Category The Chinese Air Force

David Frelinger and Jessica Hart

This chapter presents an alternative framework for approaching the dis­cussion and assessment of the “military balance” between the United States and China, with an emphasis on the effect of People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) modernization. This approach provides for a more comprehensive means of thinking about the military balance and illuminates some deficien­cies in current assessments. The framework assesses PLAAF modernization through the lenses of three “games”—the Game of Influence, the Battle over a Third Party, and the Great Power Game—that represent the range of relation­ships the United States and China could forge, with a focus on the military aspects of those games. As this analysis will demonstrate, the effect of PLAAF modernization is most fully understood not as an input in one overall U. S.- China military balance, but as a series of moves occurring in the context of the game or games the United States and China are playing.

Why a New Framework?

The U. S.-China military balance is most often spoken of in Cold War terms of force-on-force counts, defense expenditure comparisons, and other metrics that are relatively straightforward to calculate. These calculations are then used to define the balance within future “worlds” that could exist between the two nations.1 These analyses assume that the United States and China are playing the same game in these worlds, that both recognize the other side is playing that game, and that the game remains dominant and consistent for an extended period of time. Assessing the balance through this narrow aperture misses important nuances in what is in fact a fluid military context—one in which PLAAF modernization plays many roles. This type of assessment also does not account for the facts that powers may play more than one game simul­taneously, that both sides are not necessarily playing the same game, and that both may fail to recognize what game the other has chosen.

An alternative framework is necessary to address these analytical defi­ciencies. By acknowledging the range of games and the fluidity of their context, the framework allows for a fuller assessment of the effects of PLAAF modern­ization on the military balance within the games. This avoids viewing PLAAF modernization through the lens of only one game while also highlighting the fact that there is not one military balance, but several. By adopting a more comprehensive framework, this assessment also avoids utilizing familiar—and inappropriate—analytical narratives. Many attempt to frame at least a portion of the U. S.-Chinese interactions in Cold War terms—what we call here the Great Power Game. In the Cold War, the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union as the only two remaining great powers were relatively ossified from the outset, and the overarching ideological narrative provided a ground­ing framework for understanding the game that both sides were playing. This is not the case for the United States and China. The relationship is not yet mature, and there are multiple, competing narratives about interests and goals on both sides. Those narratives as well as U. S. and Chinese actions provide no convincing indications that either side has made a deliberate decision as to which game it wishes to be playing—much less what game the other is play­ing or will choose to play in the future. Instead there are elements of multiple games that must be assessed.

The key to strengthened national defense and military modernization is to foster and raise a large batch of high quality, new-model, talented mili­tary personnel, while vigorously increasing the ability to make innova­tions in science and technology. We must grasp these two requirements as the primary responsibility of the military academies, properly grasp­ing the developing trends of modern technology and the developing pat­terns of military education, diligently pressing for military academies to successfully become the cradles for development of high quality, talented military personnel—the foundations of new high technology and military theory innovation.43

While the PLAAF aspires to set up educational infrastructures that “become the cradles for development of high-quality, talented military person­nel,” it remains to be seen whether the programs that are now being put into place will deliver the desired results. Accurately assessing the competency of PLAAF personnel has been and remains a difficult endeavor. The PLAAF has not been operationally tested since the Korean War, and it has been absent from

Chinese military interventions since the 1950s. The air force was never com­mitted into battle during ground force skirmishes on Vietnam’s border in the late 1970s. Since then, PLA operations have been limited to humanitarian relief efforts in response to flooding or earthquakes. In these instances, the PLAAF’s limited airlift capacity has left it sidelined during the army-led operations. Nor has the PLAAF participated widely in United Nations peacekeeping missions, although the PLA is expanding its support of logistics and medical teams in Africa and Asia. And, the PLAAF has not established the type of bilateral train­ing exercises with other regional air forces that would provide insights into the level and sophistication of its tactical forces. Although the PLAAF Command College has cracked opened its doors to foreign military students, these officers are segregated into a separate international seminar which limits their interac­tion with and exposure to Chinese field grade officers. Thus it is necessary to look for other proxies that can yield insights into the progress, professionalism, and operational capacity of the officers and airmen of the PLAAF.

Despite recent progress and increased accessions of graduates of civil­ian universities, the PLAAF may be a long way from reaching its education goals. The PLAAF has announced that improved officer education is a top pri­ority and an enduring long-term goal. In fact, the PLAAF has set as a near­term goal to ensure all new officers attain a 4-year undergraduate degree prior to accession. In the mid-to-long term, the PLAAF hopes to build an officer corps in which 100 percent have undergraduate degrees and over 30 percent have advanced degrees. Additionally, the PLAAF intends to see that over 95 percent of commanding officers at the division, brigade, and regimental lev­els are equipped with basic degrees, with 80 percent or more having advanced degrees.44 Yet, as late as 2009, fewer than 40 percent of officers leading the air force’s front line units possessed an undergradu­

ate degree and less than 1 percent of those commanders held a postgradu­ate degree.45 This lack of credentials among PLAAF commanding officers may be explained by PLAAF restrictions placed on their course attendance. Senior command track officers—at the colonel and senior colonel level—are only authorized to attend a 1-year, nondegree PME program, while support and technical officers are afforded opportunities to pursue graduate degrees in multiyear programs at either PLAAF or civilian colleges.

Another measure of the professional development of the PLAAF is the vol­ume and quality of military professional publications that are being developed by its officer corps. The PLA’s airmen have published extensively during the past 10 years, oftentimes in the performance of directed research on key topics—strat – egy, doctrine, tactics, air force building, education and training, logistics, etc.— assigned by the PLAAF Headquarters. Officially developed publications are generally produced by a research team under the guidance of a senior officer and vetted through a formal review prior to publication. Top-level writings are endorsed by the PLAAF Commander or the Political Commissar, or both. In recent years, the PLAAF has written extensively on military education and train­ing, and a listing of relevant recent publications can be found in the appendix.

Although the volume of PLAAF military writings is an important indi­cation of the transformation that is taking place in PLAAF education and training, significant variations and gaps remain in both the substance and the operational concepts articulated by various authors and institutions. For exam­ple, Science of Air Force Training (ё¥¥ВДШ^), published in 2006 under the guidance of Lieutenant General He Weirong, was the air force’s contribution to a PLA series that includes separate volumes on army, navy, and joint train – ing.46 The book provides a comprehensive overview of the PLAAF training structure, laying out the hierarchy of training organizations, classifications of training, specific training responsibilities at various levels of command, and categorization of training methods. But, one must ask: what is the purpose and motivation behind this publication? And, who is the target audience? The publication lacks the authority of a service regulation or manual, and it does not include sufficient detail to either develop or execute training programs. In effect, the Science of Military Training series serves only as a primer on PLAAF service training programs and infrastructure, and therefore may be an indica­tion that the PLAAF (and the PLA) are still at a very early stage of revamping military training programs.

Yet another indicator of professional development within the PLA—and by extension within the PLAAF—is the well-defined process for compilation, review, and validation of training standards. The PLA has demonstrated a con­sistent pattern of managing operational training as it has twice revised and pro­mulgated new Outlines for Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) within the past 10 years. The most recent effort was undertaken beginning in 2006 to correct recognized training deficiencies in the 2002 version of the OMTE. From initial review in December 2006 through promulgation in July 2008 and implementation in 2009, the OMTE development and review process took slightly over 2 years to complete. As the event sequence and timelines in table 10-1 demonstrate, the procedures and deadlines for the development of the 2009 OMTE followed a pattern of development similar to the previous OMTE revision cycle that ran from January 2000 and October 2001.

Field units played a substantially greater role in the initial development of the 2008 OMTE. Standards development and field testing were carried out during the 2007 and 2008 annual training cycles with 163 division – and bri­gade-level units participating in the trial training and validation of the 2008

OMTE.47 The 2-year process of revision, experimental training, and valida­tion was a PLA-wide effort that included participants from each of the seven military regions, the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, People’s Armed Police, and 21 departments within the four General Headquarters.48

The new OMTE was designed to address the training shortfalls that have repeatedly been cited in Kongjun Bao and other PLA newspapers, including expanded training for noncombat military operations; increased proportion of informatized knowledge skills and simulated training with high-technology weapons and equipment, including aircraft; standardized methods, procedures, and criteria for network-centric and “opposing force” training; clarified condi­tions, styles, methods, and requirements for training in complex electromagnetic environments, training at night, and training under adverse weather conditions; established capabilities-based training standards and assessment system; raised standards for basic training; expanded scope of training appraisals; revised eval­uation program; and defined training management scheme, specified duties, and functions of training.

July 1, 2009.

— "PRC Officers Discuss Training Outline Reform," Jefangjun Bao (Internet Version) in Chinese August 15, 2000, 6.

The immediate Chinese leadership response to Tiananmen was a polit­ical clampdown and economic retrenchment, but by early 1991 economic growth had resumed and the stage was set for further economic reforms that would lay the foundation for sustained Chinese growth. Openness to trade and foreign investment helped the Chinese economy grow rapidly and develop a deeper civilian technology base. Although the United States and Western European countries sought to limit Chinese access to Western arms and military technology through export controls and sanctions, the lure of access to China’s market ultimately gave China’s defense industries access to considerable dual-use technology that could be “spun on” to military appli­cations. Moreover, the rapid advancement of computer, communications, and material technologies in a globalized economy meant that technologies once used primarily in military industries became ubiquitous (and free from export controls).

The Chinese defense industry’s access to advanced computers in the mid-1990s supported efforts to develop more sophisticated design capabilities. Supercomputers obtained from the United States after export laws were loos­ened in 1996 and 1998 were later used to simulate the detonation of nuclear warheads without actual underground testing.98 China’s shipbuilding industry also made new advances enabled by computer-assisted design (CAD) technol­ogy to improve both the quantity and quality of maritime vessels.99 The Xian FBC-1 fighter-bomber (also known as the JH-7) presents the most compelling example of U. S. supercomputer technology being used to expand Chinese mil­itary aviation capabilities. Designed to replace outdated light bombers like the Nanchang Q-5 and Harbin H-5, the development program for the JH-7 began in the 1980s. Six prototypes were developed in the early 1990s and delivered to the PLAAF and PLANAF for evaluation. An upgraded variant, the JH-7A, came out around 2000 and was the first Chinese aircraft based solely on CAD design. Chinese engineers reportedly bragged that the fighter-bomber was designed using supercomputers imported from the United States. The fact that Xian Jiaotong University houses a supercomputer and has ties to the Xian Air­craft Industry Corporation (XAC) and the 603d Aircraft Design Institute, the principal contractors on the JH-7A, may explain why CAD technologies were applied to the JH-7A rather than the more advanced J-10 fighter. In the wake of discoveries during the 1990s that China had diverted some supercomputers acquired from the United States for military purposes, Congress passed a law in 1998 tightening restrictions on the technology. China’s indigenous efforts to develop its own supercomputers since the late 1990s have made the law (at least as it applies to China) somewhat irrelevant.100 A 2003 report cites the twin seat J-10BS variant as the first Chinese fighter produced with CAD, noting that the software decreased the time it took to render design drawings from 10 to 6 months.101 The fact this achievement was reported publicly does not con­tradict the conclusion that the JH-7 was China’s first CAD assisted fighter, but instead hints at the fact that the J-10BS was the first example of a military air­craft designed using domestically produced CAD technology. All subsequent Chinese military aviation development projects almost certainly utilize CAD.

Although China lost legitimate access to most Western defense tech­nologies after Tiananmen, it continued existing defense technology ties with Israel and reestablished them with Russia. Ukraine also emerged as an impor­tant source of air-to-air (AAM) and air-to-surface missiles (ASM) for the PLAAF.102 Unlike the previous Sino-Soviet defense arrangement where Beijing was dependent on Moscow and negotiated from a weaker bargaining position, the economically tumultuous post-Soviet Russian state was much more depen­dent on China as a buyer. This allowed China to gain access to both advanced fighters and aviation technologies that a more solvent Russian government likely would have preferred not to sell.

In response to these new opportunities, China pursued multiple options to advance military modernization. The PLA purchased limited quantities of advanced Russian aircraft, ships, and submarines in order to gain experience operating modern weapons systems. For the PLAAF, this included acquisition of the Su-27 fighter and the S-300 surface-to-air missile. The deal eventually evolved into a coproduction arrangement intended to produce 200 aircraft and then into efforts to reverse engineer key components to create an independent production capability. Chinese defense industries continued efforts to develop their own new systems, seeking to integrate advanced imported technologies and components into the design where Chinese equivalents were not available. The J—10 fighter, which uses Russian engines, is one such example. Chinese defense industries also sought to adapt imported and indigenous avionics and armaments to improve the capabilities of older platforms.

At the strategic level, in keeping with Deng’s earlier pronouncements regarding the centrality of airpower in winning modern wars, the Chinese began investing more time in related research. Academics and military strat­egists examined U. S. and Soviet theories on how to achieve maximum effect through the use of airpower.103 Beijing was realistic about the relative weak­ness of the PLAAF when measured against its U. S. and Soviet counterparts. While it assimilated airpower strategy as conceived by the superpowers, China was equally interested in understanding how countries with qualitatively less advanced air forces could employ airpower against more powerful opponents. Several works cite surprise attacks by the Argentine air force against British naval forces during the Falklands War as an illustrative example.104 It was also during this time period that Chinese defense analysts and military planners began to translate the emphasis on expanded airpower into concrete technol­ogy acquisition and procurement goals. In the early 1990s, the PLA was still operating under significant budget constraints; since the outset of opening and reform, resources had been shifted to nondefense areas of the economy. Despite this situation, PLAAF planners mapped out a development trajectory for the air force which has been more or less followed: (1) phase out equip­ment based on antiquated technology; (2) place emphasis on aircraft quality over quantity; (3) graft, when possible, new technology (radar, avionics, mis­siles) onto older airframes to increase combat effectiveness and extend service life; and (4) focus on long-term self-reliance, while filling existing technology gaps in military aviation via procurement of foreign equipment/knowledge.105

In 1998, China undertook a massive restructuring of its defense industry with the aim of ensuring that the PLA was adequately involved in procurement decisions. Prior to creation of the General Armaments Department (GAD), the intermediary between the end user of weaponry (PLA) and the supplier (the defense industry) was the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). This system resulted in a fundamental mis­alignment of interests as COSTIND failed to properly represent the needs of the Chinese military, instead allowing the weapons producers to advance their own institutional interests at the expense of the PLA.106 The defense reforms of the late 1990s allowed the PLA, through the GAD, to take the lead in dictating procurement requirements based on actual need.107 While the reforms did not specifically address resource competition among the service branches, they did provide a mechanism for the PLAAF to align procurement with its strategic development objectives. Leadership support for increased airpower capability also helped the PLAAF advance its procurement agenda.

Because this framework seeks to assess the military balances, the games are best understood through the different roles military power plays in each. The Game of Influence is one where military power is utilized in an essential sup­porting role to advance national interests, but military victory in a conflict is not the ultimate goal. The Game of Influence is not necessarily a zero-sum game. In the Battle over a Third Party, military power in the context of a conflict over a third party plays the central role, but asymmetric stakes tend to prevent a zero – sum character. In the Great Power Game, military power is the central aspect, and it is the most comprehensive game in scope as it ranges across all military and political spheres. It is also the only true zero-sum game discussed.

In my assignment as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, I had the responsibility of monitoring air forces around the world. There is no question which country has made the greatest strides in developing its airpower capabil­ity. Over the last two decades, Chinas air force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), has transformed itself from a large, poorly-trained force oper­ating aircraft based on 1950s Soviet designs to a leaner and meaner force flying advanced Russian and indigenously produced fourth-generation fighters. This remarkable transformation is still a work in progress, but China has made up a lot of ground in a short time.

China’s civilian and military leaders grasped the centrality of airpower in modern warfare as early as the mid 1970s, a lesson reinforced by the stunning success of the U. S.-led coalition during the first Gulf War. They set the goal of building the PLAAF into a world class, high-technology air force capable of pre­vailing against sophisticated adversaries in regional conflicts. China’s expanding airpower capability has had a profound impact on the Asia-Pacific region (and beyond), causing countries to reassess their own air force modernization needs.

China’s successful 2011 test flight of a stealth fighter prototype, the J-20, demonstrates just how ambitious its airpower goals have become. The United States and Russia are the only other countries deploying or developing true fifth-generation fighter aircraft; Beijing is now seeking to match the capabili­ties of the two most established aerospace powers. In addition to stealth fighter development, the Chinese aviation industry already produces two fourth-gen­eration fighters (the indigenous J-10 and China’s Su-27 copy, the J-11) which are roughly equivalent to the aircraft that make up the bulk of the existing U. S., Russian, and Western air force fleets. China has also successfully test flown a fourth-generation fighter (J-15) that can be launched from an aircraft carrier.

More sophisticated combat aircraft are just one component of the expan­sion of Chinese airpower. Chinese military planners are focused on development of antiaccess/area denial capabilities with an eye toward negating any potential threat to their dominance in the Western Pacific. Chinese efforts to develop an “informatized” military include a focus on integrating and networking aero­space systems, using airborne early warning and control aircraft together with space-based assets. China plans to field a large fleet of remotely piloted aircraft

(RPAs) with both combat and surveillance missions. The deployment of RPAs will enhance and extend the range of China’s area denial capabilities, challeng­ing the ability of other nations’ forces to operate in the Western Pacific.

China’s Second Artillery Corps now possesses a large arsenal of increas­ingly accurate cruise and ballistic missiles that could strike air bases in Japan and islands throughout the Pacific, and target U. S. aircraft carriers. Nonstealthy air­craft attempting to operate near China will be confronted with an increasingly capable land-based air defense network. PLAAF training has advanced in parallel with technological improvements, resulting in a better-educated and more pro­fessional cadre of officers and enlisted personnel. Even in an era of constrained resources, China’s comprehensive expansion of its airpower capability should be a matter of great concern to U. S. civilian and military leaders and to U. S. friends and allies in Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

I was honored and privileged to take part in the October 2010 conference in Taipei on the Chinese Air Force, which was jointly organized by Taiwan’s Council for Advanced Policy Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the U. S. National Defense University, and the RAND Corporation. The organiz­ers did a superb job in assembling a first-rate group of international experts on airpower and the Chinese military. The conference papers were discussed and debated at length as experts sought to assess Chinese air force current and future capabilities and the trajectory of the air balance across the Taiwan Strait and in the Western Pacific. The current volume contains substantially revised versions of the papers presented at the conference, benefiting greatly from conference dis­cussions and careful editing by Richard Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip Saun­ders. Together, the chapters offer a complete picture of where the Chinese air force is today, where it has come from, and most importantly, where it is headed.

This book should be of keen interest to policymakers, senior military leaders, the intelligence community, academics, and China watchers of every stripe. However, it is of particular relevance to senior U. S. civilian and military leaders as they make difficult decisions about funding U. S. air and naval capa­bilities in an environment of constrained defense resources. It is also impor­tant reading for U. S. Air Force and Navy officers, who need to understand the progress China has made in modernizing its air force, and to consider the ways Chinese leaders might employ air power in the future.

David A. Deptula, Lt General, USAF (Ret.)

Senior Military Scholar Center for Character and Leadership Development United States Air Force Academy

The concept of strategic strike serves as the principal rationale for cre­ation and sustainment of a military service organization independent and dis­tinct from ground or naval forces. For example, strategic strike serves as the raison d’etre for an independent U. S. Air Force. The strategic strike mission is the principal driver for the Second Artillery’s existence as an independent force, and a vision for the PLAAF.25 From a U. S. perspective, strategic strike seeks to “weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition.”26

The Second Artillery’s conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missile force has been at the forefront of the PLA’s strategic strike capa­bility for almost 20 years. As the 2008 Defense White Paper notes, the “Second Artillery Force is a strategic force under the direct command and control of the

CMC [Central Military Commission], and the core force of China for strategic deterrence.” In addition, “the conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is charged mainly with the task of conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against key strategic and operational targets of the enemy.”27 The PLA leadership depends upon its ballistic and land attack cruise missile force—the Second Artillery—to deter potential adversaries and defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In­creasingly accurate conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) are the optimal means for suppressing enemy air defense and creat­ing a more permissive environment for subsequent conventional air operations due to their relative immunity to defense systems. Along these lines, ballistic missiles function similarly to U. S. stealth assets. In a conflict, they can be sup­ported by electronic attack assets which reduce early warning and confuse en­emy commanders. In addition, space-based, airborne, and ground-based sen­sors can facilitate command and control and provide crucial strategic intelli­gence, theater awareness, targeting, and battle damage assessment information.

For integrated attack-defense operations and coercive air campaigns to­day, the PLAAF depends upon the Second Artillery for suppression of enemy air defenses and missions that would enable a more permissive operating envi­ronment. As time goes on, however, the PLAAF may become less reliant on Sec­ond Artillery support as it evolves “relatively independent” capabilities through economical “leapfrogs” (S*SS) in technology development.28 The PLAAF has been diversifying its roles and missions, moving away from a force that once was almost exclusively responsible for air defense, interdiction, and close air support toward a service whose primary mission is deterrence and strategic attack. The PLAAF’s diversification is grounded in a body of theory stipulating that an inde­pendent air strike campaign could support national objectives.29 According to China’s 2008 Defense White Paper,

the Air Force is working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its ca­pabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build it­self into a modernized strategic air force.

The PLAAF is characterized as “a strategic service of the PLA, and the main force for carrying out air operations. It is responsible for such tasks as safeguarding the country’s territorial air space and territorial sovereignty, and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide.”

With the White Paper stopping short of enshrining the strategic strike mission, PLAAF representatives have made no secret that the service’s long-term vision is to be able to conduct an independent air campaign to achieve decisive strategic effects.30 Such a goal should not be surprising. Since the publication of Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air in 1921, airpower pro­ponents have envisioned the transformation of warfare through long-range strategic strikes. PLAAF representatives have argued in favor of a gradual tran­sition from supporting roles and predominantly defensive counterair missions and close air support, to joint operations, and finally to a fully independent service able to conduct strategic strike missions at extended ranges.31 Accord­ing to one detailed Taiwan assessment, the PLAAF had set a goal to be able to conduct an air campaign within a 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) radius of China’s periphery by 2010—one that has not been successful to date—and extend the range to 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles) by 2030.32

The PLAAF has long struggled to assert its relevance within the PLA. In January 1979, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping enshrined airpower as a key component of overall force modernization by stating that “without air superi­ority, success in future war is not possible… give priority to the development of the air force… invest in the aviation industry and air force to ensure air su­periority.” However, as John Lewis and Xue Litai have noted, Deng’s advocacy had a secondary motive, which was to assert his authority over a service that had been perceived to be politically questionable.33

Strategic strike is intimately related to a coercive aerospace campaign. The strategic center of gravity in a coercive aerospace campaign is the opposing lead­ership. Coercive force seeks to affect the amorphous and unquantifiable variable of national will, morale, and resolve, or to manipulate a leader’s decision calcu­lus by ensuring he understands that the costs of continuing a particular course of action outweigh the benefits. The challenge is to shatter the will and morale of an opponent or affect his decision calculus. In theory, an effective aerospace campaign would degrade an adversary’s capabilities to such an extent that suc­cess looks impossible, defeat looks inevitable, further resistance appears futile, and the costs of continuing to resist outweigh the costs of surrendering.34

In a coercive aerospace campaign, PLA observers highlight the utility of well-planned preemptive strikes as a means to shock an opponent, paralyze his ability to conduct operations, and force a political solution soon after initiation of hostilities. PLAAF doctrine stresses rapid mobility, “paralysis warfare” (ЯЙ $), concentration of its best assets, surprise, and pre-emption. A fundamental PLA guiding concept is to compel a political concession swiftly, using only the minimal force necessary.35

A more ambitious offensive air campaign is conceived as having two general phases: first strikes and follow-on strikes. PLA first-strike opera­tions would involve Second Artillery conventional missiles, the concentrated application of the PLAAF’s best assets, as well as aviation assets from other ser­vices. In theoretical operational analysis, first strikes would consist of multiple waves in order to suppress enemy air defenses. This includes preventing key enemy aviation assets from taking off, effectively preventing ground-based air defenses from organizing resistance along specific corridors, and eliminating enemy early warning assets. Achieving air superiority will facilitate follow-on air activity or landing operations.36

Force should be concentrated against those targets whose destruction or suppression would have the greatest strategic and operational effects. Howev­er, planning should take into consideration neutralization of targets that would permit a more permissive environment for follow-on strikes. Flexibility is im­portant, requiring a capable and timely reconnaissance network that can eval­uate results of the first strike. In general, given fundamental economy-of-force considerations, fewer aircraft are needed for follow-on strike operations. One assessment concludes that for deep-strike operations, ballistic and extended – range cruise missiles may be preferable to aircraft in order to avoid the com­plexity of first attaining air superiority and to take advantage of the inherent surprise aspects of missile operations.37

In some circumstances, an offensive air campaign would be the precur­sor to establishment of a coercive “air blockade.”38 As a relatively new mission, an air blockade is viewed by authoritative PRC sources as an effective means to compel an adversary to accede to Beijing’s demands. A blockade could “create internal struggles and societal collapse.” Air blockades involve strikes against ports and navigation routes to shut down air and maritime traffic and cut off contact with the international community as a means to achieve specific po­litical or military objectives. Operations also include efforts to counter an en­emy’s attempt to break the blockade. An air blockade can weaken an enemy’s capacity for operations, or compel him to accede to Beijing’s demands short of war. An air blockade can take many forms, including suppressing air and naval bases, halting land transportation, or, in the case of Taiwan, cutting off traffic in the Strait. An air blockade can be carried out in conjunction with a maritime blockade or quarantine.39

In seeking an independent strategic strike capability, the PLAAF appears to be encroaching upon a conventional mission that the Second Artillery has monopolized for almost two decades. However, the Second Artillery serves in a supporting role in the PLA’s strategy for suppressing adversary air assets on the ground or at sea. Augmenting traditional airpower, Second Artillery assets fa­cilitate the occupation of the air domain and offset weaknesses of the PLAAF. To be sure, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles offer advantages over traditional airpower due to an assured ability to penetrate defenses, ability to prepare and launch with little warning, short time of flight, and lower mission support costs. However, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles are unable to sustain flight, are not reusable after launch, and therefore are relatively inflexible.40

Familiarity with the PLA’s 15-grade and 10-rank structure, which applies to officers and organizations for all the services and branches, is the key to understanding the PLAAF’s organizational structure. The current system became effective in 1988 and is based on ground force terminology. Although this paper refers to the grade and rank system only in passing, it is important to understand the basics of the system as it provides the basis for hierarchical and cross-organizational relationships throughout the PLA.19

According to PLAAF 2010, there are four key differences between the U. S. military and the PLA in terms of their use of grade and rank. First and most importantly, in the PLA, rank is not as important as grade. The PLA uses rank insignia primarily as a visual cue to identify an individual’s approximate sta­tus; military grade is the more accurate reflection of one’s status.20 Second, the PLA assigns billets based on one’s grade, not rank. Third, promotion in grade, not rank, is what determines how one moves up the career ladder. For example, moving from senior colonel to major general while remaining in the same grade is not as important as moving from one grade to the next, even if one retains the same rank. Finally, the PLA assigns every organization, not just officers and billets, a grade, as shown in table 4-1. The grade system is what defines the organizational structure and the relationship among organizations.

Chinese analysts contend that penetrating enemy air defenses to estab­lish corridors through which the main assault forces can reach their targets (kongzhong tufang, ЙФ^ІЙ) is one of the most difficult tasks of the offensive mission. But they also underscore the importance of this task to the success­ful execution of the overall mission.39 Their assessments are heavily influenced by their very high evaluation of the air defense systems of the countries of their most likely prospective adversaries (the United States, Taiwan, and prob­ably Japan), as well as by their concerns about the shortcomings of China’s own forces. Some argue that penetration will be extremely difficult because “presently our main operational targets are the established and tightly inte­grated long, medium, and short range, and high, medium, and low altitude air defense systems.” They also argue that the PLAAF should expect to encoun­ter enemy air defenses with advanced intelligence warning systems, continu­ous 360-degree monitoring of the battlespace, and other features that create an “unprecedented” level of battlespace transparency. All of these, they contend, will make the execution of penetration very difficult.40

In order to penetrate advanced air defenses, Chinese analysts have advo­cated using a combination of “stealth penetrations” and “storm penetrations.” Stealth assaults emphasize deception, concealment, flying at ultra-low levels and a variety of other radar avoidance techniques to avert detection and mislead enemy defenses. Storm assaults involve preceding and escorting the actual attack group with as many as five other groups assigned to such tasks as reconnaissance, electronic interference, air defense suppression, screening, and support.41

To maintain China’s initiative following the initial assault, Chinese ana­lysts urge preparations to launch quick follow-on attacks. They emphasize that this requires very rapid assessment of the damage inflicted by the first wave, which, in turn, places a heavy burden upon all surveillance and recon­naissance assets—air, space, naval, ground, and other assets—to quickly sup­ply data for follow-on assaults.42

Another aspect of the assault that Chinese analysts emphasize is the early and continuous preparation to defeat enemy counterattack operations. In addi­tion to defending the security of key war zone targets, these analysts stress that preparing to block counterattacks is critical to allowing Chinese forces to remain on the offensive and facilitate the overall “smooth progress” of the mission.43

Many individuals deserve credit for ensuring the success of the 2010 International Conference on People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Affairs, particu­larly conference organizers Arthur Ding, Secretary General, Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies; Roger Cliff, Senior Political Scientist of the RAND Corporation; Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chi­nese Military Affairs at the U. S. National Defense University (NDU) Institute for National Strategic Studies; and Michael Swaine, Senior Associate, Carn­egie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP). The conference could not have succeeded without the hard work of Yi-su Yang of the Chinese Coun­cil of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), who superbly managed the travel and logistics arrangements and coordinated meetings with Taiwan and U. S. mili­tary and government officials. The editors would also like to thank Teresa Yen and the staff at the Far Eastern Plaza hotel in Taipei.

The presenters and panelists deserve great credit for taking time from very busy schedules to prepare provocative and thoughtful papers rooted in Chinese sources and rigorous analysis, illuminating the current state and likely future of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The editors would like to thank discus­sants Xiaoming Zhang of the U. S. Air War College, Air University; Richard P Hallion; Paul Godwin, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Benjamin Lambeth, RAND Corporation; Alexander Huang, Tamkang University; and Andrew Erickson, U. S. Naval War College for their comments on individual papers. We are also grateful to panelists Michael Swaine, Sze-Wei Chang, Taiwan Univer­sity of Science and Technology, and David Deptula, RAND Corporation, for their observations on the PLAAF.

This volume also benefited greatly from the questions, comments, and discussions of conference participants, who represented nearly fifty official and unofficial think-tank, academic, political, business, and military organi­zations and associations. In addition to CAPS, CEIP, NDU, and RAND, these included the following:

Academia Sinica

Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation

Alion Science and Technology

American Chamber of Commerce

American Institute in Taiwan Ancer Technology Asia Centre

Australian Commerce and Industry Office Center for Naval Analyses Defense Group Incorporated European Union Centre in Taiwan Foreign Policy Research Institute Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies French Institute in Taipei Genco International, Inc.

German Institute in Taiwan

India-Taipei Association

Institute of Chinese Communist Studies

Israel Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei

Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission

Nanyang Technological University

National Policy Foundation

National Chengchi University

National Taiwan University

Phoenix Satellite Television Ltd.

Project 1049 Institute

Prospect Foundation

Singapore Trade Office in Taipei

Taipei Medical University

Taiwan Brain Trust

Taiwan Legislative Yuan

Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Taiwan National Defense University

Taiwan Society for Strategic Studies

Taiwan University of Science and Technology

Tamkang University

U. S. Air Force Air War College

U. S. Air Force Pacific Air Forces

U. S. National War College

U. S. Naval War College

U. S. Pacific Command

University of New South Wales

Yuan-Ze University.

Richard Hallion would also like to thank Andrew Erickson, Associate Professor, U. S. Naval War College; Xiaoming Zhang, Associate Professor, U. S. Air Force Air War College; Polly Shen, Research Associate, Taiwan Council of Advanced Policy Studies; Maj. Gen. Tsai-mai “Mike” Tien, Superintendent, Taiwan Air Force Academy, Gangshan; Edward Chuang, Chairman, Genco International, Inc.; and Sun Tai Hsiang, Director, Aviation Museum of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Taoyuan International Airport. Each con­tributed to the understanding of China’s aerospace heritage, and to the issues and concerns that are examined in this work.

The editors would like to thank George Maerz (copy-editing), Frank Hoffman, and Jeff Smotherman at NDU Press and Guy Tom (cover design) and Jessica Reynolds (layout) at the Government Printing Office for their hard work in turning the draft manuscript into a finished book. National Defense University Research Analysts Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman and Budget Analyst Debbie Jefferson provided administrative and other support for the conference and subsequent efforts to publish and distribute this book.

A more ambitious and long-term force development airpower concept is “integrated air and space (aerospace) operations” (Й^—Ф). As a preface, definitional and translation issues are important. Air and space have tradition­ally been viewed as separate domains, with “near-space” occupying the realm between the two. Traditional airbreathing platforms operate in accordance with the laws of aerodynamics, and are flexible and responsive. Space systems are governed by orbital mechanics, cover a broader expanse of Earth, and in the case of satellites, offer a more continuous presence. However, with air and space being defined as a single operational medium, and with an emphasis on capabilities that blur the distinction between traditional boundaries, the term aerospace may be more appropriate than “air and space” in describing PLA fu­ture ambitions.

China’s traditional concept of airpower is centered upon air superiority (ФІЙІХ) in support of ground and naval forces. However, due to what is viewed as the near inevitable militarization of space, observers stress the need to view the air and space domains as a single realm.41 Aerospace implies that air and space function as a single, integrated medium. From a Chinese R&D perspec­tive, integrated air and space operations conceptually link two defense indus­trial organizations: aviation (^Й) and space and missiles (ffi^).

At least as early as 2002, opinion leaders called for establishment of a “national aerospace security system” (Й^й^Ф^). The PLAAF appears poised to become the country’s principal custodian of an evolving aerospace defense system.42 As PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang argued in a recent media interview, an integrated approach to aerospace operations is needed to ensure strategic dominance on the sea and ground.43 PLAAF-affiliated analysts out­line intent to leapfrog in the service’s ability to conduct integrated aerospace operations.44 With the concept of aerospace operations still in its infancy, ob­servers note that technological and legal issues constrain the pace of develop – ment.45 Nevertheless, as one senior PLAAF official noted, “space control is a reasonable extension of air control.”46

The PLA’s concept of integrated aerospace operations includes the zone between the atmosphere and outer space, known as “near-space.” Chinese ana­lysts view the near-space realm (often termed the “transatmosphere” in West­ern aerospace thought) as an area of future strategic competition. Near-space is generally characterized as the region between 20 and 100 kilometers (12.4 to 62 miles) above the earth’s surface. The 100-kilometer altitude point, some­times called the Karman Line, is a rough border dividing the earth’s atmo­sphere and outer space. The near-space realm is too high for fighter jets and too low for orbiting satellites, though winged boost-glide craft and high-super­sonic and hypersonic transatmospheric craft such as North American’s X-15 research airplane and Scaled Composites’ SpaceshipOne have transited it.47

Both the PLAAF and Second Artillery indicate their intent to establish space operations as a core competency. While writings assume space assets would naturally support air operations, uncertainty surrounds the role of the PLAAF, Second Artillery, or other entities in managing space operations, in­cluding planning, programming, and budgeting functions; satellite launch, tracking, and control; ground processing; and counterspace operations. An­other possible contentious issue could be future flight vehicles that operate in or transit all domains of space, near-space, and the atmosphere.48

Both the PLAAF and Second Artillery appear to make arguments in favor of organizational control over space-related policy, budget, and peace­time operational control. Today, China’s space assets appear to be controlled by the headquarters-level General Staff and General Armaments Departments. Requirements development and ground processing and analysis of satellite im­agery for military consumers appear to be the responsibility of the General Staff Department Second Department Technology Bureau.49

The PLAAF’s argument is premised upon the concept of integrated aerospace operations, that air and space are a single integrated medium, and that space is a natural extension of air. However, its vision appears set upon control of the entire aerospace domain (f’JS^fX). Senior prominent space and missile industry authorities associated with the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Second Academy appear to advocate on behalf of the PLAAF, arguing that aerospace assets should be concentrated under a single military service, and that a space force should be built upon the founda­tion of an air force, similar to the United States, Russia, and others.50 In addi­tion, the battlespace for air defense operations should be extended beyond the atmosphere and into space and over sea, yet integrated under a single air de­fense command organization.51 In addition to the air force, an internal Second Artillery text references a potential “Second Artillery space operations unit” (“Й^ЙІТіКнРРА) with an operational support function.52

Ownership of satellites now and in the future remains unclear. Products and services, including imagery and communications, are national assets and thus made available for military purposes. Space launch and satellite tracking and control services in peacetime appear to be under the control of the Gen­eral Armaments Department (GAD). However, the PLA likely assumes that satellite assets and perhaps even static space launch facilities could be vulner­able during a conflict. Therefore, prudence dictates that satellite reserves are in place, as well as mobile launchers, most likely derivatives of the DF-21 me­dium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). For logistical reasons, Second Artillery could be a service provider in contingency situations due to its inherent opera­tional responsiveness.

Integrated aerospace defense also includes an ability to counter foreign space-based surveillance, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles, and hyper­sonic aerospace strike vehicles in the future.53 After outlining a 15-year, three – phased missile defense development plan in 1996, China’s space and missile industry conducted successful tests in January 2007 and January 2010, thus demonstrating an ability to intercept satellites in low Earth orbit and rudimen­tary medium-range ballistic missiles during the mid-course portion of flight.54

Insufficient information is available to assess which service would be equipped with aerospace intercept systems once a viable capability is fully operational. Presumably, however, the Equipment Department of either the PLAAF or Second Artillery is overseeing R&D. One analysis explains that the aerospace defense domain would be divided along the Karman Line—the PLAAF would assume the air defense mission for threats below 100 kilometers (62 miles) while the Second Artillery would be responsible for threats above 100 kilometers.55