Seeking DOD Support

Fletcher lunched with Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard on October 19. It was Packard, with a background in high-technology indus­try, who was the most senior DOD official dealing with space issues, rather than Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Fletcher found that Packard had “two general points to make” with respect to the shuttle. The first was that Packard personally felt “very uneasy” about the three requirements laid down by those at lower levels within DOD that were driving the shuttle design—“the cross-range requirement, and payload [weight] requirement, and the size requirement.” Packard “felt that the cross-range requirement might have been an artificial one” and “that if it were causing difficulties, it could easily be modified.” Fletcher assured Packard that the payload bay width “came primarily from NASA and not the Air Force, but that the length probably came from the Air Force.” Packard “knew quite well which program caused the length difficulty” (the successor to the then highly classified Hexagon photo-intelligence satellite program) and sug­gested “that something could be done about it.” Fletcher and Packard also agreed that “the payload [weight] requirement was somewhat arbitrary at this point.”

The fact that Packard suggested that there was flexibility in the national security requirements had levied on the shuttle was likely surprising to Fletcher, since both the DOD representatives on the DOD/NASA Space Transportation Systems Committee and Air Force Secretary Bob Seamans and Assistant Secretary for Research and Development Grant Hansen had been adamant in their pressure on NASA to meet those requirements. DOD support was seen by NASA as a key to White House approval of the shuttle, and this had been a major driver of NASA’s determination to pursue a shuttle design that met all the DOD requirements. So Packard’s flexibility was not exactly an asset in the final stages of the shuttle debate; rather, it suggested that the top leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including Packard and Director of Defense Research and Engineering Johnny Foster, were not yet fully committed to supporting NASA’s preferred shuttle on national security grounds.

By October 1971 NASA’s engineers had come to recognize that “whereas the initial request for a 1500 n. m. [nautical mile] cross range capability originated as an Air Force requirement, it became evident with increased depth of study that a substantial degree of aerodynamic maneu­vering capability at hypersonic and supersonic speeds is fundamental to the operation of the orbiter.” So even if DOD were to relax its cross­range requirement, NASA would still want a delta-winged orbiter that was capable of such maneuvers.21 In contrast, Packard’s suggestions that “something could be done” about the DOD-imposed payload bay length requirement of 60 feet and his view that the payload weight was “arbi­trary” would influence NASA’s thinking during the final stages of nego­tiations over shuttle design.

Packard’s second point was that NASA’s approach to selling the shut­tle “was all wrong.” Packard suggested that the real reason for the shuttle “has to do with national security and an intangible thing which might be called ‘men’s presence in space.’” Packard suggested that he and Fletcher put together a team “to develop a rationale for the shuttle.” He thought “it is probably desirable to write a letter to the President indicating recent prog­ress on the shuttle development, incorporating perhaps the rationale. . . and asking for a chance to explain it to him in person.” In reporting this conver­sation to Low, Fletcher indicated that it was important for NASA that any rationale developed on the basis of NASA-DOD effort “includes all of the essential points that NASA wants to make” and “doesn’t become unduly military in its flavor.”22

Following his conversation with Fletcher, Packard quickly convened a meeting to begin the process of developing a revised shuttle rationale. Attending it were Fletcher and Low from NASA, Packard, Foster, Seamans, and Under Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas, who was also the director of the National Reconnaissance Office. As a result of the meet­ing Foster, thought to be a recent convert to supporting the shuttle, was charged with preparing a paper to be used within the executive branch and the White House to support the shuttle. Low suggested that “this single event is probably the most important in NASA’s ability to move out with this [shuttle] program. Without DOD support, we would not have been able to do it. If Fletcher and Laird together can go to the President to seek Shuttle support, we just might get approval.”23