In Conclusion

The Asia-Pacific region is in the midst of fundamental change, with sig­nificant implications for long-term strategic stability. The gradual expansion of China’s long-range precision-strike capabilities is altering the regional strategic landscape. The PLA Air Force and Second Artillery are making modest prog­ress in developing advanced capabilities with an eye toward expanding their operational range into space and into the Asia-Pacific region. For the PLA Air Force, the ability to carry out strategic strike missions at ranges of 3,000 kilo­meters (1,860 miles) or more is viewed as the key to becoming a truly indepen­dent service, rather than one dependent on the Second Artillery or a support­ing player to the ground forces. Despite the PLAAF’s aspirations to develop a force capable of an independent air campaign around China’s periphery and speculation of subordination of Second Artillery conventional ballistic mis­sile units to the PLAAF, senior PRC political and military authorities will likely continue to rely on the established capabilities of the Second Artillery for coer­cion, strategic strike missions, and suppression of enemy air defenses for some time to come.124

Due their speed, precision, and difficulties in fielding viable defenses, these systems—if deployed in sufficient numbers—have the potential to pro­vide the PRC with a decisive military edge in the event of conflict over terri­torial or sovereignty claims. Reliance on ballistic missiles and extended-range LACMs incentivizes other militaries to develop similar capabilities.

The rapid deployment of ballistic missiles and GLCMs has dampened the requirement for an offensive-oriented air force. Another possible constraint has been the limitations of China’s aviation industry and its corresponding re­liance on foreign procurement of key systems. Nevertheless, over the coming decade, a more capable, technologically advancing domestic aviation industry may be better positioned to support the PLAAF’s vision of becoming a world – class service capable of conducting air campaigns independent of the Second Artillery.

Beyond force modernization programs in India and Taiwan, PRC ex­pansion of its aerospace capabilities is at least a partial driver for a modest shift in U. S. defense policies.125 Intended to counter lower end threats, such as those of North Korea and Iran, U. S. missile defenses are likely unable to coun­ter more sophisticated and larger Chinese ballistic missile raids, much less new generation, hypersonic, extended-range flight vehicles.126 As a result, the Unit­ed States and allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region would need to rely on hardening and counterstrikes for defense.

Beijing’s missile-centric strategy presents a number of challenges for re­gional stability. Barring the fielding of effective countermeasures, Chinese con­ventional aerospace power, specifically short – and medium-range ballistic and extended-range land attack cruise missiles, may over time give the PLA a de­cisive advantage in future conflicts around China’s periphery. Barring a vis­ible and decisive American response, the PRC’s successful deployment of an antiship ballistic missile capability could diminish confidence in U. S. security guarantees not only in Taiwan but throughout the region as a whole.

Beijing’s continued theater missile-centric strategy presents challenges that transcend the operational realm. Beijing’s large infrastructure of short – range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan fosters mistrust and discourages mean­ingful political dialogue that could lead toward a resolution of differences in a manner acceptable to the people of Taiwan and the international community. Beyond Taiwan, Beijing’s continued reliance on and expansion of convention­al theater missiles as the centerpiece of its aerospace power have the potential to create strategic competitions that increase the risks of conflict in the future. Looking out toward the future, PRC success in linking aspirations for integrat­ed aerospace power with operational capabilities over the next 10 to 15 years is far from certain, yet clearly bears watching.