Category Soviet and Russian Lunar Exploration

Samplers, rovers and orbiters

When Luna 15 was smashed to pieces in the Sea of Crises in July 1969, Russia’s plan to upstage Apollo by the first automatic recovery of lunar soil came unstuck. But the Soviet Union permitted the programme to continue, for two reasons: first, because the series could produce a credible automatic programme for the exploration of the moon; and, second, because the series was important if the Soviet man-on-the-moon pro­gramme were to be completed after all. Such hopes still existed in reality up to the summer of 1974 and on paper for another two years.

Luna 15 was the first of the Ye-8-5 soil sampler missions to leave the Earth, one earlier mission having failed on launch. Some considerable work was still required for such a mission to be successful. A number of lessons had arisen from the troubled experience of Luna 15. There had been considerable difficulties controlling the craft. Luna 15’s original orbit had been far from that intended. The radar had presented problems. Despite delaying the final landing manoeuvre, the final burn had not proved to be sufficiently precise. In the months that followed the loss of Luna 15, the Lavochkin engineers made the adjustments that they felt sure could guarantee success the next time.

The Lavochkin engineers were convinced that the basic design was sound. Although the three missions had been launched hastily, the basic Ye-8 design, origin­ally intended for lunar rovers, had a lengthy and careful design over many earlier years. The sample return spacecraft consisted of three parts: a descent stage, ascent stage and return cabin.

Ye-8-5 lunar sample return spacecraft

Height 3.96 m

Weight on launch 5,750 kg

on moon 1,880 kg

KT descent stage

Подпись: One 11D417

Samplers, rovers and orbiters Подпись: 520 kg 245 kg 2m 1.92 tonnes Nitric acid and UDMH

Engine

Return cabin

Подпись: 39 kgПодпись: 50 cmWeight

Diameter

For radio communications, the lander carried a cone-shaped antenna on a long boom, working on 922 MHz and 768 MHz. Uplink was received on 115 MHz. A dish-shaped radar was located on the bottom of the spacecraft.

The Lavochkin bureau still had another three sample return spacecraft available. All were duly launched in the period following the Apollo 11 landing, on 23rd September 1969 (Cosmos 300), 22nd October 1969 (Cosmos 305) and 6th February 1970. On Cosmos 300, there was a leak in the oxidizer tank of block D, which depleted the entire supply during Earth orbit injection and could not fire out to the moon, leaving the spacecraft to crash back to Earth four days later. On Cosmos 305, the attitude control system failed and block D did not get into the right attitude to fire to the moon, crashing back near Australia. With the February 1970 launching, Proton’s first-stage engines were erroneously turned off at 127 sec and it cratered downrange.

Of the first five attempts, only one had left Earth orbit. A second batch of sample return spacecraft was now constructed and there was a delay until the first of the new spacecraft could be available. In the meantime, concerted efforts were applied to attempt to fix the appalling record of the Proton rocket. Proton’s unreliability had not only cost the moon programme dearly, but dogged the interplanetary pro­gramme, destroying two of a new series of Mars probes in March 1969. Eventually, Georgi Babakin persuaded the minister responsible for the space programme, Sergei Afanasayev, to introduce a requalification programme. This took place over spring and summer 1970, culminating in a suborbital test on 18th August 1970. This led to a swift and radical improvement in performance, but Soviet space histories might have been happier, had these changes been introduced sooner.

THE REVIVAL? LUNA GLOB

These and other plans were overtaken by political events and the financial crisis that engulfed the Soviet Union and then Russia in the early 1990s. In the post-Soviet space programme, the moon was rarely mentioned. The first instance was in summer 1997, when IKI proposed plans to send a small spacecraft into lunar orbit, using a Molniya rocket from Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia in 2000 (a Proton would be prohibitively expensive). Over time, this mission acquired the title Luna Glob, or ‘lunar globe’. The orbiter would deploy three 250 kg penetrators, modelled on those developed for the Mars 8 mission the previous year. They would dive into the lunar surface at some speed, burrowing seismic and heat flow instruments under the lunar surface, leaving transmitters just above the surface. With small nuclear isotopes, they would transmit for a year, operating as a three-point network to collect information on moonquakes and heat flow. A number of variations on these themes appeared, but none progressed beyond the aspirational stage at this time. The reality was that Russia lacked the financial resources to mount any scientific missions during the 15 years that followed the fall of the Soviet Union and concentrated all its efforts on keeping its manned, military and applications space programmes going. For the time being, the only hopes for more moon probes rested with private industry and Russia providing a booster rocket for a freelance Western venture. One such mission, Trailblazer of the TransOrbital Corporation, was postulated in the early 2000s, using an old Cold War rocket called the Dnepr.

July 2005 saw the Russian Federation announce that there would be a new federal space plan to run through 2015. One of the highlights of the plan was a return to Mars with a new mission to its moon Phobos in 2009, the mission being called Phobos Grunt. Analyzing the plan proved an impossibility, since the government issued only press releases and interviews about it, but never the original text. Almost a year later, it was made known that the plan included, in a revival of the Luna Glob mission, a return to the moon in 2012 [4]. Details of the mission were given by officials of the Russian Space Agency, the Vernadsky Institute and the Institute of Earth Physics. All appeared anxious that Russia, for all its past expertise in the exploration of the moon, should get back in the business of lunar exploration. They were also motivated not just by American plans to return to the moon by 2020 announced by President Bush, but by the prospect of moon probes being sent there by China, India and Japan much sooner.

The new Luna Glob envisaged the launch by a Molniya rocket of a mother ship into lunar orbit. Before arriving at the moon, the mother ship would release a fleet of ten high-speed penetrators to impact into the Sea of Fertility in a circular pattern, each only 2,500 m from the next one, forming a 10-point seismic station. The mother ship would continue into lunar orbit. First, it would deploy two pene – trator landers at the Apollo 11 and 12 landing sites, to rebuild the seismic network they began there in 1969. Then it would send a soft-lander down to the south polar region, called the polar station, carrying a seismometer and two spectrometers to detect water ice. The mother ship would act as a relay for the 13 data stations on the lunar surface.

Although the name Dennis Tito will never be as famous or recognizable as many of the great astronaut or cosmonaut heroes, what he did may prove ultimately to be of great importance. When his Soyuz rocket fired him up to the International Space Station in 2001, he became the world’s first paying space tourist. In one of the great post-Cold War ironies, commercial space tourism was developed by Russia, albeit by an American company, Space Adventures in cooperation with the builder of Soyuz, the Energiya Corporation. After launching a number of space tourists to the station, Space Adventures decided to offer an even more staggering – and pricey – idea: lunar tourism. Space Adventures’ proposal: to offer a six-day loop around the moon in a reconstructed Zond cabin for C80m, with a first flight set for 2009. When the original plans for space tourism were put forward, they were considered a publicity-seeking stunt, but with a queue of millionaires ready to spend the money and go through the year-long training, Space Adventures had established a viable business. Maybe, 40

years later than scheduled, Zond will make a round-the-moon manned flight after all [5].

ZOND’S ANCESTOR: SOYUZ

The basic Soyuz was 7.13 m long, 2.72m wide, with a habitable volume of 10.5m3, a launch weight of up to 6,800 kg, and a descent capsule weight of 2,800 kg. Soyuz consisted of three modules: equipment, descent and orbital. The equipment module contained retrorockets and manoeuvring engines, fuel, solar wings and supplies. The acorn-shaped descent module was the home of cosmonauts during ascent and descent, which one entered through the top. There were portholes, a parachute section and three contour seats. The orbital module, attached on the front, was almost circular, with a spacewalk hatch, lockers for food, equipment and experiments. Being more spacious, the cosmonauts lived there rather than the cramped descent module. From Soyuz there protruded a periscope for dockings, two seagull-like solar panels, aerials, docking probe on the front and flashing lights and beacons. On top of the Soyuz was an escape tower. Normally jettisoned at 2 min 40 sec into the flight, the purpose of the escape tower was to fire the Soyuz free of a rogue rocket. A solid rocket motor, with twelve angled nozzles of 80,000 kg thrust, would fire for 5 sec.

ZOND’S ANCESTOR: SOYUZ

The Soyuz spacecraft

The initial tests of Soyuz were not auspicious. The first test of Soyuz was Cosmos 133 on 28th November 1966. Cosmos 133 was to have docked with a second Soyuz, launched a day later, but this launch was cancelled when Cosmos 133 developed attitude control problems. The Cosmos could not be positioned properly for reentry and was destroyed deliberately for fear that it would land in China. During the second test, a month later, the rocket failed to take off. When the gantries were swung back around the rocket, the cabin was accidentally tipped, causing the escape tower to fire, thus setting the upper stage on fire and causing an explosion which destroyed the pad. One person died, but it could have been many more. The third test, Cosmos 140 on 7th February 1967, followed the test profile up to reentry when a maintenance plug in the heatshield burned through and caused structural damage. Worse followed: the cabin came down in the Aral Sea, crashed through ice and sank (divers later retrieved the cabin from 10 m down).

Despite these difficulties, Russia pressed ahead with a first manned flight of the Soyuz for April 1967. Instead of a cautious, single mission, a big shot was planned. Soyuz would go first, with a single cosmonaut on board, Vladimir Komarov. Twenty – four hours into the flight, Soyuz 2 would follow, commanded by veteran, Valeri Bykovsky. Two newcomers, Yevgeni Khrunov and Alexei Yeliseyev would fly with him. The rendezvous would simulate the moon link-up. Soyuz would be the active craft and would rendezvous on orbit 1. Then the show would really begin. Khrunov and Yeliseyev would don suits, leave Soyuz 2 and transfer into Soyuz to join Komarov. The spacewalk would simulate the transfer of cosmonauts between the the lunar orbiter and lunar lander as they circled the moon. The two ships would then separate after about four hours. Komarov, now accompanied by Khrunov and Yeliseyev, would be back on the ground by the end of day 2, Bykovsky following on day 3. So, in 72 breathtaking hours, the new Soyuz craft would demonstrate Earth orbit rendezvous on the first orbit, transfer by spacewalking to a primitive space station, carry out key tests for the moon flight and put the USSR back in front.

As the launch date drew near, there were a record 203 faults in Soyuz which required correction. The pre-test flights had been disconcerting. An atmosphere of foreboding prevailed at the cosmodrome. As Vladimir Komarov climbed into the transfer van to take the ride down to the pad, he had an air of fatalistic resignation about him. His fellow cosmonauts joshed him, trying to cheer him and get a smile. They started singing, encouraging him to join in. By the time they reached the pad some minutes later, he was singing with them too and the mood of pessimism had lifted somewhat. At 3: 35 a. m. Moscow time (not quite sunrise local time) on 23rd April 1967, the R-7 rocket lit the sky up and headed off in the direction of the growing embers of the onrushing dawn. Eight minutes later Vladimir Komarov was back in orbit testing out the most sophisticated spacecraft ever launched.

The trouble started at once when one of Soyuz’s two solar panels failed to deploy, starving the craft of electrical power. Other glitches developed as the day went on. The first attempt to change the craft’s orbit was unsatisfactory. The ship began to rotate around its axis and only spun more when Komarov tried to correct the problem. The thermal control system degenerated, communications with the ground became irregular and lack of electricity prevented the astro-orientation system from operat­ing. The ion system had to be used instead. Ground control was considering a way of launching Soyuz 2 and for the spacewalking cosmonauts to free the errant solar panel of Soyuz when a tremendous storm hit the launch site and knocked out the electrical systems of the waiting rocket. The decision was taken to abandon the Soyuz 2 launch and bring Komarov home at the first available opportunity, on orbit 16 the next morning.

Even then, there was more trouble. Just as the attitude control system was lining up the Soyuz for reentry, the craft passed into darkness and it lost orientation. The decision was made to try again on orbit 17, even though it too would bring Soyuz far away from the normal landing site. Using procedures that he had never practised in training, Komarov managed to align the craft and fire the retrorockets himself. Despite his heroic efforts to save the mission, worse was to come. As the cabin descended through the atmosphere, the drogue parachute came out but the main parachute remained stubbornly in its container. When the reserve chute was popped out, it tangled in the lines of the drag chute of the main parachute. Soyuz 1 crashed at great speed into the steppe at Orenberg at 7 a. m. The cabin exploded on impact and when Air Force recovery teams arrived all they found was burning metal, the rim of the top of Soyuz being the only hardware they could identify. They piled on soil to extinguish the flames.

The control centre knew nothing of what had happened. As they closed in on the wreckage, the recovery team sent a garbled message to the effect that the cosmonaut needed ‘urgent medical attention’ (a euphemism for the worst possible news), but the local Air Force commander closed off all communications. Defence Minister Ustinov was informed of the true outcome at 11 a. m. and Leonid Brezhnev an hour later in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. The Soviet people were officially informed later in the day. Gagarin himself removed Komarov’s body from the wreckage. Some days later, some young Pioneers (boy scouts) found some further remains of Vladimir Komarov on the steppe. They buried them and made a small memorial for him of their own.

ZOND’S ANCESTOR: SOYUZ

Soyuz spacecraft rendezvous, docking system

Vladimir Komarov’s loyal comrades laid his remains to rest in the Kremlin Wall two days later. It was a sombre and chilling occasion, an unwelcome reminder of the real costs of the moon race. As the bands played the haunting Chopin funeral march the grim-faced and tight-lipped cosmonaut corps, now diminished to nine men and one woman, swore that the programme must go on relentlessly.

The consensus afterwards was that the whole mission had been rushed before Soyuz was really ready. It was apparent that Komarov had behaved masterfully in steering Soyuz successfully through reentry against all the odds. The failure in the parachute system was quite unrelated to the many problems that had arisen in the flight up to that time. The system for sealing the parachute container was defective, making the parachute likely to stick as it came out. This left the investigators with the chilling conclusion that if Soyuz 2 had been successfully launched, it too would have

ZOND’S ANCESTOR: SOYUZ

Vladimir Komarov and his friend Yuri Gagarin

crashed on its return. Years later, Valeri Bykovsky recalled how the storm had saved his life.

Early tests of Soyuz

28 Nov 1966 Cosmos 133 (failure)

Dec. 1966 Pad explosion

7 Feb 1967 Cosmos 140 (failure)

23 Apr 1967 Soyuz (failure)

LAST TRY: ZOND 6

Just over a week later, Zond 6 headed away from Earth onto a moon trajectory (10th November). Several cosmonauts attended the launch, some hoping that one day soon they would fly a future Zond. The problems from the earlier missions then reasserted themselves. The Earth sensor failed and then the high-gain antenna failed to deploy. Despite this, two days later Zond 6 adjusted its path and on 14th November rounded the moon at a close point of 2,418 km with its automatic camera clicking away and taking metres and metres of photographs of the moon’s surface. Zond 6 carried a similar payload to Zond 5: 400 mm camera, cosmic ray sensor, micrometeorite detector and some unidentified animals (probably turtles again).

LAST TRY: ZOND 6

Zond 6 around the moon

Even as the mission was in progress, the Russians were well aware of the start of the countdown for Apollo 8 at Cape Canaveral. The head of the cosmonaut corps, General Kamanin, considered the Apollo 8 mission to be pure adventurism and an extraordinary risk. He then considered a Russian manned flight around the moon to be a possibility for the first half of 1969. But, he conceded, the Americans might just pull off their mission first. There were hurried phone calls from the Kremlin: Can we still beat Apollo 8? No, said Kamanin. The best we could do is a manned flight in January, assuming Zond 6 is a success and Apollo is delayed. The most realistic date for a manned circumlunar mission was April 1969. The leaders of the space programme would not be rushed. The Soviet approach – four successful Zonds first – was clearly more conservative in respect of safety.

Zond 6 was now returning to Earth, though more problems emerged. Cabin pressure in the descent module suddenly fell, but then held. Temperatures in the fuel tanks fluctuated up and down. Zond 6 did manage to fire its engine briefly on 15th November, 251,900 km out, to adjust its course home and again a mere 10 hours before reentry to refine its trajectory. Zond 6 reentered over the Indian Ocean and dived to 45 km altitude. Pointing its heat shield at 90° to the flight path generated a cushion of lift underneath the Zond, bouncing it back into space. It was skipping across the atmosphere like a stone skipping across water, its speed now down from 11 km/sec to 7.6 km/sec. Zond 6 soared back into space in an arc and several minutes later began its second reentry. At this stage, things began to go awry. First, the high – gain antenna failed to separate. Second, more seriously, a gasket blew, depressurizing the cabin while it was still in space – which would have been fatal if unsuited cos­monauts had been on board and certainly did kill the animals on board at this stage. Third, between 3 km and 5 km above the ground, a spurious electrical signal com­manded the firing of the landing retrorocket and the ejection of the parachute. Zond 6 crashed to the ground from a great height unaided. Unlike the first Soyuz, it did not explode on impact, but any spacesuited cosmonauts on board would have died. It took ground crews a day to find the cabin. They salvaged the film, which was then exhibited to the world as proof of a completely successful mission. Only decades later was film of the badly battered moon cabin released and the truth of Zond 6 told.

Zond 6 was a triumph for the skip reentry trajectory first plotted ten years earlier by Department # 9. However, the performance of Zond 6 to and from the moon still needed some improvement. The landing accident was so serious that more work was still required on the landing systems, which had been considered solved by the smooth return of Soyuz 3. Sadly, the Russians did not learn their lesson as a result of the depressurization high above the atmosphere and put cosmonauts into spacesuits for such critical manoeuvres. The crew of Soyuz 11 later paid the penalty for this failure to learn. As for the planned flight around the moon by cosmonauts, it was postponed.

LUNA 16

The first of the new batch of Ye-8-5 spacecraft was not available until the following month. Luna 16 was launched on 12th September 1970, and it headed out moonwards on a slow four-day coast. In contrast to the great media interest which Luna 15 had attracted, Luna 16 went virtually unremarked by the Western media. This was a pity,

LUNA 16

Luna 16, testing before launch

for Luna 16 was a remarkable technical achievement by any standard. Its flight coincided with what became known to the world as Black September. Four airliners were seized in the space of a few hours by Palestinian fighters; the aircraft were hijacked to a remote airstrip called Dawson’s Field in Jordan; King Hussein’s army moved in to crush the Palestinians. The world looked on, mesmerized.

Luna 16 carried, like Luna 15 before it, the new KTDU-417 main engine built by the Isayev design bureau. The KTDU-417 had a throttleable engine ranging from

750 kg to 1,920 kg. At highest thrust, it had a specific impulse of 310 sec, able to burn for 10 min 50 sec using up to four tonnes of propellant. This engine was built to perform mid-course correction, lunar orbit insertion, pre-descent burn, the ‘dead – stop’ burn to take it out of lunar orbit and the final burn 600 m above the moon. There was also scope for further manoeuvres in lunar orbit, as had proved necessary on Luna 15 and the engine could be fired up to eleven times. It could also be used at lowest thrust with a specific impulse of 250 sec [1]. The engines for the final stages of landing had a thrust of 210 and 350 kg.

Luna 16 burned its engine on the first day for 6.4 sec to make a course correction. Luna 16 entered moon orbit on 17th September at an altitude of 110 km to 119 km, 71°, 1 hr 59min. The aim was to achieve a circular lunar orbit around 100km.

After two days, Luna 16 fired its engine to make a 20-m/sec velocity change and brake into an elliptical course of 106 km by 15.1 km, with the perilune over the landing site. Its final path before descent was 15 km by 9 km, so low as to only barely scrape the peaks of the moon’s highest mountains. At this stage, the four 75 kg large propellant tanks that had been used for mid-course correction, lunar orbit injection and orbital change were jettisoned.

As Luna 16 skimmed over the eastern highlands of the moon on the 20th, the retrorocket of the 1,880 kg craft blasted and Luna 16 began to fall. First, the main engines blasted for 267 sec, using about 75% of fuel remaining, to kill all forward motion. This was a big burn, 1,700 m/sec. The critical stage had begun. Luna 16 was now over flat lowlands. Sophisticated radar and electronic gear scanned the surface, measuring the distance and the rate of descent. After the ‘dead stop’ engine burn, Luna 16 was in free fall, coming down at 215 m/sec, until six minutes later it was at 600 m. Then the main engine blasted again. At 20 m, a point detected by Doppler – sounding gamma rays, the retrorocket cut off and small vernier engines came into play. At 2 m, sensing the nearness of the surface, these too cut out, the intention being to achieve a landing speed of 2.5 m/sec or 9km/hr. Luna 16 dropped silently to the airless surface, bouncing gently on its four landing pads. It was down, safe and sound, on the Sea of Fertility, 100 km from crater Webb. The flat and stony ground was marked only by a few small craters, even if they were not visible during the descent, because Luna 16 had landed in darkness. This and subsequent soil-sampling missions carried stereo cameras of the type carried by Luna 13, so the quality of images should have been very good. The purpose of the cameras was to help to guide the operators of the drill and for such night landings floodlights were carried.

Strong signals were picked up by Western tracking stations. Within hours, the USSR had announced its third soft-landing on the moon – but said no more. The Russians had still not admitted that the intention of the probe was to collect samples.

Meantime, a quarter of a million miles away a 90 cm drill arm swung out from Luna 16 like a dentist’s drill on a support. It swung well clear of the base of the spacecraft, free from any area that might have been contaminated by gases of landing engines. The wrist of the drill had a flexibility of 110° elevation, 180° rotation and was able to drill to 35 cm. The drill head bored into the lunar surface at 500 r. p.m. using electric motors for 7 min and then scooped the grains of soil down to 35 cm deep. There it began to hit rock and, rather than risk damaging the drill, the boring was

terminated and the sample collected and put into the container attached to the drill head. Like a robot in a backyard assembly shop, the drill head jerked upwards, brought itself alongside the small 39 kg spherical recovery capsule, turned it round and pressed the grains into the sealed cabin, which was then slapped shut.

LOOKING BACK AT THE OLD MOON

How do Soviet space leaders regard their exploration of the moon now? In the early 1990s, the leaders of the space programme at the time emerged from the shadows to tell their story of the moon programme. Inevitably, granted the secrecy of the period, their first concern was to tell what happened. Many were directly involved as partisan protagonists, so their comments must be treated cautiously.

One of the first to tell the story was Chief Designer Vasili Mishin, first in magazine articles and then in interviews (his diaries were bought by the Ross Perot Foundation and have yet to be published). He was followed by numerous journalists, writing in dailies such as Izvestia and magazines like Znaniya. Some of the most detailed infor­mation was provided by the head of the cosmonaut squad, General Nikolai Kamanin, who kept a diary throughout the period and which has now been translated [6]. Latest and possibly last of the old guard to speak out was Boris Chertok, who in his eighties compiled a multi-volume memoir, published as Raketi i Lyudi (Rockets and people). Regrettably, little has been put in print by the cosmonauts involved in the lunar programme and some of them have already died. Oleg Makarov, for example, although he would have been on the first around-the-moon and first landing mission, was prepared to talk about the planned Zond mission, but would say very little about his own prominent role [7].

All expressed varying levels of regret, even grief, that the Soviet Union failed to win the moon race. Having achieved all the early breakthroughs in space exploration, they took the view that the Soviet Union should, with proper organization, have been able to reach the moon first. ‘How could we, after such a bright start, have slipped into second place?’ asked military journalist and cosmonaut candidate Col. Mikhail Rebrov [8]. Kamanin told his diary just how difficult it was for him to come to terms with what he regarded, unambiguously and without any mitigating factors, as a crushing defeat: ‘We drain the bitter cup of failure to the dregs,’ he acidly told his diary. He can’t have been the only one.

Most agreed with the reasons advanced by Mishin to explain why the Soviet Union lost: resources much inferior to the United States, the rivalry of the design bureaux, the continual revision and remaking of decisions, the false economy of avoid­ing comprehensive ground-testing, the death of Korolev at a crucial stage [9]. Most were sympathetic to Mishin, regarding his dismissal and the suspension of the N-1 programme as bad and even unjust decisions. In histories in which blame is liberally apportioned and widely scattered, several focused on Glushko for not being big enough to cooperate with the N-1 project from the start, arguing that he played an inconsistent, spoiling and even vindictive role in the programme [10]. Most felt that the N-1 would probably flown and been a successful rocket, eventually assembling large orbital stations. Chertok believed the Soviet Union did have the capacity to build a proper lunar base in the late 1970s and that such a venture made political, engineering and scientific sense, although it would have been costly [11]. Mishin [12]: We were able and should have implemented such an expedition after the USA. ‘Only a sense of political embarrassment, out of coming second, after the great rival, pre­vented this from happening,’ he said. Most of all he regrets the cancellation of the N-1, the wasted effort, the bitter resentment this caused in the industry and its replacement by an even more expensive programme which was ultimately cancelled in turn. Mishin’s final comment: ‘We were just a step away from success with the N-1. We could have built a base on the moon by now without stress or hurry.’

Having said this, these accounts are somewhat one-sided. Vladimir Chelomei did not leave memoirs, nor did Valentin Glushko. Although Glushko published technical papers, he never left behind a political statement defending his role in the space programme. When he died in 1989, his vast Energiya bureau was re-divided much as it was before he clustered its constituent companies together in 1974. The original OKB-1, now RKK Energiya, published a vast, colourful company history of the bureau and its projects, providing much of the detail on which an important portion of our knowledge of the Soviet moon programme is based. More critical comments and views come from General Kamanin. A diehard Stalinist, his severest criticisms focused on what he regarded as the poor quality of leadership given by the party and government, his own military and the space programme leadership, like Mishin and Keldysh. He was critical of the N-1 from the start, which he always regarded as an unsuitable and bad rocket: Chelomei’s UR-700 would have been better. Patriot though he was, he was overwhelmed in unconditional admiration of America’s stunning lunar successes. He resented the way in which they were under-reported and downplayed by the Soviet media and that he could not speak publicly and approvingly of them. He felt just how tough it must be on disappointed Soviet cosmonauts not to fly to the moon. Kamanin was especially critical on how good decision-making was undermined by the corrosive secrecy with which the Soviet lunar programme was run.

Retelling the Soviet side of the moon race, with its setbacks, ‘grandiose failures’ (Kamanin’s words), waste and poor decisions, seems to have given these writers little satisfaction, apart from the unmeasurably important one of making the facts of this hidden history known. They seemed to derive little comfort from the fact that from the chaotic final stages of the moon programme, a plan emerged for the building of space stations. This was a field in which their country became the undisputed world leader and remains so to this day. In his own way, Glushko was vindicated, for in 1987 his replacement for the N-1 did fly, Energiya giving the Soviet Union the most powerful rocket system in the world. Its subsequent cancellation, for economic reasons, can hardly be laid at his door. Unlike the N-1 and more like the Saturn V, the Energiya flew perfectly on its first two testflights and it was not for technical reasons that it never flew again.

Some of the writers refer to the general loss of interest in going to the moon among the Soviet political leadership, now that the Americans had achieved the feat and demonstrated it several times. Afanasayev [13] said that this was the considered view of the Soviet political leadership by 1972 and suggests that the decision to wind down the unmanned lunar programme was taken at around the same time as the decision regarding the manned programme. It is interesting that the political leadership of both the United States and the Soviet Union lost interest in flying to the moon in parallel at around the same time, even though one country had been there and the other had not. The next grand projet of Brezhnev’s Soviet Union was a more practical, earthly one, the Baikal Amur Railway.

The hardware and rockets from the Soviet lunar programme mostly found their way to museums, like the LK lander. The main collection of unmanned Soviet lunar spacecraft may still be found in the Lavochkin Museum, and that is where Lunokhod 3 may be found. When the financial situation of the Russian space programme reached rock bottom, many of its most famous artefacts were sold, from spacesuits to space cabins, Vasili Mishin’s diary, even Sergei Korolev’s slide rule. Even real spacecraft were sold. On 11th December 1993, Sotheby’s sold Lunokhod for $68,500, but it was explained to the buyer that he would have to collect it from the Sea of Rains!

It is with the moon drivers that we leave the story. Lunokhod was one of the great achievements of the lunar exploration programme, though, as we saw, far from the only one. The moon drivers did everything expected of them and more. Not only had they worked away from home for the year-long journey of Lunokhod and the half­year journey of Lunokhod 2, but they were not even allowed to tell their families or friends where they were or what they were doing. Not until perestroika were they allowed to come out of the shadows and tell their remarkable story. Since then, the Lunokhod drivers would gather once a year, on the great 17th November, to recall their experiences in driving on another world. They are older and greyer now and most have now retired. Vyacheslav Dovgan is now a general. Happily, they were at last formally conferred with the medals that they had deserved a quarter century earlier and now wear them with pride [14].

THE SPACESHIP TO CIRCLE THE MOON: THE L-l, ZOND

Preparations for the flight of Soyuz coincided with those of the Soyuz-derived L-1 cabin, which would fly a cosmonaut around the moon. The L-1 cabin was later called Zond, thus creating confusion with the engineering tests developed by Korolev as part of the interplanetary programme. Zond 1 had flown to Venus, Zond 2 to Mars, Zond 3 to the moon to test equipment for Mars and now Zond 4-8 would fill an important part in preparations to send cosmonauts around the moon.

From August 1964, the Soviet lunar programme had been divided between the around-the-moon programme (Proton, L-1/Zond) and the manned lunar landing (N-1, LOK, LK). When the State Commission on the L-1 met in December 1966, it set a date for the first manned circumlunar flight of 26th June 1967, to be preceded by four unmanned tests.

Zond was a stripped-down version of Soyuz. Its weight was 5,400 kg, length 5 m, span across its two 2 m by 3 m solar arrays 9 m, diameter 2.72 m and a habitable volume of 3.5 m3. It could take a crew of either one or two cosmonauts in its descent module. The sole engine was the 417 kg thrust Soyuz KDU-35 able to burn for about 270 sec, but it fired more thrusters than Soyuz. Its heatshield was thicker than Soyuz in order to withstand the high friction on lunar reentry at 11 km/sec. It carried an umbrella-like, long-distance, high-gain antenna and on the top a support cone, to which the escape tower was attached. Designer was Yuri Semeonov. The following were the main differences between Soyuz and L-1 Zond. Zond was:

• Smaller, without an orbital module.

• Maximum crew of two, not three.

• Instrument panel configured for lunar missions.

• Support cone at top.

• Long-distance dish aerial for communications.

• Thicker, heavier heatshield for high-speed reentry.

• Removal of docking periscope.

• Smaller solar panels.

Theoretically, Zond could take three cosmonauts; but, without an orbital module it would be tight enough for two for the 6-day mission. The mission profile was for Proton to launch Zond into a parking orbit. On the first northbound equator pass, block D would ignite and send Zond to the moon. Zond would take three days to reach the moon, swing around the farside in a figure-of-eight trajectory and take three days to come home. The spacecraft would have to hit a very narrow reentry corridor. It would use Tikhonravov’s skip technique to bounce out of the atmosphere, killing the speed and then descend to recovery. The designers decreed that there should be four successful missions out to the moon, or a simulated moon, before putting cosmonauts on board for the mission.

An important distinction between Apollo on the one hand and the Soyuz, L-1/ Zond and LOK on the other was the high level of automation on Soviet spacecraft. As noted above, the Soviet Union decided to pave the way for a manned flight around the moon with no fewer than four automatic flights that precisely flew the same profile as the intended manned spacecraft. A comparable regime would have been followed for the LOK and a series of wholly automatic tests were set for the lunar lander, the LK and the block D upper stage. The Soyuz system was designed to achieve entirely automated rendezvous and docking in Earth orbit. All this required a high level of sophistication in control and computerized systems, something the Russians were rarely given the credit for. From the start, Korolev had built a high degree of automation into spacecraft, a decision which seems to have gone unchallenged

THE SPACESHIP TO CIRCLE THE MOON: THE L-l, ZOND

Cosmonaut Valeri Kubasov in Zond simulator

and the early manned spaceship designs were finalized long before the first cos­monauts arrived. The head of cosmonaut training, General Kamanin, is known to have been privately critical of the high level of automation and the lack of scope given to cosmonauts to fly their own spacecraft. Zond carried the first computers used on Soviet spacecraft, the Argon series. Argon weighed 34 kg, light for its day and was the primary navigation system. It was assessed as having a reliability rate of 99.9% [12]. The Argon 11S was completed in 1968 in time for the Zond lunar missions. The cosmonauts would control the L-1 with a command system called Alfa, which had a 64-word read-write menu and 64 commands, with a choice of 4,096 words [13].

Although Zond was based on Soyuz, it had an entirely different control panel. As happened from time to time in the Soviet space programme, this came to light by accident. During the late 1970s, at a time when the Russians claimed ‘there had never been a moon race’, they released pictures of cosmonauts Vladimir Shatalaov and Valeri Kubasov in training, set against a background of what was presumed to be a Soyuz control panel. It must have escaped the censors that the control panel was entirely different from the Soyuz, with the Earth orbit orientation system taken out. The Zond control cabin comprised a series of caution and warning panels; cabin pressure, composition and electric meters; computer command systems; periscope; and translunar navigation systems.

The Soviet around-the-moon mission operated under a number of constraints, as follows:

• The moon should be high in the sky over the northern hemisphere during the outward and returning journey, so as to facilitate communications between Zond and the tracking stations, which were located on the Russian landmass.

• There should be a new moon, as viewed from Earth, with the farside illuminated by the sun. Zond should arrive at the moon when it was between 24 and 28 days old.

• The parking orbit must be aligned with the plane of the moon’s orbit.

• Reentry posed a real dilemma. Zond could reenter over the northern hemisphere, in full view of the tracking stations, but the long reentry corridor would bring the spaceship down over the Indian Ocean, where it would have to splash down. The cosmonauts would therefore be out of contact with the ground during this final phase, waiting for recovery ships to find them and pick them up.

• Alternatively, Zond could reenter over the Indian Ocean in the southern hemi­sphere, out of radio contact, but come down in the standard landing zone for Soviet cosmonauts in Kazakhstan. This offered a traditional landing on dry land, the prospect of being spotted during the descent and a quick recovery. Generally, this was the favoured approach and the one that would probably have been followed on a manned mission.

Opinions in the space programme were divided about the wisdom of splashdowns. Chief Designer Mishin was in favour, believing they presented no particular danger. Many others were against, arguing that the descent module was not very seaworthy,

THE SPACESHIP TO CIRCLE THE MOON: THE L-l, ZOND

The skip trajectory

was difficult to escape in the ocean and could take some time to find. They also argued against the expense involved in having a big recovery fleet at sea.

The timing for Russian around-the-moon missions around the sun-Earth-moon symmetries was therefore quite complex [14]. To meet all these requirements, there are only about six launching windows, each about three days long and a month apart, each year. There can be long periods when there are no optimum conditions. There were no optimum launch windows for Zond to the moon between January and July 1969, the climax of the moon race. The scarcity of these opportunities explains why several L-1s (e. g., Zond 4) were fired away from the moon. Although these missions caused mystery in the West, the primary Russian interest was in testing navigation, tracking and the reentry corridor. Having the moon in the sky was not absolutely necessary for these things and since it was not available anyway, they flew these missions without going around the moon.

L-l/Zond

Length

5m

Diameter

2.7 m (base)

Span

9m

Weight

5,680 kg

Habitable volume

3.5m3

Engine

One KDU-35

Fuel

AK27 and hydrazine

Thrust

425 kg

Specific impulse

276 sec

Block D

Weight

13,360 kg

Fuel

Oxygen and kerosene

Thrust

8,500 kg

Specific impulse

346

Length

5.5 m

Diameter

3.7 m

Source: Portree (1995); RKK Energiya (2001)

When the L-1 Zond was wheeled out for its first test – Cosmos 146, set for 10th March 1967 – the three-stage UR-500K Proton stood over 44 m tall and must have been a striking sight. The first two tests were called the L-1P, P for ‘preliminary’ indicating that a full version of Zond would not be used and that a recovery would not be attempted. The first stage would burn for 2 min with 894 tonnes of thrust. The second stage would burn for 215 sec. The third stage would place Zond or the L-1 in low – Earth orbit in a 250 sec burn. Finally, the Korolev block D fourth stage would fire 100 sec to achieve full orbit. One day after liftoff, the fourth stage, block D, would relight on the first northbound pass over the equator to send Zond out to a simulated moon [15].

Cosmos 146 was the fifth flight of Proton and the first with a block D. The block D’s single 58M engine had 8.7 tonnes of thrust and burned for 600 sec, enough to accelerate the payload to 11km/sec. In the event, block D successfully accelerated the cabin to near-escape velocity, with Cosmos 146 ending up in an elliptical high orbit reaching far out from Earth (though its ultimate path was not precisely determined). Signals and communications tests were carried out. This was an en­couraging start to the L-1 programme, setting it on course for the first lunar circumnavigation by the target date of June 1967. Then the landing missions could get under way [16].

Cosmos 154 on 6th April 1967 was designed to repeat the mission to a simulated moon. This time the BOZ ignition assurance device failed during the ascent to orbit and was not in a position to control the block D stage for the simulated translunar burn, which could not now take place. This was a setback, now made worse by the crash of the related Soyuz spacecraft 20 days later and which raised questions about Zond’s control and descent systems. Zond’s parachute system was retested. When two such tests took place in Feodosiya in the Crimea, in June, the parachute lines snarled. Modifications took all summer. The programme underwent a thorough safety review in early September, being reviewed by an expert commission with nine working groups. Although Russia would have loved to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the revolution with a flight around the moon that November, the chances of doing so safely slipped further and further into the distance.

Working overtime, the designers and launch teams got the third L-1 Zond out to the pad by mid-September 1967. The countdown began for a launch on 28th Sep­tember. The aim was to fly the L-1 Zond out to the moon and return for recovery at cosmic velocity, 11 km/sec, coming down 250 km north of Dzhezhkazgan on 4th October (or failing that in the Indian Ocean). The huge red-and-white Proton booster, weighing a record 1,028,500 kg, Zond cabin atop, tipped by a pencil spear of an escape tower, was taking with it Russia’s moon hopes. It sat squat on its giant pad, shrouded by its gantry, as engineers fussed with one technical problem after another. Yet it all went wrong. One of the six engines in the first stage of Proton failed to operate when a rubber plug was dislodged into the fuel line. At 60 sec the rocket veered off course and impacted 65 km downrange, but the Zond cabin was dragged free by the escape system. The cabin was found intact the next morning, though recovering it was difficult, for the toxic burning remains of Proton were all round about.

For the anniversary of the Revolution, the Russians were left with carrying out the mission that had been intended for Soyuz that April, but now without cosmonauts on board. What happened was important for the lunar programme, but not the kind of event that would bring throngs of excited crowds out onto the streets. Cosmos 186 was first to appear, beginning a series of flights that would requalify Soyuz for manned flight once more. It went up on 27th October and was followed three days later by Cosmos 188. Using totally automatic radar, direction-finding and sounding devices, Cosmos 186 at once closed in on 188 in the manoeuvre Komarov was to have carried out in April. The rendezvous and docking manoeuvres that followed went remarkably smoothly, although the double mission was plagued with other difficulties later. At orbital insertion, 188 was only 24 km away from its companion. Cosmos 186 closed rapidly, within two-thirds of an orbit. One hour later, over the South Pacific, they clunked together to form an automatic orbiting complex and 3.5 hours later they separated. Cosmos 186 was recovered the next day and 188 was deorbited on the 2nd November (it was blown up when it came down off course). Although not visually impressive to a spectacular-weary public, it was a display of advanced robotics. It proved the feasibility of first-orbit rendezvous, the viability of Soyuz-style docking and took some of the fears out of lunar orbit rendezvous when all this would have to be done a third of a million kilometres away.

However, the elation surrounding the Cosmos 186-188 mission was followed by a disheartening experience three weeks later. The next attempt to launch Zond, the fourth, was made very early on 23rd November and was aimed at a lunar flyby and recovery. The first stage behaved perfectly, but four seconds into the second-stage burn, one of the four engines failed to reach proper thrust. The automatic control system closed down the other three engines and the emergency system was activated. The landing rockets fired prematurely during the descent and the parachute failed to detach after landing, but the scratched and battered cabin was recovered. Proton itself crashed 300 km from where it took off.

The next L-1 Zond, the fifth, got away successfully on 2nd March, 1968. This time the UR-500K Proton main stages and block D worked perfectly. Zond 4 was fired 354,000km out to the distance of the moon, but in exactly the opposite direction to the moon, where its orbit would be minimally distorted by the moon’s gravitational field. The primary purpose of the mission was to test the reentry at cosmic velocity, so going round the moon itself was not essential. Cosmonauts Vitally Sevastianov and Pavel Popovich used a relay on Zond 4 to speak to ground control in Yevpatoria, Crimea.

The Zond 4 mission was not trouble-free and the first problems developed out­bound. The planned mid-course correction was aborted twice because the astro – navigation system lost its lock on the reference star. When the correction did take place, it was extremely accurate and no more corrections were required. Zond 4 was supposed to dive into the atmosphere to 45 km, before skipping out to 145 km before making its main reentry. The tracking ship off West Africa, the Ristna, picked up signals from Zond indicating that the skip manoeuvre had failed and that it would make a steep ballistic descent, bringing it down over the Gulf of Guinea. On the insistence of the defence minister, Dmitri Ustinov, who was afraid that it might fall into foreign hands, the spacecraft was pre-programmed to explode if it made such a descent. Accordingly, Zond 4 was blown apart 10 km over the Gulf of Guinea. Not everyone was in agreement with this extreme approach to national security. It transpired that Zond 4 was actually 2 km from dead of centre in its reentry corridor (the tolerance was 10 km), but that a sensor had failed, preventing the skip reentry.

Some consolation could be drawn from a repeat of the Cosmos link-up of the previous winter. On 15th April 1968, Cosmos 212 (the active ship) linked to Cosmos 213, this time in a record 47min. Television showed the last 400m of the docking manoeuvre as they aligned their wing-like panels one with another. Millions saw the separation 3 hr 50 min later over the blue void of the Pacific.

THE SPACESHIP TO CIRCLE THE MOON: THE L-l, ZOND

Rendezvous in Earth orbit

By the end of April 1968, the problems experienced by Zond 4 had been cured and the time was ready to try the first circumlunar flight to a ‘real’ moon this time. Launch took place on 23rd April. Unfortunately, 195 sec into the mission, the escape system triggered erroneously, shutting down all the Proton engines and flinging the Zond capsule clear, saving the cabin which came down 520 km away, but thereby wrecking the mission in the process. A replacement mission was planned for 22nd July, but in a bizarre pad accident in which at least one person died, block D and the L-1 toppled over onto the launch tower. Extracting the stages without causing an explosion took several nail-biting days. Further launchings were then postponed till the autumn.

The early L-1 Zond missions

10 Mar 1967 Cosmos 146

8 Apr 1967 Cosmos 154 (fail)

28 Sep 1967 Failure

23 Nov 1967 Failure

4 Mar 1968 Zond 4

23 Apr 1968 Failure

Requalification of Soyuz

27 Oct 1967 Cosmos 186

30 Oct 1967 Cosmos 188

14 Apr 1968 Cosmos 212

15 Apr 1968 Cosmos 213

CLIMAX

With the flight of Zond 6, the Western press rediscovered the moon race. Time magazine ran a cover of an American and a Russian in a spacesuit elbowing one another out of the way as each raced moonbound. Newspapers printed cutaway drawings of ‘The Zond plan’ and ‘The Apollo plan’. Apollo 8 astronauts Borman, Lovell and Anders were right in the middle of their pre-flight checks. Their Saturn V was already on the pad. In London, Independent Television prepared to go on air with special news features the moment Zond went up. Models and spacesuits decorated the studio. The American Navy even broke international convention to sail eavesdrop­ping warships into the Black Sea to get close to the control centre in Yevpatoria. The Americans had Baikonour under daily surveillance by Corona spy satellites. The whole world was waiting…

The launch window at Baikonour opened on 7th December. No manned Russian launching took place, to the evident disappointment of the Western media. They were of course unaware of the many problems that had arisen on Zond 5 or the even more serious ones on Zond 6. The Russians were in no position to fly to the moon in December 1968.

We now know that there were intense debates within the management of the Soviet L-1 programme in November and that many options were considered. The records of the time, like the Kamanin diaries, are contradictory and even confusing at

CLIMAX

Zond over Crater Tsiolkovsky

times, but they reflected the dilemmas faced by the programme leaders. On the one hand, they did not wish to be panicked into a premature response to what they considered to be the reckless American decision to send Apollo 8 to the moon; at the same time, they realized that, with their Zond experience, they were more prepared for a lunar journey than the Americans. The cosmonauts openly expressed their willingness to make the journey to the moon ahead of Apollo 8 – several report that they sent a letter to the Politburo – but as one government minister commented, ‘they would, wouldn’t they.’ It seems that Mishin’s natural caution prevailed. Years later, Mishin told interviewers that he had recommended to the state commission against such a mission: neither Zond nor Proton were yet safe. The state commission had agreed.

The success of Apollo 8 brought mixed feelings in the Russian camp. Leaders of the Soviet space programme were full of admiration for the American achievement, which they still regarded as a huge gamble. The Americans had gone one stage further than Zond, for Apollo 8 orbited the moon ten times. The Russians were full of regrets that they had not done it first and wondered whether they had made the best use of their time and resources since the first L-1 was launched in March 1967. The head of the cosmonaut squad, General Kamanin, made no attempt to downplay the signifi­cance of the American achievement. I had hoped one day to fly from Kazakhstan to Moscow on an airplane with our cosmonauts after they had circled the moon, he confided in his diary. Now he had the sinking feeling that such a pleasurable airplane flight would never happen.

The state commission overseeing the L-1 project met on 27th December and the safe return of Apollo 8, which took place that day, was very much in their minds. They set dates for the next L-1 launches at almost monthly intervals in early 1969, starting on 20th January 1969. Some asked What is the point?, a moot question granted that such a mission would now achieve less than Apollo 8. The L-1 Zond programme continued, with diminishing conviction, but no one proposed cancellation.

The government’s military industrial commission met three days later on 30th December. The commission underlined the value of unmanned lunar exploration and laid down a new official line on the moon programme. The Soviet Union had always planned to explore the moon by robots and would never risk lives for political propaganda. The Soviet media were invited to advertise the virtues of safer, cheaper unmanned probes. This was the first step in starting the myth, which was the official position for 20 years, that there never had been a moon race. There was little discussion of the moon-landing programme, which was now ready for the first launch of the N-1. A meeting of the party and government on the issue was set for a week later, on 8th January.

THE GENIUS OF OKHOTSIMSKY

By the 21st, Luna 16 had spent a full day on the moon. There was still no official indication as to its purpose. Jodrell Bank reported still more strong signals. In fact, what Luna 16 was doing was checking out its exact landing coordinates so as to give the best possible return trajectory. Luna 16 had landed at the lunar equator at 56°E, the perfect place for the direct return to Earth on Dmitri Okhotsimsky’s passive trajectory. The return system would now be put to the test.

All was now set for the return of the ascent stage to Earth. The top stage of Luna 16 weighed 520 kg, with the recoverable cabin. There was one engine on the ascent stage, the KRD-61 of the Isayev design bureau. Burning 245 kg of UDMH and nitric oxide, the ascent stage had a specific impulse of 313 sec and could burn just once for 53 sec, sufficient to achieve a velocity of between 2,600 m/sec and 2,700 m/sec. A complication of the 2.9 day return flight was that – to recover the spacecraft in the normal Kazakhstan landing site – liftoff would take place out of sight from Yevpatoria: the moon would be over the Atlantic, where it could be followed by a Soviet tracking ship offshore Cuba.

Twenty-six hours after landing, explosive bolts were fired above the Luna 16 descent stage. On a jet of flame, the upper stage shot off and headed towards the white and blue Earth hanging in the distance. It headed straight up, motor still purring, building up to lunar escape velocity, its radio pouring out details from the four aerials poking out the side. The Sea of Fertility returned to the quiet it had known for eons. The descent stage was the only forlorn reminder of the brief visit. The lower stage on the moon continued to transmit signals for a couple of days until the battery ran out. Only two instruments seem to have been carried: a thermometer and radiation counter.

The returning rocket – capsule, instrument container, fuel tanks and motors – reported back from time to time as it headed for a straight nosedive reentry. These coordinates had to be as precise as possible so as to best predict the landing spot on Earth. At 48,000 km out, the tiny capsule separated from the instrument and rocket package, plunged into the upper atmosphere, glowed red and then white as tempera­tures rose to 10,000°C as it hit forces of 350 G. Helicopters were already in the air as a parachute ballooned out at 14,500 m. The capsule hit the ground and beacons began sending out a bright beep! beep! signal as rescuers rushed to collect the precious cargo. The mathematicians had done their job well, for Luna 16 came down 30 km from the middle of the intended recovery zone, 80 km southeast of Dzhezhkazgan, Kazakhstan.

THE GENIUS OF OKHOTSIMSKY

Luna 16 stage left on the moon

The small capsule was transferred to a plane and flown at once to Moscow to the Vernadsky Institute of Geological and Analytical Chemistry for analysis. The person in charge of assessing the lunar soil was Valeri Barsukov (1928-92), subsequently to become director of the institute (1976-92). How the scientists ever got the soil container open is a mystery for the entire outer skin of the capsule may well have been welded by the intense heat of the fiery return. Once open, the grey grains of moon dust poured out – loose lumps of dark grey, blackish powder like very dark, wet beach sand. It had small grains at the top and large grains at the bottom where it had begun to encounter rock.

The sample, although small (105 g), provided a considerable amount of scientific information [2]. The following were the main features: [11]

THE GENIUS OF OKHOTSIMSKY

The Luna 16 cabin back on Earth

It was a tremendous triumph. The Luna 16 mission had gone perfectly from start to finish. The tricky stages of soft-landing, drilling and take-off were just like the book said they should be. ‘It’s the decade of the space robot!’ heralded the Soviet press. The USSR made great play of how such flights were cheaper than manned flights like Apollo, how they did not expose humans to danger and how versatile space robots could land just about anywhere.

THE GENIUS OF OKHOTSIMSKY

Luna 16 recovery

THE GENIUS OF OKHOTSIMSKY

Luna 16 moonrock

For NASA and Western observers the real significance of Luna 16 lay elsewhere: it confirmed what many, but not all of them, had suspected was Luna 15’s real purpose, namely that it was a real challenge to Apollo 11a year earlier. Russia did have good grounds to celebrate Luna 16. Some of the remarks about its low cost and versatility were exaggerated and Luna 16’s sample of 105 g was tiny com­pared with Apollo, each mission of which brought back well over 20 kg. Luna 16 did not have the same capacity to search around for and select samples as the men of Apollo, for the arm would set the drill into the nearest piece of adjacent surface regardless. The Russians later exchanged 3g of Luna 16 samples for 3g each from Apollo 11 and 12. Many years later, the Russians sold 2 mg of soil at Sotheby’s in New York, fetching an out-of-the-world price of $442,500. The results of the soil analysis were published in a number of scientific papers over the following years.

List of all Soviet moon probes (and related missions)

Date

Name

Type

Outcome

23 Sep 1958

Ye-1

Failed after 90 sec

12 Oct 1958

Ye-1

Failure after 104 sec

4 Dec 1958

Ye-1

Failure

2 Jan 1959

First Cosmic Ship

Ye-1

Passed the moon

18 Jun 1959

Ye-1a

Failure

9 Sep 1959

Ye-1a

Pad abort

12 Sep 1959

Second Cosmic Ship

Ye-1a

Hit the moon

4 Oct 1959

Automatic Interplanetary Station

Ye-2

Circled farside

15 Apr 1960

Ye-2F

Failure

16 Apr 1960

Ye-2F

Failure

4 Jan 1963

Ye-6

Failure

2 Feb 1963

Ye-6

Failure

2 Apr 1963

Luna 4

Ye-6

Missed moon

21 Mar 1964

Ye-6

Failure

12 Mar 1965

Cosmos 60

Ye-6

Failure

10 Apr 1965

Ye-6

Failure

9 May 1965

Luna 5

Ye-6

Crashed on moon

8 Jun 1965

Luna 6

Ye-6

Missed moon

18 Jul 1965

Zond 3

3MV

Passed, imaged moon

4 Oct 1965

Luna 7

Ye-6

Crashed on moon

3 Dec 1965

Luna 8

Ye-6

Crashed on moon

31 Jan 1966

Luna 9

Ye-6M

Soft-landed

1 Mar 1966

Cosmos 111

Ye-6S

Failure

31 Mar 1966

Luna 10

Ye-6S

Orbited moon

24 Aug 1966

Luna 11

Ye-6LF

Orbited moon

Date

Name

Type

Outcome

22 Oct 1966

Luna 12

Ye-6LF

Orbited moon

21 Dec 1966

Luna 13

Ye-6M

Soft-landed

10 Mar 1967

Cosmos 146

L-1

High-altitude test

8 Apr 1967

Cosmos 154

L-1

17 May 1967

Cosmos 159

Ye-6LS

Failure

28 Sep 1967

L-1

Failure

23 Nov 1967

L-1

Failure

4 Mar 1968

Zond 4

L-1

7 Feb 1968

Ye-6LS

Failure

7 Apr 1968

Luna 14

Ye-6LS

Orbited moon

23 Apr 1968

L-1

Failure

15 Sep 1968

Zond 5

L-1

Returned to the Earth

14 Nov 1968

Zond 6

L-1

Returned to the Earth

20 Jan 1969

L-1

Failure

19 Feb 1969

Ye-8

Failure

21 Feb 1969

N-1

L-1S

All-up test, failure

14 Jun 1969

Ye-8-5

Failure

3 Jul 1969

L-1S

All-up test, failure

13 Jul 1969

Luna 15

Ye-8-5

Crashed on landing

8 Aug 1969

Zond 7

L-1

Returned to the Earth

23 Sep 1969

Cosmos 300

Ye-8-5

Failure

22 Oct 1969

Cosmos 305

Ye-8-5

Failure

18 Nov 1969

KL-1E

Failure

19 Feb 1970

Ye-8-5

Failure

12 Sep 1970

Luna 16

Ye-8-5

Returned samples

20 Oct 1970

Zond 8

L-1

Returned to the Earth

10 Nov 1970

Luna 17/Lunokhod

Ye-8

Landed rover

24 Nov 1970

Cosmos 379

LK

LK test

2 Dec 1970

Cosmos 382

KL-1E

Block D test

26 Feb 1971

Cosmos 398

LK

LK test

27 Jun 1971

N-1

[LK, LOK]

Failure

12 Aug 1971

Cosmos 434

LK

LK test

2 Sep 1971

Luna 18

Ye-8-5

Crashed on landing

28 Sep 1971

Luna 19

Ye-8LS

Orbited the moon

14 Feb 1972

Luna 20

Ye-8-5

Returned samples

23 Nov 1972

N-1

LOK

All-up, with LOK (failure)

8 Jan 1973

Luna 21/Lunokhod 2

Ye-8

Landed rover

2 Jun 1974

Luna 22

Ye-8LS

Orbited the moon

28 Oct 1974

Luna 23 (failure)

Ye-8-5M

Crashed on landing

16 Oct 1975

Ye-8-5M

Failure

9 Aug 1976

Luna 24

Ye-8-5M

Returned samples

WHERE ARE THEY NOW? LOCATION OF SOVIET MOON PROBES

These are the current locations of Soviet moon probes:

In solar orbit

Name

Date of lunar flyby

Distance from moon (km)

First Cosmic Ship

4 Jan 1959

5,965

Luna 6

11 June 1965

160,935

Zond 3

20 July 1965

9,219

In eccentric Earth orbit

Name

Date of lunar

Distance from

Final orbit

flyby

moon (km)

(km)

Luna 4

5 Apr 1963

8,451

89,250-694,000*

* There are reports that Luna 4 was eventually perturbed into solar orbit. Impacted on the moon’s surface

Name

Date of impact

Coordinates

Location

Second Cosmic Ship

14 Sep 1959

39°N, 1°W

Marsh of Decay*

Luna 5

12 May 1965

31°S, 8°W

Sea of Clouds

Luna 7

7 Oct 1965

9.8°N, 47.8°W

Kepler, Ocean of Storms

Luna 8

6 Dec 1965

9.8°N, 63.3°W

Ocean of Storms

Luna 15

21 Jul 1969

17°N, 60°E

Sea of Crises

Luna 18

10 Sep 1971

56.5°E, 3.57°N

Apollonius

Luna 23 6 Nov 1974

*Also its upper stage, place of impact not known. On the moon’s surface, intact

13°N, 62°E

Sea of Crises

Name

Date of arrival

Coordinates

Location

Luna 9

2 Feb 1966

64.37°W, 7.08°N

Ocean of Storms

Luna 13

24 Dec 1966

18.87°N, 62.05°W

Ocean of Storms

Luna 16 landing stage

20 Sep 1970

0.68°S, 56.3°E

Sea of Fertility

Luna 17 landing stage

17 Nov 1970

38.28°N, 35°W

Bay of Rains (1)

Luna 20 landing stage

21 Feb 1972

3.53°N, 56.55°E

Apollonius

Luna 21 landing stage

15 Jan 1973

25.9°N, 30.5°E

Le Monnier Crater (2)

Luna 24 landing stage

18 Aug 1976

12.8°N, 62.2°E

Sea of Crises

(1) Also Lunokhod; (2) also Lunokhod 2.

In lunar orbit

Name

Date of arrival

Equatorial plane

Luna 10

3 Apr 1966

71.9°

Luna 11

27 Aug 1966

27°

Luna 12

25 Oct 1966

15°

Luna 14

10 Apr 1968

42°

Luna 19

5 Oct 1971

о

О

Luna 22

6 Jun 1974

19°, then 21°

Returned to Earth from the moon’s surface

Name

Recovery

Landing location

on Earth

Luna 16

24 Sep 1970

80 km SE of Dzhezhkazgan, 47.4°N, 68.6°E

Luna 20

26 Feb 1972

Kazakhstan, 48°N, 67.56°E

Luna 24

21 Aug 1976

Surgut, Siberia, 61.06°N, 75.9°E

Returned to Earth after circling the moon

Name

Recovery

Distance over moon (km)

Landing location

Zond 5

14 Sep 1968

1,950

Indian Ocean,

32°38’S, 65°33’E

Zond 6

17 Nov 1968

2,420

Kazakhstan

Zond 7

8 Aug 1969

2,000

Kazakhstan

Zond 8

20 Oct 1970

1,100

Indian Ocean,

730 km SE Chagos

The Automatic Interplanetary Station passed the moon at a distance of 6,200 km on 6th October 1959 and returned to the vicinity of the Earth, but no attempt was made at recovery.