Background and. Circumstances

Due to the bad weather which had directly followed the arrival ofJGI at Сарру on 12 April, von Richthofen had not made many flights over that part of the front from this base. He had, of course been fighting over this sector in early April when based at Lechelle, which is a little further north from Сарру. From studying maps, reinforced by those flights, he was certainly familiar with the river, the towns, the villages and the wooded areas.

All were easy to identify when seen from an altitude of 2,000 feet or more. However, from 50 feet above the ground things look very different. Virtually nothing has any quickly recognisable outline or form. The woods no longer have any shape; they are just trees seen from the side. The villages have no shape either, they arc just a collection of houses, or ruins of houses. Worse yet, objects pass so quickly that there is no time for a second look just to make sure.

On 21 April there was an additional confusion factor. The wind, which normally blew from the west, was on this morning blowing strongly from the east. Lieutenant May, followed by the Baron, was heading west which means that the wind was hurrying them both along relative to the ground. A pilot who is mentally conditioned to the time taken for landmarks to pass by in a 110 mph aeroplane flying into a 25 mph headwind, can easily be a long way ahead of the place on earth where he believes himself to be when flying with a 25 mph tailwind. The distance over the ground that he would normally cover in three minutes now takes one minute, 44 seconds. With one village looking like another, no distinct forest outlines at this height and no front-line trenches within view on either side of the river (remember, there were only strong points at this stage, front­line trench systems had not been dug), it would be very easy to confuse Vaux-sur-Somme for Sailly – le-Sec. (Both of the present authors have flown over the area and were initially confused. This was around 400 feet and the Baron would have even less chance at around 50 feet.) Both villages are about the same size, both lie on the north side of the canal, and in both cases the canal has turned to flow north-west. Sherlock Holmes found the fact that the dog did not bark in the night to be of singular significance. Something similar was about to happen, or better, not to happen.

In April 1918 the important difference between the two villages was that Sailly-le-Sec was only half a mile inside Allied-held territory whereas Vaux-sur-Somme was two miles inside. The main night-time supply route to the Allied forces in the Sailly area was the Corbie-Bray road which runs past the Sainte Colette brickworks atop the Morlancourt Ridge. This road was a favourite target for German fighter pilots who regularly strafed it at dawn to catch breakdowns or stragglers, plus the odd attack during the day if cloud cover was favourable. The strong anti­aircraft defences along and nearby this road were very well known to the German Army Air Service. Von Richthofens subsequent actions
strongly suggest that he took a distant village on the north bank of the canal to be Sailly-le-Se. whereas it was actually Vaux. On this hypothes:- von Richthofen, in quite unknowingly having proceeded beyond the genuine Sailly-le-Sec. was in absolute violation of his strictest precept: never to fly low down over enemy territory. He hac never done so before and there was no reason f * him to do so today. Moreover, in terms of anti­aircraft fire, he was fast approaching the mo-r heavily defended sector for miles around.

In addition to the strong cast wind and the badly manufactured ammunition in his gum. another adverse factor entered the situation for the Baron. Presumably because of the hazy air du: morning, he was wearing flying goggles with special lenses. From their shape, they probably had been captured from an Allied airman. Their brigr: yellow double layer lenses considerably improved forward vision (one of the authors has inspected them) through haze, and by eliminating glare made moving objects stand out against a stationer- background. But, being flat, they had the disadvantage of eliminating peripheral (side vision. Like Lieutenant May and Captain LeBoutillier, to see either side von Richthofen he^ to turn his head considerably; to see directi’, behind he had to turn his aeroplane.

The later fanciful journalistic stories of Brov. – seeing the glint of von Richthofens eyes as he glanced back at him are simply not true. Looking at someone wearing the goggles today from ju<t a few feet away, the eyes are totally obscured.

It was at this point that Lieutenant Punch (windmill FOP) saw the two aircraft, both at tree – top height, approaching his position from the ea-: He spoke to Gunner Rhodes who cranked the handle of the field telephone and asked for the duty officer at the 53rd Battery.

The village ofVaux-sur-Somme now appeared right in front of May and the chasing Baron. Thi – should have been the moment for the latter и turn back, but like the singular behaviour of the dog in the Sherlock Holmes story, he did not rea.: to the situation. This tends to confirm that Richthofen had the erroneous impression that the village was Sailly-le-Sec and that he was in the relatively clear area which began a short distance behind the Allied forward defence positions.

From the testimony of the few people who sav. the next part of the action, it appears that von Richthofen came within normal accurate firing distance of Mays Camel at about this time. Judging by the events which followed, the most probable explanation why a man who was renowned for his
accurate shooting failed to dispose of the easy target in front of him is that his left-hand gun was the only one in proper working order and it jammed the instant he opened fire. When the breech-block of the gun was later opened on the ground, it was found to contain a split cartridge case. This was a fault which could not be diagnosed accurately in the air and a pilot could easily expend useless effort in the hope of clearing it. It fits with the puzzlement of some of the ground witnesses as to why the Triplane s pilot did not take advantage of more than one instance when the Camel was at his apparent mercy. As to why von Richthofen continued the chase, the most plausible reason is that the right-hand machine gun was still operable. However, for the sole two or three rounds it would fire at a time to be effective, he needed to reduce the range considerably and, in the total absence of another hostile aircraft, he still had opportunity to do exactly that.

Lieutenant-Colonel J L Whitham (CO 52nd Battalion), in his command post in Vaux, could hear the noises of the air battle up above the patches of mist which lingered over the village and nearby canal. Spent bullets were dropping from the sky from time to time. He had a front seat in the Stalls and was about to receive a surprise such as occurs when the stage magician waves his magic wand. Suddenly before his eyes and those of the garrison of Vaux a British biplane followed by a German Triplane appeared at roof-top height. Until then they had been out of sight below the tree-tops along the river and canal banks to the east. The British aeroplane was so low down that it had to turn sharp right to miss the church tower. Some of the surprised soldiers took aim with their rifles and fired at the German machine. In early 1933, Whitham replied to his friend С E W Bean (a war correspondent), following an enquiry:

lam very definite on the point that two ‘planes only came down the valley. A heavy fog or river mist, with a curtain of about 150 feet, had rested in the valley of the Somme for several hours and prevented our view of the air fight which we could hear plainly… towards the east, ie: over Sailly – le-Sec and Sailly Laurette. Both these ‘planes came from the east and downwards, and they flattened out as they passed over Vaux-sur-Somme, less than 100 feet from the valley level. It seemed certain that both would crash into the spur immediately west of the sharp bend of the Somme where it turns southwards towards Corbie, but we saw the leading ‘plane rise at the spur, closely followed by the triplane. The triplane seemed definitely under control of its pilot as it passed over Vaux-sur-Somme and it is difficult to credit the assertion [1] that the pilot was fatally wounded by a shot fired from the air prior to his passing over Vaux.

I cannot say whether Richthofen was firing at the Camel at this stage – the noise of both engines was very great – but I heard machine guns firing from the ground further west down the valley.

After a short excursion heading north towards the Ridge, the British Camel turned west again just as though the pilot had realised that to make the steepish climb in front of his pursuer was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. The Triplane followed the manoeuvre, cutting corners as it went, and step by step reducing the distance between them. It was obvious that an ‘old hand’ was trying to catch a novice. The puzzle was why the ‘old hand’ had let pass two or three excellent opportunities to down the Camel. In those moments too, the usually cool and methodical Baron must have been feeling frustrated and quite busy in his cockpit, which must have reduced the amount of time to glance around and ascertain his exact position. Just moments earlier, the Camel pilot had almost led him into a church tower!

The chase at low-level through the wisps of mist along the south face of the Morlancourt Ridge had begun. One possible reason why von Richthofen made an exception to his normal operational limits and headed deeper into Allied territory is that he saw two Triplanes some distance away and at a higher altitude to his left (south) near Hamelet (not to be confused with Le Hamel) which would provide him with ‘top cover’. Leutnant Joachim Wolff, the pilot of one of them reported having seen von Richthofen. There is no record whether Oberleutnant Wilther Kaijus, the pilot of the second Dr. I, also saw him.