German Technical Exchange with Japan: A Brief Overview

It should not be surprising given Japan was allied to Germany as part of the Axis powers that there were numerous requests for and the exchange of war materials between the two countries. What was perhaps surprising was that the bulk of the exchange would go one way with very little going in the opposite direction.

Japan’s relationship with German aircraft and manufacturers went as far back as 1915 when the Isobe Kaizo Rumpler Taube, a copy of the Taube aircraft, was built and flown by the Imperial Flying Association. In the 1920s and 1930s, Heinkel and Junkers were the dominant German Firms, both of whose designs were much in demand by the Japanese. Other German firms such as Dornier, Rohrbach and Hansa-Brandenburg also sought to make sales prior to the start of World War 2. Before the war the Japanese military also entertained contacts with British, French and American aviation firms.

However, with the advent of hostilities and Japan having sided with the Axis powers, the country no longer had access to this broad spectrum of aviation companies and aircraft designs. Of course, through their acquisitions of aircraft prior to the war and their subse­quent study of aircraft design, the Japanese were capable of producing their own indige­nous aircraft with a good measure of success. Prior to the war beginning, and continuing through until 1943, the Japanese obtained a number of German aeroplanes. Some would see series production such as the Biicker ВІІІ31 Jungmann basic training aircraft, while others were obtained for evaluation or as comparison aircraft to be pitted against Japanese planes.

Formal agreements between Japan and Germany did exist during this time, but it was the signing of the Economic Agreement of January 1943 and, later, the Manufacturing Rights Agreement of March 1944, which paved the way for increased German techni­cal exchange. These agreements, however, restricted Japan to only acquiring technology that Germany’s war machine was fielding operationally. This clause denied Japan access to the advanced research being con­ducted by Germany’s war industry. In addi­tion, there were some in the German industrial sector and government who were reluctant to share the fruits of their labours with Japan. Nevertheless, Japan was able to obtain a considerable amount of war mater­ial for her army and navy forces. A third agree­ment, the Patent Rights Agreement drafted in December 1944, was meant to protect tech­nological advancements and prevent confis­cation of patents. The Japanese dragged their feet on the agreement and it was never signed.

It would take a decree by Reichschancellor Adolf Hitler in January 1945 to remove the restrictions of the 1943 and 1944 agreements, following which Japan had full access to the German military industry including experi­mental projects. However, by this time it was too little, too late, because both Germany and Japan lacked the capability to ship material to Japan by sea or by air.

Perhaps surprising given the very long list of technical exchanges that left Germany for Japan is that there was very little that went the other way. Germany was content to receive currency in exchange for the designs and data – Germany needed raw materials for her war industry. One of the very few examples of Japanese technology that was acquired by Germany was a single Nakajima E8N float plane (codenamed Dave by the Allies) that, oddly, ended up disguised in British markings and was used by the German merchant raider Orion. The only other occasion when Germany attempted to acquire a Japanese aircraft, the Mitsubishi Ki-46 (codenamed Dinah), the Japanese ensured that the nego­tiations with the Luftwaffe for a manufactur­ing licence went nowhere.

Japan would receive all manner of war goods and data from Germany during the war and it would make for a long list were every­thing to be included. As such, the list pre­sented here is limited to aircraft and selections pertinent to the experimental nature of the subjects in this book.