Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

The R 100 air-to-air Rheinmetall-Borsig spin-stabilised rocket was heavier than the WGr 21. Its fragmentation effect was very destructive even against large targets because of the powerful explosive charge. First prototypes capable of Mach 1.5 were developed from 1943 as R 100 M (mine warhead). Several improved versions followed.

The projectiles were fired from a simple AG 140 device below the ETC 50 which if necessary could be jettisoned. A Neptun range­measuring device was installed. Faun and Elfe equipment could be fitted for automatic firing of the rocket. The R 100 was first fired successfully in December 1944 without an explosive charge. In January 1945 500 were ordered for initial tactical tests. Up to five R 100s were to be carried by the Me 262, six by the Me 410 and 16 by the Ar 234, the latter two carrying their load mounted below the wings.

A report from Rheinmetall-Borsig at Berlin – Marienfelde dated 15 January 1945 considered that the RBI00 BS rocket would be very efficient against any Allied aircraft of the time.

It distributed some 400 red-hot splinters per 56 grams of mass over an area of between 115 and 1,000 square metres. The explosive charge was a 1-kg (2.2-lb) shrapnel mine-type explo­sive. The splinters would pierce the fuel tanks of an aircraft under attack, their heat then igniting the fuel.

An automatic firing-solution computer, ‘Oberon Process’, developed by Arado engineer Kurt Bornemann was used for aiming. In combination with the EZ 42 gyro-reflex sight attacks were also possible in a pursuit curve at angles up to 30 degrees. The first R 100 BS tests took place atTarnewitz test ground in February 1945, but by the month’s end there were too few rockets left for continuation testing in flight.

Tests in a Me 262 A-la (Works No. 111994) using the R 100 BS saw the rocket being condemned as unsafe and not sufficiently advanced for operational use in the spring of 1945. By 3 March tests had come to a standstill because

the rockets supplied to Tarnewitz were incomplete, and work on an improved firing installation had been set back in an air raid on the assembly plant at Berlin-Marienfelde. Once EZ 42 production at Dresden and the manufacture of the FuG 217 Elfe unit fell by the wayside, the entire venture passed into history at the latest during March 1945.There is no record of any further trials before the test centre fell on 2 May.

In an extensive evaluation of air-to-air rockets produced just before the war’s end, an R 100 fitted with infra-red equipment and an acoustic fuse was reported close to operational readiness but its manufacture was now menaced by the advancing front. Rockets featured in the various weapons systems on which Ober – gruppenfuhrer Kammler set such store. In the end the production of prototypes was modest. Only a few R 100 rockets survived the end phase of the war to be confiscated by British scientific teams in May 1945.

As the early jet turbines had not lived up to expectations, efforts were made from 1942 to increase thrust substantially. For this purpose the BMW P3390 TLR engine was developed. The Me 262 C-2b version of the Me 262 A-la was confirmed on 28 April 1944, but work on the engine plant was still well short of completion. On 20 December Messerschmitt began conversion work for the first C-2b once Works No. 170074 (V-074) arrived at Lechfeld. On 8 January 1945 the aircraft flew under turbine power but without using the rocket motor.

After metal fragments were found in the port turbine and a defect discovered in the drive bearings, the aircraft was grounded and the jet engines did not attain the prescribed levels of output until 24 February. Next day the starboard combustion chamber exploded, seriously damaging the whole turbine. At the end of March another defect was found in the port turbine, which had to be replaced. Because of shortage of В-4 fuel, works pilot Karl Baur did not fly Heimatschiitzer II from Lechfeld until 26 March when the thrust of two BMW 003 turbines and the two rocket motors (burn time 40 seconds) provided the prototype with a tremendous rate of climb. In the second and last flight of V-074 on 29 March, a switching fault prevented the rocket engine being used. The cause could not be found for a time because no fuel was available to run the turbines. V-074, the only Me 262 C-lb to have flown, was captured intact by US ground forces at Lechfeld on 27 April 1945, but it did not interest the

Side profile of the He 162 ‘Protector of the Homeland’with BMW 003 R propulsion unit. Unlike the Me 262 C-2b the rocket motor was not mounted directly on the turbine but under the fuselage.

Americans and was discarded behind a hangar for scrap. After month-long testing it was clear that the TLR turbines were far from suitable for series – produced aircraft, and they were not used for the Ar 234, He 162 or the Focke-Wulf Flitzer.

Me 262 C-3

This was almost an emergency design once it was realised from the Me 262 C-la and C-2b track record that a series-produced TLR fighter was still far off. By the beginning of February 1945 plans were placed before the Chief-TLR for the Me 262 C-3. By mid-February design work for the first prototype was complete and a full-size mock-up ordered. Messerschmitt calculated that the project bureau and factory annexe at Oberammergau would have the first fuselage ready for testing with an HWK 109-509 S2 rocket motor by 10 March. The rocket fuel was to be carried in two large 600-litre disposable tanks below the forward fuselage. Ultimately only one engine unit was made and the conversion work was never started. US troops captured many of the project studies and future aircraft plans.

As with all other rocket aircraft, the Me 262 variants had shown that the technology could not be mastered under the prevailing war conditions. This was true as much for the various rocket fighters (Me 163 and Ju 248) as for the Me 262 Homeland Protectors and the numerous emergency solutions which left the drawing boards from the summer of 1944.

Another flak rocket which failed to meet expectations was the Rheinmetall Rheintochter. Despite great investment and its own test centre at Leba on the Baltic, the rocket was never ready for series production. Early in the autumn of 1941, Generalmajor von Renz, Dr Heinrich Klein (Rheinmetall-Borsig) and the Director of Radar Research at Telefunken, Professor Leo Brand, agreed on an initial specification for a flak rocket. After Goring spoke in favour of subsonic designs on 1 September 1942, Rheinmetall reworked an earlier type (F-Pl) into F-P2 and F-P3, which had an operational ceiling of 18,000 metres (59,000 ft). On 7 December 1943, the HWA awarded Rheinmetall a contract to develop all three versions. In the spring of 1943 the entire project, except for the design office at Leba, was transferred from Berlin to Zittau. By the summer of 1943, several missiles had been built at 1:2.5 scale, all but the first being tested later at Leba using a provisional starting procedure so as to judge how the rocket would fly in practice. On 3 June 1943 Rheinmetall presented its newest designs, R 1 to R 3. Since the manufacturer could not work on all three simultaneously, the RLM favoured for R 3 but Rheinmetall kept working on the others. From December 1943 the R 1 and R 2 versions were test fired at Leba: between February and October 1944 there were 43 test starts in all and some ground trials. Most tests involved the R 1, since R 2 was not yet so far advanced.

An R 3 was first test-fired in October 1944. The prototype had no second- stage motor and served as a test vehicle for the start procedure. Aiter seeing an

R1 demonstrated on 30 October 1944, Goring authorised a continuation of tests in the hope of finding greater efficiency. When on 1 November the 51st solid – fuel R 1 was tested, the R 3 was almost ready. The missile had no cruising motor, since these were far from completion, the thrust jets not having been delivered on time for the first 20 engines. After the liquid-fuel engines designed by Professor Beck of the Technical University were tested and found to be under­powered, the planners fell back temporarily on the solid-fuel alternative.

The next stage of work was discussed at a conference in Karlshagen on 19 November 1944. The endless postponements of set dates and problems with liquid-fuel engines gave a pessimistic oudook on the future. On 18 December the first R3 was fired successfully using a solid-fuel engine. Despite the successful demonstration to the Reichsmarschall, there were still some doubts, and even the super-optimistic Rheinmetall spokesman did not expect even to receive the liquid-fuel engine ordered by the Chief-TLR before the New Year. In mid- January a number of the latest Type HV 10 gyro sets were ordered for Rheintochter testing from February onwards. In January 1945 tests the rocket
flew for 120 seconds. The range was established at 12.7 km (7.9 miles), the operational ceiling 9,650 metres (31,600 ft). By 5 February inclusive, 5 R 3s had been test fired, 51 R Is, and 7 R 2s. Only 24 hours later the Rheintochter project was cancelled by Gruppenfiihrer Kammler since he did not believe it would be ready within a reasonable time.

The Rammjager went one step further. The idea was that, should the enemy aircraft attacked not be mortally wounded by gun fire, it was to be finished off by ramming. The loss of air superiority goaded a small group at OKL into taking these drastic measures. For some time the tactic was rejected by many unit commanders, and also by some pilots asked to undertake it. General der Jagd – flieger Adolf Galland opposed it and was relieved of office on 23 January 1945 by Goring, his replacement being the more committed Oberst Gordon Gollob. At the same time Goring appealed to all fighter pilots ‘inspired by holy fire, being conscious of the struggle for a just cause, to give everything’.

Galland had favoured conventional fighter tactics, if possible from a numerically superior position. As a means of downing whole bomber formations, he wanted to send up a thousand fighters at a time. For this reason in the autumn

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of 1944 he had tried to re-equip and re-staff the exhausted fighter units. On 18 November 1944 he accumulated 18 fighter Geschwader and 3,700 pilots for ‘The Big Blow’, but despite long preparations the concentrated attack never came, so strong by then were the Allied air raids and their penetration to the heardand of the Reich.

This was therefore the prevailing sorry state of affairs from which Oberst Hajo Hermann revived his idea of the mass ramming operation. Even Hider, despite all his reservations, approved the concept, ‘if unwillingly’, as his Luft­waffe adjutant Oberst von Below reported later. When Oberst Hermann seized the opportunity to make his proposal at the Reich Chancellery in January 1945, Hider replied that he would not order it, but nor would he stand in the way of those who wanted to volunteer for it.

Rammkommando Elbe was set up at the beginning of March, with control being placed in Gollob’s hands. The first volunteers were assembled at Stendal aerodrome and lodged in an enclosure with a double security perimeter. At the end of the month, about a week before the start of the ramming operations, Anglo-American land forces were already at Gotha, Kassel and Munster, and approaching Erfurt, Halle, Hannover and Wurzburg. In the East the Red Army
was preparing for the final assault on Berlin. Nevertheless on 31 March Oberst Hermann called on his pilots ‘to fight to the uttermost’. His vision was that Ramming Unit Werwolf s pilots would destroy coundess Allied bombers at the selfless expenditure of their own lives, to such affect that the USAF would be forced to break off its bombing operations. This was obviously an illusion.

The training course at Stendal was basically theoretical for shortage of fuel. The pilots were kept in good humour with plentiful meals, cognac and chocolate which, unlike the fuel, seemed available in unlimited quantities. There was also a shortage of unit commanders with front-line experience since these knew only too well what this kind of operation would demand of them. Therefore they were commandeered from the ranks of IX. Flieger-Division( J) to build the framework for the young pilots who had volunteered for ramming operations in the hoped – for numbers.

On the night of 5 April 1945,30 pilots were driven from Stendal to Delitzsch, Eilenburg, Gardelegen, Sachau, Salzwedel and Stolpe. For psychological reasons OKL did not want to delay the operations too long and had set 7 April as the opening date. Many of the pilots had too little experience with the Bf 109. Fighter protection was to be Me 262s of Stab and III./fG 7 from Brandenburg- Briest. The ramming aircraft were to assemble over Magdeburg and climb to 11,000 metres (36,000 ft). Spurred on by heroic words and military marches they would receive the order to attack – ‘To all vultures and falcons – attack at will! Sieg Heilfln all 184 Bf 109 ram-fighters and 51 Me 262 escorts, of which 48 eventually took off, were to be deployed. The tactical inexperience of the attackers resulted in the mission of Sonderkommando Elbe not proceeding as hoped. The Eighth AF bomber formations were at 7,000 metres (23,000 ft) altitude and their fighter escort was quickly in attendance. The Bf 109s were only able to engage singly or in small groups, and the bomber losses remained within acceptable limits.

At the end of the engagement, 77 mosdy young pilots had been shot down. The Luftwaffe had lost 133 machines, numerous others were damaged to a greater or lesser degree by enemy defensive fire, and many of these crash-landed. On the plus side 23 heavy bombers, most attached to 3rd Air Division, were destroyed by ramming or the Me 262s of JG 7. Others got back to England, tailplanes ribboned, wings damaged. Overall the long-planned operation had not brought OKL the desired result.

Nevertheless Oberst Hermann would not give in. He wanted better preparations for a second try; next time the 80 remaining pilots of Sonder­kommando Elbe would attack the bomber formations over their bases. But time ran out. Apart from individual instances of ramming Allied aircraft, towards the end there were some sporadic suicide missions on the pilot s own initiative by those who realised that the war was lost and did not wish to survive it.

Because of the constant delays, JG 1 had not become active again until mid – March after its earlier problems. The Auffangsstaffel was subsequently reformed as Stabstaffel/JG 1: at the same time I./JG 1 transferred to Ludwigslust and II./JG 1 to Garz, countermanding a previous order to fly to Warnemiinde. Not until 8 April did the first two machines reach I. Gruppe from the central

German production. By 11 April conversion training was being carried out with up to 16 He 162s, but the fuel shortage kept training flights down to 10 or 12 per day. Even so, 30-40 pilots had had their first flying experience with the jet. During this training the Gruppe lost several pilots, amongst them Ober – feldwebel Stenschke and two Unteroffizier, Enderle and Werner. Despite all its protests, II./JG 1 had no He 162s; its conversion training got under way finally on 20 April.

On 14 April I./JG 1 led by Oberleutnant Demuth, transferred from Ludwigslust to Leek with a refuelling stop at Husum because the Gruppe did not have enough fuel for a non-stop flight. During this flight, Leutnant Rudolf Schmidt encountered a Spitfire which was shot down, but the victory was credited to a flak battery which also fired on the RAF aircraft. During the continuation flight to Leek, Allied fighters appeared, but the ten-strong formation escaped at high speed. On 18 April the greater part of the ground staff arrived at Leek from Warnemiinde.

Despite the numerous improvements the Volksjager was still not completely safe in all flight situations. On 20 April Leutnant Schmitt needed the ejector seat to save himself and three days later Unteroffizier Steeb of L/fG 1 was forced to jump out after his ejector seat failed to work. On 24 April the commander of II./JG 1, Hauptmann Dahne, killed himself by operating the ejector seat without having first opened the cabin hood. Other fatalities in flying accidents with the He 162 between 20 and 26 April were Fahnrich Halmel and two Unteroffiziere, Fendler and Rechenbach. All were buried in Leek cemetery. The number of operational machines was few because of fuel shortage. Hauptmann Ludewig and his wingman, Feldwebel Gehrlein, were forced to make emergency landings for lack of fuel.

During the last weeks of the war the main focus of fighter operations over northern Germany was against RAF low-level aircraft. This included operational units of JG 1. From 25 April some He 162s were therefore used in this role over the Flensburg-Heide-Schleswig area. A pair from I. Gruppe attempted unsuccessfully to intercept an RAF Mosquito. There were no successes reported the following day, although Leutnant Gerhard Hanf attacked an RAF Typhoon. By 29 April Hanf had flown a further six sorties with his Volksjager. On 27 April the remainder of II./JG 1 arrived at Leek from Mecklenburg after refuelling at Kaltenkirchen. The number of training and operational flights in the next few days fell off for the lack of new aircraft and shortage of fuel. On 2 May the Kommodore, Oberstleutnant Herbert Ihlefeld, arrived at Leek with the Geschwaderstab.

On 4 May OKL merged I. and II. Gruppen under the Kommodore of I.(EG)/fG l. The first and second operational Staffeln led by Major Zober and Hauptmann Ludewig were then merged into the new Gruppe. All who had sufficient experience with the He 162 to engage low fliers over northern Germany were now assembled in this Gruppe.

Despite the war situation flights continued when fuel allowed, between one and three operations for two to four machines daily. These resulted in a few flying accidents shortly before the war’s end. Feldwebel Oskar Kohler ran out of landing strip at Leek and folded his He 162 A-2, being pulled free from the wreck by Oberleutnant Demuth at the last moment. Leutnant Schmitt flew some of the last operations. According to his flight log, his fifth patrol was on 4 May in ‘White Ґ when he caught up with an RAF Typhoon and scored hits. The aircraft crashed, but was credited to a flak unit on the basis of the captured RAF flier s report. The latter spent the last few days of the war in the JG 1 mess waiting for the Allies to arrive.

Shortly before the war’s end it was decided to send the operational Gruppe to northern Denmark or southern Norway, which proved impossible for lack of fuel, and on 5 May the aircraft were rigged with explosives to prevent their

capture. Towards midnight the Kommodore ordered the charges removed and a few hours later the Germans surrendered to a British armoured car which arrived at the airfield. One of the British guards was killed shortly afterwards while fooling with the ejector seat of an He 162. The remnants of JG 1 remained at Leek until 15 May. On the 21st they arrived at Schorholm and were then given quarters at Hennstadt. A period in PoW camps terminated within a year in repatriation.

JG 400 was never equipped with the machine.

According to QM-General (6. Division) statistics, 116 completed He 162 aircraft were produced. The delivery of 60 of these can be proven. In total about 180 He 162s were ready for delivery. Fuselages, wings and tailplanes were in preparation for another 500. The majority of the serviceable machines in May 1945 were on the airfield at Leek. Of the 31 machines there, about 20 were airworthy to some extent. Of these, 5 went to the USA and France and 12 to Britain. Ten unserviceable machines were scrapped. Trials of the light fighter continued in France until 1948, and longer in the United States. It was accepted that the concept was well in advance of contemporary Allied standards.

The first rocket to engage heavy four-engined bombers was the 4-kg (8.8-lb) spin-stabilised solid-fuel R4M with folding tail-unit. It was designed at Osterode/Harz by the firm of Heber, and DWM of Liibeck-Schlutup. After short and highly encouraging trials, 20,000 were ordered almost immediately, but only 12,000 were turned out, the manufacturers being DWM, Schneider KG and LGW Hakenfelde. EKdo 25, later JGr 10 under Major Chrisd, carried out extensive tests proving that the R4M reached 540 m/sec (1,770 ft/sec) in only 0.8 seconds. Operational range was 500-600 metres. The mine-type warhead would bring down a heavy bomber even with a near-miss.

The first successful firing of an R4M was achieved from an Me 262 with a makeshift rack on 2 November 1944. The first use in action was on 18 March 1945 by JG 7. Between operational flights, the Knight’s Cross holder Oberstleutnant Heinz Bar, then commander of III./EJG 2 flew trials with an Me 262 fitted with a modified R4M firing rack. Because the rockets tended to jam in the rack, the installations were continually being modified even when carried operationally by Me 262s. On 31 March a Staffel, some of them equipped with R4M rockets, claimed 17 RAF Lancaster bombers.

The R4M rocket was of great importance in the defence against Allied bombers. It weighed 4 kg, had solid-fuel propulsion and a mine warhead.

R4M racks were fitted to Ju 87 D-5s and Fw 190 D-9s as well as the Me 262 A-la, as seen here. The racks were of wood and therefore easy to manufacture in quantity.

On 5 April JGr 10, a test Gruppe and Messerschmitt works personnel were instructed to fit out 20 Me 262s of JV 44 at Munich-Riem with R4M racks to increase the aircraft’s fighting power, and even General Galland, JV 44 commanding officer, was credited with two kills of В-26 Marauder medium bombers just before the war’s end when he fired a salvo of 24 R4M rockets into a formation over Bavaria. An operation against a formation of 425 B-17 Flying Fortresses counts amongst the greatest victories achieved by the Me 262 fighter: 25 bombers were shot down by R4M rockets and MK 108 guns.

Experimental ‘automatic rockets’ (RA) which appeared just before the war’s end came too late. The racks with the firing gear were to be fitted below the wings of the Ar 234 or the forward section of the Me 262 fuselage. The engine works at Esslingen/Neckar produced several of the honeycomb-like devices for firing the R4M and other spin-stabilised rockets such as were fitted later to the Ba 349 Natter. At the capitulation only about 60 Me 262 fighters had been fitted with two simple racks with rails for eight, then twelve R4M rockets. Six other Me 262 A-las tried out 24-rail racks. Together with four MK 108 guns in the nose, this was a very successful combination of weapons for intercepting heavy bombers.

ecause of many poor decisions by the policy-makers from Reichsmarschall Goring down, the air war was ending in catastrophe for Germany. To bring about any transformation in this situation, fanatical efforts by pilots and crews would be necessary. As there were insufficient aircraft to hold off the Allies, it was now time to consider operations whose execution would inevitably result in the death of the pilot. In the end, Luftwaffe crews would aim their aircraft at Soviet pontoon bridges over the Oder and fight tanks with Panzerfaust rockets.

Self-Sacrifice or Final Salvation?

A secret report of October 1943 from the Academy for Aviation Research (LFA) entided ‘Suggestion on Assembling a Luftwaffe Formation for Effective Pin – Point Bombing’ considered at length the possibility of operations in which the pilot had only a 50 per cent chance of survival. The volunteers would draw their targets by lot. The primary source of recruitment was to be amongst glider pilots although members of the formation could be drawn from all arms of service. The new aircraft would be the manned V-l. Any sacrificial pilot who lost the will to carry through his mission to completion ‘will be shot immediately’, the document recommended.

At the beginning of February 1944 the manned bomb idea was considered at a working conference of the LFA, and ground rules set out for the future development. These concerned not only the likely type of target, but also the machine. For the greatest possible damage, bomb-loads such as the PC 1800 and heavy ‘torpedo bombs with aerial’ (guided bombs) seemed appropriate. In the two-month training period the future suicide pilots would receive training in a flight simulator and be taught to recognise all important warship types. With purpose-built 5-metre long practice bombs, the men would then make gliding approaches to training targets, baling out by parachute shortly before the collision. The later operational machines would have no means of escape, a letter dated 21 February 1945 from a Rechlin flight surgeon to the RLM explained. The main reason for publicising this was to reduce the expected large number of

volunteers for the project. The idea had a life of its own, however, and was taken up by the Geschwaderstab at KG 200 from where, in March 1944, an approach was made to Generalfeldmarschall Milch and the Chief of the Luftwaffe Command Staff which coincided in virtually all respects with the ideas promulgated at the LFA conferences.

It was decided to produce 5,000 Me 328 wooden midget aircraft for the project, and woodworking began in mid-March 1944. Carpenters and other woodworkers at small and medium-sized concerns were exempted from conscription to protect the project. Behind the scenes heated discussions continued about ‘self sacrifice’. The situation was clarified in a session of 27 March 1944 attended by Flugkapitan Hanna Reitsch and senior officers from OKL. It was agreed that a piloted bomb was the best way to destroy major warships – a PC 1400 or ВТ 1800 bomb might even sink a battleship – and the aircraft for the job was the Me 328. Other machines such as the Bf 109, Me 163 and Fw 190 were considered before being ruled out as more essential for

Reich air defence. In conclusion it was decided to accelerate Me 328 testing and force through the production of prototypes leading to early series production; later the piloted V-l would also be considered.

The first drawings for project Go P 55 were completed at Gotha on 17 April 1944. This was a modification of the ВТ 3000, a flying bomb with rudimentary wings proposed despite the decision of the research team leaders on 27 March 1944 to go for the Me 328. The KG 200 Kommodore considered that an Fw 190 F-8 carrying an SC 1800 was adequate and suggested rejecting the Go P 55 and other suicide aircraft. The advocate of the latter, Oberleutnant Lange, of whom more later, was not to be deterred, and pursued the self-sacrifice concept inherent in the Gotha machine.

Me 328

The first aircraft fully suitable for suicide operations was the Me 328, a small machine with ramjet propulsion conceived originally as a parasite fighter to be

carried by a long-range bomber, or later used in the local anti-bomber role. The veteran DFS test pilot Erich Klockner said after the war that flying the Me 328 was not a pleasure. In a towed start the aircraft was difficult to handle and it was even worse under ramjet power. Although this was well known, in March 1944 serious thought was being given to a manned Me 328 with a 1,600-kg bomb – load. To ensure accuracy the pilot would sacrifice himself or bale out as close as he could to the target once the aircraft was certain to collide with it. The idea was top secret. A part of the development was handled by DFS Ainring near Bad Reichenhall in Bavaria where the technical preparations were taken hastily in hand.

The machine had begun life on 14 December 1942 when the Technical Office ordered ten experimental aircraft (Me 328 V-l to V-10) for testing at DFS Ainring. An option for a further ten was not taken up. At that time there was no call for them since Germany had no giant strategic bombers, and tests of the А-prototypes did not proceed. Me 328 В was a variant ‘Special Development for the Fast Bomber Role’. These would be low-level attacks on important targets made by ‘flying coastal artillery’ against the Allied invasion fleets on the French coast when the invasion came. The planning provided expressly for a Mistel take­
off, DFS Ainring favouring the Do 219 M-l as the parent aircraft since it was 10 per cent more powerful than the earlier Do 217 E variants.

After lengthy wind-tunnel tests work started on Me 328 В V-l and V-2. Prototype V-l arrived at the DFS annexe at Horsching/Linz on 18 May 1944 and after vibration tests was put on the test flight programme for the summer. In June 1944 the Kittelberger firm of Hochst/Bregenz took over construction of the second prototype after Jakobs-Schweyer Flugzeugbau GmbH received orders to build the wooden tail section for the Me 262.

A two-seat Me 328 trainer development was abandoned in the summer of 1944 because of the expense. The possibility of using the Me 328 as the parent aircraft of a Mistel pair was given up because it did not have the range for the return flight, nor the speed to evade enemy fighters in a long pursuit. Its only use therefore was as a ‘piloted bomb’, the former ‘Fast Bomber’ now being loaded down with a 2,500-kg bomb. Attacks would be made in a gliding approach. The Me 328 would be towed to operational height by a Ju 88 S-3 or Ju 388 K-l.

On 3 June 1944, Me 328 V-II, the converted second prototype, was probably flown by engineer ‘Gretchen’ Ziegler in a Mistel arrangement with a Do 217 K-03. A final flight under ramjet propulsion is also credited to Ziegler, although he was forced to bale out after engine vibrations broke the aileron control rods. Me 328 V-II was a total loss. Besides the two completed machines, a third was

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More or less how the planned Me 328 would have looked. Its primary purpose was the destruction of pin-point targets. The idea was to carry an HE bomb of up to 500 kg below the fuselage.

under construction (Me 328 V-3) but no flights were attempted and the project was abandoned. All attention was now to be concentrated on the Reichenberg, the piloted V-l.

Initially it seemed that the Henschel designed Schmetterling had better prospects than other concepts. It was a subsonic, remote-controlled flak rocket with combined ailerons/rudder integral to the wings and was fired at a steep angle along a launch trailer on a light revolving chassis. Take-off was assisted by two solid-fuel boosters and a powerful liquid-fuel engine provided the cruising stage. After extensive research in 1942, Henschel received a contract for a pre-series ‘S’ in August 1943. The technical problems could not be overcome during that winter, and the first experimental rocket S V-l was first fired on 15 February 1944. Three of the first four starts that spring were failures. To put the development on a firmer footing, close cooperation developed between Henschel and the Askania, Bosch and Siemens companies. It was expected that 150 missiles would have to be fired to identify and eliminate all weaknesses before the project was ripe for series production.

An assessment in November 1944 on the launches so far reported that the small payload of S 1 had an effective destructive area which was too limited, but in the short term Schmetterling would be more effective than Wasserfall because the launch equipment was manoeuvrable. The RLM set great store by the fact that Schmetterling had a proven control system which would not require a long trial phase. By mid-November 1944 there had been 15 air launches from an He 111 H-6 for stability testing and flight attitude control while 21 were fired from the ground. The first two of these had no remote control; the others were fitted with a flight control unit.

On 21 December 1944, Oberst von Giildenfeldt of the Flakwaffe General Staff reported to the Chief-TLR that the first emplacements protecting armaments factories important for the war effort had been chosen for the Schmetterling. By the end of December 1944 another 23 Hs 117s had been produced; this was repeated in January 1945 and another 20 were planned for February, and after that nobody could predict because high-value raw materials for the envisaged series production were in very short supply.

Henschel was also planning an improved series version, the S 2, which resulted in three different and promising designs, S 2a, S 2b and S 2c. Despite the grave war situation, further Schmetterling testing continued. In test launches in January 1945, the rocket reached an altitude of 9,000 metres and had a range of 25 kilometres (30,000 ft/15 miles). Six more air launches followed at the beginning of February, and 38 from the ground. Only 28 of the 59 starts were satisfactory, in the others, as the report states, ‘some area of the rocket’ failed.

There were serious problems regarding the envisaged series run. The Chief – TLR War Diary entry for 21 January 1945 reports that BMW would not be able to supply engines for the Hs 117 on time. Delays of at least three months were anticipated. New variants such as the TV-guided Hs 117 H were cancelled on 6 February by Kammler, while all other designated work on the rocket had to be completed as soon as possible so that production of the basic S 1 design could follow at location B3 in the Harz. The war situation prevented the plans being realised, and the building work on the subterranean factory was abandoned in March 1945. The War Diary also indicates that the SG 45 solid-fuel engine for the Hs 117 was not supplied on time despite repeated reference to the Fiihrer’s standing order. More delays of at least three weeks ensued.

Mittelwerk was to house the production, and on 27 February the SS requested all relevant files from Henschel. A start date in March was not possible, however. On 13 March Himmler and the Dornberger team agreed a new date in May from when 300 Schmetterling would be produced monthly instead of the originally planned 3,000. The collapse in fuel production reduced fuel availability to one tenth the requested level. Once the rocket was deleted from the Fiihrer Emergency Programme, the series was downgraded on Himmler s order.

By 15 March only 140 rockets had been produced. Of these 80 were fired, but none operationally. The other 60 lacked a motor or parts of the remote-control equipment and were held back at the factory or test centres. After the Henschel development division relocated to the Harz in early 1945, development activity was resumed on a small scale and for a short time only in the incomplete under­ground complex at Himmelberg (B3a) at Woffleben. Meanwhile US armoured forces had advanced through the Harz, taking village after village with relatively little opposition. On 5 April rocket technicians in the Bad Sachsa-Bleichrode- Nordhausen area were shipped out to Upper Bavaria, where they ended the war. On 11 April US Special Forces captured Hs 117 parts in an underground gallery near Woffleben and these were spirited away to the United States before the arrival of the Soviet ally.

he end of the era of the piston-engined fighter coincided with the end of the Second World War. In the second half of 1944 the Luftwaffe turned its hopes increasingly to the twin-turbine Me 262 A-la jet fighter. Even though only relatively few Geschwader enjoyed its use, that does nothing to alter the fact that in 1945 this machine was the fastest jet fighter in the world to be operational in large numbers.

Me 262 A-la

The introduction of the Me 262 jet was hindered initially by reverses. The BMW turbines failed to live up to their promise. Even the change-over to Jumo 004 T-ls and T-2s brought no quick breakthrough. General der Jagd-

The Luftwaffe believed that the Me 262 A-la would revolutionise air warfare. Production in fits and starts prevented the deployment of the jet fighter in the numbers desired by OKL.

flieger Adolf Galland declared the machine ready for operations after his trial flight in the V-4 prototype, but the euphoria was soon dispelled when the new technology with all its attendant problems delayed completion and delivery of the first pre-series run into the spring of 1944. During testing new defects came to light almost daily, causing ever more postponements. New delays followed the Blitzbomber idea which had been accepted without protest by Goring, and on 25 May 1944 the aircraft was transferred to the jurisdiction of the General der Kampfflieger for future use mainly as a fighter-bomber.

Nevertheless the development of the single-seat fighter was continued. In December 1943 a test commando had been established at Lechfeld and from May 1944 the pilots of III./ZG 26 underwent conversion training for jets. Although one of the most influential advocates of the Me 262, Hauptmann Thierfelder, was shot down in his machine, the first victories were achieved during the operational testing period. On 26 September 1944 Kommando Nowotny was founded. Major Walter Nowotny and his pilots proved from 8 August 1944 how efficient the Me 262 A-la was in aerial combat: Nowotny himself, a highly decorated commander, lost his life when shot down on 8 November 1944. Before being incorporated into JG 7, the Kommando obtained at least 17 victories.

Despite great efforts, the number of Me 262s available remained small. This was because of the advanced technology and the air raids on the assembly lines at Augsburg. The relocation of these to forests, or the construction of underground assembly facilities were both necessary, but meant fewer aircraft being produced than originally planned. Even at the end of the war the relocation of plants for Me 262 A-la assembly was incomplete. Delays in the delivery of new aircraft to individual units in the spring of 1945 prevented a smooth change­over to the Me 262, and OKL succeeded in equipping only a few fighter Gruppen, especially those ofJG 7 and KG(J) 54, with reasonable numbers.

ffensive operations were naturally to the forefront in Luftwaffe tactical thinking. In view of the enemy superiority piston-engined aircraft such as the Ju 87 and Fw 190 were ever less suitable to relieve pressure on German troops and to strike hard at the enemy. Knowing this Hider had decided that he needed aircraft able to combat a numerically superior enemy in the case of invasion. The solution appeared to him to be the Blitzbomber. These would be machines such as the Ar 234 or Me 262 which, by virtue of their great speed, would be able to operate even over regions where the enemy had aerial superiority. Because these machines were not available until the summer of 1944, and far too few Blitzbombers were on hand, their pilots’ tactical successes were modest.

Fighter Bombers

The need to engage Soviet tank groups assumed particular importance from mid-1944 once the Red Army had begun to undermine the foundations of the Eastern Front, and not only Army Group Centre was staring at disaster. An even greater material superiority was making its presence felt on the Western Front.

Despite the comparatively high achievements of the single-seater Fw 190, in the final phase of the war attacks at dusk or in the early morning were more numerous than in broad daylight and were confined mainly to areas with poor AA defences or few enemy fighters. The Fw 190 was still a very dangerous opponent in skilled hands. Its fixed weapons were normally two MG 131s built into the fuselage, and two MG 151/20s in the wing roots. Pilots would sometimes unship some of the guns to save weight.

Fw 190s would often attack the more rewarding targets in a restricted area in a ‘rolling attack’. As in anti-tank operations some of the attacking machines would tie down the enemy defences by dropping anti-personnel bombs from disposable containers. This could be either an ETC 501, 502 or 503 bomb container below the fuselage and four ETC 50s or ETC 71s below the wings. These made it possible to use all standard types of bomb. Used with small HE or hollow-charge bombs they could be extremely destructive against enemy

vehicles, whether stationary or mobile. The potential was obviously greater the larger the formation. Occasionally all machines of a Gruppe would be involved, but when few aircraft were operational a number would fly nuisance raids and perform reconnaissance or weather-reporting duty on subsequent flights.

At the beginning of 1945, SG 4 succeeded in assembling over 100 Fw 190 F-8s to hold back the Allied advance using low-level techniques. Many were lost during the flight to the target while air raids on airfields in western Germany also caused losses. Most Fw 190 fighter-bombers were grouped in three Geschwader, SG 1, SG 4 and SG 10. SG 1 had up to 115 machines; at the beginning of the year SG 10 had over 70. Major Jabo operations were carried out as a massed unit, in formation for the outward and return flights but with individual attacks.

On 10 January 1945, only SG 4, consisting of the Geschwaderstab and I. to III. Gruppen flying Fw 190s, and the night-attack Gruppen NSGr 1,2 and 20 were attached to Luftflotte Reich. Far more low-level units were distributed along the Eastern Front. With Luftflotte 6 were III./SG 3 and NSGr 3. These were equipped with only obsolete auxiliary aircraft such as the slow Ar 60 and Go 145. SG 2 and 10, and IV./SG 9 were operational at Luftflotte 4. IV./SG 9 had more than ten machines mostly Fw 190s and Ju 87s. I. and II. Gruppen had 66 Fw 190s between them. Ju 87 Ds were still being flown by III./SG 2, while SG 10 had all Fw 190 As and Fs. On 10 January 1945 another 65 of these aircraft became available.

Luftflotte 6 provided the defensive force in the central section of the Eastern Front with three Jabo Geschwader equipped with Fw 190s. SG 1 and SG 2 had two Gruppen each, SG 77 had three relatively strong Gruppen and included the specially equipped night unit NSGr 4 with 60 Ju 87s and Si 204 Ds.

By the end of January 1945 Russian armies in East Prussia had occupied virtually the whole area between Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) and Lotzen (Gyzycko) and were heading north for the Frisches Haff. Graudenz (Grudziadz) and Thorn (Toruri) were encircled and Elbing (Elblag) came under threat after strong units crossed the Narev. Further attack wedges were moving simultaneously for the territories along the Warthe and in Upper Silesia. On 1 February numerous Jabo Gruppen were operating against the Soviets in the Luftflotte 6 region. SG 1 Geschwaderstab had three Fw 190 F-8s and another 104 in I. and III. Gruppen, although only half the machines were operational. SG 2 had only two Gruppen: II./SG 2 flew the Fw 190 F-8 with anti-tank rockets, III./SG 2 the Ju 87 D-5. In SG 3,4 and 77, Fw 190 F-8s were used on operations, each having a Staffel of 12 aircraft equipped with Panzerblitz or Panzerschreck rockets.

Besides the operational Geschwader there were up to six Jabo formations consisting mostly of fighter and night-fighter units. The largest were two units of JG 300 and JG 301. The first was composed of I., II. and IV./JG 300 and 3./JGr 10, which had 109 Bf 109s and 46 Fw 190s; fighter-bomber unit JG 301 was three Gruppen plus II./ZG 76. Gefechtsverband (Battle Unit) Major Enders had been drawn up from Stab, Training SG 104 and II./SG 151, while Gefechtsverband Oberstleutnant Robert Kowaleski had crews from KG 76 plus the test commando of the Air Navigation School, Straussberg. This unit had only eight Ju 188s and five He Ills, but the crews were veterans.

At the end of January, the Soviets had assembled strong forces and surrounded Posen. The final battle against hopeless odds was fought out in the city centre between 19 and 23 February. From 13 February fighting raged at Glogau/Oder, but with air support the Germans held out until 2 April. At the beginning of February the Red Army had crossed the Oder between Kiistrin (Kostrzyn) and Frankfurt at several points and established bridgeheads on the western bank. Another strongpoint was north of Fiirstenburg. The Russians had gained ground east of Stettin (Szczecin) although the German strongpoint at Altdamm held initially. At Lauban (Lubari), German Panzers won a victory at the beginning of March after wiping out large sections of 7th Guards Armoured Corps assisted by Jabos. Between 6 and 12 March, Russian divisions broke through towards Danzig and Stolpmiinde (Ustka), being held temporarily only with the greatest effort just short of their objective.

Despite all restrictions, between 1 and 31 March 1945 1. Fliegerdivision alone flew 2,190 sorties over the Eastern Front. 172 Russian tanks and more than 250 lorries were claimed destroyed, another 70 tanks damaged. Luftwaffe Staffeln shot down 110 enemy aircraft and damaged 21 others. At 4. Fliegerdivision SG 1 flew 619 missions, SG 3 66 and SG 77 123 in March 1945. Pilots of SGI dropped 295 tonnes of bombs and 36 tonnes of disposable containers of bombs, and though few tanks and lorries were destroyed at least 26 direct hits on bridge targets were claimed.

Amongst the most important units on defensive operations in April were SG 1 with over 89 Ju 87s and Fw 190s in all. 91 Fw 190 A-8s and F-8s were operational at SG 2. Stab and II./SG 3 had about 40 Fw 190 F-8s: SG 77 had 99 operational machines in its three Gruppen. An obstacle to large numbers of operations was the shortage of fuel, as so often, and a fair number of these aircraft were to be found parked on the airfield fringes at any given time.

In a successful attack by SG 1 on 11 April, 17 Fw 190 pilots dropped the usual SC 500s, plus five SC 500s with an experimental explosive filling and 16 SD 70s on railway and bridge targets near Rathstock. On 16 April two Fw 190 F-8s were lost to Russian AA fire, but the remaining pilots destroyed a number of vehicles. During these weeks Luftflotte 6 had around 250Jabos, mostly Fw 190

F-8s, and relatively few Ju 87 Ds. This force was able to call on well over 100 Bf 109s of JG 4,JG 52 and JG 77 for protection.

Meanwhile the war had moved closer to the heart of Germany as merged German divisions, Volkssturm and reserve units could do little to stop the Allied advance. On the Autobahn at Radeberg, German pilots destroyed three tanks and blocked traffic for some time. Over Cottbus-Finsterwalde-Lubben, 62 Jabos flew numerous attacks against enemy artillery and bombed an airfield occupied by the Russians.

On 24 April VIII Fliegerkorps had four Gruppen of SG 2 and SG 77 while 3. Luftwaffen-Division had additionally three Gruppen from SG 4 and SG 9 and an anti-tank Staffel. Fw 190 pilots scored noteworthy successes. Even from positions of great numerical inferiority they were able to strike hard against the Russians in ground attacks in support of Army Group Schorner.

In the last few nights of April 1945, crews of SG 1, who had been at Gatow/Mecklenburg until 26 April, sortied to relieve the pressure on Berlin. They flew as a rule twenty operations daily over the burning city. The strength of the enemy had become overwhelming: on the night of 1 May some of the 39 Fw 190 F-8s attached to III./KG 200 dropped containers of supplies to the defenders.

Despite the precarious situation, on 3 May the Luftwaffe could still call on a number of Jabo units although operations were now greatly limited by lack of fuel and bombs. Luftflotte 4, responsible for the air support of Axmy Group

South and the Commander-in-Chief South-East, had I./SG 10 at Budweis and II./SG 10 at Weis, where the remnants of SG 9 were stationed on anti-tank duty.

I. /SG 2 pilots at Graz-Thalerhof engaged enemy forces advancing from the Alps: two more Jabo units served Seventeenth Army, these being Jabo unit Weiss with 3./NSGr 4 and II./SG 77 for night and daylight attacks respectively. Gefechts- verband Rudel, most of which was at Niemes-Sud, was composed of II./SG 2 and 10. Anti-tank Staffel. Its commander, Oberst Hans-Ulrich Rudel, had been awarded the Gold Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross on 29 December 1944.

II. /JG 6 flew fighter escort for his machines.

Luftwaffenkommando West (from 1 May 1945 Luftwaffen-Division North Alps) was made up of remnants of disbanded night-fighter units and sections from JG 27, 53 and 300, and was used increasingly at the end for low-level attacks. Although hostile operations against the Western Powers were terminated on 6 May, there was no let-up in the fight against the Russians. Strikes against their supply lines in the rear and against forward units were flown almost to the very end. When the general fuel situation at the excellent Prague aerodromes deteriorated drastically, the last aircraft there were destroyed by their pilots, although a few managed to fly out and surrender to the Americans.

Despite the successful change-over at many anti-tank Staffeln from the Ju 87 G-2 to the faster Fw 190 F-8, and the introduction of efficient rockets

such as the Panzerblitz, the collapse of the infrastructure and the lack of fuel and ammunition meant there was no possibility of holding the Western Allies at the Rhine and the Red Army at the Oder.

At times it seemed possible that Jabo jets might be the way to improve matters, but the number of available Ar 234s and Me 262s was insufficient. It is, however, worth examining the role played by these aircraft.

The Blitzbomber

The immense numerical superiority of the enemy appeared to have only one solution, which was to equip all fighter-bomber squadrons with jets. The only bomber Geschwader to be equipped and operational with the Me 262 Blitzbomber was KG 51 Edelweiss. Pilots of the single-seater ‘fast bomber’ used mainly explosive anti-personnel Red ^ anti. aircraft batteries clustered bombs or AB 250 or AB 500 containers against around ground targets caused increasingly pin-pointed targets and troop concentrations serious problems for Ju 87 crews,

behind the Western Front. On 20 July 1944

Einsatzkommando Edelweiss began attacking Allied troop formations in Normandy. In Operation Bodenplatte on 1 January 1945 during the Ardennes Offensive the unit bombed the airfields at Eindhoven and s’Hertogenbosch successfully, and maintained an offensive presence to the end of the campaign, covering the German divisions as they retreated. From mid-January they attacked targets west of the Rhine.

On 7 January the Geschwaderstab at Rheine (Major Wolfgang Schenk) had 4 Blitzbombers while I./KG 51 had 30, with 9 more on the way. II. Gruppestab had 3, but the inventory of the entire Gruppe was only 10, and 10 pilots.

III. Gruppe had been disbanded in September 1944 while IV./KG 51 had been re-designated IV.(Erg)/KG 51. This was a pilot supply Gruppe which had been at Erding since January and was disbanded in April. Only I. and II./KG 51 carried out operations. A few days after 7 January the total of Me 262s available was 58. Despite a heavy air raid at Rheine airfield, Me 262 attacks continued against targets in the Rhineland and western Ruhr. In attacks on ground targets around Kleve, 55 Me 262s of Stab and I./KG 51 took part. These massed operations failed to hold back the endless British columns. By the end of the month the attacks were ebbing for lack of fuel.

J

On 22 February, 34 Me 262s of KG 51 set out for Kleve protected by over 100 piston-engined fighters. Several KG 51 pilots were lost on this operation while a number of aircraft dropped out with turbine defects. The expected operational life of 40 hours for these engines was optimistic. Poor maintenance and inexperienced ground staff contributed to avoidable losses amongst the Edelweiss pilots.

After the bridge at Remagen fell almost intact into US hands on 7 March, early next morning the Reichsmarschall called KG 51 operations room to request volunteers to sacrifice their lives by diving bomb-carrying Me 262s into the bridge. Two pilots stepped forward but were dissuaded by their squadron commanders at the last moment. Between 13 March and 20 April, I./KG 51 used the Autobahn between Leipheim and Neu-Ulm as its operational base. Since the delivery unit of the Kuno assembly works (a factory hidden in woods near Burgau), and a similar plant near Leipheim aerodrome were nearby, this offered some limited opportunity for engine overhauls. At least two operations were flown from Giebelstadt against armour heading for Mainz, one of these against the important railway bridge at Bad Munster am Stein on 18 March 1945. These few operations fell well short of doing anything to change the situation or stop the Allied advance.

On 30 March Kammler ordered all available Blitzbombers, transferred to IX. Fliegerkorps. General der Flieger Josef Kammhuber intervened and diverted two-thirds to JG 7 and the other third to KG (J) 54 on the orders of the Luftwaffe General Staff once the Reichsmarschall had refused to hand Kammler unlimited power over IX Fliegerkorps. On 31 March jet bombers at KG 51 totalled 79, of which a number had come direct from the Leipheim production line near the Autobahn. A little later Kammler’s decision to disband the Jabo unit was overturned when Hitler ordered the resumption of ground attacks by Blitzbombers. KG 51 then received more of the aircraft, but from mid – March ever fewer were operational for lack of parts and above all fuel. The number of low-level attacks dropped, and most Allied columns arrived at their destinations unmolested.

On 18 April seven Me 262s of KG 51 attacked enemy lorries near Nuremberg, and in a skirmish with eight P-5 Is shot down one without loss. Two days later the Geschwader evacuated south as Allied troops menaced its airfields. On 20 April I./KG 51 relocated from Leipheim to Memmingen. Next day, together with JG 53 fighter pilots, a massive low-level raid was flown against long convoys near Gottingen. On 23 April two pilots attacked the bridge over the Danube at Dillingen which had been turned into a hub for the Allied advance. At this time I./KG 51 had only 12 Blitzbombers for its 43 pilots. On 25 April the last nine

airworthy Me 262s moved to Munich-Riem, and on the 26th KG 51, after taking over nine Me 262s of the stock of 44 at JV 44, fell back on Holzkirchen where it was intended to disband the Geschwader, no further missions being considered possible.