Why Did the Nixon Administration Select the NASA Shuttle?

On November 24, 1971, Richard Nixon had indicated his preference for a “more modest option” with respect to the space shuttle, and again on December 3 had said “yes” to the OMB proposal to work with NASA to examine a smaller, less expensive shuttle design. Yet when the final decision on which shuttle design would be approved was communicated, and most likely made, by George Shultz and Cap Weinberger, it was NASA’s full capa­bility shuttle that won the day. The evidence suggests that there were three primary reasons for that choice.

One reason was the importance to the White House of a continuing program of human space flight as a symbol of U. S. space leadership. Cap

Weinberger in August 1971 told President Nixon that not moving ahead with some major post-Apollo space effort would be a “mistake,” arguing that such a decision “would be confirming, in some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining credence at home and abroad: that our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward, reducing our defense commitments, and voluntarily starting to give up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superiority.” Nixon had written on Weinberger’s memo­randum “I agree with Cap.” In making its best case for shuttle approval, NASA had argued “man has learned to fly in space, and man will continue to fly in space. This is fact. And, given this fact, the United States cannot forego its responsibility—to itself and to the free world—to have a part in manned space flight. . . For the U. S. not to be in space, while others do have men in space, is unthinkable, and a position which America cannot accept.” As he met with Fletcher and Low on January 5, 1972, President Nixon asked the NASA leaders if they thought that the space shuttle was a good investment. They of course responded positively, but Nixon, echoing NASA’s argument, then added “even if it were not a good investment, we would have to do it anyway, because space flight is here to stay. Men are fly­ing in space now and will continue to fly in space, and we’d best be a part of it.”18 While, as OMB and OST were arguing, a smaller shuttle launched a few times a year would have kept the U. S. human space flight program alive and would have been a useful symbol of U. S. space leadership, clearly a large shuttle launched on a frequent basis would be a much more potent indication of that leadership.

A second reason for the decision to approve the full capability shuttle was President Nixon’s interest in its national security uses. John Ehrlichman in

a 1983 interview suggested that “what the military could do with the larger bay in terms of the use of satellites” and the fact that “the space shuttle would have the capability of capturing satellites or recovering them” had “a strong influence on me” and “weighed into my attitude toward the larger shuttle.” He added “I feel it is valid to say it also weighed into” the president’s evalu­ation of the shuttle. Nixon’s interest in national security uses of the shuttle was well known as final decisions were made, and the president discussed them with Fletcher and Low at their January 5 meeting. As Fletcher and Low met with Cap Weinberger and Jon Rose on March 3, 1972, to discuss NASA’s decision on using solid rocket motors to boost the shuttle orbiter off its launch pad, Weinberger reminded the NASA leaders that “the President’s strong interest in retaining the military capability” was an important factor in “confirming our decision on the larger size” shuttle.19

The third and most immediate reason for the choice of the NASA shuttle was the anticipated short-term employment impact of that choice in par­allel with Richard Nixon’s 1972 reelection bid, particularly in Southern California. The evidence in support of this assertion is conclusive. Aerospace unemployment had emerged as an important political issue in early 1971, particularly after the congressional cancellation of the supersonic transport program. Meeting with Flanigan and Weinberger in May, the president dis­cussed “what could be done about high unemployment areas with specific emphasis on California.” Nixon “indicated a very great concern about the California area and the high level of unemployment among technically – trained individuals.” The White House created a “California Employment Project” to address this issue in a systematic way. In June 1971, even before the shuttle decision process reached its final stage, Cap Weinberger told a California politician “I am sure that whatever is done will be largely based in California.”

On November 24, as he made his initial decision on the space shuttle, President Nixon had commented to Ehrlichman: “Jobs—right, John? Do it in terms of jobs. It ought to be in California.” Ehrlichman recalled that the issue of shuttle-related employment in Southern California “was a very important consideration in Nixon’s mind. . . I can recall conversations about that, which were highly persuasive. . . You must not underemphasize that ele­ment, that employment element, in Nixon’s decision [on the shuttle], the whole manned space program.” When Bill Anders told Ehrlichman in late December that the NASA shuttle would create more short-term jobs than the OMB alternative, the reaction was “OK, that will be the one” chosen. In preparing President Nixon for his January 5 meeting with Fletcher and Low, Flanigan told him that “this program will greatly stimulate the aerospace industry.” Nixon himself, discussing his shuttle approval with his political adviser Charles Colson a few days after it was announced, noted that “in Florida and California this [approving the shuttle] is a big deal. It will save the aerospace industry.” A few months later, he told a delegation from New York lobbying for the shuttle contract to go to Grumman’s Long Island facility that “I’ll take the heat for putting the money there [on the space shuttle contract] rather than the ghettos and all that sort of thing, but then by God we’d better at least get a little credit for it. This is jobs. I mean that is really what is at stake here, jobs.”20