The Impact of PLAAF Modernization

The highlights of PLAAF modernization are:

■ Aircraft have improved in terms of overall performance, particu­larly in regard to longer-range fighter-bombers, but the total force has shrunk in size.

■ Munitions for air-to-air and air-to-surface operations are greatly improved as less capable air-to-air weapons and ground attack weap­ons such as dumb bombs and cluster bombs are supplanted by mod­ern guided weapons.

■ Electronic attack capabilities have improved.

■ Training and tactics have improved.

■ Supporting systems such as early warning, C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence), and battle manage­ment systems have been improved.

Specific examples of PLAAF improvement include:

■ fourth-generation fighters (the Su-27, J—10, Su-30, and J—11, called third generation in PLAAF doctrine ) that are equipped with modern avionics for targeting and electronic countermeasures and that enable employing precision air-to air and air-to ground munitions17

■ longer-range upgraded variants of the B-6 medium bomber employ­ing long-range cruise missiles

■ new air-to-surface weapons such as long-range land-attack cruise missiles for medium bombers and fighter-bombers, and shorter-range near-precision and precision weapons

■ Modern early warning, surveillance, and battle management systems to facilitate control of forces.

To fully understand the effects of PLAAF modernization, the role of the Second Artillery must also be assessed.18 The Second Artillery’s ability to threaten base operations has continued to grow substantially, meaning that the U. S. ability to reliably generate fighter sorties from close-in bases will be chal­lenged during the period of time that the Second Artillery’s force persists in substantial numbers. This would occur in cases where the conflict is of suffi­cient importance to China to substantially draw down the Second Artillery’s missile forces by firing the missiles and potentially engaging in attacks in sev­eral countries.19 The mere existence of these capabilities in Chinese hands cre­ates a number of challenges, alters the way that all informed parties view oper­ations in the region, and provides a means of challenging the U. S. style of air operations as conducted in the early phases of a serious conflict since the end of the Cold War.

Given these improvements, the potential impact of PLAAF moderniza­tion on the three games can be considered, along with possible actions these improvements cause the United States to take in response to those problems if it is playing that particular game. The ranges of actions are representative of possible U. S. actions within these games and are not exhaustive or reflective of official U. S. policy. The PLAAF’s impact on the Game of Influence is outlined briefly below. Table 14-1 highlights a few of the major impacts of the current PLAAF modernization and the significance within the game, plausible strate­gies the United States might adopt, and concrete steps the United States could take to implement the strategies. This is intended to be illustrative and to pro­vide an overview of the actions the United States could take and of the impli­cations of those actions.

Table 14-1. The Game of Influence Impact of People’s Liberation Army Air Force Modernization Significance of Action within the Game Plausible U. S. Strategic Approach for Counter Plausible Future U. S. Actions within the Game Provides extended operational area for fighter aircraft Introduces People’s Liber­ation Army (PLA) airpower into new regions Increase the operational area of deployed U. S. forces Increase area of respon­sibility forces to counter threat [ubiquity of pres­ence] Provides improved air – to-air and air-to-surface capabilities and effec­tiveness Changes perceived PLA effectiveness by key ob­servers in military domain Improve U. S. tactical en­gagement effectiveness to influence opinion Improve air combat capa­bility; counter munitions’ effectiveness Serves as a symbolic statement of military competency Creates a perception of military/technical parity to broader audiences Be perceived as better than opponent within a military context relevant to key audiences Create/leverage capabili­ties relevant to key popu­lations

For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on the three aspects of the PLAAF modernization that have the most significant consequences for the United States: extended areas of operations and influence, an increase in per­ceived effectiveness of operations, and a statement of military competence by operating the PLAAF as a modern air force.

The PLAAF’s extension of its area of potentially effective operations is significant because of the resulting increase in the PLAAF’s relevance to situa­tions of importance to other nations in the region. PLAAF fighter-bombers can now extend their capabilities to not only Taiwan, but to significant regions in other countries. Fighter-bombers have also begun to extend their reach to sea areas that hold interest for countries including Japan and South Korea, as well as to countries in the South China Sea.20 Observers in Australia, where there are keen concerns over the Northern Territory and approaching sea areas, have noted Chinese air assets’ increased range of influence. Other nations, nota­bly Singapore, also view increased range of Chinese forces with concern. To address other nations’ concerns, the United States may be required to simulta­neously exert influence in more regional areas. When this requirement is com­bined with qualitative changes in the Chinese force, both a larger and more capable U. S. force will be necessary to maintain situational relevance. A force that would operate quite successfully in an array of combat situations is sim­ply not relevant if it is not present when and where the adversary is operating. The presence requirement drives a buy-in force posture for the United States to maintain presence in areas where it retains interests.

The increased effectiveness of the Chinese force also influences how mil­itary technical experts who assess operational implications of Chinese capabili­ties in a narrow military sense perceive the Chinese air force. The effective­ness of the PLAAF in one-versus-one and small “M-v-N” combat engagements forces the United States to allocate more of its own forces and potentially to operate them in a manner acknowledging its opponent’s capabilities.21 This might translate into different numbers of fighters allocated to certain situa­tions, a need to allocate the most capable fighters to the theater (even if bas­ing them forward might expose them to damage or destruction from the Sec­ond Artillery), or, in the longer run, improving key U. S. capabilities to operate under conditions where U. S. assumptions of large-scale conflicts are no longer obtainable.22

Aside from their direct operational impact, these combinations of capa­bilities are also important because they are viewed by outside observers as symbolic of China’s rise to the level of a great military power. Possible U. S. approaches to address these capabilities focus on strategies to maintain the desired equilibrium in theater by stepping up the presence of U. S. forces. This increased presence is intended to be visible to allies and to clearly demon­strate relevant defensive capabilities to both the general populations and to the national decisionmakers. These U. S. capabilities are generally associated with protecting key partners from attack, as the PLAAF represents a force of signifi­cant utility in a variety of coercion campaigns against neighboring states. The U. S. counters to these Chinese capabilities need to be relevant to the observers to have a significant impact. For instance, threats of escalation must not only be viewed by the Chinese as credible and potentially successful, but they also need to be seen as credible and sufficient for protection by the nations seek­ing protection. Defensive postures are probably easier to demonstrate and to have accepted by other nations, provided they are compatible with potential sensitivities about U. S. military presence in the region. In practice, this is a difficult line to walk, and building a useful narrative about when, where, and how U. S. forces would be used requires a careful alignment of strategies, capa­bilities, and operational concepts that can prove difficult and time-consuming to enact. Table 14-2 offers a perspective of impacts and likely fall-outs from the Battle over a Third Party game.23 Because this game is a military problem where the array of forces and strategies is associated with protection of a key party, standard military metrics are relevant.

Table 14-2. The Battle over a Third Party Game Impact of People’s Liberation Army Air Force Modernization Significance of Action within the Game Plausible U. S. Strategic Approach for Counter Plausible Future U. S. Actions within the Game Makes U. S. assured air superiority more chal­lenging in key periods of operations Creates potential for greater damage to third party from air attack Disrupt sortie generation; engage forces absent general air superiority Emphasize longer-range forces and munitions, raids, and disruption operations early in the conflict Makes routine air opera­tions (coercive air opera­tions and intelligence, sur­veillance, and reconnais­sance ) within China’s air­space much more difficult Creates potential for greater damage from China’s air operations as U. S. counterforce and disruption capabilities are eroded Shift to operations in area where U. S. advan­tages persist; empha­size easier targets not requiring persistence; emphasize focused deep operations Engage forces outside most heavily protected areas; configure forces to have a total capacity and rate of target servicing to meet defense objectives Renders effective opera­tions by the third party military much more difficult Creates greater demand for U. S. contribution Have U. S. forces take over the missions from the third party Deploy more forces or deliver capabilities that compensate for loss of friendly sorties

The key PLAAF improvements focus on three elements: significant air- to-air capability improvements that make air superiority operations signif­icantly more difficult (especially in cases where force ratios might be unfa­vorable because of airfield suppression by the PLAAF); increased overall effectiveness resulting in a decrease in the U. S. ability to operate in contested airspace which makes deep attacks and intelligence, surveillance, and recon­naissance (ISR) operations more difficult and costly; and greater PLAAF offen­sive impact that is largely directed at the third party military which prevents it from effectively waging a defense. Although the area where the PLAAF can operate extends the battlespace, the focus of the Battle over a Third Party oper­ation is still most likely to be within areas where other Chinese forces can play a substantial role. The cases where the PLAAF is the only military arm play­ing are degenerate cases where the Chinese would be forgoing much of their advantage.24

Improving PLAAF capabilities manifest themselves as an erosion of U. S. capabilities to prevent PLAAF operations from inflicting damage both on the third party military and on U. S. forces. The detrimental impact of PLAAF operations on the third party air forces and air defense assets also increases the demands on U. S. forces. The PLAAF’s ability to challenge opponents in the air-to-air arena and the addition of better munitions and improved tactics for air-to-surface operations mean that the force is much more capable in opera­tions where relatively simple tactics and operational concepts can be employed to facilitate actions by other forces. The PLAAF thus becomes an enabler for other operations, rather than strictly a supporting force. The PLAAF defen­sive improvements mean that its opponents’ offensively focused air operations reliant on relatively free access to airspace over some or all of the key battle areas become problematic. The great difficulty of maintaining loitering ISR in a modern air defense environment, as well as the difficulty in engaging mobile forces such as mobile rocket and missile forces that are themselves enablers of air operations, creates a problem for U. S. planners.

The potential paths that the United States might take to counter these improvements are quite distinct, and the underlying logic is predicated on very different strategies. For instance, the United States might shift attention from a comprehensive protection strategy to operations that seek to defeat a cer­tain class of attack such as a land or sea invasion, deeming acceptable a some­what higher degree of damage from early air attacks. The United States might likewise emphasize operations against fixed targets supporting a set of com­bat operations. It might also consider strategies that punish the adversary for attack by engaging in either vertical or horizontal escalation, employing force in a manner to its relative advantage.25

Each of these notional approaches requires a different emphasis on force types. Some approaches may focus on destroying certain classes of targets (such as land forces), while others may focus on fixed targets supporting com­bat operations.26 Improving this capability with strictly shorter-range forces requires an extremely robust (i. e., hard and redundant) basing posture with forces close to the defended areas to minimize logistical vulnerabilities. Absent that type of posture, forces capable of longer-range combat operations (air-to – air and air-to-surface) are required since they might minimize the threat from Second Artillery units and still retain some combat capability in both domains during the period of greatest Second Artillery threat.27

The Great Power Game is particularly interesting because of the compe­tition’s comprehensive nature and the scope of the competition that locks the participants into a fundamentally antagonistic relationship across all aspects of the competition. When viewed from this game perspective, PLAAF changes in the quality/quantity mix of forces, area of influence, and rate of develop­ment become the central issues of its modernization. The Great Power Game is also the least desirable of the games because, as table 14-3 reveals, it tends to lock parties into adversarial relationships and is more prone to drive arms race dynamics because of the pervasive nature of the competition and the strong and broad military character of many interactions.28

Table 14-3. The Great Power Game Impact of People’s Liberation Army Air Force Modernization Significance of Action within the Game Plausible U. S. Strategic Approach for Counter Plausible Future U. S. Actions within the Game Produces challenges to the U. S. within the region because of quality/quan – tity mix of forces In 1-v-1 and M-v-N engagements, U. S. domi­nance is not assured Increase number and quality of forces; focus on robust operations near enemy homeland; redefine the game Shift U. S. forces from other regions; secure more bases and harden posture in region; invest in new long-range forces that operate without tactical air dominance Results in increased area of influence because of expansion of effective air operations Increase of adversary’s influence results in a de­crease of U. S. influence Increase presence Create more robust force postures; focus on long – range projection missions into area; emphasize in­creased naval operations Results in a rate of change in improvements and a slope greater than the U. S. response Potential allies make pro­jections based on visible trends Increase visible U. S. actions to have trend­lines shift in U. S. favor; have allies committed to operations to decrease aggregate change; lock-in allies to prevent sudden shifts in relations Engage in tit-for-tat programs and operations; focus on combined allied and U. S. operations; forge formal security relationships

The quantity/quality improvement of the PLAAF (along with improve­ments in munitions) means that it has evolved into a modern force that is capable of challenging in many dimensions the ability of the United States to conduct the sort of dominating combat operations it desires. The challenge to the balance may not be per se about engaging in combat in a specific area, but about the perceptions of dominance and perceived changes in capabili­ties across the broad spectrum. For instance, the assessment of the changes in the few vs. few and one-on-one combat outcomes become significant because these outcomes, whether favorable or unfavorable, are widely viewed as sur­rogates for engagements between the powers at a variety of levels. But sim­ple superiority may not be adequate given either the plausible employment scenarios or the narrative used to describe the situation. In order to address this, the United States might alter the deployment of its forces, alter the qual – ity/quantity mix of its forces, or even redefine the game as to render moot the specific discussion of force performance. This could be accomplished by con­centrating on Chinese homeland targets or forces outside of China without emphasizing the U. S. forces that are being matched. Such an approach might mean that the United States would accept a decrease in tactical air dominance by utilizing different strike options, focusing on secure strike against targets at all depths, building more robust basing, and allocating more forces. This approach also might build new combat systems to reestablish superiority in the air-to-air arena and build the basing infrastructure for those cases. The United States also might go in a completely new direction by trying to redefine the game it is playing.

Another challenge to the United States is the number of potential states that feel they may be forced to deal with the PLA threat as the effective range of PLAAF operations increases. To allay these concerns, the United States might need to aid in the defense of a wider geographic area. The purpose for the United States is not only to defend that area in wartime; it is to provide reassurance in peacetime to prevent erosion of confidence in U. S. abilities. Defense of the rel­evant areas needs to be plausible to the interested parties and must cope with the problem of third parties wanting to be supported by the United States while simultaneously not wanting to be antagonistic to China. Increasing U. S. pres­ence in several ways would be a reasonable top-level description of U. S. actions here. This increased presence might be manifested in a host of operations that demonstrate the U. S. ability and willingness to commit forces to the area. To more demanding allies, the ability of the United States to commit forces in the face of the substantial Chinese challenge as well as the U. S. ability to defend the assets that the supported country deems important might be required. The specifics would need to be tailored based on the nature of the perceived chal­lenge, but could include long-range operations, maritime operations, and dem­onstrated robustness of the regional force posture in the face of attack.

The rate of change and acceleration of the change in relative capabilities define another aspect of the Great Power Game. These measures are an assess­ment of the projected capabilities of the two forces some number of years down the road. In a Great Power Game, this assessment defines the research and development (R&D), force development, and force planning futures of each side. In turn, potential allies look at the projected paths of the major powers in order to make their own investments and strategic decisions well in advance of the possible outcomes. These projections are arguably the most interesting and contentious aspect of the game, since it is about what might be and is not bound to current reality.

High rates of change and significant accelerations of that rate of change that are adverse to the United States are potentially alarming for allies, who will seek to make their way through a future based on extrapolations from near­term actions. Australia, which frames its own strategic arguments about future plans in terms of how situations might change in response to U. S. actions, is an example of a nation that is forward looking in its defense policy.29 An absence of a U. S. response to alter the changes in apparent airpower capabilities might necessitate changes in Australia’s own defense policies years before the imme­diate balance has been affected. The United States cares about these actions by allies because the overall assessment of the balance in this game is heav­ily influenced by allies whose association with the United States has not been effectively locked in by factors such as shared existential threats, and/or stand­ing alliance arrangements like the relationships typified by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) arrangements for mutual defense.30

For the United States, the implications of this sensitivity to projections are quite striking because it has significant incentives to take actions across several levels to address the revealed changes. One possible U. S. action is an essentially symmetric response of improving U. S. capabilities such that the apparent improvements in basic combat effectiveness of the opposing forces are largely reversed. However, this might initiate an ongoing arms competi­tion that can degenerate into a type of arms race if left unconstrained by other forces. Another action might be to pursue and then exercise military opera­tions with allies to demonstrate commitments in the wake of PLAAF improve­ments. Exercising forces that might be effective in combat operations tends to undercut perceived gains of the opposite side and also improves the prospect of basing and cooperation of allies in situations where the United States might need support for defense of other nations. Finally, the United States might seek to negate any Chinese gain by pursuing stronger formal arrangements to bind allies together. This binding would buffer to a certain extent the need to respond to deficiencies created by increased PLAAF capabilities by giving the United States more basing options, adding the contributions of partner mili­tary and logistical capabilities to those of the United States, and making it less likely allies will question U. S. commitments to a region.