A Rebalancing Act

Griffin got off to a rapid start, making a series of decisions, technical and orga­nizational, relating primarily to human spaceflight. He was determined to nar­row the four-year gap between the shuttle and its successor to one or two years and took close control of decision making regarding that front. He ordered relevant officials to plan in accord with the Moon-Mars priority, including the head of the Science Directorate. Although he said he would review O’Keefe’s Hubble servicing termination and ultimately reversed O’Keefe on this matter, he gave the science enterprise far less attention than he did human spaceflight. However, he did listen to what he had heard from critics of the O’Keefe-Diaz “strategic” approach.

As the Griffin-led review process of NASA programs proceeded in Washing­ton, NASA’s Spirit and Opportunity continued to perform remarkably well on Mars. They were already well beyond their 90-day prescribed lifetimes and still going strongly. They were traveling further and reaching higher than expected. They were viewing scenes never before observed and sending these images back to Earth for scientists to analyze and the general public to witness.

Spirit’s and Opportunity’s achievements were based on decisions made years before. There is a long latency between decisions and their execution in space policy. Thus, decisions made at NASA years before would influence what Grif­fin could or could not do in his tour. In May, in his characteristically direct and laconic way, he said that NASA “can’t afford to do everything on its plate.” Looking for efficiencies, he sent a document to Congress on May 11, describ­ing sweeping changes affecting most NASA programs. He told Congress that human space exploration would trump the science budget only “under the most extreme budget pressure.” At a Senate hearing the next day, he stated, “We have tried to be sensitive to the priorities of the affected research communities and have listened carefully to their input.” He said NASA had responded accord­ingly.5 The overall spending level for space and Earth science was unchanged. However, he said there would be shifts within the science envelope.

What the “shifts” to which Griffin alluded meant for Mars became clear in July. Figueroa had “filled out” the 10-year MEP with a 2009 telecommunica­tions satellite. NASA now killed plans for that satellite. McCuistion explained the decision as driven by a diminished need for a dedicated relay at Mars and enlarged funding requirements of astronomy, Earth science, and planets other than Mars. The “core” program that Hubbard and his team had designed in the era of Goldin remained. But the “augmented” program that came with Bush’s human exploration initiative under O’Keefe was deferred. The “safe on Mars” element that linked robotic with human spaceflight died. The funding wedge O’Keefe had instituted for the Mars program to reach $1 billion in 2010 was cut 50%. Diaz made the cuts under Griffin’s direction.6

Joseph Alexander, staff director of the NAS SSB, applauded the rebalancing decision. He pointed out that Mars exploration had long commanded a large share of NASA’s space science spending and said he was pleased to see Griffin’s restoration of balance to the science program. “In the grand scheme of things there were people who felt that the emphasis on Mars was starting to come at the expense of other areas,” Alexander noted.

The Planetary Society’s Friedman was not happy with the downplaying of Mars. He protested that “taking Mars out of the exploration program, as was done in the budget cuts, and pulling back on the infrastructure for the eventual Mars outpost, could create another dead-ended program with no destination and no public support.”7 What Griffin was doing was sacrificing the longer-term Mars requirements for more immediate needs of other science programs. Mars Sample Return, for example, was pushed farther into the indefinite future.

Even as decisions went against more distant Mars interests, Mars spaceflights already scheduled moved ahead. Due up in August was the Mars Reconnais­sance Orbiter. “It’s the most powerful suite of instruments ever sent to another planet,” said McCuistion. “The MRO spacecraft is many things,” commented Richard Zurek, the JPL primary scientist for the mission. “It’s a weather satel­lite, it’s a geological surveyor, and it’s a scout for future missions.” James Garvin, now NASA’s chief scientist at headquarters, called the August 12 launch “utterly stupendous.” However, while excited about MRO, Mars advocates could not help but express regret that MSR was “still only a dream.”8