Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

Water is fluid, soft, and yielding. But water will wear away rock, which is rigid and cannot yield. As a rule, whatever is fluid, soft, and yielding will overcome whatever is rigid and hard. This is another paradox: what is soft is strong.

Lao Tzu

Chinese philosopher (604 BC-531 BC)

The term soft power has become a part of popular security discourse since 1990, when it was first used by Prof. Joseph Nye in his book titled Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power [1]. Prof. Nye has developed this concept further in some of this subsequent works.

This chapter is in three parts. The first part outlines the theory, the concept, the notion as well as the critic of soft power in broad terms. The second part analyses the geopolitics of space technologies as a source of soft power. The third part explores the meaning of soft power in context of China’s space programme.

Asian states are working on various areas of technology from astronomical satellites to heavy lift launchers to space food and space clothing (for Moon travel) to asteroid mining. Any significant developments in fields like smart materials, robotics, communication systems and power and energy devices are expected to bring in

revolution in various aspects of space research. Japan is working on ambitious projects like space solar power with an intention of collecting solar power in space and zapping it down to Earth, using laser beams or microwaves. They propose to achieve this within the next two decades but will need a strong economical and tech­nological support. Japanese scientists are working on innovative concepts like space elevator. Significant breakthroughs in carbon nanotech technology are expected to boost this project. India has a major interest in reusable launch technologies. During the next two to three decades, states in the region are expected to enhance their expertise in such fields by using ‘step by step’ approach. Development of the technology leading to ‘launch on demand’ has significant strategic relevance, and various developed Asian states also would have interest in that arena.

Scenarios

As the above discussion underlines, there are various drivers which could decide the future of space programmes of Asian states. Each driver could have different connotation towards shaping the trajectory of individual state’s space programme. Also, relative importance of these drivers vis-a-vis each other will play a role towards determining the future direction of each country’s space programme.

Technology development is crucial for the growth of nation-states. Globalisation has made technology central to the process of development. Technology helps to improve leaving standards, increase productivity, generate new industries and employment opportunities, and create more competitive products in world market. In general, technology is knowledge applicable to the practical problems.[3] Technol­ogy development necessitates investment from both the public and private sector. Particularly, the public sector Research and Development (R&D) has played a vital role in developing some of the key technologies of the twentieth century both globally and in Asia, including aeronautics, electronics and nuclear power.[4] It has also played a significant role in the development of space technologies. The bulk of the space technologies in various parts of world have been developed in response to the explicit and strong government support.

Technology programmes are as vulnerable to the pulls and pushes of politics as other socioeconomic programmes. The governmental stake in developing tech­nologies indirectly plays a role to decide the future of these technologies. Both political and financial backing is essential for any large-scale development of technology. It is important for the space agency managers (technocrats) to control their political environment or their programmes become its victims. It is important for them to negotiate the process of developments of technical programme with the political system. For this purposes, many a time they engage in certain metaphorical and coalition-building strategies. The metaphorical strategies allow them to garner wide public support by making a technology compatible/comparable with some overarching value that is easily understood. The strategies of coalition building also involve expression of another kind where an idea and requirement of collaborating with other states is presented to the political authorities [5, p. 64].

Developing a new technology is mostly a complicated affair, given the myriad technical uncertainties. The expense of large-scale technologies increases economic uncertainties. When a technology has government as its primary developer, a host of political uncertainties arise. This could happen mainly when various government departments are involved simultaneously in the process of technology development. Such situation at times ends up in making design of technology problematic. Also, political conflict can stop a technology from being successfully developed or, if developed, productively applied. A process of technological change is also dependent on political decision-making concerning that technology [5, p. 47].

It is important to appreciate that certain technological experimentation has faced the favour from of the world, and in certain cases, the world has overlooked few inventions. The availability of technology with one state has brought in a paradigm shift into the policies of others. The ‘Space Age’ was born with the launch of first artificial Earth satellite Sputnik by the erstwhile USSR in the autumn of 1957. The only event in recent history which can match Sputnik in general public awareness was the exploration of atom bomb in 1945 [6, p. 555]. Sputnik launch had shaken the USA’s confidence about their technology and military strength [6, p. 570].

It perhaps reversed the foundations of the post-World War II international order. ‘The launch promised imminent Soviet strategic parity, placed the US under direct military threat for the first time since 1814, triggered a quantum jump in the arms race, and undermined the calculus on which European, Chinese, and neutralist relations with the superpowers had been based. The space and missile challenge was then mediated by massive state-sponsored complexes for research and development, in the US and throughout the industrial world, into institutionalized technological revolution and, hence, accelerating social, economic, and perhaps cultural change. Space technology altered the very proportions of human power to the natural environment in a way unparalleled since the spread of the railroads’ [7, p. 1010]. This concept of having a technology which could view the Earth dispassionately from a distance brought a momentous change in both policy and scientific thinking. The idea of operating and experimenting in negligible/zero gravity was caught on by the scientific community. It probably made a major impact in regard to growth of natural sciences.

The four areas most often cited as the loci of revolutionary change in the Space Age are ‘(1) international politics (2) the political role of science and scientists (3) the relationship of the state to technological change and (4) political culture and values in nations of high technology’ [7, p. 1011]. In early years after the launch of first satellite, the growth of space technologies was rapid. During 1961, with the first human visiting the space, the USSR supremacy in this field was restated. Yuri Gagarin’s space flight came as a ‘bolt from space’ for the USA. This ‘loss of face’ forced the USA to significantly increase NASA’s budget. One positive outcome of the superpower rivalry in space was the Apollo programmes, which led to the overall development of space and rocket science. When Neil Armstrong became the first man to reach the moon, the USA believed that it had stolen a march on the USSR in the space race. It could be said that in the Cold War era, the relevance of space supremacy had social, political and scientific tenets.

In present era, the interest of various governments towards supporting any technology development is essentially dependent on its assessment about its utility mainly for socioeconomical progress. The Cold War era race was the outcome of the superpower rivalry and the investments in technology were made from the one – upmanship standpoint. In the post-Cold War era, particularly in Asian context where the developments in space technologies started much later, such compulsions were non-existent. The political support in Asian context towards the development of space sciences emerged mainly out of the social and scientific reasons. In twenty – first century, this development is also found taking place for the economic and military reasons. Also, states are attempting to find the availability of resources on the other planets, and certain space efforts are directed in that direction too.

East (Eastern) Asia is an extremely important region of Asia. Almost one fourth of the world’s human population live over here. The world’s second and third largest economies reside over here, and the region comprises of the only Asian state which is the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This chapter and following two chapters discuss the space polices of few important states within the region. This chapter highlights on the space policies of the two Koreas and Taiwan, and subsequent chapters discuss the space policies of China and Japan.

The future of two Koreas has great influence on the security landscape of the East Asian (North-east) region. For many years, the two Korean regimes are found facing both internal and external challenges and opportunities [1]. The future of Korean peninsula mainly depends on the management of internal contradictions within the North Korea and the level of their engagement with the outside world. North Korea’s approach in deciding the future of its nuclear policies would play an important role towards deciding the geopolitical and geostrategic future of the region.

In regard to North Korea, only time would tell whether the mercurial and enigmatic North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s death during Dec 2011 could lead to greater instability on the divided Korean peninsula or brighten the prospects of peace in the region. A new era of political rapprochement and economic opening could strengthen and broaden the global development partnership in the region.

The growth of science and technology in both the Koreas during last few decades could be viewed as a mixed bag of intense growth as well as stagnation and failures. The strategic requirement of both Koreas appears to have played a significant role towards deciding the trajectory for the technology development.

North Korea

North Korea is perhaps the world’s most militarised, isolated and strictly controlled communist state [2]. The state has naturally harsh terrain and experiences various natural disasters frequently. The country’s corrupt political (military) system is

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_6, 69

© Springer India 2013

unwilling to undertake any major economic reforms, and their entire focus remains to make investments in technologies of strategic significance. Albeit being viewed as an isolationist country, they have (limited) association with states like Russia and China. These states may not be called as North Korea natural allies, but they do have some influence on them. North Korea also has connections with Iran and Pakistan and over the years has looked at these states for a mutual defence technology and hardware business.

Being a state driven by military ambitions, their investments in the military hardware are significant in nature. North Korea believes that as a pariah state, they need to arm themselves ‘expansively’ to make their ‘presence’ evident regionally and bring in the element of deterrence upfront.

For last two decades, the North Korean government has promoted its nuclear and missile programmes as strong pillars of national defence and prominent symbols of scientific nationalism. This is probably because universally such military technolo­gies are being used for showcasing country’s greater scientific accomplishments. Such technologies along with space technology also become the basis of nationalis­tic pride. For North Korea investments, such programmes are representative of the national effort to build a ‘strong and prosperous country’ (kangsngdaeguk) under the political and military leadership of the country. The term kangsngdaeguk first appeared in August 1998 in reference to Kim Jong Il having provided ‘on-the – spot guidance’ in Chagang Province in February 1998 and is now established state doctrine.1

Prior to the 1980s, North Korea had a clear military advantage over South Korea, but the balance of conventional forces has turned against Pyongyang, especially after the end of the Cold War. During the famine of the mid-1990s, the North Korean leadership increasingly relied on the military to manage government affairs, and it introduced a ‘military first’ policy in 1998 to coincide with Kim Jong Il’s official rise to power. Since economic woes have made it impossible to compete with neighbours in conventional forces, Pyongyang has had a strong incentive to retain and expand its asymmetric capabilities.2 North Korea’s investment in space arena needs to be viewed at the backdrop of military influence on the policy-making practices of North Korea. As discussed elsewhere in this book, North Korean space programme is generally perceived as an offshoot of its missile programme. There is no clarity yet in regard to the future road map of North Korea’s space programme. Space programme could be useful for North Korea in some sense to expand its missile capability mainly in the medium-range missile arena. However, it could be prudent to study their space programme and missile programme as separate domains in order to have better understanding because few issues beyond missiles also demand attention.

It is important to note that the state has established the Korean Committee of Space Technology (KCST) probably sometime during 1980s and is agency responsible for various activities in space from research to satellite manufacture and launching. The agency also manages the country’s rocket launch sites.

On Sept 04, 1998, the Korean Central News Agency broadcasted a report claiming the successful launch of the first North Korean artificial satellite, Kwangmyongsong-1 (Brightstar-1). This very small satellite was launched into the orbit on Aug 31,1998. The initial claims by Russian military space forces about the success of the launch were very encouraging. On Sept 06, 1998, they confirmed that the satellite was in orbit [3], but these claims were subsequently withdrawn. Various civilian and military agencies in the world (particularly in the US) track various activities in space, and they failed to observe the presence of this satellite into the space. It is generally perceived that this was the test of North Korea’s first medium-range Taepodong 1 ballistic missile.

Including the 1998 test, till date (early 2012) North Korea has done three attempts to put satellite in the space, and as per various international assessments, none of them have succeeded. However, North Korea has made certain claims of success particularly with its 2009 test which is found tenuous.

In 2000, the North Korean authorities had unilaterally decided to observe a mora­torium in missile flight testing. However, on the occasion of the US Independence Day on July 4, 2006, North Korea had undertaken multiple missile tests (probably six in number). It has been identified that one of the liftoff was the first Taepodong – 2 rocket, perhaps topped by a satellite. The rocket was launched on a minimum energy-saving trajectory close to 41° out of the launch sit heading in a direction of the Pacific Ocean and Hawaii islands. This was a typical satellite launch trajectory. However, the launch failed after around 50 s of flight. The satellite was presumably named Kwangmyongsong-2.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea proceeded with its announced satellite launch against the increasing international pressure for not to do so. International com­munity, particularly its neighbours Japan and South Korea along with the USA, was of the opinion that this so-called satellite launch was a facet and North Korea has actual plans of testing the Taepodong-2 ICBM. It was announced by the North Korean government that an Unha-2 rocket had carried the satellite. The launch was a failure, and the rocket had landed into the Pacific Ocean.

Interestingly, North Korea had claimed that the three-stage rocket had put a satellite into space, and it was circling the Earth transmitting revolutionary songs. They had reported that their scientists and engineers have succeeded in sending satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 into orbit by way of carrier rocket Unha-2.[83] But, various agencies from South Korea, Japan, Russia and the USA declared this test as a failure. The negative impact of this test was that the North Korea withdrew from six-party talks. They cited the criticism by the US President Barack Obama about this test as a reason for their withdrawal. Obama has expressed opinion that test has violated the international norms and action must be taken against North Korea for this violation.[84]

Politics has always been at the forefront of the North Korea’s space programme. Probably, the origin of the North Korea’s space programme has not been rooted as a need for social reasons but more as a response to the South Korean space programme. Another possibility is that they could have attempted to follow the Iran model to use space agenda as a means to exhibit the missile capabilities. Particularly, during the last decade after undertaking the nuclear tests, probably North Korea appears to have become more ambitious in space arena to use it as an instrument for power projection.

Understanding the importance of engaging North Korea constructively in the past, the US administration had attempted to use the space card as one of the option. During 2000, the then President Clinton had offered a satellite launch deal in exchange for terminating their ICBM programme. However, during his first term of presidency, President Bush had dropped the idea due to verification issues [4]. In the year 2009, Russia had also shown readiness to launch North Korean communication satellites and assist its space programme.[85] Particularly after the withdrawal of North Korea from the six-party talks, now it looks unlikely that the state would accept any international assistance in this regard.

The satellite imagery assessment based on the Feb 2011 images indicates that North Korea has developed a new sophisticated satellite launch side.[86] It could serve the double purpose, either for launching a satellite or it could be turned into an ICBM facility. North Korea has also announced its intentions to undertake manned space flight and Moon mission in the future. Nonetheless, the current status of their space programme indicates that they would have to overcome many hurdles to reach that level of technology sophistication. The basic question which arises at this point in time is: ‘Is North Korea’s space agenda a mere propaganda or they have interest in reaching higher heights in space realm’ ? The answer to this question is probably both.

Since, the World War II the issue of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology has dominated the global strategic calculus. Various issues related to space regimes and nuclear regimes have mostly been linked (directly or indirectly). More so because the global security discourse has been dominated by nuclear issues for all these years the matters related to space security occasionally get debated under the nuclear shadow. Hence, it is important to examine the interconnection amongst nuclear and space issues.

Under the rubric of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China is the only Asian nuclear weapon state (NWS). However, states like India and Pakistan have demon­strated their nuclear weapon potential during 1998. Also, North Korea has tested nuclear weapons during 2006.[164] Israel is also known to have developed (but not tested) nuclear weapons during 1970s. However, Israel’s nuclear policy is of nuclear ambiguity/nuclear opacity, total non-acknowledgment and secrecy [2]. Apart from these known nuclear weapon states, few other states in the region have certain (covert) interests in investing into nuclear technology from the point of view of making a weapon. Particularly, Iran’s investments into nuclear technology for the purposes of energy are being viewed with suspect, and also some doubts are being raised about Myanmar’s nuclear intentions.

Interestingly, all nuclear weapon states (official or unofficial) are not spacefaring nations. States like Pakistan have made significant investments in the nuclear and missile arena, but in comparison their investments in space field are minimal.

North Korea has made certain claims in regard to successful launch of satellite, but their claims have been disputed. The other nuclear weapon states from the region, namely, China, India and Israel are established spacefaring nations. Few states within the region (with no nuclear weapon aspirations) also aspire to become spacefaring nations.

For understanding this interdependence in Asian context, it is important to reason it under the global settings. This is mainly because disarmament and arms control issues both in nuclear and space arena have certain commonalities, and any Asia – specific discussion needs to have the global backdrop.

Various treaties in space field actually have ‘nuclear’ origins. Majority of analyst and policy maker community since the 1940s generally never have viewed space as an ‘independent’ entity. Particularly, during Cold War period, the NWSs mostly looked for the ‘nuclear’ relevance of space technology—meaning how satellites and launch vehicles could be used effectively to carry forward the nuclear agenda. They realised that space technology could help the process of putting weapons of mass destruction in space and also testing of nuclear weapons could be undertaken in outer space. This made arms control and disarmament lobbies to work towards stopping/restricting likely ‘nuclearisation’ of outer space. Hence, various space security agendas got formulated mainly under nuclear settings.

The most prominent space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty (OST 1967), is more about restricting the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space than addressing the issues related to space. The UN Moon Treaty (1979) also emphasises that the state parties shall not put nuclear weapons on or around the trajectory of the moon. Various debates and discussion in the UN bodies like Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS-set up by the General Assembly in 1959) and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) highlight that space issues are difficult to bifurcate from nuclear issues.

Another area where space regime is being held hostage to the nuclear issues is negotiations on the FMCT (fissile material cut-off treaty). China is linking the issue of negotiations on FMCT with the PAROS [3]. China wants the conference on disarmament (CD) to negotiate both FMCT and PAROS concurrently. However, the USA opposes this idea [4]. This has prevented the CD from undertaking any serious negotiations on space issues. Overall, the Chinese position is having a bearing on the various international negotiations in space domain.

The nuclear policies of non-NPT signatory states have put them under interna­tional sanctions regime. Imposition of sanctions has denied them export of space technology too. States like India suffered technological isolation because of their nuclear policies and the nuclear testing undertaken by them during 1974 and 1998. The state had to suffer of technology apartheid, and space technology was a prominent element of such embargo. Space technology was not traded with India for many years. A particular case in point is the transfer of cryogenic technology by Russia to India. During 1992, Russia was pressurised by the then US administration in this regard because it was felt that India would use this technology for its missile programme in violation to MTCR requirements. Indian space programme has suffered significantly because of this and is yet to indigenise the cryogenic

technology. Space agenda of India has been always held hostage for nuclear matters. Only after the successful negotiation of the Indo-US nuclear deal (2005) by the year 2010/2011, the USA had removed various embargos put against India’s space agency.

Table 12.1 summarises few details of the first Moon missions of Japan, China and India.

Table 12.2 lists important sensors which are part of the Moon missions of the three Asian countries. Here, an attempt has been made to present them in a comparative fashion (as far as possible) in regard to their functions. However, it may be noted that the design approaches and designing agencies for all these sensors are different. Also, the characteristics of some sensors vary. Hence, only a partial comparison is possible.

The civilisation has mostly equated power with strength. Power could be viewed as their ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the desired outcomes. This shaping the behaviour of others could be carried out by using different instruments. It could be done by economic engagement or by attraction or by coercion. Usually, nation-states are found using carrot and stick policy to retain or increase their authority.

It would be incorrect to believe that only the conventional instruments like military or economic might be useful to acquire power. There exists a possibility that at times using these instruments could even prove counterproductive. It is possible in certain cases to get the desired outcome without tangible threats or payoffs. This process of achieving results could also be referred as ‘the second face of power’. This allows a state to achieve the desired outcomes because other states respect its

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values, follow its model and aim to reach its level of prosperity and openness. This is what the soft power is all about. It involves attracting others to crave for the results that you desire.

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. However, it involves much more than mere influencing others. It is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It involves the ability to attract, and this attraction could lead to acquiescence [2]. Soft power resources are the possessions that could create such attractions. Apart from state actors, the soft power could also be put into effect by non-state actors like major NGOs (nongovernmental organisations), MNCs (multinational corporations), various subnational entities and global institutions.

It is important to appreciate that there are various confines of the soft power. It does not allow you to take any active control of the other state or a group. It is not about ‘owning’ everything. The reasons for ‘attraction’ could vary from situation to situation and target to target. The eagerness of the recipient and his/her zeal to ‘comply’ plays an important role in this power dynamics.

There is an opinion that the concept of soft power is more theoretical in nature. It could also be argued that power is ultimately a power, and there is nothing hard or soft about it. A former New York Times columnist Leslie H. Gelb argues that there are no examples found in recent history where leaders of a country have changed their position on a major interest to them because they were persuaded to such an extent that they realised that the pursuing power had understood their interest better than they did. In reality such things just don’t happen.1

The soft power argument based on the ‘mechanism of attraction’ looks problem­atic for some. There is an opinion that the concept of attraction does not form a suitable foundation upon which to base a category of analysis [3]. It is also argued that to presume attraction as a natural force feasible or logical in the context of world politics may not be correct. Rather in the ‘context of world politics it makes far more sense to model attraction as a relationship that is constructed through representational force—a nonphysical but nevertheless coercive form of power that is exercised through language. Insofar as attraction is sociolinguistically constructed through representational force, soft power should not be understood in juxtaposition to hard power but as a continuation of it by different means’ [4].

Such critical reviews about Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power are neces­sary to take the debate further. It is important to note that Nye is not discussing about the attraction in isolation. His argument is that soft power is about the capacity to change what other countries want, and it could be connected with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. He also argues that the soft power of a country has three primary sources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policies [5, 6]. Soft power also includes the capacity to shape

international organisations and agendas. It’s not always the state, but any major industrial house or even great philosophers or actors who wield influence on the polity and population of other states could also be recognised as sources of soft power.

For any nation-state, the various foreign policy initiatives are mostly undertaken to address various foreign policy challenges. These initiatives are mainly diplomatic and economic in nature. In certain situations, states are found using military diplomacy as an instrument of policy initiative. The concept of soft power when viewed under such settings demands a nuanced debate and discussion on one of the most important but often less discussed tenets of soft power that is the role of science and technology (S&T). Limited attempts [7] have been made either by Nye’s supporters or critics to contextualise the importance of science and technology as an element of soft power projection. In general, there is an absence of debate either for or against the relevance of S&T in wielding the soft power. The criticism to Nye’s postulation has emerged mainly from the community of social scientists who have different yardsticks to judge the effect of attraction. Nye’s hypothesis of attraction argues well when looked at the backdrop of S&T as a key instrument of soft power.

In 2030/2040, Asia will continue to exhibit a rapid growth of development in the field of space. Japan, China and India will continue to be the leading Asian space powers. At global level, they would remain as tier two space powers. However, China would succeed in putting the human on Moon. India would overtake China and Japan in Mars missions.

China and India would have their own global/regional navigational systems op­erational. China-Japan-India would have much improvised remote sensing systems with state-of-the-art sensors giving day/night and all weather and all terrain im­ageries with resolutions in few centimetres. Their astronomical and environmental satellites would be fully operational. India would have fully developed the capability to put 6-8 ton satellites in the space and would be having fully matured cryogenic technology. Iran’s space programme (as missile programme) would grow further and would limit itself to use their satellite launches to demonstrate their missile capabilities.

Many rich Asians would visit space. Japan/Singapore/South Korea would have major stakes in global space tourism business, while India would be a major player in transponders. Indian satellite launching facilities would offer best economical options but would face competition from China. South Korea would be a beginner in this field.

China’s military space station would have lived its life, and based on this experience, they would have launched one more such station. China’s international space station would be under construction with participation from APSCO members as junior partners. Indian and Japanese satellites would face temporary blackouts because of jamming from unknown sources (la 2009-10 cyber attacks).

Non-nuclear Iran would make a slow but steady progress in space field and would have positioned its own satellites mainly in LEO. South Korea and Indonesia would have independent launch facilities. Many of the SE Asian states would remain dependent on regional and global powers for support of their space ambitions and would have numerically more satellites in space. Many Asian states would have more number of small (mini/micro/nano/piceo) satellites. Space would play a prominent role towards enhancing the soft power status of Japan, China and India.

Progress in science and technology (S&T) has been responsible for vast improve­ments in the physical conditions and living standards of the majority of the world’s population. In a way, technological advancement has played a major role towards the global transformation and has offered competitive advantages to the states. Progression of technology has allowed cultures to communicate with each other and learn more about each other. It has also been responsible in bringing economic interdependence which indirectly could be viewed as one of the important cause for the cessation of conflicts.[5] All this has been possible because of the social, political and economic support gathered by various fields of technology development.

In recent times, mostly after the Second World War, states have started making significant investments in technologies in various parts of the world. The same has been the story in Asian context too. States in the region have understood the significant social, economical, political and strategic advantages for acquiring and developing various new technologies. However, technology progress assessment in regards to Asia as a whole tends to present a serrated image. Particularly during the Cold War period, Japan was the only Asian country making a mark on the global level. Subsequently, few of East Asian and Southeast Asian states like China, Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines and Singapore made rapid technological developments. The level of development in technologies in states like India and Israel has also been noteworthy. At the same time, there are various other states in the region which are technologically reticent.

In overall analysis, it is very important to do a nuanced distinction amid the sci­entific and technological independence of the nation states. ‘Scientific independence

is the capacity of a country to create and sustain its own scientific institutions, traditions and programmes in the process of making significant and original con­tributions to the advancement of world science. Technological independence at the national level means national autonomy in technology acquisition and technological innovation; it is the capacity of domestic firms to forecast, assess, select, acquire or generate, and commercialize the technologies they need to create and sustain competitive advantages for themselves and self-sustaining growth for the national economy. Technological independence can be attained by a country through the adoption, imitation, learning and improvement of foreign technologies. Such tech­nological independence, however, can be easily undermined by countries that have the capacity to become technological leaders and pioneers through the continuous creation of new technologies from endogenous research and development (R&D). Hence, a country cannot sustain its technological independence unless it also has scientific independence. Technological independence that is not based on scientific independence will sooner or later be reduced to technological followership; techno­logical independence that is supported by scientific independence can develop into technological leadership’ [8].

Appreciating the limits of technological independence, the countries in Asia are found making independent efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. Few states in the region like India have undergone technological apartheid for many years for various political reasons. Particularly the decade 1995-2005 has witnessed dramatic increase in government spending by many Asian states. The research contributions by the Asian scholars working in Asian research institutes have increased multifold, and also a sharp increase in number of PhD holding scientists and engineers is on the rise [9]. Strengthening of research infrastructure of many states has also attracted the native talent back to the motherland from the Western countries. The economic instability in the West particularly after the 2008 global financial has also contributed to the process of reverse brain drain. Alternatively, understanding the economic importance of the region, developed states have started selectively tweaking their rigid technology denial positions and policies. The 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal is the case in point.

South Korea is a key US alley in East Asia. This fastest growing country is the fourth largest economy of Asia. South Korea and North Korea could be regarded as states separated at birth. Technically, South Korea is at war with North Korea for the last many years. Since its inception in 1948, North Korea has mostly be a part of the list of countries unfriendly with the USA and its allies. Over the years, North Korea has been called ‘names’ like the State Sponsor of Terrorism, Rogue State, part of Axis of Evil and even at times Outpost of Tyranny. Evaluation of South Korea’s progress or retreat in any field is mostly done by factoring the North Korean angle.

Like any other developing state, South Korea is keen to invest in space tech­nologies for its socioeconomic benefits. At the same time, appreciating the typical security circumstances they are embroiled in and the nature of investments they are doing in military hardware, it becomes obvious that space is and would be an important element of their military preparedness particularly since they are a part of a US military alliance.[87] The US militaries’ dependence on space technologies is well-known. Presently, ‘South Korea has been caught between political and historical legacies and emerging complex threats, while searching for a new strategic paradigm and operational concepts that would allow greater flexibility and adaptability under conditions of strategic uncertainty. The changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula has arguably decreased the effectiveness of South Korea’s traditional deterrence and defence strategies. In this context, their military has attempted to adapt selected US RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) concepts as a part of broader military modernization to counter the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with US forces, and eventually attain self-reliant defence posture’ [5]. Various Western, South Korean and Japanese spy agencies are using human and technical intelligence as a means to learn more about internal situation and military preparedness of this hermetic country. Today, South Korea suffers from a typical security dilemma, and this makes them to spend approximately 2.5-3 % of their GPD for the defence.

Any assessment of the South Korean investments in the space technologies needs to be carried out at the backdrop of regional geopolitical realities. Apart from the civilian and commercial benefits of space technologies, its relevance for satisfying South Korean strategic requirements needs to be appreciated. The RMA philosophy of South Korea revolves around making significant investments in the area of command, control and surveillance systems (C4ISR). Importance of space technologies (either developed indigenously or otherwise) to carry this agenda further is obvious.

In mid-September 2005, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defence announced a Defence Reform Plan designed to modernise ROK military equipment and achieve a higher level of professional military personnel. The most crucial aspect of the plan was the massive investment in battle management assets focusing on C4ISR, all of which are essential for network-centric warfare. This Defence Reform 2020 plan has mandated the acquisition of theatre operational command facilities, communication networks and military communication satellites [6].

South Korea started late in the space arena in comparison with other important space actors in the region. They started with their various activities in space arena in late 1980s. It’s interesting to note that they started ‘thinking big’ in the initial stages of development of their space programme only and announced its ambitions to work in astronautics and other space fields. During Aug 1989, the state established Satellite Technology Research Centre (SaTReC). The centre started with their associate with the Surrey Satellite Technology Limited in area of micro-satellites. Within 3 months after the creation of centre, South Korea established its national space agency called Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) [7]. The first South Korean satellite Kitsat-1 was launched on Aug 10, 1992, onboard an Ariane launcher, and satellite manufacture was facilitated by the Surrey systems.

South Korea’s first indigenously produced satellite, KOMPSAT-1, was launched in 1999 aboard a Russian-produced rocket. Since then, the KARI has launched several advanced communications, imaging and weather satellites [8]. The KARI has also been involved in the development its own rockets too. Apart from successful launching of various satellites in space (with outside support), the other notable achievement by South Korea has been to launch its first astronaut into space with Russian assistance in 2008. The biggest limitation of the South Korean space programme so far has been its inability to successfully develop its own satellite launch capability.

By the 1990s, South Korea had developed an independent capability to manu­facture solid propellant rocket motors of up to 1-ton mass. In 1990, KARI had built the first indigenous sounding rockets, flown as the KSR-I and KSR-II. In December 1997, KARI was planning the development of liquid oxygen/kerosene rocket motor for an orbital launcher, but this idea was discarded because by then the South Korean government had proposed to try to be amongst the top ten spacefaring nations by 2015 and they wanted to leapfrog the technology curve. They decided to follow the route of international collaboration for rapid progress. Hence, they engaged with Russian companies to assist in building a new space launch centre together with a large space launch modular booster. This multibillion dollar programme got underway in 2004.8

The first two attempts by South Korea with its indigenous launching system to launch satellites have failed. South Korea had launched its first space rocket during Aug 2009, but the satellite it was carrying failed to enter into its proper orbit.

South Korea’s two-stage Naro rocket had Russian liquid-fuelled first-stage while the second stage, burning a solid fuel, was produced by South Korean engineers. The rocket could place the satellite into orbit but not followed its intended course. The satellite had reached an altitude of 360 km, rather than separating at the intended 302 km. South Korean agencies had described this as a partial success/half success.[88] The second attempt during Jun 2010 was a major failure when the rocket exploded 137 s after the takeoff.[89] These two successive launch failures have put South Korea satellite programme under pressure, and they are yet to realise the dream of becoming spacefaring nation.

Even though South Korea is not able to successfully develop a launch system, still their success with satellite design and manufacture is noteworthy. Till now, they have launched 12 different satellites. From strategic context, their investments in KoreaSat are significant. This series of satellites are basically for commercial purposes (communication and broadcasting). Amongst the four satellites launches so far, KoreaSat-5 (Aug 2006) has an integrated communication system for military purposes [9]. They also have a KOMPSAT/Arirang series satellite for Earth observation purposes. All these satellites are mainly devised for civilian uses; however, their defence utility could not be ruled out. Their requirements for spy satellites or dedicated military observation satellites are obviously being met by the systems available under the US command.

Limited achievements in space arena have not deterred the South Korea from continuing ‘thinking big’. As per their Ministry of Science and Technology, they are proposing to develop a large-sized rocket capable of carrying 300 ton of freight into space by 2017. They also have plans to develop a space shuttle launching system by 2020. The state is keen to undertake missions in the deep space arena and has plans to send an unmanned probe to the Moon’s orbit in 2020 and land a probe on the Moon’s surface in 2025.11

Like any other developing state, South Korea’s space agenda also suffers from the budgetary limitations. They understand that presently there is disconnect between their ambitions and achievements. Exact reasons for their inability to successfully develop launch vehicles are difficult to identify. From the technological perspective in the business of rocket science, two consecutive failures are not desirable but definitely tolerable. For many years, the USA is having concerns about South Korea’s ballistic missile intentions. Probably, that is the reason they could be (secretly) unhappy to the South Korean inroads into rocket technology. This also could have had certain impact on the progress of South Korea in developing launcher technologies.

After making years of investments in space arena, now it is unlikely for South Korea to discard its space programme just because of few failures. They

understand that space is an integral element of a modern international power and has connotations both for national pride as well as international standing. They are also keen to exploit the economic and strategic benefits of this technology. The state is expected to quickly learn for its failures and make rapid progress in near future.