The "New Historic Missions": Extending the Boundary of Security

Xu’s comment that “the boundary of security should extend to wher­ever there are national interests”6 is firmly rooted in the strategic guidance pro­vided by the PLA under the banner of the “New Historic Missions.” The New Historic Missions were first introduced by President Hu Jintao in 2004—the same year the PLAAF introduced its concept of integrated air and space opera­tions—and ratified by the Communist Party in 2007. They direct the PLA to carry out four missions:

■ Guarantee Chinese Communist Party rule. The PLA is to remain the ultimate backer of the Communist Party.

■ Safeguard the strategic opportunity for national development. The PLA is to serve as a powerful defensive force that can deter aggres­sion against China and protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity so that China may develop economically.

■ Safeguard national interests. The PLA must defend China’s interests, not only within its land borders, territorial waters, and territorial air space, but also in distant waters, outer space, and in the electromag­netic sphere.

■ Play an important role in world peace. China will maintain a defensive military strategy and will participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions and international cooperation on counterterrorism.

The New Historic Missions reflect the Chinese leadership’s intention to have the PLA protect the Communist Party’s and country’s interests by meet­ing the challenges of the 21st century. While the New Historic Missions direct the PLA to continue with its legacy missions of guaranteeing Communist Party rule and maintaining territorial integrity, they expand the PLAs missions in important ways. For the first time, the PLA is directed to defend China’s eco­nomic interests, not only within China’s borders but also in the new areas of distant waters, outer space, and the electromagnetic sphere. In this respect, these missions are partly aspirational, serving as a guide for the development of operational concepts and capabilities.

Space plays two roles in the Historic Missions context, constituting both a domain in which China has interests, and a domain through which China defends its interests. Not surprisingly, China’s interests in outer space are becoming more pronounced and varied as it becomes more vested in space. China’s increasingly robust and varied space program is made up of commu­nications satellites, remote-sensing satellites, and navigation and positioning satellites that not only provide military benefits but also commercial oppor­tunities. Communication satellites can relay voice and television transmis­sions and support credit card transactions. Remote-sensing data can be used in urban planning and environmental studies. Navigation and positioning sat­ellites have given rise to commercial and private navigation products and ser­vices. Outer space also holds vast natural resources, such as those deposited in asteroids or on the surface of the moon. One of the primary reasons for Chi­na’s lunar exploration program is to search for Helium-3, touted as a potential source of clean energy.7

Indeed, a common theme in Chinese writings is that outer space and its associated technologies are of increasing economic value. Chinese space industry representatives cite reports, such as those by The Space Foundation, that revenue from the global space industry increased 7 percent to $261.61 bil­lion in 2009.8 According to one source, the value of a spacecraft and rocket is $150-200 million. If a satellite is lost, not only is there the monetary loss of a satellite that cannot be easily replaced, there is also the loss of the services it provides.9

As a result, space takes on a much more strategic character than its mil­itary applications alone would suggest.10 PLAAF writers assert that if China does not develop space capabilities, it will neither be able to exploit the bene­fits of space nor will it be able to defend itself from threats from countries with strong space capabilities.11 Furthermore, those countries that have strong space capabilities will be able to garner higher international prestige and more influ­ence from which to promote military, economic, science and technology, and cultural interests.12

In fulfilling the Historic Missions, Xu states that the air force will face “numerous difficulties” in “scientifically planning” its innovative develop­ment.13 Indeed, air force analysts state that the service is required to transform itself from being homeland defense-oriented to being offensively and defen­sively capable, from being mechanized to being informatized, from being air – oriented to being air – and space-integrated, and from being a tactical and cam­paign-oriented force to being a strategic force.14

The concept of the PLAAF as a strategic air force was codified at the same time as the New Historic Missions during the 17th Communist Party Congress held in November 2007. The Party Congress called on the PLAAF to strive “to build a modernized strategic air force that will be compatible with the international stature of our country and capable of carrying out the historical mission of our armed forces”15 Being a strategic air force requires the PLAAF to participate in joint operations as well as independent strategic actions to support the military and national development strategy of the country.16 The PLAAF intends to carry out its strategic mission through the use of “integrated air and space operations.”