Replies to Arnold’s teletype re development of camouflage tabulated, April 17,1943

The replies from the different theater commanders were collected and are paraphrased below as far as bombardment types were con­cerned:

London. – Subject appreciable increase in speed, removal of camouflage from heavy bombardment types favored. Removal same from underside only of medium types favored. Bases reasonably safe from surprise attacks due to modem radar so value of passive defense of camouflage in air is deleted.

Alaska. – With 20 miles per hour increase in speed, believe non camouflage of airplanes more desirable in this theater if nets are available for camouflage of aircraft on ground. Believe speed increase due to weight reduction rather than glossy surface.

Brisbane. – At this time do not desire removal of camouflage from airplanes for this theater.

Cairo. – Further camouflage not required as long as airplanes given dull neutral color not reflecting sunlight.

4th and 11th Air Forces, – Desirable removal of camouflage all types except transports.

Hawaii. – Recommend no paint on top, sky blending camouflage on bottom, propellers to be painted antiglare. In ac cordance with background, top to be camouflaged locally.

As a tentative conclusion, it was suggested that:

Due to the early warning and vectoring capabilities of radar, camouflage is losing its importance when weighed against the cost in speed and weight.

A compromise along the following lines was suggested for bombardment types:

(1) Reduce the weight of the camouflaging materials to as low a weight as possible consistent with changing the metallic sheen of the ship to a less conspicuous appearance.

(2) Allow the surface to be roughened to a minimum extent to somewhat reduce reflection consistent with the smoothness of surface required for low drag. Some reflection could be tolerated if a minimum of roughness was obtained,

(3) Following documents noted as having important bearing on subject:

(a) Final report on Experimental Camouflage Finish for Aircraft, dated March 8,1943 (Eglin Field).

(b) Memorandum Report on Camouflage of Aircraft in Flight, dated October 27,1942 (Eglin Field).

(c) Report on Conference on Special Camouflage for Anti-Submarine Aircraft at Langley Field, Virginia, dated September 16,1942, (Eglin Field).

These comments and recommendations were withheld from further distribution until all answers had been received from the theater commanders. However, a memo to the Bombardment Branch of the Requirements Division, the Air Support Branch (of the same divi­sion) stated:

Six replies had been received with five widely varying answers. If these answers were typical of the other replies to be received, camouflage would have to be provided for each type of theaters requirements. To date, a sky blue to dull drab camou­flage had been desired by two of the theaters. Camouflage had to fit the terrain condition, the tactical tasks being performed and the passive type of protection required for the theater.

Further remarks could not be made until all replies had been digested. However, it appeared that it would be necessary to provide camouflage for each theater as necessary to fit the particular situation.