SCIENCE AND UPGRADES

In April 1970. after Apollo 11 (the "G” mission) and Apollo 12 (the first of the “H” missions), the most dramatic and hazardous halt to the program occurred with the near-fatal loss of Apollo 13. But four months later, in August, NASA made one of its boldest decisions. In the face of that near disaster in space, dwindling public support, and a rapidly declining budget, it decided to skip the final "IF’ type mission, press on with upgrading the total ‘system” (hardware, software, science, and operations) and finish the program with three full-up ".)” missions to the most significant scientific sites on the Moon. This upgrade from "IF’ to ’T’ included, in particular, the lunar roving vehicle, which in turn greatly increased the exploration capability, especially to investigate several different geological areas miles away from the LM in different directions, significantly more scientific equipment and experiments, and importantly, a mobile TV camera to view and record the distant activities of the crew so that MCC (and the public) could participate in the exploration to an unprecedented degree. As a result, a single ".I” mission that used an LRV to investigate multiple geological areas at a particularly worthy landing site became almost equivalent to sending a series of “II" missions to individual sites. Consequently, the ".I” mission erews became very proficient in "planetary field

geology”.

Of the thirty original astronauts, none had any formal geology training NASA had to teach pilots how to be proficient planetary field geologists; adding science to engineering as a primary discipline. Again, the training was superb; and because of their previous spaceflight experienee, the mission commanders played a major role in planning the training for their crew. After many hours of practical and effective geology training (classroom, laboratory, and field), the results justified the process, because it can be argued that during the “F‘ missions the performance of the eight "pilot-geologists” (in orbit and on the surface) was equal to the performance of the only "geologist-pilot” who reached the lunar surface on Apollo 17. which was the final mission of the program.

But this commitment to the "F‘ missions was surely one of the most rewarding decisions of the Apollo programme. It would have been a lot easier, safer, and cheaper to have finished up with the final two "H” missions as scheduled, because if one of the final missions had failed then the programme would surely have been brought to an end and "Apollo’’ would have passed into history as a "failure’’. In this regard, the lunar roving vehicle was the final element in the overall configuration of a complete "system” for human planetary exploration. For the future of Apollo and for human planetary exploration in general, in August 1970 NASA management truly made the “right” decision!

But as time passes, hardware for lunar exploration will come and go; software will eomc and go; and astronauts, cosmonauts, and the staff who support them in training and in flight will come and go. Although the future will see more automation and robotics, the manner in which manned spaceships fly to the Moon (and return!), like wheels rolling the roads and ships "sailing” the seas, will be the same for most likely decades to come. This exceptional book describes "how” for those who contemplate, for those who plan, and for those who fly; and also for the historical record.

David R. Scott Commander, Apollo 15 Los Angeles, California January IS, 2011

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