Category The Chinese Air Force

Chinese air – and spacepower analysts demonstrate great faith in the util­ity of modern air and space offensive missions, and they maintain that PLAAF offensive missions can accomplish or support a wide array of strategic, cam­paign, operational, and also political objectives. To underscore the concept of the PLAAF as a “strategic” service, a number of analysts stress the ability of modern, informatized air and space forces to achieve the strategic objectives of the state either singlehandedly, or as the lead service in joint operations. Their contention is that in several recent limited wars and operations around the world, the speed, range, and destructiveness of offensive air and space have not only been militarily critical, but also politically decisive—constituting “the final word” that destroyed the adversary’s economic and logistical capability to sustain military operations, and that undermined the political will of an adver­sary’s population, armed forces, and government to fight onward.

Writing in 2006, analysts Cai Fengzhen and Deng Fan described the decisive importance of the air and space offensive mission this way:

The practise of modern warfare has already verified that “victory or defeat is determined in the air and space.” Air-space superiority not only can achieve maximum military advantage. It can also be used to obtain comprehensive benefits in political, spiritual and other areas. By means of operations in air-space battlefields. . . fighting speedy battles and win­ning quick decisions has already become the principal measure used by the United States and other major air – and space-countries for seizing comprehensive political and military benefits.26

The Science of Campaigns has identified three clusters of “basic tasks” that define the key strategic – and campaign-level objectives of PLAAF offen­sive campaigns. These focus on destroying or disabling enemy forces to achieve air dominance, supporting ground and maritime campaigns, and achieving other unspecified strategic goals of the state. More specifically, they include the following: “Destroy or cripple enemy aviation forces and ground air defense forces, and thereby seize air dominance”; “Destroy or weaken large enemy troop concentrations, and destroy enemy transportation systems, to create conditions for ground or maritime campaigns”; and “Strike enemy polit­ical, military, and economic targets, weaken the enemy’s combat potential to achieve specific strategic goals, and accomplish other specially assigned stra­tegic aims.”27

NDU analyst Yuan Jingwei’s description of the objectives of offensive missions, however, places more explicit emphasis on disabling the enemy’s combat systems than the list of tasks in The Science of Campaigns. He describes the objectives of these missions as follows:

to achieve air and space superiority [kongtianyoushi, Й^’ЙЙ’], paralyze the enemy’s combat systems [nanhuan di zuozhan tixi, ЯЙ±Й! ТШФ^], and weaken the enemy’s combat potential [xiaoruo di zhanzheng qianli, ШШШШ&%ІТ], in order to create the conditions for achieving strategic and campaign goals [wei dacheng zhanlue zhanyi mudi chuangzao tiao- jian, or to achieve these goals directly.28

Table 8-1 lists the composition of the Chinese air force at 5-year inter­vals from 1990 to 2010. It shows that as late as 1995, almost 80 percent of the PLAAF’s combat aircraft were variants of 1950s vintage Soviet MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters. To put this in perspective: the original MiG-19 was intro­duced in the Soviet air force in the mid-1950s and entered Chinese service around 1962. In 1962, the most common combat aircraft in the U. S. Air Force was the F-100 Super Sabre. While the F-100 was an excellent airplane in its own right, it is hard to imagine the U. S. Air Force (USAF) in 1995 being built around it, as the PLAAF was built around the MiG-19/J-6.2

As notable—though perhaps less remarked upon—is the dramatic reduction in the number of combat aircraft in the PLAAF inventory. Between 1990 and 2010, almost 3,500 obsolete aircraft—70 percent of the force—were retired, mostly since 1995. Again by way of comparison, the USAF’s fleet of fighter-bombers shrank from a Cold War level of 3,620 in 1990 to 2,650 in 2010—a little over 25 percent.3 That the PLAAF was willing to shed so many of its aircraft indicates the scope of the PLAAF’s modernization efforts equally as much as its acquisition of modern aircraft.

One way of understanding the impact of the past 20 years on the PLAAF’s fighter force is to compare the number of its modern fighters with the numbers

owned by the air forces of other advanced countries; table 8-2 shows that com­parison. It reveals that the third-largest fleet of advanced fighters in the world may be found within the PLAAF, smaller only than those of the United States and Russia, and larger than the combined inventories of, for example, the Brit­ish and French air forces.

Finally, figure 8-1 presents a third way of visualizing the reshaping of the PLAAF’s fighter fleet by depicting its order of battle according to fighter “gener­ation.” Today, almost a third of the PLAAF’s fighter-bombers are fourth-genera­tion jets; yet as recently as 2000, they made up only 2 percent of the force. (Chinese writings refer to fourth-generation fighters as “third-generation” aircraft; this book employs the Western terminology throughout.)4

As early as 2004, a guiding PLA objective for developing its armed forces has been “informatization.” This principle stresses the centrality of information technology in weapons systems and their application.20 The PLA still considers itself in the early stages of integrated information-firepower (й^^Л_Ф) with a goal of achieving its fullest capabilities by 2050.21 The application of Chinese aerospace power against operational targets is likely to be linked with (and thus limited by) the scope and sophistication of its persistent surveillance network and related command, control, and communications system. PLA joint firepow­er operations theory thus envisions the seamless connection between sensors and shooters of the PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, and other firepower custo­dians echoing Western F2T2EA (“Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess”) the­ory and evolving practice undertaken over the past two decades.

The mission of firepower warfare is three-fold. First and most important, air strikes and theater missile operations, supported by information operations, are intended to create the conditions necessary for a decisive attainment of stra­tegic and theater objectives. These conditions include the achievement of the “Three Superiorities” (HfX): information dominance, air superiority, and sea superiority. Achievement of the three superiorities could, in and of itself, cre­ate the necessary conditions for termination of conflict on the PRC’s terms. The second mission of firepower warfare is to support large-scale ground force op­erations through annihilation of or paralyzing the enemy’s effective strength. The final function involves independent firepower operations in direct support of strategic and theater objectives. Independent missions involve demonstra­tions of force or resolve, “strategic deterrence” missions, punishment through long-range air strikes, or a series of Second Artillery strikes that are intended to achieve limited strategic or operational objectives. Firepower warfare would dominate the preliminary phase of a campaign and, under certain conditions, could independently achieve strategic objectives of the PRC.22

Limited firepower assets would be intended for use against targets whose destruction or suppression can achieve the greatest effects. Primary targets for the application of firepower include the command and control system and as­sociated communications; strategic infrastructure; the most advanced capabil­ities of the opponent, including the air defense system; defense industries; and airbases and ports. From the PLA’s perspective, air and conventional theater missile strikes are the most important means of firepower against deep targets.

The PRC views information operations as integral to a successful joint aerospace or firepower campaign. Coercive military operations ultimately are intended to affect the decision calculus and morale of opposing civilian and military leaders. Perceptions and decisions of an opposing leadership are shaped by the quality and amount of information which they possess. Effective military operations rely upon the ability to defend one’s sources of information while exploiting and assaulting an opponent’s information structure. The fo­cus of information operations is the enemy’s command system. The command system serves as the strategic and operational “vital point” (^A), and consists of policymakers at the strategic level, the operational military command, and supporting command, control, and communications systems.

In addition to increasingly accurate and lethal theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles and increasingly sophisticated multirole fighter aircraft, the PLA is prioritizing development of stand-off and escort jammers as well as other electronic warfare assets. At the same time, Beijing is investing in ad­vanced command, control, communications, and intelligence systems while placing greater emphasis on training, particularly through the use of simulators.

Intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological operations are force multipliers that can enhance the effectiveness of air and missile oper­ations in the successful attainment of limited political objectives. These capa­bilities are intended to confuse an adversary and increase the chances of stra­tegic or operational surprise. From a psychological perspective, information operations can magnify the effects of air strikes with detrimental effects on an enemy leadership’s morale and national will. Electronic attack and electronic defense are integral aspects of a PLA joint air campaign.

Electronic warfare is another key aspect of integrated information-fire­power warfare. PLA strategists believe electronic warfare can powerfully affect the results of a military campaign and theater offensives, and perhaps help deter­mine the outcome of a war. The PLA also has been developing a computer net­work attack capability. The most likely target would be automation systems, of­ten referred to as process control systems (PCS) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are critical to the safe, reliable, and efficient operations of critical infrastructure. PCS is used extensively in managing electric power, water, petroleum, natural gas, as well as communications systems. If a PCS system could be affected, there may be no need for physical destruction.

Counterstealth is another aspect of integrated information-firepower warfare. The PLA is seeking to reduce the advantages that low observable air assets enjoy. Most important is the ability to detect, track, and engage aircraft and land attack cruise missiles with low radar cross sections. Also focused on reducing the signature of its own assets, greater knowledge of stealth systems will increase their capabilities against U. S. low observable systems.23

PLA programs to counter potential adversary space capabilities also are an aspect of integrating information with firepower, and essential for denying or degrading adversary C4ISR (command, control, communications, comput­ers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. For electronic defense, the PRC is investing heavily in command automation, tactical data links, electronic attack, and space-based reconnaissance and communications systems. The PLA appears to be applying principles of network-centric war­fare to correlate data from increasingly sophisticated sensor architectures. Net­work-centric warfare equips soldiers, airmen, and soldiers with a common op­erational picture that significantly increases situational awareness. As a result, individuals and units equipped to participate in the network are able to syn­chronize action, without necessarily having to wait for orders, which in turn reduces their reaction time. In addition, the network allows for dispersed and flexible operations at lower cost. Therefore, the introduction of a networked common tactical picture based on an advanced tactical data link program is a paradigm shift that could gradually break down the PLAs traditionally stove – piped, service-oriented approach to defense.24

The PLAs Joint Theater Command structure would direct integrated infor­mation-firepower warfare. The Firepower Coordination Center would coordinate an air and theater missile campaign against key targets in order to achieve strategic and theater objectives. Cells would contain PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, spe­cial operations, and ground force elements that would carry out necessary liaison with their respective corps-level service headquarters. Other supporting facilities would include centers for communications, firepower coordination, intelligence information, electronic countermeasures command, and weather.

The PLAAF’s organizational structure is a complicated one.4 The 2002 and 2008 editions of China’s National Defense state: 5

Concerning the PLA Air Force organizational structure, the Air Force practices a leadership system that combines operational command with Air Force building and management. The organizational system consists of Air Force Headquarters, seven Military Region Air Force Headquarters, [deputy] corps – and division-level command posts (CPs), divisions, bri­gades, and regiments. The Air Force [has] four branches—aviation, sur­face-to-air missile (SAM), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and airborne—plus five types of specialty forces—communications, radar, electronic counter­measures, chemical defense, and technical reconnaissance. The Air Force also has education, research, testing, and training institutions.

According to PLAAF writings, the air force’s organizational structure or military system (Й¥¥$І) consists of 11 components, each of which has various subcomponents, some of which overlap.6 These are the organizational system (ШІР4Ф$І);7 leadership and command system (^Й^ІнШФФІ);8 estab­lishment (e. g., table of organization and equipment / TOE) system (^$J);9 edu­cation and training system (ЙМЛІШФ®);10 scientific research system (f4^W ір4Ф®І);п political work (ШпІІ^);12 logistics support (йШЖШФ®);13 equipment management (^^вИФ®);14 equipment technical support (S^S ARB);15 personnel management (A#®!);16 and mobilization (ййІФФІ) and reserve forces (й^ЛИй).17 Each is subsequently examined.18

Yuan’s definition of the offensive mission reflects a growing consensus among PLA air – and spacepower theorists (including the authors of The Sci­ence of Campaigns in 2007) that a primary objective of offensive missions is to destroy or undermine the capability of the enemy’s command and control, sur­veillance, and other information systems to function together effectively. This mission is to be accomplished by sudden, carefully targeted attacks on “key – point” (zhongdian, Фй) or “critical” (yaohai, ШШ) targets. A critical aim is to disable enemy air defenses and induce paralysis, blindness, or isolation in these key combat systems at least long enough for PLAAF forces to establish and exploit corridors to carry out their main attacks.

A number of PLA air – and spacepower analysts portray these enemy information systems as fragile, interdependent “systems of systems” that are potentially subject to something like cascade failure, rather than as intercon­nected systems with a robust level of redundancy built in. Analysts Cai Feng – zhen and Tian Anping contend that, properly carried out, “an attack on one point can paralyze the entire situation” (ji qiyidian tanhuan quanju, фй—,йШ Йй^).29 This perspective that the enemy is a vulnerable “system of systems” is spelled out in a number of other analyses as well.30

Toward this end, PLA analysts increasingly emphasize the critical role that achieving information superiority (xinxi youshi, and under­

taking successful information operations plays in the offensive mission to incapacitate enemy systems while protecting China’s own systems.31 They distinguish three aspects of information operations that play a critical role in the overall offensive mission—reconnaissance, attacks, and defense:32

■ Information reconnaissance involves expanding the campaign com­manders’ capability for gathering intelligence materials on enemy information operations.33

■ Information attacks involve seeking information superiority by dis­rupting the enemy’s flows of key information. A major purpose of these operations is “to completely blind the enemy’s air defense sys­tem” and “to open a gap in the enemy’s air defense system to make it difficult for the enemy to organize effective interception actions.” PLA analysts note two forms of “soft” information attacks—electronic jamming and deception and computer network attacks—and “hard” attacks involving firepower destruction of enemy information assets.34 Key targets include enemy reconnaissance and early warning satellites, airborne early warning and control aircraft, ground-based long-range warning and fire-control radars, surface-to-air missile radars, and command guidance systems.35 The Science of Campaigns specifically recommends that attack planners assign a portion of China’s most capable fighters to attack enemy airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes in order to “chop down one of the enemy’s important information pillars” (qieduan di de zhongyao xinxi zhizhang, ЩІШШ МШШШ^^Й).36 Some analysts contend that China’s electronic jam­ming and deception resources are limited at present, and hence these information attacks are likely to rely more heavily on air attacks.37 This strongly suggests that Chinese forces may be forced to place much greater emphasis on destroying enemy warning and command and control and guidance systems through use of firepower destruction.

■ Information defense involves organizing defensive operations to pre­vent enemy jamming, firepower destruction, and computer network attacks.

Q-5. The last second-generation aircraft in combat service with the PLAAF is the Q-5 Fantan. The Q-5 evolved from the J-6, which itself was a Chinese-pro­duced MiG-19; it first flew in 1965 and entered service in 1970. In keeping with what we will see is PLAAF practice, the Q-5—nearly obsolescent already by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Warsaw Pact standards at the start of its operational career in China—has been modified and updated several times over the years. The newest variant, the Q-5L, has been fitted with a conformal belly fuel
tank and a laser designator under the nose, and Chinese Internet photos show it equipped with a targeting pod on a ventral pylon and laser-guided bombs hung on the wings. Despite its age, the Q-5L could be an effective light attack aircraft if employed in a very forgiving air defense environment.

1st Generation

2d Generation 3d Generation 4th Generation

J-7. A reverse engineered MiG-21, the J-7 Fishbed was put into produc­tion in the early 1960s, entered PLAAF service in 1965, and has since been pro­duced in a bewildering variety of subtypes.6 It is still the most numerous type of fighter in the PLAAF’s inventory; the latest (and probably last) model, the J-7G, first flew as recently as 2002. In production for nearly 4 decades—a time span that likely will never be approached, let alone surpassed, by another com­bat aircraft—the J-7 has been improved over time, including several upgrades to its radar, addition of a head-up display (HUD) and other updated avion­ics, a larger, double-delta wing, and integration of more modern air-to-to air missiles (AAMs), including the infrared (IR)-guided PL-8. Production of the J-7G reportedly continued at least into 2009.

J-8. Originally an enlarged, twin-engine development of the J-7, the J-8 Finback is yet another PLAAF aircraft that has been progressively upgraded since its introduction in 1981.7 A major redesign was undertaken in the late 1980s, which saw the forward fuselage with its MiG-21-style nose intake give
way to one featuring a solid nose—accommodating a more powerful radar— and two lateral air intakes, one on each side of the aircraft. It is this version, the J—8II or J-8B, which continues to serve and has also been the platform for several generations of progressively more capable models. The latest con­firmed variant is the J-8F, which has been equipped with new cockpit avionics, more powerful engines, and a probe for in-flight refueling.8 The most signifi­cant upgrade is the installation of a newer radar that enables employment of the PL-12 active homing radar-guided “fire and forget” medium-range AAM (MRAAM). Although not as capable as the most modern aircraft in its arsenal, these late-generation J-8s provide the PLAAF another, presumably cheaper, platform capable of using its most up-to-date air-to-air weapons.

JH-7. The JH-7 Flounder is an indigenously designed twin-engine attack fighter that entered PLAAF service by 2004.9 The current production model is the JH-7A, equipped with improved radar, digital flight controls, and modernized cockpit instrumentation. The aircraft’s empty weight has been reduced via utilization of composite materials and the number of stores hard – points increased from 7 to 11. The JH-7A can be equipped with navigation, targeting, and data link pods mounted under the forward fuselage and is capa­ble of carrying a wide array of land attack and maritime strike weapons of both Chinese and Russian origin. It, too, has been photographed carrying the PL-12 MRAAM. There are reports that a second update, the JH-7B—with improved engines and some radar signature reduction—is under development, although no solid evidence of this has yet appeared.

J—10. The J—10 is a single-engine multirole aircraft developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC). First flown in March 1998, the J-10 reportedly entered PLAAF service in 2003. A tailless design with canard foreplanes, the J-10 strongly resembles the cancelled Israeli Lavi fighter though it is unclear how much design assistance, if any, CAC received from either Israel or Russia (although the latter has to date provided the J-10’s engine). It has 11 weapons stations and has been photographed with what appear to be navigation and targeting pods mounted ventrally just aft of the underslung air intake, and with a removable fixed air refueling probe on the starboard side of the fuselage. Around the time that the first J-10s were being deployed by operational units, development began on an upgraded version of the aircraft. Dubbed the J-10B, the new model features a simplified engine inlet ramp that reduces weight and improves the aircraft’s radar signature. The J-10B also adds an electro-optical targeting system (EOTS), visible as a bulge forward and to the starboard side of the canopy. Featuring an infrared search and track (IRST) sensor and a laser rangefinder, the EOTS allows a pilot to passively detect and target enemy air­craft without requiring telltale signals from the J-10’s radar.

Su-27SK/UBK, J-11A. The first variants of the Sukhoi Flanker to join the PLAAF were the single seat Su-27SK and the two-seat operational trainer, the Su-27UBK.10 These were also the first fourth-generation combat aircraft to enter PLAAF service when they appeared in the mid-1990s. Initially, the PLAAF purchased its Flankers from the Russian production line, but these have been supplemented over time by more than 100 aircraft built from Rus­sian-supplied kits by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), aircraft that are designated J-11A. Chinese assembly of these J-11A kits was ended about half­way through the planned 200 aircraft run because PLAAF requirements had reportedly evolved such that the single-role air superiority Su-27/SK/J-11A no longer suited the service’s needs. As originally built, China’s Su-27SK/J-11 fighters can carry neither the Chinese PL-12 nor the Russian R-77 (AA-12) active-homing MRAAMs. There are, however, reports that at least some of these aircraft have been fitted with the radar modifications needed to fire the R-77/AA-12. Like the J-10B, all Flankers feature an EOTS mounted in front of the canopy. In an intriguing development, the PLAAF apparently sent sev­eral Su-27/J-11 aircraft to Turkey in October 2010 to participate in an exercise called “Anatolian Eagle.” This is the first time a NATO country has hosted an exercise that included the PLAAF.11

J-11B. The J-11B is SAC’s response to the PLAAF’s requirement for a true multirole Flanker variant. Based on the Su-27SK airframe, the J-11B fea­tures Chinese-manufactured engines and avionics, including indigenous radar, and can be armed with a wide variety of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, including the PL-12 MRAAM. Among other improvements, SAC claims that the radar cross-section of the J-11B has been reduced by 75-80 percent from the Su – 27SK by reconfiguring the engine intakes and employing radar-absorbing paint. This degree of signature reduction may strain credulity absent more substantial changes to the airframe, but the assertion alone indicates that the PLAAF under­stands the advantages afforded by stealth. The J-11B appears to have entered PLAAF service in 2007. A two-seat version, the J-11BS, is under development.

Su-30MKK. The Su-30MKK is yet another derivative of the Flanker family, a two-seat multirole aircraft developed from the Su-27 for the PLAAF. China has reportedly purchased 76 of these Russian-manufactured fighters, which incorporate improved avionics, including a more advanced radar with improved air-to-ground capabilities. The Su-30 can be fitted with a wide array of “smart” and “dumb” weapons and munitions, and it also features a retract­able refueling probe. Licensed production of the Su-30 in China was once expected but now appears unlikely, with the two-seat J-11BS potentially occu­pying what might otherwise have been the Su-30’s “strike fighter” niche in the PLAAF force structure.12

China’s Fifth-Generation Fighter (J-20).13 The first public flight in Janu­ary 2011 of a stealthy new Chinese fighter, the J-20, came as a surprise to many observers who had agreed with then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that China would “have no fifth-generation aircraft by 2020” and only “a handful” by 2025.14 The flight took place while Gates was in China, an irony that may or may not have been intended by the Chinese.

The J-20 appears to be a large airplane, estimated to be about the size of an F-111 by at least two analysts. Its appearance shows that substantial care was taken in the design to shape the jet for low observable (LO) char­acteristics.15 At this point, all performance specifications are wholly specu­lative, but the J-20 is thought to have two internal weapons bays and to be capable of “supercruising” flight. In both regards, the aircraft resembles the USAF F-22.

Some accounts report that J-20 prototypes had been flying at a PLAAF test center for several months before the fighter’s official debut in January, and that a total of four airframes are being used in the test program.16

Late in 2009, the PLAAF’s deputy commander, General He Weirong, said that a new fighter would soon “undertake its first flight” and be in ser­vice “8 to 10 years” after that.17 This schedule would appear to bring the jet into service around 2016, earlier than previous intelligence assessments had projected.

H-6. The H-6 Badger is the PLAAF’s only true bomber, a twin-engine medium-range aircraft copied from the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 of the mid – 1950s, with which it shares the same Western reporting name, Badger. The H-6 has been built in a number of versions for both air force and naval use since its first delivery in 1969.18 The newest versions in PLAAF use are the H-6G, which is the carrier platform for China’s first air-launched land attack cruise missile (LACM), the KD-63, and the H-6K, which can carry up to six smaller Tomahawk-like LACMs. The H-6K in particular appears to be a fairly radical reworking of the Badger, with modern turbofan engines appar­ently replacing the less powerful and less efficient turbojets that powered all previous models, composite materials being used to reduce weight, a modern “glass” cockpit installation, improved avionics, and a thermal-imaging sensor under the nose.

Special Purpose Platforms. The PLAAF has long sought to acquire an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform along the lines of the U. S. E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). A program to buy four A-50I aircraft—a Russian Il-76 Candid airframe equipped with Israeli radar and mission equipment—collapsed in 2000 when Israel suc­cumbed to substantial U. S. pressure and dropped out of the deal. After this disappointment, China moved forward with its own aircraft, also based on the Il-76 platform, but with an indigenously developed mission suite. At least four of these KJ-2000 AWACS aircraft are in active service with the PLAAF, provid­ing it with its first sophisticated airborne battle management assets.19

Another area of interest to the PLAAF is aerial refueling, which is a necessary competence if China intends to extend the reach of its airpower beyond its immediate environs. Today, the PLAAF possesses a fairly rudi­mentary capability, owning about a dozen H-6U tankers equipped with a “probe and drogue” refueling pod under each wing. Relatively few of China’s combat aircraft can be refueled in the air: some late-model J-8s have probes fitted, and a fixed probe can be installed on the J—10. The PLAAF’s Su-30s have retractable refueling probes, but their system is allegedly not compatible with the H-6U.20

In 2005, China ordered 34 additional Il-76 Candid transports and four Il—78 Midas tankers from Russia, but none have been delivered to date due to a dispute between the Russian export company and the factory responsible for building the aircraft.21 The PLAAF needs not only additional tankers but also more strategic airlifters—if not from Russia, then from its own aviation indus­try—to achieve any aspirations it might have for possessing a credible power projection capability. In fact, a new large transport aircraft, sometimes called the “Y-20” is reportedly under development; a first flight “around 2012” has been suggested.22

The PLAAF has also developed about a dozen specialized platforms based on the Y-8 four-engine turboprop transport.23 The “Gaoxin” series includes another AEW&C aircraft, a maritime surveillance variant, an air­borne command post, and a number of platforms for various electronic war­fare functions, such as jamming and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Unmanned Aerial Systems. Table 8-3 lists unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) deployed or under development in China. They range from a copy of the Vietnam-era U. S. Firebee reconnaissance drone to the Xianglong high-alti­tude long endurance (HALE) UAS that bears a passing resemblance to the U. S. RQ-4 Global Hawk.

In the past decade, China has displayed a dizzying array of various UAS models at air and trade shows; many if not most seem never to have gone into production. A look at the table suggests that China is experimenting with many classes of UAS, mostly for surveillance and reconnaissance. Of particular interest is the Harpy, an Israeli-made antiradiation drone. It flies to a target area and loiters until an appropriate target begins to emit, at which point it dives into the target and detonates. Harpy is an interesting hybrid of UAS and cruise missile, somewhat akin to the cancelled American AGM-139A Tacit Rainbow program of the late 1980s.

Air-to-air missiles: Table 8-4 lists air-to-air missiles (AAMs) in service with the PLAAF. As can be seen, for many years the PLAAF was equipped with obsolete AAMs. Through to the mid-1980s, the most common missile in its inventory was the PL-2, a Chinese copy of the Soviet AA-2 Atoll AAM, itself a copy of the first-generation U. S. AIM-9B Sidewinder. But, in the early 1990s, this began to change. Along with Russian Su-27s came modern Rus­sian missiles: the R-27/AA-10 Alamo radar-guided medium-range air-to – air missile (MRAAM) and the R-73/AA-11, short-range AAM (SRAAM), which at the time was probably the best visual range “dogfight” missile in the world. As well, China developed two indigenous infrared homing SRAAMs, the PL-8 and PL-9. The PLAAF fielded its first indigenous MRAAM, the PL-11 semiactive radar homing missile, developed from the Italian Aspide (which Beijing had purchased in small numbers) around the turn of the cen­tury. Along with its Su-30s, China procured a number of R-77/AA-12 “fire and forget” MRAAMs from Russia. Shortly thereafter the PLAAF also began fielding the PL-12, an indigenous active-homing MRAAM compatible with most of its modern fighters.24

Both the AA-11 and the PL-9 are reportedly compatible with helmet – mounted sights, which allow the missile to be locked onto an air target when the pilot looks at it. When combined with the missile’s “off boresight” capabil­ity—it can be fired at targets to one side or another of the launching aircraft up to some specified limit—the sighting system streamlines the engagement dynamics of close-in aerial combat.

Looking ahead, it has been reported that China is working on at least three new AAM designs: an extended-range ramjet powered version of the PL-12, a short-range active radar homing missile, and the PL-ASR, an IR mis­sile employing thrust vector controls which would provide greater agility to the weapon.25

Air-to-surface missiles: Table 8-5 lists air-to-surface missiles (ASM) reportedly fielded by the PLAAF. They range from the Hellfire-class AR-1 to the HN-1, a Tomahawk-like long-range cruise missile (LRCM). In addition to these missiles, China is also beginning to deploy laser- and satellite-guided bombs, although it is not clear whether they are yet available in operationally significant quantities.26

Surface-to-air missiles. The PLAAF operates China’s long-range strate­gic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); as table 8-6 shows, these are a mix of indig­enous and Russian designs. While the HQ-2 is obsolete, the HQ-9, HQ-12, and SA-300 variants are all very capable systems. Of particular interest is the HQ-12, which appears to have been designed expressly to attack AWACS – type aircraft and jamming platforms; it is unique in being a surface-to-air anti­radiation missile (ARM). The table includes the new S-400 SAM system that has entered service in Russia. No exports of this very long-range SAM—the intended successor to the S-300 series—are as yet reported, but China, which is said to have paid for a substantial portion of the system’s development, is likely to be an early customer for it.

Measuring Up: The PLAAF’s Equipment versus the United States

Consider the circumstances had U. S. and Chinese fighter pilots encountered one another in the skies near Taiwan in 1995. The American would have been flying a fourth-generation F-15, F-16, or F/A-18, armed with AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) and AIM-9L/M short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAMs). The U. S. pilot would almost certainly have been supported by a controller in an E-3 AWACS, and would have found a KC-135 tanker orbiting nearby in the event that fuel became an issue.

For his part, the PLAAF pilot would most likely have flown a MiG-21 variant without any medium-range missiles, being armed instead with only obsolescent PL-2 or PL-5 short-range IR weapons. While a ground control­ler back on the mainland would have helped manage and inform the PLAAF pilot’s sortie, that controller’s picture of the relevant airspace would have been substantially inferior to the one being monitored inside the AWACS as it cruised high above. And there would have been no tankers available to pro­vide additional fuel should that have been necessary or desirable. In short, the Chinese airman would have been flying an obsolete aircraft carrying anti­quated missiles, have modest situational awareness, and, as is discussed else­where, would himself have been the product of inferior training and prepara­tion compared to the U. S. pilot. Thus, he would have been overmatched and outgunned.27

Now fast-forward 15 years. While the U. S. pilot would most likely be in essentially the same plane with essentially the same weapons and essentially the same support, the picture on the PLAAF side would be very different. Consider the following changes:

The PLAAF Now Has Platforms Comparable to U. S. Platforms

The PLAAF’s Su-27/J-11s are often compared to the U. S. F-15, the J—10 to the F-16, and the Su-30 to the F-15E. As table 8-7 shows, these compar­isons are not far-fetched; though hardly identical, the two sides’ jets clearly seem to fill parallel slots in their respective force structures.

The similarities between each side’s “fourth-gen” fighters go beyond static comparisons of size and payload. Plotted in figure 8-2 are two factors for each of eight aircraft: weight-to-thrust and wing loading. The first shows the relation­ship between an aircraft’s weight and the power of its engines, and the second the relationship between its weight and the surface area of its wings.28 These fac­tors help determine a fighter’s maneuverability in both the horizontal (banks and turns) and vertical (climb and dive) dimensions. Lower is better for each factor, so the farther down and to the left an aircraft lies, the better.

Unsurprisingly, the USAF F-22—seen in the figure’s lower left corner— is superior on both counts; in the upper right are the F-16C and the F/A— 18E/F, which trail the pack in these two regards. Clustered in the middle are five aircraft, the F-15C, F-15E, F-35, J—10, and J—11, which are in more or less the same neighborhood on these two important characteristics. While weight – to-thrust ratio and wing loading vary over the course of a mission as fuel is burned and ordnance expended, these platforms themselves start out broadly similar in these important factors.

The J-10B and Flanker variants are equipped with passive IRSTs. These sensors can permit a pilot—without emitting a radar signal— to detect another aircraft by “seeing” the heat from its engines, the friction produced as it moves through the air, or the heat signature from the launch of a powered missile. Sukhoi claims that the OLS-35—developed for its Su-35 advanced Flanker— has a front hemisphere detection range of 50 kilometers (30+ miles), and as much as 90 kilometers (55+ miles) in the rear hemisphere, where it is “look­ing” at the hot exhaust of a target aircraft.29 While the OLS-27 and OLS-30 that equip China’s Su-27/J-11s and Su-30s, respectively, are less capable, it is worth noting that no current generation U. S. fighter has an IRST at all, not even the F-22.30 The forthcoming F-35 (now in advanced flight testing) will mount an IRST, and programs are underway to retrofit both the F-15C and F/A-18E/F.31

In my assignment as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, I had the responsibility of monitoring air forces around the world. There is no question which country has made the greatest strides in developing its airpower capabil­ity. Over the last two decades, Chinas air force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), has transformed itself from a large, poorly-trained force oper­ating aircraft based on 1950s Soviet designs to a leaner and meaner force flying advanced Russian and indigenously produced fourth-generation fighters. This remarkable transformation is still a work in progress, but China has made up a lot of ground in a short time.

China’s civilian and military leaders grasped the centrality of airpower in modern warfare as early as the mid 1970s, a lesson reinforced by the stunning success of the U. S.-led coalition during the first Gulf War. They set the goal of building the PLAAF into a world class, high-technology air force capable of pre­vailing against sophisticated adversaries in regional conflicts. China’s expanding airpower capability has had a profound impact on the Asia-Pacific region (and beyond), causing countries to reassess their own air force modernization needs.

China’s successful 2011 test flight of a stealth fighter prototype, the J-20, demonstrates just how ambitious its airpower goals have become. The United States and Russia are the only other countries deploying or developing true fifth-generation fighter aircraft; Beijing is now seeking to match the capabili­ties of the two most established aerospace powers. In addition to stealth fighter development, the Chinese aviation industry already produces two fourth-gen­eration fighters (the indigenous J-10 and China’s Su-27 copy, the J-11) which are roughly equivalent to the aircraft that make up the bulk of the existing U. S., Russian, and Western air force fleets. China has also successfully test flown a fourth-generation fighter (J-15) that can be launched from an aircraft carrier.

More sophisticated combat aircraft are just one component of the expan­sion of Chinese airpower. Chinese military planners are focused on development of antiaccess/area denial capabilities with an eye toward negating any potential threat to their dominance in the Western Pacific. Chinese efforts to develop an “informatized” military include a focus on integrating and networking aero­space systems, using airborne early warning and control aircraft together with space-based assets. China plans to field a large fleet of remotely piloted aircraft

(RPAs) with both combat and surveillance missions. The deployment of RPAs will enhance and extend the range of China’s area denial capabilities, challeng­ing the ability of other nations’ forces to operate in the Western Pacific.

China’s Second Artillery Corps now possesses a large arsenal of increas­ingly accurate cruise and ballistic missiles that could strike air bases in Japan and islands throughout the Pacific, and target U. S. aircraft carriers. Nonstealthy air­craft attempting to operate near China will be confronted with an increasingly capable land-based air defense network. PLAAF training has advanced in parallel with technological improvements, resulting in a better-educated and more pro­fessional cadre of officers and enlisted personnel. Even in an era of constrained resources, China’s comprehensive expansion of its airpower capability should be a matter of great concern to U. S. civilian and military leaders and to U. S. friends and allies in Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

I was honored and privileged to take part in the October 2010 conference in Taipei on the Chinese Air Force, which was jointly organized by Taiwan’s Council for Advanced Policy Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the U. S. National Defense University, and the RAND Corporation. The organiz­ers did a superb job in assembling a first-rate group of international experts on airpower and the Chinese military. The conference papers were discussed and debated at length as experts sought to assess Chinese air force current and future capabilities and the trajectory of the air balance across the Taiwan Strait and in the Western Pacific. The current volume contains substantially revised versions of the papers presented at the conference, benefiting greatly from conference dis­cussions and careful editing by Richard Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip Saun­ders. Together, the chapters offer a complete picture of where the Chinese air force is today, where it has come from, and most importantly, where it is headed.

This book should be of keen interest to policymakers, senior military leaders, the intelligence community, academics, and China watchers of every stripe. However, it is of particular relevance to senior U. S. civilian and military leaders as they make difficult decisions about funding U. S. air and naval capa­bilities in an environment of constrained defense resources. It is also impor­tant reading for U. S. Air Force and Navy officers, who need to understand the progress China has made in modernizing its air force, and to consider the ways Chinese leaders might employ air power in the future.

David A. Deptula, Lt General, USAF (Ret.)

Senior Military Scholar Center for Character and Leadership Development United States Air Force Academy

The concept of strategic strike serves as the principal rationale for cre­ation and sustainment of a military service organization independent and dis­tinct from ground or naval forces. For example, strategic strike serves as the raison d’etre for an independent U. S. Air Force. The strategic strike mission is the principal driver for the Second Artillery’s existence as an independent force, and a vision for the PLAAF.25 From a U. S. perspective, strategic strike seeks to “weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition.”26

The Second Artillery’s conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missile force has been at the forefront of the PLA’s strategic strike capa­bility for almost 20 years. As the 2008 Defense White Paper notes, the “Second Artillery Force is a strategic force under the direct command and control of the

CMC [Central Military Commission], and the core force of China for strategic deterrence.” In addition, “the conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is charged mainly with the task of conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against key strategic and operational targets of the enemy.”27 The PLA leadership depends upon its ballistic and land attack cruise missile force—the Second Artillery—to deter potential adversaries and defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In­creasingly accurate conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) are the optimal means for suppressing enemy air defense and creat­ing a more permissive environment for subsequent conventional air operations due to their relative immunity to defense systems. Along these lines, ballistic missiles function similarly to U. S. stealth assets. In a conflict, they can be sup­ported by electronic attack assets which reduce early warning and confuse en­emy commanders. In addition, space-based, airborne, and ground-based sen­sors can facilitate command and control and provide crucial strategic intelli­gence, theater awareness, targeting, and battle damage assessment information.

For integrated attack-defense operations and coercive air campaigns to­day, the PLAAF depends upon the Second Artillery for suppression of enemy air defenses and missions that would enable a more permissive operating envi­ronment. As time goes on, however, the PLAAF may become less reliant on Sec­ond Artillery support as it evolves “relatively independent” capabilities through economical “leapfrogs” (S*SS) in technology development.28 The PLAAF has been diversifying its roles and missions, moving away from a force that once was almost exclusively responsible for air defense, interdiction, and close air support toward a service whose primary mission is deterrence and strategic attack. The PLAAF’s diversification is grounded in a body of theory stipulating that an inde­pendent air strike campaign could support national objectives.29 According to China’s 2008 Defense White Paper,

the Air Force is working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its ca­pabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build it­self into a modernized strategic air force.

The PLAAF is characterized as “a strategic service of the PLA, and the main force for carrying out air operations. It is responsible for such tasks as safeguarding the country’s territorial air space and territorial sovereignty, and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide.”

With the White Paper stopping short of enshrining the strategic strike mission, PLAAF representatives have made no secret that the service’s long-term vision is to be able to conduct an independent air campaign to achieve decisive strategic effects.30 Such a goal should not be surprising. Since the publication of Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air in 1921, airpower pro­ponents have envisioned the transformation of warfare through long-range strategic strikes. PLAAF representatives have argued in favor of a gradual tran­sition from supporting roles and predominantly defensive counterair missions and close air support, to joint operations, and finally to a fully independent service able to conduct strategic strike missions at extended ranges.31 Accord­ing to one detailed Taiwan assessment, the PLAAF had set a goal to be able to conduct an air campaign within a 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) radius of China’s periphery by 2010—one that has not been successful to date—and extend the range to 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles) by 2030.32

The PLAAF has long struggled to assert its relevance within the PLA. In January 1979, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping enshrined airpower as a key component of overall force modernization by stating that “without air superi­ority, success in future war is not possible… give priority to the development of the air force… invest in the aviation industry and air force to ensure air su­periority.” However, as John Lewis and Xue Litai have noted, Deng’s advocacy had a secondary motive, which was to assert his authority over a service that had been perceived to be politically questionable.33

Strategic strike is intimately related to a coercive aerospace campaign. The strategic center of gravity in a coercive aerospace campaign is the opposing lead­ership. Coercive force seeks to affect the amorphous and unquantifiable variable of national will, morale, and resolve, or to manipulate a leader’s decision calcu­lus by ensuring he understands that the costs of continuing a particular course of action outweigh the benefits. The challenge is to shatter the will and morale of an opponent or affect his decision calculus. In theory, an effective aerospace campaign would degrade an adversary’s capabilities to such an extent that suc­cess looks impossible, defeat looks inevitable, further resistance appears futile, and the costs of continuing to resist outweigh the costs of surrendering.34

In a coercive aerospace campaign, PLA observers highlight the utility of well-planned preemptive strikes as a means to shock an opponent, paralyze his ability to conduct operations, and force a political solution soon after initiation of hostilities. PLAAF doctrine stresses rapid mobility, “paralysis warfare” (ЯЙ $), concentration of its best assets, surprise, and pre-emption. A fundamental PLA guiding concept is to compel a political concession swiftly, using only the minimal force necessary.35

A more ambitious offensive air campaign is conceived as having two general phases: first strikes and follow-on strikes. PLA first-strike opera­tions would involve Second Artillery conventional missiles, the concentrated application of the PLAAF’s best assets, as well as aviation assets from other ser­vices. In theoretical operational analysis, first strikes would consist of multiple waves in order to suppress enemy air defenses. This includes preventing key enemy aviation assets from taking off, effectively preventing ground-based air defenses from organizing resistance along specific corridors, and eliminating enemy early warning assets. Achieving air superiority will facilitate follow-on air activity or landing operations.36

Force should be concentrated against those targets whose destruction or suppression would have the greatest strategic and operational effects. Howev­er, planning should take into consideration neutralization of targets that would permit a more permissive environment for follow-on strikes. Flexibility is im­portant, requiring a capable and timely reconnaissance network that can eval­uate results of the first strike. In general, given fundamental economy-of-force considerations, fewer aircraft are needed for follow-on strike operations. One assessment concludes that for deep-strike operations, ballistic and extended – range cruise missiles may be preferable to aircraft in order to avoid the com­plexity of first attaining air superiority and to take advantage of the inherent surprise aspects of missile operations.37

In some circumstances, an offensive air campaign would be the precur­sor to establishment of a coercive “air blockade.”38 As a relatively new mission, an air blockade is viewed by authoritative PRC sources as an effective means to compel an adversary to accede to Beijing’s demands. A blockade could “create internal struggles and societal collapse.” Air blockades involve strikes against ports and navigation routes to shut down air and maritime traffic and cut off contact with the international community as a means to achieve specific po­litical or military objectives. Operations also include efforts to counter an en­emy’s attempt to break the blockade. An air blockade can weaken an enemy’s capacity for operations, or compel him to accede to Beijing’s demands short of war. An air blockade can take many forms, including suppressing air and naval bases, halting land transportation, or, in the case of Taiwan, cutting off traffic in the Strait. An air blockade can be carried out in conjunction with a maritime blockade or quarantine.39

In seeking an independent strategic strike capability, the PLAAF appears to be encroaching upon a conventional mission that the Second Artillery has monopolized for almost two decades. However, the Second Artillery serves in a supporting role in the PLA’s strategy for suppressing adversary air assets on the ground or at sea. Augmenting traditional airpower, Second Artillery assets fa­cilitate the occupation of the air domain and offset weaknesses of the PLAAF. To be sure, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles offer advantages over traditional airpower due to an assured ability to penetrate defenses, ability to prepare and launch with little warning, short time of flight, and lower mission support costs. However, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles are unable to sustain flight, are not reusable after launch, and therefore are relatively inflexible.40

Familiarity with the PLA’s 15-grade and 10-rank structure, which applies to officers and organizations for all the services and branches, is the key to understanding the PLAAF’s organizational structure. The current system became effective in 1988 and is based on ground force terminology. Although this paper refers to the grade and rank system only in passing, it is important to understand the basics of the system as it provides the basis for hierarchical and cross-organizational relationships throughout the PLA.19

According to PLAAF 2010, there are four key differences between the U. S. military and the PLA in terms of their use of grade and rank. First and most importantly, in the PLA, rank is not as important as grade. The PLA uses rank insignia primarily as a visual cue to identify an individual’s approximate sta­tus; military grade is the more accurate reflection of one’s status.20 Second, the PLA assigns billets based on one’s grade, not rank. Third, promotion in grade, not rank, is what determines how one moves up the career ladder. For example, moving from senior colonel to major general while remaining in the same grade is not as important as moving from one grade to the next, even if one retains the same rank. Finally, the PLA assigns every organization, not just officers and billets, a grade, as shown in table 4-1. The grade system is what defines the organizational structure and the relationship among organizations.

Chinese analysts contend that penetrating enemy air defenses to estab­lish corridors through which the main assault forces can reach their targets (kongzhong tufang, ЙФ^ІЙ) is one of the most difficult tasks of the offensive mission. But they also underscore the importance of this task to the success­ful execution of the overall mission.39 Their assessments are heavily influenced by their very high evaluation of the air defense systems of the countries of their most likely prospective adversaries (the United States, Taiwan, and prob­ably Japan), as well as by their concerns about the shortcomings of China’s own forces. Some argue that penetration will be extremely difficult because “presently our main operational targets are the established and tightly inte­grated long, medium, and short range, and high, medium, and low altitude air defense systems.” They also argue that the PLAAF should expect to encoun­ter enemy air defenses with advanced intelligence warning systems, continu­ous 360-degree monitoring of the battlespace, and other features that create an “unprecedented” level of battlespace transparency. All of these, they contend, will make the execution of penetration very difficult.40

In order to penetrate advanced air defenses, Chinese analysts have advo­cated using a combination of “stealth penetrations” and “storm penetrations.” Stealth assaults emphasize deception, concealment, flying at ultra-low levels and a variety of other radar avoidance techniques to avert detection and mislead enemy defenses. Storm assaults involve preceding and escorting the actual attack group with as many as five other groups assigned to such tasks as reconnaissance, electronic interference, air defense suppression, screening, and support.41

To maintain China’s initiative following the initial assault, Chinese ana­lysts urge preparations to launch quick follow-on attacks. They emphasize that this requires very rapid assessment of the damage inflicted by the first wave, which, in turn, places a heavy burden upon all surveillance and recon­naissance assets—air, space, naval, ground, and other assets—to quickly sup­ply data for follow-on assaults.42

Another aspect of the assault that Chinese analysts emphasize is the early and continuous preparation to defeat enemy counterattack operations. In addi­tion to defending the security of key war zone targets, these analysts stress that preparing to block counterattacks is critical to allowing Chinese forces to remain on the offensive and facilitate the overall “smooth progress” of the mission.43