Concealed Missile Ambitions

In Asian context, some states could be viewed to have taken the path of space launches to showcase their capabilities in missile arena. The missile systems particularly the ballistic missile systems are an important element of military hardware for NWSs or states with interest in developing one. Possession of a nuclear-capable missile advances the deterrence potential of the NWSs. At times, few Asian states are found undertaking space launches as a roundabout way to announce to the rest of the world about their missile capabilities.

Analogous efforts undertaken in regard to space launch vehicle and ballistic missile development are considered as a major dilemma towards judging the intensions of a state. ‘SLVs and ballistic missiles are derived from virtually identical and interchangeable technologies, and the similarities between SLVs and ballistic missiles extend from subcomponents to production facilities. SLV programmes can allow a country to test propulsion systems, stage separation, and some guidance and control technology, and provide a path to gain access to controlled, missile-related technologies and materials under the guise of peaceful space ambitions’.[165]

By 2010/2011, missile capabilities of various Asian states particularly those who are spacefaring nations have expanded significantly. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed account about the missile capabilities of various states in the region. In fact, as mentioned earlier, it really does not matter if states are using their space launcher knowledge to develop missiles because they are technically not violating any space treaty regime (since none exists!). Still the discussion on this subject merits attention because of the investments in space launch vehicles indirectly demonstrate the ability to field long-range ballistic missiles. There is a significant amount of technology commonalty in both the systems. For scientists and engineers working on either of the systems, shifting focus from space to missiles to missile to space becomes possible. This allows the state to use the expertise generated in one field to the development of other. It is also important to note that because of the apprehensions about the objectives of ballistic missile programme of few states, international sanctions have been put on them on specific occasions.

The overall politics behind missile issues has been more intriguing. Both the parties—the NPT group and the anti-NPT states—have their individual (but differing) assessments about the missile subject. The development of missile technology has mostly remained a complex task for many states mainly due to geopolitical, technological and logistical reasons. It is important to note that foreign technology has remained an important factor for various regional actors in regard to the development of their operational ballistic missile or space launch vehicle programmes [5, p. 19]. Particularly, various third-world missile or space launch vehicle programmes are mostly found developed mainly based on technology transfer or hidden purchase/ theft of technology from other states or agencies.

A basic problem in the missile field is that no comprehensive and widely agreed norms have been established which defines what is ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ in this arena. The international community is found criticising specific activities by individual countries on a case-by-case basis without any official multilateral instrument [6]. The MTCR (1987) is an informal and voluntary export control regime to limit the proliferation of missile platforms, UAVs and rocket systems. It is about controlling the design, development and testing of missiles that can deliver a payload of 500 kg or more to a range of 300 km or more. The scope of MTRC was extended in 1993 to include missiles capable of delivering WMDs. However, no restrictions on national space programme could be put as long as they do not add to the development of the delivery systems for WMDs [7] MTRC has no universal acceptability. In Asia, only Japan is a member of MTRC. States like India consider MTRC mechanism as discriminatory.

Apart from MTCR, another multilateral arms control mechanism (not under the UN authorization) is in vogue called International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)/The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC). This agreement also highlights the issue of SLV versus missiles. It demands ‘necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to SLV programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes’.[166] It also outlines few transparency measures in this connection.

Universally, there always has been assistance from the space programmes of the state to further its missile programmes (taken either overtly or covertly) and vice a versa. However, any direct evidence to link space vehicles and missiles would be hard to come in various cases, and there is a need to ‘read between the lines’ to appreciate how missile technology could have got developed in certain cases. Several states have supplemented their missile programmes by diverting knowledge and paraphernalia from the space programme. Technically, space launch vehicles (SLVs) are actually ballistic missiles used in surface to space mode. Satellites are nothing but the payloads delivered by missiles from the surface to Earth orbit. Such SLVs could be converted into ballistic missiles by adding re-entry vehicles and suitable guidance and control packages.

In Asian context, such similarities could be viewed in the programmes of Israel and India during the 1960s. In 1961, Israel launched the Shavit II multistage rocket 50 miles into the ionosphere for metrological measurement purposes. Almost, within a gap of few years, Israel was simultaneously working in space launch field as well as on its project Jericho a designation given to the Israeli short-range ballistic missiles programme. Probably, Shavit was a derivative of Jericho. India is known as the first developing country (sixth in the world) to orbit a satellite using indigenously developed rocket SLV-3 during 1980. Roughly around the same time, India started the development of Agni IRBM. Few analysts are of the opinion that this missile’s propulsion system was based on SLV-3. In regard to China, analysts note that they were successful in putting their first satellite into orbit during the 1970s and within a decade’s time possessed an ICBM capability [5, pp. 24-25]. It is also important to note that in certain cases, missile systems have been modified into space launchers (probably, Iran modified its missile Shahab-3 to blast a satellite).

In Asia, nuclear and space policies of North Korea and Iran have always been a suspect. The USA and its allies are of a firm convection that satellite launches by these states actually establish their expertise to develop long-range ballistic missile systems. There also has been a past history of technology transfer in the missile arena between North Korea and Iran. Space programmes of North Korea and Iran are being looked with suspicion for their demonstrative missile designs. However, it is important to note that both these states had entered into the missile arena much before conceptualisation of their space programmes. Hence, it could be incorrect to believe that space launches is the only option for them to display their missile prowess.

North Korea has developed a significant amount of nuclear and missile arsenal. ‘Possibly, it has deployed over 600 short-range Scud variants that can strike South Korea, and as many as 320 medium-range Nodong missiles that can strike Japan. Long-range missiles with the potential to hit the continental United States are still under development. It probably, has somewhere between 6 and 12 nuclear weapons, or at least explosive devices’.[167] Over the years, North Korea has used missile technology for the purposes of economic gains too. It has sold this technology to few states and has also cooperated with Iran to develop long-range missiles and SLVs.

It has been reported that North Korea had supplied an estimated 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran and Syria in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is also known to have exported a smaller quantity of Scuds or Scud components such as engines to Egypt, Syria, Yemen and possibly Libya. What is important from the perspective of this chapter is the sale of Nodong missiles or components to Iran and Pakistan [8].

On Aug 31, 1998, North Korea tested Taepodong space launch vehicle flying a ballistic missile trajectory (rocket meant for intercontinental ranges). It was claimed that Kwangmyngsng-1 satellite was launched by using this launcher. However, experts were of the opinion that the satellite had failed to achieve the orbit and out of three stages of the SLV only two worked. The partial success of this launch was enough to demonstrate the technical capabilities of North Korea in both space rocket and missile arena. For North Korean state, their missile programme became a national priority at par with the nuclear programme during the late 1970s. Their programme has witnessed a speedy growth particularly during the initial decade. The country initiated a multifaceted ballistic missile programme in 1975 [9]. Taepodong-1 is expected to have a range in excess of 2,000 km. North Korea has achieve partial success in respect of Taepodong-2. This missile was first tested in July 2006, and it has been reported that the missile failed in mid-flight, 35-40 s after launch.[168] However, during the second test (April 2009), the missile is reported to have travelled about 3,200 km before landing in the Pacific Ocean east of Japan. This test was declared as an SLV test by the North Korean authorities.[169] The purpose behind this could have been to tell the world (mainly the USA, Japan and South Korea) that it was not a provocative act but an attempt to launch satellites. There is no authentic information about the exact range of this missile. Theoretically, such missiles could have a range of around 10,000 km [10, pp. 179-80]. However, North Korea is yet to prove the capability of reaching such distances.

Since July 8, 1994, till very recently, Kim Jong-II was heading North Korea. He had selectively used missile issues as a bargaining strategy with international community. In the beginning of the twenty-first century (July 2000), he had offered to give up the missile programme in exchange for satellite launch services. It is understood that the symbolic importance of missiles and space launch vehicles would dissuade North Korea from abandoning its programme unconditionally. It was argued that the international community could provide data, satellite launch services or opportunities to participate in other peaceful space programmes as an alternative to the North Korea’s current missile programme.[170] However, such ideas were not taken to any logical conclusions probably because of geopolitical compulsions. Almost for a decade, the concept of limiting the North Korea’s missile programme by providing them assistance in space arena has faded away.

Interestingly, missiles have not been on the agenda in the famous six-party talks mechanism[171] to engage North Korea. In 1999, ‘North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s pledge to lift certain economic sanctions. The deal was later abandoned during the Bush Administration. In 2006, the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 barred North Korea from conducting missile-related activities. North Korea flouted this resolution with its April 2009 test of the long-range Taepodong II’ [11]. It is more or less confirmed that North Korea’s missiles could reach Japan and the surrounding US military bases. Also, the targets on the west coast of the continental USA are likely to be in the range of North Korean missiles in near future. It appears that primarily to work around the UN restrictions, North Korea is keen to undertake satellite launching.

The US administration is of the opinion that their strategy with North Korea of strategic patience has failed. This was elucidated by the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates during his Jan 2011 Asia visit (including South Korea). However, diplomacy being the best answer, it is important for the USA to take the path of negotiations to its logical conclusion. There is a need to engage North Korea and emphasise to them that states like Vietnam and Sri Lanka are in the process to develop their indigenous and peaceful space programmes and are being helped by other powers in their endeavour, and similar policy could be adopted with them also [12]. In order to resolve the North Korean impasse, one element for negotiations could be to make a satellite counteroffer (space diplomacy). Such action could help preventing a genuine nuclear threat in the future [13]. North Korea could be engaged by offering help in space arena with launch facilities and other related assistance. Russia could offer such assistance and prevail on them to give up their long-range missile programme. China has shown keenness to help North Korea to structure their economy. Knowing the strength of the Chinese space programme and the nature of influence it commands over North Korea, it could be prudent for them to engage them on space front too.

North Korea’s space ambitions conceal military aims, and same could be said about Iran too. More importantly, there exists an umbilical relationship between these two states in missile arena. North Korea has been the big brother to Iran in missile field. It has helped Iran with missiles and missile know-how and also with the supply of related hardware. Knowing the nature of relationship and commonality in the technologies, it is obvious that some interaction in space field too must have happened. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons, but Iran is (probably) sometime away from making nuclear weapons. However, it is important to note that particularly in the satellite arena, Iran has overtaken North Korea.

Albeit the country is in denial mode, still Iran’s nuclear ambitions are well – known. Particularly, the US and Israeli intelligence sources are continuously claiming that the various actions by Iran in their so-called quest for producing nuclear energy are actually leading them towards making a nuclear bomb. To carry forward this hidden agenda to a logical conclusion, it has become important for Iran to make investments in the missile field too. This Iran’s quest for missiles also indirectly supports the assessment in regard to their nuclear agenda.

Iran is in possession of missiles which could reach Israel, Turkey, the Arab Gulf States and parts of southern Russia and south-eastern Europe. In November 2008, Iran tested a solid-fuelled Sajjil missile. This system is capable of delivering a 750­kg nuclear payload over 2,500 km distance. Within a span of 1 year, two more successful Sajjil tests were carried out. During Feb 2009, Iran successfully launched a communications satellite, Omid, into orbit by using a long-range missile (Saflr rocket[172] [173]). Iran has proved its expertise in developing liquid-filled missiles such as the Shahab-3 and the Ghadr-1.11 Overall, Iran has succeeded in establishing the industrial infrastructure and technological foundations in missile and space field [14]. Iran’s ballistic missile Ghadr-110 which has better manoeuvrability is said to have a range of 2,000 km [10, p. 178] (few reports in indicate it to be 2,500­3,000 km). On Jun 15, 2011, Iran has launched a satellite named Rassad-1 by using Safir rocket. Safir-B1 rocket can carry a satellite weighing 50 kg into an elliptical orbit of 300-450 km.[174] Iran’s SLVs would be justifiably seen as an indication of potential to develop ICBMs. On the other hand, Iran would not actually need to develop an ICBM. By launching a satellite which could pass above US territory would help them to remind Washington that Iran has come of age and now has a truly global reach [15].

Iran’s efforts in this field indicate that it has successfully established an SLV programme which complements its missile development. For many years, Iran’s MTCR Category I ballistic missile programmes[175] helped it to establish a technology base which must have assessed its development of an SLV programme Safir. Currently, the Safir system is restricted to very small payloads into the orbit but has demonstrated several technical capabilities applicable to longer-range ballistic missile systems, including staging, clustering small engines and using gimballed engines[176] for control of the Saflr’s second stage. It is important to note that various technologies, required to undertake such launches, have been ‘managed’ by Iran by involving multiple layers of intermediaries and frontend companies (deceive export control officials). Probably, they are using the automotive industry as a procurement cover for the missile programmes. Another Asian country, Malaysia is feared to be serving as a procurement hub for missile-related goods and technology. ‘Companies in Malaysia repeatedly have attempted to procure a variety of aerospace-qualified electronics from the US and other MTCR Partner countries on behalf of military- and missile-related end-users in Iran’.[177]

Iran could be said to have become a prime target for MTCR regime. In 2003, restriction was put on its members in regard to the export of items supposed to be used for missile proliferation programmes, such as those at the Iranian facility producing Shahab-3 missiles. China not being a signatory to the MTCR had continued with its business with Iran. However, this became the ground for rejecting the Chinese application of joining MTRC in 2004. On its part, Iran also has obstructed every multilateral arrangement dealing with missile issues. It is the only country to have voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions in 2005 and 2008, endorsing HCoC [14]. On the 23 Dec 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1737[178] (for failure to halt uranium enrichment), prohibiting the transit of missile technology to Iran.

Other nuclear states in the region like China, India, Pakistan and Israel have well – established missile programmes. Amongst this, Pakistan not being a spacefaring nation generally does not become a part of any space-nuclear linkages debate. Israel is known to have most advanced ballistic missile programme, but there is much secrecy surrounding it. It possesses a robust medium-range missile programme and a space launch vehicle that essentially gives it ICBM capability, if it chooses to pursue that option.[179] India is developing most advanced space launch vehicle, the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV), capable of putting a 5,500-lb satellite into geostationary orbit. The British Centre for Defence and International Security Studies estimates that if the GSLV were used as a ballistic missile it would be a major ICBM, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 14,000 km. The first flight of GSLV was successfully flight tested on April 18, 2001 [16]. However, India’s GSLV programme had received setback with two failures in 2010. India is yet to become self-sufficient in regard to the production of cryogenic rocket engine; hence, the exact future of GSLV is difficult to predict.