A calculated but accepted risk

Timing is crucial in order to escape from pending disaster, but so is design. On Apollo 1, the 100% oxygen environment, bare electrical wires, poor communica­tions, and a complicated hatch opening system all contributed to the loss of the crew on the pad during a demonstration test prior to launch. The first Soyuz seems to have been launched with inherent problems and the design of the para­chute deployment system was at fault. On Soyuz 11, the fact that the crew did not have separate pressure suits for launch and entry meant that they lost conscious­ness and died when the atmosphere escaped rapidly from the descending crew module with the landing following the preplanned automated sequence.

No matter the precautions, training, and practice, there is always the potential for the unexpected or “bad luck” to affect a mission. To date (2012), no crew has actually been lost in space, all crews having begun the recovery process, although three crews (Soyuz 1, Soyuz 11, and Columbia STS-107) have not survived it. Loss in space may well happen, but if and when it does, is the program mature enough to handle that type of tragedy? Are the politicians or public willing to accept that type of sacrifice? Only time will tell.

In reviewing 50 years of human space endeavor, what continues to shine through are the outstanding technology, skill, and professionalism that has safely carried most of the crews from launch to landing. With the development of new spacecraft, it will be interesting to see what escape options the crews have. When so-called private, commercial, and “tourist” flights arrive, as they surely will, how will the participants approach the fact that space flight is, and always will be, inherently dangerous?