Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

As mentioned in Chapter 34, an FAA-industry program called Continuous Lower Energy, Emis­sions, and Noise (CLEEN) is underway to reduce aircraft fuel burn by 33 percent and to reduce oxides of nitrogen by 60 percent, while reducing aircraft noise by 32 decibels, all from the cur­rent ICAO standard. CLEEN technologies include alternative fuels, noise reducing engine nozzles, adaptable wing trailing edges, optimized flight trajectories using onboard flight management sys­tems, and open rotor and geared turbofan engines. Target date for beginning implementation is 2015.

NextGen: Tomorrow at a Glance

2012: Issue final investment decision 2015: Initiate revised departure learances

2018: initiate en route capability

• 2012: Publish FAA response to Aviation Rulemaking Committee recommendations

• 2012: issue final investment decision

FIGURE 36-4 Elements of the NextGen program in the works.

Another joint program is in the process of developing the use of “drop-in” alternative jet fuels. While there are several definitions as to what constitutes a “drop-in” alternative jet fuel, one popular one says that it is any renewable fuel which can be blended with petroleum prod­ucts and utilized in the current infrastructure of pumps, pipelines, and other existing equip­ment. They are functionally identical to conven­tional jet fuel and do not differ in performance or operational capability. ASTM International has so far approved two drop-in alternative jet fuels.5

There is no single renewable jet fuel that will meet all of aviation’s needs because of the lack of predictable availability, which is a function of crop availability, climate factors, and related variables. The FAA, therefore, is working to secure ASTM approval for as many
alternative biofuels as possible through the CLEEN program.

The roots of IATA go back to 1919, the year that saw the world’s first scheduled air transport ser­vice, when six “air transport” companies formed the organization known as the International Air Traffic Association. Membership comprised solely European carriers until Pan American joined in 1939. The present organization was founded in Havana, Cuba, in 1945, and was originally composed of 57 airlines mostly operat­ing in Europe and North America. The purposes of the new organization were to promote safe and

economical international air transport, to provide a means for collaboration of airline companies, and to cooperate with the newly formed Inter­national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as the representative of member airlines. As liaison to ICAO, through its members IATA supplied technical input for the Standards and Recom­mended Practices (SARPs) found in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention. IATA contributed to documentation and procedures standardiza­tion that has allowed countries with differing languages and cultures to commercially interact with little difficulty. It also assisted in structuring a sound legal basis for international commercial transactions, meshing treaty law with existing air transport law of the United States. Ongoing work involves revision and modernization of the legal, basis of carriage of persons and cargo in interna­tional aviation, as liability provisions of the War­saw Convention have given way to subsequent amendments and superseding agreements.

After World War II, IATA began develop­ing tariffs containing fares and rates (Traffic Coordination) for international carriage of pas­sengers and cargo at meetings called Traffic Conferences, subject to the approval of the gov­ernments involved. A consistent schedule of rates and fares was also established, allowing airlines to accept each other’s tickets on multisector itin­eraries, which in turn led to interlining between the world’s airlines. It had been argued for years that IATA was, through its Traffic Coordination practices, engaged in price fixing that would normally be in violation of antitrust laws and in derogation of competition. Yet the United States, and other countries having similar laws, routinely granted antitrust exemptions for the activity. The truth was that international air transportation was among the least competitive industries in the world.

With the “father of deregulation,” Alfred Kahn, at the helm of the CAB when deregulation was enacted in 1978, the deregulators turned their attention to international aviation. In 1979, hearings were conducted by the CAB in the United States

to ascertain whether antitrust immunity should be removed from the Traffic Coordination activities of IATA. The world’s airlines lined up in uniform opposition. The hearings concentrated on the North Atlantic routes, which were served by 40 airlines. The Justice Department supported the CAB, but the Department of Transportation urged a “go slow” position. Nevertheless, on May 5, 1981, the CAB issued a “show cause” order that raised the issue of whether antitrust immunity should be removed from IATA Tariff Coordinating Conferences. No decision was reached by the CAB prior to its demise at the end of 1984 pursuant to the “sunset” provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act. The Department of Transportation, having inherited the antitrust responsibilities of the CAB beginning in 1985, terminated the proceeding that year.

IATA, taking its cue, then reorganized itself into two parts, a Trade Association and a volun­tary Traffic Conference, the latter dealing with the controversial issues of fare setting. In this way, IATA members sought to avoid further antitrust scrutiny of the United States antitrust regulators. No further proceedings have been ini­tiated by the United States on this issue. IATA is still an influential trade association.

The organization has also served since the early days as the clearinghouse for interline accounting, and today services the accounts for 240 airlines in over 115 countries. Multilateral Interline Traffic Agreements have been signed by most of the international carriers, which facili­tates the seamless flow of passengers and cargo throughout the world.

On November 15, 2000, agreement was reached between the United States and four of its avia­tion partners for a comprehensive liberalization of aviation services: the first multilateral Open Skies agreement. Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Sin­gapore, countries from diverse areas of the globe, agreed with the United States to unrestricted ser­vice by the airlines of each country to, from, and beyond the other’s territory, as well as unrestricted destinations (except cabotage), routes, number of flights, and prices charged. This multilateral accord was finalized in 2001 and it has been sub­sequently joined by Samoa, Tonga, and Mongolia.

Deregulation and the United Kingdom

In contrast to the apparent worldwide move toward liberalization, efforts to secure agree­ment with the U. K. failed, and the restrictions in the current bilateral agreement between the United States and Britain, known as Bermuda 2, are severe. Bermuda 2 was signed 30 years after the original agreement between these countries,6 and while the new agreement relaxed some of the requirements and restrictions of the original pact, air transportation between the two countries remained heavily constrained. This “anachro­nistic agreement,” as labeled by the Secretary of Transportation,7 still limited the number of cities in the two countries that can be served, the num­ber of airlines that can serve the market, the fares that can be charged, and the level of service that can be provided. Under Bermuda 2, for instance, only American Airlines and United Airlines were allowed to serve Heathrow airport.8

According to the DOT, the U. K. position is nothing other than protectionism of British Airways, which opposes entry into the world of free and fair competition. The effect of the British position has created a degree of British isolation in an increas­ingly progressive European aviation community.

The Skylab space station was launched on May 14, 1973 in the program designed for the conduct of scientific experiments in zero gravity, earth resources experiments, and solar observations in long-duration missions. Three separate crews were launched in Apollo-type command modules on May 25, July 28, and November 16, 1973. These crews remained, respectively, for mis­sion periods of 28 days, 59 days, and 84 days. The Skylab mission also proved that humans can remain for extended periods of time in space without adverse health or psychological conse­quences and that resupply of space vehicles is workable.

Skylab’s orbit deteriorated because there were no spacecraft, nor any program ready (the Space Shuttle had been delayed), to boost its orbit. On July 11, 1979, Skylab reentered the earth’s atmosphere and disintegrated over the Indian Ocean and across Western Australia.

Apollo-Soyuz Mission

This mission was the first international manned space flight and had as one of its main goals the proving of the reliability of rescue plans of international crews. The Apollo spacecraft used was essentially the same as that used in the lunar program and the Soviet Soyuz was the same that had been in use since 1967. The flight was conducted between July 15 and July 24, 1975, with launches in the United States and the Soviet Union, docking over a two-day period, and return of the spacecraft to their respective countries after separation.

The return of Apollo marked the beginning of a six-year hiatus in the American manned space flight program. In addition to the human space flight program, NASA also maintained a small aeronautics research program, a space sci­ence program (including deep space and inter­planetary exploration), and an earth observation program.

Ще first person account of the original survey flight from New York to Chicago on Septem­ber 5, 1918, made to determine the feasibility of carrying airmail between those two cities, by Max Miller, Aerial Mail Pilot No. 1. Miller died on September 1, 1920 when his mail plane caught fire in the air and crashed.

Blazing the air trail to Chicago would have been a “cinch” if I had started at 6 a. m. on Sep­tember 5th, as had been planned. This would have enabled me to start one hour ahead of the storm, and I could have reached Chicago by evening without trouble.

I left Belmont Field, Long Island, at 7:08 a. m., with a good wind in back of me, flew over the City of New York, the Hudson River and Hobo­ken, and headed west 284 degrees.

There was a bank of low clouds near the ground and another layer of clouds at a high alti­tude. I kept right between them and flew on my compass course. I could not see the ground, but ran for about two hours and at ten o’clock I came down through the lower strata of clouds and landed one mile from Danville, N. Y., about 155 miles from New York City. There I inquired to find out my bearings and found that I was not more than two miles out of my course. I did not kill the motor, but left it running, and after five minutes started up again and headed for Lock Haven.

I entered the fog which hung low over the ground and over the tops of the mountains, and I
figured that it would take me about three-quarters of an hour to make Lock Haven. I came down and saw the field through a notch in the mountains and made a good landing. My motor was missing, so I changed spark plugs which took me about an hour, filled up with oil and gas, got a couple of sandwiches, and left about 11:45 a. m.

I climbed up through the fog again and went on over the mountains. I sailed on my compass course for an hour, 283 degrees, and I figured I was about 100 miles further on. Then I came down to see where I was and get my bearings, and the first thing I knew I hit the top of a tree. That sure gave me a good scare. I hustled back up again into the fog, determined to get plenty of altitude and keep on going as long as my gas held out.

I went fifty miles, and then I found my radia­tor was leaking and I came down and I saw a town with a fair going on. There was such a mob of people that I did not land there, but went on about twenty miles to a town named Cambridge. I inquired where I was and was told “Jefferson.” On looking on my map I found a town called Jef­ferson lying to the north of my route, so on leav­ing I headed toward the south in order to cross the route again; but I found that it was Jefferson Country, PA, instead of the town of Jefferson, Ohio, and I went about 150 miles out of my way before reaching Cleveland, where I had to remain all night on account of darkness.

The next morning I got my radiator fixed and rested up after being buffeted about by the storm and rain, and got away at 1:35 p. m. for Bryan on the compass course of 275 degrees, a little south of due west about 140 miles. I had to stop sev­eral times to fill up my radiator with water. The weather was very much better, and I was able to make Bryan, where I was received by Postmas­ter Jordan and got away at 4:35 p. m. I skirted the southern shore of Lake Michigan and arrived over Grant Park at an altitude of 5,000 feet at 6:55 p. m.

I circled around and made a good landing and was received by Postmaster Wm. B. Carlile, Mr. Chas. Dickenson, President of the Aero Club of Illinois, Capt. В. B. Lipsner, Superinten­dent of Aerial Mail Service, Mr. Thos. Downey, Assistant Superintendent of Mails, Mr. James O’Conner, Director of the U. S. War Exposition, Mr. James Stevens, Secretary of the Aero Club of Illinois, and Mr. Augustus Post, Secretary of the Aero Club of America, who had come on from New York to witness the inauguration of the first aero mail service between New York and Chicago.

The weather on the return trip was much bet­ter. 1 started from Chicago on September 10, at 6:26 a. m. I carried about three thousand pieces of mail. The weather looked so good that I expected to make a record trip. There was some haze on the ground, but not nearly enough to prevent land­marks being distinct. Just as I was over Cleve­land, I found a broken connection in the radiator and I landed there to get it repaired.

This took some time, but I got away from there by 4:30 p. m., in time to make a pleasant flight to Lock Haven, one of the scheduled stops, before dark, a distance of 210 miles. I stayed at Lock Haven all night, leaving there at 7:20 a. m. As a path finding trip it was an immense success. We gathered a lot of information which will be very valuable in the future trips.

The radiator trouble was the only thing that prevented me from making the trip within the ten hours set. If I had had a spare aeroplane even, I could have done it. We will, of course, have spare machines for the permanent route, so it will not happen again.

he steam engine, first fitted to a wagon in 1804, evolved into a primitive railroad loco­motive to pull the first railroad carriages in 1830. (See Figure 3-1.) The first chartered railroad, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, operated from Baltimore to Ellicott’s Mills, a distance of just 13 miles. Short-haul railroads like this began springing up all over the East Coast of the United States about this time. The noisy, dirty, and gener­ally terrifying apparition of an early steam loco­motive, spitting steam and hot coal cinders in its wake and upon the few discomfited passen­gers who may have been loaded in the open cars behind it, rudely intruded on the sedate horse and buggy countryside. Yet few questioned its future. It was, after all, the most significant transportation advance in the history of the world, even at its maximum speed of 16 miles per hour, and even though it had the worrisome tendency of setting fire to the countryside through which it passed.

Like most inventions, the locomotive was gradually improved through the contributions of many people until it worked smoothly and readily achieved its designed purpose. This was advanced technology. The various small lines began meeting up, forming interchange points and exchanging the relatively small amount of freight traffic available. Passenger service was tentative, and the destinations sparse. These early
rail lines were constructed to meet local needs, and there was no overall plan for lines to serve the nation or any particular geographic region.

Railroads were considered, legally and prac­tically, to be monopolistic enterprises. The large capital investment required to begin operations virtually guaranteed little competition. Land had to be purchased, then the land had to be made level—requiring fills or bridges to connect over low places, valleys, and rivers, and causing cuts or tunnels to be dug to eliminate hills and mountains. Once that was done, the roadbed, consisting of ballast, ties, and finally the rails themselves, had to be laid. This process was required in one form or another for every linear foot of road. Even as the road was laid, and large sums of money spent, the question was unanswered: How should and would the government consider this new industry?

This was a time of forging new relation­ships all around, relationships that, once defined, would extend into the as-yet-unimagined air age of the future.

• What was the responsibility of a railroad to passengers and shippers?

• Was there any responsibility to communities served?

• Where was the higher allegiance—to stock­holders or to the public?

Prior to the construction of the great trans­continental road that linked the West Coast of the United States with the Midwest, government had generally refrained from intervening in the affairs of the infant railroad industry. There was no federal governmental interest in railroad regu­lation since, in the early 19th century, federal issues like the “public interest” or “interstate commerce” had yet to be framed. Local govern­ments treated the small railroads as any other business. When it would later come, federal gov­ernment intervention would be characterized as either “positive” or “negative.” Positive interven­tion could be described as government action that is designed to support or benefit the railroad, such as favorable tax treatment, subsidies, land grants, and the like. Negative intervention takes the form of restrictive legislation, the curbing of pre-existing rights enjoyed by the railroads, and the forcing of certain behavior deemed to be in the public interest, such as prohibiting arbitrary or unequal treatment of shippers.

The sheer magnitude of the proposed trans­continental railroad construction dictated that the government’s participation would be required.

No corporation, group of corporations, bank, or group of banks was big enough to make it hap­pen. Only the government was big enough, and only the government had the money and other resources necessary (including the land), and the sovereignty necessary to assuage the conflicts, partisanship, separate interests, and legal ques­tions guaranteed to arise in the vast undertaking.

The western land over which most of the transcontinental railroad would run was com­posed of acquisitions by the government beginning in 1803. Known as the “Louisiana Pur­chase” (see Figure 3-2), this vast tract consisted of over 800,000 square miles that extended from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border and from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Moun­tains. The land area of the United States was doubled. Fifteen new states, in whole or in part, would come from this tract.

In three years between 1845 and 1848, the land area of the United States would be enlarged again by a third, as the State of Texas was annexed in 1845, the Oregon Territory was negotiated with England in 1846, and the great southwestern territory was ceded by Mexico to

the United States in 1848. The United States now extended all the way across the continent, from sea to shining sea.

The passage by the Congress in 1862 of the Pacific Railroad Act became the first of govern­ment’s involvements in the world of modern transportation. The law provided for the creation of two private corporations, the Union Pacific (building from the East) and the Central Pacific (building from the West), whose charters were to build a railroad and a telegraph line’ between the Missouri River and Sacramento, California. The government would issue its bonds, bearing interest at the rate of 6 percent, to the railroads

RI1790 CT 1788 NJ 1787 MD 1788 DE 1787

for sale to the public. The improvements and the land on which they were placed would stand as security for the government’s obligation to pay the interest on the bonds and to pay the face amount of the bonds when due. The government was not subsidizing the construction; rather, it was loaning its credit in order to raise the con­struction funds.

The government would, however, grant to the railroads the right of way (200 feet on each side) for the roadbed, and it would also deed land adjacent to the right of way in square miles amounting to 6,400 acres per mile. This was land expected to be used to entice settlers from the East who would create and work farms and ranches. The land would be used to build towns and to provide for industry, all of which in turn would provide passenger and freight traffic for the railroads and insure westward expansion and

population of the Great Plains and points west. This was truly a win-win situation, even for the government, since the value of the remainder of the land that the government owned would be greatly enhanced by the efforts of the railroad companies and those who would follow them. The interests of the government would also be served by facilitating a viable railroad system to serve the nation and to advance the national economy and the public welfare.

The line began in the East on the Missouri River, at Omaha, Nebraska, and made its way west to Promontory Summit, Utah, where in 1869, the line of road that began in Sacramento, California, was joined. Along the way it laid down settlements which were to become the cities of the future, with names like Cheyenne, Laramie, North Platte, and Elko, names which 50 years later would also figure prominently in the annals of early flight as the first cross­country air mail service struggled to create yet another, but altogether different, fledgling trans­portation system. This transcontinental railroad is shown in Figure 3-3. With air transport, the government, once again, would take the lead and then step out of the way, leaving the captains of industry to their own devices in making the system run.

But turmoil lay ahead. It has been said that the years between 1860 and 1868 laid the foundation for the uprooting of the society of America. The Civil War, beginning in 1861, tore the country apart for four years, and the so-called Reconstruction era that followed effec­tively rendered the South a land occupied by a foreign power for many years. Centuries-old traditions in both the North and the South were eradicated or radically altered. Politics and social life changed.

The impact of available and relatively fast railroad transportation on the stability of the population compounded the problem. People began to move and to follow the railroads as they connected sections of the country and both coasts, and as the heartland was settled. People could more readily live and work anywhere in the country, leaving behind their pasts, their established social networks, and sometimes their principles and mores. Political power was for sale in the legislatures of the states and in Con­gress as graft and corruption became prevalent.

The new opportunities afforded to corpo­rations led to a time of unbridled capitalism at the hands of rapacious men of industry like the Vanderbilts, the Goulds, and the Carnegies. The power of corporations, like the Pullman Com­pany, Standard Oil, and United States Steel, joined with the new political structure to create a vast gulf between owners, known as the “rob­ber barons,” and workers. Labor was set against management in an epic struggle that would poi­son labor relations in the railroad industry for generations to come and that would be carried over to the airlines. The government’s initial assistance, as positive legislation, would soon turn to regulation of the restrictive kind with the passage of the first comprehensive national legis­lation regulating transportation.

Not content to leave the issue to be exclusively determined by the lawyers, at the invitation of the Smithsonian Institution in 1914, Curtiss entered into a contract with the Smithsonian to rebuild and fly the Langley Aerodrome for the consideration of $2,000. The Smithsonian was seeking to rehabilitate the reputation of Lang­ley by demonstrating that the Aerodrome was, indeed, flyable and that the problem with the December 8, 1903 flight attempt was the defec­tive launch mechanism, not the airplane. Curtiss was only too happy to accommodate the Smith­sonian, since he too wanted to prove that the Aerodrome could have flown before the Wrights’ machine.

The disassembled Aerodrome arrived in Hammondsport at the Curtiss facilities in crates loaded into a railroad boxcar. On arrival, it was clear that modifications would have to be made to the Langley machine. The 1903 Manly engine had been in storage for 10 years and would develop only two-thirds of its original power. The carburetor had to be changed. Curtiss pro­vided it with magneto ignition instead of the original dry cell batteries. The airplane had no wheels, no skids, and no floats. Curtiss added pontoons to the Aerodrome, which required addi­tional support and bracing. The floats added about 340 pounds of weight and added drag. The central stiffening keel was removed. The origi­nal propellers were used but one wing had to be rebuilt, as well as replacing several broken ribs in other wings. The wings had to be recovered with cloth and varnished. The Aerodrome did not have ailerons or wing warping; control was limited to the dihedral of the wings, the vertical tail rudder, and the shifting of the pilot’s weight in order to maintain lateral balance. No changes were made to the system of balance. Curtiss stated that not a single change had been made to the Aerodrome that could have improved its fly­ing qualities.

The reassembled machine was taken down to Lake Keuka where it was successfully made airborne for several short hops in the late spring of 1914. This proved to the satisfaction of Cur­tiss and the Smithsonian that the Aerodrome was, and always had been, flyable, and but for the defective launch mechanism on the Lang­ley barge, it would have been the first pow­ered, controlled flight in history. The Aerodrome was then fitted with a larger and more power­ful engine and, during September and October

1914, it was able to lift off the water for flights of up to 3,000 feet.

■ The Jenny

While aircraft development had been seriously stagnated in the United States by the Wright patent litigation, somehow Curtiss kept driv­ing forward. He visited the factory of Thomas Sopwith in England in 1913, and was impressed by the progress shown in the development of the tractor designs Sopwith was producing. The – Model J, a 90-horsepower tractor, was launched on May 10, 1914, followed by the Model N, also with a 90-horsepower tractor engine. These were supplied to the British and American armies and navies as trainer aircraft during 1914. In

1915, Curtiss produced the aircraft that was to be known as the “Jenny,” and which combined the best aspects of the “J” and “N” models.

World War I had begun in the summer of 1914, and the demand for aircraft and engines spiraled upward. Although the Jenny was too slow, too underpowered, and lacked the perfor­mance capabilities required of fighter aircraft in World War I, it fit well as a trainer both in England and the United States. Rapid improve­ments in design and increased horsepower in the Jenny made it the trainer of choice for the war. The Jenny first used the Curtiss OX 90-horse­power engines, but later in the war the 150-horse­power Hispano-Suiza engine, built by the Wright Company, was installed.

Thousands of Jennys were produced dur­ing the war, and afterward were used by both the Post Office in the airmail service (before being replaced by the De Havilland DH-4) and by the Army for training. The private sector was flooded with Jennys, which made for bargain prices for barn-stormers, banner-towers, and flight schools and made the Jenny a household word in an era when hardly anyone flew. A newly designed Jenny was placed on the market in 1920 as the “Oriole,” and flew in the competitive market for almost twenty years.

Before 1930, the airplane industry was a very scrambled lot. The main aircraft manufacturers were Curtiss, Martin, Consolidated, Douglas, Boeing, and Vought. These comprised the list of military contractors, but these companies were also being drawn into the commercial field due to the sudden expansion of participants in the fledgling air transport business. The main engine producers were Pratt & Whitney and Wright Aeronautical, the latter of which merged with Curtiss Aeronautical to become Curtiss-Wright in 1929. The air transport companies, according to Fred Rentschler, numbered as many as one hundred.9 Most of these operators did not have CAM routes and flew one or two airplanes from any place to practically anywhere else hauling what passengers or cargo there was. These companies, operated mainly by aviation enthusiasts, had little realistic hope of ever developing a successful business. Yet they were eager to bid on any government-offered route or proposal, irrespective of their chances of operating success.

To qualify for government airmail contracts, bidders had to establish some reasonable degree of soundness in financial and operating responsibility, which by itself quickly had the effect of separating out the contestants. Among the relatively sound new business entities were Colonial Air Transport, Boeing Air Transport, Transcontinental Air Transport, Western Air Express, National Air Transport, and Pacific Air Transport. But under its competitive bidding requirements, the Post Office had made CAM awards to marginal companies who were operating at a loss and engaging in marginal operational practices, using obsolete, cheaper airplanes and engines. Clear cases of fraudulent billing practices to the government were commonplace.

The larger companies were better capitalized, could afford newer and more modern equipment, and generally observed better operating practices. These attributes translated into greater reliability and safer air transport. In the late 1920s the broad aircraft industry came under the control of a few large companies that combined the primary air industry sectors: airmail carriers, airplane manufacturers, and engine manufacturers. Three groups, in particular, formed the core of the vertical holding companies that were to figure prominently in the future of the airline industry. These groups were:

1. United Aircraft & Transport Corporation

2. North American Aviation (NAA)

3. Aviation Corporation of America (AVCO)

s the world approached the end of the third decade of the 20th century, the United States had overcome its disadvantaged position of being the last in the world of aviation to gradu­ally becoming the first. The advances made in engine development during the 1920s by Pratt & Whitney with the Wasp and Hornet radials and by Curtiss-Wright (formerly Wright Aeronautical) with the Cyclone radial established those compa­nies as the industry leaders. Airframe manufac­turers during the 1930s had also gone through a “monoplane revolution,” which had completely transformed the design and manufacture of com­mercial aircraft from the biplanes of earlier years.

The 1930s had proved to be a turbulent period, dominated by the economic “Great Depression.” The promise of airline development springing from government-subsidized airmail had been sacrificed on the altar of politics when the Roosevelt Administration took office, and the airlines were having an exceedingly hard time making ends meet under the rate cuts mandated by the Black-McKellar Airmail Act of 1934.

The state of the art in airplane design and manufacture had evolved in the United States during this time, and it was represented first by the Boeing 247 and then by the Douglas aircraft
(DC-1 and DC-2) that evolved into the DC-3 design. Yet, in 1938 there was not much market for airline transports. That year only 42 civilian aircraft were built of any type designed to carry five or more passengers.

The military forces were a little better off in airplane numbers, but many were obsolete, and several hundred of the Navy’s aircraft were biplanes. Japan had been building militarily both in its air arm and its navy since the 1920s. Begin­ning in the middle of the decade, Germany began designing and then producing superior military air­craft. America was in a lethargic phase, separated from Asia and Europe by two great oceans and not vulnerable to air attack, but trouble was brewing.

About the time the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed, with war clouds on the horizon, Congress authorized funds for upgrading the Navy, but mostly for ships, not carrier planes. The Army received little funding, and none for bomber aircraft.

S War Beyond the Great Oceans

Japan was on the march in Asia in the late 1930s. It had militarily occupied Korea, Manchuria, and parts of China and appeared to have designs
on Southeast Asia and the Philippines for their rubber resources. In Europe, after concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, Hit­ler invaded Poland to start World War II in Sep­tember 1939. Japan, Germany, and Italy aligned to form the “Axis Powers.” Britain and France declared war on Germany. In 1940, Germany overran most of Europe north of the Alps, includ­ing France, the Low Countries, and Norway. The Soviet Union invaded Finland. Italy controlled Sicily, several other Mediterranean Islands and, along with Germany, several countries in North Africa. Italy attacked Greece, but had to be backed up by Germany in 1941, which also took Yugoslavia and then Albania. Germany invaded Russia in 1941 for oil resources in the Southern Russia and Caucasus region and for “Lebens – raum” in the Ukraine.

Great Britain stood alone as the last democ­racy against Fascist aggression in Europe. Many people believed an accommodation with Hitler was unavoidable, including some senior Brit­ish Ministers in government. Appeasement and avoidance of war characterized the policies of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. When the Chamber­lain government fell in May 1940, Sir Winston Churchill, whose mother was an American, became Prime Minister and he set an entirely dif­ferent tone.

Three days after taking office, with expecta­tions of an imminent German invasion of Eng­land, he expressed his resolve against Hitler in a speech to the House of Commons, saying “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat.” On June 4, 1940 he gave his famous “We shall fight them on the beaches” speech in the House of Commons, adding “we shall fight on the land­ing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.” As the aerial war over England progressed between the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe during the summer of 1940, which was a prelude to Hitler’s plan to invade the island nation (Operation Sea Lion), he gave his third stirring speech, a tribute to the RAF and its brave pilots, saying: “Never in the field of human con­flict was so much owed by so many to so few.”

In spite of all this, sentiment in the United States was mostly isolationist. After all, the peo­ples of Europe had been engaged in mutual com­bat from time immemorial, and the carnage of World War I was still fresh in the minds of most adult citizens. Neutrality Acts were passed by Congress to prevent the United States from “tak­ing sides” in the growing hostilities worldwide. These Acts prohibited American vessels from transporting passengers or articles to the bel­ligerents. There were even those who held up the recent industrial advances and full employ­ment of the German nation as something to be admired. Charles Lindbergh was a prominent and active isolationist, frequently taking the stump to caution against “foreign entanglements.” In the 1940 election, Roosevelt had promised Ameri­ca’s mothers that he “would not send American boys to fight in any foreign wars.”

Yet, England and the United States were historically closely bound together—by lan­guage, by culture, and by common law. A secret correspondence had begun in September 1939 between Roosevelt and Churchill, even though Chamberlain was then still Prime Minister, cen­tering on details of the coming war that had been precipitated by the German invasion of Poland only days earlier. There was a kind of kindred spirit between Roosevelt and Churchill—both had in their earlier years been identified with their countries’ navies, Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson Administra­tion and Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty before and during the First World War, a posi­tion he again held in the run up to World War II. This personal correspondence provided a “back door” channel between the two countries that served to allow the United States an inside look at the dire situation England would find itself in after the fall of France the next year. And it gave

Churchill a direct line to the United States to plead for help.

The Royal Navy was fighting for its life against German U-boats, which were sinking prodigious amounts of tonnage, and the new battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz were prowling the North Atlantic sea lanes. In the summer of 1940 the aerial “Battle of Britain” was a touch and go affair with daily bombing raids on Lon­don and other English cities and on Royal Air Force airbases. Although the Office of Home Defense had developed a primitive form of radar that enabled the RAF to anticipate the approach of Fuftwaffe planes, the resulting daily aerial dogfights were depleting the fighter capabil­ity of the RAF, and new aircraft production in England could not keep up with the losses being sustained. The same situation existed with naval transport vessels and warships. The HMS Hood, pride of the Royal Navy, was sunk in May 1941 by the Bismarck.

There was little doubt that Roosevelt believed that the future of Western Civilization depended on preserving the British nation and defeating Nazi and Japanese aggression. Roos­evelt’s public persona reflected the isolationist sentiment of the country, and he was legally bound by the law of the land, which required strict neutrality. But the 1937 Neutrality Act contained a loophole that allowed the president to authorize the sale of materiel to belligerents in Europe as long as they paid for the goods in cash and arranged for their transport, which provided a little daylight to the Roosevelt Administration to quietly begin to help England.

The FAA enhances the safe operation of aviation by controlling, through certification, who may legally function in civil aviation, and by certifica­tion of certain equipment used in domestic civil aviation. Certification by the FAA applies to eight major categories:

1. Airmen

2. Aircraft

3. Air Carriers

4. Air Navigation Facilities

5. Air Agencies

8. Airports

7. Designees (representatives of the

Administrator)

8, Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Airmen

Certification is required of pilots, flight engi­neers, navigators, air traffic controllers, aircraft dispatchers, mechanics, repairmen, and para­chute riggers. Certification of airmen includes procedures not only for the written and oral testing of applicants, but also the requirement of practical demonstrations of required levels of proficiency.

Minimum physical and mental health stan­dards are applied through periodic medical exam­inations of airmen. The FAA issues separate medical certificates to airmen through its net­work of Aviation Medical Examiners. The amor­phous standard that airmen possess “good moral character” has been consistently required of all certificate holders since passage of the Air Com­merce Act of 1926.

Aircraft

The FAA issues three types of certificates appli­cable to aircraft and their components—Type, Production, and Airworthiness. The aircraft com­ponents that must be certified include aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances. Every civil aircraft manufactured in the United States is sub­ject to this inspection and certification regimen beginning with the design of the aircraft. A Type Certificate is issued to the aircraft manufacturer after flight and static testing confirms that the design conforms to the standards adopted by the FAA and published in the FARs. The issu­ance of a Production Type Certificate follows on the manufacturer meeting all FAA standards designed to assure that all aircraft produced pur­suant to the Type Certificate will faithfully con­form to the approved design of the aircraft. This certificate is a sort of quality assurance require­ment based on the manufacturer’s production and inspection methods at its plant. The final require­ment imposed by the FAA is the Airworthiness Certificate, which is awarded to each and every aircraft that comes off the assembly line and is required before the aircraft can be delivered to a purchaser. This certificate is valid only for a period of twelve months.