Category Why Mars

What the SSB and scientists generally wanted to do cost a great deal of money, and Griffin was increasingly annoyed with scientific criticism and calls for NASA to do more when it had a flat budget. He had reconstituted the top-level NASA Advisory Council to reflect his and Bush’s priority, the Moon-Mars mission. He had appointed Harrison Schmitt, former Apollo astronaut and New Mexico senator, as NAC chairman. Schmitt was not happy with the role some leading scientists played on the council. He wanted them to advise Griffin how to carry out existing priorities. They disagreed with the priorities. He complained they were not being useful. Griffin backed Schmitt, and on August 21 he sent a mes­sage to the NAC that revealed his frustration not only with the scientists on NAC but with his scientist-critics generally.

“The scientific community. . . expects to have far too large a role in pre­scribing what work NASA should do,” Griffin charged. He noted that the com­munity spoke of effectiveness in NASA policy. “By ‘effectiveness,’ ” said Griffin, “what the scientific community really means is ‘the extent to which we are able to get NASA to do what we want to do.’ ” He said that if NAC members wanted to have NASA take a different course than it was taking, “the most appropriate recourse” was “to resign.”

The chair of NAC’s scientific subcommittee, Charles Kennel, a former NASA Earth Science Division leader, currently director of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, did resign. Griffin then personally requested that two other members, Wesley Huntress and Eugene Levy, the provost of Rice University, step down. Huntress countered, “This is a different NAC. Our advice was sim­ply not required nor desired.” The current council, he added, “has no under­standing or patience for the science community process.”52

While Griffin battled over policy with scientists in Washington, including Fisk and Huntress, former associate administrators of NASA’s Science Direc­torate, NASA’s operations on Mars continued to go extremely well and provide remarkable discoveries. In early October, Opportunity began complicated ma­neuvers 242 million miles from Earth at the massive Victoria Crater. This was potentially the most spectacular and significant target of the entire $800 million twin-rover mission. “We are frankly feeling a little overwhelmed by what we see so far,” said Squyres.53

Later in the month, the first results from MRO yielded new evidence of diverse watery habitats capable of supporting life eons ago. MRO also found evidence of recent climate changes only hundreds of years apart.54 As November began, MRO’s predecessor, MGS, reported technical problems. Launched in 1996, it had been the longest-lived Mars mission in history, and one of the most productive. On November 21, Michael Meyer of NASA’s SMD said at a press briefing at JPL, “We may have lost a dear old friend and teacher.” He declared that MGS had “surpassed all expectations.”55 Its most important findings had come in its waning days of operation and were not announced publicly until NASA had carefully confirmed them in December.

A comparison of photos taken several years apart by MGS found that two gullies, at least, had apparently experienced flash floods between the photo shoots. “Water seems to have flowed on the surface of today’s Mars, said Meyer at a December 6 news conference. “The big question is how does it happen, and does it point to a habitat for life?”56 “This is the sort of thing you dream about, what everybody’s been waiting for,” said planetary scientist Jennifer Hellmann of NASA’s Ames Research Center. The discovery lent support to the existence of liquid water so near the surface, at least in places, that it could spurt out on rare occasions.57 MGS also found evidence of recent high-velocity impacts from meteorites. This finding was critical in that it pointed up hazards for human exploration. Either way, MGS could not have ended its life on a more significant note.

While planning for a joint flagship mission, NASA also had to implement its existing flagship, MSL. MSL’s centerpiece was the rover, and the rover now had a name, Curiosity. NASA’s hope was that that name, chosen on the basis of a national competition, would become as familiar as Spirit and Opportunity.

In late March, NASA reluctantly decided that the special 3-D camera being built for MSL would not be ready in time for the November-December MSL launch window. This camera was being developed by Malin Space Science Sys­tems of San Diego. Malin, a longtime Mars enthusiast and contractor, had been joined by James Cameron, whose space science fiction film Avatar had been a blockbuster success. Cameron was himself an advocate of Mars exploration and was serving NASA as a public engagement coinvestigator with Malin on MSL.40

The camera had been descoped in the Stern period and been reestablished subsequently by Weiler. NASA Administrator Bolden had himself provided ad­ditional resources from his own reserve fund to try to speed the development of the camera. For Bolden, Mars was an agency priority, and Mars exploration was one of two science missions to which he gave significant personal attention (the other was the James Webb Space Telescope, a project whose cost overrun was a major headache for the Administrator).41 But NASA could not make up the lost time from the 2007 descope.42 This camera (which some called the “Cameron” Camera) provided exceptional imaging capability that would bring the public along as a rider on MSL. There were other cameras on MSL which would help in this respect, just not as dramatically as the Cameron Camera. But the dead­line for launch was getting closer, and time precluded waiting for the camera to be fully ready. The total MSL package had to come together.43

Bilateral Talks Continue

Throughout April, the joint working group between NASA and ESA labored to find ways to merge the two programs. Southwood retired, as scheduled, and passed his ESA science leadership torch to Alvaro Gimenez in May. Gimenez regarded the joint effort as a “hot potato,” but he agreed with Southwood’s analysis of the situation NASA and ESA faced: “As for Mars, the fact is that neither of us can realize the ambitious goals of Mars exploration on our own. We are, I think, linked in this.”44

NASA was telling ESA in May it would contribute $1.2 billion to the revised 2018 mission, plus an estimated $300 million in launch costs—or $1.5 billion. This was $700 million below what it had projected when Weiler and Southwood had begun discussions and assumed two separate spacecraft. In considering the 2016 and 2018 missions as one ExoMars program, ESA had authorized 1 billion euros (U. S. $1.4 billion). The top official of ESA, Jean-Jacques Dordain, was personally steering the merger through key ESA governing boards.

In selling the revised (but still formative) program to the boards (and na­tions), Dordain promised to hold to the approved 1 billion euro ceiling and protect the 2018 mission from cost overruns by the 2016 mission. He had ESA take the unusual step of waiving almost all of its usual management fees—a $50 million saving—as a show of commitment to the project and holding the line on costs. Dordain’s big problem was that he had to get at least a tentative agree­ment to the concept of a NASA-ESA merged program from his ESA masters to restart payment to contractors on ExoMars 2016. Because of 2016 launch windows, he felt that work had to recommence July i.45

Dordain wanted a formal assurance from his counterpart, Bolden, that NASA would provide promised funds for the 2018 mission. This assurance would help him persuade his superiors to provide authorization for the July i, 2016, mission restart. International collaboration, wonderful in theory, was cumbersome in practice. But on May 26-27, Dordain got from ESA’s policy body, the Human Spaceflight and Operations Directorate, agreement to the general outlines of the NASA-ESA program. He would now go to the Industrial Policy Commit­tee for financial approval in June. One body provided policy legitimacy, the other money. He needed both affirmations.46 The verbal promise of U. S. re­sources helped leverage decisions with ESA to some extent. He awaited a letter from Bolden which he could show the Industrial Policy Committee to close the arrangement.

Mars is a program in a science directorate in an agency. Not elevated orga­nizationally, it has a high visibility to the political world. That visibility has helped make it a focus of agency attention and controversy over the years. The history of robotic Mars exploration has seen a sequence of overlapping eras. The eras overlap because NASA is usually trying to sell a new program as it is implementing an older one. The history has seen recurring issues. One has been conflict between the priority given Mars and that for other planets. Another has been the tension between those who would explore Mars incrementally and comprehensively and those who favor faster leaps forward and specifically target the search for life. A third is the debate between Mars and space activities other than planetary exploration, such as telescopes or human spaceflight. A fourth is the conflict between NASA and external forces that want to contain space costs generally—sometimes for non-space priorities—and press NASA to cut back expenditures, including those for Mars.

These and other issues have played out in the various eras. They illuminate the politics of Mars. The first era involved the pioneering flights of Mariner— the flybys of the 1960s and orbiters of the early 1970s. Mariner took place when the emphasis at NASA was on the Moon. Second came the aborted program Voy­ager, and then Viking, America’s initial landings on Mars, in 1976. Viking was an extraordinary success in many ways, but critics saw it as a failure because it did not achieve its avowed goal to find life. There was dispute over the findings, but the scientific consensus was negative as to life, and this perceived failure helped halt momentum in the program. Calls for a mobile Viking (Viking 3) follow-up went nowhere, as did those for Mars Sample Return.

The third era was an interregnum, in which advocates of other missions made their claims and Mars proponents struggled to get a hearing. As Mars dimmed on NASA’s agenda, the agency’s planetary program in general also suffered fi­nancially. A relatively few adherents kept the flame of Mars burning, but not brightly. Eventually, Mars Observer launched and approached Mars 17 years after Viking. Although Mars Observer failed as it encountered the Red Planet in 1993, it gave rise to a fourth era of Mars exploration. The new era, called Mars Surveyor Program, featured a sequence of two missions that were relatively small and simple and that were launched every 26 months when Mars and Earth were in an optimal alignment. NASA’s strategy of “faster, better, cheaper” fit the political times of post-Cold War America. A premature attempt to accelerate

MSR and failure of two Mars probes in succession brought this era to an abrupt close.

The fifth era of Mars exploration was the “follow-the-water” Mars Explora­tion Program. It was more incremental, comprehensive, and realistic about pace and cost and began in 2001 with the Odyssey orbiter.

Those who wished for greater leaps rather than incremental steps made the most ambitious mission of this series, MSL, even more sophisticated than its original planners had recommended. It was the mission that transitioned from following the water to looking for organic carbon compounds and other in­dicators of life potential. The boldest and most expensive Mars mission since Viking, in many ways MSL was the Viking 3 that never happened in the late 1970s—except that MSL was far more capable than Viking 3 could have been. MSL’s cost soared to $2.5 billion as it was deferred to 2011 from its 2007 and then 2009 schedule. It built on everything NASA had learned scientifically and technically up to this point.1

What NASA would do after MSL and the smaller project sent in 2013, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution Mission, was unclear at the time of writing. What had initially emerged for the sixth era had been a bilateral pro­gram with Europe. NASA and the European Space Agency had designed a joint program that would begin in 2016 and 2018 and take advantage of succeeding opportunities to build toward an MSR after 2020. Under severe cost-contain­ment pressure from OMB, the United States withdrew from a major role in the 2016 and 2018 missions as originally planned. To help maintain Mars momen­tum in the wake of the MSL Curiosity landing, NASA instituted a smaller U. S. mission, InSight, for 2016. It also said it would contribute to the European mis­sions via certain instruments. Most significantly, NASA got approval for a $1.5 billion rover in 2020 that would build on MSL’s Curiosity. The MSR sequence of missions might or might not be initiated with this later mission. In 2012, NASA Administrator Bolden pledged that NASA would continue Mars exploration and better integrate robotic and human spaceflight requirements in a proposed new programmatic era, which he called Mars Next Decade.2

But the initiation and contours of Mars Next Decade were uncertain. There is hope that missions after MSL Curiosity and MAVEN would lead to a coher­ent program aimed at MSR. In any event, a sixth era presumably will begin in 2016 and build to bolder ventures. That there has been a rocky start to this post – MSL era is not surprising. History shows that Mars exploration has had a long and tortuous journey, consuming decades, with ebbs and flows in momentum. A

program of programs, it has not been a steady evolution. It has been marked by punctuation points and key decisions between programs, and sometimes within programs and specific projects.

Mars exploration represents not only a set of missions and hardware but an agreed-upon scientific and political strategy. However, that strategy is a re­sult of conflict and consensus building among interest groups, governmental and nongovernmental. A program constitutes an equilibrium of interests.3 The equilibrium exemplifies agreements among specialists in a space policy subsys­tem—bureaucrats, legislators, scientists, others—about a particular course of action. There is relative stability. Events, key individuals, and disagreements within the subsystem, or pressures from larger forces from outside, can disrupt the subsystem and bring about policy change. The task of Mars advocates gen­erally and NASA leaders particularly has been to make the case for Mars. It has been to build and then rebuild consensus within the space sector and relate it to national and international policy as circumstances have necessitated. Situations internal or external to NASA require decision makers to adapt. Change is to be expected. Managing it is an art more than a science.

What and who have been the moving forces behind NASA’s journey from Mariner to MSL and beyond? What and who have stood in the way of the Mars proponents? How has their clash of interest influenced the course of Mars exploration? What decisions by NASA have favored one side or the other in the politics of Mars? Where is the program headed?

At 1:25 a. m. (EDT) on August 6, 2012, NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), encased in a larger spacecraft and protected by a heat shield, hit the atmosphere of Mars. After a journey of eight months and 352 million miles, MSL embarked on what NASA called “seven minutes of terror.” In this brief span of time, MSL would need to decrease its speed from 13,000 miles per hour to almost zero—or it would crash. Failure was unthinkable for a $2.5 billion mission at a time when NASA was under budgetary siege. The Mars atmosphere immediately caused the spacecraft to slow, but seven miles above the Mars surface the spacecraft was still flying at 900 miles per hour. At this point, the spacecraft unfurled a giant, 51-foot parachute.

As the spacecraft’s rate of descent gradually diminished, MSL disconnected from the spacecraft that had been carrying it to this point. The spacecraft flew off, and retro-rockets blasted from MSL, causing it to come to a virtual hover two stories above the Mars surface. At one ton in weight, containing delicate instruments, the car-sized machine was too heavy to complete its landing with retro-rockets or airbags. Instead, for the first time, a newly invented device attached to MSL, called the sky crane, deployed, and cables carefully lowered the machine to the ground. Finally, with cables disconnected, the sky crane rocketed away from what NASA had now safely placed on the surface—the nuclear-powered MSL rover called Curiosity. All this happened automatically

154 million miles from Earth. The landing occurred at 1:32 a. m. (EDT). It took another 14 minutes for radio signals to go from Mars to Earth and reach the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California. Allen Chen, flight dynamics engineer at JPL, received the information. He announced excitedly, “Touchdown confirmed. We’re safe on Mars!”1

Never before had a technology this complex gone to Mars. MSL, with its Curiosity rover, climaxed a multiyear program geared to “following the water.” Its goal was to discover whether Mars was now or previously capable of being inhabited. MSL Curiosity would not actually find life. It aimed at locating the chemical “building blocks” of life. A later flight, or series of flights, would return a sample of Mars soil and rock to Earth’s laboratories for analysis. Such a mis­sion of far greater expense lay well in the future. But this particular mission was critical to Mars exploration—a milestone in a long-term quest that had begun over a half century earlier, building on what had gone before, enabling what might come ahead.

Getting to this point was a remarkable accomplishment, not only in science and technology, but in public policy and program implementation. Not only did NASA have to surmount severe technological barriers, but it also had to meet daunting political challenges along the way. In some ways, the political problems were greater than those that were technical. Large technical achieve­ment, especially when dealing with government and costing billions over many years, does not happen automatically. It takes a strong push of political advocacy from inside and outside NASA to make Mars a funding priority, establish a program, and carry it out successfully. Who does what to forward Mars explora­tion? How? The answers are critical to the history of NASA and the Red Planet.

The intent of this book is to illuminate the role of key individuals and institu­tions that have constituted a moving force for policy action in Mars exploration. Its thesis is that an informal and changing coalition of advocates inside and out­side NASA has sought to make NASA the institutional embodiment and lever for their quest to the Red Planet. The influence and limits of this coalition, as well as their scientific and political strategies, have shaped the course and pace of the Mars exploration program.

The study contends that over the long haul, the advocacy coalition has pro­pelled Mars exploration forward. This has been particularly the case as it has turned individual missions into an integrated and sequential whole, beginning in the early 1990s. It has built political support for this program and sustained it in the face of changing times and opposition. The actors most critical to coali­

tion leadership and influence affecting the Mars exploration program have been senior officials of NASA. Decisions and strategies in Washington, D. C., have powered (or frustrated) exploration on Mars.

The focus of this book is not the history of science, or advance of technology, or cultural aspects of Mars. Such subjects come up, but not as foreground. This book seeks to reveal and analyze the politics and policy behind Mars exploration.

In 1965, even as NASA and its Mars constituency celebrated the success of Mari­ner 4, they thought ahead to what would come next. “Next” meant not only next in the line of Mariner projects, but the beginning of a new program called Voyager. Not to be confused with an interplanetary Voyager, launched in the late 1970s, this Voyager—a Mars lander with an automated biological laboratory payload—was conceived in the early 1960s at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory with the encouragement and involvement of the exobiology community. It was seen as the natural successor to Mariner, which featured flybys and orbiters. From the beginning, advocates knew that it was unusually challenging, but the challenge attracted top engineers at JPL. Also, the exobiologists who wanted to look for life knew they would have to develop experiments and unprecedented life-detecting equipment. NASA leaders zealously aimed to surpass the Soviet Union in the space race, and that race encompassed robotic Mars missions. For NASA, the program was also precursor to human Mars flight. Hence, in the 1960s there was relative unity within NASA and among various interests—planetary scientists, exobiologists, engineers, and administrators—about the rationale and direction of robotic Mars exploration. All three drivers for the Red Planet operated: life on, life to, and international competition.

But NASA Administrator Webb belatedly added another reason for Mars Voyager—keeping the Saturn 5 rocket alive. This use of the giant Moon rocket

raised the potential cost of Voyager tremendously, ultimately making it politi­cally unacceptable. When Congress killed Voyager, NASA substituted Viking. NASA made Viking’s purpose clear: to search for life. With its budget declin­ing, NASA felt that it had to recapture public support. It decided to put most of its planetary program energy and money behind Viking. Tom Paine, Webb’s successor, raised the stakes by augmenting the complexity and costs of Viking. While planning and selling Viking, NASA landed on the Moon. Surely, if NASA could succeed with Apollo, it could succeed with Viking! Technological opti­mism reigned. The political consensus in the space sector and between space policy and national policy which had operated in the Apollo/Mariner era gave way to discord over Mars Voyager. What happened to the robotic program de­pended in large part on what happened to NASA. Eventually, the president and Congress settled the question of NASA’s future via the shuttle decision. Mean­while, a new consensus and equilibrium among NASA, scientists, the White House, and Congress were forged around Viking.

On June 19, 1976, Viking і swung into Mars orbit. “After eight years, we’re finally in orbit,” a relieved James Martin exclaimed.46 This was an achievement in and of itself. But NASA knew that this was but the first step. Soon, Viking was transmitting photos of Mars’s surface, including the region where NASA planned a landing for Viking і. Various NASA officials and others gathered at Mission Control, Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Gentry Lee, JPL mission planning director, recalled how grown scientists and engineers behaved like 10-year-olds as pictures of Mars from the orbiter came in. They whooped and yelled and ran to the screen where images appeared with cries of “wow.”47

While the images were fascinating and spectacular, they also produced anxi­ety. Sagan, a member of the landing site team, remarked that Viking could see the larger-scale features, and many were menacing. But what about smaller – scale features the orbiter could not see? If Viking landed the wrong way on a boulder the size of a trash can, it might be wrecked.48 Looking at images of the previously selected landing site, Harold Mazursky, on loan to NASA from the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS), felt that the risk was acceptable.

Martin, however, was not so sure. He conferred with superiors at NASA Headquarters up to Fletcher. NASA had scheduled the first landing for July 4, aligned with the national celebration of the country’s 200th birthday. Presi­dent Gerald Ford was “enthralled” and eager to make the landing part of the celebration. Fletcher and other top managers told Martin not to worry about the scheduled July 4 landing date. If he believed the site in question was too dangerous, they said, he should delay the landing and look for a place that was safer. On June 28, Martin informed a vast media assemblage that had gathered for the historic event that the chosen site “had too many unknowns, and could be hazardous.”49 Fletcher, meanwhile, informed the president that the July 4 rendezvous was out. Martin “would have thrown his badge on the table if we’d taken the risk of landing on July 4,” Hinners recalled.50

The vital importance of Viking to NASA kept Fletcher intimately involved. On July і, Fletcher announced from JPL’s Mission Control Center that NASA had found an alternative 150 miles northwest of the original place. “Mars is a lot different planet than we thought it would be,” he stated. “By a combination of intuition, wise judgment, and a little bit of luck, we found a site close by that exceeded all expectations.”51 But just a few days later NASA examined radar signals of the new site from Earth, and they indicated that the orbital images could be wrong as to the smoothness of the terrain. Again, Martin and his team decided they had better keep looking, and senior NASA officials once more went along with the judgment.

This time the reconnaissance was even more thorough, using orbiter pho­tos, radar, and expert analysis. The problem was that as NASA looked farther from the original site, it moved more distant from potentially fruitful places of scientific interest. The search for life was the prime announced purpose of the mission, and that purpose was in danger of being jeopardized. The Viking team had to find a place that was both reasonably safe and scientifically interesting, which was becoming extremely hard to do.

The meetings of scientists took place every day for long hours, amidst grow­ing frustration about getting consensus on a place to land. There was no time for personal lives. Viking dominated all schedules. Gentry Lee worried that the landing date would coincide with the birth of his first child. Tim Mutch, a Brown University geologist in charge of the lander’s camera system, tested the system again and again, so often that he became mesmerized by his routines and, at one point, confused testing with reality. He went home one evening to tell his wife how well the photos had gone only to be reminded that the actual work lay ahead.52 Everyone was on edge and getting cranky. Minds wandered and speculations roamed amidst the nervousness and loss of sleep. Mazursky imag­ined great floods taking place on Mars carving giant canyons. His USGS col­league, Mike Carr, countered that the surface features were more likely caused by slow-moving streams that took eons to carve the cleavages. Observers called Mazursky “the great inundator” and Carr “the long, slow trickler.”53

No one was more frustrated or tense than Martin. “We always had it in the back of our own minds that Mars would not cooperate, and it hasn’t,” he complained.54 One day he exploded over a trivial matter, signaling to everyone the exasperation they all felt about the exigency to make a decision soon about where to land.55 Finally, at midnight, July 14, the landing-site team reached agreement on a particular site. It was 200 miles to the northwest of the original target in the plains of Chryse, where water was believed to have flowed.56 An­nouncing the decision the next morning, Martin said Viking 1 would land July 20, a date that marked the anniversary of the first Moon landing of Apollo.

Although preoccupied with immediate issues, Fletcher and Fisk were aware that the Soviet Union was presenting an opportunity to direct policymakers’ atten­tion to Mars and space exploration generally. Whereas the Planetary Society stressed cooperation, NASA used the competition card.

NASA looked beyond Mars Observer to propose what it and its scientific advisors wanted—a rover and Mars Sample Return mission. Once the Soviets went to Phobos, they would likely launch such a mission to the Red Planet. NASA argued that the United States should compete. In late March, Briggs and the directors of JPL and Johnson Space Center (JSC) proposed the “Mars Rover and Sample Return” mission at a meeting with 200 representatives from industry in Houston, Texas. “This is a mission that has to happen,” said Briggs. “NASA is not exactly at the zenith of its activities at the moment,” he pointed out. “Nor is the planetary program.” “We either do it now or after the Soviets do it,” he continued. “NASA has got to get moving again.”

It was made clear that this particular mission had strong support from the scientific community and NASA in general. Aaron Cohen, the JSC director, declared, “If we want to be able to carry out tasks [involving astronauts] on the Moon or Mars, we must have a firm base in science. Lew Allen [the JPL Direc­tor] and I agree that by working together, we can learn much from this mission.” NASA gave a similar briefing to contractors a few days later in Pasadena, home ofJPL. JPL would be lead center in the project, with JSC assisting. Briggs again emphasized the competitiveness driver. He said that the Soviets were en­gaged in a similar mission and “that it is my responsibility to make sure the United States is in a position to do a mission with the same kind of complexity in the same time frame. So that really is the trigger on the timing.”23

NASA—and Mars advocates generally—seemed to be searching for any ratio­nale that would sell to get the agency moving again, after Challenger. Whether it was cooperation or competition did not matter, as long as the strategy was effective. The problem was not in the packaging. It was whether policymakers were in a buying mood for the product.

In August 1987, Ride’s report was published. Cooperation and competition gave way to “leadership.” Entitled Leadership and America’s Future in Space, Ride listed four possible long-range initiatives that would restore the United States to a position of leadership in space. Without stating priority among the four, Ride listed them as (1) Mission to Planet Earth—Earth satellites to monitor the global environment; (2) Exploration of the Solar System—essentially the robotic program recommended in 1983 by SSEC, as augmented in 1986, to include more ambitious endeavors; (3) Building an Outpost on the Moon; and (4) Humans to Mars. This last initiative overlapped with the second, as robotic flights to Mars were essential precursors. Ride wrote, “Robotic exploration of the planet would be the first phase [of humans to Mars] and would include the return of samples of Martian rock and soil.”

The problem, as Ride pointed out, was that while many space enthusiasts wanted to go beyond the shuttle and space station to bolder ventures, exist­ing programs would continue to dominate agency spending for the foreseeable future. Given realities, she noted, many observers believed that NASA could

not handle another major program.24 These ambitions and financial realities had to be reconciled somehow, she argued, for NASA needed strategic goals and direction.25

Fletcher responded to the Ride study in two ways. First, he established an Office of Exploration to provide a focus for sustained thinking and advocacy for exploration in general, with emphasis on human spaceflight. With Ride leaving NASA for an academic appointment, he placed John Aron, a veteran NASA official, in charge of the new office as an assistant administrator. In addition, on August io, he met with Vice President George H. W. Bush to brief him on NASA’s plans after Challenger recovery. In this meeting, he pointed out that the Soviet Union was surpassing the United States in certain technologies and program ambition. He said that the Soviets had an advantage in both robotic and human exploration of Mars. He advised that the United States needed to choose a long-term, post-space station goal to give the agency strategic focus, and that human spaceflight to Mars was the logical one.26

Fletcher also wanted to discuss NASA’s future with the president but was blocked in getting to Reagan. The word was that Reagan’s lieutenants felt that Fletcher should get space station spending under control before trying to per­suade the president to launch a Mars venture.27

In November-December 1987 the Planetary Society published and circu­lated what it called the Mars Declaration. Former NASA Administrators, Apollo – era officials, astronauts, Nobel laureates, actors, authors, politicians (including former president Jimmy Carter), university presidents, professors, activists, mu­sicians, and many other notables signed on. The Declaration echoed Sagan’s view that the two countries should go together to Mars, first robotically, and then with humans. The Declaration also noted that a Mars destination would give the space station greater purpose, as a step toward the Red Planet.28

When Reagan and Gorbachev met in a summit in December 1987, the two leaders discussed many common issues, and space collaboration was one area where partnership was deemed possible. Gorbachev spoke officially with Rea­gan and unofficially with others. He met with one group of Americans which included Sagan and Paul Newman, the actor, a member of the Planetary Soci­ety’s advisory board. Gorbachev specifically mentioned to this group his desire that the United States and the Soviet Union collaborate on Mars exploration.29

While conversations took place in Washington, D. C., NASA scientists and engineers were in Moscow conferring with Soviet counterparts about how to collaborate in view of the Soviet Union’s stated desire that Phobos initiate a sequence of missions to Mars. The Americans had Mars Observer approved, as well as ambitions for more missions. Beyond Phobos, to go up in 1988, the So­viets planned a mission in the mid-1990s (after the U. S. Mars Observer) which would go to Mars (rather than Phobos) and release balloons to study Mars’s at­mosphere. NASA entered into talks the Soviet Union initiated with the French as potential collaborators on this mission. If Mars Observer carried an antenna, it could receive data from Soviet balloons and transmit information back to Earth. The robotic programs of the two nations could thereby get collaboration on Mars started in a serious way.30

The Reagan budget came out in February 1988. NASA got a raise, but most of the new money went to the space station, which was suffering overruns, and a new space shuttle to replace Challenger. Money for Mars robotic flight re­mained tight.31 Reagan had considered a “Kennedy-style declaration” calling for a dramatic space venture, such as a Moon base or trip to Mars, but rejected such an initiative. Instead, the White House issued in February a national space policy that called for the United States “to expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.”32 While these larger policy activities relating to NASA’s future went on, NASA implemented the one Mars project it had.

OMB, leading presidential budget-balancing policy, had had NASA going down drastically in ensuing years, and that included draconian cuts for space science. Both Gore and House Speaker Newt Gingrich went on record after the Mars rock discovery, saying NASA would get more money for Mars explora­tion. There was political agreement on that. But from where would the money come? House Republicans argued for taking the money from Gore’s favorite program—space-based global environmental observation—which they believed provided ammunition for Gore in the global warming debate.43

Goldin did not wish to rob the budget of other important missions to fund Mars. He pressed OMB to keep the overall NASA budget stable, at least, and not have it decrease in following years. On November 19, he wrote T. J. Glau- thier, OMB associate director, pleading for budget stability in the out-years. He followed this up the same day with a letter to Glauthier’s superior, the OMB di­rector Franklin Raines, declaring that NASA was “at a crossroads… level fund­ing is critical.”44 Huntress complained publicly that NASA’s “productivity has been going up, but our budget has been going down.” Gibbons acknowledged that NASA’s financial situation was a “dilemma [that] is coming to a head.”45

The Russian connection had helped “stabilize” NASA’s space station budget in 1993, and the Mars Together initiative might have been an additional help with regard to the robotic Mars program if it proved viable. But Russia had monstrous financial problems and continued its string of robotic failures. On November 16, Russia launched “Mars ’96,” but it went awry soon after launch and crashed into the Pacific.

Russia’s more recent failure reminded NASA and its Mars constituency how difficult implementing big plans for the Red Planet could be. “You always have to stay humble in this business,” said Tony Spear, project manager for the Path­finder lander/rover mission.46 On December 4, Pathfinder soared into space successfully, on a trajectory that would take it to Mars ahead of MGS. Huntress exclaimed, “Pathfinder will establish the technological basis for missions of the future. Each mission will learn from its predecessors to pry loose the secrets of Mars.”47

In early December, Sagan paid what would be his last of a number of visits to Goldin. His hair gone and appearance gaunt, he showed the ravages of a bone marrow disease that would soon take his life. The two men spoke for hours, during which Sagan “laid out a series of visions about the future of space exploration.” “He was talking with intensity,” Goldin recalled. “A man on his deathbed. This is the Carl Sagan I love, a man so full of hope and optimism that he never gave up.”48

On December 12, Gore held his much-anticipated meeting to discuss the implications of the Mars meteorite. This was presumably preparatory to the policy summit Mikulski had demanded and Clinton had promised. The Gore meeting was about ideas and philosophy, not programs and budgets. Scientists, philosophers, theologians, NASA, and administration officials attended. Not present, and sorely missed, was Sagan. The scientist most identified with the quest for life was himself now so gravely ill that he could not come. He would die on December 20.49

The Gore meeting extended almost three hours, more like an academic seminar than a government hearing. Most present were impressed with Gore’s knowledge of the subject. Although he “brushed off’ one participant’s sugges­tion of an Apollo-style approach, he clearly was eager to do more on Mars and Origins.

He said it was important to seize the moment, because the combination of Mars and extraterrestrial life fired the human imagination. He said he person­ally believed in the “ubiquity of life.” At the end of the meeting, OMB’s Glau – thier—the same OMB official to whom Goldin had recently pled for funding— declared he would try to find ways to insulate space science from cuts. He would not have said that if it was not clear that Gore and Clinton were supportive of such a statement. Finally, after the meeting, Gore declared his desire for a “robust space science program.”50

An unidentified “administration official” told Science magazine that prior to the Mars meteorite, space science had few advocates in the White House. “Clearly,” this official said, “space scientists have more leverage now than they have ever had.”51

In January 1997, Clinton began his second term as president. He retained Goldin, now regarded as a valuable member of his administration, the poster boy for federal reinvention. Clinton gave his State of the Union Address on February 4 and—in a rare presidential nod—specifically mentioned his support for space and the Mars program. He declared, “We must continue to explore the heavens—pressing on with the Mars probes and the International Space Station.”52 Then, on February 6, Clinton rolled out his budget proposal for the upcoming fiscal year.

As expected, the budget was a reprieve for NASA. Overall, the budget re­fleeted Clinton’s desire to make progress to achieve a balanced budget during his time in office. But it also showed a conscious effort to support research and development as key to the nation’s future. NASA was helped by this govern­ment-wide decision. That did not mean a budget increase. It meant averting a huge cut. Within NASA, the budget also showed a particular desire to favor space science.53

The mark for NASA was $13.7 billion. This was $280 million down from its current budget. But this was far better than what NASA was going to get if OMB’s earlier recommendation had had its way. At the White House’s direction, the new Origins theme became the focus of NASA’s budget submission, and OMB worked with NASA to add $1 billion over the agency’s five-year projec­tion for this initiative.54 Goldin knew he had dodged a bullet, and he expressed delight to the media. “Holy Mackerel,” he said, “this is a great program.”55 Space science got a 4% raise, bringing it to $2 billion. Ed Weiler, put in charge of the new Origins activity and destined to succeed as associate administrator for science when Huntress retired from NASA in 1998, declared, “I’m exceptionally happy. All the boats are going to rise.”56 This would especially be true of Mars exploration.

Senator Mikulski was particularly elated. When she saw the budget, she wrote Vice President Gore, declaring, “A space summit is no longer necessary.” She had been the prime mover for such a summit, but she had achieved as much as she could have expected without one, thanks in large part to the Mars rock and the vice president’s support. “How do you spell relief?” she asked. The answer she spelled out: “G-O-R-E.”57

Exhilarated, Goldin pushed officials in NASA space science and human spaceflight directorates to work closely together, and—while there was fric­tion over who would pay for what—there was serious effort expended by both sides.58 Goldin believed that if all went well with the robotic and the space station programs, he or a successor could propose to the president the “next logical step,” which Goldin regarded as human spaceflight to Mars. Goldin had come to Washington to set NASA on a trajectory to Mars. Like many advo­cates, especially Friedman, who had easy access to the NASA Administrator, Goldin believed that this was the place where the human and robotic programs converged. He shared Zubrin’s view that humans to Mars required extracting resources while on Mars. But the “living off the land” philosophy required bet­ter knowledge of what resources existed that could be converted to human use.

Accordingly, NASA could equip robotic Mars probes with instruments to scout such resources, as well as detect radiation and other hazards to astronauts in the Mars environment. For Goldin, robotic Mars missions combined scientific and precursory rationales, and he made that clear to the agency.

But the fanfare that ordinarily would have greeted the formal announcement of the president’s proposed budget February 3 was missing. Just two days before, disaster struck the agency and nation: Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated as it prepared to land, killing seven astronauts aboard and scattering debris across a number of states. The shock numbed all of NASA.

What would be the impact of Columbia on NASA’s robotic MEP? O’Keefe had been appointed Administrator chiefly to deal with the space station financial problem. All of a sudden, he was cast in the role of a disaster manager. This role dominated O’Keefe for the remainder of the year and influenced most of his decisions the following year. The shuttle and its future took center stage. More­over, the media gave saturation coverage to the Columbia investigation, carried out by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a body appointed by NASA but given maximum independence by O’Keefe.

In this time of crisis, Weiler and his SMD managed the Mars program with an extra burden. They knew how crucial to the agency it was that the twin rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, succeed. From the outset, the rovers had been more than a science priority—they had been a NASA priority. In the wake of Columbia they took on even more significance. They would symbolize NASA’s technical credibility. As the CAIB investigation extended over a seven-month period (February to August), it uncovered evidence of not only technical but also organizational flaws. These added to the blemishes on NASA’s record stem­ming from the 1999 robotic Mars failures. The media highlighted these multiple indicators of management weakness. All those connected with the upcoming Mars flights worked harder than ever to make them show that NASA was still a “can do” agency. JPL in particular became increasingly focused on the MER. Never before had Naderi seen JPL come together behind a project so inten­sively as it did on the Spirit and Opportunity rovers.22

Those involved at JPL and in the Mars science community worked incred­ibly hard. Squyres, the principal scientist, recalled his own experience: “I taught [at Cornell] on Monday and Wednesday. Then, Wednesday night I flew to the West Coast. I worked at JPL Thursday and Friday. Friday night, I stayed at a Los Angeles International Airport motel. I flew back East in time for dinner with my family on Saturday evening.. ..I lived on West Coast time when in the East. I went to bed at 2am, got up at ioam….I usually arrived in Pasadena at iipm.” Squyres kept to this routine over and over again as necessary, for six years spanning before and after the rovers launched.23

Success for the Mars rovers depended greatly on where they landed. As Wei – ler put it, NASA had to balance “science value with engineering safety.”24 NASA looked at 155 potential places to land, involving ioo Mars scientists in the deci­sion process. On April ii, NASA announced its choices. It selected two sites. The first rover, scheduled for launch in late May, would be sent to Gusev Crater, 15 degrees south of Mars’s equator. The second, to go up in late June, would go to the Meridiani Planum. Gusev was a giant crater that appeared to have once held a lake. Meridiani was a broad outcropping with deposits of an iron oxide mineral, usually associated with water, 2 degrees south of the equator, halfway around Mars from Gusev.

NASA and the Mars community grew increasingly tense as the date for the first rover launch approached. Their preparations were accompanied by the din of media attention not only to their work but, even more loudly, to the CAIB investigation. Ironically, Scott Hubbard, architect of the new Mars program, was on the CAIB panel and playing a leading role in determining what had gone wrong. He knew that everything he had done to put the Mars program in shape could go down the drain if both Spirit and Opportunity failed. One of these missions had to work. He declared, “I will be holding my breath with everybody else.”25

On June ii, Spirit, the first of the two rovers, rocketed into the sky. It became clear shortly afterward that all had gone well. The next month, Opportunity went aloft, again successfully. Each would take seven months to reach its des­tination. Figueroa was elated and told the media so. Weiler tried to explain where this particular set of launches fit into the program. “We’re not searching for water this time,” he pointed out. “We know there’s water on Mars; we know there was water on Mars” in the distant past. “What this mission does is try to understand how long water preserved at any one point. That’s the key question for life.” Where water has been around for thousands, even millions of years, “life seems to spring up,” he said. Then, he contained his enthusiasm with a note of caution. He pointed out that there was no guarantee of success. “Mars is a death planet,” Weiler lamented. “It’s a graveyard for many, many space­craft. Despite all these efforts [to eliminate risks], the rovers remain high-risk missions.”26

The macropolitical context of Mars exploration changed significantly at this time, making it even more difficult than before for Griffin and the scientific community to reach an accommodation. The Democrats recaptured control of Congress in the November elections. With Bush in the White House, relations in policymaking grew toxic. Fights between Congress and the president in No­vember and December made it almost impossible to get budget bills through. This was bad news for NASA, space science, and robotic Mars exploration. The lobbying campaign by the Planetary Society and others had paid off in getting congressional bills that added money to science at NASA. Moreover, friendly senators had gotten the Senate to pass a $1 billion supplement to NASA, above its regular program appropriation, for shuttle recovery and Katrina-related re­pairs. Such legislation—if it had become law—would have been a great help to the agency in restoring some of the cuts to science, including Mars exploration.

But legislation of this kind was not to be. The best Congress could do was to pass a continuing resolution to keep most agencies, including NASA, funded at their current year’s rate. This meant no raise at all, at least until after the Demo­crats had taken charge of the new Congress in January 2007. If the continuing resolution held the entire next fiscal year, NASA would have to cut deeper into its programs. Mars research could be further damaged.58

The year 2007 opened with NASA getting decidedly mixed signals from its political masters. In February, the new Congress, led by the Democrats, ex­tended the continuing resolution that funded NASA and various other federal agencies at the 2006 level through the end of the fiscal year, September 30. In doing so, Congress gave some agencies small increases at the expense of other agencies that received modest cuts in order to maintain the overall figure. NASA was one of the agencies cut. However, the president’s FY 2008 budget, also announced in February, gave NASA a raise, to $17.3 billion. That was a 3.1% increase over the president’s 2007 request, which Congress did not grant thanks to the continuing resolution. So NASA had to do the best it could, Mars science included. The president’s science advisor, John Marburger, suggested that space scientists curb their appetites and turn off missions before launching new ones.59

Griffin focused all the more acutely on his own priorities under the circum­stances. Everything narrowed down to his view of the core mission, and pro­grams were weighed in terms of their value to that mission. For Griffin this meant concentrating on the first phase of Constellation, Orion-Ares I, which promised a shuttle successor and technology development relevant to Orion – Ares V, the heavy-lift Moon rocket that would come later. Mars research gave way to lunar research. The Mars budget was far from what it had been projected to be when O’Keefe left the NASA Administrator’s post. But Mars was treated better than many other planets or science projects. Astrobiology was especially hard-hit, not just by budget reduction, but also by Griffin’s words. “If they [as – trobiologists] want to work for government money,” he declared, “they must look at what the government wants—not what they think it should want.”60

Implementation of the existing MEP continued. The next mission in line for launch in the Mars program—Phoenix (2007)—was experiencing an over­run. NASA considered killing Phoenix, the first Scout mission, but wanted to stay with its launch-at-every-26-months strategy. NASA decided to meet the additional costs. McCuistion indicated that the Mars program had very little flexibility and that “the overrun on Phoenix was going to have some effect on us,” which meant that NASA would have to take money from elsewhere in the Mars budget to pay for Phoenix.61

In 2007 MSL also revealed overrun issues. Solving the overrun problem for MSL was going to be much more difficult than for Phoenix given MSL’s size, the criticality of the mission, and the scale of the potential overrun. Dealing with MSL would not be Cleave’s problem, however, as she had retired in De­cember 2006. Colleen Hartman served in her place on an acting basis. Griffin in February announced that S. Alan Stern would succeed Hartman in April, as associate administrator for science. Stern was executive director of the South­west Research Institute in Boulder, Colorado. He was a well-known, respected planetary researcher and the principal investigator of the Pluto mission.62