Twenty-First-Century Dilemmas of Progressive American Air Power

Progressive sentiments have continued to guide America’s appli­cation of air power in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but the results have not matched the rhetoric. Both conflicts have evolved into struggles against irregular units in which ground combat has dom­inated. Enemy fighting techniques have varied from guerrilla war­fare, replete with suicide terrorism, booby traps, and roadside bombs, to occasional massed uprisings. Generally, when the en­emy chooses to fight, civilians are likely to be close at hand, which increases the chances of bombing mistakes even with the sophis­ticated technology now available in the likes of Predator drones and satellite-guided bombs. In Iraq, an estimated 1,560 civilian deaths resulted from air strikes between 2006 and 2008.46 In Af­ghanistan, according to un assessments, air raids killed 116 civil­ians in 2006, 321 in 2007, and 522 in 2008.47

The trend is especially discouraging in Afghanistan, where ef-

forts to compensate for the lack of ground troops with air power have given way to increased restrictions on bombing near civil­ians, and in Pakistan, where American drones have attacked Tal­iban and al Qaeda forces in the tribal areas on Afghanistan’s bor­der.48 America’s success in stabilizing Afghanistan depends in large measure on how public opinion—both locally and throughout the Muslim world—perceives America’s use of force. Afghan Presi­dent Hamid Karzai has condemned American air strikes on sev­eral occasions, noting that civilian casualties continue to under­mine the support of the Afghan populace for the American war effort.49 Episodes of collateral damage in Pakistan, where air strikes that killed fourteen terrorist leaders have also killed an estimated seven hundred civilians, have produced intense anti-American protests in an already fragile nation that possesses nuclear weap­ons.30 Aware of the negative impact of civilian losses, Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents have tailored their tactics accordingly, and work hard to guarantee that the news media broadcast bombing mistakes to the world at large.

Besides dealing with collateral damage, American political lead­ers and air commanders today still face the same great problem that confronted Roosevelt and his air chiefs—determining how bombing that destroys the desired targets will speed the end of a conflict. The odds that current precision-guided munitions will hit their desired target are exponentially higher than they were for the high explosive and incendiary bombs carried by в-17s and B-29S. Yet determining the ultimate impact of such bombing that does strike home—whether the target is a supply of roadside explosives, a suspected nuclear facility, or a notorious terrorist leader—remains incredibly difficult. The task is especially ardu­ous when confronting enemies, reminiscent of the Germans and Japanese in World War II, who are utterly committed to the cause that they support. Historian Robert F. Futrell, in his analysis of the Air Force in the Korean War, commented on this problem that remains a great dilemma for those who tout air power’s ability to achieve rapid, inexpensive success: “Air intelligence could tar­get physical objectives for attack and could calculate the physi­cal damage done to the air targets by air strikes, but it was not able to determine what significance a particular physical objec­tive might have to the Communist regime nor could it project the effect of a given amount of destruction upon the hostile regime’s primarily political decision to end the fighting.”51

The progressive vision that has shaped American air power dur­ing the past eight decades has created enormous challenges for it in the years ahead. That vision portrays bombing as a rational, just military instrument that helps achieve victory more quickly, with less destruction and fewer lives lost—on both sides—than surface combat. This notion of efficiency has had an enduring ap­peal to American air commanders and presidents alike. In many respects those political chiefs have found air power’s siren song even more enticing than have the airmen, for it seemingly offers political leaders a way to eliminate a perceived evil cheaply, and without having to inflict undesired pain. In the classic phrasing of Johns Hopkins professor Eliot Cohen, “Air power is an un­usually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without com­mitment.”52

Much like President Roosevelt, Presidents George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush all turned to bombing to help fight wars that each viewed as a just crusade, and each believed that air power’s progressive ideals blended well with the war’s righ­teous cause. President Barack Obama has also relied on bomb­ing to thwart America’s enemies.53 The presidents have all tried to achieve success by risking the fewest American lives, and re­lying on air power has risked fewer Americans than turning to armies or navies. Yet the war aims sought and the type of war en­countered have profoundly affected bow air power could be ap­plied. Roosevelt pursued unconditional surrender in a total war. That political objective condoned such methods as area bomb­ing to produce victory as rapidly as possible. His successors have all pursued goals far more circumscribed in conflicts far more constrained. Despite having vastly more sophisticated technology available, presidents can no longer apply it in unlimited fashion— limited goals demand limited applications of violence. In the age of cnn and al Jazeera, collateral damage is an American enemy’s best friend, and perceptions of damage inflicted often count more than reality. The limited goals sought in the wars that America is most likely to fight will demand not only extreme precision from air power, but also, in many cases, infallibility, and that is a very tall order for any type of military force.

Ultimately, tying air power’s progressive ideals to a wartime crusade leads to a strategy based more on faith than sound reason­ing. Episodes of collateral damage will continue to offset positive pronouncements of air power accomplishments made by Amer­ican leaders. Although proponents may proclaim that air power can end wars quickly and cheaply, skeptics—in particular, non – American skeptics—can argue that such progressive views ap­ply only to proponents who are also U. S. citizens. The emphasis on the speedy conclusion of hostilities and a small loss of life ap­pears ideally suited to Americans, who have the world’s greatest air power and have displayed a willingness to use it, in the last two decades, as their first choice of military options.

To some observers, the espoused progressive notions are mor­ally bankrupt, and really equate to assuring the smallest possible loss of life for American combatants, rather than guaranteeing no civilian casualties—as was indeed the case during the last years of World War II. Author David Halberstam summarized Opera­tion “Allied Force” against Serbia as follows: “The war may have started with Milosevic’s brutality against the Albanians, but what much of the world was soon watching was a big, rich, technolog­ically advanced nation bombing a poor, little country, and doing it in a way that showed its unwillingness to accept casualties it­self.”54 Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, the air com­mander responsible for conducting Allied Force, seemingly con­firmed that assessment by listing one of his primary objectives as “zero losses. … I wanted to destroy the target set and bring this guy [Milosevic] to the negotiating table without losing our kids.”55 Many of the world’s onlookers likely nodded at Short’s admis­sion, and believe that such emphasis will continue to guide appli­cations of American air power.

Many around the globe also discount American assurances that precision bombing will not threaten noncombatants. Although American political and military leaders continue to make such promises, bombing mistakes consistently prove them wrong. The more limited the conflict, the greater the progressive rhetoric seem­ingly becomes, and the greater the probability that “collateral damage” will undermine the political goals sought.

The key problem in stressing progressive air power as an as­pect of American military prowess is that it does not suit war’s basic nature, much less the types of war that America now faces. As Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz observed, the fundamental nature of war is constant, a swirling mix of vio­lence, hatred, and enmity; calculated reason; and probability and chance.56 No amount of technological wizardry can remove those components, no matter how sophisticated the technology, or how sound the intentions of those who apply it.

Clausewitz added: “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy with­out too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.”57 More than half a cen­tury after Spaatz stood on the deck of the Missouri in Tokyo Bay, American air commanders and their political leaders still control the world’s mightiest air force. As long as they continue to rely on it to help achieve their objectives in war, they must emphasize Clausewitz’s realism, not the progressive notions of Mitchell and his successors. In the end, progressive air power is an enticing idea waiting to be victimized by conflicting goals, uncooperative ene­mies, and the imposing momentum that every war generates.

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