Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

Compared to the Flitzer, the Та 183 appeared much more suitable for mass production. The design for aTL-Fighter with HeS Oil powerplant (Design 1, Ra-1) presented to the Riistungsstab on 10 January 1945 seemed to increase the chances of Focke-Wulf obtaining the contract for a top-rank fighter. A swept-wing jet with a squat fuselage, designed by engineer Multhopp, it would be armed with either two MK 108s or the more powerful MK 213. The DVT (German Experimental Institute for Aviation) had calculated in January 1945
that the machine would have a top speed of 875 km/hr (544 mph) near the ground and 940 km/hr at 7,000 metres (584 mph at 23,000 ft).

Design 2, Ra-4 from 1945 was to be of steel and wood construction for reasons of economy and to avoid using duraluminum and other high value materials in short supply. In the last version at the beginning of 1945, two large additional fuel tanks were envisaged to increase the range. March 1945 plans have at least two MK 108s with 100 rounds each, but though planning was well advanced nothing had come of this design by the capitulation.

The main effort was concentrated on the Ra-2, a flying mock-up of the future Та 183 with a Jumo 004 turbine. Basic performance calculations and the construction of the fuselage of Та 183 V-l (Ra-2) were completed in March, the second mock-up Та 183 V-2 (Ra-3) would be tested operationally with an HeS 011 powerplant. Work on improved control surfaces, turbine installation and wing fuel tanks was still in hand on 29 March. An increase in armament to four MK 108s, first thought of in Designs 2 and 3 was taken up and the possibility of adding two MK 103s studied. From a typed page dated 18 February

1945 it seems that the development team considered release gear for a 500-kg (1,100-lb) bomb-load. This resulted from the continuing interest of the OKL in machines which could do a stint as fighter-bombers.

In a concluding conference at the EHK (Main Development Commission) on 27 and 28 February 1945 there was unexpected agreement on Focke-Wulf project No. 279 as ‘an immediate solution. RLM number 183 was rejected by the Office for Aircraft Development on technical flight and tactical grounds, the Messer- schmitt ‘optimum solution for tailless construction being favoured. The overall result for the Та 183 was that two prototypes only would be produced in a short series at Detmold. Focke-Wulf wanted ten prototypes and two fuselages (Та 183 M-l to M-12) within four months. The Riistungsstab did not make clear for security reasons whether mass production was likely at the end of it all. Before anything further could be undertaken the Allies overran the factories and all the planning went to waste. On 8 April units of the US 84th Infantry Division occupied Bad Eilsen and district.

Although the situation was in reality hopeless, at the end of April the new four – turbine Ar 234 versions began to arrive at unit. The first pair of Ar 234 C-3s (Works Numbers 250002 and 250004) arrived at Alt-Lonnewitz in the second half of March, and were test-flown on the 27th by Unteroffizier Eheim. During these flights, Knight s Cross holder Lukesch – according to some reports – reached an altitude of about 15,000 metres (49,000 ft). Another three Ar 234 C-3s arrived at the beginning of April at III./EKG 1. These were listed for pilot training.

By 16 April, Russian armies had assembled between the Neisse Estuary and the Oder for the final offensive on Berlin. III./EKG 1, the operational training Gruppe at Alt-Lonnewitz, could soon hear artillery fire, and on 19 April the unit transferred to Pilsen, bringing all serviceable operational and training machines to safety. One Ar 234 C-3 crashed on landing for unknown reasons.

Lukesch flew the penultimate machine, an Me 262 B-la, with his leading ground technician as passenger. After Hauptmann Reymann followed him in an Me 262, the installations were blown up. After the second Ar 234 C-3 was destroyed in an air raid at Pilsen, at the end of April the stock of jet bombers was reduced to one Ar 234 C-3 and a few Ar 234 B-2s.

On 27 April III./EKG 1 transferred to Pocking am Inn on the orders of the Airfield Servicing Company (FBK) in order to avoid being cut off. Pocking is 20 kilometres south­west of Passau. Shortly before the transfer the Germans were surprised by an air raid in which all but two of the jet bombers were either damaged or wrecked. Eventually only one C-3 and one B-2 arrived at Pocking. The last serviceable C-3 was blown up shortly before the arrival of US forces. The last III./EKG 1

machine, an Ar 234 B-2, was flown by Oberfeldwebel Oepen to Horsching (Linz) and handed over to l.(F)100. On 29 April, III./EKG 1 was disbanded by Luftflotte 6.

Besides the Ar 234 C-3 which arrived on 28 April, III./KG 76 received a further four up to 3 May. One of these was the former prototype Ar 234 V-25 (RK+EO) coming from Brandenburg-Briest. It had touched down first at Warnemiinde on 15 April, from where it flew to Kaltenkirchen on 1 May. As the B-4 fuel needed for the BMW 003 turbines was almost impossible to obtain, attempts by KG 76 to test-fly the aircraft as ordered were unsuccessful at the outset. Two or three missions were flown after arrival. In one of these, British positions south of Bremervorde were attacked on 3 May. The following day terms for unconditional surrender to the Western Allies in northern Germany were accepted, and the remaining operational machines at KG 76, insofar as they were serviceable, were flown north using the last drops of fuel to be surrendered to British forces.

On the basis of experience gained with the local-defence fighter the idea was pursued from July 1944. Although the production of special fuel for the Me 163 lagged because of heavy air raids day and night on the chemical industries, thought was given to even smaller rocket-powered local fighters. The Luftwaffe, and Waffen-SS in particular, set great store by the deployment of such aircraft in huge numbers in order to break down Allied air superiority, since industry could produce ten of these small fighters for every Bf 109 K-4 or Fw 190 D-9.

The lightweight machine would be truly mass – produced. In various modifications it became increasingly simplified, so that in the end the Chief-TLR and the Development Commission were looking at a miniature rocket-propelled fighter which was a cross between a manned flak rocket, a midget rocket aircraft and the Heimatschutzer (or ‘Protector of the Homeland’ as the Me 262 was sometimes known). One of the most promising designs was Heinkel s Julia, the rival to Bachem’s Natter. As another alternative solution, the further development of the Me 262 C design was pursued until near the war’s end.

Following the missions against the Normandy invasion fleet in the summer of 1944, there was a pause in Mistel activities for several months which was only brought to an end when the necessity arose to demolish bridges and so protect Reich territory. On 30 January the Luftwaffe General Staff incorporated KG(Jagd) 30 into KG 200 as Mistel Gruppe II./KG 200, revoking earlier plans to convert the unit to the Me 262. Pilots were trained at Prague from February where losses occurred due to the unusual flight configuration and enemy fighters.

Operation Eisenhammer, the planned destruction of important targets in the USSR, had less sense behind it with every passing day. According to British aerial reconnaissance on 24 February, for example, Mistel operations were being planned against British fleet units from occupied Denmark. The Eastern Front had become catastrophic. A numerically and materially superior enemy faced assorted weak German units whose Panzers and heavy artillery often existed only on paper. Fuel was so scarce that it could only be released in the direst emergency. The Luftwaffe therefore looked for opportunities to strike at the enemy lines of supply, particularly by attacks on the Vistula bridges used by the Red Army.

On 1 March KG 200’s Kommodore, Oberstleutnant Baumbach, ordered the bridges at Deblin, Sandomierz and Warsaw destroyed. Six M 1 and eight M 3B

Mistel were to attack all three simultaneously if the weather was right. Three attack groups with three, five and six Mistel, each with three pathfinders, was assembled. The Mistel would start from Burg near Magdeburg and Jiiterbog Damm, heading for Warsaw with the fighter cover keeping below the clouds. Flight leader was Oberleutnant Pilz (II./KG 200). The guidance Bf 109s were to land afterwards at Stolp, Vietker-Strand or Kolberg (Kolobrzeg); the Fw 190 pilots had longer range and could make for the nearest airfields in Bohemia or Saxony. Because of bad weather, this promising attack was called off at the last moment and provisionally cancelled.

On 8 March four Mistel from II./KG 200 controlled tactically by Battle Unit Helbig (an ad hoc force commanded by Oberst Helbig and comprising various bomber and other units) attacked important Oder bridges at Goritz. The first Ju 88 bomb received a hit to rudder and ailerons and fell well wide of the target. The second struck the railway bridge dead centre and collapsed it. Ju 88 and Ju 188 escort aircraft kept the enemy anti-aircraft batteries quiet using ten AB 500 (SD1) and 22 AB 70 (SD1) bombs although a Ju 188 A-2 was hit by ground fire and crashed south-west of Fiirstenwalde after the crew baled out. JG 11 provide fighter cover to the Oder.

By 21 March, II./KG 200 had 14 older M 1 pairs, two M 2s and 17 M 3s. A KG 200 report dated 28 March complained that Mistel operations against pontoon or other emergency bridges were uneconomic and ineffective because the crossings were narrow and thus very difficult to hit. In the opinion of Werner Baumbach sticks of bombs or guided bombs were far more likely to be successful.

Operations against bridges often failed because the Mistel tactic was not very suitable for mobile commands. It was difficult to avoid disorganisation when transferring Mistel between airfields. Because of Allied air superiority Mistel could realistically only operate by night. Most Fw 190 pilots would not be able to return to base, despite the best navigational aids, without lengthy night flying training. Often the weather forecast for the attack zone was unreliable and a long-range reconnaissance aircraft collected information for the attack and reported the local weather.

The next Mistel attack was protected by 24 fighters from JG 52 and was led by two Ju 88 S-3 and Ju 188 pathfinders. Five Mistel set off from Burg on 31 March for the huge railway bridge at Steinau/Oder (Scinawa). Two Mistel dropped out with engine trouble early on, but the other three scored a near-miss and a hit on the central section of the bridge despite the Russian anti-aircraft fire.

On 1 April the unit had only 8 Mistel M 1,2 M 2s and 12 M 3s available. Of these, only the Mistel 2s and one Mistel 3 were operational immediately. The Steinau bridge was attacked again on 1 April using the II./KG 200 force. The six Mistel were each accompanied by two Ju 88s and Ju 188s as director aircraft, and 24 Bf 109s of JG 52 as fighter escorts. The aircraft took off between 0723 and 0735 for the 90-minute flight to the target. The first Mistel Ju. 88 suffered rudder failure and fell wide, another hit the eastern side of the bridge where it caused extensive damage. The third functioned normally and was probably a hit. The other three Mistel aborted. One pilot flew clear at separation when his hydraulics failed. The Ju 88 bomb dived into the ground but failed to explode. Another Mistel had engine problems, the pilot turning back at Torgau over the Elbe, and after his engine failed at Gorlitz he parachuted down. The Ju 88s and Ju 188s accompanying the Mistel dropped two SC 1000s containing the highly explosive Trialen mixture over the western bridgehead, obtaining near misses at the foot of the bridge and near the railway station. Towards 1038 the last Fw 190 returned to base. Overall the operation could not be classified as a success.

The last Mistel was building at Merseburg on 6 April, but then cancelled. Other Mistel stood ready. On 7 April II./KG 200 had 18 Ju 88 A-4s and S-3s, and 8 Ju 188s operational, and 8 Mistel 1, 2 Mistel 2 and 14 Mistel 3. The Kommodore of KG(Jagd) 30 reported to Luftflotte 6 on 8 April that he had 24 Mistel located at Oranienburg, Parchim, Peenemiinde and Rechlin-Larz, plus two reserves for the revived operation against the Vistula bridges at Warsaw. After an air attack wiped out the Parchim Mistel, on 9 April the Kommodore redistributed the pilots for the attack on the southernmost bridge, and after a favourable weather report was received at 1849 hrs, Luftflotte 6 decided to go ahead with the operation.

At take-off there were major delays at Oranienburg since the command was informed late, and the crews were eventually stood down because of engine problems. At Peenemiinde the first Mistel would not start. Misunderstandings with the ground crew leader led to delay and a reserve aircraft was not fuelled-up because of shortage of fuel. The first to go moved off at last, crashed while taxying and burnt out. This blocked the runway and grounded the other five Mistel.

The take-off distance between each Mistel of only three minutes was too short, at least eight minutes, better ten, would have been more reasonable. Night take­offs in darkness were only possible at Oranienburg or Rechlin-Larz, but not at Peenemiinde or the Heinkel reserve airfield Rostock-Marienehe. This meant that the operation had to be rescheduled. The next start – with a full moon and hoped-for cloudless skies – would not be possible for another four days.

The day came, and five Mistel taxied out to the runway. Only one of the Fw 190s returned. The pilots of three others parachuted down, one wounded and landing near Giistrow, another coming to earth at Stade. A pilot jumped clear from the Mistel around 0200 over Miincheberg after compass failure and the next pair had to disengage when surprised by enemy fighters. Only one Mistel arrived over the Vistula at Warsaw. The long and well planned attack was ruined. The target was well illuminated by 237 LC 50s dropped by 15 He 111 H pathfinders of II./KG4, but the Ju 88 guided bomb missed. Four Bf 109s flying
escort were lost, one wounded pilot being rescued; two others were never found. The problems could all have been quickly resolved but for the lack of experienced officers at the distant bases.

A number of the now experienced fliers were seconded to the National Socialist Command Staff for Propaganda. This hampered preparations for Operation Eisenhammer, and Oberst Baumbach argued that it should be abandoned. The fronts had shrunk and further reduced the chances of Mistel operations. The poor weather conditions also played a role. On 9 April a Ju 88 S-3 of KG(Jagd) 30 flew weather reconnaissance over Graudenz-Thorn – Bromberg (Bydgoszcz)-Warsaw-Posen, often at low level, between 1840 and 2310 hrs for Operation Weichsel. At 2145 hrs the aircraft dropped eight SD 70s over Warsaw inner city. On that day the Red Army had only one railway bridge in usable condition, two others were being hastily repaired and besides fourteen road bridges, three others were being constructed by Russian sappers.

On 10 April the infrastructure at Larz aerodrome was damaged in an air raid, although the Mistels, which were in the open, seem to have escaped. The next operation followed on 11 April when 15 Fw 190s of III./JG 6 flew escort for six Mistel of KG 30 heading for the bridge over the Autobahn at Queisse. A direct hit was scored, another Mistel fell 50 metres short of the bridge approach, a third struck the railway viaduct nearby. The fourth was released prematurely with an engine fire and spun down out of control. The pilots had no knowledge of the other two as they were lost to sight after release. A Mistel attack the following

day on a railway bridge at Kiistrin was a failure. It was becoming ever more difficult to organise sufficient fuel for these missions.

On 17 April, Battleunit Helbig was ordered by Luftflotte 6 to destroy immediately the single track railway line re-established on the bridge at Steinau. Shortly afterwards VIII. Fliegerkorps agreed to supply at least 25 fighters as Mistel escorts for the late afternoon of 18 April. The Russian advance had to be halted without regard to German losses and so save Berlin. The majority of the German divisions had been defeated, or were resisting in their trenches with courage born of desperation. Neither reinforcements nor supplies were to be expected.

The planned major attack by three Mistel groups on bridges over the Vistula on 24 April proceeded partially. Only those aircraft starting from Peenemiinde, seven Mistel and three Ju 188 escort groups, got up: the other two groups broke off for pre-flight problems. Only two Mistel pilots returned.

On 30 April the last four Mistel at Peenemiinde were manned by KG 200 pilots for an attack on the Oder bridge at Tantow. The first combination turned back with technical problems soon after take-off. The other three reached the bridge at 0900 hrs. The attack was not a success. The second Mistel Ju 88 was shot down by fighters. The Fw 190 pilot flew his aircraft back to Peenemiinde. The third Fw 190 and pilot were never found. Only the fourth hit the bridge.

These desperate operations ordered by the Luftwaffe leadership showed how easily the hope for a positive outcome with these ‘solutions’could be disappointed. Numerous pilots paid with their lives for a few hits. Yet at the beginning of 1945, even very experienced Luftwaffe pilots were ready, in the face of the hopeless situation, to plunge with their machines into a bridge. In the rarest cases they may have been ordered to do so.

For the foregoing reasons, none of the new design – Та 154, He 219, Ju 88 and all other twin-engined night fighters – produced a really outstanding
performance in flight. Experiments with under-fuselage turbines proved too costly. The only reasonable solution was to use jet fighters and on 12 December 1944 OKL ordered the setting up of two ‘Jet Night Fighter Commandos’: Kommando Welter led by Leutnant Kurt Welter with three Me 262s, and Kommando Bisping, led by Hauptmann Josef Bisping with three Ar 234s.

OKL’s demand for the medium term was a night fighter with two heavy HeS Oil turbines and a crew of two or three. The efficient Bremen 0 radar and offensive armament of four 30mm MGs and rockets made these aircraft the ultimate weapon for night-fighter operations. To gather practical experience a number of ‘auxiliary night fighters’ converted from available operational Me 262 A-las were ordered from Arado and Messerschmitt, but work advanced slowly. Deutsche Lufthansa only completed the first Me 262 B-la/Ul ‘auxiliary night fighter’at its Berlin-Staaken hangar in February 1945.

On 18 October 1944, Leutnant Welter, a Knight’s Cross holder with 33 victories, was given the opportunity to test the Me 262 as a night fighter, and took over his small command on 2 November 1944. In close cooperation with 1. Flakdivision (Berlin), he flew his first night sortie on 27 November using a loaned, slighdy modified Me 262 A-la. He shot down an RAF Mosquito, his fourth victory with the Me 262 that month. As his unit did not have Me 262s initially, his pilots were given Bf 109 G-lOAs and G-14As. Welter, promoted to Oberleutnant in December, continued operational training at night with the day fighter. The instrument panel had a second turn indicator and better illumination. During flights with this experimental aircraft Welter trained himself for his further air victories in the coming weeks. His grasp of night flying a jet aircraft quickly revolutionised the art. Welter trained the first of his pilots on a two-seat Me 262 B-la (ЕЗФ04) at Rechlin-Larz under conditions no more favourable than for day-fighter trainees. As a rule the men flew five or six short instruction flights before becoming operational.

Because of the desperate need for jet fighters with the day units, especially JG 7 and KG(J) 54, it was extremely difficult for Welter to obtain Me 262s. On 3 January 1945 his command received its first new Me 262 A-l; two others followed during the month. Despite the lack of aircraft, by 24 January the Kommando had accounted for two four-engined bombers and three Mosquitos. Four more jets arrived in February, but not the agreed Me 262 B-la/Ul. The first of these was probably wrecked near the Rechlin test centre during a test flight in February. Operational training and missions with the single seaters were continued from Burg aerodrome near Magdeburg. On the night of 10 February an Me 262 of 2. Jagddivision engaged a Mosquito in searchlight beams near a protected installation. On 15 February two Me 262 A-las operated in a single night. On 22 Februarv during an anti-Mosquito flight over 2. Jagddivision territory three Mosquitos were destroyed. From then on, mission followed mission.

On 28 February Kommando Welter became 10./NJG 11, part of Oberst Heinrich Wittmers 1. Jagddivision. Two weeks later six more Me 262 A-la’s arrived at Burg, and with these aircraft 10. Staffel pilots flew more than 40 sorties. At the end of March the unit received another single seater and a two-seater conversion. According to the delivery note the latter machine was not a B-la/U-1 but the В-2 series conversion. Those Me 262 A-la series aircraft converted into two-seaters at Stade were given alternative armament, mostly two MK 108s or two MG 151/20s.

After mid-March many 10./NJG 11 pilots had enough Me 262 tactical experience to increase their tally of victims. The total was 19 including five alone on 22 March. Next day the unit possessed nine Me 262 fighters, mostly single- seaters. On 7 April the next two-seater arrived at Burg. The two-seaters were not completely serviceable, however, because of serious problems with the two jettisonable 300-litre fuel tanks. Despite all difficulties, the number of enemy bombers destroyed by 10./NJG 11 rose quickly to 33, but, by 10 April, 10 of the 19 Me 262s had been lost, most to crew error or technical defects. In a heavy raid that day on Oranienburg aerodrome near Berlin, four Me 262s of 10./JG 7 and a rare converted Me 262 two-seater previously with Kommando Welter were lost. The aircraft had been stationed there for comparison flights against other high-speed night fighters, including the Ar 234 auxiliary night fighter and the Do 335 M-10. In a simultaneous raid on Burg airfield, 10./NJG 11 lost four of its Me 262s.

On 12 April the number of operational machines was four. Eight days later these flew from Burg to Blankensee/Lubeck. After 10./NJG 11 was bombed there the following day, the machines flew to Reinfeld to use the Autobahn as their operations base, the first operational 10./NJG 11 flights from the road beginning on 21 April. Because of the lack of infrastructure only sporadic flights were possible, and on 30 April Welter transferred to Schleswig. The last operations were flown on 2 May after a few Me 262s arrived at Blankensee. On 7 May the pilots and some of the ground staff moved from Liibeck to Schleswig – Jagel and surrendered there to British forces, who thus came into possession of four operational Me 262 A-las and two grounded but undamaged two-seaters parked on the airfield boundary.

By the capitulation 75 missions had been flown in which 43 enemy aircraft had been destroyed at night and five by day. Besides damage from flying debris, an Me 262 was lost by collision while engaging a Mosquito. Of the aerial victories, Kurt Welter was credited with 22 Mosquitos and two Lancaster bombers using Y- or Egon direction. He claimed other successes but lacked witnesses to substantiate. It is probable that the Staffelkapitan shot down around 30 Allied machines using the Me 262. Oberfeldwebel Fritz Reichenbach obtained six successes by night and one by day, Feldwebel Karl-

Heinz Becker six by night and two by day. An experimental upwards-firing MG 131 was installed behind the cockpit of Becker’s Me 262 A-l ‘Red 7’. His first success was an American Lightning on 19 February which exploded after receiving up to 39 З-cm AP rounds. Flying wreckage damaged his left turbine. By 22 March he had shot down at least six Mosquitos. His last report is dated 25 April. Oberfeldwebel Gustav Richarts was in fourth place with four Me 262 victories by night. The short operational period proved that fast jets were suited to night operations.

The same could not be said for the Ar 234 night fighter. As with so many futuristic ideas, OKL had given too much thought to the project before placing the contract. Within a short period Arado responded with a high-performance night fighter based on the Ar 234 В-2. By the end of 1944, a total of 30 machines had been converted to night fighters at Sagan and Alt-Lonnewitz. The first experimental aircraft was Ar 234 В-2 (SM+FE) which had flown only twice on night tests by 26 November 1944 and was seriously damaged while making a night landing in mid-December.

On 12 December 1944 OKL ordered the formation of a small test unit for Ar 234 night fighters under Hauptmann Josef Bisping. By mid-January 1945 only a few flights had been made using the repaired Ar 234 B-2. Frequent technical problems interfered with the test programme, which was suspended at the beginning of February. During this period another Ar 234 B-2 was slighdy damaged during a night flight.

On 13 February Bisping and his radioman, Hauptmann Albert Vogl, were killed during a night take-off at Oranienburg as the result of crew error. On 1 March Bisping’s replacement, Hauptmann Kurt Bonow, reported that, besides the first accident, three other Ar 234 B-2s had been lost at night possibly as a result of reflections in the perspex nose. To reduce the problem the lower part of the perspex nose and the entire underside of the fuselage was given a coat of matt black paint.

On 26 March Kommando Bisping was renamed Kommando Bonow (Ar 234). At the end of the month the second experimental machine Ar 234 B-2/N and a third (Works No. 140608) were declared airworthy. In subsequent flights it was reported that the FuG 218 radar aerial assembly caused speed loss, while the high fuel consumption and relatively short endurance made the Ar 234 B-2N a poor prospect as a night fighter. In April 1945 another auxiliary converted by Deutsche Lufthansa arrived at the Bonow unit, probably one of the three Ar 234 B-2Ns previously at Werneuchen.

After all operational aircraft were grounded for a while, one became available for duty in early April. Two officers, Oberleutnante Gustav Francsi and Joachim Piitzkiikl, joined Bonow s unit, the latter newcomer taking Ar 234 B-2 (Works No. 140608) up for five training flights before failing to return from a mission over Berlin. Between 5 and 9 April Hauptmann Bonow and radioman Oberfeldwebel Beppo Marchetti flew five missions over Berlin against RAF

Mosquitos, but despite the speed advantage no kills were claimed even though the target aircraft often came within firing range.

Numerous bomb hits on Oranienburg aerodrome on 10 April practically put the airfield out of commission for jet fighter testing. Accordingly KdE ordered the commando back to Rechlin. An air attack in the early afternoon of 15 April caused further serious damage at Oranienburg. The sole remaining operational machine was flown to southern Germany by one of the Oberleutnante on Kurt Bonow s orders since the general situation even at Rechlin was extremely difficult. Oranienburg fell to the Russians shortly after 24 April.

In parallel with the operational testing, Arado was attempting to develop a high-performance night fighter. The Ar 234 B-2N was merely a quick interim solution before the Ar 234 C-3N or better still C-5N and the next variant C-7N became operational. On 9 January Ar 234 V-27 was the first experimental version of a C night fighter. Because of the heavy fuel consumption of the C-3, the Bad Weather and Night Fighter Development Special Commission cancelled the C-3 and C-5 as night fighters on 20 January and laid everything on the twin-jet Ar 234 C-7/N and Ar 234 P-1, both of which had a stepped cockpit. Neither had any chance of being series-produced. In comparison to the Me 262, the Ar 234 was less well suited for use as a night fighter. It had been built primarily as a bomber and was not so good in the turns as an Me 262 converted day fighter. All efforts at Arado to make the Ar 234 B-2 or C-3 into a useful night fighter by a number of expensive modifications led nowhere.

It is not well known that at the beginning of 1945 efforts were made to turn the Go 229 into a night fighter. This was a two-seater, all-weather machine based on the planned Go 229 A-l. The first designs were prepared in the spring of 1945. The aircraft would have had an FuG 244 Bremen 0 radar in the specially enlarged forward fuselage. ‘Flying-wing’ aircraft were already in existence as mock-ups for the night-fighter role, but did not proceed beyond March 1945.

The many designs, dating from 1944, at the Focke-Wulf project bureau at Bad Eilsen and proposing the creation of a superior night fighter with mixed propulsion remained on the drawing board. A combination of integral DB 603 N, Jumo 222 C/D or Argus As 413 J and two BMW 003 turbines below the wings was planned. The fixed armament was exchangeable: four MK 108s or two MK 103s and two MK 213s or one MK 112/412 and two MK 108s. The Bremen 0 radar would have been the best available. Similar designs were produced at Dornier, but the planning at Focke-Wulf and Dornier was thought too expensive by the Chief-TLR and the Jagerstab to have a chance of a series run, as was the Focke-Wulf design for a triple HeS 011 turbine night-fighter jet.

The only night fighter jet which had a chance of being series-produced in the first half of 1945 was the Me 262 B-2 with HeS Oil turbines and FuG 240 Berlin 0 radar. The improved night fighter, the two-seater Me 262 with

He S ОНА turbines, or the three seater version in the advanced planning stage at Oberammergau, would have been a dangerous handful for any enemy aircraft. The planned use of the two HeS 01 IB turbines and the installation of the FuG 240 radar with dish antenna would have provided the Luftwaffe with a superior night fighter, but the development lost its point after March 1945.

ardly any subject in modern history contains as much explosive potential as the end of the Second World War in Europe. It was an epoch of complete social, cultural and technological upheaval. After the fall of National Socialism and its allies a new age began in Western Europe. In the realm of military and aviation history this period was revolutionary. The eclipse of the piston engine and the introduction of electronic detection equipment, rockets and airborne weapons in previously unknown quantities changed the face of air warfare. The tragic course of the wars final months in the aviation sector left its traces not only in Germany. Allied forces thrusting to the heart of Germany were followed closely by scientific units and headhunters, who formed an important part of the team, for it was essential not only to disarm the enemy, to deprive Hitler s Germany of its last chance of resistance, but also to grab as much of its military and technical know­how as possible. The aviation and motor industries had numerous surprises ready. In the final chaotic weeks of the war, lorry-loads of secret files disappeared along the road to the legendary Alpine Redoubt – and specialist firms such as Mauser with its newest revolver-cannons, or the Heinkel development offices in Bavaria, insofar as their whereabouts were known, were well worth locating. Many of the discoveries came as a complete surprise when the excellent camouflage concealing them was unveiled. Now that the fifty-year mark has been passed, the time has arrived to begin the disclosure of the top secret files of the wartime German aviation industry, and many a surprise certainly awaits us.

Plans to regain air supremacy by the use of modern fighter aircraft were drawn up at Messerschmitt Augsburg and later Oberammergau. The Messerschmitt

works had been relocated in a bombproof subterranean gallery near the abandoned Gebirgsjager barracks not far from the latter market town. At Augsburg the main factory was increasingly targeted by Allied bombers. Me PI 101 project was conceived in the summer of 1944. A simple method of construction with easily obtained materials was sought. All machines were required to have excellent flight characteristics and be capable of a short take-off. OKL had also demanded good armament and easy maintenance in the field. By October 1944 the planned machine had been wind-tunnel tested intensively with various wing configurations. After the construction of several prototypes, these would then be tried out with two MK 108s. Turbine was to be either a Jumo 004B or HeS Oil. Take-off from even small runways would be rocket – assisted. The Me PI 101 was offered to the Rustungsstab as a fighter-bomber, interceptor and all-weather aircraft.

The first rig, Me Pi 101 V-l, on which Me 262 A-la outer wing sections were used, had its wings swept back 40 degrees. The second set of wings was manufactured in February in the Autobahn tunnel at Leonberg, and tests could only be carried out on the ground, not during flight because the behaviour of variable wing geometries remained to be determined.

In February work proceeded intensively to prepare for Me PI 101 series production, the basic planning being concluded on 22 February 1945. Development was continued in the Upper Bavarian Research Institute at

The Messerschmitt Me P 1110 was a futuristic design for a single-seat jet fighter with single HeS Oil turbine and outstanding armament.

Oberammergau. The final modifications in March 1945 involved improved control surfaces, completing the equipment and armament, and preparing the first series run of the single-seater.

When work on the prototype was close to completion and a mock-up of an HeS Oil powerplant had been installed, the machine was damaged, or possibly sabotaged, by marauding forced labourers or Messerschmitt personnel. Lodged finally in Hall 615, on 7 May 1945 it came under the scrutiny of American experts. On 21 May 1945, 85 men of the Bell Corporations field team arrived. The documentation was found by British, French and American military and scientific teams and confiscated. Later the Bell Corporation turned out two experimental aircraft (X-5) based on the Me Pi 101, trials of which continued into the early 1950s.

An almost forgotten chapter of the air war was the enforced use of multi-seater night fighters as Jabos (fighter-bombers). On account of the lack of operational aircraft for night operations at the end of 1944, the gap was bridged by the plentiful night-fighter arm.

The Ju 88 G-7 ‘Mosquito-hunter’was only built as an experimental machine.

During the Ardennes Offensive of December 1944-January 1945 IV./NJG 3 crews had flown operations along the southern flank of the attack near Metz and Nancy to seal off the battlefield. Night low-level attacks on railway targets were of special interest. In addition to IV./NJG 3, I./NJG 4 and I. and IV./NJG 6 were redeployed, enabling 32 machines to attack Bastogne convoy traffic. Between 17 December 1944 and 1 January 1945 the two NJG 6

Gruppen flew ten fighter-bomber operations using SD 1,10,15, 50, 500 and SC 500 release containers. During one attack an American Northrop P-60 Black Widow night fighter was shot down. NJG 6 lost nine crews during the nightly low-level missions.

On the night of 1 January, IV./NJG 3 scored some successes during assaults on railways in the west despite repeated encounters with Black Widows. As these were easy to out-manoeuvre, the highly skilled Ju 88 pilots saw them as inoffensive provided they were spotted in time. The Allied medium AA fire, however, continued to exact its toll of Ju 88 G-6 bombers.

After V./NJG 2 completed night-fighter training in January 1945, night Jabo training commenced. For this purpose Ju 88 G-6 night fighters were made available. The radar aerial installation was removed and the machines fitted with bomb-release gear. Training began on 3 January at Neubiberg. From mid – February flight training was cut back for shortage of fuel. In March 1945 flying was only possible on four days. The Reichsbahn provided two decommissioned locomotives for gunnery practice.

On the night of 9 April, five Ju 88 night fighters left Schleissheim to attack ground targets in the Karlsruhe-Mannheim-Oppenheim-Kirn-Landstuhl area. More than 20 heavy lorries were left in flames. These low-level operations were very dangerous because the convoys were well protected by AA. On 10 April five Bf 110 G-4s attached to 7./NJG 6 searched the Mannheim-Strasbourg – Pirmasens area and set afire numerous heavy lorries, little defence being offered. On 11 April night-fighter crews sought targets in the Eisenach-Ohrdruf-Erfurt area. A number of enemy supply transports driving with headlights were bombed and strafed with machine-gun fire. No aircraft were lost. These attacks were little

Drawing of the mixed-propulsion Do 335 B-6 night fighter. Expensive projects of this kind had no prospect of being realised after 1944.

At the end of 1944 the Do 350 was one of two jet versions being planned as the successor to the planned piston-driven Do 335 night fighter.

more than nuisance raids and no significant interruption of the enemy traffic was to be expected with so few aircraft.

Constant attacks by low-flying Allied aircraft against airfield dispersal areas caused increasing losses of Luftwaffe machines. Although these were well protected by machine guns and light flak, it was risky to be in the open around the airfields. Allied aircraft repeatedly attacked planes parked on the airfield boundaries. On the night of 14 April Thuringia was the main target for the night fighters. Crews of I./NJG 6 for example attacked ground positions in the Augsburg area. On 20 April several night fighters were sent to bomb a small bridge near Rastatt. The result is not recorded. Several attacks were made from Neubiberg against enemy airfields in Alsace. Major Siebel of IV./NJG 6 failed to return from probably the last of these on the night of 30 April. The other crews were made prisoner over the next few days. In view of the losses sustained it is clear that these operations did not inflict any grievous damage on the enemy. The night raids disrupted supply traffic to a minor extent, but this was of such a size in 1945 that it scarcely mattered.

Cannon Fodder

The desire for small or midget fighters which were cheap to turn out led from the summer of 1944 to a stream of suggested solutions, amongst them Arado’s Ar E 381 project for a small, well-armoured parasite design (that is one carried in the early stages of its flight by a ‘mother’aircraft). These small rocket-propelled aircraft with narrow fuselage cross-section and recumbent pilot not only provided enemy air gunners with little to aim at, but the protection was proportionately lighter than with full-size aircraft. This armour was mainly designed to protect the cockpit and the rocket unit. The Ar E 381 design of 1 December 1944 was for a machine only 4.95 metres (16 ft 3 in) long with an 8.5-metre (27 ft 10 in) wingspan. Two dismantled aircraft could be transported in the back of a long lorry. Because of the small size there was not much room for a fuel tank in the fuselage and probably only one attack could have been flown. For this reason Arado suggested that the fighter should be carried to its operational altitude by an Ar 234 C jet bomber. Once released the Ar E 381 would glide away, then build up speed under rocket propulsion, before diving into an Allied bomber formation at high velocity.

The Ar 234 C would follow in support of the parasite fighter whose attack would be made with a single MK 108 gun (45 rounds) located on the upper fuselage. The gunsight was a Revi 16 reflector sight or alternative. The pilot was protected by a massive armoured windshield. Contact with the mother aircraft was by EiV intercom radio unit.

To spare expense the parasite fighter was slung below the fuselage bay of the

Ar 234 and for this reason the pilot had to be recumbent. On returning to the ground the aircraft would deploy a parachute to soften the skid impact, enabling landings on even small areas. The pilot would land by preference near a highway, a glider landing field or a meadow. The fighter was easy to dismantle for quick return to its airfield. The demountable assembly consisted of three parts: the wings, the fuselage with cockpit and engine, and the tailplane. For ground maintenance the weapon and cover, perspex nose, skid and engine plant with cover could all be removed.

The low production cost of the parasite fighter, the ease of assembly and the separate involvement of fighter and parent aircraft favoured the Ar E 381/ Ar 234 C-3 combination. On 5 December 1944 Arado submitted a project proposal to the Chief-TLR for approval, but as all Ar 234 developments took second place behind the He 162 A-l and A-2, and the Me 262 A-l and A-2

by virtue of the Fuhrer-edict of 27 March 1945, further work on the Ar E 381 was suspended.

As the operational targets became ever more distant and ever greater payloads were being carried, the Mistel arrangement became more complicated. One idea in August 1944 was to convert 100 He 177 A-З or A-5 to Mistel bombs for dropping on pin-point targets. The order for 98 of the 100 conversions was cancelled, however, in September 1944. In a conference on 20 November 1944 attended by General-Engineer Rudolf Hermann, the future use of the He 177 was discussed and Heinkel asked for a timetable to be set for the two machines. Each conversion required 7,500 man-hours. At the end of November Heinkel stated that, if so instructed, the first He 177 Mistel could be ready for testing in ten days, the second in fifteen. The first machine would be completed on 6 December and the other on 14 December 1944. The only foreseeable problem was the finked guidance system.

For the series conversion of 50 machines, Heinkel-Siid at Eger Werke estimated at first four to eight weeks, then four months ‘provided they were given

the necessary labour’. On 2 December it seemed clear that from the beginning of 1945 only 20 conversions could be started. RLM required only two machines definitely, however, and the first was promised to be ready for transfer to Nordhausen on 8 December. This date was not met.

On 8 January the Technical Directorate at Heinkel set the completion date for the first He 177 Mistel for 1 February, and 15 February for the second, but the two He 177/Fw 190 Misteh were already doubtful in early January. Some of the construction hangars at Zwolfaxing could not be heated for shortage of coal. All energy was being concentrated for He 162 production at Heidfeld to guarantee the night shift would be able to work, although the frequent power cuts made work almost impossible at Heinkel Slid. On 28 January the Mistel project was suspended indefinitely ‘for lack of coal’. The He 162 enjoyed unrestricted priority over all work at Heinkel Vienna. On 12 March the ‘Great Mistel’ was abandoned and the only existing guidance control system for the pairing shipped away. The majority of the Heinkel workers on the Mistel project were reallocated to the Volksjager.