Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Input from all stakeholders is necessary to design the NextGen system so that it will work for everyone and provide the most benefits.

The FAA is also working with selected air carriers to obtain ADS-B data for operational, training, and experience purposes, including JetBlue along the east coast and United Airlines over the Pacific Ocean. Tests, trials, and experi­ments are on-going at all times in various places in a joint effort between the FAA and stakehold­ers, particularly the airlines, to find better and new ways to utilize the new technology.

Commercial air carriers and the FAA have established an unprecedented system of sharing proprietary information (from the airlines) and internal data from the FAA under the acronym

ASIAS (Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing), from which 65 databases have been created from 43 commercial carriers, accounting for more than 95 percent of commercial opera­tions in the NAS. These databases are used to evaluate safety in emerging systems, and point to the cooperative and joint effort of government and private enterprise to enhance safety in the air transportation system.

Concepts are evaluated and tested for inte­gration at the William J. Hughes Technical Cen­ter in Atlantic City using simulators for aircraft cockpits, air traffic control tower interiors, airline operations centers, and unmanned aircraft system ground control centers. Test bed facilities, which is a term used to describe a platform for experi­mentation, have been established in Florida and

Improved Airport Surface Operations and Airspace Access in 2011

FIGURE 36-2 FAA-designated Metropiex areas.

North Texas, with the Department of Defense Research and Engineering Network being added in 2012. The training of the FAA workforce is also in process.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, member states of ICAO endorsed a global plan for strengthening aviation security, to include a review of legal instruments in aviation security to identify gaps and inadequacies in relation to emerging threats. It was concluded that the use of aircraft as weapons, suicide attacks, electronic and computer-based attacks, chemical, biological and radioactive attacks, were not adequately cov­ered by existing agreements.

It was also concluded that existing law focused mainly on persons who actually perpe­trated the attacks, usually on board the aircraft or at the airport, without considering the people who might be responsible for organizing, direct­ing, or financing the attack.

The Beijing Convention and the Beijing Pro­tocol may be considered together as two new coun­terterrorism treaties that promote and improve aviation security. These agreements criminalize the act of using civil aircraft as a weapon, and of using dangerous materials to attack aircraft or other targets on the ground. The unlawful transport of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons is a pun­ishable offense, as well as conspiracies to carry out such attacks. Making threats against civil aviation is also covered. The effect of these provisions is to require signatories to criminalize these acts.

After entry into force, the Beijing Con­vention of 2010 will prevail over the Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Protocol signed in Montreal in 1988.

As a part of the SES initiative, SESAR repre­sents the technological dimension of the plan, which will incorporate state-of-the-art innovative technology.

SESAR might be compared to the Next – Gen program in the United States and, like the Joint Planning and Development Office (JDPO), the planning segment of NextGen in the United States, it is a forward-looking program that involves all of the entities that operate within the air transport system. These include civil and mili­tary agencies of government, legislators, indus­try, operators, and users. These entities will be central to the defining, committing to, and imple­menting of a pan-European ATM system.

The SESAR program is separated into three sequential phases:

Definition Phase (2005-2008), now completed Development Phase (2008-2013), like Next­Gen, under development.

Deployment Phase (2014-2020), like Next­Gen, under development.

During the first phase, a European Master Plan was presented, bringing European ATM stakeholders together to produce and validate a common view of the future of European ATM. The updated second phase takes into account the global financial crises that began in 2008 after the Master Plan was published. It pro­poses to seek an impact statement to confirm that the Master Plan is affordable and can be done and to update the Plan in light of devel­opments. This is a work in progress, as is the remainder of the SESAR program. Fast-mov­ing technological developments, as well as global financial developments, will affect the deployment effort. The implementation phase will depend on accomplishing the goals of the second phase.

SESAR will incorporate the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) known as Galileo, into the ATM system to be launched. Details of the manner and means by which the new system will operate have not been disclosed, but it might be presumed that it will evolve in a similar manner to the NextGen plan in the United States. Part of the U. S. plan, in fact, is to reach out to the global community so that the several systems now on the drawing boards might be developed with the requirements of the others in mind. It makes sense that these satellite – based air traffic control systems be compatible to the extent possible so that the globalization of the air transport system will extend, not only to marketing and governmental policy develop­ments, like deregulation and Open Skies, but to operational considerations, like air traffic control, to enhance the seamless transition of air transport operations over the globe.

Harmonic Convergence

The United States and the EU are working simul­taneously on the complete transition of their air traffic control systems from land-based naviga­tion to satellite navigation. The fact is that these programs are being carried out separately, under separate management and with distinct chal­lenges; yet the hundreds of flights that travel between the two continents daily demand that these separate systems be compatible and that the flights be operationally seamless and safe.

There are also distinctions between the two systems that reflect the political and cultural dif­ferences between the United States and the coun­tries of Europe. The U. S. system is a federal one, while the EU must still deal with the concerns of 27 sovereign states. The controlling governmental entity for the United States is the FAA, while that for the EU is the SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU), which consists of Eurocontrol, the European Commission, and 15 more member organizations.

The tentative nature of some aspects of each of the programs, partially because of still unde­veloped technological systems, unknown pricing, and even undetermined commitment, have caused skepticism and doubts among stakeholders (pri­marily airlines, on both sides of the Atlantic, who must equip their aircraft). All of this has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis, which has manifested itself in a very divisive manner in the EU and its separate Member States.

The uncertainties inherent in each of the programs contribute to difficulties in harmo­nization. There can be no doubt that each side understands that the systems must, in fact, be compatible and consistent, but both programs at this point still involve a lot of theory, unproven development, and the possibility of a change in course that will affect the financial conditions of both the private and governmental sectors.

Final developments cannot be stated with certainty under these conditions. There appears to be a bona fide commitment to accomplish the stated goals of both the United States and the EU, and hard work is proceeding in many quarters in the United States and in Europe; indeed, includ­ing private enterprise all over the world. Air traf­fic management systems are obsolete and must be fixed. Exactly what will develop, and when it will develop, remains to be seen.

Endnotes

1. Minestere Public v. Lucas Asjes, 3 C. L.R. 173, Eur. Ct.

R. 1425.

2. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) p. 202.7 (1978).

3. Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communi­ties regarding application of their Competition Laws, 1995 0. J. (L95) 47.

4. See discussion in Chapter 37.

5. Most developed countries have their own regulatory author­ity that is equivalent to the FAA. Here are some world­wide certification agencies: Canada—Transport Canada; Brazil—СТА; EU—EASA (27 countries); Kenya—KCAA; Russia—Aviation Register; China—CAAC; Japan—JCAB; Australia—CASA.

6. Lipinski, William 0., An Evaluation of the U. S.-EU Trade Relationship <http://www. house. gov./lipinski/ aviation. htm>.

7. Competition in the U. S. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U. S. House of Representatives, July 26, 2001, U. S. Govern­ment Printing Office.

8. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

“The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod­ies,” or the Moon Treaty, is yet another follow-on treaty that proceeds from the first space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty. Each of the treaties that have been adopted since the Outer Space Treaty has added more detail and definition to the gen­eral principles enunciated in the first treaty. The Moon Treaty, however, is considered by most as a “failed” treaty because the specific, additional language used has met with opposition from the major space-faring countries.

The basic stumbling block in the treaty is the use of the words “common heritage of man­kind” to describe the nature of the moon and its resources, as well as the other celestial bodies. The treaty provides for the establishment of an
international regime to govern the exploitation of these resources when such exploitation becomes feasible.

The general interpretation of this language is that all nations of the world have equal rights to the resources of the heavens, irrespective of whether or not they put forth any effort or incur any risk, financial or otherwise, in development of ways and means to recover those resources. Any plan to develop these resources would osten­sibly require approval of all nations on earth, which would be impracticable.

The rejection of the Moon Treaty follows a similar rejection of the terrestrial Law of the Sea Treaty (referred to gleefully by its detractors as LOST). In 1982, the United Nations conceived the Law of the Sea Treaty as a means of con­trol and governance of the world’s oceans. The breadth of the treaty was such that it sought to

biotechnology), physics (including fluid physics, materials science, and quantum physics), astron­omy, and meteorology. The goals of this research include developing an understanding of, and the technology to deal with, long-term human pres­ence in space, developing methods for the more efficient production of materials, developing new ways to treat disease, achieving more accurate measurements than is possible on earth, and a better understanding of the universe.

1 NASA and the United States
Space Program-А Review

Created by the National Aeronautics and Space Act on July 29, 1958, during the Eisenhower Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration replaced the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) which had been researching flight technology for more than 40 years. NASA’s mission continued the work of aeronautics research, but also specifi­cally assumed the responsibility for research in aerospace and for the overall civilian space pro­gram for the nation, including the human space flight program.

The United States space exploration and development program has included both manned and unmanned launches, and unmanned launches designed specifically as precursors of human space flight. Included in these are Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, the Space Shut­tle, Skylab, and the International Space Station.23

ince the award of the Langley Medal to the Wright brothers three years ago, there has been great activity in the field of aviation. The war departments of the differ­ent nations have been constantly at work, but little is known concerning the character of the advances made. So far as the public are aware the chief progress has related to details of con­struction and improvement in motive power. The advance has been much greater in the art than in the science.

There has, however, been considerable advance in the science of aerodromics along the lines laid down by our late Secretary, Dr. S. P. Langley, and by M. Gustave Eiffel, Director of the Eiffel Aero-Dynamical Labora­tory in Paris.

In 1907 M/Eiffel published the results of experiments made at the Eiffel Tower; in 1911, he published the results of his experiment at the aerodynamic laboratory in Paris on the resistance of the air in connection with aviation, and these
results have been of great value to aerial engineers in designing and construction flying machines. Indeed his works upon the subject have already become classical.. ..

In spite of the great advances that have been made in the art of aerodromics we are confronted with a long list of fatalities to avia­tors, for whose protection there remains a great deal yet to be done. There has been one very notable development in this direction, made by an American, Mr. Glenn R. Curtiss of Ham – mondsport, N. Y.

In 1908, the Aerial Experiment Associa­tion, of which Mr. Curtiss was a member, dis­cussed the advisability of have flying machines so constructed as to enable them to float, and to rise from the water into the air, as an element of safety. In pursuance of these ideas, the Associa­tion’s aerodrome No. 3, the “Curtiss June Bug” was attached to pontoons and an experiment was made on Lake Keuka on November 6, 1908. Although the speed on the water appeared to be
satisfactory, the machine failed to rise in the air, but the occasion formed the starting point for Mr. Curtiss’ independent researches.

After the dissolution of the Association, March 31, 1909, Mr. Curtiss continued his exper­iments to find a practical solution of the prob­lem, and in May 1910, he made that remarkable flight from Albany to New York City over the Hudson River, a distance of 152 miles in 2 hours 52 minutes, with two light pontoons attached to his machine, to enable it to float should it come down into the water.

In 1911 Mr. Curtiss continued his efforts to construct a machine that would not only float, but would rise from the water into the air, and in January 1912, he succeeded in doing this in San Diego Bay, California. “On January 26, 1912” he says “the first success came”: and on January 27, 1912, the Aero Club of America awarded him the Collier Trophy for his accomplishment.

In February 1912, he demonstrated the use to the Navy of such machines by flying to the U. S. Armored Cruiser “Pennsylvania” . . . alighting in the water beside the vessel. The machine was hoisted up on the vessel’s deck, and then again lowered into the water without damage, showing the possibility of handling such machines without special equipment. He then rose from the water and flew back to the starting point.

By July 1912, he had developed the remark­able machine he calls “the flying boat,” which represents the greatest advance yet made along these lines. It develops great speed upon the water and also in the air, and is equally at home in either element. The world is now following Mr. Curtiss’ lead in the development of flying machines of this type.

Great experience in the handling of aer­ial machines is necessary before aviators can safely make extended flight over land, where a fall might be fatal. The successful develop­ment of the hydro-aerodrome now enables this experience to be gained over water without seri­ous danger to life or limb; and marks a notable advance in the direction of safety that might well be recognized by the Smithsonian Institution by the award of a Langley Medal to Mr. Glenn M. Curtiss.

his is a story that begins with man’s earli­est reported technological accomplishment, the invention of the wheel, and continues with an ever-increasing intensity. A curve plotted on one axis as time and on the other as the rate of technological advance will depict a flat to gradu­ally rising line, becoming at a point a rapidly rising line, disclosing a recent very high rate of technological accomplishment. (See Figure 1-1.) Between 1790 and 1870, for example, there were just over 40,000 patents granted in the United States for that entire 80-year period. During the 30 years between 1870 and 1900, the Patent Office granted over 400,000 patents, a 10-fold increase in slightly more than one third of the time. In 1870, there was nothing in America that could be called a steel industry; but by 1900, over 10 million tons of steel were being produced annually, more than the rest of the world com­bined. As men struggled to fly, the rate of tech­nological innovation was beginning to move up, but it had been a long time coming.

All modern-day accomplishments are based, to one degree or another, on the efforts and accomplishments of those who went before. The ancient Phoenicians sailed the confines of the Mediterranean Sea by reference to land, and also by reference to the sun and stars. The length of
the Mediterranean, its east and west limits, were known to them as Asu (east) and Ereb (west), the word roots that form the names of Asia and Europe in use today. Ocean travel was coast­wise. Improvements were made to the shapes of sails and hulls used in early maritime commerce. Insurance and accounting came into vogue in the maritime trading centers around the Mediterra­nean, in the city-states such as Venice. Gunpow­der arrived by the 9th century and, by the late 12th century, the magnetic compass was coming into common use on land and sea.

But the rising curve of progress really only begins with the rise of Western Civilization and the Rule of Law. Circumstances conducive to invention and innovation depend on many fac­tors, including incentive to innovate—like the profit motive—and protection for the results of invention, like patent law. These and other rel­evant factors depend on a stable, progressive, and lawful society, and a strong government. Magna Carta (The Great Charter), in 1215, establishing for the first time limitations on the arbitrary pow­ers of the King of England, is widely regarded as the cornerstone of personal liberty. Its principles have evolved into broad constitutional concepts embraced today. In 1420 began a period of prog­ress and enlightenment known as the Renaissance

(rebirth), a time of advances in astronomy, anatomy, engineering, physics, and art. Great leaps of mind made by the luminaries of that day included the idea that man might actually fly—or so believed Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519). His sketches depicting wings to support manned flight disclose that he understood the same basic airfoil concept used today. His ideas on the subject were lost for a period of 300 years before rediscovery.

«When once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return, w

Curtiss remained busy. His sojourns in California during 1910 convinced him of the benefits of the winter climate there compared to the snow of Hammondsport and frozen Lake Keuka in New York. Late that year he leased North Island in San Diego Bay and offered free pilot training to both the Army and the Navy, receiving his first military students early the next year. In Novem­ber 1910, a pilot employed by Curtiss, Eugene Ely, was the first to take off an airplane from a Navy vessel, the USS Birmingham, anchored at Hampton Roads, Virginia. (See Figure 8-8.) Two months later in January 1911, Ely became the first to land an airplane back aboard a vessel, the USS Pennsylvania anchored in San Francisco Bay, utilizing in both cases specially constructed wooden platforms on the ships, and in both cases without the benefit of any wind over the decks of the anchored ships. (See Figure 8-9.)

He set up shop facilities for conducting experimentation with floats in order to develop a successful seaplane, at that time called a

hydroplane. Although he had experimented with floats on the June Bug in 1908, and again in May and June 1910 with a canoe fitted centrally beneath one of his D2 machines, he had not been successful in getting an airplane off the water. At North Island, tests showed that significantly greater engine power was required to permit a takeoff from water as compared to land, so vari­ous hull designs were tested.

A breakthrough known as a “stepped” con­figuration essentially solved the problem of the water takeoff. The “stepped” hull design

incorporated a recessed aft section, so that the bottom of the aft section of the hull was higher than the forward portion of the hull. As speed increased, the aft section of the hull came out of the water first, which greatly reduced drag and produced a planing effect of the hull on water that later came to be known as “being on the step.” These original designs were modified and improved, spray patterns were controlled, and the improved hulls ultimately allowed take off from the water with close to the same horse­power as that required from land. By 1912, the Curtiss-designed aircraft hull had become state – of-the-art for the world. Further improvements were made as engines were mounted on the upper frame of the airplane, and as airframes were redesigned to account for pitch changes caused by these changes in the center of thrust. The Curtiss flying boats proved highly popular and sales were made to many foreign countries all over the world.6 (See Figure 8-10.)

In February 1911, he built his first tractor seaplane, with the engine and propeller at the front of the airplane (to avoid damaging water spray to the propeller) and the elevators at the rear. At the request of the Navy, he person­ally flew this craft out to the USS Pennsylvania anchored in San Diego harbor, where the airplane was winched aboard and then redeployed to the

water, completing the demonstration for what would become a common practice for the use of airplanes for scouting missions from warships. On May 8, 1911, the Navy ordered two Curtiss hydroplanes.

By the end of 1927, the government had extended the lighted portion of the airway system from New York to Salt Lake City on the transcontinental route, and on portions of feeder and parallel segments, such as Los Angeles to Las Vegas, New York to Atlanta, Chicago to Dallas, and between Los Angeles and San Francisco. That year there were 4,121 miles of lighted airways operated by the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce. By 1933, there were 1,500 beacons in place, extending the lighted airway systems for a length of 18,000 miles. While the lighted airway was of significant aid in navigation, it had serious limitations in the context of an all-weather air carrier system. It was still a visual navigation system, dependent on reasonably good weather in order to operate effectively.

The Bureau of Standards in the Department of Commerce began, in 1926, to work with radio as a means of communication and navigation. As government involvement in aviation began to kick in as a result of the Air Commerce Act, money and effort were applied to solve problems and to attempt to eliminate limitations on the commercial development of air commerce. In 1926, for instance, there was no two-way voice communication possible with aircraft in flight. This amounted to a serious limitation in safety, including a lack of pilot awareness of developing weather. By 1927, the first radio transmitter was established at Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, allowing communication with aircraft in a 150-mile radius.

In 1928, the Bureau of Standards developed a new radio beacon system of navigation, the first non-visual navigation system in the world. The Aeronautics Branch, which had authority over the lighted airway system, took over the installation and control of the new radio navigation system in 1929. The system was known as the “four-course radio range,” and it would provide the first step in allowing a true all-weather air carrier system to begin to develop. It would remain the standard navigation system in use until World War П.

The four-course radio range utilized low frequency radio waves (190 to 535 kHz radio band) transmitted from powerful 1,500-watt beacons spaced 200 miles apart on the airway. The beacons transmitted two Morse code signals, the letter “A” and the letter “N.” In Morse code, these signals are opposite, “dot-dash” for A, and “dash-dot” for N. When the aircraft was centered “on the beam,” these signals merged into a steady, monotonous tone. If the aircraft ventured to one side of the airway, the signal heard was either the Morse A or N, depending on the aircraft’s position from the beacon. (See Figure 13-3.)

Each beacon defined four airways, thus the name “four-course radio range,” and the beacon’s identification was broadcast in Morse code twice each minute. The so-called beam width was 3 degrees, so that at the halfway point of 100 miles between beacons, the on-course deviation was about +/-2.6 miles. Station passage was

marked by a “cone of silence,” at which point the aural tone would disappear as the aircraft passed overhead. Distance from the station was later provided by marker beacons placed along the airway at intervals of 20 miles or so.

By today’s standards, the four-course radio range was primitive. Low frequency radio was subject to electrical static and other weather aberrations and distortions, but it constituted a quantum leap forward over the visual, lighted beacon system in use at the time. Pilots became very adept at flying the four-course system, and as the airlines began establishing schedules on their new routes. All-weather navigation allowed adherence to schedules that theretofore would have been impossible.

The CAB was established as an independent board of five individuals who reported directly to the president and whose function was primar­ily to exercise control over air carrier economic regulation, such as rates, routes, and mergers. The CAB was also given the responsibility to investigate aircraft accidents and for safety rule­making. It was specifically charged with “the promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.”

Ш The Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)

The CAA was created as an agency, headed by an administrator, which was placed back within the Department of Commerce. Responsibility for all non-military air traffic control, safety programs, and airway development was now assumed by the CAA. Compliance with Civil Air Regulations became mandatory. Training centers were established to educate and standardize train­ing for air traffic controllers and others affected by safety regulations. Coordination of all control­lers followed, with towers and en route centers falling under the CAA umbrella.

When the Department of Transportation Act cre­ated the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the function of the government in promoting, regulating, and enforcing aviation safety stan­dards finally found a permanent home. A quick review of the history of the administration of aviation safety shows the torturous path that it had taken.

The Air Commerce Act of 1926 first autho­rized safety regulation, the administration of which was placed within the Department of Commerce. The Aeronautics Branch was created as an agency in the Department of Commerce and became the first government agency to con­cern itself with aviation safety. This agency was renamed the Bureau of Air Commerce in 1934. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (as amended in 1940), these functions were trans­ferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and remained within the Department of Commerce.

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 signifi­cantly reallocated existing authority in avia­tion regulatory matters. The CAA was renamed the Federal Aviation Agency, removed from the Department of Commerce, and organized as an independent agency that reported only to Congress and to the president. The Federal Aviation Agency was given the responsibility previously exercised by the CAB for propos­ing air safety legislation (statutory) and for rule making, designated under the CAB as Civil Aeronautic Rules (CARs), and now known as the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). All air safety research and development authority was consolidated within the Agency, including that previously carried out by the National Advi­sory Committee for Aeronautics, the Airways Modernization Board, and the Air Coordinating Committee. The procedural responsibility in air­man certificate actions was also transferred from the CAB to the Federal Aviation Agency. Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the CAB retained its responsibility for the investigation of aircraft accidents as well as its economic regu­lation of the airlines, and it became an appeals review board for certificate action taken by the Federal Aviation Agency.

Under the provisions of the Department of Transportation Act, responsibility for aviation safety, and virtually all logical ramifications of safety issues, were placed within the authority of the Federal Aviation Administration. Its basic mission is defined by its legislative mandate, particularly the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. In 1984, Congress authorized commercial space launches by the private (nongovernmental) sec­tor for the first time under the Commercial Space Launch Act. Regulatory authority was initially placed within the Department of Transportation in the Office of Commercial Space Transporta­tion (AST), but in 1995 this function was moved over to the FAA under the same name, Office of Space Transportation (AST). This office con­ducts the only space-related function within the FAA. FAA/AST regulates the commercial space transportation industry to ensure compliance with international obligations of the United States and to enhance safety and national security. It also licenses commercial space launches of both orbital and suborbital rockets and nonfederal launch sites, or spaceports.

The scope of the functions assigned to the FAA are pervasive. While safety has always been the mainstay of the FAA mandate, ongo­ing developments in aviation have caused new emphasis to be placed on related but separate concerns, such as security,1 the environment, airport funding, international relations, and com­mercial space activities.

The functions of the FAA could logically be examined from several different perspec­tives, but for our purposes the following break­out of FAA responsibility should be the most instructive.