Conclusions

The chain of events which culminated in the death of von Richthofen form a fairly simple story. Whoever in the RAF HQ advised Captain Roy Brown to re-submit his claim on the proper form did so prematurely and then, after the publicity, could not withdraw it. The artificial situation resulted in the instruction to the pilots of 209 Squadron not to talk about the event. The secrecy, aggravated by the files being closed for 50 years, created a vacuum which was filled by rumour, speculation and pure fiction phrased for thrills. Each one fed upon the other until the truth was lost.

Dale Titler, in the foreword to his well – researched book The Day the Red Baron Died. puts it so well that the authors can pay him no better compliment than to present his words once more.

For 52 years sensationalists have filled the undocumented gaps of this day with lurid and dramatic happenings. For all it was worth, they moulded the war drama of a national tragedy and highlighted the mystery and contention. In time, the facts of this gallant nobleman’s violent finish became so enmeshed in fiction that the early war records and eyewitness accounts were submerged in a sea of fabrication.

The research conducted by John Coltman, who was killed in action with the RAF in 1942, has filled in one big gap; exactly where Captain Brown attacked the red Triplane. Then Mr A Twycross, by sending the story of his father, Gunner Ernest Twycross, to the Imperial War Museum, where­upon Mr Brad King passed it to the present authors, provided the key to exactly when von Richthofen died, and thus settled the 79 years’ old controversy as to whether he was killed in the air during Roy Browns attack and the Triplane crashed shortly afterwards or whether he died later whilst attempting an emergency landing.

With the new information provided by those mentioned above, tempered by airmanship, military organisation, trained reactions and the modern understanding of ballistics, it now seems possible to connect that fateful day’s events together in a logical manner and without significant gaps.

On 21 April 1918 the wind was blowing strongly in the opposite direction to normal. This had a definite effect upon ground speed relative to the previous days and appears to have had a significant role in the events of that morning.

Even though von Richthofen was having trouble with his guns, a novice pilot was a tempting target. To go after him was not a dirty trick; all the aces had begun as novices. Why let him gain experience and possibly become another Albert Ball, James McCudden or Mick Mannock?

Flying west at a ground speed of 135 mph (aeroplane 110 plus wind 25) against the normal 85 mph (with wind speed subtracted), von Richthofen was covering ground 50 mph faster than usual as he chased May. During his dive around or through the low mist, he appears to have made a simple navigation error of the ‘time versus distance flown’ type, and being too low down for the terrain to look like his mental map of the area, he confused two villages which, although similarly situated on the north bank of the Somme canal, were actually a mile and a half apart.

The obvious landmark which would have revealed his error, the sharp bend from west to south of the canal just before Corbie, was obscured by the trees along the sides of the zig-zags of the waterway. The present authors can attest to this; they did not see it either until it loomed up in front of their aeroplane around what appeared to be just another ‘zag’. When the quick kill became hard work, von Richthofen failed to cut his losses and head for home, that was his first wrong decision.

The attack by Captain Brown, which he skilfully countered upon hearing the first shots zip by his Triplane, was a sharp warning, but victory was so close that he, on seeing Brown’s Camel banking away towards the south-west at high speed, appears to have decided upon one more tty at May. That was his second wrong decision. The Baron saw nothing to tell him his true position, and that the heaviest concentration of anti-aircraft guns in the area was just ahead of him — not two miles away as he thought.

The crucial and unexpected bend in the river suddenly appeared a moment later. Due to the strong tail wind there was only one way out – a steep climb which included a turn of 45°, over a

CONCLUSIONS

place where the trees were not so tall.

Machine-gun fire from Sergeant Popkin and from Private McDiarmid passed behind him so he would have neither seen the smoke of the tracer nor heard the Rak-ak-ak sounds. As he topped the Ridge, the lower wing and mid-wing of the Triplane would have hidden the camouflaged 18- pounder guns from his view – ironically the very guns he and his men had been sent to the area to help find. He might have seen them if he had banked and looked down, for, from his low height, camouflage netting is not very effective.

Quite unknowingly he followed Lieutenant May’s Camel along the west side of the line of guns which was when he began to notice ground fire coming from Buie, Evans and probably Gamble. Although the Triplane’s nose was pointing north, the wings were supported by air that was travelling west at 25 mph. Thc result was the Triplane’s track over the ground was close to north-west. The ground machine gunners not only had to lead their target, they also had to aim to the west of it. In addition, the Triplane was flying so low-down that the machine guns had to be traversed and elevated rapidly to follow it. The result was the Triplane presented a complicated deflection shot to machine gunners who had not been trained for such situations. Von Richthofen skilfully avoided their bullets, although some hit his wings and/or interplane struts.

Then he made his third and fatal wrong decision. He started to climb and began following a predictable flight path heading east. He was now flying into the strong wind which greatly reduced his ground speed, for the wind was no longer ‘lowed by the trees and friction with the terrain. Worse still, he was no longer being carried sideways – he was moving in the direction that the nose of the Triplane was pointing. Therefore he became an easy target from the front, from behind and for anyone at the side who was able to calculate the angle of deflection correctly.

Gunner Buie, and possibly Evans also, had emptied their panniers, so until the empty one was taken off and a fresh one locked into place, Buie at least, could not fire again. In any event, as he himself stated afterwards, he thought the Triplane was already finished and he was not even contemplating further firing. Private Emery, up by the brickworks, was biding his time; he was well aware of the danger of firing early, missing, and giving away his position to an enemy pilot who was heading in his direction, sitting behind twin machine guns.

Half a mile south-east of the Triplanes flight path, that is on the right-hand side of its fuselage.

were the soldiers of Lieutenant Woods platoon who had exchanged tools for rifles and were firing at it. Near them were four Vickers machine guns under Sergeant Popkin, of which only one was manned. The Sergeant opened fire for the second time, having missed with his earlier burst as the Triplane flashed by and below him a couple of minutes earlier. (It is interesting to speculate that if Popkin had shot the Triplane down with his earlier burst. Brown would have had a better claim, having attacked the Triplane just moments beforehand!)

As Private Emery told Geoffrey Hine, it was AFTER he heard the Lewis guns (Buie, Evans and Gamble) stop firing and BEFORE he heard the Vickers gun start, that the Triplane gave indication that its pilot had been hit. He added that there had been a background of rifle fire all the time, and that his first impression was that one of the soldiers in Lieutenant Woods platoon had scored a hit.

The apparently clear picture becomes blurred when 1,100 feet per second is included; that is the approximate speed of sound in an air temperature of 45° Fahrenheit.

Sergeant Popkin was about 2,1(H) feet south of Private Emery, therefore Emery would not hear him beginning to fire until two seconds later. Similarly, Emery was about 3,000 feet away from Buie and would not hear him ceasing fire until three seconds after he had actually done so. Add in the wind factor which was carrying the sound away from Emery, and the delay becomes even longer, thus a hit from Popkin s machine gun shortly after he opened fire is definitely possible.

From the foregoing it can be deduced that von Richthofen was alive and well four to seven seconds after Buie and Evans ceased firing. At 85 mph he would be travelling at 130 feet per second, so in that time he would have covered 520 to 910 feet. If von Richthofen is allowed 10 to 15 seconds to descend and touch down, it can be calculated from a map that he was hit somewhere between 900 and 1,200 feet away from the 53rd Battery. This agrees with Gunner Buie’s estimate of 300 to 500 yards. The numbers fit together, not precisely, but acceptably. The bounds of probability do not need to be stretched one iota, which contrasts with other hypotheses advanced in the past for which the bounds of ‘possibility’ not ‘probability’ were considerably strained.

Who killed the Red Baron?

We have come to the definite conclusion that, despite much of what has been written over the last 80 years, the new evidence available today confirms the elimination by most earlier serious investigators of Captain Brown as being responsible for von Richthofen being shot down.

In the remote possibility that the bullet was not fired from a machine gun. it could only have come from one of the Australian riflemen of Lieutenant Wood’s platoon (see table below).They were at the right distance and angle from the Triplane. Some of them came from farming communities back home where they had helped eke out their living by shooting game birds on the wing. Leading a target was second nature to them.

By virtue of the volume of fire per second it is far more likely that the fatal bullet came from a machine gun, and the evidence, as interpreted by the present authors, indicates Sergeant Popkin. His was the only machine gun in action and firing at the right-hand side of the Triplane at that time. This agrees with the findings of Captain Bean and of the late Pasquale Carisella, and it is worth remarking that ‘Pat’ reached his conclusion by using the evidence available at the time (mid – 1960s), most of which he obtained by writing letters to every person involved whose name and address he could find.

The authors find the evidence and probabilites, based on logic, indicate that the honours belong to Sergeant Cedric Bassett Popkin.

	BROWN	BUIE	EVANS	EMERY	PLATOON	POPKIN
Was firing when Baron was struck	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Fired at R. H. side of Triplane	NO	possibly	possibly	NO	YES	YES
Fired at an acceptable angle	NO	possibly	possibly	NO	YES	YES
Ammunition included rifle bullets	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Range was suited to the wound characteristics	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES