Category And Colors

At this time, the Eighth Air Force was winding down the conversion of its day bombing operations to night bombing, which had been accelerated earlier, mainly as a result of its devastating losses in attacks on Regensburg and Schweinfurt. This had started in July, 1943, with a plan to convert six B-17 groups, three from each bomb division. These were the 92nd, 94th, 96th, 305th, 306th and 385th Bomb Groups.

This was a major undertaking, as the entire AAF bomb campaign in Europe had revolved around continual day operations, this complementing the British RAF night bombing operations. The lack of suitable long-range escort fighters had forced the Eighth AF to make its longer missions deep into Germany without fighter escort, and in the summer of 1943, the resulting losses were far too high to sustain.

Gen. Eaker ordered the necessary preparations for switching to night operations; this included the changes to the B-17 to allow its use at night. These changes proved to be very extensive, numbering 100 per aircraft. Quite apart from the addition of engine exhaust flame dampers, flash eliminators for the guns, blackout and anti-searchlight curtains for various crew stations, night lights, etc., the aircraft required repainting for night flying. The following information has been extracted from a "Secret” report issued by the 422 Bomb Sq. (H), 305 Bomb Group, on night operations. This report contained details of the results of converting 13 operational B-17F’s for use in night bombing missions over Germany, The repainting was both external and internal and consisted of the following:

1. Black-out band on windows.

A 1 1/2 inch black band or stripe was painted around the edge of each window in the radio and navigation compartments to prevent leakage of light around the black-out curtains. This was necessary on all aircraft and required one man, one hour per plane.

2. Blacken bombardier compartment.

All unpainted metal in the bombardier’s compartment had to be painted black to reduce reflection and glare from searchlights. One man, one hour per plane.

3. Blacken waist and tail sections.

The entire waist and tail sections of the aircraft had to be painted black to reduce reflection and glare from searchlights. The waist windows and door windows were painted black in order that in the case of emergency the dome lights could be turned on without danger of light escaping. One man, five hours per plane,

4. Blacken underside of aircraft.

The undersides of alt aircraft were painted with black camouflage paint. This required three men, eight hours to clean and paint each aircraft.

The report’s summary stated that:

It has been definitely proved that American Aircraft can operate at night. The obstacles, though considerable, are not impos­sible. It is not believed possible to operate both day and night with the same aircraft without losing a great deal of efficiency for one or the other.

For dusk operations there is a considerable time after sundown, and after it is too dark to fly formation, that the western sky will remain light enough to cause a bomber above to be silhouetted, while an enemy fighter below will, in all probability, be unseen.

Eleven personnel were listed as being responsible for the experimentation, modification, and the results of the project. These included seven USAAF personnel and four RAF personnel, showing the close cooperation between the two air forces.

At that time, the RAF was using matt black finishes on the underneath and vertical surfaces of its night bombers. However, these finishes considerably increased the drag of the aircraft. Moreover, the increasing effectiveness of the Luftwaffe night fighters increased the need for improved performance.

Thus, the RAF was investigating the use of smooth, seem-gloss and high gloss black finishes for its aircraft. Information on these finishes was passed along to VIII Bomber Command, stating that they had been able to obtain approximately a 10 mph increase in speed, together with decreased detection by searchlights. However, they were afraid that a high gloss finish would be too easily detected in moonlight, This information set off research into the possible use of high gloss for the Eighth AF night aircraft.

In the event, the night operations by the 422nd Bomb Squadron, run in September and October, 1943, suffered higher-than-expected losses and caused the tests to be terminated. A top level conference at Eighth AF HQ. in October decided that the VIII Bomber Command would be better utilized by continuing its original day bombing, especially as suitable long-range fighters were now becoming available.

However, the night operation testing resulted in two new operations which continued to the end of the war:

(1) Leaflet dropping

(2) Operation Carpetbagger – support to the resistance movement in Europe.

A third operation was the use of B-24s in support of RAF Bomber Command’s 100th Group jamming operations, but this was concluded in March, 1945.

The JAC sub-committee on Standardization met on January 19, 1944, to review the new requirements and policies of the three services concerning the use of camouflage on their aircraft. Particular attention was paid to the latest AAF Military Requirements Policy (MPR) No. 15, dated January 6,1944. The new AAF camouflage policy read as follows:

Aircraft allocated to Lend-Lease beneficiary governments and the Navy will be delivered with standard U. S. Army camou­flage, unless other specified camouflage has been requested bythe recipient Agency.

The AAF stated that MRP No. 15 only referred to camouflage paints and that the Material Command retained control of protective coatings. The committee decided that in view of this, that the existing service specifications should continue to define protective coatings. The AAF, Navy and British committee members agreed that:

1. The weight of camouflage paint applied to aircraft was less than had been commonly believed; for example, the paint on a B-24 aircraft only weighed 71 pounds, an insignificant proportion of the aircraft’s 60,000 pound gross weight.

2. The increase in drag due to rough camouflage paint was not a serious factor.

3. Aircraft on the ground could be camouflaged more effectively than in flight.

4. Navy tests on an F4U-1 aircraft showed that speed increases due to lack of camouflage were smalt, and their results substan­tiated those obtained by AAF and British tests.

The British member stated that they had found that nets were less effective over non-camouflaged aircraft on the ground, and the Navy member agreed with this statement. The AAF member said that MPR No, 15 did not apply to this situation.

Consolidated B-24H-20-DT, 41-28967, was the Formation lead aircraft for the 458th BG, 96th CBW, of the 2 Air Division, Eighth Air Force, it crash landed on March 9,1944. The forward half of the fuselage and all surfaces of the wing were painted in white with blue and red polka dots. The left of the aircraft was olive drab with yellow and red polka dots. Outer surfaces of the red vertical tails had a white stripe in the middle. The letter Z was in red. Just visible in the photograph is the row of lights on the white stripe in the middle of a red circle, replacing the fuselage cocarde. (USAF)

Consolidated B-24H-20-DT, 41-28967, shown in happier days while it was still flying. Note the red, black and white shark teeth around the nose and the black outlined “eye”. (USAF)

In view of these statements and data, the committee decided that standard camouflage schemes would be applied by the manufacturers; if this was not possible, the camouflage would be applied at the Modification Centers.

The committee also approved the addition of the Navy Light and Dark Gull Grays to the standard camouflage colors. The Dark Gull Gray would replace the Navy Light Gray and the British Sea Gray Medium, and the Light Gull Gray would be an additional color.

These recommendations were approved by the JAC on January 27,1944.

On October 20, 1944, the JAC approved the deletion of camouflage from all P-47 aircraft allocated to the French Government, and on November l, 1944, they did the same for P-47s allocated to the British Government. The Chief of Administration (WF) requested that they be informed of the serial numbers of the first non-camouflaged aircraft delivered to those countries.

Eleventh Air Force given data on comparative effectiveness of current camouflage schemes, November 6.1944.

The Production Engineering Division (WF) informed the CG, 11th AF Systems Command, on November 6, 1944, that standard olive drab camouflage, unpainted aircraft, and Jet black no. 622 finished aircraft, respectively, were most effective for daytime flight camou­flage. White, rather than gray, was better against a cloudy sky, but gray was effective against a clear sky.

They further stated that unpainted and olive drab finished aircraft were equally invisible against a heavy haze background, but that the olive drab finish gave better concealment for ground camouflage.

North American P-51D-15-NA, 44-14951, aircraft E9-Pof the 367th FS, 361st FG, Eighth Air Force, is seen at strip A-64 on December 30,1944. It had been ordered to France to fly top cover for aircraft of the Ninth Air Force operating over the Battle of the Bulge. The spinner and nose were in yellow, as was the rudder. (William L. Swisher)

North American P-51D-15-NA, 44-15387, aircraft SX-? “Stasia П", of the 352nd FS, 353rd FG, Eighth Air Force, at Raydon, England, in late December 1944. Spinner and nose markings are black and yellow. The under fuselage invasion stripes are still in place. (DSAF)

For a long time, the interior surfaces of all AAF aircraft had been painted “Yellow Green.” Amendment No. 3 to Spec. 98-24113-B was issued on August 18, 1945, and directed that all “Interior (Enclosed) Surfaces” were now to be finished in “Interior Green”, ANA Bulletin No. 157 color no. 611. This now meant that the interior of all AAF aircraft would be finished in either black, medium green, or interior green, depending on the location of the particular surface.

Spec. 98-24105-S adds new requirements for markings, including escape hatches,

September 1945.

This specification covering markings for airplanes and airplane parts had grown steadily in size with the increasing complexity of AAF aircraft and a new release, dated September 5, 1945, had grown to no less than twenty eight pages. The applicable changes follow:

H-5a. Camouflage Finishes.—All exterior markings on aircraft having camouflage finishes shall be applied with black, blue, or orange yellow, shades Nos. 604, 606, and 614, respectively, of Bulletin No. 157, of the same materials as the finish of the airplane. On aircraft having night camouflage finish, Jet No. 622, the exterior markings shall be applied with insignia red No. 619.

E-6. Fuselage Markings:

E-6a. The following markings, properly filled in, shall be stenciled on the left side of the fuselage, forward of the front cockpit. Where the cockpit is in the nose of the fuselage, the markings shall be placed to the rear of the cockpit:

U. S. ARMY—(Model Designation)

A. A. F. SERIAL NO

E-7. Vertical Tail Surface Markings:

E-7b(l). When there is a possibility that the numbers will be obscured by exhaust gas residue, they shall be placed as high up on the vertical surface as possible and still comply with the discernibility requirement.

E-7e. Gncamouflaged Airplanes.—For uncamouflaged airplanes, the radio call numbers shall be placed on the vertical stabilizer surfaces. For light colored backgrounds, the numbersshall be black, and for dark backgrounds, the numbers shall be International orange in accordance with color shade No. 508, Bulletin No. 166.

E-7d. Camouflaged Airplanes.—For camouflaged airplanes, the radio cali numbers shall be placed to utilize both the vertical stabilizer and the rudder surfaces. For light colored backgrounds, the numbers shall be black in accordance with color shade No. 604 of Bulletin No. 157 and for dark backgrounds, the numbers shall be orange yellow In accordance with color shade No. 614 of Bulletin No. 157, except that the numbers for night fighter aircraft shall be Insignia Red in accordance with color shade No. 619 of Bulletin No. 157.

E-15b. External Markings.—The following external markings dealing with the identification of emergency exit open­ings and their operation from the outside of the airplane shall be in accordance with the following:

E-15b(l). Materials.—The markings for the identification of escape hatches, doors, and exits on the outside of the airplane shall be painted orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 506 of Bulletin No. 166, except that on yellow sur faces the color shade shall be No. 515. The markings either shall be in lacquer conforming to Specification AN-L-29 or in enamel conforming to Specification AN-E-3.

E-15b(2). Exit Release,—All external releases for operating emergency exit panels shall be labeled “Exit Release” on the outside of the airplane to facilitate quick identification. This wording shall be painted orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 506 of Bulletin No. 166, except that on yellow surfaces the color shade shall be No. 515.

E-15b(2) (a). Operation Instructions.—The wording describing the operation of the “Exit Release” shall be in standard English, such as “pull”, “push”, “turn”, or “slide”, and shall be painted orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 506 of Bulletin No. 166, except that on yellow surfaces the color shade shall be No, 515.

E-I5b(2) (b). Size of Lettering.—The words “Exit Release” and “pull”, “push”, "turn”, or “slide” shall be preferably 2 inches in height, and shall not be less than 1 inch in height.

E-16. Identification of Areas for Auxiliary Exits, for Forced Entry into Aircraft for Rescue Purposes, and for Forced Exits:

E-16a. Markings.—The following markings dealing with the identification, from the outside of the airplane, of areas for forced entry into airplanes for rescue purposes and with the identification, from the inside of the airplane, of areas for forced exit shall be in accordance with the following:

E-16a(l). Materials.—The markings for the identification, from the outside of the airplane, of areas for forced entry into airplanes for rescue purposes, and the markings for the identification, from the inside of the airplane, of areas for forced exit shall be painted orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 506 of Bulletin No, 166, except that on yellow surfaces the color shade shall be No. 516. The markings either shall be in lacquer conforming to Specification AN-L-29 or in enamel conforming to Specification AN-E-3.

E-16a(2). Identification of Areas Around Auxiliary Exits.—Openings, such as auxiliary exits, windows, and navigators domes, are usually of a smaller size than the primary openings and consequently entry or exit is more difficult. Where the struc­ture immediately surrounding the foregoing openings is free from heavy structural members such as bulkheads and main longi­tudinal members, from oxygen, fuel, and oil lines, and battery leads, such areas shall be marked, both on the inside and out­side of the fuselage at the extreme boundary of such areas, with a broken band, which shall be orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 506 of Bulletin No. 166, except that on yellow surfaces the color shade shall be No. 516,

E-16a(2) (a). Size of Broken Identification Marking Band.—The broken identification marking band, both on the inside and outside of the fuselage, shall be 1/2 of an inch in width. Each segment of the broken band shall be approximately 1 inch in length, with segments approximately 12 inches apart. Examples of the identification of such areas on the outside of the airplane are shown in Figures 4 and 6.

E-16a(3). Identification Nomenclature.—The words “Cut Here For Emergency Rescue", shall be painted or stenciled on the inside of, parallel with, and immediately adjacent to the broken band identifying an area on the outside of the airplane, for forced entry into the aircraft for rescue purposes. The words, “Cut Here For Emergency Exit” shall be painted or stenciled on the inside of, parallel with, and immediately adjacent to the broken band identifying an area, on the, inside of the airplane, for forced exit from the airplane. The foregoing nomenclature shall be orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 606 of Bulletin No. 166, except that on yellow surfaces the color shade shall be No. 516.

EJ6a(3) (a). Size of Lettering,—The words, “Cut Here For Emergency Rescue” and “Cut Here For Emergency Exit”, shall be painted or stenciled approximately 1 inch in height.

E-16a(4). Identification of Other Areas.—Other emergency escape areas are usually areas of a type which may be cut through to provide a means of rescue when entrance or exit cannot be made in any other manner. These areas shall be deter­mined by visual inspection of each affected airplane, since relocation and reinstallation of equipment, furnishings, oxygen, fuel and oil lines, and battery leads may have been made which would not be indicated on the installation drawing of the airplane. These areas shall be as close as possible to the normal stations of personnel, except where personal injury to occupants might result from forced entry at that point These areas shall be marked both on the inside and outside of the fuselage by painting or stenciling corner markings only which shall be orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 506 of Bulletin No. 166, except that on yellow surfaces the color shade shall be No, 515.

E-16a(4) (a). Size of Identification Corner Markings.—The horizontal and vertical bars of the corner markings, both on the inside and outside of the fuselage, shall be approximately 3inches in length and 1 inch in width. Examples of the identifica­tion of such areas on the outside of the airplane are shown in Figures 6 and 7.

E-16a(5). Identification Nomenclature.—The words, “Cut Here For Emergency Rescue”, shall be painted or stenciled in the approximate center of the four corner markings, on the outside of the airplane, indicating other areas for forced entry into the aircraft for rescue purposes. The words, “Cut Here For Emergency Exit”, shall be painted or stenciled in the approximate center ofthe four corner markings, on the inside of the airplane, indicating other areas for forced exit from the airplane. The foregoing nomenclature shall be orange yellow in accordance with color shade No. 506 of Bulletin No. 166, except that on yellow surfaces the color shade shall be No. 515.

E-16a(5) (a). Size of Lettering.—The words “Cut Here For Emergency Rescue” and “Cut Here For Emergency Exit”, shall be painted or stenciled approximately 1 inch in height.”

Radio call numbers replace aircraft designators, August 1941

A major change in USAAF markings for its aircraft introduced the now familiar radio cal! number painted on the vertical tail surfaces. Shortly after the revised April 8,1941, issue of T. O. 07-1-1 came out, the Air Corps Inspection Division recommended that the specified airplane designators should be replaced by the airplane radio call (i. e. the aircraft serial number). It was suggested that this should be painted in large figures in a conspicuous place on the airplane, such as on the fin or the side of the fuselage. Meanwhile, the Training and Operations Division had also recommended that the number should be painted on the vertical fin at the factory, as this would be easy and the number would also serve as the manufacturer’s identification.

Both of these recommendations were approved by the Chief of the USAAF in a teletype to Maintenance Command on August 22, 1941.

The radio call number was made up of the last digit of the fiscal year of procurement, followed by the Army Air Force serial number. For example, Boeing B-17E, serial number 41-2393 would have the radio call number 12393 painted on the vertical tail.

Another change was that the new designator was to be painted on by the manufacturer at the factory, whereas previously, airplane designators had been painted on by the service units concerned.

Each Army Air Force airplane (including training types), regardless of whether equipped with radio, was to be identified. The call numerals composing the airplane designator were to be of the vertical block type, the width two-thirds of the height and the strokes approximately one inch (2.54 cm) wide for every six inches (15.24 cm) of height. The distance between the letters was to be equal to half the width of a letter.

Three North American BT-14s show the underwing markings, with the two eocardes and “U. S.ARMY” lettering. (March AFB Museum)

Due to the varied sizes and configurations of Army Air Force airplanes, it was impractical to specify a standard height of letters that would meet she requirements for all airplanes. In general, the height of the numerals was such as to make the designator readily discern­ible from a distance of approximately 150 yards (137 m). The numerals comprising the designator were to appear in one line painted in a centrally located position.

For airplanes not camouflaged, the designator was to be on each side of the vertical stabilizer. If there was more than one vertical stabilizer, the designator was to appear on the left exposed side of the left-hand stabilizer and on the right exposed side of the right-hand stabilizer.

On camouflaged airplanes, the designator was to be the same as above, except that the necessary area of both the vertical stabilizer and the rudder was to be utilized. If there was insufficient area on the vertical stabilizer or on the vertical stabilizer and rudder combined, the numerals could be placed on the sides of the fuselage.

Black numerals were to be used against a light background – in the case of camouflaged airplanes, black Shade 44 of Bulletin No. 41. Yellow was to be used against a dark background, A-N orange-yellow for uncamouflaged airplanes or Identification Yellow, shade 48 of Bulletin No. 41, for camouflaged airplanes. (These radio call numbers remained in use throughout the life of the USAAF and continue to be used by the USAF at time of writing).

The recommendation to have the radio call number painted on by the manufacturer was carried out by an order issued to contractors by the Prod. Eng. Sect, in November 1941. This specified that the airplane designator was to be painted on the aircraft prior to delivery, providing only that there was to be no additional cost to the government or delay in delivery of the aircraft.

Technical Order No. 01-1-21 stated that the new Air Service Command (ASC) Insignia, consisting of an internal gear faced with a four bladed propeller, was to be placed on all aircraft assigned to the Command. Only decalcomanias were to be used. No standard location was specified, but the preferred position was on the fuselage sides between the star insignia and the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer, The Wright Field arrowhead identifying insignia was to be eliminated when the new ASC insignia was applied to aircraft, thus depot or sub-depot identifying letters were to be painted in insignia blue paint on the white shield at the bottom of the ASC insignia. The new decals were available in 16 and 24 inch sizes.

Letters “U. S. ARMY” under lower wings of training aircraft ordered removed, October 19, 1942

On October 19,1942, the Production Division issued a Priority teletype issuing instructions for the deletion of “U. S.ARMY” from the lower wing of training aircraft, effective October 11,1942. This followed instructions issued by the Dir. of Mil. Req. for the removal of the letters “U. S.ARMY” from the under surfaces of all aircraft. Spec. No. 98-24105-Q, Amendment No. 1, dated November 2, 1942, subsequently deleted all requirements for lower wing markings, except for the insignia.

AAF Proving Ground Command, Eglin Field, FL, issues final report on test of Haze paint, October 23,1942.

Report No. 3-42-32 covering testing of haze paint at Eglin Field, was released on October 23, 1942, by the AAF Proving Ground Command. The conclusions stated that:

a. That the subject paint, while slightly superior to standard camouflage under haze conditions, is not superior to other types of camouflage,

b. That the subject haze paint, in its present form, is not as durable as the present camouflage finish.

They recommended that no further tests of the subject haze paint be considered.

The report stated that the tests were run as a result of directions from the Director of Military Requirements, dated April 25, 1942, with the object of establishing the comparative value of haze paint for the camouflage of airplanes with the standard camouflage now used by the AAF.

Many individual observations were made of the haze paint in comparison to standard camouflage, white paint, and a white-and-gray combination. Special missions were run at different altitudes, with various approaches, to establish factual data on the distances from which the stated types of camouflage would be perceived by observers, and the distances at which the camouflaged airplanes disappeared from sight.

Haze painted airplanes parked on various types of terrain were more visible at low altitudes than airplanes with standard camouflage, but from high altitudes both types of camouflage had the same visibility. (Photographs attached to the report showed haze painted and standard camouflaged airplanes paired on macadam, white concrete, and grass). Some P-39 airplanes used for the speed run included 41­6762, in both standard dark olive drab and natural metal finishes, 41-6775, in standard dark olive drab, in natural metal finish, and in haze paint. It was found that there was no appreciable difference of speed of the aircraft in any of the finishes.

At night, both dark olive drab and haze finishes showed up clearly in searchlight beams, the haze paint actually stood out more than the dark olive drab. During day missions, when observed from above against a foliage, broken landscape, or a water background, haze paint was more visible than standard camouflage.

When observed from below, at certain sun-target-observer angles, one wing of the haze painted airplane did at times blend in perfectly with the background. At no time did the entire haze painted airplane “disappear” completely. However, it was also noted that all camouflaged airplanes had certain angles at which one wing disappears. White camouflage did this against a cumulus background, and olive drab against foliage, from certain angles.

Luminosity of the haze paint showed that there was a very perceptible contrast of brightness between the haze paint and the sky background, and illustrated why there was no “disappearance” of the haze painted airplane. Tests of observation from the ground of the various test airplanes flying at altitudes of 10, 000, 15,000, and 20,000 feet were inconclusive. Regarding durability of the haze paint, it was noted that after two months of operation at Eglin Field, that the haze paint had worn of all of the leading edges of the airplane, down to the black undercoat, and on the side of the airplane used by pilots and ground crew in servicing, some of the paint was down to the metal. Consequently, the airplane had to be repainted for further testing. As a result, it was believed that the standard AAF paint was more durable under field conditions.

Report No. 3-43-30 was issued by Eglin Field on May 26,1943, titled "Test of Daytime Camouflage”. This covered tests which had been run to determine the effectiveness of blue and gray paints as camouflage against lateral observation. It was concluded that gray was a better camouflage for side surfaces rather than the standard dark olive drab.

The report recommended that gray should be used for the side surfaces of heavy bombardment and large transport aircraft, because the olive drab often became darker or lighter under tropical conditions and lost its camouflage value. Eglin Field suggested that Mat. Com. investigate the color change of olive drab.

Markings for walkways and “No Step” added to Spec. 98-24105-Q, June 7,1943.

Amendment No. 4 to Spec. 98-24105-Q, issued on June 7, 1943, added a new paragraph, E-19, which read as follows:

E-19. Marking for Walkways. – All walkways shall be differentiated from other external surfaces of the airplane by a border two inches wide in black. The surrounding areas immediately adjacent to the walkway shall be labeled “NO STEP”.

This was the first official use by the USAAF of this now common marking (note, though, that B-17s had used such markings from their first deliveries).

New version of T. O. 07-1-1 issued in color, June 15, 1943.

A revised version ofT. 0.07-1-1 was issued on June 15, 1943, containing color chips and color views of the various official camouflage schemes at that time. In view of its importance, it is repeated in full below.

T. O. NO. 07-1-1 JUNE 15, 1943.

AIRCRAFT
CAMOUFLAGE
MARKINGS AND INSIGNIA

This Technical Order replaces T. O. Nos. 07-1-1, dated June 1, 1943,

07-1-lA dated January 9 1943 and 07-1 – IB dated August 15 1942.

Note: The work directed herein will be accomplished whenever necessary by service activities with the aid of sub-depots if necessary.

NOTICE: This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act 50, U. S. C. 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECTION I

Anew version of Military Requirements Policy, was issued on November 16, 1943, and authorized the following:

a. Removal of camouflage paint from all AAF aircraft in sendee is authorized, removal to be carried out in accordance with Technical Orders.

b. Camouflage is to be removed from transport aircraft when local materials and facilities became available, provid­ing that this does not interfere with operations.

c Removal of paint from all AAF aircraft, except transports, is to be accomplished when aircraft are sent to depots for repair or overhaul. Removal is to be at the discretion of the depot commander.

d. P-38 and B-29 aircraft are the only types to remain in production without camouflage being applied, due to a lack of general agreement concerning the desirability of camouflage by the various air forces.

e. Night fighter aircraft are to remain painted with non-reflective type paint.

f. Aluminum paint is to be used on fabric and wood type aircraft.

1944.

On January 30, 1944, Gen. Arnold sent a teletype to all AAF commanders stating that a copy of an Eglin Field report on glossy paint camouflage was being sent to them by courier. The recently developed paint was a high gloss black with tow diffuse reflectance for night camouflage, intended for use on the under and side surfaces of airplanes; it was now standard for use on all night fighters. He asked the commanders if they had a requirement for such a paint on their bombardment aircraft, and if so, how much would they need. He concluded by stating that AAF could send paint and civilian instructors to train personnel in use of the new paint.

On January 23,1944, an earlier teletype had informed HQ Eighth Air Force that policy had been established for the use of the black paint on all night fighters and it was being implemented. They were also looking into its use on night bombers (note this-author).

The first reply to Arnold’s teletype came from Gen. Spaatz, Commander USSAFE, dated February 3,1944, and said that their require­ments were not sufficient to warrant shipping special paint from the United States. Royal Air Force black paint would satisfy their present needs, which were very minor.

On February 10, 1944, Gen. Brereton of the Ninth Air Force stated that they had no requirements for the black paint on their bombard­ment aircraft. However, a follow-up teletype on February 19,1944, stated that the gloss black paint was desired for painting all night fighter squadrons being shipped to the Ninth AF, basing this on the impression gained from a Gen. Arnold message of February 8,1944, that the new paint was superior in all ways to the existing matt black paint,

IWTTfrrrrrrrrrrfflty,

Consolidated B-24H, aircraft number 89 with vivid “Tiger" nose markings. Dark Olive Drab and Neutral Gray. Believed to be from the 448th BG, 2nd Air Div, Eighth Air Force. (USAF via Gerry R. Markgrafl

Republic P-47D-10s of the 325th FG, Fifteenth Air Force in Italy, prepare to take off for a bomber escort mission. The aircraft were camou­flaged, with yellow and black checks on the tail surfaces and red cowl markings with white trim. Aircraft numbers were in white. (Robert L, Baseler)

The ground crew of Lt. Col. Robert L. Baseler in front of his Republic P-47D-10-RE, 42-75008,325th FG, Fifteenth Air Force, in early 1944. All of his P-47 aircraft carried the name of “Big Stud" and the Ace of Spades card insignia. (Robert L. Baseler)

Another message from Gen. Spaatz, dated March 8, 1944, to Gen. Arnold, requested sufficient glossy black paint for thirty heavy bombers as the initial requirement. It also requested an officer who was an expert in the paint’s application be sent with the materials to supervise the work. The first use of this paint was to be the B-17s of the 422 BS, the Night Leaflet Squadron at Station 102, AJconbury, home of the 92nd BG (other accounts state that this unit was based at Chelveston – author). On March 15,1944, the unit was informed that a Major and sufficient paint for thirty heavy bombers would be leaving Wright Field on April 1, 1944.

Gloss Black paint assigned designation of Jet No. 622, March 15,1944.

The Supply Division, ASC, Patterson Field, Fairfield, OH, asked the Engineering Division at Wright Field, the designation for the new gloss black paint. On March 15, 1944, Eng. Div. replied that it had been assigned the designation Jet No. 622, and that it would be added to ANA Bulletin No. 157 as soon as possible. There were presently three sources for the new paint: (1) DuPont deNemours, (2) Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., and (3) The Sherwin-Williams Co,. Other sources would be added as they were qualified.

(Jncamouflaged aircraft begin to reach UNSAFE, February, 1944,

On February 16, 1944, the 1st Bomb Division was informed by Hq Eighth AF, that in the future, many unpainted aircraft would be dispatched from North Africa to the United Kingdom, and at that time, there were many such aircraft at Marrakech awaiting dispatch to the UK. The 1st Bomb Div. was requested to notify all necessarily concerned.

Another memo concerning the use of uncamouflaged aircraft stated that after the 457th BG reached its effective strength in uncamouflaged aircraft, another BG would be designated by HQ Eighth AF to receive uncamouflaged aircraft. Some B-17s were then arriving in UK uncamouflaged. The 1st Bomb Div. was ordered to make arrangements for reassignment of 457th BG camouflaged aircraft in number equal to the number of uncamouflaged aircraft it had received.

On March 15. 1944, Gen. Spaatz informed the Eighth and Ninth AF Commanders that aircraft of all types were then arriving in Europe without camouflage and that he expected that all aircraft would soon be delivered uncamouflaged. He desired that the AF Commanders determine their own policies regarding the use of camouflage. He stated that paint could be removed from presently painted aircraft, or uncamouflaged aircraft could be painted, depending on their individual tactical considerations and desires.

In reply, Ninth AF HQ stated on March 22, 1944, that their earlier policy re camouflage, dated January 15,1944, was rescinded and the following was now their established policy:

(1) Unpainted aircraft arriving in the theater would be assigned to combat units as received. These aircraft were not to be painted and would be used in the same formations ascamouflaged aircraft without discrimination.

(2) No camouflage paint would be removed from aircraft now on hand or received at a later date.

Radio call number color changed, March 1944.

Spec.98-24105-R, amendment no. 2, dated March 21,1944, revised some of the color requirements for the radio call numbers. The new requirements read as follows:

Uncamouflaged airplanes. – For light colored backgrounds, the numbers shall be black, and for dark backgrounds, the numbers shall be International Orange, in accordance with color shade No. 508, Bulletin No. 166.

Camouflaged airplanes. – For light colored backgrounds, the numbers shall be black in accordance with color shade No. 604 of Bulletin No. 157, and for dark backgrounds, the numbers shall be Orange Yellow, in accordance with color shade No. 614 of Bulletin No. 157, except that the numbers for night fighter aircraft shall be Insignia Red in accordance with color shade No. 619 of Bulletin No. 157.

1945 opened with a massive surprise attack by the Luftwaffe on Allied airfields in Belgium. However, when the attack was over, the Luftwaffe had suffered huge losses in aircraft and pilots, while the Allies were able to replace all of their aircraft in a week, and lost only a few pilots. This broke the back of the Luftwaffe and from then on, the AAF were able to carry out ever increasing at­tacks on German industry as the country’s borders shrank under the Allies massive ground attacks. The end of the war in Europe came after only a few months and VE-Day was celebrated on May 8,

1945.

After catching its breath, the AAF turned to its final war effort, the defeat of Japan. The Twentieth Air Force had been formed in April 1944 and in the summer of that year had started heavy bomber operations against Japan, Formosa, Thailand, and Burma, At the beginning of 1945, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) was attacking the Philippines and Borneo. The Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Air Forces were chasing the Japanese in the Asia and Pacific theaters, moving closer and closer to the Japanese home­land. The end for Japan came in August, when two atomic bombs proved that Japan could be defeated without an invasion,

Even though the war only continued for just over four months against Germany, aircraft losses continued to be heavy, 3,631 air­craft being lost in the European and Mediterranean theaters. This brought the total losses in the war against the Axis powers in Eu­rope to no less than 18,418 aircraft. In the Pacific area in the war against Japan, some 1,699 aircraft were lost, bringing the total in that area to 4,530 aircraft. This included 399 lost by the new Twen­tieth Air Force, primarily B-29s. Fighting the greatest war in world history had cost the USAAF some 22,948 aircraft and total casual­ties of 121,867 personnel.

At mid-1945, the USAAF strength had declined in total num­ber of aircraft, to 68,398, but this was somewhat misleading: all combat types of aircraft had actually increased, the decrease being chiefly in a drop of training aircraft from the previous 27,907 to some 12,581. Very heavy bombers, mainly the B-29 plus a few B – 32s, had grown to no less than 2,374 aircraft.

Once victory had been gained, the United States demobilized headlong, just as it had done at the end of World War I. Hundreds of aircraft were scrapped or sold, the strength having dropped to 44,782 aircraft by December 1945, and bases world-wide were closed. So many men were demobilized that the AAF could only muster two groups ready for combat by July 1946. A totally new Air Force had to be built for peacetime operations; its authorized strength was 70 groups but peacetime budgets kept it to only 48 groups (in fact, the reduction in the number of aircraft was such that when the next war broke out in Korea, there were only 19,944 on strength in June 1951).

As a result, the amount of time and effort spent on specs, and T. O. s was extremely small compared to the very active war years, as we shall see in this chapter. However, the Army Air Forces com­manders had never lost sight of their aim to become a separate ser­vice, on a level with the Army and Navy. Planning for this had started in 1943 and was well advanced by mid-1945. Eventually, all of this came to fruition in 1947, but not until after meeting with strong opposition from the Navy.

During this immediate post-war period, the AAF also began to receive the first of its jet-propelled aircraft, and put some of them into unit service. The Lockheed P-80 was the first to enter service, to be followed somewhat later by the Republic P-84. The first of the giant inter-continental bombers in the form of the competing Northrop XB-35 and the Convair XB-36 also made their first flights, as did the North American B-45 and Convair B-46 four-jet light and medium bombers. However, the transport field was still domi­nated by piston-engined types, such as the Douglas C-74 and the Fairchild C-82. It was a period of transition to new technologies, and opened up the future to the sharply reduced AAF.

US Army Air Forces specifications in use, revised, or issued, by date and version,

during 1945. The letters indicate a letter revision of a spec., such as T. O. 07-1-1 A. The numbers indicate an amendment to an earlier version of a spec., such as Amendment No. 6 to Spec. 24114.

Gen. Spaatz succeeded Gen. Arnold as CG, AAF on February 28, 1946, and finally became the first Chief of Staff of the new US Air Force on September 26, 1947, the point at which this volume concludes.

The major developments in the 1945-1947 time period for USAAF aircraft markings and camouflage were:

PT trainer aircraft to have yellow wings and tail surfaces, January 1945.

All A-20, A-26, and B-25 aircraft destined for the Far East Air Force to have ANA Olive Drab and Sea Gray camouflage, March 1945. Interior of all USAAF aircraft to be painted medium green or black, April 1945.

T. O, 07-1-1 adds yellow and black markings for Air Sea Rescue aircraft, July 1945.

Air Sea Rescue aircraft identification numerals changed to last three digits of serial number, September 1945.

Camouflage no longer required on gliders, liaison aircraft, helicopters, and troop transports, November 1945.

TO. 07-1-1 adds “Buzz Numbers” for all aircraft operating solely within the continental USA, November 1945.

Insignia applied to black camouflaged surfaces to now omit the insignia blue circle and border, June 1946.

Insignia red stripes added to white bars of national star insignia, January 1947.

US Army Air Forces specifications in use, revised, or issued, by date and version, during 1946-1947. The letters indicate a letter revision of a spec., such as T. O. 07-1-1 A. The numbers indicate an amendment to an earlier version of a spec., such as Amendment No. 6 to Spec. 24114. The USAAF came to an end on September 26, 1947, when it was superseded by the new US Air Force.