane, that would have been hidden from him by the terrain.

Gamble and his crew opened fire on the red Triplane after it levelled off over the crest and headed north. He supplied two sketches, one horizontal and the other vertical, which Ronald East included in the article. They depict the trajectory of his shots. Aiming in front of the fuselage, he fired a whole pannier of 47 rounds upwards and semi-frontally at the left-hand side of the Triplane. The Triplane turned right – north-east – and he remarked to his crew:‘Well, at least we saved our chap’s life.’ He marvelled that an aeroplane could pass through so many bullets without the pilot being injured, although from later information received, he came to believe that he had hit him. Shortly afterwards, the other two German aeroplanes came within range and he opened fire on them too, but without any observed results.

With the German attack expected any day, before he could report the event to his officer, his gun team was moved down to the low ground between Le Hamel and Corbie. On the 24th he was caught in a barrage of poison gas shells, and then wounded in the head the next day, eventually losing an eye. He never did file a claim.

Corporal Gamble obviously fired at the von Richthofen Triplane and may even have put a few shots through some fabric, but his sketches show clearly that he could not have inflicted the right-to-left wound.

3. Private Ernest Boore

The London Daily Express, 20 March 1995. published a

APPENDIX К: LATER CLAIMS TO FAME

story sub-titled Foot Soldier Grabbed Rifle to Shoot Down German Ace, says family. Private Boore’s grandson said: ‘I can remember Grandad holding up his trigger finger and telling me,“That’s the finger that shot down the Red Baron.”

Ernie’s close friend Bill Carless, who was still alive at the time, clarified that Ernie had tears in his eyes as he explained how he had seen the Red Baron firing at this Canadian. Ernie, who had no weapon at the time, snatched a rifle from a New Zealander, pointed it and hit the Baron with a single shot.

The Daily Express consulted the RAF Museum, Hendon, London, where they were told that Ernies story was possible. It agreed with Professor Nixons medical report. The Museum also confirmed [the obvious], that Captain Browns squadron had forced [sic] von Richthofen down so low that he could have been hit by a shot from the ground.

If Private Boore formed part of Lieutenant Wood’s platoon or was somewhere near it. the story is possible. The only error present is in the clarification provided by an official at Hendon, viz: the reason why the Baron was flying so low down.

Unfortunately the reporter who wrote the story, did not mention where Private Boore was standing at the time which makes it impossible to evaluate his claim until such information is discovered or provided.

4. Private Theodore Henzell

A newspaper clipping with the page heading missing but known to be from Brisbane, around 1986, presented the claim of a pensioner who, in 1918, was serving in the Australian 3rd Trench Mortar Battery. Due to illness, he was on light duties and was serving as a batman to a lieutenant (unidentified) who was stationed in Vaux-sur-Somme.

Private Henzell said that on 21 April, at Vaux, he watched a German aeroplane shoot down two British observation balloons. The aeroplane changed direction and was heading directly towards him. With his.303 rifle and standing slightly to the left of the flight path, he fired one shot at it from about 80 yards range. The German aeroplane, which he defined as a Fokker, nosed downwards and crashed about 1,000 yards away near some British trenches. He claimed that the angle of his shot agreed with the results of: ’… years of painstaking research…. into the medical records which showed that he [von R] had been killed by a bullet which entered his chest on the left side, piercing his heart and exited behind the right shoulder.’ Unfortunately the only painful thing for Private Henzell is that the true original medical records state no such thing, although some edited combinations of the First and the Second Reports do.

The Baron, who regarded a live, effective pilot as more valuable to Germany that a dead hero, would never go near an observation balloon, and in his earlier career was fortunate enough never to be ordered to do so. There is no evidence that he ever even contemplated such a move in his entire combat career. Very wise.

5. Trooper William Howell

In 1969, the Melbourne newspaper, 77i<* Age, published the story of a member of the Australian Light Horse, Trooper W Howell. He stated that he had fired his.303 rifle at the Triplane that was flying at a height equivalent to about’three gum trees’.The Australian eucalyptus (or gum) tree grows quite tall, so the height at which he placed the Triplane is quite possible as von Richthofen was climbing, heading east after surviving the shots fired by Buie, Evans – and Gamble. Howell was supposed to be quite good at deflection shooting and allowing for the wind.

Unfortunately the reporter who wrote this story did not mention where Howell was standing either, which also makes it impossible to evaluate his claim until such information can be found.

The above stories are just a few of the many which have appeared over the years in various forms. Most have some basis of truth, but the only thing that brings them together is the fact that all eventually become part of the Richthofen legend. Author Norman Franks remembers vividly looking at a display ofWWl model aeroplanes some years ago outside a shop window in Twickenham, Middlesex.

An elderly gentleman came along and stopped, looking keenly at a large model of the Baron’s red Fokker Triplane. He was obviously eager to relate some tale about it as he turned first to the left and then to the right to see if anyone was in earshot. Finally looking behind him. he saw Franks. Without hesitation the man said:‘I saw him come down, you know.’ Franks looked interested. ‘Yes, he was quite near me and he climbed out of his cockpit, gave his iron cross to one Tommy and his scarf to another, then they took him away to prison camp.’ A companion standing next to Franks, as the old gentleman walked away, the smile of recollection on his face, enquired why Franks did not chase after him and ask him more about it. The reader can imagine what Franks said in response!

The thing is, the old gentleman believed unquestioningly that the German pilot was Baron von Richthofen. He had obviously witnessed something similar while in France and over the intervening years he had associated this with Richthofen because that became a well known event. Or was he just shooting a line…?