Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

Is weaponising a space a legitimate option for any state? The outer space treaty (OST) emphasises that ‘peaceful usages’ of space is important. But, at the same time, there is no common understanding on what should constitute a space weapon. Damage to satellite in space could be carried out by firing a missile from the ground to the space, by using a space-based weapon or by using ground and/or space-based jammers. Presently, only a theoretical possibility exists in regard to putting weapons in space to engage a ground-based target. On the other hand, various treaties and norms do exist in the space arena, which could be interpreted to conclude that space weaponisation is incorrect. However, mostly the selective and inferred interpretations of law would have limitations. Hence, there is no direct answer to the question regarding the legitimacy of space weaponisaton.

Also, it is argued that if the USA, the sole superpower in space and even otherwise, escalates the process of militarisation and weaponisation of space, then other states would try to follow them. This would lead to a destabilising effect on global community [14]. In contrast, five decades since the launching of the first

satellite barring few cases of ASAT demonstration, no actual ASAT attack has ever happened. This is a good omen, but absence of any attack on the adversaries’ satellite infrastructure till date does not guaranty that it would not happen in future. Understanding such realities, few Asian states have probably started making investments in the ASAT technologies. The aim could to be to develop and test them to demonstrate the capabilities. However, there appears to be much ambiguity in regard to the ASAT policies of various Asian states (same is true globally too). None of the Asian states are found taking clear positions of this issue. It appears that every state is waiting for others to make the first ‘move’!

Contradicting its own stated goal of a ‘peaceful rise’ on January 11, 2007, China carried out an ASAT test by destroying its own ageing weather satellite (Y-1C) by using a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) technology. This act involved mounting a metal piece on the top of the missile KT-2 which destroyed its target simply by colliding with it. Beijing demonstrated the dramatic technological advances made by China through this test. It conducted this test on a spacecraft flying as fast as an intercontinental ballistic missile, re-entering the atmosphere. The satellite’s destruction was carried out by a unitary hit-to-kill payload—a technique far superior than what was used by the erstwhile Soviet Union. Since this satellite intercept occurred along the ascent trajectory of the offensive missiles’ flight, it could be concluded that the overall guidance and control systems as well as the KKV’s own sensors were so accurate that the Chinese engineers never took the option of exploiting the booster’s descent trajectory to give the kill vehicle more time, both to observe the target satellite and to manoeuvre as necessary [15]. During this test, China destroyed a 750-kg satellite orbiting at an altitude of 850 km. This in turn has created significant amount of debris in space almost to the tune of 300,000 big and small pieces of debris.

Apart from the ASAT weapons, China’s counter-space efforts also include satellite jamming technologies. China has probably made substantial investments in the field of ground-based lasers to destroy/damage satellites. In fact, China has pursued a variety of space warfare programmes particularly over the last decade. China has also invested in direct-attack and directed-energy weapons [16]. As per the Pentagon’s 1998 report to the Congress, ‘China already may possess the capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by lasers’, and that ‘given China’s current interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing would develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in the future’.24 In 2006, US government officials had accused China of using lasers against their reconnaissance satellites on a number of occasions [17]. According to one Pentagon report a year before, ‘PLA is building lasers to destroy satellites and already has beam weapons capable of damaging sensors on space based reconnaissance and intelligence systems. Consequently, China could blind the US intelligence and military space equipment systems vital for deploying US military forces in current and future warfare’.[285]

For the last couple of years, the Chinese interests in developing and testing various methodologies for carrying out antisatellite operations are being debated. There are reports that China has completed ground tests of an advanced antisatellite weapon called ‘parasitic satellite’. It is likely to be deployed on an experimental basis and enters the phase of space test in the near future. These satellite systems are probably already ground tested. This ASAT system can be used against various types of satellites such as communication satellites, navigational satellites and early warning satellites in different orbits. The cost of building this satellite system is 0.1-1% of typical satellite [18]. References to Parasite satellite are also found in 2003 and 2004 annual reports on the military power of China of the department of defence. Few scholars are of the opinion that even though China is working on small satellites, the idea of a Parasite satellite may not be true [7, p. 217]. Probably, arguments negating the likely ASAT potential of China were mostly made before the 2007 tests.

Theoretically, apart from China, India is another country in the region capable of developing and demonstrating ASAT capability. It is planning to build up its ‘potential’ for delivering an antisatellite weapon (ASAT). It appears that India has both technological wherewithal and political determination to undertake such test. At the same time, it has the maturity to understand the geopolitical implications for such testing and hence it likely to undertake the test only after undertaking a detailed cost benefits analysis.

India’s premier Defence Research and Development Organizations (DRDO) Director General VK Saraswat has claimed that ‘India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites’, while speaking to media on the sidelines of the 97th Indian Science Congress.[286] This announcement has significant strategic significance and could have wider global ramifications in regard to India’s strategic calculus. Hence, it is vital to view this ‘statement of intent’ in a correct perspective. India’s any probable ASAT programme could emerge as a part of its ballistic missile development programme. This indicates that ISRO, the India’s only space agency, would not have any mandate for such a programme. ISRO is expected to continue to perform various civilian and commercial mandates, and ASAT policies could be decided by other agencies.

Geo-strategically, India could be viewed caught in an unusual situation. Its adversaries (which are also its neighbours) are nuclear weapon states out of which

one is a communist state with a burning ambition to become a global superpower, and the other is a failing democracy where the safety of nuclear weapons is always a suspect. This indicates that India’s basic interest would lay with the development of ballistic missile defence (BMD) architecture. ASAT technology could emerge as an offshoot of such development. In regard to ASAT testing, India has not taken any official position yet.

To develop indigenous BMD capability, India proposes to develop two systems: Prithvi Air Defence Exercise (PADE) and Advanced Air Defence System (AAD) by 2015. This entire project has begun few years back. The first interception test was successfully conducted during November 2006 at a 50-km range. India proposes to develop a two intercept mode system to hit a target at both exo­atmospheric and endo-atmospheric levels [19]. DRDO is building an advanced version of its interceptor missile with a range of 120-140 km. All such technological developments could allow India to develop its own ASAT capability. Engaging any satellite at the height 250 km or even less is advantageous to avoid creation of debris. If India wants to demonstrate any capability, then it should avoid creation of any debris, and their progress in BMD technology development arena could allow them that option.

In Asia, apart from India, China and Japan are also investing in missile interception technology. In the case of China which has already demonstrated ASAT capability, a reverse (in contrast to India) inference could be drawn. China’s ASAT indicative of direct-ascent or ‘direct-kill’ capability signifies that China has developed most of the technologies needed to bring together a modern anti-ballistic missile defence [20]. Japan’s interests in BMD are known, but their entire BMD architecture is in collaboration with the USA. Hypothetically, developing ASAT should not be problematic for them. Israel has also achieved success in interception technologies, and they have also made some of these technologies commercially available. This state also have technological base available to undertake ASAT. Pakistan has a successful missile programme but would have to make additional effort to develop ASAT capability. They could expect some help from China if they decide to do so. Not much of information is available in regard to these states about their interests in satellite jamming technologies. It appears that in the region, China would remain in the forefront in this field.

Assessment

Satellites have emerged as a main focus of military activities for the last two decades, particularly post 1991 Gulf War. Since then various other military cam­paigns have demonstrated to the world the relevance of space technology in modern-day conflict and their capability to provide direct support for ground, air and water/underwater operations. Space technologies have brought in the transformation in warfare which is ultimately leading towards the revolution in warfare, particularly

for the defence forces in developing countries. By the beginning of the twenty – first century, the nature of the battlefield has undergone a transformation. Space is being recognised as the fourth dimension of warfare. Robotic equipments are slowly becoming the inessential part of the modern-day battlefield, and they also would operate in space. Fully automated warfare may be technologically feasible in the next 20 years, and space technology would play an extremely significant role in this.

Realising the importance of militarisation of space, few Asian states have started making specific investments into military-specific satellite technologies. The significant investments are being made by China, Japan and India. Particularly, these three states have developed high-resolution imaging satellites. Israel also has made investments into this field. All these states have launched satellites, offering them imagery with sub metre resolution (70-80 cm, in certain cases, approximately 1 m). Such imageries are also available commercially (with certain restrictions). Since various Asian states are not having direct accessibility for such information, they would depend on commercially available inputs, and India, China and Japan could offer such services to their friends and could also engage in imagery diplomacy. Communication is another arena where investments form military points of view are being made. India is planning for dedicated satellite services for their armed forces. Space technology is expected to help India, China and Israel to enhance the efficiency of their nuclear setup too.

Satellite navigation is one area where China is making rapid progress and has already declared their Biduo system operational regionally during Dec 2011. India is expected to take few more years before their indigenous navigational system becomes operational. Till that time, their dependence on GPS and GLONASS is expected to continue. For the armed forces of other states like South Korea, Malaysia, etc., GPS continues to remain the best option. Amongst the major spacefaring nations in the region, Japan’s military space programme displays transparency. India has few dual-use systems and has already announced their plans in regard to military satellites. China is unlikely to get out of its ambiguity cover. The need of the hour is for these states to become proactive towards the formulation of a space regime.

There are major concerns about space weaponisation leading to arms race in space. Asia has a very critical role to play in this regard. Already, China has vitiated the atmosphere by undertaking the ASAT in 2007. This has put India in an extremely precarious situation. Till date much before China, only the USA and Russia had demonstrated their ASAT capabilities. Owing to its BMD compulsions, the USA is not seen interested in developing any global space regime banning weaponisation of space. Also, the efforts made by China and Russia by jointly submitting to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) the draft Treaty on February 12, 2008 on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) are found inadequate. This draft suffers from various lacunas, and the intentions of China and Russia in regard to space weaponisation remain doubtful. Various opinions are being expressed in regard to the EU’s space code of conduct. All these happenings indicate that many states in the world have at least started debating space security issues which is a positive change, and Asian states should not miss this opportunity to put their points of view across.

It is important for powers like India to learn from the past experiences of NPT. This treaty regime canvassed as one of the most successful UN regime is actually one of the most unfair UN document on arms control and disarmament. It allows five states in the world to keep their nuclear weapons stockpile while depriving others. It is important for India to learn lessons from this to decide their ASAT policy. For other smaller Asian powers, it is also important to remain connected with these issues and need to have a stake in the system for obvious resigns.

It is important to note that vulnerabilities do not necessarily result into threats. Currently, there are very few states having technological capabilities in ASAT arena. Most importantly, the ‘deterrence’ potential of space weapons is yet to be clearly established by the scientific, political and academic community. Hence, states are not looking at the space weaponisation as an immediate policy option. In Asia too, the process of militarisation of space is far more rapid than the weaponisation. Simultaneously, the armed forces from various Asian states lobbying for satellite technologies need to realise that, although the space technologies assisting the modern state-of-art military hardware has capabilities to neutralise the threats in a significantly reduced amount of time, there also exists a danger that such technologies have potential to escalate the conflict.

Japan-China-India are found being more ambitious in defining their priorities in space than ever been in the past. Their space policies are responding not only to their own aspirations of emerging as a major global actor but also to the space efforts of other powers.[332] Apart from civilian benefits, they have also witnessed the advantages the US forces have received during all these years from their military space assets. Even a state like Japan has passed a law during 2008/2009 to allow military use of space and proposes to strengthen the national security through the development of space.

In particular, post-1991 Gulf War, the concept of militarisation of space is not being viewed as a taboo globally. Japan has launched spy satellites to address the North Korean threat, and states like India and China have dual-purpose remote sensing satellites. India proposes to launch communication satellites for its armed forces in near future. India and China have plans for independent regional/global navigational systems. Smaller states within the region like Pakistan, Indonesia and Iran may get support from China to develop their own military-related space assets. The future emphasis for all these states could be towards development of small satellites which are cheap, relatively easy to launch and offer almost the same utilities as normal satellites.

China appears to be viewing war in space as an integral part of future military operations. Chinese test of its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2007 has reinforced China’s status as a true military space power, equal to the USA and Russia. This puts the US space systems at risk in any future conflict with China [13]. It is also likely that China has developed satellite jamming capabilities too. Naturally, this puts the satellite systems of not only the USA but also that of other states within the region at risk. Many western analysts feel that there is ‘suggestiveness’ in Chinese actions regarding the weaponisation of space. General Xu Qiliang, commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Air Force, was interviewed on November 1, 2009 by China’s PLA Daily, and he has articulated the importance of space for the military. According to him, military competition has shifted towards space, and it is a historical inevitability [14]. At the beginning of 2010, a senior US defence official argued that ‘the Chinese have stated that they oppose the weaponisation of space but their actions seem to indicate the contrary intention’.[333] India has also pronounced its plan to develop anti-satellite technologies (not test). States within the region which do not have indigenous satellite manufacturing and launch capabilities can still possess anti-satellite capabilities with reasonable knowledge of missile technology or even with expertise in developing satellite jamming capabilities.

Future Chinese actions would largely depend on how international community (read the USA) succeeds towards establishing a globally acceptable space regime. The USA has already withdrawn from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty with Russia. It is strongly pushing its missile defence programme by trying to overcome technological limitations. The US approach of all these years indicates that it has no intentions in getting trapped under any treaty mechanism that could harm its interests in space. In view of this, it is unlikely that any globally acceptable space treaty mechanism would emerge in coming few decades.

In recent years, the idea of Asia is generating great excitement. The resurgence of Asia is resulting as a turning point in the world history. The emerging Asia is no longer been viewed with the earlier stereotyped vision as a quagmire of poverty, illiteracy, religious fundamentalism and border disputes. The region’s different identity in terms of faiths, religions, cultures, political systems and economic inequalities is now been skillfully used by the Asian states for their own development. Various regions of Asia have acknowledged the liberal and democratic values of the West but at the same time have identified and adopted their own model linked to their respective cultures and values.

Over the years, knowledge economy has played a major role towards the growth of Asia. This concept of knowledge needs to be viewed in a more holistic sense while debating Asian growth. Knowledge could be said to contribute both as a product and also as a tool towards this development. The application of knowledge in science and technology has played a crucial role towards the growth and development in this region. The region has a history of various scientific inventions to its credit. However, for last few centuries major inventions have originated mainly from the European and American soil. Fundamental research has not been the Asian forte for many years now. Nevertheless, some change is being witnessed in this field recently. Presently, major emphases have been given for applied research by various Asian states. But, in overall analysis for many years, the internal stimuli for innovative research have mostly behind been found lacking in some sectors of science and technology. Interestingly, the narrative in regard to the rocket science and high technology looks bit different. Space technology is one area where the contributions by few Asian states have been noteworthy particularly both in basic and applied fields during last few decades. Military angle behind the development of rocket science in Asian states should not be ruled out. In turn space science also appears to have benefited from this.

This book is an attempt to explore the character and counters of the Asian Space Race. The book talks about the successful use of space technologies made by spacefaring Asian states towards achieving their socioeconomic mandate, increasing the global footprint in commercial sector and factoring these technologies in their

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_Z, 7

© Springer India 2013

security calculus. The book also talks about the investments being made by non – spacefaring Asian states in this field. The book could be viewed as an attempt made towards understanding the space agendas of Asian states and their relationships with other states (both inter – and intra-regional) in respect of cooperation, geopolitics, strategic relevance and economics.

This chapter, more as a backgrounder, attempts to develop the context for this book by taking into account the Asian settings and situating the relevance of space technologies into it. It starts with underlining few basic facts mainly with a view to reiterate and set the tone form the point of view of this work.

Post-industrial revolution, the multidisciplinary technology revolution, is changing the thinking of the militaries all over the world, and Pakistan is no exception. In the near future, Pakistan is expected to incorporate much technological advancement into its military hardware. It has already started the incorporation of information technology (IT) into its military systems.

The question is, to what extent is this influencing the structure and use of military power? High-performance computing, satellite imagery, crypto technologies and other forms of militarily useful IT-based techniques are in use all over the world. Pakistan is importing a majority of its military equipment from the developed nations. Naturally, most of the recent procurements are state-of-the-art machinery. Pakistan already has large conventional armed forces based overwhelmingly on mechanical and electrical industrial age technologies [7]. In future, it is expected that Pakistan’s existing military hardware will be increasingly augmented by IT – based systems. In South Asia, India has marched ahead in the IT revolution which, in turn, has made a major impact on Indian defence policy. Today, India is in possession of many technologies which seek decisive IT-based battlefield advantages. This, in turn, is going to intensify regional arms race as potential combatants are likely to seek decisive IT-based battlefield advantages.

Pakistan understands that the astonishing proliferation of precision-guided muni­tions (PGMs), sophisticated intelligence-gathering capabilities, advanced command and control systems and ingenious information warfare processes is evidence of the RMA’s impact. The RMA’s technological focus is apparent in today’s Pakistani military thinking [8] The RMA, however, is about more than simply grafting the latest technologies onto existing forces. Most analysts insist that for a true RMA to occur, doctrinal and organisational change must accompany the new war-fighting technologies.

As of 2010, about 650,000 people were on active duty in the Pakistan military, with an additional 543,000 people in reserves. The total strength of the Pakistan Army is approximately 550,000 personnel. Pakistan is planning to downsize the army [9] with a view to enhancing the combat potential of the army by qualitative upgradation. This appears to be an attempt to re-muster non-combatant personnel for new ‘force multiplier’ units such as electronic warfare, information and cyber warfare, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) and air defence units, all of which Pakistan is known to be raising in its quest to catch up with the RMA [10].

The existing assets of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force which include main battle tanks, attack helicopters, F-16 Falcons, J-10, Mirage-III and Mirage-5 squadrons, A-5 Fantan and naval combat aircraft and submarine[54] imply that first phase of the RMA itself would take time and effort. Upgradation of these assets and investments in new technologies is likely to make their RMA more contemporary. Already a debate is on in Pakistan’s defence establishment regarding the need of investment in modern technologies. It is argued that new tools and processes of waging war like information warfare, network-centric warfare (NCW), integrated command and control (C4ISR) and system of systems, all powered by information technology, have led to the RMA, and the Pakistani establishment should take serious note of it.

This in turn will also broaden the parameters of Pakistani thinking about national security. The countries of the world are now on the brink of a major revolution (read India). Also, the ramifications of the RMA need to be understood not only by Pakistani military officers but also by strategy planners, both military and civil. The Pakistani military has to contend with the fifth dimension of warfare— information—in addition to land, sea, air and space.[55]

Pakistan’s direct and indirect dependence on space technologies and information technologies is expected to increase in the future. This becomes evident from its force modernisation plan. The Pakistan Navy has received four P-3C Orions[56]

long-range maritime surveillance aircraft from the US. The US handed two P3C Orion aircraft to Pakistan Navy in late April 2010. This was in addition to the earlier supplied two aircraft. By 2012, Pakistan Navy is expected to take delivery of a total of eight P3C aircraft. Unfortunately, for Pakistan two of its aircraft were destroyed by the Taliban forces when they attacked PNS Mehran base near Karachi on May 22, 2011. It is expected that the US would replace these aircraft.

Pakistan has also acquired four F-22P frigates and antisubmarine helicopters from China.[57] It has taken a big leap to strengthen its fast-depleting air power by securing an airborne early warning and control system (AEW&CS). This state-of – the-art system has augmented the Pakistan Navy’s existing potential for maritime and tactical surveillance. Pakistan has an ‘eye in the sky’ since 2009 when the first Swedish Saab-2000 ERIEYE AWE&C was delivered to them. In total, PAF has received four AWACS planes from Sweden. China has also provided one ZDK – 03 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWC) plane, and three more are in the pipeline.[58]

There are also unconfirmed reports that Pakistan is planning to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from Turkey. The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), an aircraft manufacturing factory at Kamra, manufactures PAC Ababeel which is a small arms air defence target. PAC had also exhibited a new aerial target called Nishan at the Dubai Air Show in November 1997.[59] Pakistan Navy’s first squadron of indigenously developed UAVs has been formally inducted in Pakistan Navy Fleet during July 2011.[60] It is believed that Pakistan is manufacturing the UAVs with the support from Turkey and China.

The Institute of Optronics (IOP) at Chaklala-Rawalpindi has established state – of-the-art military specifications production and testing facilities of night vision devices, based on image intensifier tubes.[61] The night vision systems have vastly improved the ability of the Pakistani armed forces to undertake a number of vital functions related to force effectiveness, command and control and surveillance. These systems have also improved their tactical and logistical movements and have increased the accuracy of firepower.

Such modern technologies depend largely on information and satellite technolo­gies for purposes of communication and intelligence reporting. Space capabilities play an important role in network-centric warfare. This type of warfare offers a method to build information superiority, a key factor to success in the modern battle

space. The twenty-flrst century militaries are greatly dependent on network-centric warfare because it makes possible smooth and accurate information sharing and increases situational awareness amongst the troops and in turn enhances mission effectiveness. The Pakistani armed forces and defence industries are aware of these advantages. The future plans of the Institute of Optronics include the establishment of facilities for night vision devices based on thermal imaging techniques for all types of armoured vehicles and helicopters. The latest batch of Al-Khalid main battle tanks (developed at the Heavy Industries Taxila—HIT) assures greater survivability of the machine in the battleground. The other vital feature of the upgraded Al-Khalid is a data-link system which allows the tanks to exchange data with each other and with the command centre.[62] These upgradations have been conducted by the HIT keeping in view the need of modern-day network-centric war strategies. Pakistan’s emphasis on network-centric warfare has made a real-time electronic map display system available to its tank commanders.

Other network-centric force multipliers like SQPS (squad personal positioning system[63]) are being made available to the Pakistani commando units. After a paradrop from an aircraft inside a hostile territory, Pakistani troops can locate their exact positions from the SQPS personnel electronic map positioning system. On a small portable colour screen, troops can view the map of the area, their objective, their own position and that of their entire squad. A miniature GPS (global positioning system) sensor on their shoulder establishes the ground position, which is electronically transmitted to the commander and displayed on a hand computer via the squad radio. The entire mission is programmed in the map on the commander’s hand computer overlaid on the geographic map of the area.[64]

Pakistan is likely to be in possession of ECOM WISPER WATCH unmanned airborne SIGINT system (it is being marketed by a Pakistani firm named East West Inflniti (EWI) (P) Ltd.,1-10, Industrial Area, Islamabad[65]) which is designed for armed forces like Pakistan that cannot procure and maintain a high-end manned SIGINT aircraft. It provides nearly the same capabilities at a fraction of the cost and is like an electronic ear in the sky to eavesdrop on RF signal emitters up to 250 km away. EWI has used the maturity of unmanned aerial platforms and software con­trolled radios to produce a new force multiplier. The WISPER WATCH unmanned airborne SIGINT system can be deployed in a small UAV or an AEROSTAT (a deal for the sale of six of these radars was cleared by the US Congress during July 2002 for the purposes of bolstering Islamabad’s counterterrorism capabilities[66]) which is operated as a remote-controlled monitoring station. The receivers are positioned in the airborne platform whereas the workstations and operators are positioned in a ground mission control a few kilometres from the flying platform, out of harm’s way.[67]

Pakistan is also fully aware that technologies like satellite technology make the military establishments more transparent. The nuclear sites of Pakistan are on display on the web. The credit goes to IKONOS, Internet and Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The FAS’ Public Eye project is acquiring imagery of nuclear and missile facilities around the world. The high-resolution images, acquired by the FAS from the space-imaging IKONOS satellite, show details of Pakistan’s weapons facilities previously known only to the secret intelligence world. These imageries on the website (www. fas. org) cover two of Pakistan’s most important special weapon facilities, the plutonium production reactor at Khushab, and the nearby medium-range missile base at Sargodha.

Plutonium from the Khushab reactor could probably be used in lightweight nuclear warheads for the M-11 missiles at Sargodha, which Pakistan acquired from China in the early 1990s. The satellite imagery indicates that construction of the Khushab reactor is essentially complete and that Pakistan has built a dozen garages for mobile missile launchers and associated vehicles at Sargodha [11]. Pakistan should not look at these imageries as leakage of a secret but should use them towards formulating confidence building measures (CBMs) with India in the nuclear arena. Such transparency in Pakistan’s defence activities may help in bringing peace in the region.

Malaysia is one of the most important states in the Southeast Asian region comprising of 11 states. Malaysia was subject to the British Empire and gained independence on Aug 31, 1957. The Malaysian economy has enjoyed steady growth since independence, and particularly in recent years, the main export earners have been electronics and electrical machinery.[150] In 1981, Mahathir Mohamad, a charismatic and outspoken doctor, became prime minister of the country and is recognised as main of architect of Malaysia’s growth story. He played a major towards developing industry and was also instrumental for bringing science and technology in policy focus.

In space arena, Malaysia has started making its presence visible in the binging of twenty-first century. Interestingly, country’s foray into this highly specialised field began way back in the 1960s when the plan for the country’s space programme was first put into place. Subsequently, not much of growth was witnessed. Malaysia’s satellite programme officially could be said to have started in the 1990s with the construction of its first communication satellite receiving station. In 1988, the Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing (MACRES)/Remote Sensing Malaysia was established to assume research and development in the field of remote sensing. The development of satellite technology in Malaysia was largely shaped by the country’s National Telecommunication Policy (NTP) which called for Malaysia to have its own satellite and stated that ‘Continued reliance on other countries’ satellites will create future problems in terms of security and balance of payments’.[151]

The Malaysian policy for last two decades appears to be concentrating on two fronts. They are investing in satellites technologies with socioeconomic relevance and are using space technologies as a tool to undertake symbolic activities and to raise the sense of nationalism amongst its population. The Malaysian National Space Agency (ANGKASA), established in 2002, is officially responsible for all activities in space domain related to strategic planning and policy formulation. It is also expected to provide leadership in the educational aspects and the research of space science. Another agency called Astronautic Technology Sdn Bhd (ATSB) has been established in 1997 which focuses on designing and development of space- qualified systems. Apart from these two, a separate institute of space science is undertaking research work in areas like microgravity experiments, space weather and ionosphere studies.

Few years before the formation of this state-owned agency, the first satellite for Malaysia was launched in 1996 under the commercial agreement. The MEASAT-1 (Malaysia East Asia Satellite No. 1) became Malaysia’s first communications satellite when it was launched on Ariane rockets from Europe’s Spaceport in

Kourou, French Guiana. The satellite was followed up with two more launches, MEASAT-2 in 1996 and MEASAT-3 in 2006. MEASAT-1 was a commercial communications satellite that was developed to provide Malaysia with a greater communications infrastructure. These satellites offers communications services that include telephony, television, business networks and data transmission network for the region covering an area spanning from India to Hawaii and from Japan to east Australia.[152]

In 2000, ANGKASA launched the micro-satellite, TiungSat-1, for Earth observationf imaging. This was a unique mission with satellites orbital inclination being nearly equatorial. This was an exceptional case in regard to the imagery satellites which normally maintain much higher inclinations, often neglecting equatorial regions. However, for Malaysia, its geographical position had different demands hence this particular mission configuration. This satellite was developed through a technology exchange between ANGKASA and the British micro-satellite manufacturer, SSTL, and was launched aboard a Russian Proton rocket from Baikonur. Named after a variety of a singing mynah bird, this satellite operates on amateur radio frequencies and has remote sensing capability. It also carries a cosmic energy deposition experiment. In the summer of 2009, ANGKASA launched another micro-satellite, RazakSat with the South Korean help. It is meant for imaging, and was launched at the Kwajalein Atoll by the Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) launch vehicle, Falcon 1. This satellite covers 51 nations, most of them developing and located near the equator. This launch has helped the state to forge cooperation with some of these countries and help realise the solution to numerous remote sensing problems facing the developing nations especially those in need of appropriate space technology.[153]

On Oct 10, 2011 Malaysia celebrated its 4th anniversary of sending its first man (they identify astronaut as Angkasawan) into the space. In the recent history of this country, it was a unique movement when the Malaysian man landed on the International Space Station aboard a Soyuz spacecraft. This act has given major moral boost for their space programme and has helped increase in interest in science and technology within Malaysia. Other benefits like increase in the nationalistic feeling were obvious, going by the euphoria it had set in the country during the actual mission.

As part of the effort to nurture interest in satellite development and space launch vehicle, ANGKASA has initiated the SiswaSAT and water rocket competition.[154] All such attempts are aimed at providing platforms for students to enrich knowledge, acquire experience and exchange information in relation to space technology. Such investments needs to be viewed as an attempt of the administration of create interest in rocket science and make the next generation ready to enter in space field. However, it is important to note that Malaysia has much to achieve in the space arena and need to invest in cutting edge technologies for the purposes of indigenous development of satellites and space launch vehicles.

For a developing country like Malaysia, their investments in space appear to be directed in correct direction. Understanding its own the technological constraints, the state is engaging other global players mostly under commercial collaborations to gain access to space. One interesting aspect of their space programme is that they fulfilled their ambition of space travel by a Malaysian under an offset policy with the Russians. Because of purchase of their defence equipments from Russia, the state allowed them to send a Malaysian man to the space station free of cost. The country is keen to develop its satellite launching sites to provide facilities for space launches. They understand that the state needs to exploit its geographical position which allows sending satellites to be space in a faster time and at less cost. Presently, Malaysia is trying to fulfil its overall space vision but suffers from financial limitations.

Any satellite (or a probe) which travels to a distance of 100,000 km or more from the Earth’s surface is known to have entered the region which is normally depicted as deep space.1 Earth’s Moon is approximately at the distance of 400,000 km; hence, Moon missions are generally termed as deep space missions. Various other activities to reach planets like Mars, Venous or far-distance asteroid would be viewed also as part of deep space schema of the states. This chapter discusses the Asia’s agenda into deep space region. This chapter restricts itself to discuss Moon and Mars missions.

One of the primary activities the global space community pursued in the year 2006 was to answer the questions, ‘Why should we return to the Moon?’ and ‘What do we hope to accomplish through lunar exploration?’ NASA was instrumental in posing these questions and was looking for answers from the global space community. Almost 200 lunar exploration objectives resulted from this quest. These objectives could be fitted under six major lunar exploration themes.

These themes are (1) human civilisation: to extend human presence to the Moon to enable eventual settlement; (2) scientific knowledge; (3) exploration preparation: test technologies, systems, flight operations and exploration techniques; (4) global partnerships; (5) economic expansion; and (6) public engagement.[233] [234] [235]

The extent of these categories identified (is based on only one dataset) indicates that the expectations from the Moon are far too many and demand substantial tech­nological and economic investments on part of the state. It could take few decades to accomplish a substantial number of the things the global space community

envisages. It may not be possible for only one state to achieve this on its own strength, and success could be achieved in lesser time if states cooperate with each other and undertake joint missions. The current trend indicates that few states have already launched the first phase of their Moon programmes and have well – articulated roadmaps for the future. Some of these programmes have some element of international cooperation, but no policy exists for global cooperative efforts to ‘conquer’ the Moon. This signifies that the states are basically interested in finishing their groundwork for advanced space voyages on their own. States understand that the enormity of the overall task (like establishing human colonies over Moon and Mars) demands international cooperation but at the same time do probably weigh the options for such arrangement based on their own understanding about the ‘strategic relevance’ of the Moon.

Apart from the USA, Russia and Europe, few Asian states are very keen to invest towards mapping and mining the Moon and also have plans for Mars missions. These states are Japan, China and India. These three states have already finished their first Moon missions and have a blueprint ready for the future. It is argued over here that their overall deep space mission aspirations have strategic ambitions attached to it.

For mankind, space exploration has always been a mix of curiosity, utility and profitability. Any ambitious space plan mostly becomes successful provided trained manpower, technology support and adequate funding is available. Societal, scientific and educational requirements have been the key focus for the Asian investments in space arena. They seek space capabilities mainly to achieve developmental goals. At the same time, since the involution of their space programmes, few Asian states have dreamed big like sending manned missions to space.

Asian states are aware of the fact that their achievements in space arena indirectly boost up their global status. Simultaneously, these states also realise the correlation of their achievements to nationalism. Asian spacefaring states understand the significance of Sputnik launch and the success of Apollo missions. Over the years, the space investments of these states have also helped them to expand their technology trajectory. These states have ambitions in space arena which are beyond the conventional uses of satellite technology like remote sensing, communication and navigation. They dream to have human space flights, build space stations and undertake missions to Moon and Mars.

This chapter limits itself towards discussing the Asian interests in human space flights, development of space shuttles and establishing space stations.

Race for Resources

China’s ‘Lunar Probe Project’ has explored that there is about 1 million tons of helium-3 on the Moon’s surface that could meet mankind’s energy demand (only a little more than 10 tons of helium-3 is available on the Earth). Meeting China’s power demand needs consumption of only 8 tons of helium-3, equivalent to 220 million tons of oil or about 1 billion tons of coal.[334] The Moon programme of Asian states has a bias towards resources mining including helium-3. Also, based on the samples received from various Apollo missions, it has been found that various platinum group metals (PGMs), indispensable for efficient fuel cell operation, exist on the Moon in diffuse quantities.[335] Based on various direct and indirect evidences, various studies have reached a conclusion that the Moon is an alluring mining site, ripe for the picking of rare elements of strategic and national security importance.[336] It appears that the Asian states have started the process of indentifying, experiment­ing and analysing the efficacy of Moon for resources mining. It may take another three to four decades to actually transport the resources from Moon to Earth (if any). The process for undertaking this task has already begun. Probably, it is the beginning of the currently ‘invisible’ race for resources on the Moon.

Asia is viewed as the congregation of some of the world’s most primitive civilisa­tions. In recent past, this region was also viewed by few as a region of backwardness; however, this conceptualisation was not entirely true. This continent constitutes more than 60% of the Earth’s population and around 30% of land area. The region has people with different religions, languages and cultures. The concept of Asia needs to be viewed at two distinct levels. At one level, Asia needs to be viewed beyond a meagre geographic identity because it represents much more. While at other more practical level, it becomes important to ‘quantify’ Asia by identifying the nation-states forming a part of this region.

The word Asia was probably invented by the Europeans and its concept has been propagated by European geographers, politicians and encyclopedia writers. Naturally, there could be regional and extra-regional biases to ‘define’ Asia in strict geographical sense. In simple sense, Asia is the region which encompasses the Europe [1]. The definition and boundaries of Asia at times vary when viewed from a physical geography and political geography perspective. The best option to identify the states from Asia could be use the United Nations (UN) geoscheme for Asia. As per this, Asia is subdivided to four broad categories: Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, Southeastern Asia and Western Asia.1 Even part of Russia is sometimes been referred falling in the Asian continent. It is referred as North Asia or Northern Asia (Asian portion of Russia). However, experts view that Russia sees itself more of a European and Western nation with critical interests in Asia. Probably, in the twenty-first century, the Russians see themselves culturally and ethnically more as Europeans rather than Asians [2]. For the purpose of this study, Russia is excluded from Asia both because of geographical and technical reasons. This is mainly because Russia is one of the most developed spacefaring nation and it would not be accurate to bracket it with the other developing Asian space powers. Also, Central Asian region has not been included in this study basically because presently very minimal investments in space arena are being made over there and states like Kazakhstan are mainly catering for the Russian interests in space arena (launch station Baikonur has been leased by the Kazakhstan government to Russia).

Considering various historical, geopolitical and technological realities, for the purpose of this work Asia has been subdivided into four regions. These regions along with the few of their important states (mainly from the point of interest for this study) are as follows:

1. West Asia: Israel, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey (it is partially in Europe)

2. East Asia: China, Japan, Taiwan, North and South Korea

3. Southeast Asia: Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

4. South Asia: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka

Many universally recognised space-based and satellite systems are inherently dual­use technologies, with both civilian and military applications. Pakistan is yet to have a dedicated ‘military space system’. Hence, Pakistan’s military space capabilities may be inferred from its civilian space programme.

Pakistan probably depends on civil communication satellites for military com­munication requirements and may be using the information provided by navigation and meteorological satellites for planning military manoeuvres. While a detailed investigation of the impact of dual-use space systems on the military preparedness of Pakistan is not the purpose over here, some broad implications can be discerned.

Pakistan is not even a second-tier space power. (The first tier could be the US, European Union (EU) and Russia, and the second tier could be China, India and Japan). With non-affordable costs, limited domestic expertise availability, restrictions on technology transfer and a spoiled international reputation, Pakistan is likely to remain a peripheral space power, at least in the near future. However, it is important to note their association with China which is likely to assist them for development of their space programme as well as to provide with ready-made satellite-derived information.

Despite of SUPARCO’s existence for many years, the process of development in the space arena has been relatively slow. Pakistan is gradually progressing in this field and will take some more time, probably a decade or so, to establish full capability of launching its own satellites into space. SUPARCO’s success, to a large extent, will also depend on the financial backing received from the Pakistani government and the success of the collaborations with international space giants in the near future.

All this is not likely to limit their access to space resources or operational capa­bilities in the present. The easy accessibility of numerous and growing commercial launch services has increased the ability of many states to develop and operate satellite systems for various purposes or purchase ‘reception rights’ from existing commercial satellite constellations. Like many other nation-states, Pakistan also could be a beneficiary of this ‘space reality’.

The capabilities of commercial satellites all over the world are getting dramati­cally improved on a regular basis. A few US licensed companies and Israeli firms plan to make 0.5-1-m-resolution satellite imagery commercially available in the near future.36 Other developed nations may also join this business of the high – resolution imagery market. Such images are good enough to detect and identify nuclear sites and production facilities, airfields, oil refineries, troop concentrations, etc. Pakistan is expected to derive benefits from such commercial ventures for its intelligence gathering.

Currently, Pakistan is using LANDSAT and SPOT images overtly for civilian purposes. The military potential of such commercial satellites mainly depends on factors like optical resolution, spectrum, orbital features, sun angle and return time. For military reconnaissance purposes, satellite ‘resolution’ plays a major role towards providing quality input.

Satellites with resolutions of 10-15 m can provide useful information for strategic planning. The SPOT system is the primary operational example in this category. Today, Pakistan receives SPOT images with a resolution of 10 m or even less. It is important to note that SPOT has played an important role in revealing details of the situation at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor complex. Most importantly, SPOT and LANDSAT images were embargoed during the 1990-1991 Gulf War,

indicating that these images contained militarily useful information.[68] Hence to a certain extent, their requirements could be satisfied by ‘purchasing’ the data.

At the same time, it should be appreciated that the military utility of systems with resolutions of between 15 and 30 m is limited. Such images do not have much significance at the tactical level. Hence, Pakistan’s dependence on SPOT and LANDSAT may not be of much use during the actual operations phase. This is mainly because very low-resolution images may not be sold during the war period or they may even be totally be blocked by the company. Also, the Badr-II system does not have a good resolution (approximately 250 m).[69] Hence, it could be inferred that Pakistan’s ‘military dependence’ on space technologies is mainly peace-time specific, and the satellite inputs could essentially be used only for military planning purposes. In case of an actual war scenario, Pakistan would have to depend on China for supply of tactical information based on satellite imagery.

NOAA satellite inputs may not have much military utility other than their use for predicting meteorological conditions on the battlefield. These satellite inputs will come handy, particularly for undertaking aerial operations during the conflict phase. These satellites with a resolution of around 1.1 km[70] could in some way be helpful for topography and terrain analysis.

Interestingly, nuclear Pakistan does not have robust command, control, com­munications and intelligence systems (C3I) in place. Given the economic and technological constraints, this is not likely to materialise for some time to come [12]. The PAKSAT-1R would help Pakistan to improve its military communication network.

The Pakistani satellite programme has a clear bias towards remote sensing technologies for obvious reasons. It understands the value of remote sensing in the war effort. These techniques are very handy for identifying troop and tank movements as well as activities in underground bunkers. With Chinese help, Pakistan is trying to develop a network to acquire robust and versatile space reconnaissance capability. Pakistani interest (with Chinese help) in the development of a new small, solid-propellant space lifter would provide them an opportunity to hurl small satellites into orbit for broad military, civil and commercial applications.

But, being a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty,[71] Pakistan cannot plan to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. Pakistan has signed this treaty on ‘Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ (signed on December 9, 1967, and ratified on August 4, 1968). Hence, it is technically (overtly) bound to making use of outer space only for exploration and in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.

Post 9/11, the US policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including counterterrorism, nuclear stability in South Asia, missile proliferation, growing Asian markets and human rights. Today, the US considers Pakistan as its ‘vital ally’ in its war against terrorism and has nominated it in the category of major non-NATO ally. Hence, in future, US-Pak technology collaboration is expected to be on an upswing. It is important to note that in spite of Osama bin Laden being found on Pakistani soil, the US is not showing any signs of abandoning Pakistan. Hence, some direct and indirect help for the US could help Pakistan to make progress in the areas of RMA and network-centric warfare.

Given Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth, it is expected that in the event of an Indian missile strike, Pakistan would have just 3 min warning time. Clearly, this is much less time than the 15 min warning PADS (Pakistan Air Defence System) provides in case of an attack by enemy aircraft.41 Hence, no perfect early warning mechanism exists for Pakistan. This is where Pakistan expects to get help from AWACS and other IT infrastructure in order to device a system for getting adequate early warning. This could be one way to cater for the absence of any space-based warning system.

Pakistan has succeeded in putting few indigenously made satellites into orbit, riding on Chinese or Russian launches. It has also managed to form links with commercial ventures of the US, France and the EU. However, Pakistan has still long way to go in the space field. Nuclear Pakistan is incapable of starting a space arms race in the subcontinent. However, Pakistan understands the importance of space technologies, and if it plays ‘space politics’ well, then in the near future, it would be able to satisfy many of its strategic needs of satellite data by ‘outsourcing’ the space necessities. It is important to note that Pakistan being missile capable is in position to develop an ASAT system, if need be.

As the trend suggests, Pakistan is likely to get onto the Chinese space wagon in the near future. Pakistan may also explore the possibilities of engaging other Muslim countries since the Islamic network in the arena of ‘space collaboration’ already exists. It could look for collaboration with countries like Malaysia which have already started modest investments in these technologies. Pakistan is expected to try for accessing commercial technologies available in the market to get military imageries.

Pakistan desires to acquire more RMA capabilities in order to match the Indian force structure. Its Afghanistan border is in a state of flux even after one decade has past post 9/11. Its uneasiness with the ‘rise of India’ and India’s relevance in Afghanistan is well-known. Hence, it is continuing with military transformation aimed at developing basic force projection and more advanced RMA capabilities. It understands that the accurate and timely information is the key for increasing battle-space awareness. On the other hand, the state also desires to use the satellite technology for the purposes of agriculture, commercial communication, disaster management and various other social needs. Hence, in years to come, Pakistan is expected to increase their interest and investment in space arena.