Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

The heavy Luftwaffe losses led to ever younger pilots filling the gaps in the ranks. Both the NSFK and the Hitler Youth could not remain inactive. New operational pilots, especially for the He 162, were to be trained at the Reich Glider School at Trebbin, and also at Laucha and Brno from the end of January 1945. At all three aerodromes, training was arranged for the Me 163 and other types kept secret from the novices, perhaps the Natter.

The ‘total mission had been rejected by Hitler in principle, but from the beginning of the year had numerous advocates, amongst them the famous female aviator Hanna Reitsch. What the young candidates were actually being trained for seems to have been a mystery to all involved. Ever greater importance, as was obvious, was being attached to the He 162. A whole Geschwader was to be equipped with it. The idea of giving the second formation the name HitlerJugend was received with enthusiasm in the ranks of the boyish heroes and their promoters. It was necessary to press ahead as soon as possible but as neither the required infrastructure nor airworthy He 162s were available for the planned training, instruction tended to be mainly theoretical.

From the end of November 1944 therefore, life was breathed into Recruitment Group Oesau by accepting volunteers born in 1928 for training in theory at Luftkriegsschule 1, Dresden-Klotzsche, from where they would be drafted to Oschatz in central Germany for continuation training as fighter pilots. A training company and supply unit were set up from the various recruitment groups. In February 1945 Kompanie Oesau was spread between Celle and a holding camp at Goslau instead of Dresden. This was a unit whose personnel were to be used as ‘fighter pilots recruited for special purposes’ and then – depending how things turned out – as infantry. Once aviator training was dissolved, many of the pilots went to recendy formed anti-tank commandos.

Most of the barely 17- or 18-year-old pilots still believed, on the basis of assurances given by their superiors, that there would be a chance to fly the Natter, over which the SS had great influence, or the Volksjager if things changed. Behind the scenes the power struggle between the Party (that is the SS, NSFK and Hider Youth) and the Luftwaffe raged on. The Reich Youth leader attempted to shrug off NSFK influence by making a deal with the SS. Meanwhile Himmler had accepted the Natter, successfully test flown by Oberstleutnant Siegfried Knemeyer, despite Luftwaffe objections that it was included in their projects classified as ‘manned flak rockets’. The machine was a ‘disposable’ unit from which the pilot would bale out after firing his Fohn rockets. The idea of a ‘Luftwaffe Suicide Division’, openly proposed by Generalmajor Walter Storp during his stint as General der Flieger to 31 January 1945, also found a reception at the RLM. Most at OKL, and Hider himself, were opposed to suicide missions of all kinds, but could not always prevent them, although they remained few.

As development of the Natter and other aircraft needed time, the NSFK attempted to conjure up at least a couple of He 162s. In mid-February 1945 work had barely begun on the first two planned training machines with an engine. The He 162 training glider built by the NSFK at Dresden was flight- tested for the first time at Trebbin on 1 March 1945. In the provisional judgement of veteran airmen the aircraft was unsuitable for Hitler Youth pilots, being so unstable that the planned run of prototypes had to be halted while attempts were made to improve the design. Time was lacking in which to turn out a useful glider tug after production centres in the Erzgebirge came under threat from the Red Army sooner than expected.

Besides the single-seater with normal surfaces (as a glider), work on a two-seat trainer with greater wing surfaces began. The fourth variant in preparation at the beginning of 1945 was a two-seater with BMW 003 E-l turbine at DLH Oranienburg. Due to under-capacity the prototype engine for the two planned experimental machines was never completed at Heinkel-Siid Heidfeld/Vienna, as was the case with all other mixed-construction He 162 trainers. In the end, none left the works. So long as it remained possible, training and instruction was given in the hangars, but youthful dreams of the aviator’s life now faced an imminent end.

On 19 March training for fighter pilot recruitment in Bohemia was abandoned upon the approach of the Red Army, and as a result the NSFK agreed with OKL to concentrate practical flying training mainly in central Germany. After even the meagre requirements for two geographically separate training institutions could no longer be met, the best candidates from each of the three

schools were assembled at Trebbin. The Reich Glider School belonged to 4. Group NSFK Berlin/Mark Brandenburg. In comparison to the unit at Brno, the school was relatively well equipped at the beginning of 1945.The last course began at the end of March, some of the trainees having been transferred in from Laucha and Brno.

According to the diary entry of instructor Georg Cordt, in the second half of March there was at least one He 162 training aircraft in its component parts in one of the hangars at Trebbin. On 26 March construction of the machines began and two days later several flying instructors attached to the course for ‘Fighter Pilot Recruitment for Special Purposes’ made at least seven flights in the unpowered school glider, an especially powerful winch being used for the take­offs. On 29 March an aircraft was used as a tug. On 8 April the famous aviator Hanna Reitsch arrived unannounced in her Bii 131 and flew for the first and probably only time over Trebbin airfield in the He 162 S. Meanwhile motorised training flights at the Reich Glider School had been ordered severely restricted. Constant air alarms made any useful work on the ground or in the air extremely difficult and although some flying was done it could not be called very useful.

From 15 April flying routine gave way to Panzerfaust training. This involved firing the weapon at a wooden mock-up of a T-34 and at targets set up in the terrain. That their future role in the war, whether trainee or instructor, would be as ground troops became ever clearer. A few days previously Oesau units at Celle and Goslar with a total strength of 1,500 men were ordered to prepare for the

front. On 1 April 1. Kompanie Oesau at Celle was raised to Bataillon Oesau of three companies. On 6 April 2. Kompanie Oesau, also of battalion size, went direcdy from Goslar to the front. Only two weeks later, on 21 April at the hamlet of Michelstein, the battalion had been reduced to 65, all others being dead, wounded or missing in action. The survivors served as ‘paratroops’ on the so – called ‘Innermost Line’.

Numerous weapons for pin-point bombing, such as this ‘Special Machine with Bomb – Torpedo 1400’were projected from 1944 onwards. They would have demanded kamikaze tactics from the pilot.

On 20 April the Special Course at Trebbin was dissolved and all personnel at the Reich Glider School were attached to the newly formed Division Friedrich Ludwig Jahn of Twelfth Army, for the defence of Berlin. During the heavy fighting around Potsdam, the unit was encircled for a while but reached German lines after sustaining heavy losses. Casualties rose. One of two Hitler Youth companies was reduced to 14 boys, the other, including its company commander, fell in the field. Shordy afterwards the surviving unit broke up and its members sought refuge in flight.

The midget fighters such as He P 1077 Julia developed from the summer of 1944. The Bachem Natter was another midget fighter intended to assist jet

fighters such as the Me 262 to regain mastery in the air. These and all similar projects arose from the stated desire of the RLM on 15 July 1944 for a light fighter for local defence. By mid-November 1944 it was evident that it had poor tactical potential, contrary to the assessment of the light fighter with BMW 003 engines given in September 1944. For this reason, on 15 November a ‘single – seater special aircraft in wood’ suitable for anti-bomber work in the local protection role was demanded. Simpler than ‘midget fighters’, the new fighter generation would fire rockets of great destructive power into the enemy bomber formation.

The two Arado plans presented to the RLM in August 1944 were discussed on 4 and 5 September at Landeshut/Silesia with RLM representatives. An average speed of700 km/hr (435 mph) was proposed, as with the Ar 234 B-2.The Mistel would have an additional powerplant of two ‘cast off’ turbines which had to provide between 300 and 500 kg standing thrust. They would be limited in size to 0.5 metres diameter and 2.5 metres in length and easy to maintain. Arado’s idea for a plastic fuselage was rejected by the RLM because the material had not

been perfected: the lower aircraft would be all-wood. The wings were to be shoulder-mounted and tapered and would serve as auxiliary fuel tanks for the parent aircraft as suggested by Dr Hiitter. The 20-tonne Mistel would take off using a Rheinmetall-Borsig chassis which could remain attached to the lower aircraft during flight to enable landings without fuel and payload. The power – plant was an Ar 234 C-3 using four 1,000 kg-thrust rockets on the take-off chassis. The Ar E 377 itself could be piloted if necessary by means of fighter pilot controls once the upper machine had detached. A 2-tonne explosive charge in the nose was sufficient to sink a 15,000-ton ship. For ground targets a thin – cased container with up to 500 kg flammable liquid was planned.

On 30 November 1944 the design division completed detailed drawings of the two versions in which the previous SC 1800 was replaced by a more destructive 2-tonne bomb. On 7 December 1944 the Arado team provided the completed specifications for the new Mistel as follows:

(i) Ar 234 C-3 with Ar E 377 or Ar E 377a on 20-tonne take-off chassis;

(ii) He 162 with Ar E 377a on 20-tonne take-off chassis.

The lower unit with explosive payload would be steered in flight on a straight course to the target by means of a gunsight in the Ar 234 C-3. An He 162 could

have been used in place of the jet bomber. Probably the only difference in construction from the Ar 234 would have been in the use of explosive bolts to hold the Volksjager and Arado body together, since the Ar 234 spring bolt was not practical for the lighter He 162 to guarantee the release. If used with the He 162, the lower unit would have had two BMW 003 A-l turbines installed below the wings to supplement the engine power of the fighter, and a reserve of 4.5 tonnes of fuel.

This idea was abandoned by OKL on the grounds that there were insufficient He 162 A-2s to equip the envisaged JG 1, and the Riistungsstab would have had to free the necessary capacity to build the Ar E 377. In the few weeks before the final collapse, this Mistel would not have been possible no matter which system was chosen.

Despite the appalling experiences with chemical weapons to which troops of all belligerents had been exposed in the First World War, similar weapons were developed and improved after 1918 by the victors. Germany’s chemists had worked on tear gases such as xylyl bromide, then increasingly on anti-respiratory agents such as chlorine. Next came mustard gas and the dangerous lewisite, then the poisonous arsine or chlorzyan. Most gases were released to drift with favourable winds or were fired in artillery shells. Germany had been forbidden to have battlefield gases by the 1919 Versailles Treaty (and battlefield gases were declared illegal universally in 1925), but work progressed in secret and noxious substances which were easy to store, simple to fabricate and lethal were developed in laboratories. Deadly nerve gases such as sarin, soman and tabun were also produced in quantity.

In the late summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had phosgene, tabun, several kinds of mustard gas and so called ‘mask-breakers’ (irritant gases which forced the wearer to remove his gas-mask and so expose himself to a far more dangerous
back-up gas). All these gases could be dropped operationally in cylindrical containers (КС). Apart from the КС 50 bomb, the standard weapons for this were the КС 250 and КС 500. One of the most dangerous was КС 250 IIGr filled with 100 kg of tabun. Germany produced almost 60,000 tonnes of battlefield gases. In the autumn of 1944 the Luftwaffe audit showed an arsenal of 1,160,340 bombs filled with chemicals, 1,600 of these being tabun-filled, 900 heavy КС 1800 with White Cross (tear-gas) and Green Cross (suffocating gas) and 3,600 КС 1000 Green Cross, enough to have laid low whole regions worldwide. Hitler imposed a strict rule that no such weapons were to be used at the front or against civilian targets in enemy territory. Most German chemical bombs were discovered by Allied forces in ammunition depots or underground facilities, such as Stassfurt. At the beginning of 1945 British forces captured a few Ju 88 G-ls and G-6s rigged to carry battlefield-gas payloads. The special containers were examined by British experts to determine their general purpose.

Bacteriological weapons, especially those bearing easily transmissible diseases such as anthrax, went into the arsenals. All belligerents were aware of the dangers of these weapons. Exacdy how much Germany produced, if any, is not known but the research existed. Fortunately there seems to have been some kind of tacit

understanding between the various belligerents that even in defeat they would not resort to chemical or bacteriological weapons.

Rumours

Rumours regarding certain kinds of research were used by the Third Reich leadership. Whether circulated deliberately or in error, these bred new rumours. It was easy to believe that work must be proceeding on larger and more terrible rockets, for example. The new America-Rocket or the solid-fuel counterpart V-101, both armed with a powerful warhead or lethal substance, were bound to strengthen belief in final victory. In the end it was all wishful thinking. There were to be no miracles, nor miracle weapons in a German Reich crumbling to ruin. Belief in a miracle weapon, however, inspired many senior military men to fight on. Even in the Fiihrer-bunker, in the embattled city centre of Berlin, Hitler spoke to his last Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief, Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Greim, about the many modern jet aircraft at readiness. Greims task was to

make the Luftwaffe leadership believe that the war was still not lost. It was a similar story with new rockets, death rays and other new weapons which existed only in fantasy. The Propaganda Ministry had no difficulty in convincing many people that weapons which would soon be on hand would bring victory, and whoever did not believe it hoped nevertheless that somehow it might be true.

Many Wehrmacht units kept fighting even when the war was lost and the capitulation was actually in effect. On 8 May 1945 there was aerial fighting in the East over the Erzgebirge mountains between Me 262 A-las of JG 7 and Soviet fighters. That same evening German aircraft attacked Soviet tanks for the last time near Eger (Saaz). In Bohemia, Generalfeldmarschall Schorner’s Army Group tangled on 9 and 10 May in skirmishes with the Red Army and partisans before throwing in the towel and admitting defeat.

There was only one way to counter the comprehensive aerial strength of the enemy because of the limited possibilities of production in Germany. Tactical superiority was to be regained by high performance aircraft – ‘quality instead of quantity’. Faced with shortages of materials and no chance of a major increase in production, the fighter squadrons were to receive more efficient machines to clear the skies over the Reich of Allied P-47s and P-51s and their four-engined bombers. Time was the problem. It was impossible within a few weeks and

months to design, turn out and make operational a stream of new aircraft. The later experience with the He 162 Volksjager would prove the point.

Even initial production of flak rockets was not completed, as long planned, by mid-1944, nor air-to-air rockets and weapons such as the futuristic revolver – cannon MG 213. In August 1944 OKL (Luftwaffe High Command) announced the future equipment of Luftwaffe squadrons for the period to December 1945. The nine and one-third bomber Geschwader in late summer 1944, most equipped with the Ju 88 and Ju 188, would be cut to eight, and in all probability two more would be disbanded during 1945 so that by the end of 1945 only six Geschwader would survive, equipped with the Ju 388 K-l. All Do 217-equipped units were to be disbanded by October 1944 at the latest. Ju 388 K-ls would replace the Ju 88 A-17s at KG 26. Between December 1944 and May 1945 three Gruppen of that unit were meant to get improved Ju 188s and Ju 388s for torpedo-bomber operations over the North Sea and Arctic waters. The fourth Gruppe would probably not come to operational strength because of the production situation at September 1944. The Gruppen to be disbanded were those flying the He 177 A-5 with remote control installations and the Do 217 K-3 with the Hs 293 A Kehl missile guidance system. As it could not be determined to what extent these aircraft would be required for missions in future,

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all 135 bombers would go provisionally into the OKL Reserve. A number of these were decommissioned on airfields in Denmark and Norway after the heavy losses suffered over Normandy and western France, some being cannibalised for their DB-605 engines for re-use in new machines. There would also be no further Fw 200 C units operating.

The further reduction of He 111 front-line groups would depend on demand: since the production of the He 111 H had been discontinued, the only fresh aircraft being delivered to units would arrive from the repair shops. III./KG 3 would receive ten aircraft monthly in connection with the V-l flying bomb programme. If and how the He 111 H-20s with other bomber groups would be operational on the Eastern Front was left open.

OKL wanted the Me 262 A-la/bo or A-2 available in two bomber Geschwader. From December 1944 a third Geschwader would be formed, and this strength would be maintained. The Me 262 Blitzbomber would be reduced to two Gruppen at the latest by March 1945 since KG 76 was being expanded into the first jet bomber Geschwader. III./KG 76 was planned as the first operational Gruppe with the Ar 234 C-3 or C-5. The first Do 335 bomber Gruppe was expected to be ready in July 1945: the Luftwaffe planners believed

that this would be the first, and probably only bomber unit to have this aircraft before the year was out. The Ju 287 was to be the first heavy jet bomber with the Luftwaffe. The first Gruppe was expected to be ready from July 1945, the second to follow at the year’s end by the latest. Although up to 20 per cent shortages due to delivery problems had been allowed for, it would have needed a great effort to meet these estimates by the scheduled dates, not least because some Ju 88 S-3s, Ju 388 K-ls, Me 262 A-ls and Do 335 A-ls were needed as training machines.

The dismantling and partial re-equipping of the bomber squadrons would continue to the end of 1945. Two Gruppen of LG 1 would receive the Ju 388 K-l instead of Ju 88 A-4. KG 2 would be disbanded if the Do 335 A-l was not available short-term: 14./KG 3 would be disbanded by October 1944, the V-l- equipped III./KG 3 by September 1945 at the latest. The same went for KG 4, whose I. to III. Gruppen, mostly flying the He 111 H-20 and H-16, would cease to operate between April and June 1945. KG 6 would lose its Ju 88 S-3s and Ju 188s in favour of the Ju 388 K-l in stages from February 1945, remaining operational until at least December 1945, while KG 26 would receive the Ju 388 M-l for anti-torpedo operations replacing its Ju 88 A-17s and Ju 188 A-3s.

OKL wanted the remainder of KG 27 disbanded by January 1945 and KG 30 by the end of that year. KG 40 was to remain in reserve, where the former bomber groups would be converted to the Me 262 fighter. The operational period of KG 51 with the Blitzbomber would be short: by the end of 1945 the recently converted units would be disbanded and replaced by KG 76.

KG 53 equipped with He 111 H-ll, H-16 and H-22 would be dissolved in March 1945. It was intended to replace the Ju 88s of at least two Gruppen of KG 54 with the Me 262. KG 55 was to be disbanded by November 1945. I./KG 66 was the only Luftwaffe pathfinder unit and would remain in service, receiving the Ju 388 K-l from August 1945. II. and III./KG 76 would test the Ar 234 B-2 for its suitability as a fast bomber. KG 100 with its He 177 A-5s would remain intact although no immediate operations were on hand for its PC 1400 X or Hs 293 missiles. As the last test unit, mostly equipped with the He 111 H-20, TGr 30 was to remain operational into the summer of 1945 although nobody could decide what should happen subsequently.

On account of lack of fuel and new replacement machines, the transport units were required to keep gong with clapped-out original-issue machines or converted He 111 bombers. The surviving Gruppen ofTG 1 to TG 4, except IV./TG 1, which flew the He 111 H-l to H-5, were to keep the slower but more robust Ju 52/3m. IV./TG 4 would continue to fly heavy machines such as the four-engined Pi 188, Fw 200 and Ju 290 and the three-engined Ju 252 and Ju 352. For transport missions over the battle zones, such as supply drops to encircled troops, TGr 20 would be used with He 111 H-6s, H-16s and principally H-20s and H-22s.

Further changes were foreseen for 1946. From the end of 1945, the air offensive would be pursued using the Do 335 in four Gruppen at KG 2, while two Gruppen at KG 76 and 12 other Gruppen elsewhere would fly the Ar 234. It was hoped to fit out two Gruppen at LG 1 with the Ju 388 high-altitude bomber, and KG 6 would remain in commission with the Ju 388 beyond January 1946, as would pathfinder Gruppe I./KG 66. Three Gruppen of torpedo bombers were planned for KG 76.

From the summer of 1944, Jabos were only operational as sections of ZG 26 and ZG 76. Both could field a single Gruppe, I./ZG 26 and II./ZG 76. Since the production of the Me 410 had been cancelled in the interim, the only fresh arrivals were from the repairers. This state of affairs was not expected to continue beyond February 1945. To replace these Gruppen, at least eight Gruppen were to be equipped with the Do 335 by the end of 1945, provided this aircraft proved superior to the RAF Mosquito. It was believed that two Jabo Gruppen could be formed between August and the end of December 1945 using Ju 388 J-ls orJ-3s.

In the later summer of 1944, 21 long-range reconnaissance Staffeln were operational flying the Ju 88 D or Ju 188 F. Another three flights had the Me 410.

For night reconnaissance Aufklarungsgruppe Nacht had three StafFeln. 1. and 2. Staffel of Fernaufklarungsgruppe 5 flew maritime reconnaissance sorties, Aufklar­ungsgruppe 123 had two StafFeln equipped with Bf 109s. The majority of these units, 29 in all, were to be retained and would fly operations by day, 3 using the Ar 234 B-l, 14 the Do 335 A-4 and 10 the Ju 388 L-l. Ju 388 L-ls or L-3s would replace the Do 217s and Ju 188s of night reconnaissance units. A total of eight StafFeln of Ju 88 G-ls and G-6s would fly weather reporting, amongst them Wekusta OKL 1. He 177s of Wekusta OKL 2 flew long range reconnaissance. Later consideration was given to using the Ju 635 or perhaps the Hii 211.

The extent to which these extremely optimistic plans were called into question by the end of 1944 is demonstrated by the idea of operating KG 51 (Me 262 A-la/A-2) and the Ar 234 B-2 at KG 76. Even after all Ju 388 production had been abandoned in favour of the jets, and the Do 335 and Ju 287 were put on hold, neither of the ambitious schemes for KG 51 and KG 76 ever came to fruition, not even partially.

Once the rearrangement of the bomber formations was given up as impossible, the fighter and Jabo units were given absolute priority. Since small piston-engined aircraft and jets were easier to manufacture, the schedule was drawn up for large numbers by the end of 1944. It was clear to the squadrons that the Fw 190 D-9 or the Bf 109 K-4 together with the Me 262 jet fighter, coming off the lines in ever greater numbers, were the likely new deliveries. JG 1 wanted to exchange its Fw 190 A-8s and Bf 109 G-lOs for the Fw 190 A-9. JG 2 also required a complete changeover to the Fw 190 D-9. At JG 3 to JG 6, JG 11, JG 26, JG 27, JG 51 to JG 54 and JG 77, the existing Bf 109 G-6s, G-lOs and G-14s were to be exchanged for G-lOs and G-14s and principally K-4s. These machines would be delivered to squadrons from the beginning of 1945 to replace the Bf 109 G-6. All units flying the Fw 190 A-8 would make a gradual change to the A-9 and then D-9. Only a few units, in particular the three Gruppen of JG 26, were chosen to receive the Fw 190 D-12 instead of the A-9 or D-9 from the beginning of 1945.

All-weather units JG 300 and JG 301 had a special role. It was considered that the Fw 190 AS-6 to A-8 and Bf 109 G-6 to G-10/R6 of JG 300 should be

traded in for the Fw 190 A-6 to A-8 with A-9/R11 and then the Fw 190 D-9/R11. Later III./JG 301 would receive the Та 152.

The only rocket-fighter Geschwader, JG 400, would continue to use the Me 163, and perhaps later the Me 263 (Ju 248). The only jet-fighter Geschwader, JG 7, would retain the Me 262 A-la. All bomber Geschwader operating in the fighter role would receive the Bf 109 G-10 to K-4 or, to a lesser extent, the Fw 190 A-9/R11, while all units awaited delivery of the Me 262.

Jabo formations were to be equipped with the Fw 190 F-8 and F-9 to await mass production of the Та 152 when it was intended that many of these machines would be fitted to carry the Panzerblitz I to III or the Panzerschreck, both efficient anti-tank rockets. The Та 152 would have been an outstanding ground-attack aircraft with its more powerful engine. However, mass production had not begun by the end of 1944. For the moment a few units with Hs 129 B-3s and Ju 87 D-5s still flew missions mosdy over the Eastern Front.

The night Jabo Gruppen NSGr I to X flew mainly the Ju 87 D-3 and D-5 until the end of 1944 except 4./NSGr II, NSGr V, and NSGr VII equipped with the Fiat CR 42. Most of these units also operated Ar 66 Cs and Ds, Go 145s, Fw 58s and Si 204 training aircraft converted to auxiliary night Jabos. All of these units flew initially with what was available. There is no indication of advance planning.

The seaworthy Do 24T-1 flying boat dominated amongst the few remaining air-sea rescue units. For aerial protection and search missions some Ju 88 C-4s and C-7s, Fw 190 A-8s and Jabos such as the Me 410 were on hand. No forward plans are known of, and are hardly to be expected in the light of the situation in 1945. In mid-December 1944 the general outlook was such that the intentions might still be forced through, though with delays. Once the Western Allies were advancing to the Rhine, and the Russians had begun their major offensive from Poland, the final collapse, perhaps within months, would become apparent.

From February 1945 – at steadily decreasing intervals – one emergency plan after another replaced the former policy. At the beginning of the year, the At 234, Do 335, He 162 and Me 262 were in the frame. Then the Do 335 was dropped. On 27 March 1945 Hitler put SS-Obergruppenfiihrer Kammler in charge of the development, testing and completion of all jet aircraft. As ‘General Plenipotentiary for Jet Aircraft’ in April 1945 he ordered that the Me 262 alone was to be produced in the greatest numbers possible. In that decision he saw the one last chance, and a small one, of providing a local air defence. It was a vain hope, for the war had long been lost.

any though not all OKL hopes were vested in the He 162 Volksjager from the summer of 1944. This new machine was meant to transform Germany’s fortunes in the air from 1945. Together with the Me 262 this jet fighter of the simplest construction would, in the eyes of the Luftwaffe chiefs, re-establish the Luftwaffe in the skies above the Reich.

The available fighter Geschwader equipped with Bf 109 G-14 and K-4, and the Fw 190 A-9 and D-9, were no longer able to make inroads into the enemy’s aerial hordes. Fuel shortages limited operational opportunities for the daylight units over the Reich itself. The solution for the future was to be quality instead of quantity. Only aircraft superior to the Allied machines could win significant victories and so seize back, at least for a time, the initiative. What was necessary here was not only a Luftwaffe with more powerful aircraft, but the fanaticism of its younger pilots. This was the thinking behind the creation of the so-called Volksjager Geschwader equipped mainly with the He 162 A-l or A-2.

When the fortunes of war began to favour the Allies, National Socialist ideology became the important thing for those who did not shrink from replacing proper training with fanaticism. More frequent thought was given to forming new elite units such as the fighter Geschwader Hitler Jugend. Superior technology paired with the uncompromising use of pilots was to guarantee air supremacy over the

Reich. Surviving a mission was gradually replaced by the concept of the extreme operation and ‘self sacrifice’. Goring spoke out against these unsoldierly intentions, recognising that the reservoir of future pilots had to be protected against the designs of Himmler and the WafFen-SS. He feared moreover that his personal standing with Hitler would be lost if the SS succeeded in taking over part of the Reich air defence. For this reason in the summer of 1944 the idea matured of training very young volunteers in the classic manner for subsequent drafting to JG 1 Oesauy from which developed the Nachwuchsgruppe (recruit group) Oesau proposed by Oberst Hannes Traudoft, former Hider Youth leader and classmate of General Dietrich Peltz and Wernher von Braun. Traudoft advocated forming an elite fighter Geschwader of volunteers, principally from the Hider Youth, using Flieger-HJ trained youths as pilots in the Reich air defence. Although this did not come to fruition, members of the Flieger-HJ were used almost as a fighter pilot reserve once they had successfully passed out from glider training.

In the general collapse, many long-term plans could no longer be realised, and this included the Volkssturmgeschwader. Personnel of JG 1 at Sagan were called upon to assist in the formation of a lesser Volkssturmstaffel. The idea of forming such a Staffel using the HJ came to nothing because JG 1 could not be re-trained for the He 162 A-1 and A-2 in time, and too few aircraft would be available. Furthermore the general situation prevented the conclusion of the ‘Special Purposes’courses, and the loss ofTrebbin and Sagan rendered these plans purposeless.

Chapter Seven

This flying machine designed by Bachem at Waldsee was basically a manned rocket, a term which shows the direction the planning was taking. Because of the very tight raw materials situation it was a surprise that, despite Julia, the Natter should now arrive on the scene. Although vaunted as disposable, after a mission the main components of the aircraft could be saved by parachute. Natter – pilot training was only 20 hours and limited to learning how to steer the machine and fly it into the enemy bomber fleet. The Waffen-SS was very keen on the Natter because of its speed, while the SS-FHA believed that the rocket aircraft could be used in bad weather, poor visibility and at night.

Everything was to be done to make Natter a lethal opponent for enemy bombers. The design of Gerat N, the title of the original rough sketch, was presented to the SS-FHA. Work to manage the technical side was assigned by OKL and the Chief-TLR. From the shadows the SS provided the logistical support: the SS-FHA (Amt X) was responsible for personnel, transport and other materials. Above all OKL brought to the project the technicaland tactical lessons learnt from the Me 163. Amt X was responsible for SS-Sonder – kommando ‘N’ as well as the Natter work group.

It was not very long before the Sonderflugzeuge (‘special aircraft’) Develop­ment Commission expressed grave reservations about machines such as the Natter. Director Robert Liisser, previously at Fieseler, was appointed by the Commission to head Biiro Liisser whose objective was to ensure that the Natter was quickly ready for series production. He was also responsible for maintaining contact with the individual research centres. In the late summer of 1944 he resigned to work with Heinkel on the Julia since in his opinion the vertical launch of the Natter was far less suitable for engaging enemy bombers than the less dangerous catapult launch of the Heinkel machine.

Liisser s departure caused a crisis for the Natter. In the short term, the Chief – TLR could find no suitable replacement for Liisser, nor were sufficient technical staff available for the project. Although the tactical possibilities were relatively good and the financial investment not large, the development of Julia, and a litde later Natter, were suspended by the Commission, although apparently the order was ignored and work proceeded as though nothing had been said. Through the influence of the SS-FHA the number of staff at Bachem Werke plus the SS special commando rose in stages to 475, and then 600, although there was still a shortage of aeronautical engineers to speed up the work on the Natter.

At the beginning of September 1944 flight testing of the Natter was laid down as follows. After successful tests with the Liegekranich and Habicht gliders by the NSFK, the DVT would make a thorough evaluation of the ‘flying-while-lying’ position by means of the Berlin B9 and FS 17. The Reich Gliding Training School atTrebbin would convert Kranich gliders from the upright to the recumbent-pilot position. A short flight programme would investigate the practical flight possibilities. At Trebbin, starts by winch and inclined ramps would also be tested. Experienced test-parachutists from the Rechlin E5 department would make several jumps from a Natter fuselage (classified as risky). A DFS 230 would be used as a Natter-Mistel to see how the Natter behaved when air-launched.

At the Travemiinde test centre ways were sought to save the lives of future Natter pilots by a new kind of ejector seat. In mid-1944 it was not clear how this could be effected for a pilot in the recumbent position. The engine tests were to be completed with the help of the Walter Werke, where the Natter engine had also been installed experimentally into an Me 163. During tests at altitude, courageous DVL specialists were to investigate if it were possible to reach 10,000 metres (33,000 ft) at a rate of climb of 200 m/sec (650 ft/sec) without oxygen equipment, remain for 30 seconds at the operational height and then endure the life-saving fall at over 250 m/sec (820 ft/sec). After the conclusion of the preliminaries an He 177 would be set up as a Natter-cainer to extend the radius of operations although as a rule the Natter would be ground-launched to intercept incoming marauders. These tests and firing the rockets in the nose were seen as extremely important.

The pilot’s position now changed from Erich Bachem’s first sketch, which had the pilot recumbent, to a crouching figure and then finally a pilot seated in the normal manner. The operational flight-test programme would consist of only five unmanned starts from a ramp, followed by 12 manned starts. For the subsequent firing programme, 10 Natters were planned.

Initially OKL wanted to instal a battery of RZ 65 spin-stabilised rockets of

65- mm calibre in the nose. The tests showed that these were woefully inaccurate – at the Tarnewitz test centre against a Bristol Blenheim fuselage at 200 metres range only one light hit was achieved from 20 rockets fired. The 19 misses were

up to 20 metres wide. Accordingly the RZ 65 idea was dropped and two MK108 guns considered instead, but the final armament remained long in doubt.

For trials of the new fighter and night flying by KdE test pilots or operational fliers at least 30 Natters were to be made available. In September 1944 an order was issued to build 15 ‘BP 20 aircraft’. The work was to be forced ahead by SS – Obersturmfuhrer Flessner, an engineer recovering from a wound, who began work with Bachem on 20 September 1944. As Himmler’s special charge d’affaires, SS-Obersturmfuhrer Gerhard Schaller was sent to the Heuberg to observe the initial Natter vertical starts.

By October 1944 the final Natter shape had crystallised. The completion diagrams of the BP 20, meanwhile re-designated 8-349 by the RLM, consisted of a disposable nose segment, a re-usable central fuselage section and the tailplane with rocket motor, both the latter being parachute-equipped. Propelled by an HWK 109-509 A-2 rocket motor, the machine was designed for sustained speeds up to 800 km/hr (500 mph) and a top speed of 1,100 km/hr (680 mph). Launch was to be from a tower or vertical ramp. Four SR 34 (later known as SG 34) rockets were to be located in pairs on either side of the fuselage to assist take-off. Before these could be used, a long list of technical and constructional problems had to resolved.

Testing of the first three Natter machines was set for 16 October 1944 between Bachem and the DFS at Ainring/Salzburg. The first airworthy unit, BM-1, was tried under tow to examine its general performance in flight, after which the tug pilot detached the Natter to parachute down. The unmanned second machine, BM-2, was taken up by an He 111 H and released by parachute. The third Natter had a tricycle undercarriage and could be tested extensively in flight. Bachem finally received the official contract for the Natter in the second half of October, after which steps were taken to build the launch tower at Karlshagen the following month, but the test centre was over-booked and an alternative in Mecklenburg was sought for ‘Test Group N The centre would be used for weapons testing for the future operational versions. Armament initially would be two MK 108 guns, 24 R4M or 48 Fohn rockets in the fuselage. While the final choice of gun was still under consideration, the fuselage of the fourth test machine, M4, was fitted with two MK 108s for trials, although as mentioned it could not be fitted as a standard to the series run because the weapon was in short supply and those there were went to the Me 262 A-la. The alternative was the spin-stabilised R4M rocket. The firm of Curt Hebei designed a lightweight firing assembly to fit 34 rockets into the Natter nose, and a Natter fuselage was brought to Reichenbach aerodrome firing ground at Schussenried for the tests. The Chief-TLR considered that the armament should be 28 and not the 34 R4Ms requested. From the late summer of 1944 work was carried out on the so- called ‘barrel-battery’, a fixed assemblage of 64 MK 108 barrels, this number being later reduced to 32 to save weight.

In a report from the Chief-TLR dated at the end of October 1944, differences of opinion were discussed respecting the operational possibilities of the Natter. Most experts believed that a Natter would be less at risk passing through an enemy bomber formation than a traditional piston-engined fighter. To shoot down a four-engined bomber it would require 60 rounds of З-cm ammunition fired in a long burst from two MK 108 guns, or 28 R4M air-to-air rockets, or fire from the 32 barrels of the barrel-battery. Range was between 200 and 500 metres for the MK 108,400 metres for the R4M and 250 metres for the barrel-battery.

The provisional firing trials at Schussenried on 10 November 1944 showed that the arrangement of the weapons installation was unsatisfactory for series production and a few days later the files for the MK 108 and barrel-battery were made available to DFS for further appraisal. It had been decided not to proceed with the R4M since these rockets were needed for other jet aircraft. More testing followed on 15 November. Ninety MK 108 rounds fired at a range of 100 metres gave a group of 0.7 square metres. After a revision by Rheinmetall the weapons installation worked flawlessly. It was also announced that day that Rheinmetall would need a Natter fuselage as soon as possible for the installation of a barrel – block drum from which 46 Fohn projectiles could be fired in a salvo.

The first two trial machines were to be completed by the end of November 1944 by Ebnerspacher of Esslingen near Stuttgart. On 30 October three Natter variants were being worked on. Variant A had a top speed of 880 km/hr (550 mph) though its operational ceiling of9,000 metres (29,500 ft) was inferior to Variant B. Variant C matched the speed and had longer range. After receiving the documents and several favourable opinions, on 27 November the Jagerstab ordered the first 50 trial aircraft. These were not to be suicide machines. Even in an attack at point-blank range, the substantial cabin armour would give the pilot a good chance of surviving defensive fire from numerous 0.5-inch guns. The Natter could operate up to a ceiling of 16,000 metres (52,500 ft). After the attack the pilot would dive to 3,000 metres (10,000 ft) from where he and the machine would descend to the ground by their respective canopies.

In December 1944 the first prototype, BP 20 M-l, was completed with a trolley undercarriage while the second and third prototypes had a fixed chassis. The first vertical start of an unmanned Natter, assisted by take-off rockets, took place on 8 December. Despite the unequal thrust of the four rockets the machine rose to 700 metres. On 14 December 1944 the first successful tow was made at Neuburg/Danube. Flight testing of the first two prototypes showed that the first assessments had been good although the aircraft attitude at release left something to be desired. The first vertical launch attempt on the Heuberg at Stelten am Kalten Markt used an upright start rail attached to a tower of metal scaffolding. On 18 December 1944 the test machine burned to a crisp when the arrest gear failed to disengage.

On 21 December Bachem Werke received a telex from the SS-FHA’s SS-Standartenfuhrer Fritz Czolbe, who had approved the highest priority for the Natter development, requesting all SS service centres, authorities and firms to support the project. The next day on a second unmanned launch the aircraft reached 750 metres despite an engine defect. The tail canopy deployed, the dummy pilot fell out and the rear segment of the aircraft descended to the ground by parachute. Acceleration during the launch procedure was calculated at 2.2G. The rate of climb was 700 km/hr (435 mph).

Progress was visible, and on 28 December 1944 SS-Untersturmfiihrer Minzloff of the SS Propaganda Company took photographs of the Natter to present Himmler with a more reliable impression of the new aircraft. Next day SS-Obersturmfuhrer Walter Klockner reported that the development did not have the speed specified by the SS-FHA. The head of Amt X was responsible for the work. Despite his influence, the frequent requests for technical personnel for the firm of Bachem Waldsee had not been met satisfactorily. The starting rockets continued to give problems. SS-Obersturmfuhrer Heinz Flessner, engineer and commander of SS-Sonderkommando ‘N’, made repeated demands for fuel for transport vehicles, but even everyday items such

as service insignia for the Sonderkommando and special identity documents were most difficult to procure.

At the Heuberg meanwhile the vertical take-off trials continued. The third start on 28 December 1944 was made primarily to test the booster rockets. Prototype BP 20 M-17 was the first to reach an altitude of 3,000 metres, but the machine was destroyed in a heavy landing due to partial parachute failure. From 4 January 1945 orders were given that Natter trials were to be carried out at Neuburg/Danube, Horsching/Linz and Ainring/Salzburg, but there was nothing to be gained at this stage by rushing the development, and a second launch tower was planned at Ohrdruf in Thuringia to match the first at Heuberg. This work was under the direction of SS-Untersturmfiihrer Bodensteth. A shortage of200 sacks of cement for the foundations of the Ohrdruf tower caused substantial delay.

On 5 January 1945 the Riistungsstab cancelled the Natter and next day the Me 163. Testing of the Me 263 (Ju 248) was to proceed. At Bachem the

cancellation notice was not taken very seriously, since the He P 1077 Julia had been dealt the same blow. All these projects had been pursued provisionally as ideas to be looked at within the framework of existing possibilities. A fire at Brodenbach where the starting rockets were manufactured caused a bottleneck in supply in January, however. To alleviate the situation, several simple wooden launch trolleys were devised to do away with fixed emplacements. Obersturm – fiihrer Klockner of the SS-Sonderkommando asked Obersturmfiihrer Kersten at SS-FHA Amt X for more men and a few cars and lorries. These were necessary for the transport of materials and supplies between Waldsee and the Heuberg.

By 20 January the requested workforce had still not arrived at Waldsee nor the supply of coke to heat the Bachem factory. The MK 108 barrel-battery and Fohn honeycomb launcher were to have been tested from 23 January on the Heuberg but, despite all efforts by Amt X, the ammunition failed to arrive. There was also a shortage of cement needed to improve the ramp on the Heuberg. Towing trials continued, the tug used on 27 January being the DFS aircraft He 111 H-6 (DG#RA).

Meanwhile the SS-Sonderkommando and Bachem Werke were working all out for the imminent Operation Crocus. This involved setting up ten mast ramps and preparing 15 Natter A-Is each with a Fohn launcher in the nose. Each installation fired a single rocket from a honeycomb of 24 cells. Most of the munitions for the first operation had not arrived by 27 January. The first firing position was set up close to the Autobahn at Holzmaden. The first Natter used against the Allied bombers was to be launched on 1 March 1945.

The machine factory at Esslingen was to supply the first three mast ramps by 20 February. After the only available Natter at Neuburg/Danube had been damaged, the flight test group was transferred from there to DFS at Ainring/Salzburg. Another free-flight machine had been completed and fitted out for tests while work continued round the clock on the Ba 349 A-l for Operation Crocus. It was hoped to have the first machine ready by 17 February; at one new machine per day the last would be ready by 3 March. To help out, the Waffen-SS sent another 12 technical workers, and Bachem Werke also received 11 experienced carpenters and mechanics.

An extraordinary effort was invested in Operation Crocus. Besides the urgently needed 6,500 litres of fuel for road vehicles, 2,500 litres of C-fuel and 5,000 litres ofT-fuel were required for the rockets. SS-Obersturmfiihrer Strasser was to obtain all this at the earliest opportunity using a Waffen-SS tanker. SS- Obersturmfiihrer Flessner attempted to procure at least seven tonnes of brown coal to keep the work going at Waldsee.

On 14 February works pilot Unteroffizier Hans Ziibert took off in prototype M-8 for the first free flight in a Natter Ba 349. He released from the He 111 H tug at 5,500 metres and began a free glide. His speed at 3,600 metres was 600 km/hr (12,000 ft/370 mph) and he landed safely in a soft field near the banks of the Danube at Neuburg. Test report No. 11 of 22 February mentions another unmanned test machine, M-22, due to fly that day, and M-23 scheduled for a manned flight from the ramp 24 hours later, but both starts were cancelled when M-22 was damaged. A problem-free launch with complete separation and dummy pilot ejection followed on 25 February. By the end of the month, the SS preparation for Crocus had advanced, due mainly to the arrival at the Waldsee workshops of an expert in electrical supply and heating from SS-FHA Amt X. Latent problems with the Natter steering and rocket motor were being overcome by the Siemens LGW (Aviation Equipment Works) and specialists sent by Walter Werke respectively.

Early in 1945 Major Edmund Gartenfeld, Kommandeur I./KG 200, began the groundwork for the Crocus unit. This included selecting the operational airfield and setting up the ground infrastructure. A flak officer was appointed for target finding and aircrew instruction. The aim now was for a test operation of at least ten Natter over the Stuttgart area by 20 March at the latest. A larger operation would have to await completion of the Ba 349 B-l. This variant, of which only one machine was being built when work was halted, had longer range than the A-l and double the armament.

On 1 March technical development of the Natter was handed over to the Luftwaffe Flak Development Division in close cooperation with the Waffen- SS. That day a first manned Natter launch was scheduled on the Ochsenkopf. That morning veteran Luftwaffe pilot Lothar Sieber climbed into Natter M-23 upright at the starting tower. Sieber had been at Bachem as a ‘test pilot’since 22 December 1944 and knew the risk he was taking. The former Leutnant Sieber had been reduced to the ranks for an offence against military discipline by a court-martial in the Moscow Luftgau jurisdiction. He had survived numerous dangerous assignments subsequently. At the end of November 1944 after one such mission Generaloberst Ritter von Greim had given Sieber his own Iron Cross First Class as a token of his admiration and promoted him to Ober – leutnant. Sieber was the world’s first pilot to achieve a vertical take-off but it cost his life. He may have dislocated a cervical vertebra as he threw off the cockpit cover in an attempt to bale out after losing orientation in low cloud. In the Waffen-SS Sonderkommando report of 2 March, SS-Obersturmfuhrer Schaller thought that he might have wrenched his head against the cockpit cover at launch. Because of this tragedy it was decided to suspend manned vertical take­offs until an almost fully automatic Natter operation was possible. On 8 March, M13 flew an unmanned automated test followed on 10 March by M-34, and it was hoped that the A-l series production could now proceed.

At the beginning of March, M-25 was ready for use as the second manned aircraft with rocket motor, M-33 would be the unmanned test. Other Natters such as M-31 were being equipped with Siemens LGW steering. Of these aircraft, seven were launched from the 9.5 metre ‘telephone pole’ ramp, the first being the unmanned M-32. Apart from testing on the Ochsenkopf, work to make the Natter operational at the beginning of March 1945 went full out despite the severe shortage of rocket fuel. Through the SS-FHA, Bachem had attempted to obtain a higher priority for raw materials for Natter construction and the works’ cars and lorries, and more rocket fuel to enable flight testing to be continued, and to plan the first operational missions. On Kammler’s orders, Sonderkommando ‘N’ was to receive all conceivable support. Intensive
construction of the Natter continued at Hirth and in the Thuringian Forest, but the extra workers requested urgently by Bachem from the Luftwaffe and SS never found their way to Waldsee.

For the imminent Crocus operation, the SS was planning to use machines M-51 to M-65 against Allied bombers over Wurttemberg. On 8 March at a Natter conference attended by representatives from OKL and the Chief-TLR and aides of the Reichsfiihrer-SS it was agreed that the Luftwaffe would take over management of the project because the SS-FHA lacked technical expertise and Natter trials ‘in action in the coming weeks would not be possible in view of the existing problems. How the situation on the ground would look then was anybody’s guess. On 13 March Himmler ordered, with immediate effect, that enough fuel must be made available for 20 Natter starts monthly. Should all go well until July 1945 he would argue for much more, although in any case there was enough C-fuel and T-fuel for the next six months, he thought.

Probably the last interim report on the Natter development was that dated 23 March 1945 mentioning the Malsi equipment which had a target-finding range of 21 kilometres up to a ceiling of 12 kilometres.

A Natter launch was to proceed in the following manner. On detection of the enemy approach by the flak command post the director equipment would be tuned

in. On receipt of the signal the Natter pilot would switch on his on-board systems, flying controls and turbine. He would then report himself ready with the words: ‘Meldung, fertigf (‘Announcement: ready!’)- When the attack bearing had been calculated, the ramp would be traversed accordingly. On the command ‘Achtung 1’, the crew would secure the chassis and take cover. The pilot would then unlock the autopilot and code in the flying time to target on the clock. After working up the motor slowly for four to five seconds he would make a final check of the control stick and pedals. At the commands ‘Achtung’ and ‘Start’ the pilot pushed the ignition button and grasped the handgrips in the cockpit. The Natter would then fly a direct course to the enemy. This never happened in practice.

On 28 March Generalmajor Walter Dornberger, head of Arbeitsstab Domberger at Peenemiinde, ordered the cessation of the Natter project. This did not go down well with the Waffen-SS, and the SS-FHA demanded its continuation with some vehemence, new vertical take-off trials having been prepared on the Ochsenkopf. On 2 April 1945 the unmanned M-52 was launched, and after a brief flight dived into the ground near Bensingen village. Probably the last Natter rose on 10 April and came down near Ebingen (Albstadt). The dummy pilot and machine components were retrieved with their parachutes.

As Allied forces advanced, personnel of the Ochsenkopf test ground were evacuated to Bad Worishofen on 15 April for a possible transfer to Bavaria. In mid-April an attempt was made to remove the Bad Waldsee operation to Bad Worishofen. On 24 April the first French tanks arrived at Waldsee, where engineer Zacher had sunk 15 rocket motors in the Waldsee. American troops found most of the project files and four Natters at St Leonhard in Austria. A damaged tug aircraft was impounded at Aiming. At Bachem about 30, mostly Ba 349 A-ls, left the Hirth workshops, while one of ten pre-series machines was being manufactured at Nabern-Teck. This run was an А-series conversion with improved armament. Only one was near completion by March 1945. A variant in the advanced planning stage with demountable wings to be series-built as Ba 349 C was never realised although the wings were reported to be under manufacture at the war’s end.

One last Natter may have been fired from the mast at Ohrdruf just before the capitulation but the machine did not rise far and was apparently crushed after leaving the ramp. Allied troops then occupied the area and the military depot.

By mid-April 1945 there had been 18-20 vertical starts and at least five successfixl flights under tow, some with a release of the warp and a problem-free parachute landing. In trials ten Natters were lost to accidents, two machines to rocket-motor fires and a third to fire on the launch mast.

deas for flak rockets originated before the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. The commander of Lehrstab III, the Reichswehr department responsible for flak artillery research, and the later Inspector of Flak Artillery, Oberst Gunther Riidel, made secret studies before submitting their proposals to revolutionise air defence in a memorandum to the Army Weapons Office (HWA). It is interesting to observe how the Weimar government was often left in the dark on new weapons ideas such as this, the HWA being a culpable party in this respect. Though it found the idea of powerful flak rockets attractive, the HWA was wary of innovations, and the project advanced only slowly, solid-fuel rockets not being seriously considered until 1935. In the early summer of 1941, Oberst Walter Dornberger and Dr Wernher von Braun sketched a small-scale version of the A-4 (later V-2) as a flak rocket, but this seemed less important at the time than a powerful weapon in the offensive role which against which there was no defence.

n the spring of 1945 the war was as good as lost. The Allied armies were within the old Reich borders and the Soviets were heading for Berlin. Resistance on the various fronts was in a state of collapse. Yet, on the aviation production front, the design bureaux pressed on, churning out plans which had no hope of realisation. What use were these paper tigers with no bauxite, chrome, manganese, electric current, hardly any fuel and chaos in communications? Many decision-makers seem to have been ignorant of the problems. They continued to make plans as in the glory days of the Luftwaffe and the Blitzkrieg. The dreaming did not end even in April 1945.

Symptomatic of the situation were talks attended by high-ranking officers on 10 February 1945 in Berlin. For the first time they were forced to acknowledge, with no ifs and buts, that nearly all hydro-electric plant had been wrecked by bombing, and that no more fuel was forthcoming until the end of March.

Fuel production in underground or bombproof factories could not be expected until the autumn, and even then the output would be small. The Wehrmacht could rely on 50,000 tonnes of oil from underground centres in January 1946. But of what use would that be to facilities such as the underground works at Ebensee (Traunsee), now under hasty construction, if no more oil was arriving for refining? Even the last oilfields near Zistersdorf north of Vienna had meanwhile been seized by the Red Army.

The stark reality was that between February and the autumn of 1945 only 16,000 tonnes of B-4 and C-3 fuel, and 43,000 tonnes of J-2, would become available. This represented a

monthly output of 2,300 tonnes for piston-aircraft (B-4 and C-3) and 6,000 tonnes for jets (J-2) and would not suffice for even the most essential operations. Aircraft production was to be pruned down to the As 234, He 162, Me 262 and Та 152 only. Even Bf 109 and Fw 190 production was to cease, the production line to be run down as fast as Me 262s and Та 152s became available to replace them. Even Ju 88 production was to come to a halt in the late autumn of 1945 so as to maintain material reserves.

From the early summer of 1945,500 He 162s and Me 262s, 370 Та 152s and 50 As 234s would roll off the lines monthly. Such numbers spelled closure for most operational Geschwader and the remaining tactical forces could expect no better output of new machines than replacements for losses. At the beginning of 1945, reconnaissance aircraft, fighters and Jabos were given priority in the queue for fuel. Bombing missions no longer entered the picture. Several fighter Geschwader were also in line for the chop, and many of the remainder, including KG 76, would have been reduced. In the summer air transport capacity was to have been cut to six Gruppen. By the end of 1945, transport and parachute operations would not be possible and pilot training would also have come to an end.

With a resumption of production and assembly in underground plant the planners hoped to reinstate the disbanded units perhaps from the beginning of 1946. In the meantime there would have been fuel enough for some reconnaissance missions and a maximum of 75 Me 262 flights daily, not much to cope with the Allied bomber fleets.

Anybody who knew the true facts must have realised before the beginning of 1945 that because of Allied air superiority over the Reich, and the great industrial and manufacturing strength of the Allies, the time for anything other than local defence was past, yet even in the spring the effort was still being made to produce extreme high performance and therefore very costly aircraft in numbers. This included light jets, well-armoured Jabos and

multi-seater all-weather bombers with up to four jet turbines. That the production of the core He 162 and Me 262 jets was hamstrung by desperate logistical problems appears not to have struck the decision-makers.

One must therefore ask why they could not see that the war was lost. Was it from loyalty to the German leader, from a desire not to recognise the facts, or for personal reasons? There is really only one answer. From the generals down to the simple soldier, the belief existed that the end of the war would be a rough period and then things would go on as before. They recalled the motto at the 1918 Armistice: ‘The Kaiser goes, the generals remain.’ The Fiihrer and those who bore too high a burden of guilt would have to depart. Aviation, the Luftwaffe, would survive, perhaps with restrictions and prohibitions. In time new aircraft designs would be needed, for already the first cracks between the Allies were visible. Most of the Luftwaffe leadership had not been involved in war crimes and had only done their duty. Now they and everybody else stood before the abyss.

The dream of building the most powerful air force in the world was shattered, a fact scarcely

perceived in the spring of 1945. As long as the possibility of producing a single new aircraft still existed, work continued; and as long as a single drop of fuel could be obtained, flying continued. In desperation, pilots dived on bridges or rammed enemy bombers. The majority of the crews waited on the ground. It might make sense to try to avoid being killed at the last moment – too many had already been lost – or to try not to become involved in the vortex of the final battles, defending a trench impossible to hold. This went also for the Home Front. Many ‘adventurous’projects came into being simply to protect the planners against being drafted into the Volkssturm. This was often a decision taken by firms. War factory owners could see the time ahead when they would become free entrepreneurs, and their businesses would need a core of experienced workers and an intact management team. So it came about that project departments and design offices, such as at Heinkel-Siid, were kept going as long as possible. When the time came to shift, the staff were evacuated with their assignments and loaded into trains for shipping off to ‘safe’backwaters as yet unoccupied. The situation for forced labour and prisoners was of course quite different.