Turning Adversity into Opportunity

As it became obvious in succeeding weeks that Mars Observer was hopelessly lost, Goldin established a panel to determine what had gone wrong. Eventually, the panel held that the immediate culprit behind the demise of Observer was most likely a “massive rupture in its propulsion system.”26 More broadly, NASA was seen to have erred in thinking that the technology it used successfully in Earth orbiting would be easily adapted to Mars. The differences in require­ments were much greater than anticipated.27 Meanwhile, Goldin established another panel to chart where NASA would go next in Mars exploration. He put Charles Elachi, assistant director of JPL, in charge. He also appointed Sagan to this panel.28

Goldin turned to Sagan, as one true believer turned to another, for advice and encouragement. Sagan felt as did Goldin and Huntress—that NASA should go to Mars at every opportunity, meaning every 26 months. He also pressed Goldin to revive the search for life on Mars and elsewhere in the universe. Within NASA, Goldin consulted especially with Huntress. Right after the fail­ure, they huddled over how to deal with the media and then how to persevere in their goals. “Goldin didn’t beat me down,” Huntress remembered. “His ques­tion was: ‘What are we going to do? We need to fix this program. We can’t go back on our commitment to Mars.’ ”29

There was no thought by Goldin to abandoning Mars, as had happened after Viking. Goldin told his agency and the Mars community not to be depressed. The accident could be an opportunity, he said. Goldin stressed to the media and virtually everyone else that NASA would go back to Mars, and do so as soon as possible, but in the “right” way, meaning FBC. Here was the chance to show­case what his approach could mean, and to do so on the most important and visible stage, namely, that of Mars.30 Not long after Observer’s failure, he went to Arizona State University. He addressed a group of scientists and graduate students who were depressed in feeling years of work had been obliterated in the Mars Observer demise. Don’t be glum, an upbeat Goldin told the gathering. He called the loss of Observer the best thing ever to happen to the Mars program. He proclaimed that it marked the dawn of a new era in Mars research.31

For NASA and the Mars community, the instruments on Mars Observer were seen as vital to building on Viking and setting the stage for what came next. As advisors went through various options, Goldin and Huntress settled on replacing the proposed MESUR network of landers with a new Mars Surveyor Program. In this program, instruments that had been grouped together on Mars Observer would be separated and flown on a series of FBC—that is, smaller— spacecraft.32 As it evolved, the planned Mars Surveyor Program “would send two low-cost spacecraft—an orbiter and a lander—to Mars every 26 months over the course of ten years.” Each mission would be capped at a cost of $175 million and be limited to three years in development. It “would address science objectives centered on understanding Mars’ climate, resources, and the search for water and life.” The agency hoped eventually to send a robotic envoy to the surface which would be capable of collecting samples of Martian terrain and returning them to Earth.33

Goldin and Huntress sold this “program line” to OMB. Discovery was a model and precedent. They stressed the importance of continuity in Mars ex­ploration. Also, Huntress commented, “We sold it to OMB on the grounds we could get more science done in a less costly way.”34 Rather than fretting over Mars Observer, NASA leaders used the accident to build momentum for a new Mars program that carried the FBC stamp.

In selling the Mars Surveyor Program, it was in their interest to emphasize the contrast with Mars Observer. A mission can be priced at different amounts, depending on what is included, ranging from a low cost for only development of the spacecraft to a high “lifetime” cost including launch and operations. As Fisk saw it, now sitting on the sidelines at the University of Michigan, Mars Observer was a $500 million mission. Including virtually everything, the cost went up to $980 million. “But it was called a $1 billion failure to help Goldin sell faster, better, cheaper,” emphasized Fisk. It was, he said, “one of those rare situ­ations when an agency uses failure and a cost-overrun to advantage, and makes the overrun seem worse than it was.” The $1 billion cost, repeated continually, stuck.35