A White House-NASA Argument: How Best. to Go to the Moon

The first stop on President Kennedy’s two-day tour to inspect the facili­ties being developed for Apollo was the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. There he was briefed by Wernher von Braun on the approach that NASA had finally chosen for carrying out the lunar landing mission, called lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR). This approach had emerged in the first half of 1962 as NASA’s preferred approach to getting to the Moon, but the White House Office of Science and Technology and its exter­nal advisers on the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) were at the time of JFK’s trip embroiled in a dispute with NASA over the wisdom of that choice. As von Braun described the LOR approach, Kennedy inter­rupted, saying that “I understand that Dr. Wiesner doesn’t agree with this,” and calling his science adviser to join the discussion. “Some lively dialogue” then ensued among Wiesner, von Braun, Webb, Seamans, and others; this discussion was just out of the earshot of reporters. According to Seamans, the reporters “obviously knew we were discussing something other than golf scores.” Wiesner suggests that he and von Braun were having a “friendly” talk in front of the president when Webb, who thought the two were arguing, “moved right in,” so that “what had been a friendly discussion became a real argument” as the press “watched, heard, and listened.” Kennedy ended the five-minute discussion by saying, “Well, maybe we’ll have one more hearing and then we’ll close the books on the issue.”1

Key to the LOR concept was separating the functions of the lunar landing mission between two spacecraft, rather than the single heavy spacecraft con­templated in both the direct ascent and the Earth orbit rendezvous (EOR) approach to the lunar landing. One spacecraft, designated the command and service module (CSM) , would carry the crew to lunar orbit and back to Earth; the other, designated the lunar excursion module (LEM), would carry two crew members from lunar orbit to the Moon’s surface, and then, after they had finished their exploration, back to a rendezvous in lunar orbit with the CSM. After the crew and lunar samples were transferred to the CSM, the LEM could then be discarded. Since the LEM would operate only in the atmosphere-free vicinity of the Moon and would not have to carry the

The presidential party as President Kennedy toured the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama on September 11, 1962. Identifiable in the image, in addition to President Kennedy are (left to right) center director Wernher von Braun, NASA administra­tor James Webb, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, presidential science adviser Jerome Wiesner, and director of defense research and engineering Harold Brown. NASA associate administrator Robert Seamans, Jr. is partially visible behind von Braun. Most of those in this photograph participated in a brief but spirited debate about the wisdom of the lunar-orbit rendezvous approach to the lunar landing mission (NASA photograph).

heavy fuel and even heavier heat shield required for the return to Earth, it could be much lighter than a spacecraft that would both land on the Moon and also have to carry the crew back to Earth. This weight reduction result­ing from this separation of functions made it possible to launch the whole lunar landing mission with one Saturn V booster, rather than the two that would be required by the Earth orbit rendezvous (EOR) approach.

The LOR concept had been brought to Seamans’s attention in an impas­sioned nine-page November 15, 1961, letter from John Houbolt, an engi­neer at NASA’s Langley Research Center, who had bypassed several layers of the NASA chain of command in sending the letter. NASA in late 1961 was focusing on some form of EOR as its preferred approach to the lunar mis­sion, but Houbolt argued that the LOR approach was the better way to get­ting to the Moon before the end of the decade, was safer and less expensive, and required only one launch.2

After extended analysis of the concept, NASA’s top leaders by early July 1962 had agreed that LOR was indeed the best choice for achieving the

lunar mission by the end of the decade and were preparing to announce their decision at a July 11 press conference. In anticipation of the announcement, NASA on July 3 sent a summary of its comparison of the various options to science adviser Wiesner. By the end of the day, Wiesner called Webb “in a highly emotional state” to say that “L. O.R. is the worst mistake in the world.” Webb asked Joseph Shea, the NASA systems engineer who was lead­ing the effort to select the lunar landing approach, to go to the White House immediately; when he met with Wiesner, the science adviser called LOR a “technological travesty.”3

There were several reasons for Wiesner’s reaction.4 One was the intuitive sense that a mission that depended for its success, and for the crew’s survival, on a rendezvous in lunar orbit, 240,000 miles from Earth, would be exces­sively risky. This was especially the case since there had been no experience with rendezvous, and Project Gemini, the just-initiated effort to gain that experience, was at that time not scheduled to have its first flight until late 1963. (The first flight actually did not come until early 1965.) Given the end of the decade deadline, the choice of mission approach would have to be made before the feasibility of its key element, rendezvous, had been dem­onstrated. (This of course was also true for Earth orbit rendezvous, but if a problem developed in an Earth-orbiting mission, the astronauts could easily return home.) NASA’s engineering analyses showed that LOR was safer than EOR, but Wiesner and his staff did not trust those analyses. The principal staff person supporting Wiesner on space issues was Nicholas Golovin, who had been forced to resign his position at NASA the preceding fall and left the space agency with “bitter gall” in his throat, only to be quickly hired by Wiesner as his top staff person for space issues. Golovin was tenacious in his criticism of NASA’s choice of LOR during 1962 and became a particular irritant to the space agency as NASA attempted to move forward.

Wiesner was also hearing from the space vehicle panel of PSAC that it had serious reservations about the LOR choice. The panel had followed NASA’s planning for the lunar mission throughout the year. Members of the panel together with Wiesner met with the NASA leadership on July 6 to outline their concerns. As a result of this meeting, NASA was forced to change its message for the July 11 press conference to saying that the LOR choice was tentative and subject to further study and review.

Jerome Wiesner transmitted the PSAC views as an attachment to a July 17 letter to James Webb; in that letter Wiesner also set forth his own views. Like the PSAC panel, he was concerned about “which mission mode is most con­sistent with the main stream of our national space program, and therefore the one most likely to be useful in overtaking and keeping ahead of Soviet space technology.” In particular, Wiesner wanted more attention paid to “the ques­tion of which mode is likely to be most suitable for enhancing our military capabilities in space, if doing so should turn out to be desirable.” Wiesner told Webb that he had “reported the results of our discussions to the President.”5

Webb replied to Wiesner’s letter on August 20, listing the various studies that NASA was undertaking based on the Space Vehicle Panel’s suggestions and assuring Wiesner that NASA had thought carefully about the issues raised in Wiesner’s letter. He told Wiesner that “it is our considered opinion that the LOR mode. . . provides as comprehensive a base of knowledge and experience for application to other possible space programs, either military or civilian, as either the EOR mode or the C-5 [Saturn V] direct mode.” Webb thanked Wiesner for his and PSAC’s efforts, saying that “this con­structive criticism by eminently qualified men is of tremendous value.”6 This final comment may not have been totally sincere. The pressure resulting from President Kennedy’s “end of the decade” deadline was being felt within NASA, and continued criticism from the White House science office was a barrier to NASA’s moving ahead with its plans.

Wiesner and his assistant Golovin continued to intervene in NASA’s deci­sion process during July and August, and on September 5, a few days before the president was to visit various NASA installations, Wiesner once again wrote Webb reiterating his concerns regarding the LOR choice. Wiesner sent a copy of his letter to the president. In this letter, Wiesner called the contribu­tion of the LOR choice to the overall space capabilities of the United States “seriously questionable,” noting that any military applications of those capa­bilities “will be in the near earth environment” and that “whether manned military missions are to be either of a defensive or offensive character. . . the obvious needs for maneuverability and reasonable stay-time in orbit would require that refueling techniques be developed more or less contemporane­ously with those for rendezvous and docking.” While James Webb was sym­pathetic to using Apollo to build up overall U. S. space capabilities, his main focus in 1962 was selecting the approach that gave the best chance of getting to the Moon before the Soviets; Wiesner appeared less interested in the race to the Moon and more focused on developing near-Earth space capabilities with military relevance.7

This is where the situation stood as President Kennedy visited Huntsville and was party to the Wiesner-NASA debate. As Kennedy flew to Cape Canaveral, the next stop in his tour, he was asked what the likely outcome of the controversy would be. “Jerry’s going to lose, it’s obvious,” replied the president; “Webb’s got all the money, and Jerry’s only got me.”8

Wiesner and Golovin did not give up their fight easily and continued to contest NASA’s choice and supporting analyses in September and October. NASA finally assembled all of its analyses into a document that it hoped would be a final comparison of the approaches to carrying out the lunar landing mission and sent it to Wiesner on October 24. In that report, NASA estimated that the probability of success for any one lunar landing attempt was 40 percent for the LOR approach, 36 percent for the direct ascent approach, and 30 percent for EOR; probabilities of crew safety were 85 per­cent for LOR, 83 percent for direct ascent, and 89 percent for EOR. Wiesner and Golovin continued to question the NASA figures, but their fight was coming to a conclusion.9

The NASA report was accompanied by a “peevish” letter from Webb to Wiesner. Webb told Wiesner that “my understanding is that you. . . will examine this and you will let me know your views as to whether we should ask for an appointment with the President.” Webb’s view was “we should proceed with the lunar orbit plan, should announce our selection of the con­tractor for the lunar excursion vehicle, and should play the whole thing in a low key.” Webb said that unless he heard to the contrary, he would advise President Kennedy’s appointments secretary Kenneth O’Donnell “that nei­ther you nor the Defense Department wishes to interpose a formal objec­tion” to NASA’s going ahead with LOR. “In that case,” wrote Webb, “I believe Mr. O’Donnell will not feel it wise to schedule the President’s time and that the President will confirm this judgment.”10

As Webb wrote his October 24 letter, President Kennedy was totally involved with dealing with the problem of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and most certainly was not going to take time to referee the NASA dispute with his science adviser. Webb and Wiesner talked by telephone on October 29, the Monday after the weekend during which the Cuban missile crisis was resolved. Wiesner said that his message to the president would not be to overrule any decision NASA might reach, but rather to be sure that a full and honest assessment had been made of all the options; Wiesner still questioned whether this was the case. Webb told Wiesner he “thought it better not to go to a formal hearing or involve the President personally in the decision,” but Wiesner thought that “involving the President couldn’t be avoided” because someone was sure to ask Kennedy whether the decision was made after the best possible analysis. On November 2, Wiesner and three PSAC members met with Webb and his senior staff to go over once again the White House objections to LOR; Wiesner recommended that NASA select instead a new alternative, a two-person flight using the direct ascent approach that was being strongly advocated by the builder of the Apollo command and service module, North American Aviation. Choosing this approach would mean that North American would manufacture spacecraft that would land on the Moon, not just the ship that would ferry astronauts from the Earth to lunar orbit and back. Again NASA refused to alter its position that LOR was the preferred approach. After discussing his reservations with the president, Wiesner decided not to insist on a formal meeting with Kennedy to make a final decision.11

On November 7, the day that NASA confirmed its tentative choice of lunar orbit rendezvous and announced its intent to issue the contract for the lunar lander to Grumman Aerospace, McGeorge Bundy wrote Wiesner, saying that the “President’s conclusion on the moon method is that he would like a last letter from Wiesner to Webb saying that Kennedy “thinks the time is coming for a final recommendation and relies on Director Webb to review all the arguments and to produce that recom­mendation.” Bundy also told Wiesner that “we should make Webb feel the responsibility for a definite decision and the importance of weighing all opinions, without trying to make his decision for him.” This com­munication was somewhat after the fact, given the NASA announcement that day.12

Webb did write the requested letter to President Kennedy. He told the president that “by adopting LOR, the mission can be accomplished at least one year earlier in comparison to the EOR mode.” By this time, Webb was aware of Kennedy’s desire to accomplish the initial lunar landing at the earli­est possible date in order to give maximum assurance of accomplishing the landing before the Soviet Union did. The cost of LOR approach, suggested Webb, would be “10% to 15% less than for the EOR approach.” He told Kennedy that the decision to go with the LOR mode “had to be made at this time in order to maintain our schedules, which aim at a landing attempt in late 1967,” and that, with this decision made “we intend to drive forward vigorously on every segment of the manned lunar landing program.”13

With NASA’s November 7 announcement and Webb’s letter to Kennedy, NASA now indeed had all the pieces in place to “drive forward vigorously” on Project Apollo. Kennedy’s approach with respect to the LOR decision was again typical of his management style as president. He welcomed a wide variety of views being expressed while decisions were being made, but sel­dom if ever forced on an operating agency of the executive branch a course of action with which its leadership disagreed. If Kennedy felt that a wrong policy was being pursued, he was more likely to remove the agency head than insist on his carrying out a White House-imposed perspective. Now it was up to NASA to deliver on its commitments.