Special Space Review

Beginning in late June 1962, the BOB began a review that was intended to lay out in a consistent format the five-year space programs of the Department of Defense, NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and, although it could not be acknowledged at the time, the National Reconnaissance Office, the organization developing and operating U. S. reconnaissance satellites, the very existence of which was highly classified. This review was in response to President Kennedy’s specific request “for a consolidated presentation of the space programs and estimates of all agencies” and “that 1964 estimates for space programs be given an especially critical review.”

According to Willis Shapley of the BOB, who was in charge of the review, one question that prompted the review was a White House “reeval­uation of whether the Apollo program should really proceed.” It is not clear whether it was the president himself who was raising this question; given his interest just a few months later to push for an earlier date for the first lunar landing attempt, this seems unlikely. More probable was that his budget, technology, and policy advisers, who were in general more skeptical of the value of Apollo than was the president, were making sure that Kennedy recognized the full implications of his space commitment. In addition, there were short-term concerns in mid-1962 about a possible recession, talk of a temporary tax cut, and a desire to avoid an unbalanced federal budget; this meant that Kennedy was paying particular attention to controlling rapid increases in spending in discretionary areas such as space and defense.32

By August 15, the BOB had compiled some 250 “data sheets,” one for each of the principal space projects of the government. These were put into two loose-leaf binders and, because intelligence satellite programs were included, classified at such a high level that only relatively few people inside the gov­ernment were cleared to possess the binders. Shapley recalls that he was “not too proud” of the review, “because it was really pretty bureaucratic.”

The BOB did prepare a late August “draft staff report” based on the review. The report noted that “the central decision to be confirmed or modified is whether the manned lunar landing program should proceed at an optimum pace as contemplated in present NASA plans, or whether a deci­sion should be made to stretch out the program to avoid as great an increase in expenditures in 1964 and 1965.” The report examined the short-term budget impacts of slipping the target date for the first landing attempt until late 1968. It concluded that “under all feasible alternatives, barring a com­plete reversal of the MLL [manned lunar landing] and other augmented space program decisions of May 1961 . . . substantial increases in expendi­tures appear unavoidable in 1964 and 1965.” The staff report mentioned that this situation had been pointed out as the decision to accelerate the space program was being made a year earlier; the BOB had noted that the decision “was a long term commitment involving increasing expenditures for a period of several years.” At the end of the section of its report dealing with NASA, the BOB recommended a course of action that recognized “that nei­ther the total fiscal situation nor the space program alternatives and implica­tions are clear enough now to permit a definite decision on the program and budgetary guidance to be given to NASA.” The BOB recommended that “the issue should remain open until the final 1964 budget decision period in November or early December.”33

As the BOB was finishing its review, James Webb was once again reminded of President Kennedy’s concern about the rising costs of the NASA program. On August 15 Kennedy sent a brief memorandum to Webb, asking him about press reports that the cost of the new Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston had increased from $60 million to $123 million. Kennedy asked: “Is this correct? Who are the architects and the builders and under whose control is the Space Center building to be put up?” Webb replied on August 18, saying that the costs Kennedy was quot­ing were those in a statement by Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), who was questioning “the prudence with which the space program is being administered” and implying that “the increase in cost. . . resulted from a lack of budget discipline.” Webb said that “the figures quoted are substan­tially correct; the implications are not,” and provided a lengthy explanation of the reason for the higher cost figure. This explanation did not satisfy President Kennedy. In a note to budget director Bell, the president said that it seemed to him that the cost of the new center was “excessive,” and the cost increase “does raise the question of funding of the entire program. This needs the most careful continuing scrutiny.” Kennedy asked Bell for his “suggestions on the recent appropriations for this space program— what programs are essential and desirable and how we can make them meet the cost estimates more precisely.” He added: “This program has so much public support that unless there is some restraint there is a possibility of wasting some money.”34 This tension between Kennedy’s desire to be first in space and his concern over the very high costs of Apollo was to run throughout 1962 and 1963.