Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

In Asian context, some states could be viewed to have taken the path of space launches to showcase their capabilities in missile arena. The missile systems particularly the ballistic missile systems are an important element of military hardware for NWSs or states with interest in developing one. Possession of a nuclear-capable missile advances the deterrence potential of the NWSs. At times, few Asian states are found undertaking space launches as a roundabout way to announce to the rest of the world about their missile capabilities.

Analogous efforts undertaken in regard to space launch vehicle and ballistic missile development are considered as a major dilemma towards judging the intensions of a state. ‘SLVs and ballistic missiles are derived from virtually identical and interchangeable technologies, and the similarities between SLVs and ballistic missiles extend from subcomponents to production facilities. SLV programmes can allow a country to test propulsion systems, stage separation, and some guidance and control technology, and provide a path to gain access to controlled, missile-related technologies and materials under the guise of peaceful space ambitions’.[165]

By 2010/2011, missile capabilities of various Asian states particularly those who are spacefaring nations have expanded significantly. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed account about the missile capabilities of various states in the region. In fact, as mentioned earlier, it really does not matter if states are using their space launcher knowledge to develop missiles because they are technically not violating any space treaty regime (since none exists!). Still the discussion on this subject merits attention because of the investments in space launch vehicles indirectly demonstrate the ability to field long-range ballistic missiles. There is a significant amount of technology commonalty in both the systems. For scientists and engineers working on either of the systems, shifting focus from space to missiles to missile to space becomes possible. This allows the state to use the expertise generated in one field to the development of other. It is also important to note that because of the apprehensions about the objectives of ballistic missile programme of few states, international sanctions have been put on them on specific occasions.

The overall politics behind missile issues has been more intriguing. Both the parties—the NPT group and the anti-NPT states—have their individual (but differing) assessments about the missile subject. The development of missile technology has mostly remained a complex task for many states mainly due to geopolitical, technological and logistical reasons. It is important to note that foreign technology has remained an important factor for various regional actors in regard to the development of their operational ballistic missile or space launch vehicle programmes [5, p. 19]. Particularly, various third-world missile or space launch vehicle programmes are mostly found developed mainly based on technology transfer or hidden purchase/ theft of technology from other states or agencies.

A basic problem in the missile field is that no comprehensive and widely agreed norms have been established which defines what is ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ in this arena. The international community is found criticising specific activities by individual countries on a case-by-case basis without any official multilateral instrument [6]. The MTCR (1987) is an informal and voluntary export control regime to limit the proliferation of missile platforms, UAVs and rocket systems. It is about controlling the design, development and testing of missiles that can deliver a payload of 500 kg or more to a range of 300 km or more. The scope of MTRC was extended in 1993 to include missiles capable of delivering WMDs. However, no restrictions on national space programme could be put as long as they do not add to the development of the delivery systems for WMDs [7] MTRC has no universal acceptability. In Asia, only Japan is a member of MTRC. States like India consider MTRC mechanism as discriminatory.

Apart from MTCR, another multilateral arms control mechanism (not under the UN authorization) is in vogue called International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)/The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC). This agreement also highlights the issue of SLV versus missiles. It demands ‘necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to SLV programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes’.[166] It also outlines few transparency measures in this connection.

Universally, there always has been assistance from the space programmes of the state to further its missile programmes (taken either overtly or covertly) and vice a versa. However, any direct evidence to link space vehicles and missiles would be hard to come in various cases, and there is a need to ‘read between the lines’ to appreciate how missile technology could have got developed in certain cases. Several states have supplemented their missile programmes by diverting knowledge and paraphernalia from the space programme. Technically, space launch vehicles (SLVs) are actually ballistic missiles used in surface to space mode. Satellites are nothing but the payloads delivered by missiles from the surface to Earth orbit. Such SLVs could be converted into ballistic missiles by adding re-entry vehicles and suitable guidance and control packages.

In Asian context, such similarities could be viewed in the programmes of Israel and India during the 1960s. In 1961, Israel launched the Shavit II multistage rocket 50 miles into the ionosphere for metrological measurement purposes. Almost, within a gap of few years, Israel was simultaneously working in space launch field as well as on its project Jericho a designation given to the Israeli short-range ballistic missiles programme. Probably, Shavit was a derivative of Jericho. India is known as the first developing country (sixth in the world) to orbit a satellite using indigenously developed rocket SLV-3 during 1980. Roughly around the same time, India started the development of Agni IRBM. Few analysts are of the opinion that this missile’s propulsion system was based on SLV-3. In regard to China, analysts note that they were successful in putting their first satellite into orbit during the 1970s and within a decade’s time possessed an ICBM capability [5, pp. 24-25]. It is also important to note that in certain cases, missile systems have been modified into space launchers (probably, Iran modified its missile Shahab-3 to blast a satellite).

In Asia, nuclear and space policies of North Korea and Iran have always been a suspect. The USA and its allies are of a firm convection that satellite launches by these states actually establish their expertise to develop long-range ballistic missile systems. There also has been a past history of technology transfer in the missile arena between North Korea and Iran. Space programmes of North Korea and Iran are being looked with suspicion for their demonstrative missile designs. However, it is important to note that both these states had entered into the missile arena much before conceptualisation of their space programmes. Hence, it could be incorrect to believe that space launches is the only option for them to display their missile prowess.

North Korea has developed a significant amount of nuclear and missile arsenal. ‘Possibly, it has deployed over 600 short-range Scud variants that can strike South Korea, and as many as 320 medium-range Nodong missiles that can strike Japan. Long-range missiles with the potential to hit the continental United States are still under development. It probably, has somewhere between 6 and 12 nuclear weapons, or at least explosive devices’.[167] Over the years, North Korea has used missile technology for the purposes of economic gains too. It has sold this technology to few states and has also cooperated with Iran to develop long-range missiles and SLVs.

It has been reported that North Korea had supplied an estimated 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran and Syria in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is also known to have exported a smaller quantity of Scuds or Scud components such as engines to Egypt, Syria, Yemen and possibly Libya. What is important from the perspective of this chapter is the sale of Nodong missiles or components to Iran and Pakistan [8].

On Aug 31, 1998, North Korea tested Taepodong space launch vehicle flying a ballistic missile trajectory (rocket meant for intercontinental ranges). It was claimed that Kwangmyngsng-1 satellite was launched by using this launcher. However, experts were of the opinion that the satellite had failed to achieve the orbit and out of three stages of the SLV only two worked. The partial success of this launch was enough to demonstrate the technical capabilities of North Korea in both space rocket and missile arena. For North Korean state, their missile programme became a national priority at par with the nuclear programme during the late 1970s. Their programme has witnessed a speedy growth particularly during the initial decade. The country initiated a multifaceted ballistic missile programme in 1975 [9]. Taepodong-1 is expected to have a range in excess of 2,000 km. North Korea has achieve partial success in respect of Taepodong-2. This missile was first tested in July 2006, and it has been reported that the missile failed in mid-flight, 35-40 s after launch.[168] However, during the second test (April 2009), the missile is reported to have travelled about 3,200 km before landing in the Pacific Ocean east of Japan. This test was declared as an SLV test by the North Korean authorities.[169] The purpose behind this could have been to tell the world (mainly the USA, Japan and South Korea) that it was not a provocative act but an attempt to launch satellites. There is no authentic information about the exact range of this missile. Theoretically, such missiles could have a range of around 10,000 km [10, pp. 179-80]. However, North Korea is yet to prove the capability of reaching such distances.

Since July 8, 1994, till very recently, Kim Jong-II was heading North Korea. He had selectively used missile issues as a bargaining strategy with international community. In the beginning of the twenty-first century (July 2000), he had offered to give up the missile programme in exchange for satellite launch services. It is understood that the symbolic importance of missiles and space launch vehicles would dissuade North Korea from abandoning its programme unconditionally. It was argued that the international community could provide data, satellite launch services or opportunities to participate in other peaceful space programmes as an alternative to the North Korea’s current missile programme.[170] However, such ideas were not taken to any logical conclusions probably because of geopolitical compulsions. Almost for a decade, the concept of limiting the North Korea’s missile programme by providing them assistance in space arena has faded away.

Interestingly, missiles have not been on the agenda in the famous six-party talks mechanism[171] to engage North Korea. In 1999, ‘North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s pledge to lift certain economic sanctions. The deal was later abandoned during the Bush Administration. In 2006, the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 barred North Korea from conducting missile-related activities. North Korea flouted this resolution with its April 2009 test of the long-range Taepodong II’ [11]. It is more or less confirmed that North Korea’s missiles could reach Japan and the surrounding US military bases. Also, the targets on the west coast of the continental USA are likely to be in the range of North Korean missiles in near future. It appears that primarily to work around the UN restrictions, North Korea is keen to undertake satellite launching.

The US administration is of the opinion that their strategy with North Korea of strategic patience has failed. This was elucidated by the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates during his Jan 2011 Asia visit (including South Korea). However, diplomacy being the best answer, it is important for the USA to take the path of negotiations to its logical conclusion. There is a need to engage North Korea and emphasise to them that states like Vietnam and Sri Lanka are in the process to develop their indigenous and peaceful space programmes and are being helped by other powers in their endeavour, and similar policy could be adopted with them also [12]. In order to resolve the North Korean impasse, one element for negotiations could be to make a satellite counteroffer (space diplomacy). Such action could help preventing a genuine nuclear threat in the future [13]. North Korea could be engaged by offering help in space arena with launch facilities and other related assistance. Russia could offer such assistance and prevail on them to give up their long-range missile programme. China has shown keenness to help North Korea to structure their economy. Knowing the strength of the Chinese space programme and the nature of influence it commands over North Korea, it could be prudent for them to engage them on space front too.

North Korea’s space ambitions conceal military aims, and same could be said about Iran too. More importantly, there exists an umbilical relationship between these two states in missile arena. North Korea has been the big brother to Iran in missile field. It has helped Iran with missiles and missile know-how and also with the supply of related hardware. Knowing the nature of relationship and commonality in the technologies, it is obvious that some interaction in space field too must have happened. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons, but Iran is (probably) sometime away from making nuclear weapons. However, it is important to note that particularly in the satellite arena, Iran has overtaken North Korea.

Albeit the country is in denial mode, still Iran’s nuclear ambitions are well – known. Particularly, the US and Israeli intelligence sources are continuously claiming that the various actions by Iran in their so-called quest for producing nuclear energy are actually leading them towards making a nuclear bomb. To carry forward this hidden agenda to a logical conclusion, it has become important for Iran to make investments in the missile field too. This Iran’s quest for missiles also indirectly supports the assessment in regard to their nuclear agenda.

Iran is in possession of missiles which could reach Israel, Turkey, the Arab Gulf States and parts of southern Russia and south-eastern Europe. In November 2008, Iran tested a solid-fuelled Sajjil missile. This system is capable of delivering a 750­kg nuclear payload over 2,500 km distance. Within a span of 1 year, two more successful Sajjil tests were carried out. During Feb 2009, Iran successfully launched a communications satellite, Omid, into orbit by using a long-range missile (Saflr rocket[172] [173]). Iran has proved its expertise in developing liquid-filled missiles such as the Shahab-3 and the Ghadr-1.11 Overall, Iran has succeeded in establishing the industrial infrastructure and technological foundations in missile and space field [14]. Iran’s ballistic missile Ghadr-110 which has better manoeuvrability is said to have a range of 2,000 km [10, p. 178] (few reports in indicate it to be 2,500­3,000 km). On Jun 15, 2011, Iran has launched a satellite named Rassad-1 by using Safir rocket. Safir-B1 rocket can carry a satellite weighing 50 kg into an elliptical orbit of 300-450 km.[174] Iran’s SLVs would be justifiably seen as an indication of potential to develop ICBMs. On the other hand, Iran would not actually need to develop an ICBM. By launching a satellite which could pass above US territory would help them to remind Washington that Iran has come of age and now has a truly global reach [15].

Iran’s efforts in this field indicate that it has successfully established an SLV programme which complements its missile development. For many years, Iran’s MTCR Category I ballistic missile programmes[175] helped it to establish a technology base which must have assessed its development of an SLV programme Safir. Currently, the Safir system is restricted to very small payloads into the orbit but has demonstrated several technical capabilities applicable to longer-range ballistic missile systems, including staging, clustering small engines and using gimballed engines[176] for control of the Saflr’s second stage. It is important to note that various technologies, required to undertake such launches, have been ‘managed’ by Iran by involving multiple layers of intermediaries and frontend companies (deceive export control officials). Probably, they are using the automotive industry as a procurement cover for the missile programmes. Another Asian country, Malaysia is feared to be serving as a procurement hub for missile-related goods and technology. ‘Companies in Malaysia repeatedly have attempted to procure a variety of aerospace-qualified electronics from the US and other MTCR Partner countries on behalf of military- and missile-related end-users in Iran’.[177]

Iran could be said to have become a prime target for MTCR regime. In 2003, restriction was put on its members in regard to the export of items supposed to be used for missile proliferation programmes, such as those at the Iranian facility producing Shahab-3 missiles. China not being a signatory to the MTCR had continued with its business with Iran. However, this became the ground for rejecting the Chinese application of joining MTRC in 2004. On its part, Iran also has obstructed every multilateral arrangement dealing with missile issues. It is the only country to have voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions in 2005 and 2008, endorsing HCoC [14]. On the 23 Dec 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1737[178] (for failure to halt uranium enrichment), prohibiting the transit of missile technology to Iran.

Other nuclear states in the region like China, India, Pakistan and Israel have well – established missile programmes. Amongst this, Pakistan not being a spacefaring nation generally does not become a part of any space-nuclear linkages debate. Israel is known to have most advanced ballistic missile programme, but there is much secrecy surrounding it. It possesses a robust medium-range missile programme and a space launch vehicle that essentially gives it ICBM capability, if it chooses to pursue that option.[179] India is developing most advanced space launch vehicle, the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV), capable of putting a 5,500-lb satellite into geostationary orbit. The British Centre for Defence and International Security Studies estimates that if the GSLV were used as a ballistic missile it would be a major ICBM, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 14,000 km. The first flight of GSLV was successfully flight tested on April 18, 2001 [16]. However, India’s GSLV programme had received setback with two failures in 2010. India is yet to become self-sufficient in regard to the production of cryogenic rocket engine; hence, the exact future of GSLV is difficult to predict.

The mission profile for all the three states involved launching of a satellite which would enter into a lunar orbit and position itself approximately around 100 km/200 km over the Moon’s surface. The sensors onboard of these satellites took various observations. The attempt was to analyse the composition of materials on and below the surface of the Moon. Idea was to know the physical properties of the Moon. Scientists wanted to know more about the terrain characteristics from the point of view of selecting future landing area for unmanned and manned missions. All this information was gathered without landing on the Moon, and the satellites were essentially used as remote sensing systems.

Japan’s Kaguya-1 mission had groupings of sensors meant for elemental distribu­tion, mineral distribution, surface and subsurface structure feature analyses, gaining environment knowledge and understanding gravitational field distribution.[239] China’s Chang’e-1 mission instruments could be roughly divided into mission groupings

like mineral distribution, Moon topography assessment and solar wind understand­ing, while India’s Chandrayaan-1 mission sensors were tasked to undertake terrain and mineralogy mapping of the Moon’s surface, look for availability of water on the Moon and understand more about lunar gravity. In a broader sense, there was much commonality in the missions of all the three states.

In the case of Kaguya-1 mission, the overall mission configuration was somewhat different from others. This Japanese mission constitutes not only of the orbiter but also two 50-kg small satellites (relay satellite and VRAD satellite: The relay satellite is known as Okina[240] and the other is Ouna) which were released by the main orbiter after it had reached lunar orbit. Relay satellite plays a role towards understanding the gravity field. Knowledge of gravity filed is essential to study the evolution of Moon. Here, four-way Doppler measurements of main orbiter by using relay satellite for far-side gravity field are taken.[241] [242] The other VRAD satellite (VLBI RADio source) contributes towards measurements transmission of radio waves which in turn contribute to the accuracy of the gravity field, especially on the lunar limb areas. The ground stations involved towards monitoring and processing the data received from the satellite include National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ) and few others.11

The missions were also tasked to photograph the Earth form their position. It is expected that these missions would gather unknown information in regard to ionosphere and aurora.

Science diplomacy could be viewed as an important tool to engage states construc­tively. Science diplomacy is about the use of scientific collaborations amongst the nation-states to deal with the common problems faced and to build constructive international partnerships [8]. State’s interests in various issues related to S&T impact policy planning at the uppermost levels. The S&T issues usually dictate the strategic considerations of the state and vice versa. These issues significantly impact the socioeconomic development of the state. Naturally, they influence state’s domestic and international policies and impact budgetary provisions. More importantly ‘barter’ of technology amongst nation-states is found being used as a means for international power politics for many years. Various technology denial regimes have played an important role in shaping the geopolitics of the world over the years. In Asia, the growth trajectory of states like India was dwarfed due to the technological apartheid for many years in the past. Appreciating the role played by S&T in the overall development of major powers over the years, various developing states are found keen to acquire technology both for civil and strategic purposes. This demonstrates the ‘mechanism of attraction’ in regard to S&T.

Asian states are making important investments in the field of S&T for last few decades. Understanding the limitations of dependence on other states in regard to acquisition of new technologies, some of them have initiated the process of indigenisation. Significant investments are being made by them in research and development (R&D) fields for various technologies. Level of Asian investments in R&D is found almost at par with that of North America. China and Japan take the second and the third spot globally in their national S&T investments with only the

US being ahead of them. China has developed one of the best technological facilities in the world. They are notably making investments in the fields like nanotechnology, catalysis and cognitive sciences [9]. India has earned global reputation for its development of information technology sector, and it is now establishing itself in biotechnology field.

In South Korea, the government has elevated the stature of S&T minister to the level of deputy prime minister clearly giving an indication about the importance the state is giving to S&T development. India has launched a massive programme to expand its higher education base keeping long-term requirements in mind. Indonesia had held its first National Innovation Summit in the summer of 2006 obliquely to project its S&T ambitions. Singapore continues to advance as the world-class biotech hub in Asia. Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam have devised policies to advance S&T and are welcoming new ventures [9]. All this indicates that various developing states from Asia are having sufficient interests in matters related to S&T. The overall interests shown by developing states to connect with the ‘have’ states of technology for the transfer/purchase of technology indicate its importance to them. The ‘have’ states are found using this opportunity to realise their geopolitical and geo-economical aims. It is important to note that there are few developed technological powers in Asia too, which are engaging various developing states within and outside the region.

As mentioned earlier, the soft power could be put into effect by non-state actors like major industrial house too. The success achieved by an industrial house may create its admirers both at intra – and interstate levels. Some of such admirers would also like to emulate the business model developed by these industrial houses. While speaking at the 2008 Davos World Economic Forum, Mr. Bill Gates of Microsoft had argued that ‘there is a need to develop a new business model that would allow a combination of the motivation to help humanity and the profit motive to drive development. He called it “creative capitalism,” the capitalism leavened by a pinch of idealism and altruistic desire to better the lot of others’ [10]. Various actions taken by state and non-state actors like helping humanity to progress, offering developmental assistance, fulfilling social obligations, investing towards development of entrepreneurship, etc. are directly or indirectly, knowingly or unknowingly helping to place the soft power in effect.

One specific area of S&T which has shown ability to shape the global opinion in such a fashion that the states genuinely aspire to possess this technology, probably even envy the states possessing this technology and wish to conquer the high ground, is space technology. This technology has been viewed as symbol of power. If possession of nuclear technology is viewed as a symbol of hard power, then it could be argued that the possession space technology could be viewed as symbol of soft power. This technology has affected the formulation of socioeconomic agendas of various nation-states and that of some international institutions. It has also made a significant impact on the most important traditional component of hard power, namely, the military. This technology has played the key role of connecting continents and people. From education to meteorology to military to disaster management, the footprint of this technology is all pervasive.

In order to contextualise the relevance of space technologies from the soft power, perspective ex-NASA administrator Mike Griffin offers an interesting argument. Naturally, his argument would have a US bias, but the overall context could be appreciated under the global settings too. In specific terms, the USA is far ahead of any other state in regard to assets, investments and technological expertise in space realm. Hence, Griffin’s argument may not have the universality; however, still the basic spirit behind his argument needs to be noted.

Mike Griffin develops his argument at the backdrop of national security. He raises few basic questions in order to reach his analysis. He asks, ‘What is the value to the US of being involved in enterprises which lift up human hearts everywhere when we do them? What is the value to the US of being engaged in such projects, doing the kinds of things that other people want to do with us, as partners? What is the value to the US of being a leader in such efforts, in projects in which every nation capable of doing so wants to take part? I would submit that the highest possible form of national security, well above having better guns and bombs than everyone else, well above being so strong that no one wants to fight with us, is the security which comes from being a nation which does the kinds of things that make others want to work with us to do them. What security could we ever ask that would be better than that, and what give[s] more of it to us than the space programme?’ [11]. It is important to note the context against which Mike Griffin was making his argument. The US space shuttle Atlantis took its last flight during July 2011. Unfortunately, presently the USA has no platform available to undertake any manned space mission. NASA administrators were aware few years back that such situation would arise in near future if they do not react in time. Hence in 2007, while highlighting the need to continue working on an alternative to the space shuttle, he had argued that human ‘spaceflight is an instrument of soft power: a way of demonstrating US leadership not just in space, but on Earth as well’ [11]. It is important to note that space shuttle could be only one of the instruments to depict the relevance of soft power status; there are various other vital instruments available in the space arena having potential to display the soft power status. The abrupt shutting down of the space shuttle programme has considerably dented the US space dominance, indirectly affecting its soft power status in the outer space arena.

The phenomenal success achieved by the USA in space arena over the years has helped them significantly towards retaining the technological leadership of the world. Particularly, its achievement with its civilian space programme has allowed it to boost its soft power status. It is also important to analyse in detail whether the concentration by the USA towards developing more space technologies for strategic purposes in space has undermined its soft power status. In the twenty- first century, with the increasing global influence from its strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China in the space field, the US influence is showing certain signs of withdrawal. It may not happen immediately but eventually it could happen.

The argument put forth by Joseph Nye in his 2004 article [12] is found becoming more relevant in 2011-2012. He had said that the USA should appreciate that the soft power is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity. It should allow the USA to obtain the outcomes it desires. If the USA becomes very unpopular that being pro-

USA is considered as a kiss of death, then it means the state is losing its legitimacy in the eyes of others. Unfortunately, the USA is becoming unpopular because of its global policies. The post 9/11 US policies have not been appreciated by many (individuals and states) and have ended up in making the USA unpopular in the world. Apart from fighting the so-called global war against terrorism, the USA is also concerned about threats emerging from few state actors. The role of the US administration during the Arab Spring (2011-2012) and its approach towards the Libya uprising has added to its unpopularity. The US ‘fervour’ to undertake global policing and their ‘selective’ usage of policies in regard to democracy and human rights has not been appreciated by many.

To address the likely threats emerging from the states like Iran and North Korea, the USA is developing and simultaneously deploying the architecture for the ballistic missile defence systems. Establishing such system has direct impact on the matters related to space weaponisation. This is leading the USA to distance itself from participating towards development of any global arms control and disarmament agenda in space arena. Also, their resolve to preserve dominance in military space is consuming its resources. On the other hand, new competitors are entering in the sectors dominated by the USA for many years like global satellite navigation. On the whole, the USA appears to have started losing some ground in commercial space area and also in the field space exploration. This could lead eventually towards the USA losing its leadership in space field and indirectly affect its soft power standing. This may not happen in near future; however, such possibility in the longer run could not be ruled out.

The ‘field of space’ is rapidly becoming globally active with few Asian states realising impressive achievements. ‘Technonationalism’ has been the impetus for their space programmes [13]. Various spacefaring Asian states are found success­fully using their expertise for the purposes of commercial activates. Witnessing their impressive success, many states within and outside the region are getting attracted towards their capability and expertise. Space technology savvy Asian states are found using this opportunity to focus for commercial proposals from such states. They are also found helping few states financially to develop their space programmes. There is a geopolitical significance behind such engagements. In short, they are found using competitive socioeconomic, scientific and strategic pursuits for such engagements. The following section of this chapter examines the space policies of China from the point of view of understanding their relevance to exert soft power influence.

Space programmes of Japan, China and India would continue to grow as planned in all fields but for deep space missions. Japan and India overtake China in this field. They develop a healthy collaboration with USA, and their robotic missions successfully bring samples of helium-3 and other minerals back to the Earth. In deep space arena, China receives technical setbacks and human mission to Moon fails to take-off. However, China’s space station is fully operational. China and Russia starts helping Iran to take its space programme to greater heights. At international forums, USA starts using every opportunity to make noise about the Chinese military space stations and claims that their entire space programme has strong military bias. Globally acceptable space regime is still elusive.

Technological growth cannot be studied in isolation. Presence (or absence) of any form of growth is mainly controlled by various sociopolitical, geopolitical and economic factors. The growth of technology in any state could be the result of overall development process. There is no single, all-embracing formula explaining and evaluating the growth of technology in a particular state or a region. The same story holds good for the Asian region too.

It is said that, ‘the economic development directly translates into power’. Is the same true case in regards to technological development in Asian theatre? From consumer field to military, the technology dictates developments in every field of life. The technology spectrum with Asia is wide ranging from agricultural technologies to energy technologies to military technologies. In regard to West Asia mainly the oil factor has been the major factor for development, and also the USA influence over the region plays a vital role. The technological focus in Asia is more visible in East Asia and parts of SE Asia. Developed economies of Japan, China, Singapore and few other states in the region are the result of their technological achievements in electronics and consumer goods sector. In South Asia, India’s achievements are linked with their achievements in information technology sector.

Japan is the best example, where the Asian development suggests that absence of natural resources is unlikely to hinder growth. However, it is also important to note that the availability of technology alone does not guarantee the growth. China was technologically more advanced than Europe in many fields in the late medieval and early modern period. Yet Asia did not industrialise before the intervention of the West [10]. The growth with various Asian states is witnessed post-1980s particularly after the process of economic liberalisation begun. Also, the process of industrialisation became a reality partly because of the technology transfer within and outside the region.

Presently, Asian states understand that for the various investments in S&T is the key. They have also learnt few things from their Western experience. Unfortunately, for many decades Asia had fallen behind mainly from the Western nations, in the field of S&T. Luckily, the twenty-first century situation is looking much brighter, and Asians have started dominating the S&T turf. There are many PhD holding scientists and engineers residing in Asia, and significant amount of research is being undertaken by various Asian states [11]. States like China have more than doubled their earlier investments in this field. States like India have developed their own infrastructure in technology training (Institute Institutes of Technologies or IITs) which matches with the best in the world. Between 1980 and 2000, Asian states suffered from brain drain when many talented individuals had migrated to Western countries to the greener pastures. However, in the beginning of twenty-first century, the process of reverse brain drain has began for various reasons including economic crisis in the West and boosting opportunities in Asia. The quality of education in Asian states like China and India is of high standard particularly in subjects like physics and mathematics. This is giving Asian states an added advantage both for innovation as well as for adaption of new technologies.

In Asia, Japan[6] was the early starter in regard to developments in S&T and associated R&D issues. Japan’s technological skills have always drawn worldwide respect. In the 1970s, Japan started with ‘applied R&D’ activities with help from abroad. This was more of a catch-up policy. In 1980s, the policy shifted to focus on basic research with the realisation that an indigenous science base was needed to prepare for subsequent level technology life cycles. Over the years, they have succeeded to re-establish themselves as one of the world leaders in technological capability. Relative to its labour force size, Japan has more engineers than any

leading industrial nation, except Sweden. These are concentrated in the fields of electronics and electrical engineering and in computer science with over 70% are in industry, 13% in education and about 6% in government.

China is another Asian country with strong technological base. It caters for both civilian/commercial requirements and its military modernisation programme. China’s national security and economic competitiveness has been guided by four main principles: acquisition of foreign systems by technology transfer through joint ventures, licensing and co-production arrangements, promotion of commercial initiatives in scientific labs, creation of venture capital industry towards innovative technology start-ups and promotion of greater role for industries in R&D. As a result, its industrial growth has taken off almost simultaneously with technological growth. Its vast defence infrastructure has transformed itself into a strategic enterprise with close active cooperation with research institutes and universities.

China has understood the necessity of a sustainable S&T infrastructure for a rapid economic growth. It has launched in quick succession major programmes which would be the backbone of its technological growth. They are:

• National High-Tech R&D Development Program (National 863 Program), which aims at promoting the applied research and accelerating high-tech development. China’s high-tech priorities, including IT, biotechnology and advanced agricul­tural technology, advanced materials technology, advanced manufacturing and automation technology, energy technology as well as resource and environment technology

• National Basic Research Program of China (National 973 Program), for the development of comprehensive and multidisciplinary basic research and also in­volves important cutting-edge basic research and fostering outstanding scientists with creativity

• National Key Technologies R&D Program which works to provide technical support to industrial restructuring, the sustainable development of society and the enhancement of living standards by achieving breakthroughs in key technologies, introducing technical innovation and applying high and new technologies

• Program 211 which aimed at building about 100 higher education institutions and key disciplines as a national priority to greatly enhance the teaching quality, level of scientific research and administrative efficiency of higher education institutions8

These programmes laid the foundation of what is today a thriving S&T organi­sation which is paying rich dividends to all major spheres including defence.

In regard to development in technology, India has witnessed various ups and downs. Particularly, because of its nuclear policies (nuclear tests carried out during 1974 and 1998), India had to face technological apartheid for many years. Political establishment gave support for scientific progress in spite of financial constraints.

Till 1990s, India’s economic situation was not very healthy. Even by the year 2003, the expenditure on S&T in India was about US$5 per capita compared to US$240 for South Korea and US$705 for the USA. As per the global research report on science and engineering research currently in India, the government spending on science research is 0.9% of GDP which is expected to go up to 1.2% in 2012. However, the availability of qualified researchers has not kept pace with intended enhanced spending. A growth in scientific publications of 80% in 7 years, however, places India at only 3% of the world output, far below that of Japan. China which had slumbered through 1980s/1990s has shown a dramatic growth after 2003 [13]. India has done remarkable progress in the field of information technology sector. The country is also taking lead in the field of biotechnology.

South Korea is another country in Asia which is developing a broad technology base. Till 1980s, the state was the major contributor for R&D projects, but subsequently since 1990s, private industry is found involved in various technologies development arenas except core technologies. South Korea was assessed in 2007 to be about 6-7 in world ranking in terms of science competitiveness and technologies by the International Institute of Management Development. Presently, it has risen to 5 in science competitiveness while falling to 14th position in technology competi­tiveness. To regain the lost ground, they are following a model of outsourcing and technology integration as a means of boosting R&D capability.

Post-Iranian revolution in 1979 followed by the sanctions by the West forced Iran to pursue a path of self-sufficiency. This required Iran to develop its technological base mainly without any outside support. Particularly, under its second 5-year plan (1995-2000), S&T was declared as a top national goal with stress on infrastructure, research and education. The emphasis on R&D centres was on three key fundamen­tal areas—metallurgy, electronics and aerospace. The aim of state funded centres was to develop a scientific and professional technical community anchored within the country. At the same time support for S&T education was given a major boost with expansion in Iranian academia. All of this combined to give a major boost to S&T in Iran.

Pakistan’s focus on S&T achieved a 6.25 fold jump from 1965 to 1995 in terms of numbers of scientists and technologists in the workforce. About 47 universities and 237 R&D institutes are engaged in S&T. One important R&D unit is National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) which reportedly is a civilian controlled scientific and research organisation carrying out research in many engineering and scientific areas, with focus on the design and production of the defence systems.

Overall in Asian context, it has been viewed that historically every country was not very closely affiliated to the scientific pursuits. However, in recent past, such states are found making significant efforts to develop scientifically and technologically. As an example, Iran’s case could be considered. Historically, Iran was not a knowledge-oriented society. Naturally, issues related to science and technology had either political or economical patronage. There was not much motivation of inventions. Also, Iran’s role in the invention of science and technology at the international level was very low. There were no efficient national and legal

mechanisms for safeguarding the material and intellectual rights of scientists and technologists.9 However, this situation is changing. Particularly, post-1995 Iran is found making investments into various fields of existing and emerging technologies. Government and to certain extent private industry is also found supporting scientific research and development.

It is important to appreciate the fact that scientific research and technological progress always has a military dimension to it. Historically, it has been observed that many a time technologies are developed essentially for military purposes and subsequently they find their usefulness in the civilian field. Most commonly known examples of this are computer and internet. This pattern appears to be reversing in present times. Presently, market economics is pushing the technological development and various new inventions are getting introduced for their industrial and/or consumer project utility. Subsequently, military technologists are identifying their defence usefulness.

Post-World War II various discoveries in various fields like mathematics, physics, meteorology, material sciences, communication, electronics, aerodynamics and physical sciences have taken place. Particularly, nation-states have invested sig­nificant amount of resources towards development, testing and production of various missile systems for their armed forces. This overall development of various technologies has directly or indirectly helped the development of rocket science in few Asian states. Also, it is important to note that this technology growth need not have happened indigenously alone. Significant amount of help has been received from the Western states for such developments.

Taiwan has long conducted space-related activities using foreign space data and has developed international partnerships in various fields [10]. Development of rockets for launching satellites had not been their core area of research and investments at least during late 1980s and 1990s. They established the National Space Organization, NSPO, in 2005 (formerly known as the National Space Programme Office established in1991) which is the civilian space agency of Taiwan. It has developed a successful sounding rocket programme and has undertaken few launches of these rockets. Since 1998, the launch of Sounding Rocket No.1, NSPO has launched rockets six times. These launches were meant for the purposes of conducting the physical experiments on atmospheric airglow, ionosphere, etc. They also had relevance for flight validations of technologies such as GPS, magnetometer, etc. NSPO’s second-phased aerospace technology development programme aims at suborbital measurements. Such measurements are also expected to enhance the development of the aerospace technology’s civilian application.[90]

Taiwan is yet to develop a workable space launch booster (launcher). There are some indications that they have plans of testing its first Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) to put around 50 kg payload into LEO.[91] No specific information is available in this regard. Probably, this could take few more years to happen. However, understanding China’s apprehensions about these issues, Taiwan may not be keen to divulge much information in this regard.

The first satellite for Taiwan, a low-Earth-orbit scientific experimental satellite called FORMOSAT-1(formerly known as ROCSAT-1), was launched by the USA on January 27,1999. The first remote sensing satellite developed by National Space Organization (NSPO), FORMOSAT-2, was successfully launched on May 21,2004. For its ‘FORMOSAT-3 Programme’, Taiwan has collaborated with the USA. This project is aimed at developing advanced technology for the real-time monitoring of the global climate. This project is also known as Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate (COSMIC). For this purpose, six micro-satellites are placed into six different orbits at 700-800 Km. These satellites orbit around the Earth and form a low-Earth-orbit constellation to receive signals transmitted by the 24 US GPS satellites. This project was successfully launched

during Apr 2006 and with this ended the First Phase Space Programme (1991-2006) devised by Taiwan. The Second Phase Space Programme (2004-2018) is about the Formosat-5 Programme, the first Remote Sensing Programme. Here the aim is on building up the capabilities for independent development of spacecraft and payload instruments.14

For almost two decades, Taiwan is systematically expanding its space programme and space industry. Probably, geopolitical compulsions are responsible for an overall slow growth of the Taiwan’s space agenda. China appears to be not keen for Taiwan to develop its own programme and influences foreign states not to coop­erate with Taiwan on this issue. However, in recent past, NASA is found interacting with Taiwan on various projects. Also, ESA and Japan have interest in collaborating with Taiwan on various issues including disaster warning and management. All this could help the growth of Taiwan’s space programme probably much faster than in the past.

Missile defence systems are emerging as technologies that could change the nuclear deterrence calculus. Theoretically, this system engages the incoming ballistic mis­sile before it reaches the target. Ballistic missiles usually have a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The missile (with payload) traverses a path through the upper atmosphere or into the space. Missile defence architecture is expected to destroy this ballistic missile much before it reaches the target. The major part of this system involves interceptors and radars. The interceptors usually engage the target in the re-entry phase.[180] The fundamental aim of missile defence system is to hit the target into the outer space. This challenges the global norms of keeping the space free from any military intervention. The space security policies which many states in the world are keen to develop are about preventing the weaponisation of space, and missile defence systems actually challenge this notion.

It is important to appreciate that missile defence is much beyond undertaking space launches to demonstrate the missile advancements made by the state. It amounts to the weaponisation of outer space (if the engagement of incoming missiles is done in space[181]). This technology also demonstrates (in a limited way) the ASAT capabilities of the state.

Origins of the concept of missile defence could be traced back to conceptu­alisation of Star Wars (Strategic Defence Initiative-SDI) programme by the then US President Roland Ragan in 1983. Over the years, the nomenclature of missile defence idea has witnessed certain changes mostly based on its categorisation. However, at places, names like national missile defence (NMD), theatre missile defence (TMD), ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) and strategic missile defence are found being used interchangeably.

Missile defence has been a top priority for various successive US adminis – trations.[182] Apart from the existing radar and interceptor structure, the USA is also working on futuristic technologies like the space-based lasers and kinetic kill (so-called hit-to-kill) vehicles for intercepting enemy missiles in their ‘boost-phase’, immediately after the launch.[183] The USA is aware that any treaty mechanism related

to space would curtail their freedom in space. This fear lead them to discredit the very own agreement signed by them few years back. The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty (a bilateral agreement signed amongst the USA and erstwhile USSR in 1972) was always under threat because it was challenging the concept of ASAT. Missile interceptors threatened to erode the ABM treaty regime because of the similarities in ASAT and missile defence technologies [17]. During June 2002, the USA did the unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty, an act carried out to protect the US interests in the arena of missile defence. Over the years, the USA has been unwilling to be a part of any bilateral or multilateral arms control or disarmament mechanism which could limit their options both from missile defence and ASAT angle.

In missile defence, context most important Asian angle is the US notion of perceived threat from Iran. Israel also considers missile defence system as necessity in view of the threat from Iran. Israel has successfully tested its Arrow system by doing intercepts of a ballistic target missile.[184] India has also conducted a successful ballistic missile defence test during March 2011 (so far India has conducted six tests out of which four were successful). Indian ballistic missile defence programme involves of long-range tracking radar, command and control system and the interceptor.[185] It is implicit that for the purposes of nuclear dominance in the region and for achieving technological edge over the adversary, nuclear – capable states from the region would opt for missile defence systems. Also, states like India (and even China) which has a no-flrst-use policy (NFU) could justify investments into missile defence as a necessity to absorb the first strike.

China has been conducting on-and-off research into missile defence systems since the 1960s; however, it appears that they are increasing their emphasis now. On Jan 11, 2011, China had announced that it had successfully tested a land-based missile defence system. This test made China the only country after the USA to use a missile to destroy another in space. During the same period, the US agencies had also detected that two missiles had collided outside the Earth’s atmosphere. China’s investments in this arena basically emerge out of their Taiwan fears. They have concerns about the US sale of advanced Patriot missile defence systems to Taiwan.[186] On the other hand, they also understand that the USA will take the implicit message that such technology also could be modified to be used to attack the US space assets.

Probably, India is also looking at developing its ASAT architecture as a part of missile defence programme. India could develop their high-altitude interceptors into ASAT to damage low orbit satellites [18]. India’s future plans in regard to missile defence and ASAT capabilities were highlighted by Mr V K Saraswat, director general of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at the sidelines of 97th Indian Science Congress (2010).

In regard to Pakistan, it has been reported that the state may seek the help from China and could get the interceptor missile defence system by 2012. Pakistan is particularly looking to purchase a high-altitude missile air defence system. China could part with HQ-9/FD2000 system developed by the China Academy of Defence Technology. This system is claimed to be capable of hitting aircraft out to 125 km, air-launched cruise missiles out to 50 km and ballistic missiles out to 25 km— representing ABM capability equivalent to the Indian AAD and American PAC-3.[187]

Japan has been following a pacifist security policy post-World War II. However, their engagement with the USA to provide a missile defence cover to their state brings out the assertive aspect of this security policy. The US-Japanese cooperation in this field dates back to the 1980s since the period of Reagan initiative on SDI. But, Japan’s participation was more symbolic in nature then. The actual security efficacy of this system emerged to them after the Aug 1998 testing of Taepodong-1 ballistic missile by North Korea. The North Korean interests in developing nuclear weapons and their withdrawal from NPT in 2003 also made Japan more cautious. By end of 2003, Japanese cabinet took decision to introduce missile defence system as a part of its security architecture. It was argued that ‘BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defence-oriented national defence policy’.[188] Presently, Japan has deployed a multilayered missile defence system having sea-based midcourse missile defence (the Aegis ballistic missile defence system) and ground-based terminal phase missile defence (Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3, or PAC-3) [19].

Sending a satellite to the Moon is only one part of the story, and the other part is to establish a deep space network for tracking and communicating with the satellite when it is in lunar orbit.

China does not have an exclusive network to cater for their Moon mission. There are few networks available globally like the US network—consisting of sites in California, Australia and Spain. However, geopolitics plays a dominant role in this, and in case of China, this network is off limits for political reasons. So the mission relied on a combination of Chinese and European assets. European Space Agency (ESA) has offered China assistance with communications and tracking relays to

and from the probe using its deep space network ESTRACK. This support was mainly because the Chinese had promised to share the data gathered from the Chang’e-1 mission in return [10]. China has wisely avoided any overdependence on such agencies. For purpose of the Moon mission, they have modified their S-band aerospace Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT & C) network designed earlier for their manned space programme. The largest antennas for this network have an aperture of only 12 m. A series of technical measures were taken to ensure that such antennas could communicate with their Moon probe too [11].

India has installed a pair of giant antennas to monitor its Moon mission. The facility known as Indian Deep Space Network (IDSN) consists of two powerful dish antennas, 32 and 18 m in diameter. This network will serve as the base station for future planetary missions like to Mars and would also be used to track the proposed space telescope, the astronomical satellite (Astrosat).[243] Apart from this, various ground stations within and outside India are available under the ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC) for providing ground support to Moon missions.

As per JAXA official website for the purposes of Kaguya mission, Japan is making use of the terrestrial station which is present at many places of the world, with Sagamihara in Japan as a centre. The deep space centre at Usuda and Uchinoura Space Center that operates two large antennas (20- and 34-m dishes) also form part of this telemetry tracking and command network.

State’s interests are normally shaped by its power calculus. China is a rising power both economically and militarily. To a great extent, the much debated ‘rise of China’ has already taken place. At the same time, China suffers from an ‘image deficit’. The reasons for this could be many, from communism to human rights violations

to supporting states with dubious records to dismal arms control, disarmament policies, etc. In the arena of technology development, China is normally blamed for their covert policies of reverse engineering. However, since the last few years, China is gaining acceptance as a major, respected and even at times an envied actor in international arena. It is actively pursuing multilateral approaches for trade and investments. It is building up new security relationships. China as a state and society is in a position to influence foreign investments. China’s charm offensive in Asia, Africa and Latin America has resulted in providing major benefits to the state. At the same time, concerns have been expressed by few about the nature and manner in which China’s developmental plans are progressing. In general, various surveys conducted in many countries particularly after 2000 suggest that majority in most countries seem to have favourable view of growing China [14]. Such surveys are found offering similar results both in the Western world and amongst Asian states.

Analysts and thinker communities have provided various arguments (differing at times) about the future of the rising power. China is viewed by some as a threat to status quo power and regional peace and stability. It is important to note that just because the rise of China is a reality (peaceful or otherwise?), it does not qualify to emerge as a threat to international system. Any perception-based analysis in this regard could offer erroneous conclusions.

China’s official stance about its developmental policies is that of a peaceful growth and to avoid confrontation. However, Robert Kagan an American historian and foreign policy commentator argues that China will become a threat to the West because it is positioning itself as a ‘political power’ in the international arena. Such actions follow a pattern established by other states who have sought to challenge global powers throughout modern history [15]. Mostly, the rising powers have traditionally been considered as revisionist powers in realist international relations theories. However, it is not necessary that rising China’s foreign policy should hold such conventional wisdom [16]. For China to achieve the great power status, it is important to look beyond undertaking military modernisation and conducting economic offensive. If they have to ‘manage’ the maximum redistribution of power presently concentrated in the hands of few developed powers, then they have to make themselves more relevant globally. They will have to attempt for a new order by engaging various states. It could be done by engaging such powers on diplomatic, cultural and science and technology front. This is what soft power is all about.

The idea of soft power is not new to China; maybe the expressions used to describe it in the past were a bit different. Since the era of Sun Zi (544-496 BC) and Mo Zi (470-390 BC), idealism has provided a counterpoint to realism. Confucianism advocates that a state should obtain its leadership status by setting an example and by opposing imposition of one’s values on others. The idea of ‘culture winning over enemy’ and ‘winning a battle before it is fought’ does find references in ancient China’s strategic culture. In recent times after 1990s, with Joseph Nye’s formulation of soft power formulation and possibility at the backdrop of the global reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown 1989, Chinese scholars and policymakers are found engaged in studying the concept of soft power and identifying its relevance for the state [16, pp. 262-264] . Slowly, political and military leadership is found contextualising this concept under the Chinese settings. In his speech at the 17th CPC Congress (2007), President Hu Jintao called for enhancing culture as part of soft power [17]. While formulating the China’s International Status Report 2005, for the first time, the strengthening of soft power was used as one of the criteria to estimate China’s national power. It was observed that in the year 2004 China’s soft power had increased because of the new attempts at institutional building. The Chinese could be viewed to have started appreciating the importance of soft power theory in their framework particularly after the induction of the peaceful rise theory in 2003 and the Beijing Consensus in 2004.2

It’s important to note that at international level, there has been significant amount of debate in regard to China’s soft power potential. The 2007 World Economic Forum held in Dalian, a coastal city in China’s Liaoning Province, addressed the issue of China’s soft power. The then Australian Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd presented Joshua Kurlantzick’s book Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World to the US President George W. Bush to remind him ‘why the US has been losing influence.’ The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) had conducted two comprehensive studies on China’s soft power influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the first half of 2008 [18].

The increasing Chinese influence in the region and also in various others of the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century is indicative of the fact that the Chinese policies have grown beyond coercion. Today, China is a state with considerable soft power resources. Its soft power is increasing in respect of its resources in areas of culture, political value and diplomacy. China is yet to fully translate these resources successfully in desired foreign-policy outcomes. Nevertheless, such resources are also growing simultaneously [19]. Technology is one such area. Interestingly, in the Chinese understating the realm of S&T is not strictly compartmentalised as soft power. Party Chief and President Hu Jintao, for instance, noted at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on Jan 4, 2006, that the increase of China’s international status and influence depends both on hard power, such as the economy, S&T and defence, and on soft power, such as culture [18]. However, science and technology as a source could be viewed to have different tenets. When viewed with the prism of its importance of defence, it could be argued to have the shades of hard power, but when approach is to contrast [313] [314]

its importance as a tool in socioeconomic development, it could be viewed as an element of soft power, for example, any technological pursuit undertaken in the field of green technologies or disaster management technologies.

Post 2008, there has been a debate in regard to China’s hosting of Beijing Olympic Games as a strategy to increase its soft power status. This single event has contributed significantly towards the world forming a positive opinion about the contemporary China. Similarly, China’s investments in space arena and the significant success achieved by them particularly post 2000 have contributed significantly towards enhancing its prestige in the world. Olympic was the singular event while space is an area for continuous progression. Since the beginning of the space era in 1957, the USA and the erstwhile USSR (now Russia) have been viewed as the space superpowers. Now, China is making its presence felt in this field. Achievements like sending human missions to space, astronauts undertaking spacewalk and launching of a space station are unique acts only performed by the USA and Russia in the past but not any longer with China doing the same. Recently, China has also undertaken two Moon missions and has major plans of undertaking first unmanned and later manned Moon landings and also a mission to Mars. All these activities put China in a coveted category in space field.

China has identified investments in space technologies as one of the key areas of its focus. For China, such investment is important for various reasons in addition to technological and socioeconomical benefits. It offers strategic advantages and binds the people with the sense of nationalism. Over the years, China has earned a reputation of supplier of cheap technology lacking in quality and with a limited life span. A notion has emerged that they are the producers of low-technology and low-value items. It is important for China to change this image and make the correct projection of their success by displaying their space achievements. Such ‘image makeover’ is essential to attract business. Largely, it would also help them to ascertain their soft power credentials.

To contextualise the significance of space technologies from a soft power perspective, it’s important to identify the overall Chinese interests in various regions of the world. Knowledge of such interests could help appreciate the need for adopting soft power approach by China. This could further help for realising why space is being used as one of the sources for soft power wielding.

Chinese soft power is a relatively new concept in Chinese foreign policy [20]. Beijing has been promoting this idea at various levels and attempting to create an atmosphere to exhibit their interest in varying fields from culture, development and trade to energy and sports. As a key player on the world geopolitical vista, China is developing its ‘soft’ credentials in various parts of the world.

Chinese presence in Africa is illustrative of Beijing’s efforts to create a paradigm of globalisation in their favour. China’s political-economic bilateral goals and rela­tions in Africa are enumerated in an official 2006 document titled China’s African Policy.3 China proposes to develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa. It [315] outlines need for high-level reciprocal leadership visits and economic collaboration. Economic assistant, technological cooperation and supporting agriculture are the key features of this relationship. Apart from various other issues like culture and health assistance, the document also seeks increased science and technology cooperation.[316] On geopolitical front, China has undertaken a diplomatic offensive to peruse one China policy and deny Taiwan any international recognition. Their international assistance and aid policies have a subtext of their Taiwan policies. For example, China’s deployment of 90 peacekeepers to Liberia in Dec 2003 occurred 2 months after Liberia switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. It is important to note that Chinese technical aid to Africa is becoming increasingly important in building China’s influence in the region. Beijing prefers technical support over financial aid because such support has a chance at providing returns (sale-purchase of technology) than direct aid and loan programmes [21].

Latin America is another geographical region where China is found making investments. In recent past, China began the engagement policy with the Apr 2001 President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day tour of Latin America. Here the strategies are twofold: first is economic, to secure access to the primary materials that are required for its economic growth and to find a market for its manufactured goods. The second is a political strategy: to obtain diplomatic recognition from those countries still recognising Taiwan as the government of China. This region is important for China to gain greater access to resources—like various ores, soybeans, copper, iron and steel and oil—through increased trade and investment.[317]

The most successful Chinese investment in Latin America has been that of Brazil. Their engagement with Brazil has withstood the test of time. In 1988, the China – Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS) programme was conceptualised. Under this programme, three CBERS multispectral, high-resolution satellites have been launched from China. Here sensors are specifically designed from the point of view of gaining inputs for the management of the Earth resources, forests, geology and hydrology. The cooperation between the two countries has showed an authentic effort, from both sides, to break down the developed countries’ prejudice against advanced technology transfer [22].

China is also engaging states much closer to home. East Asia and North-east and Southeast Asia are the regions of (major) interest to China. China is employing a broadly peaceful strategy motivated by the domestic concerns and with a desire to project soft power characterised by a vague, subconscious, Confucian conception of

a Chinese world order. It has sought to project soft power by offering economic assistance to developing countries [23]. China’s growing influence (soft power) in Southeast Asia is largely economic (China is a major source of foreign aid), trade and investment.[318] It is also important to note that the region also constitutes of developed states like Japan and South Korea. Here economic assistance could not become a Chinese soft power trump card, and diplomacy has a larger role to play. Japan is a state which China has to deal more cautiously due to certain geopolitical compulsions. Also, in regard to technology transfer, not much of scope exits with Japan. Here S&T may not become a major factor for development of relationship, but initiatives like joint collaborations could help the improvement of relationship.

In all the regions discussed above, China is found making significant investments in space arena. The purpose over here is not to discuss the micro details of such investments but to flag them in order to make the larger point that space has become an instrument for China’s soft power projections. Presently, China is positioning itself as a space patron to the developing world—the same countries in some cases, whose natural resources China covets. China is helping Nigeria and Venezuela with their satellite programme. It is also developing an earth observation satellite system with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand [24, 25].

Chinese investments in Nigeria’s space programme need critical analysis. During May 2007, China launched a US$300 million communications satellite for Nigeria called the NigComStat-1. This launch is an expression of how China is establishing itself as a space benefactor to the developing world. It is intelligently using outer space as an arena for spreading its influence. This satellite was designed and constructed by Chinese engineers. A space industry from China is monitoring the satellite from China and also training Nigerian engineers to operate a tracking station in Nigeria. Above all to help pay for the satellite, China has loaned Nigeria US$200 million in preferential buyer’s credits. It is important to note that China provides Africa with economic and financial assistance. It is involved in building of roads, hospitals and airports, and in return, Africa is happy to sell oil and other commodities to China. China is using space also as a component to enhance this assistance.[319]

Unfortunately, the NigComStat-1 project has not progressed as planned. China had to face a failure with the NigComStat-1 within 1 year after its launch. During Nov 2008, this satellite was switched off since it lost both of its solar arrays [26]. This satellite was meant to function of a minimum of 15 years. In order to keep its ongoing partnership with Nigeria intact, China had promised to

launch a replacement satellite.[320] China fulfilled its promise by launching Nigerian Communication Satellite-1R during Dec 2011. This is bound to strengthen the relationship between both the countries further. This would also help to project China as a reliable partner and also keep their space prestige intact.

Under an agreement signed in Nov 2005, a Chinese industry was to de­sign, manufacture, test and put into orbit the VENESAT-1 (DFH-4 satellite) for Venezuela. This satellite having utility for telecommunication and education needs was launched by China in 2008 and is reported to be in good health.[321] The exact pattern of investment is not known; however, the investment is expected to be around US$400 m. China has also agreed to build and launch a communications satellite for Laos and to build a satellite control centre. An agreement to this effect was signed during Sep 2009. The Dongfang Hong (The East is Red) model satellite would be launched by a Long March rocket. No date for this launch has been finalised yet.10 To improve communication in rural areas and boost indigenous pride, Bolivia has decided to take help from China for its first satellite launch, expected to take place by 2013. Bolivia hopes China will cover most of the estimated $300 m costs. It will also seek donations and loans from other countries [27]. Apart from such investments far away from the Chinese mainland, the state is also engaging island nations like Sri Lanka closer home. Sri Lanka is trying to put communications satellite in space since 2007 and now has finalised its plan for launching two satellites with the help from a British company. China has agreed to provide financial and technical assistance to Sri Lanka with their space ambitions [28].

The Chinese assistance to the space programmes of various states helps them to extend their technological footprint globally. This also enables them to establish intergovernmental cooperation in different regions of the world. Beijing’s space programme is found serving various practical interests like raising cash and making alliances. As per Mr. Dean Cheng of The Heritage Foundation, ‘it’s no accident that Venezuela and Nigeria… of course, both have oil. And Bolivia, interestingly, is one of the world’s largest sources of lithium, which if you think we’re all going to drive electric cars, is going to be a vital source’ [29].

China is found making an interesting mix of investments in various regions of the world in space arena. Every investment made by China should be viewed not only from a soft power perspective but also from a strategic angle. China’s assistance to the North Korean efforts for launcher development is known [30]. Similarly, China’s assistance to Pakistan in satellite technology arena has shades of commercial and strategic dimensions. On Aug 12, 2011, China launched Pakistan’s first communications satellite (PAKSAT-1R) on a Long March-3B carrier rocket. This event demonstrates the deepening technological cooperation between these two

states. Pakistan’s inadequacy in the space field offers China an opportunity to take their strategic partnership to a higher plane and also simultaneously maintain its own commercial interests [31]. China’s satellite navigation programme may also assist Pakistan in military realm.

Assessment

In the overall global discourse on soft power, the focus of debate essentially revolves around the relevance of cultural, political and economic features. However, in the twenty-first century, the role of S&T is also gaining prominence as an additional basis for generating soft power influence. S&T is increasingly being viewed as a key instrument of soft power. States understand that the leadership in technology adds to their global prestige. Amongst the various stems of technologies, space technology emerges central to bestow the soft power status. This is not to argue that no other technology has similar capabilities. However, space technology could be viewed to have a greater say in this regard for various reasons. First, the enormity and visual manifestation (say human landing on moon) is almost unmatched. Second, expertise in rocket science puts the state at higher pedestal in comparison with others, and expertise in this science has significant strategic implications too. Third, the technology if viewed in isolation is more of an exclusive and costly technology; however, the output delivered by this technology has significant social relevance. Fourth, the economic relevance and significant growth potential of this technology is gargantuan. Fifth, it is a strategic technology with dual-use ability.

Many smaller states in the world are found rushing to develop space capabilities. Major spacefaring states in Asia have fastened the pace of their development with a view to capture the rapidly emerging space market. Asian spacefaring states have understood that space is a socioeconomic enabler and could also act as a catalyst for advancing state’s foreign policy vision in the digital age. They understand that a vast gap exists amongst space-haves and space have-nots. This gap is both economical and technological. They have sensed an opportunity over here which could offer them multiple benefits both in short and long term. This chapter has analysed one such ‘power’ for its space credentials to acquire soft power status. China’s policies are found distinctly showcasing their space endeavours to realise soft power.

China is found strategically locating itself as a focal point for various activities, from providing financial assistance to manufacturing of satellites, to helping in infrastructure development and training and to providing launching facilities for states in Asia, Africa and South America. This approach has multiple benefits including amassing soft power status. They are found developing a ‘web of space help’ to garner various economic, political and strategic advantages.

It is important to note that there are some limits to exercise this soft power. Particularly, for the state like China which suffers from ‘image deficit’, impressing other states is a challenging proposal. China’s inter – and intracontinental outreach is not believed by many as an entirely benign exercise. Also, China’s political system, their relationship with states having dubious image, opaque economical system, quality of technology and human rights record are problematic for many. Apart from such China-centric issues, there are certain general issues which highlight the limitations of soft power. Mainly the quantitative measurement of the sources of soft power is a difficult task, and understanding the actual effect of soft power would always remain in the realm of subjective assessment. Economic assistance made to other states does not guarantee their continuous support to the donor’s political actions. No effective deterrence mechanism exists with soft power to engage/dominate other powers. Most importantly, soft power is not an alternative to hard power.

In Asia, apart from China, space achievements of India and Japan are also noteworthy. These two states could also use their expertise in the field as a source for their soft power policies. In the case of Japan, most of their geopolitical policies have ‘invisible’ US bias. They could use their space pre-eminence as an instrument to engage friends in the region either alone or in collaboration with the USA.

India could take a leaf out of Chinese experience to expand its ‘soft power’ by using space technology as an instrument. India could be viewed to have already made humble beginning in this (soft) power projection game. However, there appears to be less hype about India’s efforts to engage other states in space diplomacy. India’s Antrix Corp, the commercial arm of the Indian space agency ISRO, has made modest forays in the global space market for launch services, sale of satellite resources data and spacecraft hardware and components in addition to mission support service. So far, India has launched satellites for few states under a commercial arrangement. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has offered to make available Indian satellite resources data to Southeast Asian countries for managing natural disasters. He has also offered Indian help in launching small satellites built by them. India has developed a global market for sale of Indian remote sensing satellite (IRS) imageries [32]. But definitely India has to do much more to generate geopolitical returns from its space achievements.

The human quest for exploring the universe is unending. Space technologies have their own glamour. These technologies are frontier technologies and have also been responsible for development of various other technology sectors too. They have wider applicability and global acceptability. ‘Rocket science’ being a niche field, very few states in the world are in a position to exploit its fullest potential. Many states in the world are attracted towards these technologies because of their social, commercial and strategic utilities. All this offers the states in possession of these technologies a special status. Various possessors of space technologies are found shearing and selling these technologies to other states. The discussions in this chapter clearly elucidates that the space technology has a soft power potential. Various developing (Asian or otherwise) states are getting attracted towards the space technologies for their socioeconomic utilities. The case study (China) undertaken in this chapter suggests that space technologies have remarkable soft power potential. What is important is to correctly exploit this expertise to realise the state’s aims. The ‘soft power repute’ would come automatically.

Iran goes nuclear. Few other states within the region start showing signals that they have nuclear intentions (say Japan, Saudi Arabia). India successfully develops missile defence shield. Nuclear weapons lose their shine as weapons of deterrence. China claims that ultimate high ground is space and best deterrence is space weapons. It proposes a programme for space-based weapons and successfully demonstrates few weapons by testing. India and Japan demonstrates their capabil­ities in regard to satellite jamming technologies. Space becomes a vital factor in global military power balance.

Appraisal

This chapter carried out a short appraisal about few of the important drivers in regard to various spacefaring nations in Asia. For these nations, space has become a vital element for growth. Some parts of Asia have already witnessed the impact of space technology on the society. They have experienced its utility in various facets of life from weather forecasting to education to navigation to intelligence gathering. Both ‘space’ haves and have-nots in the region consider this technology as an instrument of change. For them, this technology also has a major military relevance.

However, even after two to three decades, many Asian states are predicted to remain earthbound. They would try to get maximum benefits of space technology by engaging spacefaring nations. Given the steady growth of various existing and emerging space programmes in the region, it is expected that coming years would witness a profound impact of this technology on Asia’s culture and commerce on one hand and society and security on other.