Integrated Air and Space (Aerospace) Operations

A more ambitious and long-term force development airpower concept is “integrated air and space (aerospace) operations” (Й^—Ф). As a preface, definitional and translation issues are important. Air and space have tradition­ally been viewed as separate domains, with “near-space” occupying the realm between the two. Traditional airbreathing platforms operate in accordance with the laws of aerodynamics, and are flexible and responsive. Space systems are governed by orbital mechanics, cover a broader expanse of Earth, and in the case of satellites, offer a more continuous presence. However, with air and space being defined as a single operational medium, and with an emphasis on capabilities that blur the distinction between traditional boundaries, the term aerospace may be more appropriate than “air and space” in describing PLA fu­ture ambitions.

China’s traditional concept of airpower is centered upon air superiority (ФІЙІХ) in support of ground and naval forces. However, due to what is viewed as the near inevitable militarization of space, observers stress the need to view the air and space domains as a single realm.41 Aerospace implies that air and space function as a single, integrated medium. From a Chinese R&D perspec­tive, integrated air and space operations conceptually link two defense indus­trial organizations: aviation (^Й) and space and missiles (ffi^).

At least as early as 2002, opinion leaders called for establishment of a “national aerospace security system” (Й^й^Ф^). The PLAAF appears poised to become the country’s principal custodian of an evolving aerospace defense system.42 As PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang argued in a recent media interview, an integrated approach to aerospace operations is needed to ensure strategic dominance on the sea and ground.43 PLAAF-affiliated analysts out­line intent to leapfrog in the service’s ability to conduct integrated aerospace operations.44 With the concept of aerospace operations still in its infancy, ob­servers note that technological and legal issues constrain the pace of develop – ment.45 Nevertheless, as one senior PLAAF official noted, “space control is a reasonable extension of air control.”46

The PLA’s concept of integrated aerospace operations includes the zone between the atmosphere and outer space, known as “near-space.” Chinese ana­lysts view the near-space realm (often termed the “transatmosphere” in West­ern aerospace thought) as an area of future strategic competition. Near-space is generally characterized as the region between 20 and 100 kilometers (12.4 to 62 miles) above the earth’s surface. The 100-kilometer altitude point, some­times called the Karman Line, is a rough border dividing the earth’s atmo­sphere and outer space. The near-space realm is too high for fighter jets and too low for orbiting satellites, though winged boost-glide craft and high-super­sonic and hypersonic transatmospheric craft such as North American’s X-15 research airplane and Scaled Composites’ SpaceshipOne have transited it.47

Both the PLAAF and Second Artillery indicate their intent to establish space operations as a core competency. While writings assume space assets would naturally support air operations, uncertainty surrounds the role of the PLAAF, Second Artillery, or other entities in managing space operations, in­cluding planning, programming, and budgeting functions; satellite launch, tracking, and control; ground processing; and counterspace operations. An­other possible contentious issue could be future flight vehicles that operate in or transit all domains of space, near-space, and the atmosphere.48

Both the PLAAF and Second Artillery appear to make arguments in favor of organizational control over space-related policy, budget, and peace­time operational control. Today, China’s space assets appear to be controlled by the headquarters-level General Staff and General Armaments Departments. Requirements development and ground processing and analysis of satellite im­agery for military consumers appear to be the responsibility of the General Staff Department Second Department Technology Bureau.49

The PLAAF’s argument is premised upon the concept of integrated aerospace operations, that air and space are a single integrated medium, and that space is a natural extension of air. However, its vision appears set upon control of the entire aerospace domain (f’JS^fX). Senior prominent space and missile industry authorities associated with the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Second Academy appear to advocate on behalf of the PLAAF, arguing that aerospace assets should be concentrated under a single military service, and that a space force should be built upon the founda­tion of an air force, similar to the United States, Russia, and others.50 In addi­tion, the battlespace for air defense operations should be extended beyond the atmosphere and into space and over sea, yet integrated under a single air de­fense command organization.51 In addition to the air force, an internal Second Artillery text references a potential “Second Artillery space operations unit” (“Й^ЙІТіКнРРА) with an operational support function.52

Ownership of satellites now and in the future remains unclear. Products and services, including imagery and communications, are national assets and thus made available for military purposes. Space launch and satellite tracking and control services in peacetime appear to be under the control of the Gen­eral Armaments Department (GAD). However, the PLA likely assumes that satellite assets and perhaps even static space launch facilities could be vulner­able during a conflict. Therefore, prudence dictates that satellite reserves are in place, as well as mobile launchers, most likely derivatives of the DF-21 me­dium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). For logistical reasons, Second Artillery could be a service provider in contingency situations due to its inherent opera­tional responsiveness.

Integrated aerospace defense also includes an ability to counter foreign space-based surveillance, ballistic and land attack cruise missiles, and hyper­sonic aerospace strike vehicles in the future.53 After outlining a 15-year, three – phased missile defense development plan in 1996, China’s space and missile industry conducted successful tests in January 2007 and January 2010, thus demonstrating an ability to intercept satellites in low Earth orbit and rudimen­tary medium-range ballistic missiles during the mid-course portion of flight.54

Insufficient information is available to assess which service would be equipped with aerospace intercept systems once a viable capability is fully operational. Presumably, however, the Equipment Department of either the PLAAF or Second Artillery is overseeing R&D. One analysis explains that the aerospace defense domain would be divided along the Karman Line—the PLAAF would assume the air defense mission for threats below 100 kilometers (62 miles) while the Second Artillery would be responsible for threats above 100 kilometers.55