Obtaining the approvals

Although the Sputnik launch energized Wernher von Braun, Bill Pickering, some of the Army brass, their disciples, and many others throughout the United States, Pres­ident Eisenhower at first remained tranquil. During the days immediately following the launch, he downplayed the event’s importance. On 9 October, he sang that tune with gusto when he told newsmen at a press conference that “the effect of Sputnik does not raise my apprehension, not one iota.”3

That attempt to downplay the significance of the Soviet Sputnik failed to sway the press, and their editorials quickly became loud and critical. With the Sputnik launch,

CHAPTER 8 • GO! JUPITER C, JUNO, AND DEAL I 215

the Soviets convincingly demonstrated that they could deliver atomic weapons over great distances long before the United States had that capability. They were, in both fact and popular perception, well ahead of us in brute force long-range missilery.

Two days after the satellite launch, Russia announced that they had exploded a “powerful hydrogen device of new design” at a very high altitude. The combination of the satellite launch and their successful weapons test served to embolden the So­viets, and the tempo of their saber rattling increased markedly. Premier Khrushchev sent letters to members of NATO threatening them with H-bomb destruction, deliv­ered via long-range ballistic missiles, if they allowed any American missile bases to be established on their territory. Indications of Soviet intent to attack Turkey intensified. The Soviets even threatened the United States with missile retaliation if we interfered directly in the struggle between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic.

That situation was not eased when the Soviets launched a second satellite only a month after their first launch. Sputnik 2, weighing an incredible 1121 pounds and carrying a live dog, was launched on 3 November 1957. It triggered a flood of further criticism of the Eisenhower administration. He and his officials were faulted for letting the Soviets surge ahead of the United States in rocketry and, by straightforward extension, the broad areas of technology and science. The American public, egged on by a raucous press, embarked on a binge of critical self-analysis. All of a sudden, many things Russian, including their educational system, were viewed as superior to the U. S. equivalents.

A few days after the second Sputnik launch, acting under public pressure, Eisen­hower finally knuckled under. He gave Secretary of Defense McElroy authorization to proceed with the Army’s plan. The press promptly reported that the Army had been instructed “to proceed with the launching of an Earth Satellite, using a modified Jupiter C.”4

As a side note, criticism at that time of President Eisenhower’s reluctance to increase the priority of a satellite launch has softened over the intervening years, as the true state of overall Soviet technological prowess in the 1950s has become better understood. In the totalitarian state that existed then, the Soviets were able to commit immense resources on a selected few projects. The choice of those projects was based on military and propaganda value rather than any consideration of direct benefits to Soviet society or scientific aspirations.

Thus, the Soviets were able to pull off a whole series of space spectaculars ahead of the United States for awhile, including being first in space, first to launch a live animal, first to the neighborhood of the Moon, first to impact the Moon, first to take pictures of the backside of the Moon, first human in orbit, and first to orbit two astronauts in a single spacecraft. They did that by learning of our intentions and mounting crash

OPENING SPACE RESEARCH

programs behind their curtain of secrecy to beat us. Eventually, however, the ability of the United States to sustain a long-term high technology program won the race to place humans on the Moon. Since then, the United States has dominated the scene in both the scientific and manned space arenas.

Because of his access to believable, highly secret intelligence information, Eisen­hower was convinced even in 1957 that the Soviets actually lagged the United States in overall technical prowess. His primary error was in underestimating the propaganda value of the first achievements in space.5 6

Although news of the oral instructions to proceed with the Army program resulted in initial rejoicing in Huntsville, that was cut short when the official written directive was received the next day. It stated that the Army was to proceed with “preparations” for a launch. Calls by General Medaris confirmed that the order withheld authority to actually launch. It seemed that the thinking in Washington was to give the actual launch authority only if the Vanguard program continued to falter. If the Vanguard program became productive, the Army would be instructed, in effect, to “put their toy on the shelf.”

At that point, an irate General Medaris dictated a wire to the Army’s research and development chief, General James M. Gavin, threatening to quit if ABMA did not receive a clear-cut order to launch. Both von Braun and Pickering were in the office with him as he prepared that wire, and they insisted that Medaris include their similar sentiments.

It was only then that the Army brass in Washington issued a clear authorization for the launch. That occurred on Friday, 8 November 1957.