Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

Wild Card: Star Wars

Iran goes nuclear. Few other states within the region start showing signals that they have nuclear intentions (say Japan, Saudi Arabia). India successfully develops missile defence shield. Nuclear weapons lose their shine as weapons of deterrence. China claims that ultimate high ground is space and best deterrence is space weapons. It proposes a programme for space-based weapons and successfully demonstrates few weapons by testing. India and Japan demonstrates their capabil­ities in regard to satellite jamming technologies. Space becomes a vital factor in global military power balance.


This chapter carried out a short appraisal about few of the important drivers in regard to various spacefaring nations in Asia. For these nations, space has become a vital element for growth. Some parts of Asia have already witnessed the impact of space technology on the society. They have experienced its utility in various facets of life from weather forecasting to education to navigation to intelligence gathering. Both ‘space’ haves and have-nots in the region consider this technology as an instrument of change. For them, this technology also has a major military relevance.

However, even after two to three decades, many Asian states are predicted to remain earthbound. They would try to get maximum benefits of space technology by engaging spacefaring nations. Given the steady growth of various existing and emerging space programmes in the region, it is expected that coming years would witness a profound impact of this technology on Asia’s culture and commerce on one hand and society and security on other.

Concept of Asia and Relevance of Space Technologies

In recent years, the idea of Asia is generating great excitement. The resurgence of Asia is resulting as a turning point in the world history. The emerging Asia is no longer been viewed with the earlier stereotyped vision as a quagmire of poverty, illiteracy, religious fundamentalism and border disputes. The region’s different identity in terms of faiths, religions, cultures, political systems and economic inequalities is now been skillfully used by the Asian states for their own development. Various regions of Asia have acknowledged the liberal and democratic values of the West but at the same time have identified and adopted their own model linked to their respective cultures and values.

Over the years, knowledge economy has played a major role towards the growth of Asia. This concept of knowledge needs to be viewed in a more holistic sense while debating Asian growth. Knowledge could be said to contribute both as a product and also as a tool towards this development. The application of knowledge in science and technology has played a crucial role towards the growth and development in this region. The region has a history of various scientific inventions to its credit. However, for last few centuries major inventions have originated mainly from the European and American soil. Fundamental research has not been the Asian forte for many years now. Nevertheless, some change is being witnessed in this field recently. Presently, major emphases have been given for applied research by various Asian states. But, in overall analysis for many years, the internal stimuli for innovative research have mostly behind been found lacking in some sectors of science and technology. Interestingly, the narrative in regard to the rocket science and high technology looks bit different. Space technology is one area where the contributions by few Asian states have been noteworthy particularly both in basic and applied fields during last few decades. Military angle behind the development of rocket science in Asian states should not be ruled out. In turn space science also appears to have benefited from this.

This book is an attempt to explore the character and counters of the Asian Space Race. The book talks about the successful use of space technologies made by spacefaring Asian states towards achieving their socioeconomic mandate, increasing the global footprint in commercial sector and factoring these technologies in their

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security calculus. The book also talks about the investments being made by non – spacefaring Asian states in this field. The book could be viewed as an attempt made towards understanding the space agendas of Asian states and their relationships with other states (both inter – and intra-regional) in respect of cooperation, geopolitics, strategic relevance and economics.

This chapter, more as a backgrounder, attempts to develop the context for this book by taking into account the Asian settings and situating the relevance of space technologies into it. It starts with underlining few basic facts mainly with a view to reiterate and set the tone form the point of view of this work.


Malaysia is one of the most important states in the Southeast Asian region comprising of 11 states. Malaysia was subject to the British Empire and gained independence on Aug 31, 1957. The Malaysian economy has enjoyed steady growth since independence, and particularly in recent years, the main export earners have been electronics and electrical machinery.[150] In 1981, Mahathir Mohamad, a charismatic and outspoken doctor, became prime minister of the country and is recognised as main of architect of Malaysia’s growth story. He played a major towards developing industry and was also instrumental for bringing science and technology in policy focus.

In space arena, Malaysia has started making its presence visible in the binging of twenty-first century. Interestingly, country’s foray into this highly specialised field began way back in the 1960s when the plan for the country’s space programme was first put into place. Subsequently, not much of growth was witnessed. Malaysia’s satellite programme officially could be said to have started in the 1990s with the construction of its first communication satellite receiving station. In 1988, the Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing (MACRES)/Remote Sensing Malaysia was established to assume research and development in the field of remote sensing. The development of satellite technology in Malaysia was largely shaped by the country’s National Telecommunication Policy (NTP) which called for Malaysia to have its own satellite and stated that ‘Continued reliance on other countries’ satellites will create future problems in terms of security and balance of payments’.[151]

The Malaysian policy for last two decades appears to be concentrating on two fronts. They are investing in satellites technologies with socioeconomic relevance and are using space technologies as a tool to undertake symbolic activities and to raise the sense of nationalism amongst its population. The Malaysian National Space Agency (ANGKASA), established in 2002, is officially responsible for all activities in space domain related to strategic planning and policy formulation. It is also expected to provide leadership in the educational aspects and the research of space science. Another agency called Astronautic Technology Sdn Bhd (ATSB) has been established in 1997 which focuses on designing and development of space- qualified systems. Apart from these two, a separate institute of space science is undertaking research work in areas like microgravity experiments, space weather and ionosphere studies.

Few years before the formation of this state-owned agency, the first satellite for Malaysia was launched in 1996 under the commercial agreement. The MEASAT-1 (Malaysia East Asia Satellite No. 1) became Malaysia’s first communications satellite when it was launched on Ariane rockets from Europe’s Spaceport in

Kourou, French Guiana. The satellite was followed up with two more launches, MEASAT-2 in 1996 and MEASAT-3 in 2006. MEASAT-1 was a commercial communications satellite that was developed to provide Malaysia with a greater communications infrastructure. These satellites offers communications services that include telephony, television, business networks and data transmission network for the region covering an area spanning from India to Hawaii and from Japan to east Australia.[152]

In 2000, ANGKASA launched the micro-satellite, TiungSat-1, for Earth observationf imaging. This was a unique mission with satellites orbital inclination being nearly equatorial. This was an exceptional case in regard to the imagery satellites which normally maintain much higher inclinations, often neglecting equatorial regions. However, for Malaysia, its geographical position had different demands hence this particular mission configuration. This satellite was developed through a technology exchange between ANGKASA and the British micro-satellite manufacturer, SSTL, and was launched aboard a Russian Proton rocket from Baikonur. Named after a variety of a singing mynah bird, this satellite operates on amateur radio frequencies and has remote sensing capability. It also carries a cosmic energy deposition experiment. In the summer of 2009, ANGKASA launched another micro-satellite, RazakSat with the South Korean help. It is meant for imaging, and was launched at the Kwajalein Atoll by the Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) launch vehicle, Falcon 1. This satellite covers 51 nations, most of them developing and located near the equator. This launch has helped the state to forge cooperation with some of these countries and help realise the solution to numerous remote sensing problems facing the developing nations especially those in need of appropriate space technology.[153]

On Oct 10, 2011 Malaysia celebrated its 4th anniversary of sending its first man (they identify astronaut as Angkasawan) into the space. In the recent history of this country, it was a unique movement when the Malaysian man landed on the International Space Station aboard a Soyuz spacecraft. This act has given major moral boost for their space programme and has helped increase in interest in science and technology within Malaysia. Other benefits like increase in the nationalistic feeling were obvious, going by the euphoria it had set in the country during the actual mission.

As part of the effort to nurture interest in satellite development and space launch vehicle, ANGKASA has initiated the SiswaSAT and water rocket competition.[154] All such attempts are aimed at providing platforms for students to enrich knowledge, acquire experience and exchange information in relation to space technology. Such investments needs to be viewed as an attempt of the administration of create interest in rocket science and make the next generation ready to enter in space field. However, it is important to note that Malaysia has much to achieve in the space arena and need to invest in cutting edge technologies for the purposes of indigenous development of satellites and space launch vehicles.

For a developing country like Malaysia, their investments in space appear to be directed in correct direction. Understanding its own the technological constraints, the state is engaging other global players mostly under commercial collaborations to gain access to space. One interesting aspect of their space programme is that they fulfilled their ambition of space travel by a Malaysian under an offset policy with the Russians. Because of purchase of their defence equipments from Russia, the state allowed them to send a Malaysian man to the space station free of cost. The country is keen to develop its satellite launching sites to provide facilities for space launches. They understand that the state needs to exploit its geographical position which allows sending satellites to be space in a faster time and at less cost. Presently, Malaysia is trying to fulfil its overall space vision but suffers from financial limitations.

Space Shuttle and Space Station

For mankind, space exploration has always been a mix of curiosity, utility and profitability. Any ambitious space plan mostly becomes successful provided trained manpower, technology support and adequate funding is available. Societal, scientific and educational requirements have been the key focus for the Asian investments in space arena. They seek space capabilities mainly to achieve developmental goals. At the same time, since the involution of their space programmes, few Asian states have dreamed big like sending manned missions to space.

Asian states are aware of the fact that their achievements in space arena indirectly boost up their global status. Simultaneously, these states also realise the correlation of their achievements to nationalism. Asian spacefaring states understand the significance of Sputnik launch and the success of Apollo missions. Over the years, the space investments of these states have also helped them to expand their technology trajectory. These states have ambitions in space arena which are beyond the conventional uses of satellite technology like remote sensing, communication and navigation. They dream to have human space flights, build space stations and undertake missions to Moon and Mars.

This chapter limits itself towards discussing the Asian interests in human space flights, development of space shuttles and establishing space stations.


Iran is an ancient country which experienced two full-scale revolutions in the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, this state has been looked with ‘interest’ by many particularly because of its nuclear and anti-West policies. Obviously, Iran’s policies have important security implications both at regional and global levels. Iran is fully aware of its geostrategic importance and significance of its oil economy for the rest of the world. The state is found formulating its economic, political and strategic policies firmly, precisely and with full awareness of these circumstances.

As per the report published, Science-Metrix—a Montreal-based company ded­icated to the quantitative and qualitative evaluation and measurement of science, technology and innovation—in 2010 ‘geopolitical shifts in knowledge creation’ is taking place. Since 1980, the standard growth in the West Asia, particularly in Iran

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and Turkey, is found nearly four times faster than the world average, and Iran is showing fastest worldwide growth in science. Iran’s publications have somewhat emphasised on nuclear chemistry and particle physics; the country has also made significant progress in medical science agriculture development, stem cell and cloning research. The published work also covers field of aerospace technologies.1

It is interesting to note that despite political tensions between the USA and Iran, scientific collaboration has proven surprisingly resilient. Between the periods 1996— 2002 to 2004-2008, co-authored papers between these two countries increased from just 388 papers to 1,831 papers, an increase of 472%. Following the Iranian elections in June 2009, Iranian scientists called out to the international research community to ‘do everything possible to promote continued contact with colleagues in Iran, if only to promote detente between Iran and the West when relations are contentious’.[9] [10]

Iran has been keen to develop space technology for many years. Its interests in technical as well as arms control issues related to space sciences and technologies go back to late 1950s. It was 1 of the 24 founding members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) during 1959 and has also signed the Outer Space Treaty (OST) in late 1960s.

The history of Iran’s space efforts and its drive to pursue independent space projects began during the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, king of Iran’s (1941­1979) time. During Shah’s reign in 1977, an idea was mooted to establish an Iranian communications satellite system. In addition, several Iranian organisations were involved in plans to send small research satellites into space that would pave the way for launching a military intelligence-gathering satellite. However, not much of activity took place for almost two decades in this regard. By 1997, few reports originated giving details of a Russian-Iranian agreement on the transfer of technology enabling Iran to build its own research satellite. The name of the proposed satellite, Mesbah (variously translated as ‘dawn’, ‘lighthouse’ and ‘flashlight’), was announced in 1999. Few were of the opinion that actually a spy satellite launch has been planned [1]. Iran had plans of launching three satellites by 2002-2003; however, it took 6 more years to become a spacefaring nation.

Iran’s first satellite called Sinah-1 was launched on October 28, 2005, by Russia from the Plesetsk Space Center. It was reported that on August 17, 2008, Iran had attempted to launch a dummy satellite by using the two-stage rocket called Safir, but the rocket had failed shortly after liftoff. Within 6 months on Feb 3, 2009, Iran successfully launched its first domestically manufactured satellite ‘Omid’ (Hope), which was carried into space by the Safir-2 space rocket. Since both the launcher and the satellite were made in Iran and also the launch was carried out form Iranian soil, it could be said that Iran achieved the status of the spacefaring nation on that day.

As discussed elsewhere in this book, Iranian effort to advance its space pro­gramme is generally being viewed as a case of using civil space programme clandestinely to manufacture longer-range missiles and also to indirectly demon­strate their missile capability. During the year 2000, the then Iranian Defense Minister, Ali Shamkhani had announced that Iran was investing in space technology to strengthen the country’s deterrence capabilities. He had mentioned that “we are also investing in production of that military equipment that, with minimum cost, can have maximum effects on our deterrence capabilities. In fact we are investing in [our access] to space technology or its prerequisite field like missile technology by improving the range, accuracy, and destruction power of missiles. This is one of our main aims [2].” However, the overall progress made by Iran post-2009 onwards indicates that Iran has interest in developing its space programme too (could be for civil and military applications), and it could be incorrect to view their space programme only as covert means to demonstrate their missile capabilities.

Eight years of Iran-Iraq conflict (September 1980 to August 1988) had played a major role for significantly corrupting Iran’s various socioeconomic structures. Naturally, after the end of conflict in order to rebuild the state, Iran started making efforts at social, political and economic levels. Reformist leaders like Muhammad Khatami helped the country to view space power capabilities as a vehicle for modernity. Iran’s vision in regard to its ambitions in space could be judged from the goals enumerated at a 2002 UNCOPUOS meeting. Promoting international cooperation based on concepts of joint benefits and commercialisation of space programme appears to be the key focus of the Iran’s space agenda.[11] Iran apparently attempted to meet some of the above-noted goals starting in April 2003. The legislature approved a bill to create the Iranian Space Agency (ISA) to serve as a policy-formulating organisation for space initiatives. The ISA performs research on remote sensing projects and coordinates various space-related activities within the country.[12]

Iran’s international collaboration with few states appears to have helped towards development of its space programme. Post 1995, Iran was reported to be working together with a number of Asian countries in constructing a small research satellite.

The cooperation in Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) project was jointly signed by China, Iran, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan and Thailand on April 22,1998, in Bangkok. Bangladesh joined the programme in 1999. Subsequently, till 2005 various project committee meetings were held. It has been reported that China, Thailand and Iran were working on a joint Small Multimission Spacecraft (SMMS) devoted to civilian remote-sensing and communications experiments.[13] Probably, the aim was to provide Iran and Pakistan a semi-autonomous space-imaging capability. No further details about this project are available; however, active participation by Iran should have given it the exposure and access to various related technologies.

A locally produced satellite Rasad-1 (Observation-1) satellite was launched by Iran during June 2011. This was Iran’s second independently launched satellite and by using the same Saflr rocket used for the first launched. This LEO satellite was placed into orbit 260 km above the Earth, and it beams back to earth pictures with 150-m resolution.

The Safir is the first Iranian expendable launch system meant to place a satellite into the orbit. In February 2008, Iran launched a sounding rocket into outer space to mark the opening of its first space centre.[14] This rocket essentially belonged to the ‘category’ of instrument-carrying crafts. Such crafts are designed to take measurements and perform scientific experiments during their suborbital flight. A suborbital test flight, named Kavoshgar-1, was conducted on February 4, 2008. As per experts, Kavoshgar-1 bores a close resemblance to Iran’s longer-range missile Shahab-3. Iranian officials have declared that Kavoshgar-1 used a two-stage rocket. Iran had launched Kavoshgar-2, which carried a space-lab and a restoration system in November 2008. The Kavoshgar-3 was launched on February 3, 2010, with one rodent, two turtles and several worms into suborbital space and returned them to Earth alive. Subsequently, Iran had announced to carry a monkey into the space. On March 15, 2011, the Kavoshgar-4 rocket carrying the capsule designed to carry a live monkey was launched, but there were no living creatures on board. Later it was acknowledged by Iran that the Kavoshgar-5 rocket carrying a capsule with a live animal (a monkey) and the mission was launched during Shahrivar, an Iranian calendar month spanning August 23 to September 22,2011, but the mission failed.[15]

On February 3, 2012, Iran successfully launched a new domestically manufac­tured satellite called Navid (Herald). It has been manufactured by Iran University of Science and Technology. It was sent into space aboard the Safir rocket. The satellite weighs about 50 kg in weight and is designed to collect data on weather conditions and monitor for natural disasters. It has advanced control technology, a higher resolution camera and photocells to generate power. Iran also proposes to

launch two more domestically designed satellites dubbed Fajr (Dawn) and Tolou (Sunrise) in near future.[16]

Iran has various plans for future to launch reconnaissance and communication satellites of different make. Italy was building a telecommunication satellite for Iran called Mesbah,[17] and Russia was expected to launch it. However, both the states have gone back on their promise probably due to the sanctions issue. Tehran is keen to receive the satellite from Italy because it is now confident that it could launch this satellite by using own rocket launcher. However, having understood the geopolitical compulsions, Iran has also begun construction of a derivative of the Italian satellite called Mesbah-2. Iran’s ambitions are not limited towards launching satellites only, and the state has announced that they propose putting a man in orbit space by 2019 and also propose to undertake a manned moon mission by 2025.

Iran has also plans to establish a national satellite launch base in the southeast of the country, adjacent to the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has ordered his cabinet to approve the plan and earmark funding for the project.[18]

Iran’s public articulation about its future plans in space arena indicates that there is clarity about its space roadmap for future and the state intends to become a leading space power by 2020-2025. Post 2008, Iran has successfully undertaken two independent satellite launches. Iranian authorities over the years have claimed that their satellite programme is meant for scientific research and exploiting its civilian utility. However, the Iranian space programme is a growing source of international unease. States like the USA, the UK, France and Israel have reacted negatively to the Iranian satellite launch capability. In their view, Iran’s space capability implicitly demonstrates that Iran is inching closer towards ballistic missile capability. They feel that along with its covert nuclear weapon programme, Iran is simultaneously working towards developing technology for delivering nuclear weapons. In overall assessment till now, Iran has successfully demonstrated rudimentary space launch capabilities. Iran’s second satellite the Rasad-1 weighs around 50 kg. This clearly indicates that Iran is yet to produce a launcher comparable to the power and sophistication of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Iran appears to be following a twofold agenda of developing satellite systems with dual use utility. Satellites meant for the reconnaissance and telecommunica­tions have both civilian and military usages. However, such investments by Iran cannot be challenged because every other spacefaring nation has similar benefits. At the same time, a direct correlation exists between Iran’s (covert) nuclear ambitions and the gains which they are expected to receive for their ballistic missile programme from the satellite-launching systems. From Iran’s point of view, nuclear and space arena are directly related to their national pride. Looking at their present level of development in the space arena, it looks unlikely that Iran could realise its stated ambition of manned moon mission within next 10-15 years. However, a space visit for an Iranian astronaut could not be ruled out particularly if China offers Iran a trip to their space station. As of 2012, Iran could be viewed as a late entrant but moderately progressing actor in this field. Iran’s nuclear ambitions when seen in unison with its investments in space clearly signify their strategic interest and intentions.


Japan has a two-pronged approach to satellite navigation. First, to make use of the globally available US GPS System by incorporating additional features to make it more accurate and applicable for their area of interest and secondly, to develop a regional network of own satellites.

The topography and terrain of Japan does not permit the GPS signals to penetrate every portion of the country, resulting in the underperforming of the GPS system. In this nation of mountains and skyscrapers, at times the strength of signals gets depleted, and navigation systems particularly those used on the ground in various types of vehicles are found ineffective. To augment the strength of GPS, Japan has developed the MSAS (MTSAT[206] Satellite-based Augmentation System). It is essentially an overlay system for increasing the accuracy of the GPS navigation by transmitting differential information.[207] This system was conceived during the 1990s, and the first satellite MTSAT-1 was launched in 1999; however, there was a launch failure of H2 launch vehicle. The MTSAT system is designed to consist of one or two satellites, depending on the time frame and two Ground Earth Stations (GES) per MTSAT.

Finally, the first satellite in the MSAS space segment, MTSAT-1R, went into orbit in 2005. Japan launched its second Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT-2) on February 18, 2006, thus opening a new phase of precision air navigation and air traffic control (ATC) over the western Pacific Ocean. This five-ton satellite is the

heaviest ever launched by Japan and is operating in a circular geostationary orbit. The on-board transponders of this satellite offer another link for Japan’s MSAS, relaying differential GPS corrections and integrity messages to suitably equipped users. One interesting feature of this satellite is that being a multifunction satellite, first the meteorological payload of MTSAR-1R was operational for five years, and later during July 2010 meteorological payload of MTSAT-2 became prime which was earlier placed into standby mode (summer of 2006) until the end of 5 years. The system is supposed to seize off in 2015/2016.

The major beneficiaries of the MSAS are the aircraft operating on routes across the Pacific. The improved navigation accuracy and associated communication links allow the planes to operate close together along the most travelled routes. In addition to the GPS navigation data, MSAS provides data links to and from ATC control centres and facilitates the automatic transmission of aircraft locations to controllers when they are out of the range of ground-based ATC radars. In addition to the L-band GPS broadcasts, MTSAT provides voice and data communications over Ku- and Ka-band frequencies. This satellite also provides weather-related inputs.[208]

In 2000, Japanese Regional Navigation Satellite System (JRANS) concept was developed by the Japanese industry and was discussed and debated with the government representatives as well as the US government and industry personnel. Its purpose was to satisfy current and future operational requirements and assure full compatibility and interoperability with GPS.

After much deliberation during 2003, Japan has started a new project of Quasi­Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). This system consists of three satellites meant to provide a regional satellite positioning service as well as communication and broadcasting services. The configuration is such that each satellite is in three different orbit planes, which are obtained by inclining the geostationary orbit (GEO) by about 45°. At least one satellite is expected to stay around the zenith for about eight hours and would be visible with a higher elevation angle in mid-latitude area (e. g. at least 80° in Tokyo) than in case of using a satellite in GEO. This characteristic would be beneficial for large cities with several tall buildings which block the signal from satellites in GEO. This would vastly improve the satellite positioning and mobile communication services.[209]

The project is devised as a public-private partnership. The proposal is to develop a programme in a two-phase build-up of quasi-zenith (QZO), then another quasi­zenith and geostationary orbiting satellites (QZO and GEO). Phase one will have three satellites in quasi-zenith orbit, and Phase two will have four satellites in QZO andGEO [2].

Currently, Phase one of this project is underway. In QZSS, satellites are meant to orbit in a figure of eight patterns over Japan and the East Asian region. They would

be at a high elevation angle over Japan. This would make extra positioning signals available in urban Japan. The first of the QZSS satellites (known as Michibiki) was successfully launched in September 2010. The full operational status is expected by 2013.[210]

Michibiki (a name that means ‘guidance’ in Japanese) operates from an altitude of about 40,000 km. Japan has developed this satellite as a multipurpose satellite for aircraft, tsunami detection and ground traffic management. But the Michibiki alone cannot be the solution. As mentioned earlier, each satellite would be above Japan for about 8 h each day; hence, all three satellites are required for 24-h coverage.

Japan has a cooperative agreement with the USA since 1998 for use of GPS for civilian purposes. This was reviewed on January 13, 2011. During this meeting, the extent of cooperation was extended to include Japan’s Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT), Satellite-based Augmentation System (MSAS) and Quasi­Zenith Satellite Systems (QZSS).[211] Japan’s policy appears to be to develop its own regional system and also have maximum benefits from the GPS.

Tool for Socioeconomic Development

One of the major foci of Asian states is to develop space programmes for the purposes of socioeconomic development. Their requirements have been in areas of meteorology, communication, disaster management and remote sensing. This technology becomes a powerful tool for resources management, food security, fisheries, rural development, health care and education. Japan-China-India have achieved much of the success in all these fields and are expected to make further improvements in their existing sensor technologies. They are likely to own enhanced imaging capability in near future. With issues related to climate change taking a centre stage, the future satellites would be launched for continuous observation to

monitor global warming and climate change. In 2009, Japan launched a satellite (‘Ibuki’) for monitoring greenhouse gases around the world. India is also planning to launch by 2012 a satellite to monitor greenhouse gas emissions.12 States like China and India which have become global ‘punching bags’ on the subject of climate change would require to have own systems in space for monitoring climate change. This may also allow them to challenge false claims (if any) against them by the western world. It is important to note that space technology could help in to bring transparency in the system.

The states in Asia are presently at varying levels of proficiency regarding the use of space for broadcasting, communications, meteorology and mapping. They are found using either their homebuilt or other foreign satellites in conjunction with their own ground stations [7]. In near future, space novice Asian states would mostly depend on powers like USA, Russia, EU and China for their requirements. On the whole, for all states in Asia, satellite technology is expected to continue to play an important role as a tool for socioeconomic development. Role of technology is expected to increase significantly in the field of data monitoring for weather observations, climate change and for the purposes of disaster management.

China’s Space Programme

China’s space programme has been one of the most debated programmes in the recent past. Various analysts and academicians have written extensively on different aspects of this programme. This chapter offers a broad overview of the China’s space agenda. China being the most significant space player in Asia, various specifics of their space agenda are being discussed in detail in some of the other chapters of this book too. This chapter only makes brief mention of such space activities to avoid duplication.

It has become practically a predictable wisdom that China is the post-Cold War world’s emerging great power that poses the most intricate questions for the future of international security [1]. The last decade (2000-2010) has shown a substantial growth in China’s global power status. This has essentially happened because of the current and ‘projected’ economic transformation of China. The economic growth in China has accelerated along with increased integration with the global economy [2]. The progression of economic liberalisation has shown the world the magnitude of China’s labour force, creativity, and purchasing power; its commitment to development; and its degree of national cohesion [3]. Today, ‘rise of China’ (the term coined in 2003 by China’s political establishment is peaceful rise of China[92]) has become a part of a lexicon, and the global community understands that China has ‘arrived’ and will increasingly shape the global future, not just its own.

To a large extent, this has become possible because of the correct strategic choices made by China regarding economic liberalisation. A number of factors lie behind this new global perception of China, and Chinese investments in the field of science and technology are one of them. Particularly, China’s various accomplish­ments in the space technology arena have contributed remarkably towards making ‘rise of China’ a reality.

The present Chinese space policy represents long tale of struggle, both do­mestically and internationally, as a historically great power sought to return to international prominence. Today, China could be viewed to be standing at the pinnacle of international space prestige hierarchy, alongside Russia and the USA [4]. The Chinese struggle is commendable because in limited time it has succeeded in at least selectively closing some gap two ‘space superpowers’. However, China’s space policies have been found bit opaque. Also, there appears to be less clarity about China’s actual intentions in regard to the weaponisation of space.

During 2006, China celebrated 50th anniversary of its space evolution. Their space programme is an extensive arrangement for lofting Earth-orbiting satellites for a large number of duties, expanding its human space flight abilities and carrying out a multistep programme of lunar exploration and mission to explore Mars. At this time, five of their different operational systems are in service, namely, telecommunications, meteorological, Earth remote sensing, as well as recoverable satellites and technology demonstration spacecraft.[93] China has various other plans in space arena from establishing a space station to having missions to Moon and Mars. The first phases of many of these plans have already been successfully completed. Also, the dual-use nature of space technology is fast influencing the development of their military thinking and China is founding making intelligent investments into technologies having strategic significance.

China’s space programme could be said to have began in the late 1950s when the State Council implemented the ‘12 year development plan of science and technology’, which included rocket programming, radio electronics, automatic control and computer and semiconductor technology [5]. Over last five decades, China has established a well-balanced and coordinated infrastructure of space – related institutions, including research and development centres, launching sites, tracking, telemetry and command stations and centres and manufacturing plants. For last decade or so, China is on a fast track into space. The achievements and announcements about launch timetables, space laboratories, shuttles, space stations, lunar bases and Mars mission have swiftly transformed the Chinese space programme [6, p. 51].

The China’s space programme initially began with an agenda to promote its Maoist ideology. It has transcended that ideology’s decline to become a major political symbol of Chinese nationalism, an important economic sector, and an effective dual-use technology collaborator with the Chinese military. In twenty-first century, the programme has become more important than ever before to China’s communist regime [7].

China’s civilian and military space programmes are tightly interwoven. The China National Space Administration (CNSA-established in June 1993) carries out the management and operation of China’s space activities [8]. The organisational structure and evolution of China’s space programme is complicated and constantly undergoing change. Probably, the dual-use potential of the Chinese space pro­gramme dictates such changes.

China Aerospace Corporation (CASC) a subordinate to CNSA, this state-owned corporation directs five primary divisions responsible for building military missiles and civilian rockets: the Academy of Launch Vehicles (ALV), which designs and manufactures the Long March rocket series; the Academy of Space Technology, which design and manufactures satellites; the Academy of Solid-Fuel Rockets (ASFR); the Academy of Tactical Missile Technology; and the Academy of Cruise Missile Technology [7].

China’s space programme has withstood stages of rough beginning, reform and revival and untrustworthy international cooperation. Over the years, the Chinese space industry has been developed almost from a non-existent industrial infrastruc­ture and scientific and technological level to a modern business. After a struggle of five decades, China today is ranked amongst the fastest advancing countries in fields such as communication, remote sending, reconnaissance and navigation. They have made considerable progress in arenas like manned spacecraft, satellite recovery, multi-satellite launch by a single rocket, cryogenic propulsion, strap-on boosters, geostationary satellites, satellite tracking and control, remote sensing, communications and navigation satellites and microgravity experiments.3

China’s technological and military leadership, understanding the socioeconomic and strategic relevance of space technologies, and simultaneously appreciating the technological challenges involved, has prepared a roadmap for the future outlining plans for research, investment and development in this field. The dynamic nature of technology and strategic considerations of the nation-state demand the regular updating of such plans. Till date, China has published three White Papers on space issues in 2000, 2006 and 2011. They have been published by the information office of the State Council in order to map the activities in space. They highlight the progress made so far, spell out plans for the following 5 years, discuss developmental policies and measures undertaken till then, proposals for future, and, finally, to underline international exchanges and cooperation.

The first official White Paper (2000) primarily describes Chinese achievements in space since 1956, thus filling an information gap regarding the development of the Chinese space programme during these 45 years. Detailing the various technologies and areas in which China has made progress, the paper highlights the fact that the PRC was confident enough about its progress in space to release a White Paper, making public its overall status. The 2006 White Paper also analyses the success of the Chinese space programme. The paper shows that the Chinese government managed to achieve a number of stated goals. It also enumerated the plan for the

Table 7.1 Projections made in the White Papers

White Paper (2000)

White Paper (2006)

White Paper (2011)

Achieve marketisation and

Improve the carrier

Improving ground facilities for

industrialisation of space


receiving, processing,



distributing and applying satellite data

Complete manned space flight

Develop Earth

Expand value-added business in

system and scientific research in the field



satellite communication

Exploration studies in outer space

Develop satellite remote sensing applications

Work on lunar surface landing

Upgrade the level and capacity of

Achieve spacecraft

Explore the properties of dark

the launch vehicles

rendezvous and docking

matter particles

Improving the performance and

Achieve lunar

Continue work on space debris

reliance of the ‘Long March group of rocket launchers

orbiting probe

monitoring and mitigation and spacecraft protection

Realise manned space flight

Original and important achievements in space

Promote satellite application industry

Establish coordinated and

Continue with

Work on strengthening the

complete national remote

manned space

national space law and

sensing applications


improve related laws

Develop the application

Continue with lunar

Work on space industrial policies

technology for satellite navigation and positioning Space explorations centring on the Moon


guiding and regulating space activities

next 5 years. The third White Paper (2011) highlights the Chinese desire to achieve a Moon landing and establishment of space station. It also sheds light on Chinese ambitions towards a manned mission to the Moon.

Table 7.1 shows the projections made by the Chinese government in the three White Papers.[94]

The White Papers have also been used to list achievements made so far. Table 7.2 offers some details.

It is important to appreciate that even though these White Papers communicate that China’s rise as a spacefaring nation has been visible since 2000, but its efforts

Подпись: White Paper (2006) White Paper (2011)Подпись: Xichang and Taiyuan made progress 6. Research into space environment and also observation, reduction and forecasting of Space debris; and has developed the capability 8. to forecast the Space environment 9. 7. Launched the first lunar probe Chang’e-2 10. 11. Подпись: China’s Space Programme

Table 7.2 Achievements

White Paper (2000)

1. China has developed four types of satellites: recoverable, remote sensing satellites Dongfanghong (DFH), telecommunications satellites Fengyun (FY), meteorological satellites, and Shijian (SJ) scientific research and technological experiments satellites

2. First man-made satellite Dongfanghong I was launched in April 1970

3. By the year 2000, China had launched 47 satellites of various types.

4. Developed the Long March rockets independently; China conducted 63 launches and 21 consecutive successful flights between 1996 and 2000

5. Launched and recovered the first unmanned experimental spacecraft ‘Shenzhou’ in 1999

6. China explored the upper atmosphere with the help of rockets and balloons from the 1960s

7. By the mid-1980s, China began to utilise domestic and foreign telecommunications satellites and developed related technologies. It also began using navigation satellites of other countries

China added Earth resource satellites, Ziyuan 1.

(ZY) and navigation and positioning satellites,

Beidou 2.

2. Developed and launched 22 different types of satellites

3. Long March rockets made 24 consecutive 3.

successful flights

4. Research and development of the 120-ton 4.

thrust liquid/kerosene engine, while the development of the 50-ton thrust 5.

hydrogen-oxygen engine is in progress

5. Construction of three launching sites at Jiquan, 6.

Long March series of rocket launchers undertook with 67 successful launches sending 79 spacecraft into planned orbit Developed the Fengyun (wind and cloud), Haiyang (ocean), Ziyuan (resource), Yaogan (remote sensing) and Tianhui (space mapping) satellites

Initiated the development of a high-resolution Earth observation system

Launched 10 satellites for the Beidou system and provided

services to the Asia-Pacific region

Launched and developed the Shijian (practice) satellites

and small as well as micro-satellites

Launched the manned spaceship and also achieved space

docking between Shenzhou 8 and Tiangong 1, paving the

way for the establishment of the space laboratory and space


Building a new launch site at Hainan

Monitored space debris and provided early warning against


Removed aging GEO satellites out of orbit

Working on protecting manned space flight from space


in this direction had began much earlier. Since the 1950s, it has made steady investments in space sciences and technologies. Interestingly, against the popular perception, no blind political support was available to the Chinese technological community and the PLA in space arena. Leaders like Deng Xiaoping had their own views with regard to making investments in the space arena; Deng was not particularly keen to develop the so-called high-profile projects. Unenthusiastic about ideas regarding manned space capsule and the two-stage-to-orbit horizontal takeoff and landing reusable space shuttle, he did not grant permission to develop these programmes. It is only after Deng resigned as the head of the Chinese Military Commission in 1989 that the Chinese military was able to refocus its interest in this area.[95] Incidentally, the first Chinese White Paper giving details of the proposals for the manned mission and Moon mission was published in 2000, 3 years after Deng’s demise.

Post 2000, China has made considerable (visible) investments in the manned space flight programme. The programme has its roots in an ambitious project that was formulated in early 1992 and initially known under code name 921 [8]. CASC has general authority over manned space flight and Long March series rockets. Ultimately, however, the military (specifically the Second Artillery Corps) controls the Chinese space programme. Although specific efforts have been made towards separating the military aspects from civil/commercial aspects, China like Russia did not initially bifurcate its programme as did the USA [6, p. 60]. CNSA is specifically designated as Chinese counterpart to work with other international space agencies. In reality, CNSA personnel have been dual-hated with the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation [9].

China is capable of launching various types of satellites. China has developed an impressive range of launch rockets to support its military and commercial space assets.[96] Launch vehicle technology is one of the foundations of China’s ambitions space programme. With its Long March (LM) series of launchers, it has achieved a great deal of launcher autonomy. Long March series includes 14 kinds of launch vehicles and 12 types of carrier rockets. The first launch (LM-1) vehicle had successfully launched the first Chinese satellite 173-kg Dongfanghong I into orbit in 1970.[97] On Feb 25, 2012 China has successfully launched the 11th satellite for its Beidou navigational network, and it was the 158th launch of the Long March carrier rockets. During the year 2011, China has launched 19 rockets and 21 satellites into space indicating that the country’s space exploration is ‘highly intensive’.[98] China is developing one of its most powerful rockets to date—Long March-5—that would sport engines with the thrust of 120 ton and is expected to be operational by 2014. When operational, Long March-5 is expected to deliver up to 25 ton of payload, in to the low Earth orbit, and up to 14 ton into the geostationary transfer orbit, where most communications satellites are released after launch [10].

By 2017 China expects to make significant development with its Long March technology. Long March-5, -6 and -7 would be developed as non-toxic, low-cost, highly reliable, adaptable and safe rockets. The Long March-6 would be a high­speed launch vehicle that can put 1 ton into a sun-synchronous orbit, while the Long March-7 would have a maximum low-Earth-orbit payload capacity of 13.5 and 5.5 ton of sun-synchronous orbit payloads.[99]

Communication satellites are a high priority for China because of its commercial utility. The development of China’s communications satellites started at the begin­ning of the 1970s. China’s first experimental geostationary orbit communications satellite was launched successfully in 1984.[100] [101] China is successfully using such satellites for the purposes of TV transmission, education, long-range telephone and telegraph, data transfer in finance and air and railway traffic. Their communication satellites have been launched our various programmes which include Apstar series, AsiaSat series, SinoSat series and Zhongxing series. One of their most useful programmes in recent times is the SinoSat series satellite. The first satellite in this series is SinoSat-1 which was launched in 1998. The SinoSat-2 satellite was launched in 2006 but malfunctioned because it failed to deploy its solar panels and communication antennae. SinoSat-6 satellite which was launched successfully on Sep 5, 2010 now serves as a substitute for SinoSat-3 launched on June 1, 2007.11 Next-generation communication satellites are expected to carry C, Ku, Ka and L band transponders.

Chinese leadership understands the importance of dual-use nature of space technology. Their leader Mr Jiang Zemin on June 7, 1991, issued the instructions that no necessity exists to use separate military systems for civil use and military use. Communication is one such area having dual-use capability. It is obvious that China would have used/would be using its communication-related space assesses for strategic purposes. China launched its first military communication satellite in January 2000. This is supposed to be China’s first advanced technology spy satellite.

China uses space technologies for gathering electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Chi­nese military is exploiting the importance of remote sensing technologies towards building information superiority. In these areas of intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, China is depending both on indigenous space capabilities as well as on commercially available international space satellite constellations. In regard to signals intelligence (SIGNT) China’s major investments are in modern aircraft platforms and not satellites.

It is interesting to note that China started with FSW (Fanhui Shei Weixing, Recoverable Test Satellite) satellite series initially more from the point of view of using it for military reconnaissance purposes. But, in the late 1980s, the design was employed for Earth resource photography and experiments in crystal and protein growth, cell cultivation and crop breeding. These satellites were also used in the role of recoverable satellites. Mastering and testing of this technology during early years of its space journey should have helped China for designing its manned space programme. It may be noted that China is the third country in the world to master the technology of satellite recovery. Between 1974 and 2006, a total of 24 FSW satellites in 6 variants were launched, of which 22 were recovered successfully. The programme ended in 2006 with the introduction of the new-generation data – transmission type remote sensing satellites, but the FSW satellite is still being presented as a platform for commercial and scientific payloads.[102] Currently, China is working towards developing new-generation photoreconnaissance satellite FSW series (1 m or less resolution).

Building satellites for the purpose of reconnaissance has been a key area of focus for the Chinese establishment particularly post 2000. It appears that the Chinese government has intentionally avoided publicity in this regard. From April 2006 to May 2012, 16 satellites in the remote sensing satellite (Yaogan) series[103] were launched by China. Officially, these satellites are meant for scientific, land survey and disaster management purposes. However, it is generally believed that since these satellites have either optical or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors and hence a definite military utility. Some of the previously launched satellites in this series have been retired, and presently operational satellites are known to have a resolution of 1.5-1.0 m, almost matching the best in the world.

Navigational satellite system is another area where China has major plans for the future both commercial and military purposes. In early 1980s, China began to utilise other countries navigational satellites. It also developed an application technology of satellite navigation and positioning, which is now used for land survey and ship and aircraft navigation. China’s navigational programme has been discussed in detail elsewhere in this book.

Micro-satellite is one arena where the Chinese scientific community has got major interests. Since early 2000, China appears to be giving major emphasis to this technology. A Russian booster launched the first satellite in this category, Tsinghua 1, on Jun 28, 2000.[104] It was a joint project of Tsinghua University of Beijing and

Surrey Satellite Technology Limited, UK. It is a 50-kg bird, and its launch put China into the selected bracket of countries, which can design and operate micro and nano sized satellites. This success has implications for both China’s scientific programmes as well as for enhanced military satellite capabilities. It is equipped with CCD camera that can image objects up to 39 m in three spectral bands.

It is important to note that small satellites are capable of avoiding detection; they also have the potential to be used as ASAT (antisatellite) space mines. In April 2004, China had launched two new indigenously developed research satellites, including a nano-satellite (Experiment Satellite I and Nanosatellite I) weighing 25 kg. What the capabilities of these satellites are, however, and how much they are constrained by size, remain questions to be answered [9].

It has been reported that Experiment Satellite I transmits remote sensing data for mapping and Nanosatellite I was designed to perform unidentified technology experiments. Such small, cheap satellites could provide China with an easier path to attaining some space capabilities and provide the potential for asymmetric warfare in space. The cost advantage of micro-satellites could, if properly handled, allow China to compete at some levels with larger and more expensive US systems without having to match the US dollar for dollar [11].

China has developed a new generation of small satellite launch vehicles, Explorer I, which uses solid fuel. It has been designed to take small or micro – satellites into space and complement Long March group, the country’s large-scale liquid fuel space launchers. Explorer I will be able to carry loads weighing less than 100 kg. The low costs and high thrusts of solid fuel rockets make them an important factor in the commercialisation of the space industry [12].

China’s successful spacewalk was conducted during the Shenzhou 7 (SH-7) mission launched on 25 September 2008 (it was China’s third human space flight mission). A micro-satellite was released during this mission called the BX-1. This companion sat was a very small cube approximately 40 cm on a side and weighing around 40 kg. Technically, this satellite was to provide images of the Shenzhou seven capsule and demonstrate the ability to inspect the orbital module and conduct some limited proximity operations. It also carried out a data relay experiment. However, some observers have concluded that this satellite was meant to test some of the capabilities required for a co-orbital ASAT attack [13].

China had started preliminary work on advanced manned space flight in July 1985. The decision came against a background of vigorous international space activity the then US President Regean’s pet project ‘Strategic Defense Initiative’. The erstwhile USSR had programmes like Buran shuttle system and Mir and Mir-2 space station. Europe was developing the Hermes spaceplane. All this probably had motivated China to undertake projects like human space mission and building of space station.

In early spring 1986, a proposal for seven projects under Project 863 plans to accelerate Chinese technical development was made. Astronautics plan 863-2 included section 863-204 space transportation system, which would service the 863­205 space station. It was estimated that 2 years would be needed for concept studies. An expert group was established for the 863-204 shuttle. The final 863-204 Expert Commission report in July 1989 advocated building the manned capsule, with a first flight date of 2000. However, the report failed to impress the Chinese government. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping rejected this plan. Deng stepped down as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989. In his absence, the Chinese military decided it could safely lend its critical support to a manned space programme. In January 1991, the Air Ministry established a manned space programme office. The final plan was approved on September 21, 1992, and Project 921 to create a Chinese manned space capability began in earnest.[105]

It took a decade’s preparation for China to realise its dream of Chinese visiting the space. By Oct 2003, China successfully launched and recovered its first manned space mission. China is the only third country in the world to send the man into the space. In its report on China’s military power, the U. S. Department of Defense has stated, ‘While one of the strongest immediate motivations for China’s manned space programme appears to be political prestige, China’s efforts will contribute to improve military space systems in [the] 2010-2020 timeframe’ [6, p. 52]. Various details about the Chinese human space programme and space shuttle programme are discussed in detail in another chapter. It is important to note that China has major interest in pursuing manned space technology, and this one arena is expected to remain their principal programme for the future.

Because of the closed political system, various actions by China are sometimes viewed with military bias. China’s first manned space flight might have been imaging reconnaissance mission. However, it is important to note that carrying out operations like imaging reconnaissance either by manned or unmanned space, vehicle is not is a good option. Even a simple satellite could do this job in a better fashion. Hence, it could incorrect to assume that such missions are carried out only for the purposes of imaging reconnaissance, and at the same time, indirect military benefits (spin-off technologies) of such programme cannot be ruled out.

China’s Shenzhou design is a replica of Russian design (Soyuz) but has some more additional features, which has more military relevance. Chinese craft consists of an orbital module, a re-entry vehicle that carries crew back to Earth, and a service module for propulsion and for performing retrofire sequence. But, unlike Soyuz, the Chinese module could detach from the re-entry capsule and remain in orbit for several months, acting as robotic mini space station, using its solar panels to power instruments and experiments. However, the unit is not a re-entry vehicle and burns up while entering the atmosphere [14].

PLA strictly controls the Shenzhou programme. One indication of Shenzhou military operations was likely electronics carried on nose of the Shenzhou 3 orbital module that functioned autonomously in space for 6 months following the return to Earth of the decent module after 7 days aloft in March 2002. As per few analysts, Shenzhou 3 mission could also have carried a significant electronic intelligence eavesdropping payload. The system could have recorded UHF and radar emissions applicable to a variety of military uses including ocean surveillance [15].

The extent to which this manned activity will translate into a military advantage for China remains debatable. Most benefits to the military from the manned programme will be indirect or a function of improved Chinese technical abilities, generally in an area such as computational analysis, systems integration, and miniaturisation [10]. It also could be argued that notwithstanding that both the US and Soviet militaries have been unable to identify important advantages of a man in space over unmanned systems, the Chinese seem determined to explore that premise for themselves, likely through the use of orbital module at some later date.

It is believed that the ultimate ambition for any nation-state could be to put a human on a different planet. One of the key (undeclared) agenda for China appears to be to challenge the US supremacy of undertaking manned Moon/Mars mission. The USA could be downplaying this idea since, during late 1960s, they have already succeeded in putting man on the Moon. However, the process of putting human on other planet still has significant ‘shocking’ potential, and China believes that this could increase their global status. A single act like this could bring them unparalleled prestige and even raise their stature to a ‘superpower’.

Understanding the difficulties (financial as well as economic) involved into embarking on challenging missions like Mars mission, China is looking for inter­national collaboration. On Mar 26, 2007 China and Russia had signed a landmark space cooperation accord, entitled the ‘Cooperative Agreement between the China National Space Administration and the Russian Space Agency on joint Chinese – Russian exploration of Mars’. One stipulation of the agreement was the construction and launch of the Yinghuo probe (a Chinese Mars exploration space probe) and its Russian counterpart, Fobos-Grunt. These probes were launched in space on Nov 8, 2011, by Russia. The 115-kg Chinese probe was to orbit Mars for around 2 years and carry out a study of the planet’s surface, atmosphere, ionosphere and magnetic field. However, this Russia mission failed, and China has decelerated the loss of probe on Nov 18, 2011.[106] Overall, China’s Mars plan is not expected to remain restricted to a single probe. The speculations are that the first uncrewed Mars exploration programme could take place around 2015-2030 and could be followed by a crewed phase in 2040-2060.

China has drafted a multistep programme for lunar exploration. By 2013, China space planners will be landing a rover on the Moon surface. In 2017, China’s lunar exploration plans call for robotic lunar sample return missions.[107] It is also expected that by 2020-2025, China could plan a manned Moon mission. China has successfully completed its first lunar mission which was launched on Oct 24, 2007 (Chang’e-1), and the mission got completed on Mar 1,2009. On Oct 01,2010, China has launched of its second lunar probe Chang’e-2. Various details of the Moon programme are discussed elsewhere in the book.

Most of the space missions are dual-use in nature, but there are few missions with only military applicability, and antisatellite (ASAT) mission is one of them. For many years, speculations were ripe in regard to China’s plan for space weaponisation. According to a 2005 Pentagon report, ‘PLA is building lasers to destroy satellites and already has beam weapons capable of damaging sensors on space based reconnaissance and intelligence systems. Consequently, China could blind the US intelligence and military space equipment systems vital for deploying US military forces in current and future warfare’.[108]

All known and unknown Chinese interests and speculations by many analysts for many years were put to the rest on Jan 11,2007 when China destroyed its own aging weather satellite (FY-1C) by firing a rocket towards it. The details about this and few other Chinese agendas indirectly implying their interests in space weaponisation are discussed elsewhere in this book. It is important to appreciate China’s ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitude’ in this regard. It is said that China is a keen follower of the President John F. Kennedy view that ‘whoever controls space [the universe] can control the earth’.[109] Space operations and warfare in space are important elements of what the PLA warfare strategy. PLA strategists are convinced that space is likely to be one of the natural domains of war and that war in space would become an integral part of other military operations in years to come. They expect that space would become the primary battlefield in future high-technology war. To do this, Chinese research institutes are advocating research into various types of laser weapons, particle beam weapons and other forms of directed energy and electromagnetic systems [16]. Hence, Chinese leadership (military or otherwise) is keen to remain prepared in this field and is making all overt and covert preparations to that effect.

Alternatively, China understand that the issues related to security of space assets, freedom of utilisation of space for civilian and military purposes and issues which are rapidly gaining importance like space debris removal constitute an important part of global debate on space security. They are not keen to be treated as an outcast in the emerging global space order. They understand as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, they need to remain engaged. China feels that their active engagement with international space community indirectly reflects their views on outer space issues. They are making efforts to remain engaged with the various UN mechanisms on multiple space-related issues. Their all three space White Papers resonate that they are keen to support multilateral international cooperative mechanisms on the peaceful use of outer space within the framework of the United Nations.

China is making all efforts to demonstrate that they are an active member of the international space community. They are participating in various outer space activities and cooperative ventures. In June of 2002, China, together with the Russian Federation, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva a working paper entitled ‘Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Objects’ (CD/1679).20 In Feb 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) a draft: Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). In August 2009, China and Russia jointly submitted their working paper responding to the questions and comments raised by the CD members on the draft treaty.21 China is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), an intergovernmental organisation (a non-profit independent) with full international legal status with its headquarter at Beijing.

China’s commercial interests in space area are being looked after by China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) which was established in 1980. This company is mandated to provide satellites and offer commercial launch services. It is also expected to carry out international space cooperation and has some responsibility towards developing China’s space industry. CGWIC enjoys good reputation in the international aerospace industry, the financial community and the insurance circle. The company is actively involved in the international marketing of civilian products and services utilising space technology [17].

Mission Output

All these three states have already finished their first phase of experimentation, and few results are available in public domain. Japan has released a global lunar topographic map with a spatial resolution finer than 0.5° derived using data from the laser altimeter (LALT) onboard the Japanese lunar explorer Kaguya. India has also released many pictures taken by its craft of the surface of the Moon from various angles. All these images indicate that in comparison with the previous information available, this new set of information reveals unbiased lunar topography for scales finer than a few hundred kilometres. Also, the Japanese mission has revealed few interesting details about the volcanic activity on the Moon and new revelations about the far-side gravity field of the Moon.[244]

One of the greatest contributions of Chandrayaan-1 mission was the role it played towards discovering the water signature on the Moon surface in collaboration with NASA. Chandrayaan-1 also confirmed presence of iron in the lunar soil. The mission has successfully gathered data for a total of 30 solar flares apart from helping the manning of three-dimensional topography of the Moon.[245]

These three states have perhaps released the selective information to the outside world so far. Also, it would take some time to decipher the data received. In certain cases, they are also probably waiting for the confirmation of their assessment from the experts. It is difficult to judge at this point in time as to how much information would be made available for public consumption by these three states.

Scrutinising the Race

Race is essentially a contest of speed. It is about one-upmanship, it is about beating the opponent/s, and it is about demonstrating that you are better than others. Race is all about dominating, winning and signifying ‘power’. From sociology to sports and science to security, the connotation of the word ‘race’ remains the same, but only the context changes. In the realm of international politics, the race is essentially viewed as a competition amongst nation-states. Essentially, technology plays a dominating role in this race and helps to prove the superiority of the state. Particularly, the military technologies play a major role in deciding the power equations.

The arms race is about the build-up of military hardware leading to the competition amongst the states to demonstrate their strength.

‘The term arms race has been used since the 1850s to describe periodic competitions between states to shift (or preserve) the balance of power between them by modernizing their weaponry and increasing the magnitude of various arms stocks. However, it was not until the end of World War I that arms races were viewed as a special pathology of interstate behavior that required explanation. At a loss to account for a war whose duration and horror seemed inexplicable by the logics of political or strategic calculation, both politicians and the public seized upon the idea that arms competitions could assume a deterministic dynamic that made war inevitable. It followed that the best way for states to ensure that conflicts of this sort would not occur in the future was to regulate the building of armaments or, as it is known today, to practice arms control’.1 During the twentieth century, the term arms race was mainly referred to the build-up of military weapons by the then two superpowers, the erstwhile USSR and the USA. It was mainly discussed from the standpoint of their nuclear arms race.

In early days, the concept of arms race was more about the navel supremacy. With the advent of airpower, the focus widened mainly during the twentieth century. The idea of nuclear deterrence could be viewed as the ‘game changer’ and has brought the level of competition to a new height. All such investments into military [340]

hardware helped the states to achieve better sense of security over their opponents leading to a ‘security dilemma’. Particularly, over a period of the last two centuries, a pattern could be indentifled indicating how the developments in technologies have impacted the nature of arms race. The race probably started with naval technologies and the growth of sea power. In fact, land forces have been the part of combat almost since the evolution of the warfare. However, tank battle and artillery took some time to gain a global focus. For the last couple of years, various additional military platforms are also being viewed as an instrument to induce the opponent. Aerial platforms and the conception of airpower were followed by ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons boosting the race further to incredible levels. The flexible and versatile nature of airpower and missiles allowed the states to increase their strategic reach making nuclear weapons more relevant. The states understood that the increase in the inventory of aerial platforms particularly the combat aircrafts allows them different beneflts including deterrence. Simultaneously, the nature of warfare has also altered signiflcantly over the years with aerial warfare gaining prominence. Presently, the twenty-first century is witnessing an additional dimension of warfare called the fourth dimension of warfare which is all about the space warfare. Along with this, cyber warfare has also been viewed as a new dimension of warfare. Hence, the issue is ‘if the military warfare has evolved from land and sea warfare to aerospace warfare would it be prudent to assume that the arms race would enter or has already entered into the space domain too’?

The concept Space Race is not new and was even a reality during the Cold War era. In fact, it could be said to have started with the launch of the first satellite on October 4,1957, by the erstwhile USSR. The USA had responded within a year with the launch of its first satellite Explorer I. The real race could be said to have begun when Yuri Gagarin (1961) visited the space. Within few years (1969), the USA achieved a major success with the manned visit to Moon, and the rest is history. For more than three decades, both the superpowers were involved to outclass each other in various actions in space. It was seen as a very closely fought race with the USA having a slender lead particularly in the post-1970s period.

The question is why the then superpowers were keen to engage into the space race? There could be various motives behind this, and prestige could be the main reason. Space also could have given them the opening to invent new technologies which has both civilian and military utility. Visual manifestations of various feats achieved in the space arena are extremely overpowering. This also could have forced these states to accord a special status to the efforts in space. On the other hand, the concept of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) could also be indirectly linked to the notion of space race. MAD is about any military conflict amongst the nuclear weapon states escalating to a nuclear war leading to the obliteration of various warring sides. For a state, all this required making significant increase in the number of nuclear weapons and to keep on matching the opponent by entering into the numbers game. But, the sense of just competing with each other by increasing the number of nuclear weapons was probably getting monotonous! Recognising that such investments are infertile beyond a point, the then superpowers could have

started to look for alternatives to keep the animosity alive during the Cold War era and probably found the rivalry in space as one of the means to demonstrate the primacy.

High expectations from the future (in space territory) could have been one more reason for many to believe that race amongst spacefaring nations is possible and essential. Over the years, many space ‘beliefs’ have gained weight which actually does not depict reality. The overall initial achievements in space arena by the then superpowers have fashioned great expectations for the future. Such expectations have been extrapolated to a soaring level without giving due cognisance to technological realities and challenges. This has made many believe that creation of Moon bases, Martian colonies, easy space travel, asteroid mining, building of solar power stations in orbit, etc. is easily achievable and states could attain great power status by building space empires. Naturally, the thought of building space empires is leading to a quest for race.

To analyse the nature of space race in Asia, it is important to value some of the above-mentioned global dimensions in regard to postulation of the space race.

The relevance of dual-use utility of space technologies is not hidden. Particularly, post-1991 Gulf War various states have started using space as an instrument while deciding on their strategic priorities and interests. Naturally, this opens a window for the states to use space race as an instrument for power portrayal. Before analysing the space race ‘formulation’ in Asian context, it is important to appreciate certain ground realities. It is important to appreciate that the notion of ‘race’ has evolved over the years. In any form of a space race, the game of one-upmanship develops a tendency to interpret the opponent’s behaviour as a demonstration of growing hostility. This leads to action-reaction pattern of behaviour and fails to take into account the implications of one’s own behaviour. Over a period of time, various states in general have understood the perpetuity of their actions and various multilateral arms reduction treaties. Today, certain amount of rational strategic calculations have been made by nation-states before blindly aping the opponent. Particularly, the reasons of the end of Cold War have taught the nation-states to contextualise economical realities before entering to any arms race or for that matter the space race.

One basic question which is more theoretical in nature but demands attention is to appreciate the coloration between the concept of space power and space race. What could be basic purpose behind this race? Is the race for demonstration of the ‘ownership of the space power’ or power is just a subset of the race (or race is the subset of power) or is it incorrect to simultaneously confer these issues? From shear academic perspective, such various possibilities could be argued for or against. What is important to note is that the general theory of space power is yet to fully evolve. A blunt question has been asked by Collin Grey2 in this regard: ‘Where is the

Mahan[341] for space power?’ Interestingly, the argument put forth by Gray is somewhat deficient in taking into account the strategic significance of space. During the late 1990s, he argued that space has attracted attention:

• As a realm wherein national scientific and engineering prowess could be


• As a sentimentalised zone that should not be polluted by terrestrial nastiness

• As a geographical medium whose exploitation is potentially vital for the

effectiveness of multilayered ballistic missile defences[342]

Now, the question is ‘are these statements still completely valid in the twenty-first century’? Should the absence of terrestrial nastiness be taken for granted? In Asian context, such enquiry becomes more important particularly at the backdrop of the 2007 ASAT test conducted by China. It is also important to factor in some of the opinions of Colin Gray: he argues that ‘there has never been an aggressive weapon, only aggressive owners and operators of weapon’. On the other hand, it is important to appreciate that space is not ‘just another’ geographical environment. It is not only about military and weapons alone. In fact, in overall context, it has a larger socioeconomic dimension. Space-based weapons and other issues associated with ASAT (most of which are mainly theoretical postulations) have limited relevance. Hence, space race should not be viewed from a narrow ‘arms race’ perspective.

1950s-1970s was a different era when the launch of Sputnik and the space visit by Gagarin had created hysteria in the USA. The erstwhile USSR’s accomplish­ments were (in)directly linked to the advantages their military could get from such successes. Also, provocative opinions like the possibility ‘communist Moon’ (if the USA fails to reach there before the Soviets!) were being expressed to increase the ante then. Conversely, the situation in Asia presently is far different than the Cold War era. In Asian context, the initial media observation of an Asian Space Race probably emerged only as late as 2003 with the success of China’s manned space mission. This could have happened because along with China, other two states from the region, namely, Japan and India, also have successful space programmes with well-articulated roadmap for the future. Particularly, the interest of these three states (almost simultaneously) in development of Moon missions helped fuelling these speculations further. In short, it was realised that in Asia, China was not the only country having a capability to sit on the high table, and this could have helped to fuel the talk of Asian Space Race further. It is important to note that the concept of race is not being formulated only based on the achievements of these states in the space area but also because of the overall development shown by these three states in various other fields. Hence, any assessment of the notion of space race in Asia needs to be carried out as an offshoot of the overall growth trajectory of these states.

In comparison with the USA and Russia (USSR earlier), various Asian states could be viewed as late starters in design, manufacture and launch of satellites. However, these states have also got certain advantages of being the late starters. They have the background knowledge of requirements for planning and technical developments. Also, they have a higher level of trust in starting various space programmes because in most of the cases, they are not the beginners and are not ‘bestowed with the responsibility of inventing the wheel’. Their initial investments are found more based on the nature of support they got from the developed nations than as a result of any rivalry with their neighbours.

Most of the literature on this subject mainly takes into account the possibility of race amongst only these big three in Asia. However, race is a relative concept. Few other states in the region with less-developed space programmes may not be compared with these giants, but they could be compared amongst themselves. This becomes important because geopolitical realities in certain parts of Asia could make a case for the chances of existence of such a race. In case of Koreas, the peninsular prestige could force them to engage in space race. Similarly, a possibility exists for the Israel-Iran race. Also, even if Pakistan cannot match India in space arena they could attempt to outmanoeuvre India in missile defence and ASAT fields giving rise to a different kind of competition.

Nevertheless, it is also important to raise the question: ‘are such mostly Cold War era centric formulations like the “arms race” and “space race” valid in the twenty – first century world any more’? Most traditional perceptions of warfare catering for conventional threats by conventional means have changed over the years. Issues involving globalisation, terrorism, economic challenges, energy, poverty, natural disasters and climate change are changing the nature of overall threat dynamics. Are states willing to undertake blind investments in strategic assets only for the sake of nationalism or one-upmanship? Is the notion of nationalism true for the twenty – first-century world mainly driven by economic factors? Does nationalism has same meaning for communist, autocratic and democratic regimes? Would coming decades of twenty-first century witness commencement of post-nationalism era? Under these circumstances, ‘is there a need to reformulate the space race question’?

Asia is fast becoming the pivot of global geopolitical change. When the world is going through the crucial phase of shifts in global economic and political power structures, the Asian region is offering new opportunities as well as posing certain uncertainties. The three major players of Asia are holding the key to a cooperative security environment. Asia’s changing power dynamics are reflected in ‘rise’ of China and India, increasingly assertive foreign policy posturing of China and Japan’s reluctance to remain in synch with the USA on every issue. Never before in history have there been a strong China, a strong India and a strong Japan at the same time. At the same time, it is also believed that the rivalry between China and Japan and underlying dissonance between China and India can hardly contribute to the building of a stable and secure Asia. Unfortunately, China’s ascent is not found instrumental in bringing Asian states closure [1] In space field too, it has

been observed that these three powers are at the centre of ‘action’. Unfortunately, the geopolitical challenges faced by them are not probably allowing them to work together in this space arena.

It is also important to note that interests in space technologies for various Asian states are far and varied. Smaller and less-developed states like Laos, Bangladesh and few others have only recently began to realise the relevance of this technology in the process of state building, while for a state like China, space is probably an instrument for maintaining strategic balance of power in the region. For major players within the region, issues related to space also have wider arms control and disarmament connotations at the global level. They understand that space technologies are not only about development but have large-scale geopolitical connotations too. Also, various powers in the region have different concerns about the weaponisation of space.

Asia’s geopolitical landscape has shown major undulations in the last few decades. Various global events have brought significant changes in the policy perspectives of the states in the region. The end of Cold War has affected the political dynamics of the region. In physical sense, 9/11 did not happen on the Asian soil, but the region suffered maximum in the USA-led war on terror. Asian tsunami, Fukushima nuclear disaster and the 2011 Arab uprising are proving to be game changer for the region. On the other hand, the economic predictions for the region’s future are very bright. By 2010, China has emerged as the second largest economy in the world surpassing Japan, which is now in third position. India is expected to emerge as the third largest economic power in the world within couple of years. During global financial crises of 2008/2011, big three states from Asia along with states like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and few others succeeded in avoiding any major economic downturns. In the field of science and technology, the progress made of Asian states is remarkable and the future appears to be bright.

It is important to factor all these reasons while making any assessment of Asia’s space ambitions. Also, it is important to note that most of the spacefaring states in the region have already articulated their roadmaps for the future. In Dec 2011, China has published their third White Paper giving details of plans for next 5 years. All this offers some basis for a futuristic assessment.

Most the writings in support of the notion of Asian Space Race essentially revolve their argument based on the ambitions of big three in undertaking manned space missions and deep-space missions. Since most of the programmes of these three states in these fields have started almost simultaneously, a general conclusion has been drawn about the existence of space race amongst them. However, it could be incorrect to make any comprehensive assessment based on few variables. It is also important to factor in their capabilities in various other fields from launch vehicles to communication and remote sensing satellites to navigational constellation to making commercial exploitation of space technologies. It is also important to study the strategic relevance of their space programmes as well as the impact of regional institutional mechanisms.

The Part III of this book provides detail discussion about various strategic aspects of the Asian space programmes. In regard to Japan-China-India, there exists a commonality in various aspects of their space programme. All three have ambitions in respect of human space flights. Though, their journey so far is not indicative of any burning ambition to outmanoeuvre each other. Japan has been in the business of human space flight since 1992, and many of their astronauts have visited the International Space Station. They have achieved this feat only with the help of Russia and the USA. They have not developed any own vehicle for space travel. Few decades back with the help of Russia, India was able to send its first (and the only so far) astronaut to the space. It has been reported that during 2009, India’s Planning Commission has signed off on a proposed two-person manned spaceship to be launched by 2015 on an existing satellite launcher.[343] Subsequently, not much of a progress has been made towards converting this idea into a reality. The only bright spot so far visible, with their ambitions of reaching outer space, was the 2007 successful experiment of the Space Recovery Capsule Experiment (SRE). But, this was just one of the nascent attempts towards developing a transport vehicle which could eventually carry a human to the space. Currently, there appears to be no plans to validate this technology further and proceed to the next step of undertaking robotic missions. Indian administration has made certain announcements in regard their ambitions to undertake a human space flight. Nevertheless, actually on ground, the situation looks entirely different, and India looks still far away from having an indigenous programme for the human space flight, while China has already undertaken its first manned mission in 2003 and has followed it up by few more missions and have also successfully undertaken a spacewalk. Hence, it could be incorrect to conclude that these three states are in competition in regard to human space mission.

Japan has been one of the active members of the International Space Station (ISS) programme since its inception. In Oct 2011, China has launched the Tiangong-1, an orbital test module for a planned 2020 space station. They have also undertaken successful space docking experimentation, while India is neither the part of ISS nor it has announced any proposal for the development of a space station. Hence, even if India undertakes any human space mission, the purpose behind it could be just a technology demonstration and is unlikely to feed into any long-term programme. There are no visible military advantages of human space mission or a development of the space station. Also, the years of experimentation carried out by major space players in the zero gravity atmosphere so far has not yielded any path-breaking results. Hence, states like India understand that there are very limited benefits (at this point in time) of undertaking such missions. Probably, the best option could be to device a multilateral mechanism for all such activities. If the state has to go solo, then they could invest more in robotic missions than human missions. This could allow the state to concentrate more on developmental, strategic and commercial programmes. All this indicates that technologically or otherwise the chances of Asian Space Race in human space flights and space station arena are minimal. Amongst these three states, China could value nationalism more (could be more of a compulsion to keep the communism intact!) and would continue to invest in such ‘exotic’ programmes, while other two democratic states appear to be more pragmatic.

Moon missions undertaken by these three states have many similarities including the timing of the missions. Japan and China had launched their missions during Sept/Oct 2007, while India had launched 1 year later. The nature of sensors onboard of these crafts and the type of information gathered by all three are comparable in some respects. These missions have helped these states to boost their national pride and have also raised their stature internationally. These states have succeed in bringing the focus back to the Moon some 40 years after the USA landed a man on the Moon. However, they are well aware that from the scientific point of view, the US success was of extremely limited value, and the excitement of their achievement had dissipated relatively quickly.[344] It could be incorrect to view Asia’s interest in the Moon only for the purpose of scientific hype. They understand the relevance of the Moon from the point of view of minerals. They are also trying to judge the feasibility of helium-3 on the surface of the Moon offering a solution to energy security. These states understand the importance of the technological spin-offs from such missions. Particularly, developments in technologies like Deep Space Networks (DSN) and robotics (rovers, landers, etc.) would provide them with strategic edge. They have well-articulated plans for coming missions. These are early times, and the exact nature of output from such missions is difficult to predict. India has involved (in limited capacity) few other states mainly the USA and Russia in regard to their Moon programme. However, mostly all these states are working without any outside cooperation and more importantly no cooperation amongst themselves. The investments by the big three in the Moon mission could be viewed as a race for resources. China appears to be looking at the Moon not only as backyard for mining the minerals but have larger ambitions. They desire to undertake a human mission to the Moon as a first country in the twenty-first century. They view this mission as a ‘contrivance’ to achieve the great power status.

In military arena, it is a bit difficult to exactly pinpoint whether it is a race amongst them or they are using this technology to address their individual security concerns. It is a known fact that all of their security concerns are not independent of each other, and particularly in the case of China, both Japan and India fall in their security calculus. In Asian theatre, there are various well-entrenched geopolitical rivalries. They revolve around Taiwan, Pakistan, Vietnam, North Korea and the USA. For the region, it is very difficult to judge the exact nature of investments in military space hardware. This is mainly because various states draw little distinction between their civilian and military programmes. Luckily, states like Japan and India are becoming increasingly transparent in regard to their military space investments. But in regard to China, the ambiguity persists.

China’s ASAT test has both global as well as regional connotations. China’s test has strategic implications and holds a ‘potential’ for imitation by other states

mainly from the region. The current trend in the region indicates that the concept of weaponisation of space is likely to remain restricted to mostly debating, developing and in rare cases testing the ASAT technologies. Not much of efforts (at least overt) are visible in respect of developing and positioning weapons in space. Mostly, the states in the region understand that any significant investments in this field could cause another costly arms race similar to that during the Cold War. Perhaps, this could be one the reasons for no serious attempts being done so far to develop such weapons. However, the decision not to deploy any space weapons does not guaranty any permanent commitment to keep space forever free from weaponry. In all likelihood to keep various options open, no significant efforts are being made to develop any globally acceptable treaty mechanism.

In the twenty-first century, states are concentrating significantly on the economic development. Particularly, the Cold War period has taught states the limitations of ‘blind’ arms race. States have understood the importance of economic security for the growth of the country. Space technologies have significant potential for economic engagement of the state. The increasing global demand in satellite tech­nologies makes space as a lucrative business ground. The big three spacefaring states in Asia are keen to enter in this market both for economic as well as geopolitical benefits. To decipher the nature of regional space race, it is important to broadly understand the economic and commercial aspects of the various space programmes. One limitation of this book is that space economics of Asians states has not been discussed. There are two main reasons for this. First, since the main focus of this book has been to study the strategic aspects of Asia’s space agenda, no discussions on the space commerce have been undertaken; also very less authentic (or even otherwise) and detailed information is available in this regard. Second, economic assessment is a specialised subject, and particularly, space assessment would require separate analysis for various sectors like communication and navigation. In regard to India, an Oxford publication (2007) titled The Economics of India’s Space Programme by U. Sankar highlighting and analysing various budgetary aspects is available, but for comparative analysis, little information is available for other states particularly for state like China. On an average, India’s space budget is approximately 2-2.5 times less than Japan and China.

Space commerce mainly revolves around three different areas: satellite manu­facturing facilities, launching facilities for the satellites and the sale of satellite products (raw or processed data, satellite imagery, etc.). One of the areas where spacefaring nations in the region have business interest is the area of satellite­launching facilities.

The big three in the region are in a position to launch satellites of almost all types in almost all orbits. They have well-developed launching facilities and have a good success rate with their launching systems. Also, these states are known to offer commercially economical launch rates in compression with other spacefaring states. In 2011, China undertook 19 satellites blastoffs (18 successful). It was much higher than the previous high for Chinese launches in a year set in 2010 with 15 flights.[345] During Dec 2011, China launched a communication satellite for Nigeria and had a lift-off mass of 5,100 kg. China is set to make five commercial launches for foreign customers in 2012 (they had three commercial launches in 2011). On Jan 9, 2012, Chinese Long March 4B rocket launched a 2,650-kg Ziyuan III satellite. In the same mission, China has also carried a satellite from Luxembourg. Normally, 20-30 commercial launches happen in the world each year. Most of such launches are carried out by Russia and European countries. In the year 2012, China would approximately undertake 15 % of probable global commercial launches. So far, China has conducted 33 commercial launches for international customers, putting 39 satellites into orbit. China has ambitions of achieving a target of a 15 % share of the commercial launch market and a 10 % share of the satellite export market by 2015.[346]

India also demonstrates a good record in regard to launching of satellites for other states on commercial basis. This has become possible because of the success of its PSLV launcher, the most successful workhorse of ISRO. Till the end of September 2012, this system has proved its reliability and versatility by launching 55 satellites/spacecrafts (26 Indian and 29 foreign satellites) into a variety of orbits.[347] However, it is important to note that most the satellites launched for the foreign states were small sized, and actually, only five to six large satellites were launched from pure commercial point of view. It is important for India to expand this business with more vigour. Currently, India has two satellite launch pads and looking at the growth potential is planning to develop one more pad. India has limitations in regard to launching of heavy satellites. China’s Long March series of satellites are capable of carrying the maximum payload of 12,000 kg for LEO and 5,500 kg for GTO. They are developing next-generation rockets capable of carrying more load. India’s GSLV Mark I&II launchers are capable of launching satellites in the range of 2,000-2,500 kg payload. However, India is still not in a position to launch satellites which weigh 4,500-5,000 kg. Because India is yet to indigenise the cryogenic technology, the state is still far away from developing a self-sufficiency to launch heavier satellites.

In respect of China and India, the overall successes with their space programmes have helped them to raise their stature internationally, and this has indirectly helped them commercially.

The case of Japan is a bit different. They are yet to make a mark in commercial sector. Japan’s National Space Development Agency, JAXA’s predecessor, had developed the H-IIA rocket, and the first H-IIA blasted off in 2001. During Dec 2011, this rocket has successfully launched Japan’s spy satellite. A few years back,

the H-IIA project was taken over by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. Japan is keen to develop its satellite launch business along with this agency. On its next mission, an H-IIA will carry a South Korean satellite, representing the first launch deal with a foreign country. The present success rate of this rocket is 95 %.10 However, the company is depending only on government contracts. Since till date Japan has never launched a commercial satellite using its indigenous H-IIA rocket, it’s too premature to predict the future of its launch business particularly with expected global slowdown of launch market due to economic crisis.

Asian states are also aware about the soft power significance of this technology. Naturally, there is a competition to attract clients. All these three states have achieved certain amount of expertise to manufacture custom-made satellites and have sold few units too. They also understand that even non-spacefaring states like South Korea could give them competition in this field. Presently, China and India are finding a place as the most preferred destination for various satellite-related services including ground developing facilities like Earth stations. Understanding the business potential of this sector, states like South Korea and Malaysia are also keen to develop a niche in this field. In overall context, it could be said that like any other business, space is one sector where states are in competition. However, geopolitical significance of such business deals cannot be overlooked. In the future, a possibility exists that some of such services would be handled by private players. Already, particularly in the arena of small and micro-satellites, private industry is playing a significant role. The industry needs to learn from examples like Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, UK, which have succeeded in developing a niche in the field of small satellites.

Following table [2] gives few important details about the major programmes in the region.


Space budget (yearly US$)

Civilian space personnel

Launches per year


$ 3.8 billion




$ 2.2 billion (estimated)

80,000 (estimated)



$ 1.3 billion

32,000 (estimated)


South Korea

$ 220 million

2,500 (estimated)


Above information indicates that China offers the best turnaround time in respect of launching capabilities (they have plans to launch 21 rockets and 30 satellites in 2012), and they have invested significantly in developing human resources in this field. Presently, there are some Asian states keen to exploit the commercial component of space technologies; however, there appears to be a mismatch in respect of enthusiasm and actual ground realities. Hence, only in an imitated scene,

it could be argued that the race exists to grab the commercial market. China is much ahead of others in this field too.

China is also found intelligently using space industry as an important means for extending its soft power standing. They are found engaging states in Africa, Latin America and also few Asian states to spread their political influence and probably with a hidden agenda of bartering this technology for energy sources, minerals and natural resources. China’s attempts look well organised with clarity of motive. India appears to have realised the soft power potential of this technology, but no concentrated efforts are visible to that effect. Both China and Japan are found using multilateral mechanisms11 as a method to win friends and establishment. China is hosting Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), while Japan is instrumental in establishing the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). APSCO is without India and Japan clearly indicating that China is basically interested to engage less-developed states in the region and keep the competitors away. In its part, India hosts the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP), affiliated to UN. It was established in Nov 1995 with various organisations and countries as members. Such framework offers India to undertake multilateral scientific engagement; however, from the point of view of ‘influence’, it has limited relevance.

The general tendency of the big three Asian states appears to be to go alone in space arena. Particularly, their deep-space agendas have various commonalties, but no effort is seen to joint undertake any projects. These states could have developed an Asian space station on the lines of ISS. Pulling together of scientific, technological and economic resources could have assured a faster growth and avoided scientific duplication. However, the geopolitical divide is keeping the states away from each other. Even for many other states in the region, harmonious relations do not exist (like amongst few South East Asian neighbours, in Korean peninsula, Vietnam and China). It appears that mainly due to strategic considerations, these states are not keen to develop any joint programmes.

It is argued that ‘Asian trends stand in sharp contrast to space developments in Europe, where the leading nations cooperate extensively. By contrast, Asian space powers are highly isolated from one another, do not share information and display tremendous divergence of perspective’ [3]. The basic logic over here is that since Asian states are not keen to cooperate with each other, it indicates that there is a ‘race’ amongst them. It is important to examine such logic: but not purely in isolation or by using European standards to judge Asian realities.

The notion of collective security could vary from Europe to Asia. The Asian region’s history indicates a lack of inclination to provide any collective response in case of an attack on any country in the region. Also, there is an absence of regionally accepted multilateral security group involved in addressing security concerns of the

region. Organisations like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have limited relevance. But non-existence of any forum in context of security or for the purposes of development of science and technology does not automatically imply that the states are in competition with each other. Probably, no such culture exists. Maybe since the states within the region are not pushing for any ‘new world order’ and hence are not found keen to develop and display any inter-state mechanisms of cooperation which also includes cooperation in space. Essentially, states have a policy of neutrality in favour of collective security, and this could be one of reasons for states to opt for state-specific space programmes.

Normally, the notion of space race is being debated only in regard to be Japan – China-India. However, theoretically, the possibility of the race in few other regions of Asia also exits. Hence, for a wider scrutiny (in broad sense, the race is amongst the equals), it is important to study the interests of few states in the region whose space programmes are broadly comparable. South Korea and North Korea are the latecomers to the space field, and their investments have obvious missile bias. But, South Korea’s interests are beyond missiles too. They have major ambitions in space arena. Unfortunately, their actual achievements do not match with their ambitions. It is unlikely that in the coming few decades, they would be able to challenge the supremacy of the big three. Presently, states like Russia are assisting them to develop their programme. It is expected that in the coming few years, they would be in a position to attend the status of spacefaring nation. They are keen to develop infrastructure for satellite-launching capabilities mainly with commercial interests in mind. However, it is important to note that South Korea’s military is keen to replace some of its ageing spy planes. Hence, they are planning to buy two advanced reconnaissance planes from France by 2015, to allow its military to intercept radio messages from North Korea. The timing of the delivery of the aircrafts is significant because by Dec 2015, South Korea is scheduled to retake wartime operational control over its troops from the USA.[348] All such strategic needs of South Korea clearly indicate that they would also attempt to develop and launch spy satellites once they develop the expertise. Over a period of time, North Korea is also expected to develop reasonable launch capabilities. North Korea would have concerns about the existing spy satellite network of Japan. Hence, in the coming few years, Korean Peninsula could witness space race mainly arising out of strategic considerations.

Israel is a spacefaring state with reasonably developed capabilities. Iran is also found making rapid progress. Saudi Arabia is also making significant investments to have independent assets in space. The geopolitical landscape of this part of Asia is extremely complicated, and any cooperation in space arena is unlikely. States in the region are prone to abuse space issues for their political rivalry. Iran is likely to continue to use space launches to demonstrate their missile capabilities. But, at the same time, they are expected to take their space programme out of the limited mandate of using it as a ‘cover’ for their missile ambitions and would use it to demonstrate the level of their scientific expertise. With Iran furthering its space agenda, Israel is likely to invest in ASAT technologies. To date, Israel has not conducted any test of nuclear weapons to demonstrate its ability; however, this does not guarantee that they would follow the same policy in the ASAT field. Smaller states in Asian region, like Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan, are also growing their own space infrastructure. They are being supported in this endeavour by few states from Asia and abroad. These states individually may be keen to be a part of any ‘politics of space’; however, the increasing interests shown by few other major spacefaring states from and outside the region could end up increasing the competition amongst the patron states.

The post-Cold War era is witnessing several major changes in the nature of the space race. The end of the US space shuttle programme in 2010 without presenting any other alternative proposals to continue with the human space flight programme is indicative of the fact that the USA no longer associates ‘prestige’ as the most important issue in regard to developments in space. Today, they are depending on Russia, its one time rival to send its astronauts to the ISS. The USA understands that irrespective of stopping one of the prestigious programmes like this, their leadership in space would continue to exist. However, the US action highlights that in a broader sense: (1) Economical viability would govern the future of many space programmes, and (2) Space projects have long gestation periods. Short political life of decision­makers mainly in democratic dispensations (politicians are normally keen to have results of any project, say, within a life span of 4-5-year election cycle) could end up stalling very long-term investments. Mostly the technologies which prove their scientific, commercial or strategic relevance in reasonable time frame get political patronage. (3) The twenty-first-century world is probably entering an era of post­nationalism. National identities are getting somewhat blurred, and the perception about the so-called prestige of a state is not remaining limited to some isolated achievements. States are found undertaking cost-benefit analysis (benefits have both economic and strategic conations) before making any big investments. All this have Asian relevance too.

In Asia, the space race is being mostly discussed amongst the trio Japan-China – India. It is important to note that China and Japan are the second and third ranked economies of the world, while Indian economy is still in the process of development. China follows a communist form of government, while the remaining two are vibrant democracies. It is important to appreciate that the economic condition of a state, the political model followed by the state, the social and security challenges faced by the state, the level of growth of science and technology in the state and few other factors play their roles either directly or indirectly in deciding the space policies of a state. All such factors should be mulled over while theorising the conception of space race in Asia.

Asia’s space story is mostly being viewed as a story of competition. The inquest is ‘has the notion of competition become prevalent just because there is no cooperation’? It is understood that the main reason for lack of cooperation is the strategic compulsions particularly in respect of India-China and China-Japan. It is also important to note that for many years because of its nuclear policies,

India was the victim of technological apartheid. Some agencies under ISRO were under international sections for many years. In certain cases, India was facing certain difficulties in regard to technology transfer and other issues. Only after the successful culmination of the Indo-US nuclear deal (2005) by 2011 that various agencies of ISRO have been taken out from the list of banned companies. On the other hand, Japan is having collaboration with the USA for many years, and naturally, they had no significant interest to look for partners within the region. Hence, the argument of competition leading to space race may not be fully true. Another important aspect is the case of military concerns. Are the defence-related investments in space arena by Asian states are entirely Asia centric? The answer is no. Particularly, in the case of China, the investments are mainly US centric. When viewed holistically at the backdrop of geopolitical realities, it appears that even though the space race is getting discussed more in Asian region, but in real sense, the race is taking place amongst the USA and China.

In Asian context after analysing the various space programmes, a question arises: ‘is the Cold War era analogy of space race is being used too naively in Asian theatre’? Is there any Western agenda behind propagating this theory? Is China’s growing assertiveness and the rising power status of India being feared internationally and hence attempts are being made to keep them engaged in the region and also with each other? Is the Western notion in regard to the precarious nature of various long-standing geopolitical feuds in Asia leading to a conflicting and volatile situation real or exaggerated? Is it a ploy to discredit the actual technological achievements of the Asian states by diverting the attention by stressing about space race? Is bracketing Asian space programme into the category of race is actually defaming it probably to guard the business interests? All in all, has any objective analysis of Asian Space Race been carried out based on geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economical realities? Is the experts community within and outside Asia shying away to reason out non-existence of any Asian Space Race just because it could be unfashionable to say so? Is Asian region the only region in the world where signs of space race are visible?

For long, competition and cooperation are found coexisting in regard to space agenda of the USA and the European Union. In the recent years, the biggest shock for the USA was the conception of the idea of separate global navigational setup (Galileo) by the EU challenging the supremacy of the GPS. Europe has very strong space capabilities and considers space as a part of the EU political project. Commercial interest of the USA as well as EU in space arena is well known. Officially from Brussels, nothing much is spoken about the relevance of space technologies for the security purposes. However, this does not indicate zero interest. France, Germany, UK, Italy, etc. would definitely have some strategic expectations from the space programme. Within the EU grouping, the states like Germany, UK, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway have varying degree of investments made in the satellite technologies and their applications. Canada is also a part of ESA and has made reasonable investments in the space arena. Mostly, the European states have no major security challenges within the region but they do compete for geopolitical, economic and technological leadership both at regional and global level. However, not many attempts have been made to understand space agendas of these regions and compare and contract them from point of view of understanding the possibility of any race.

It appears that Japan-China-India to a great extent have succeeded in leaving peacefully with their respective differences for long, and probably this fact is not getting factored in various assessments of arms race and space race in Asian context. More importantly for the last four to five decades, these states have been found involved mainly with the activities involving non-military use of space. Early history of their space programmes suggests that their investments were not made as reactions to each other’s programmes but more as a part of their scientific and social agenda. The Asian security milieu has nuclear weapons at its cornerstone. However, the nuclear weapon states form the region are not found (at least overtly) linking military space power and strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. Hypothetically, if China has to engage someone in a joint space and nuclear weapons game, then they could look at the USA as a competitor and not at India.

This volume has sought to understand the purpose behind the investments by Asian states in the space area with a key focus on their strategic significance.

It has been found that the major spacefaring Asian states are making considerate investments in the space arena. Time and again, they have proved their indigenous capabilities to build and operate world-class satellites. There is clarity of vision amongst them. For them, investments in space are not about romanticism or fighting any abstract space race. They are fully aware about the scientific and strategic significance of their doings. They understand and appreciate the dangers of weaponisation of space and lack of transparent space security regime. However, they are determined to play the game of space politics, if needed, keeping their individual national interests paramount.

The ambitions of various Asian nations to use space technologies for the purpose of the declaration of their economic and technological arrival are obvious. In recent times, the talk of Asian Space Race probably has its roots in the commonality and the timing of the Moon programmes of Japan-China-India. The Moon missions by these states were launched during 2007-2008 period, and they had almost similar mandate. It is being mostly argued that currently no strategic imperatives exist for human space flight, and space exploration does not hold the same strategic importance and priority on national agenda as it did four decades ago [4]. Asian states have not created any significant international architecture for their deep – space missions particularly in regard to Moon. Maybe these are early days, and space players are yet to fully understand the military applicability (if any) in regard to deep-space missions and hence are moving cautiously. On the whole, Asian states are found duplicating their efforts in the deep-space arena. Is this a sheer coincidence or is there something more to it? One of the most likely reason could be that it is not about the race in space, but actually about the energy security compulsions (presence of helium 3 on the Moon surface) and the race for resources (mining of minerals from the Moon’s surface). The Moon is just incidental; if such resources would have been available under the ocean, the states would have attempted to reach there!

The major share of debate in regard to the Asian Space Race is found revolving around the possibility of race amongst China and India. However, such possibility should not be presumed only based on the assessment of strategic factors. It is important to factor in the actual technological capabilities and aspirations of the state too.

China’s technological progress (both in space arena or otherwise) clearly places them much ahead of other Asian space powers. They have expressed their desire to achieve greater heights in space arena and have made superior plans than others. Their track record so far clearly indicates that they have the capability to fulfil their space dreams mostly within the time frame envisaged. It appears that even in the twenty-first century, China is unable to get over the (probably) dated notion of the so-called national pride. However, this could make them focus and invest more on their space agenda. On the other hand, India and Japan have their priorities fixed. India realises the relevance of Chinese achievements in space technologies but is not found getting into the competitive mode and trying to imitate China. Indian investments are found being made based on cost and benefit analysis. In most fields, they are found making incremental developmental efforts based on their own assessment of socioeconomic and technological advantages of such investments. It is not making investments into the technologies which have no social, scientific or strategic significance. It appears that India could go slow with its human space programme, and their top priority could be to undertake robotic missions as a starting point.

In general, various states in Asia are found making investments in space technologies which could offer social, technological, commercial and strategic benefits for their country. The issue is would the Asian space investments pose a major threat to stability in the post-Cold War world? The answer is probably no, at least not in the near future. However, there are certain valid concerns about China’s intent. The world has learnt many lessons from the Chinese 2007 ASAT. Probably, China also would have learnt some lessons from the global backlash to this test. It is important to note that any eventual weaponisation of space would weaken the global economy and could convert the space race into space arms race. On the other hand, there is a sense that China has a desire to achieve great power status. They feel that an achievement in space offers them an opportunity to do so. From that point of view, they could invest more into iconic programmes like human Moon mission that could add up to their reputation than odious missions like ASAT. They are targeting to match and outdo the best in the world. Naturally, their race is not with India or Japan, but they are to outperform the USA. Overall, China has succeeded in strategically positioning itself well and has made appropriate use of their space programme to do so.

The major portion of the global space discourse since the beginning of the twenty-first century has been revolving around the theme of Asian Space Race, and to a certain extent, an impression has been created that such race exists and is brewing. Nonetheless, the issue appears to be far from settled. There are certain commonalities in the existing and the proposed space agendas of China-Japan – India. Though, the achievements of China are found far superior than other states in the region. Also, China has far greater ambitions than other Asian states in space field (too). The overall technological appreciations of various space programmes in the region clearly enunciate China as a winner. However, when viewed at a backdrop of geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economical settings, different sensitivities emerge. States also have their complimentary space narratives, and for some of them, multiple narratives exist. Few states are found intelligently using space technologies to realise their soft power aspirations. Simultaneously, the hard power relevance of space technologies is mostly being underplayed but still refuses to lay low. States are found using a blend of both soft power and hard power called a smart power strategy. The (empirical) space balance sheet and strategic realities in regard to various Asian states demonstrate that it is difficult to conclude with certitude about the existence or absence of Asian Space Race. The current trends indicate no definitive but only somewhat suggestive space race in Asia.

[1]Various studies are available which justify this argument. However, figures vary in most of such studies for various reasons like methodology, data collection, biases, etc. Academic paper like

Tom McArthur, “English as an Asian Language”, http://www. accu. or. jp/appreb/09/pdf33-2/33- 2P003-004.pdf, accessed on Oct 6, 2011, highlight this argument by putting across empirical, observational and theoretical arguments.

[3]http://catarina. udlap. mx/u_dl_a/tales/documentos/lim/kerfin_c_ma/capitulo2.pdf, accessed on Jan

25, 2012.

[5]“Basic Human Needs, Science, And Technology”, Panel on Technology for Basic Needs, United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development, Published jointly by the International Development Research Centre Ottawa, Canada and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Geneva, Switzerland, 1997, op cit.

[6]The country specific information in the section is taken from Nabanita R. Krishnan [12].

[7]http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Satellite, accessed on Sep 15, 2012.

^Militarisation of space’ is about using satellites for the purposes of military communication, reconnaissance and navigation. Such usage is universally accepted and is not in violation of any treaty regime. ‘Weaponisation of space’ means causing intentional damage to the space assets of other states either of permanent or temporary in nature.

‘“Iran’s science progress fastest in world: Canadian report”, Feb 19, 2010, http://edition. presstv. ir/

detail/118977.html, accessed on Nov 20, 2011.

3International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of Member States in 2002 National Activities of Iran (Islamic Republic of), United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, http://www. oosa. unvienna. org/natact/2002/iran. html, last updated February 7, 2003. The current documentation available on the UNOOSA website is from 2004 to 2009 covering few countries and no information on Iran is available, accessed on Dec 13, 2011.

4“International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Activities of Member States in 2003,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, http://www. oosa. unvienna. org/natact/2003/ iran. html, last updated January 27, 2004. Presently this link is not working, accessed on Dec 13, 2011. This and earlier footnote are based on Lee Kass, “Iran’s Space Program: The Next Genie In A Bottle?”, The Middile East Review of International Affairs, Volume 10, No. 3, Article 2/10 – September 2006, http://meria. idc. ac. il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a2.html, accessed on Dec 12, 2011.

[13]“Small Multimission Spacecraft (SMMS)”, http://www. globalsecurity. org/space/world/china/ smms. htm, accessed on Dec 8, 2011.

[14]http://afp. google. com/article/ALeqM5jFpohlpSs7iLXpyOB9MalGwKRIgQ

[15] http://news. discovery. com/space/iran – launch – monkey-rocket – fail- 111012.html

[16]“Iran launches newest satellite into space”, Feb 3, 2012, http://www. payvand. com/news/12/feb/ 1034.html accessed on Feb 8, 2012.

[17] The Iran Telecommunications Research Center (ITRC) and the Iran Science Organization of Science and Technology (IROST) were jointly building this micro-satellite with the Italian company Carlo Gavazzi Space.

[18]“Iran to launch new generation of satellites”, Feb 08, 2012, http://www. space-travel. com/reports/ Iran_toJaunch_new_generation_of_satellites_999.html, accessed on Feb 08, 2012.

[19]Remarks by Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel, Chairman, Israel Space Agency, at the Space Security Conference, held at New Delhi 13-14 Nov 2007. The conference was jointly organised by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India and Center for Defence and International Security Studies (CDiSS), UK.

[20]“Focus on Israel: Israel in Space”, www. mfa. gov. il/MFA//1/Focus+on+Israel-+Israel+in+Space. htm, Jan 1, 2003, accessed on Nov 15, 2011Cached.

[21]http://www. defpro. com/news/details/30645/?SID=b2138ee2c3f220b24fd99d2b35924800, Dec 11, 2011, accessed on Dec 14, 2011.

[22]http://www. space-travel. com/reports/AMOS_5_Communications_Satellite_Successfully_ Launched_999.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2011.

[23]Israel Joins Galileo, “Intelligence Online, March 26, 2004, in “Israel To Take Part in European Galileo Project,” FBIS Document EUP20040329000444. Cited in “Space: Israel: Military Pro­gramme,” at http://cns. miis. edu/research/space/israel/mil. htm, accessed on Aug 16, 2007.

[24]http://www. jewishvirtuallibrary. org/jsource/US-Israel/nasa. html, accessed on Sept 23, 2008.

[25]http://www. esa. int/esaCP/SEMKE3Y 1LJG_index_0.html, accessed on Dec 14, 2011.

[26]“Emirates close to French satellite buy”, Dec 23, 2011, http://www. spacemart. com/reports/ Emirates_close_to_French_satellite_buy_999.html, and “Yahsat’s Y1A satellite launched”, Apr 23 , 2011, http://www. 23-1.384269, accessed on Dec 26, 2011.

[27]“Arabsat – Saudi Arabia and Communication Satellite Systems”, http://www. fas. org/spp/guide/ saudi/comm/index. html, and http://www. emiratesweek. com/2010/05/1224 accessed on Dec 15, 2011.

[28]http://space. skyrocket. de/doc_sdat/saudicomsat-1.htm, accessed Dec 14, 2011.

[29]The Financial Express, New Delhi, Mar 06, 2010 and “Saudi Arabia to sign agreement with ISRO for its space program”, Jul 6, 2010, http://www. ummid. com/news/2010/July/06.07.2010/ saudi_scientists_to_seelkisro_cooperation. htm and “Saudi Arabia, Ukraine to hold joint space exploration”, Nov 6, 2010, http://en. rian. ru/world/20101106/161229095.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2011.

[30]Turksat 2A is also known as Eurasiasat 1, the craft is operated by the Monaco-based company Eurasiasat, which was established in 1996 as a joint venture between Turk Telekom and Alcatel Space.

[31]“Turkey’s first national satellite launched” http://www. worldbulletin. net/?aType=

haber&ArticleID=77632, accessed on Dec 8, 2011.

[33]“Turkey signs satellite deal with Japanese firm”, Mar 7, 2011, http://news. xinhuanet. com/ english2010/sci/2011-03/07/c_13765698.htm, accessed on Dec 15, 2011.

[34]http://space. skyrocket. de/doc_sdat/gokturk-1.htm, accessed on Dec 6, 2011.

[35]http://www. trdefence. com/2011/06/06/china-to-launch-turkeys-first-intelligence-satellite-in- december/, accessed on Dec 6, 2011.

[36]“Turkish satellite to roll back Israel’s turf veil”, Mar 10, 2011, http://www. alarabiya. net/articles/ 2011/03/10/140977.html, accessed on Dec 15, 2011.

[37]http://www. suparco. gov. pk/about. html, accessed Feb 12, 2005.

[38]http://www. suparco. gov. pk/about. html, accessed on Dec 15, 2004.

[39]http://www. fas. org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index. html, accessed on Dec 15, 2004.

[40]http://www. fas. org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index. html, accessed on Dec 15, 2004.

[41]http://www. wisconsinproject. org/countries/pakistan/miss-miles. htm

[42]http://www. paksef. org/suparco. htm, accessed on Jan 23, 2005.

[43]http://www. suparco. gov. pk/sat_badr1.html, accessed on Dec 18, 2004.

[44]http://www. fas. org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index. html, accessed on Dec 24, 2004.

[45]http://www. angelfire. com/stars/whippee/badranv. htm, accessed on Dec 24, 2004.

[46]http://www. fas. org/spp/guide/pakistan/agency/index. html, accessed on Nov 27, 2004.

[47]Details of Badr-II are from http://www. suparco. gov. pk/saCbadr1.html and http://www. fas. org/spp/guide/pakistan/earth/, accessed on Dec 5, 2004.

[48]http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Badr_(satenite) and http://www. arabsat. com/pages/

InOrbitSatellites. aspx, accessed on Nov 8, 2011.

[50]http://www. suparco. gov. pk/cyclon_99.html, accessed on Feb 18, 2004.

[51]http://www. apnic. net/mailing-lists/s-asia-it/archive/2003/01/msg00031.html and www.

pakistaniaviation. com/ and http://www. paksef. org/suparco. htm, accessed on Dec 22, 2004.

11 Jane’s Space Directory (2000-2001), Surrey, 2000, p.19.

[53]http://www. suparco. gov. pk/news. html, accessed on Dec 23, 2004.

[54]For more details on Pakistan’s military equipment holdings, see http://www. rediff. com/

news/2002/jan/23spec. htm, accessed on Dec 12, 2004 and http://www. defence. pk/gallery/

pakistan-air-force/index501.html, accessed on Feb 6, 2012.

[57]“China delivered the third F-22P frigates to the Pakistan army”, Sep 26, 2010, http://www. chinamilitary. net/china-delivered-the-third-f-22p-frigates-to-the-pakistan-army. html and http:// pakmr. blogspot. com/2011/07/pns-aslat-4th-frigate-of-f-22p-zulfiqar. html, accessed on Sep 12, 2011.

[58]http://weapons. technology. youngester. com/2011/05/pakistan-airforce-jammed-off-instead-of. html, accessed on Nov 8, 2011.

21 Jane’s Space Directory (2000-2001), Surrey, 2000, pp. 13 & 331.

[60]http://www. aaj. tv/2011/07/navy-pn-inducts-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-in-its-fleet/, accessed on

Nov 2, 2011.

[62]http://www. pakobserver. net/200408/18/view/?page=1&id=5, accessed on Jan 25, 2005.

[63]For more details of the system, refer http://www. eastwestin. com/TAPS_milproducts. htm, ac­cessed on Feb 2, 2005.

[64]http://www. pakistanidefenceforum. com/lofiversion/index. php/t35353.html, accessed on Dec 17,


[66]http://www. iwar. org. uk/news-archive/crs/20710.pdf and Times of India, August 02, 2002, ac­

cessed on Dec 15, 2004.

[68]http://www. paksef. org/suparco. htm, accessed on Dec 25, 2004.

[69]http://www. au. af. mil/au/awc/awcgate/grayspc/graysat/surv. htm, accessed on Mar 12, 2005.

[70]http://www. rrcap. unep. org/lc/cd/html/countryrep/pakistan/introduction. html, accessed on Mar

12, 2005.

[72] Even today, India has a sounding rocket programme. It is aimed for better understanding of middle atmospheric dynamics and behaviour of Indian monsoon over the subcontinent.

[73]The erstwhile USSR and India negotiated in August 1971 an agreement (signed on May 10, 1972) in regard to a joint effort to launch a satellite.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_5, © Springer India 2013

[74]It is important to note that at that point in time, the only technologically sound organisation in India was perhaps the autonomic energy department and as such government had very few independent departments (e. g. in those days India’s Meteorological Department was part of Tourism sector!). Hence, it would be incorrect to link India’s nuclear and space ambitions together.

[75]http://www. bharat-rakshak. com/SPACE/space-history2.html. accessed on Dec 1, 2008.


[77]Ibid. and G. C. Shekar, “ISRO Does an Italian Job”, Hindustan Times, Apr 23, 2007.

[78]http://www. bharat-rakshak. com/SPACE/space-launchers-gslv. html, accessed on Sept 21, 2008.

[79]M. Krishnaswamy and S. Kalyanaraman, “Indian Remote Sensing Satellite Cartosat-1: Technical features and data products”, this paper is written by project director Cartosat-1 and programme director IRS. Also refer Randall R. Correll, “US-India Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown”, Astropolitics, Vol 4, No 2, pp. 166-167.

[80]http://www. idsa. in/publications/stratcomments/AjeyLele300408.htm, (accessed on 02 Jan 2011).

[81]U. Sankar, n 2, pp. 36-40.

[82]http://etc. technologyandculture. net/2010/06/siddiqi/, accessed on Sept 28, 2011.

[83]The Telegraph, Apr 5, 2009.

[84]Remarks by President Barack Obama, April 5,2009, http://www. whitehouse. gov/the_press_office/ Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/, accessed on Dec 18, 2011.

[85]“North Korea’s Impact on Commercial Space”, Jan 6, 2009, http://www. aviationweek. com/aw/blogs/space/index. jsp? plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId= blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A04ce340e-4b63-4d23-9695- d49ab661f385Post%3A380bfbe7-63dd-4c53-82c4-0403284c3ef0, accessed on Dec 16, 2011.

[86] http://www. voanews. com/english/news/asia/New-North – Korean – Space- Launch – Site-Appears- Completed-116291839.html#comments

[87]In 1953, Washington initiated a bilateral security treaty and established a permanent troop presence in South Korea.

[88]http://news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8219669.stm, accessed on Dec 24, 2011.

[89]http://www. bbc. co. uk/news/10281073, accessed on Dec 24, 2011.

[90]http://mepopedia. com/blog/index. php?/archives/2010/05/10.html, accessed on Jan 20, 2012.

[91]C Z Chenge et al., “ARGO Science Mission”, Future Perspectives Of Space Plasma and Particle Instrumentation and International Collaborations: Proceedings of the International Conference, f 1-3 November 2006, Tokyo, AIPConf. Proc. 1144, pp. 196-200; doi:10.1063/1.3169288 (5 pages) and http://mepopedia. com/blog/index. php?/archives/2010/05/10.html, accessed on Jan 20, 2012.

[92]Zheng Bijian developed his influential thesis of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ in 2003. For details please refer Zheng Bijian, China’s Peaceful Rise Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2005, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2005).

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_7, © Springer India 2013

[93]http://www. space. com/news/060405_nss_china. html, accessed on Dec 22, 2009. Author has earlier done some work on the Chinese space programme which has been published in few journals. The structure of the work presented over here in regard to China’s space programme is based on some of the author’s earlier published and unpublished works. For the main reference to this chapter, please refer author’s earlier work ‘Future of Asian Space Powers’, The Journal of Defence and Security, Vol 2, No 1, 2011 (publication of Malaysian institute of Defence and Security, MiDAS).

[94]For complete text of the White Papers, see http://www. spaceref. com/china/china. white. paper. nov. 22.2000.html (2000), http://www. china. org. cn/english/2006/Oct/183588.htm (2006), and http:// news. xinhuanet. com/english/china/2011-12/29/c_131333479.htm (2011), accessed on January 18, 2012. Also, refer for entire discussion on white papers Ajey Lele and Gunjan Singh, ‘China’s White Papers on Space: An Analysis’, IDSA Issue Brief, Jan 20, 2012, http://www. idsa. in/system/ files/IB_ChinasWhitePapersonSpaceAnAnalysis. pdf, accessed on Jan 28, 2012.

[95]Encyclopedia Astronautica: China, available at www. astronautix. com/articles/china. htm, ac­cessed on January 10, 2012.

[96]Main sources for certain information in this portion about China’s space programme are :KK Nair, ‘China’s Space Programme: An Overview’, Air Power, Vol 1, No 1, Monsoon 2004 and Ajey Lele, ‘China as a Space Power’, Strategic Analysis, Apr-Jun 2002.

[97]http://www. wsichina. org/space/program. cfm? programid=5&charid=1, accessed on Sep22, 2010.

[98]http://www. space. com/14048-china-satellite-launch-breaks-rocket-record. html and www. wired. com/dangerroom/2012/04/china-rocket-launches/, accessed on Sep 12, 2012.

[99]‘China announces new launch rockets’, Feb 6, 2012 http://www. spacedaily. com/reports/China_ announces_newJaunch_rockets_999.html, accessed on Feb 8, 2012.

[100]http://www. globalsecurity. org/space/world/china/comm. htm, accessed on Sept 5, 2010.

[101]http://www. indiasummary. com/2010/09/06/china-sinosat-6-communication-satellite-launched- successfully-by-chinese/, accessed on Oct 9, 2010.

[102]http://www. sinodefence. com/space/military/fsw. asp, accessed on Feb 7, 2012.

[103]http://articles. janes. com/articles/Janes-Space-Systems-and-Industry/Yaogan-series-China. html,

accessed on Sep 14, 2012.

[105]www. astronautix. com/articles/china. htm, accessed on Jul 23, 2009.

[106]http://www. planetary. org/blog/article/00002655/ and http://rt. com/news/fhobos-grund-mission- 123/ and http://www. spacedaily. com/reports/Yinghuo_Was_Worth_It_999.html, accessed on Nov 12,2011.

[107]http://www. space. com/news/060405_nss_china. html

[108]Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2005), p.36 http://www. defenselink. mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china. pdf

[109]This quotation, supposedly made by John F. Kennedy, is widespread among Chinese publications and speeches. Zhao Kejin, “China Does Not Need to Start a “Space Race” with the U. S”, http:// watchingamerica. com/News/53913/china-does-not-need-to-start-a-space-race-with-the-u-s/, ac­cessed on Nov 24, 2011.

[110] The Constitution of Japan, http://www. existenz. co. jp/constitu. htm, accessed on October 23, 2009.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_8, © Springer India 2013

[111]http://www. jaxa. jp/about/history/nal/index_e. html, accessed on August 4, 2009.

[112]“Japan appoints first space development minister: officials”, June 17, 2008, www. spacedaily. com/ /Japan_appoints_first_space_development_minister_officials_999.html

[113]http://www. daviddarling. info/encyclopedia/J/Japanese_launch_vehicles. html, accessed on Aug 4,


[115]http://www. fas. org/nuke/guide/japan/missile/index. html, accessed on Aug 6, 2009.

[116]http://www. jaxa. jp/projects/rockets/h2a/index_e. html, accessed on September 2, 2009.

[117]http://www. jaxa. jp/projects/rockets/htv/index_e. html and http://www. jaxa. jp/projects/rockets/ h2b/index_e. html, accessed on Dec12, 2011.

information on various satellite systems launched by Japan is available at http://www. daviddarling. info/encyclopedia/J/Japan_in_space. html

[119]Super 301 (first passed by congress in 1988 for two years) is essentially a congressional prod to make the administration use an existing trade law (Section 301) to spur the administration into tougher action against other countries’ allegedly unfair trading practices. While it requires the US trade representative to cite countries in order of priority for US strong-arm action under procedures and deadlines set by Section 301, in practice, it leaves considerable leeway to the administration. How the administration uses that discretion will be the key. Super 301 also carried a great deal of political baggage. It symbolised US exploitation of its superpower status to force other countries to bend to US interests, bypassing agreed international procedures in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Please refer Reginald Dale, ‘Super 301:A Trade “Monster” It Isn’t’, April 9, 1993, The New York Times.

[120]http://tcc. export. gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/Japan_satellite_AG_guide. asp, accessed on Aug 31, 2009.

[121]‘Japan Moves to End Ban on Military Use of Space’, Friday, 2 June 2006, http://www. redorbit. com/news/space/524034/japan_moves_to_end_ban_on_military_use_of_space/index. html

[122]The bill is available at http://ukinjapan. fco. gov. uk/resources/en/pdf/5606907/5633988/The_Bill_ of_Basic_Space_Law. pdf, accessed on Oct 12, 2009.

[123]‘Japan Passes law to allow military use of space: official’, Space War, May 21, 2008.

[124]http://rescommunis. wordpress. com/2009/07/22/space-in-japans-defense-white-paper/, accessed on Oct 20, 2009.

[125]‘The Basic of Japan’s Defence Policy and Build-up of Defence Capability’, Defence of Japan, 2009, Part 2. Also, please refer the issues related to Space discussed in Japan’s Defence White Paper available at http://www. mod. go. jp/e7publ/wpaper/2009.html, accessed on Sep 12, 2009.

[126]The US manned mission to the Moon is within Earth’s planetary system.

[127]This periodic comet is visible after every 75-76 years. In the recent past, it was visible during 1986 and next would be visible during 2061.

[128]http://www. jaxa. jp/projects/sat/solar_b/index_e. html, accessed on October 31, 2009.

[129]The following discussion on the first Moon mission is based on Brian Harvey, The Japanese and Indian Space Programmes, (Springer: Chichester, 2000), pp.42-43, http://www. spacetoday. org/ Japan/Japan/MUSES_A_Hiten. html and http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Hiten, accessed on October 31,2009.

[130]It may be noted that Japanese system of naming its satellites is so unconventional that Muses B (Haruka) is a radio astronomy mission. While Hayabusa (Muses-C) has been developed to

investigate asteroids.

[132]These are objects normally 50 m or more in diameter in a near-Earth orbit without a tail or coma

of a comet.

[134]In conversation with Mr Yukihito Kitazawa, IHI Corporation, Japan.

[135]APSCO has started its operations in Beijing during December 2008, 16 years after the idea was put forward. It has seven member states, China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand. Indonesia and Turkey have also signed the APSCO convention. Representatives from Argentina, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia and Sri Lanka also attended the founding ceremony.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_9, © Springer India 2013

[136]Speech by Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President Republic Of Indonesia, ‘Indonesia and America: a 21st Century Partnership’, at a USINDO Luncheon, Washington DC, 14 Nov 2008.

[137]Aceh is a region in Indonesia, which incidentally was very close to the epicentre of the infamous Indian Ocean earthquake which triggered 2004 tsunami killing; approximately 170,000 Indonesians were killed.

[138]Edward Aspinall, ‘Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Trans­formation a report prepared for the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support’, August 2005, p.2 and Matthew N. Davies, Indonesia’s War over Ache, Routledge, London, 2006

[139]http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Palapa, accessed on Sep 30, 2011.

[140]A global communications leader with more than four decades of experience, Intelsat helps service providers, broadcasters, corporations and governments deliver information and entertainment anywhere in the world, instantly, securely and reliably.

[141]The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p.311.

[142]Indosat is a leading telecommunication and information provider in Indonesia that provides cellular, fixed telecommunication and multimedia, data communication and Internet (MIDI). The details are available at http://www. indosat. com/AboutJndosat/Corporate_Profile/History, accessed on Oct 21, 2011.

[143]Toto Marnanto Kadri and Adi Sadewo Salatun, ‘Indonesian LAPAN-TUBSAT Micro-Satellite Development’, presentation given by these LAPAN officials at Bangalore, India, Nov 2007, http://www. aprsaf. org/data/aprsaf14_data/day2/P07_LAPAN%20APRSAF-14%20Plenary1c. pdf and http://space. skyrocket. de/doc_sdat/lapan-tubsat. htm, accessed on Oct 20, 2011.

[144]The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) is being built by the Group on Earth Observations (GEO—constituting various states and organisations) to coordinate interna­tional efforts (period 2005-2015) in respect of environmental data and decision-support tools. http://www. earthobservations. org/geoss. shtml, and www. prime-pco. com/geoss/pdf/day1/Country/ 05Jndonesia. pdf, accessed on Dec 2, 2011.

nhttp://space. skyrocket. de/doc_sdat/indostar-1.htm and http://www. lyngsat. com/cw1.html, accessed on Sep 28, 2011.

[146]‘Indonesian Indostar II Satellite Successfully Launched’, May 19, 2009, http://www. defencetalk. com/indonesian-indostar-ii-satellite-launched-18990/, and http://www. space-travel. com/reports/ ILS_Proton_Launches_Indostar_II_Protostar_II_Satellite_999.html, accessed on Sep 28, 2011.

[147]Based on the presentation given by Mr Toto Marnanto Kadri from LAPAN at the 17th Session Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF-17) during Nov 2010, Melbourne, Australia, available at www. aprsaf. org/data/data/Day2-cs^1200_T_Marnanto_Kadri. pdf, accessed on Sep 24, 2011.

[148]http://www. space-travel. com/reports/Indonesia_launches_rocket_into_space_999.html, accessed

on Sep 24, 2011.

[150]Malaysia, Singapore & Brunei, Lonely Planet (this book is available in its electronic version.),

2009, pp. 32-49.

[152]Breaking New Scientific Frontiers, INSIGHTCS@MASTIC, Volume 7 October 2008 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation Malaysia Publication, p.6 and M. Ansdell, L. Delgado, D. Hendrickson, ‘Analyzing the Development Paths of Emerging Spacefaring Nations: Opportunities or Challenges for Space Sustainability?’, April 2011, Capstone Research, pp. 12-14.

[153]Presentation by Mohd. Alauddin Mohd. Ali from the Institute of Space Science, ‘Space Activities in Malaysia’, available at www. oosa. unvienna. org/pdf/sap/hsti//HSTI. Alauddin. pdf, accessed on Dec 2, 2011 and M. Ansdell, L. Delgado, D. Hendrickson, ‘Analyzing the Development Paths of Emerging Spacefaring Nations: Opportunities or Challenges for Space Sustainability?’, April 2011, Capstone Research, pp. 12-14 and Statement by Prof. Datuk Dr. Mazlan Othman Head of the Malaysian Delegation at UNISPACE III conference, www. un. org/events/unispace3/speeches/ 20mal. htm, accessed on Nov 26, 2011

[154]Malaysian Space Dream: Is it okay with just CANSAT and Water Rocket?,

malfly. blogspot. com/ …/malaysian-space-dream-is-it-okay-with. html, Oct 5, 2011, accessed on Dec 10, 2011.

[155]Most of the information of Vietnam’s space programme is from Ajey Lele, ‘India – Vietnam Space Cooperation: Looking for New Frontiers’, http://sspconline. org/opinion/ IndiaVietnamSpaceCooperationNewFrontiers_14092011, Sept 14, 2011, accessed on Dec 2, 2011.

[156]Presentation by Prof. Doan Minh Chung from the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, ‘Space Technology Development in Vietnam’, at Istanbul during Sep 2010, http://www. tubitak. gov. tr/tubitak_content_files//spaceworkshop/presentations/Chung. DoanMinh. pdf, accessed on Nov 30f, 2011.

[157]‘Vietnam Selecting Belgium For Second EO Satellite’, Jul 29, 2011, http://www. spacemart. com/reports/Vietnam_Selecting_Belgium_For_Second_EO_Satellite_999.html, accessed on Nov 14, 2011.

[158]‘Japan Grants US$ 1.2 billion of ODA for Vietnam’, Nov 3, 2011, http://www. vccinews. com/

news_detail. asp? news_id=24651 and ‘Japan to offer ODA for Vietnam’, Aug 14, 2011, http://www. houseofjapan. com/local/japan-to-offer-oda-for-vietnam, accessed on Dec 6, 2011.

[160]It was established in 1993 to enhance space activities in the Asia-Pacific region and presently 269 organisations from 33 countries and region and 22 international organisations are members of this forum and presentation by Prof. Doan Minh Chung from the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, ‘Space Technology Development in Vietnam’, at Istanbul during Sept 2010, http:// www. tubitak. gov. tr/tubitak_content_files//spaceworkshop/presentations/Chung. DoanMinh. pdf, accessed on Nov 30, 2011.

[161]http://esciencenews. com/articles/2011/04/20/singapores. first. locally. made. satellite. launched.

space, accessed on Sep 26, 2011.

*This argument is based on Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation the Politics and Technics, Sipri, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 52-56.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_10, © Springer India 2013

[164]As per international estimates, North Korea could have exploded a half kiloton device (Hiroshima was 12 kiloton). This test is regarded as a partial failure.

[165]http://www. cablegatesearch. net/cable. php? id=09STATE98749, accessed on May 22, 2011.

[166]http://www. armscontrol. org/documents/icoc, accessed on Jun 12, 2011.

[167]Asia Report N° 168, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear And Missile Programs’, 18 June 2009, http:// www. ciisisgroup. org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/168-north-koreas-nuclear-and- missile-programs. aspx, accessed on July 30, 2011.

[168]‘U. S. officials: North Korea tests long-range missile’

July 04, 2006, http://articles. cnn. com/2006-07-04/world/korea. missile_1_long-range-missile- long-range-test-taepodong-1?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed Feb 12, 2011.

1 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 50, ed. Duncan Lennox, (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2009), 102-103 as mentioned in http://www. missilethreat. com/missilesoftheworld/ id.166/missile_detail. asp, accessed Feb 12, 2011.

[170]Asia Report №168, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear And Missile Programs’, 18 June 2009, p.25, http:// www. ciisisgroup. org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/168-north-koreas-nuclear-and- missile-programs. aspx, accessed on July 30, 2011.

[171]The six-party talks began as an aftermath of North Korean nuclear programme in 2003. The states involved are both the Koreas, China, Japan, the USA and Russia.

[172]For a detail study for the Iran’s Safir rocket please refer Rajaram Nagappa et al., Iran’s Safir launch Vehicle, NIAS Study 2009, NIAS Pulbication, Bangalore, 2009.

[173]The Shahab 3 is a medium-range, liquid-propellant ballistic missile. Ghadr-1 is believed to be a more accurate version of Shahab 3. Iran has developed a number of variants to the original Shahab 3 missile. These have been referred to by various intelligence and media sources as the Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Shahab 3D, Shahab 3 M, Ghadr-1, and Qadr-1. The Shahab 3 has also been used as the basis for an Iranian space program, and these rockets have been called Kavoshgar-1, IRIS, and Safir. Please refer http://www. missilethreat. com/missilesoftheworld/id.190/missile_detail. asp, accessed on Aug 1, 2011.

[174]http://www. spacewar. com/reports/Iran_successfuUy_launches_sateUite_into_space_Al- Alam_TV_999.html, accessed Jul 17, 2011.

[175]The regime comprises ‘Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers’ and an annex of con­trolled equipment and technologies. The annex of controlled equipment and technology is divided into ‘Category I’ and ‘Category II’ items. It includes equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, that are relevant to missile development, production and operation. According to the Guidelines, export of Category I items is subject to a presumption of denial. Category I includes complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets); unmanned air-vehicle systems such as cruise missiles, target and reconnaissance drones; specially designed production facilities for these systems; and certain complete subsystems such as rocket engines or stages, re-entry vehicles, guidance sets, thrust-vector controls and warhead safing, arming, fuzing and firing mechanisms. The transfer of Category I production equipment will not be authorised. Please refer http://www. reachingcriticalwill. org/political/missiles/mtcr. html, accessed on Aug 4, 2011.

[176]The theoretical meaning of the word gimbal is the pivoted support that allows the rotation of an object about a single axis. In rocket science, this term is used to describe the swinging movement of a rocket engine.

[177]http://www. cablegatesearch. net/cable. php? id=09STATE98749, accessed on Jun 15, 2011.

[178]http://www. un. org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc. htm, accessed on Jun 26, 2011.

[179]http://www. nti. org/ejesearch/profiles/Israel/Missile/index. html, accessed on Jul 24, 2011.

[180]Re-entry phase is a portion of the trajectory of a ballistic missile or space vehicle where there is a significant interaction of the vehicle and the Earth’s atmosphere.

[181]Intercept of incoming missile can take place either inside (endoatmospheric) or outside (exoat­mospheric) the Earth’s atmosphere. The trajectory of most ballistic missiles travels both the regions—inside as well as outside the Earth’s atmosphere. The engagement with the target can take place in either of these regions, and they can be intercepted either place.

[182]Over the years, they have tested various technologies associated with this system. In spite of

many years of research and development, missile defence is yet to emerge as a fully successful and functional system. However, the system is operational in parts, and the ground-based interceptors have been deployed since 2004.

[184]http://www. defenseindustrydaily. com/israel-successfully-tests-arrow-theater-missile-defense- 01571/

[185]http://intelligencesinfo. wordpress. com/2011/03/31/indian-pursuit-of-ballistic-missile-defence- program-%E2%80%93-analysis/, accessed on July 16, 2011.

[186]‘Chinese missile defence’, The Economist, Jan 14, 2010.

[187]http://www. defence. pk/forums/wmd-missiles/24457-pakistan-may- seek-chinese-interceptor- missile-defense-2012-a. html, accessed on July 23, 2011.

[188]Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Dec 19, 2003, http://www. kantei. go. jp/foreign/ tyokan/2003/1219danw^e. html, accessed on May 15, 2011.

[189]The discussion in first two paragraphs of this section is based on Ajey Lele, ‘India Investing in MIRV Technology’, Oct 22, 2009, http://www. ipcs. org/article/india/india-investing-in-mirv- technology-2987.html, accessed on Jul 30, 2011.

[190]Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Washington DC: Regnery Publishers, 1999, p.251-254 as quoted in http://www. nti. org/db/china/wwhmdat. htm

[191]‘India’s latest strategic weapon’, The Hindu, May 8, 2008.

[192]http://www. space-travel. com/reports/PSLV_Launches_Ten_Satellites_999.html, accessed on Mar 12, 2011.

[193]http://www. jaxa. jp/projects/rockets/h2/index_e. html, accessed Mar 08, 2011.

[194] http://www. insidegnss. com/node/1806, accessed on May 28, 2011.

[195]http://waas. stanford. edu/research/loran. htm, accessed on Mar 28, 2011.

[196]http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Omeg^(navigation_system), accessed on Mar 28, 2011.

[197]http://www. fas. org/spp/military/program/nav/transit. htm and http://www. experiencefestival. com/ a/Satellite_navigation_system_-.History_and_theory/id/1793498, accessed on Mar 23, 2011.

[198]http://www. astronautix. com/craft/tsiklon. htm, accessed on Mar 28, 2011.

[199]www. vectorsite. net/ttgps_2.html, accessed on Apr 15, 2011.

[200]http://www. expeiiencefestival. com/a/Satellite_navigation_system_-.History _and_theory/id/ 1793498, accessed on Feb 18, 2011.

[201]Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down by Soviet interceptors on September 1, 1983, killing 269 passengers. The aircraft was shot when it strayed into prohibited Soviet airspace around the time of a planned missile test. Subsequently, it was decided that the US military would make the GPS available for civilian use so as to avoid any further navigational in the future.

[202]http://www. gpsdaily. com/reports/Russia_To_Start_Operating_New_Glonass_K_Satellite_By_Year_


[203]http://ec. europa. eu/enterprise/policies/satnav/galileo/satellite-launches/index_en. htm, accessed on Sep 17, 2012.

[204]http://www. spacenews. com/civil/100310-initial-galileo-validation-satellites-delayed. html

[205]www. oosa. unvienna. org/pdf/limited/c1/AC105_C1_L287E. pdf

[206]MTSAT is the Multifunctional Transport Satellite with a dual function of air traffic control (ATC) and navigation and meteorology. Various agencies like Ministry of Land, Infrastructure

and Transport and Japan Meteorological Agency have stakes in this.

[208]All the inputs on MSAS are based on http://www. insidegnss. com/node/107 and http://www. eurocontrol. int/nexsat/gallery/content/public/Steermg%20Group/Meeting10/MTSAT_2009. 324NextSAT_MTSAT_Status_ver.2.pdf, accessed on May 9, 2011.

[209]http://www. bipm. org/cc/CCTF/Allowed/16/cctf04-11.pdf, accessed on Feb 10, 2012.

[210]http://www. bipm. org/cc/CCTF/Allowed/16/cctffl4-11.pdfSAS and http://www. jaxa. jp/projects/ sat/qzss/index_e. html, accessed on May 10, 2011and http://www. gpsworld. com/gnss-system/the- system-November-2007-4187, accessed on Feb 10, 2012.

[211]Joint announcement on United States-Japan GPS Cooperation, Washington, DC, January 14,

2011, http://www. state. gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154688.htm and http://www. panorientnews. com/ en/news. php? k=670

[213]http://www. globalsecurity. org/space/world/china/beidou. htm (Accessed June 12, 2007) and http://www. astronautix. com/craft/beidou. htm (Accessed April 22, 2008) and ibid and g Yuankai, ‘Your Place in the World’, Beijing Review, 2009, Issue 27, pp. 16-19.

[214]http://news. xinhuanet. com/english/sci/2012-09/19/c_131859942.htm, accessed on Sep 19, 2012.

[215]http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Beidou_navigation_system, accessed on Dec 24, 2011.

[216]http://www. bbc. co. uk/news/technology-16337648?print=true, accessed on Jan 12, 2012.

[217]http://www. spacedaily. com/reports/Chin^satellite_navigation_sector_annuaLoutput_predicted_ to_reach_35_bln_USD_in_2015_999.html, accessed on Jan 25, 2012.

[218]Even though Beidou-1 is recognised as a first-generation system like most other navigational systems, it is not a passive system. This constellation is a two-way system capable of sending messages to the control centre through satellites.

[219]Three satellite-receiver ranges are needed for a position fix; a fourth satellite could increase the

area of coverage and provide redundant measurements.

[221]http://defensetech. org/2006/08/03/compass-chinese-satnav-or-galileo-bluff/

[222]http://www. defence. pk/forums/india-defence/68197-indian-regional-navigational-sate]lite-

system-irnss. html

[223]www. derm. qld. gov. au/gnss/systems. html, accessed on Apr 24, 2011.

[224]http://www. spacedaily. com/reports/Success_of_GSAT_8_and_Future_ofJndia_Space_Progra mme_999.html, accessed on Jun 15, 2011.

[225]http://www. insidegnss. com/node/2665, accessed on Apr 15, 2011.

[226]‘Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) and Indian Agreement’ http://wordinfo. info/ unit/3935?letter=G&spage=3, accessed on Jun 22, 2011.

[227]The Hindu, Dec 22, 2010.

[228] ‘Russia, India to cooperate in production of satellite navigation equipment’, http://www. gpsdaily. com/reports/Russia_India_to_cooperate_in_production_of_satellite_navigation_equipment_999. html, Dec 29, 2011, accessed on Dec 29, 2011.

[229]http://www. oosa. unvienna. org/oosa/es/SAP/gnss/icg. html, accessed on Apr 05, 2011.

[230]Report on the United Nations/United States of America International Meeting on the Use and Applications of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, (Vienna, 13-17 December 2004), available at http://www. oosa. unvienna. org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC10V846E. pdf, accessed on Jun10, 2011.

[231]http://www. oosa. unvienna. org/oosa/es/SAP/gnss/icg. html, accessed on Mar 10, 2011.

[232]http://www. oosa. unvienna. org/pdf/publications/icg_book01E. pdf, accessed on Jun 19, 2011.

Part of this chapter draws from the author’s earlier work An Asian Moon Race?, Space Policy, 26

(2010), pp. 222-228

[234]The regions beyond the gravitational influence of Earth encompassing interplanetary, interstellar, and intergalactic space. This definition is available at http://www. thefreedictionary. com/deep+ space, accessed on March 31, 2009.

[235]www. spacedaily. com/reports/Why_The_Moon_999.html – 25k, accessed on March 30, 2009 and http://www. nasa. gov/exploration/home/why_moon. html, accessed on Feb 13, 2012.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_12, © Springer India 2013

[236]www. msnbc. msn. com/id/3688344/, accessed on Apr 1, 2009 and http://adsabs. harvard. edu/abs/ 2003AdSpR..31.2363S, accessed on Feb 12, 2012.

[237]http://www. jspec. jaxa. jp/e/activity/selene2.html, accessed on Feb 12, 2012 and Satoshi Tanaka, Hiroaki Shiraishi, Manabu Kato, Tatsuaki Okada, ‘The science objectives of the SELENE-2 mission as the post SELENE mission’, Advances in Space Research 42 (2008) 394-401.

[238]http://www. planetary. org/explore/topics/kaguya/objectives. html, accessed on Jan 12, 2009.

[239]http://www. kaguya. jaxa. jp/en/about/about_sat_e. htm, accessed on Dec 14, 2008.

[240]The relay satellite ‘OKINA (RSTAR)’ made an impact on the lunar surface on February 12, 2009 (JST), and the four-way Doppler measurement mission was successfully completed.

[241]In Japan, the Usuda Deep Space Center was established in Usuda Town (new name—Saku City from Apr. 2005) to conduct command operations and receive data from deep space probes.

The uplinked radio wave from Usuda is relayed to main orbiter, which is returned to Usuda via relay satellite again, and Doppler frequency is measured at Usuda. This information is available at official JAXA website, and also please refer the succeeding note.

[243]During informal conversation with S. K. Shivakumar, director of the ISRO’s Telemetry Tracking and Command Network.

[244]At 40th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference (2009), on March 24, 2009, ‘Lunar Missions: Results from Kaguya, Chang’e-1 and Chandrayan 1’ were presented, and the details are available at http://www. lpi. usra. edu/meetings/lpsc2009/pdf/sess301.pdf, accessed on Apr 14, 2009. This information is technical in nature and discusses mainly the performance of the sensors and method to decipher data from the data obtained from these missions. Also, please refer, Science 13 February 2009, Vol. 323. No. 5916, this issue has articles analysing the details based on the data made available by the Japanese Moon mission.

[245]‘Chandrayaan’s Moon findings: Water, rocks and traces of Apollo’, Oct 22, 2009, http://news. in. msn. com/national/article. aspx? cp-documentid=3303481&page=0, accessed on Jun 12, 2011, and Ninad Bondre, ‘Planetary science: Wet moon dry Earth’, Nature Geoscience 2, 746 (2009).

[246]Geographical feature on the Moon.

[247]‘China’s second lunar probe completes 6 months’, Sept 6, 2011, http://lunarscience. nasa. gov/ articles/chinas-second-lunar-probe-completes-6-months, accessed on Sept 7, 2011.

[248]It is a point where gravitational forces and the orbital motion of a body balance each other. There are five Lagrangian points in the Sun-Earth system, and the Chang’e-2 has reached one of those nearest to Earth. Lying in the Earth’s shadow, this Lagrangian point is exposed to less radiation from the sun than other Lagrangian points, and it is an ideal place for scientists to put space telescopes when they want to observe the universe. ‘China’s second lunar probe reaches deep space’, China Daily, Aug 31, 2011, available at http://www. ecns. cn/2011/08-31/2048.shtml, accessed on Sept 2, 2011.

[249]‘China’s second moon orbiter Chang’e-2 goes to outer space’, Jun 10, 2011. http://www. spacedaily. com/reports/China_second_moon_orbiter_Change_2_goes_to_outer_space_ 999.html, accessed on Sept 7, 2011 and ‘China’s second lunar probe reaches deep space’, China Daily, Aug 31, 2011, available at http://www. ecns. cn/2011/08-31/2048.shtml, accessed on Sept 2, 2011.

[250]Moon is seismically stable and has no winds hence offers a stable platform for observation, would

allow scientists to extend the energy range of solar spectra below the energy cutoffs imposed by Earth’s atmosphere, observations would be free of complicating geomagnetic effects.

[252]“Missions to Mars Past Present and Future” http://www. disabled-world. com/entertainment/ hobby/astronomy/mars-missions. php, accessed on Aug 20, 2011.

[253]The Mars-94 and Mars-96 Missions [and Discussion] Author(s): Alexander V. Zakharov and H. Fechtig Source: Philosophical Transactions: Physical Sciences and Engineering, Vol. 349, No. 1690, The Solar-System: A Review of Results from Space Missions (Nov. 15, 1994), pp. 295-307 Published by: The Royal Society.

[254]‘China’s Yinghuo-1 Mars’, Sept 9, 2010, Orbiter http://www. planetary. org/blog/

article/00002655/linkinghub. elsevier. com/retrieve/pii/linkinghub. elsevier. com/retrieve/pii/ S0275106210000172, accessed on Sept 9, 2011. The information in this blog is based on two different papers written by Chinese scientists in Chinese journals. There are some variations (mostly minor) in the information provided in these papers.

[255]‘China Likely to Launch First Probe To Explore Mars’ Surface In 2013’, Mar 03, 2011, http:// news. xinhuanet. com/english2010/china/2011-03/02/c_13757750.htm, and Morris Jones, ‘China Goes To Mars’, http://www. spacedaily. com/reports/China_Goes_To_Mars_999.html accessed on May 15, 2011.

[256]Details of this experiment are available on http://mars500.imbp. ru/en/index_e. html, accessed on Jan 2, 2012.

[257]White House science adviser John Holdren before testifying May 4 before the House Appropriations subcommittee on commerce, justice and science. ‘Obama sees China as a partner in Mars mission’, Jun 5, 2011, http://www. msnbc. msn. com/id/42934529/ns/technology_and_science- space/t/obama-sees-china-partner-mars-mission/#, accessed on Sept 6, 2011.

[258]http://www. firstpost. com/tech/indias-mars-mission-to-begin-november-2013-459232.html, accessed on Sep 19, 2012.

[259]Helium-3 is expected to help greatly towards resolving the energy crisis on the Earth.

[260]States are looking at Antarctica model for Moon—the earlier you reach you are suitably positioned to grab the peace of ‘Earth’ for your state. A permanent base has a major military relevance too. Also, such a (zero gravity) base can help significantly research and development activities.

[261]J Vedda, n-4, p. 24.

[262] ‘Shooting the Moon’, The Economist, Sept 27, 2008, p.40.

[263]‘India’s Quest for Energy Security: The Oil and Gas Perspective’, Speech delivered by Murli Deora, India’s Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, at Rice University on March 31, 2006; available at www. bakerinstitute. org.

[264]From the lecture delivered by M. M. Pallaum Raju, India’s Minister of State for Defence, in the “P. C. Lal Memorial Lecture” organised by the Air Force Association on March 19, 2007, at New Delhi.

[265]Various retired armed forces officials have expressed this opinion.

[266]www. fas. org.

integrated HQ of MoD (Navy) and Confederation of Indian Industry, Building India’s Navy: Requirements and Indigenous Capability, 2010, available at http://www. ciidefence. com/

[268]The Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major made an announcement to this effect

at Aero India, Bangalore in February 2009.

[270]“India’s spy satellite RISAT placed in orbit”, Apr 20, 2009, http://news. rediff. com/report/2009/

apr/20/indias-spy-satellite-iisat-placed-in-orbit. htm, accessed on Jul 12, 2011and MR Venkatesh, “RISAT-2 not a spy satellite, says ISRO chief’, Hindustan Times, April 20, 2009.

[272]Stephen Clark, “China Launches New Spy Satellite”, Aug 10, 2010, http://www. space. com/ 8923-china-launches-spy-satellite. html and Rui C. Barbosa, “China completes 2009 schedule by launching another spy satellite”, Dec 15, 2009, http://www. nasaspaceflight. com/2009/12/ china-completes-2009-schedule-by-launching-another-spy-satellite/ and “China launches new Yaogan XI ‘remote sensing’ satellite”, Sept 22, 2010 http://www. china-defense-mashup. com/ china-launches-new-yaogan-xi-remote-sensing-satellite. html, accessed on Sept 18, 2011.

[273]“Selling Spy Satellites to China”, The New York Times, Jun 19, 1998.

[274]Kate Wilkinson in an interview with Saadia Pekkanen on Sept 9, 2011, http://www. nbr. org/ research/activity. aspx? id=173 assessed on Aug 20, 2011, Saadia M. Pekkanen is the joint author (along with Paul Kallender-Umezu) of the book tilted In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, Stanford University Press, 2010.

[275]John Feffer, “Japan: The Price of Normalcy”, January 13, 2009, http://www. fpif. org/fpiftxt/5780

[276]“Japan Moves to End Ban on Military Use of Space”, Friday, 2 June 2006, http://www. redorbit. com/news/space/524034/japan_moves_to_end_ban_on_military_use_of_space/index. html, accessed on Oct 20, 2009.

[277]The bill is available at http://ukinjapan. fco. gov. uk/resources/en/pdf/5606907/5633988/The_Bill_ of_Basic_Space_Law. pdf, accessed on Oct 12, 2009.

[278]“Japan Passes law to allow military use of space: official”, Space War, May 21, 2008.

[279]http://rescommunis. wordpress. com/2009/07/22/space-in-japans-defense-white-paper/, accessed on Oct 20, 2009.

[280]“The Basic of Japan’s Defence Policy and Build-up of Defence Capability”, Defence of Japan, 2009, Part 2. Also, please refer the issues related to Space discussed in Japan’s Defence White Paper available at http://www. mod. go. jp/e/publ/w_paper/2009.html, accessed on Sept 12, 2009.

[281]http://factsanddetails. com/japan. php? itemid=819&catid=22&subcatid=148 and James Dunni – gan, “Japan Loses 25 Percent of Their Spy Satellites” Sept 17, 2010, http://www. strategypage. com/ dls/articles/Japan-Loses-25-Percent-Of-Their-Spy-Satellites-9-17-2010.asp, accessed on Sept 20, 2011.

[282]“Development in the high resolution imaging satellites for the military”, Space policy 27 (2011) p.46 and “Israel launches spy satellite”, Jun 23, 2010, http://english. aljazeera. net/news/middleeast/ 2010/06/20106239424671297.html, accessed on Jun 24, 2011 and “Russian rocket launches Israeli dual-use spy satellite over Iran”, Apr 27, 2006, http://www. worldtribune. com/worldtribune/06/ front2453852.238888889.html, accessed on Jun 24, 2011.

[283]“South Korea to purchase four spy satellites by 2020”, Oct 21, 2009, http://theasiandefence. blogspot. com/2009/10/south-korea-to-purchase-four-spy. html, accessed on Aug 21, 2011.

[284]“Emirates close to French satellite buy”, Dec 23, 2011, http://www. spacemart. com/reports/ Emirates_close_to_French_satellite_buy_999.html, accessed on Dec 26, 2011.

[285]Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2005), p.36, http://www. defenselink.

mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china. pdf.

[287]http://www. jsc. nasa. gov/Bios/htmlbios/wang-t. html, accessed on Aug 7, 2011.

[288]http://www. jsc. nasa. gov/Bios/htmlbios/al-saud. html, accessed on Aug 7, 2011.

[289]http://www. astronomytoday. com/astronomy/interview10.html, accessed on Aug 7, 2011.

[290]http://www. spacefacts. de/bios/international/english/muszaphar_sheikh. htm and http://www.

spacefacts. de/bios/international/english/lee_so-hyun. htm, accessed on Aug 1, 2011.

[291]“Japan’s Hope in Space”, Highlighting Japan through articles, pp.8-9, http://www. gov-online. go. jp/pdf/hlj_ar/voL0027e/08-09.pdf, accessed on Aug 9, 2011.

[292]http://www. nasa. gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/jem. html, accessed on Aug 4, 2011.

[293]Incidentally, the space laboratory on ISS known as Kibo also means HOPE.

[294]http://forum. nasaspaceflight. com/index. php? topic=26143.0, Project Gemini was the second hu­man space flight programme of NASA. This programme was an intermediate step between Mercury and Apollo programme. During mid-1960s, it carried out ten successful manned space missions. http://www-pao. ksc. nasa. gov/kscpao/history/gemini/gemini-overview. htm

[295]http://www. sinodefence. com/space/military/fsw. asp and http://forum. nasaspaceflight. com/index. php? topic=26143.0

[296]Pan Zhenqiang, ‘Shenzhou VI and China’s Space Flight’, Foreign Affairs Journal (78), 2005, pp. 53-54 and http://www. astronautix. com/craft/shenzhou. htm. However, there appears to be certain delay in this regard.

[297]‘The Significance and Implications of Tiangong I’, http://www. idsa. in/idsacomments/ TheSignificanceandImplicationsofTiangong_alele_071011, accessed on Nov 22, 2011.

[298]http://www. scientificamerican. com/article. cfm? id=chinas- first – space-lab-ti&print=true

[299]The 8-ton China space station is very small in size in comparison earlier attempts by few other states. In 1973, the US Skylab was launched weighing 80 tons. Russia’s Mir space station (1986­2001) was a 22-ton core module. The ISS is 450 ton. However, it is important to note that Tiangong – 1is more of an excremental station, and China’s proposed station is likely to weigh 60-70 ton.

[300]http://www. chinadaily. com. cn/cndy/2011-11/18/content_14115516.htm, accessed on Nov 22, 2011.

[301]http://www. space. com/16170-china-launches-1st-female-astronaut-shenzhou-9.html, accessed on Sep 20, 2012.

[302] http://www. space. com/11048- china – space – station-plans – details. html

[303]These hypersonic aircrafts are designed to achieve orbital height and velocity in a single stage from a runway takeoff.

[304]This is being developed by India’s defence research organisation DRDO jointly with ISRO. One vehicle is expected to last for 100 launches and should carry a payload of 50-1,000 kg. For more, please visit http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Indian_Space_Shuttle_Program, accessed on Jul 12, 2011.

[305]From the unpublished work by Keith Gottschalk and Raghavan Gopalaswami titled ‘Even India’: The Birth of Tomorrow’s RLV. It may be noted that Air Commodore (Retd) Raghavan Gopalaswami was the project leader of Avatar project and is also created to have coined the name. Also, refer author’s discussions with Raghavan Gopalaswami.

[306]http://space. skyrocket. de/doc_sdat/sre-1.htm, accessed on Jul 12, 2011.

[307]http://articles. janes. com/articles/Janes-Space-Systems-and-Industry/Space-Recovery- Experiment-SRE-India. html

[308]http://www. isro. org/scripts/futureprogramme. aspx

[309]The entire above information on RLV-TD project is based on “Reusable Launch Vehicle – Tech­nology Demonstrator (RLV-TD)”, http://knol. google. com/k/reusable-launch-vehicle-technology- demonstrator-rlv-td#, accessed on Aug 27, 2011 and http://www. isro. org/scripts/futureprogramme. aspx, accessed on Aug 16, 2011.

[310]“ISRO starts work on man mission”, Mar 1, 2010, http://indiatoday. intoday. in/site/story/ISRO+ starts+work+on+’man+mission’/1/86202.html, accessed on Aug 14, 2011.

[311]http://www. isro. org/scripts/futureprogramme. aspx, accessed on Aug 14, 2011.

[312]http://www. ndtv. com/article/india/soon-india-to-have-its-own-space-shuttle-123239&cp

2Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power”, Asian Survey, Vol XLVIII, No.

[314] May/Jun 2008, pp. 456-461. In November 2003, Zheng Bijian proposed China’s ‘peaceful rise theory’ at the Boao Asia Forum, stressing the need for China to advocate power transition while developing its own peaceful international influence. Beijing consensus: ‘Since China began undertaking economic reforms in 1978, its economy has grown at a rate of nearly ten percent a year, and its per-capita GDP is now twelve times greater than it was three decades ago. Many analysts attribute the country’s economic success to its unconventional approach to economic policy – a combination of mixed ownership, basic property rights, and heavy government intervention. Time magazine’s former foreign editor, Joshua Cooper Ramo, has even given it a name: the Beijing consensus.’ Please refer Yang Yao, “The End of the Beijing Consensus”, Feb 2, 2010, http://www. foreignaffairs. com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus, accessed on Jun 28, 2011.

[315]This document is available on http://www. fmprc. gov. cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm, accessed on Feb 22, 2012.

[316]“China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, And Africa”, A study prepared for the committee on foreign relations united states senate by the congressional research service, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2008, pp. 107-108.

[317]“China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, And Africa”, A study prepared for the committee on foreign relations united states senate by the congressional research service, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2008, p.16 and Virginia de la Siega, “What is China’s interest in Latin America?”, Online magazine : IV425 – Jun 2010, http://www. mternationalviewpoint. org/spip. php? page=prmt_article&id_article=1883, accessed Oct 4, 2011.

[318]“China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” In South America, Asia, And Africa”, A study prepared

for the committee on foreign relations united states senate by the congressional research service, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2008, pp. 88-89.

[320]“China to replace Nigerian satellite”, http://www. chinadaily. com. cn/china/2009-03/25/content_ 7612718.htm, accessed on Jan 14, 2011. accessed on Aug 22, 2011.

[321]http://space. skyrocket. de/doc_sdat/venesat- 1.htm, accessed on Aug 22, 2011.

This chapter draws from the author’s earlier work “Future of Asian Space Powers” from Ajey Lele and Namrata Goswami (ed) Imagining Asia in 2030: Trends, Scenarios and Alternatives, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 243-268.

[323]http://www. sourcewatch. org/index. php? title=Andrew_Marshall, accessed on Jan 15, 2010.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_16, © Springer India 2013

[324]Rand has published a report authored by Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in Post Industrial Age, 2005. Such methods of quantification could be used for measuring national power.

[325]http://oai. dtic. mil/oai/oai? verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA363499, accessed on Dec 1, 2009.

[326]It is difficult to indicate the exact financial commitments done by Japan for this project. However,

it is estimated that the overall project cost could be US$ 100 billion and Japan could be a major contributor. The Japanese science module-Kibo is the largest science module of the ISS.

[328] ‘A wary respect’, The Economist, October 22, 2009.

[329]Literature normally refers United States, Russia and European Space Agency (ESA) as tier one and Japan, China and India as tier two space powers.

[330]http://www. cnsa. gov. cn/n615709/n620682/n639462/102448.html, accessed on Dec 6, 2009.

[331]‘Ready for lift-off’, Indian Express, Oct 30, 2009.

[332]For a detailed analysis of this please refer ‘Space Security: need for a proactive approach’, IDSA – Pugwash Working Group Report, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2009.

[333]‘US official questions China space intentions’, Space Daily, Jan 13, 2010.

[334]“Change-2 Satellite’s Camera Resolution Reaches One Meter”, Space Daily, Jan 14, 2010.

[335]The six platinum group metals are ruthenium, rhodium, palladium, osmium and platinum. Also refer http://www. space. com/816-resources-moon. html, accessed on Dec 29, 2011.

[336]http://www. space. com/9250-mining-rare-minerals-moon-vital-national-security. html, accessed

on Dec 29, 2011.

[338]‘ISRO seeks Russian spaceship for manned flight’, Business Standard, October 05, 2009.

[339]Ms Misuzu Onuki has published probably the first Japanese language book about NewSpace in Japan. This 203-page book, titled I Will Go to Space Next Week (2009), is a comprehensive round­up of commercial space activities being undertaken around the world. Topics include suborbital and orbital vacation options, marketing and branding opportunities and commercial projects such as zero gravity manufacturing and commercial lunar development.

[340]http://www. answers. com/topic/arms-race-overview#ixzz1i5wFjLQt, accessed on Jan 1, 2012.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_17, 255

© Springer India 2013

[341]Mahan is famous for his masterwork on sea power (The Influence of Sea Power upon History,

1660-1783 [1890]).

[343]http://www. popularmechanics. com/science/space/4307281, accessed on Jan 8, 2011.

[344]Dark side of the moon”, Socialist Review, July/August 1999, Issue 232.

[345]For the first time since the dawn of the space age, China’s Long March rocket family eclipsed the annual flight rate of the US fleet of space launchers, http://www. space. com/14048-china-satellite- launch-breaks-rocket-record. html, accessed on Jan 9, 2011.

[346]http://www. chinadaily. com. cn/china/2011- 12/21/content_14296838.htm, accessed on Jan 4, 2012 and Economic Times, Jan 9, 2012.

[347]http://www. isro. org/Launchvehicles/PSLV/pslv. aspx, accessed on Sep 16, 2012.

[348]http://english. yonhapnews. co. kr/national/2011/12/26/34/0301000000AEN20111226001800315F. HTML, accessed on Jan 10, 2012.