Space Power
The notion of space power is a universal. However, there is no single definition of space power. Many analysts have attempted to typify, describe and predict the character, connotation and functioning of space power. The term space power is found in writing as early as 1964, but there was no clear attempt to define it. Probably, one of the early attempts to define it was done as late as 1988. Lt Col David Lupton, in his book titled On Space Warfare, A Space Power Doctrine, published by Air University (U. S.) Press, presented the formal definition. Lupton has argued the requirement to derive the definition on the pattern of definitions of land, sea and air power offered by Mahan, Mitchell, Arnold and others. These definitions basically underscore three characteristics: (1) elements of national power, (2) purposes that are military and non-military, and (3) systems that are military and civilian. By contextualising these features, Lupton offered this definition: ‘Space power is the ability of a nation to exploit the space environment in pursuit of national goals and purposes and includes the entire astronautical capabilities of the nation.’ Alternatively, Space Power could also be viewed as an ability to exploit the civil, commercial and national security [8]
space systems (it includes space element, a terrestrial element and a link element) and associated infrastructure in support of national security strategy [16].
Another comprehensive description puts across space power as “the combination of technology, demographic, economic, industrial, military, national will, and other factors that contribute to the coercive and persuasive ability of a country to politically influence the actions of other states and other kinds of players or to otherwise achieve national goals through space activity” [17]. Since space power is viewed in context of national security strategy, it brings the dimension of security dilemma to the fore. The security dilemma spins around the paradox that the measures taken by a state to make it more secure will normally leads to making itself less secure. This is because the actions taken by the state leads to making their adversaries feel more insecure and hence attempts to measures to gain matching capabilities. The Asian region could be viewed as the place which presents the most widespread and exceptional security dilemma in the world. South Asia, Korean Peninsula, Taiwan tangle, Indo-China, Japan-China and Iran-Israel are all the cases of mutual misunderstandings where the concern for security dominates the geopolitical discourse presenting a picture of a region trapped in a security dilemma.
Alliteratively, a major criticism of the security dilemma concept emerges from the question of the validity of the offence-defence balance. Since weapons of offence and that of defence are the same, how can the distinction between the two be connected with a state’s intentions [18]? This is truer in case of space technologies which are inherently dual use in nature. However, particularity in the Asian context very less cooperative space activity is being witnessed. The real challenge in Asia would be whether the powers within the region can overcome the insecurity that drives the security dilemma.
The notion of space power becomes important particularly when space is being viewed as a medium to achieve strategic superiority. Philosophy of air power is found being extended to the idea of space power by some analysts. This has mainly directed the formulation of the concept of ‘high ground of space’. This notion was put into words way back in 1957 by General Thomas White. He had argued that
‘___ in the future it is likely that those who have the capability to control space
will likewise control the earth’s surface’ [19]. It has also been argued that ‘he who can secure control of space, deny an adversary access to space, and defeat weapons moving into or through space may cause an adversary to capitulate before forces act against each other on the earth’ [20].
The often quoted theory from the realm of International Relations, the theory of Balance of Power (BoP) could be used to appreciate the perspective of space security and space race. This is the most basic concept behind international politics and provides a structure for explaining some of the critical principles behind international relations [21]. BoP could be said to exit when there is parity amongst the competing forces. Successful space programmes of some of the Asian states contribute substantially to raise their stature as a dominant political power in Asia. States possessing such capabilities could use them for undertaking healthy interaction in this field and forging a stronger relationship. This could have a positive effect on the BoP.
For various Asian states, the key focus of investment in space arena has been for the purposes of using space applications for the betterment of the society. Asia is also a late starter in making investments into space field. The geopolitics of the region and the military capabilities of Asian states indicate that the development and influences of Asian space capabilities would have a more socioeconomic bias. The security challenges in the region could be viewed as more complex than rest of the world. But, at the same time, none of the Asian states are at the pinnacle of their space accomplishments; hence, it is unlikely that they would be preparing to achieve all out ‘space superiority’ from the warfare perspective. Hence, the notion of space power in Asian ‘wisdom’ appears to be more of a broad concept which includes projection of achievements in space technologies from a holistic sense inclusive of strategic dimension.